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Effects of Right-Wing Populist Political Advertising on Implicit and Explicit Stereotypes

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Abstract. We investigated the effects of antiforeigner political advertisements on implicit and explicit stereotypes. While stereotypical associations may become automatically activated (implicit stereotypes), individuals can reject these thoughts and decide not to use them for an overtly expressed judgment (explicit stereotypes). We hypothesized that even if citizens negated stereotypical content, advertisements might still affect implicit stereotypes. This hypothesis was tested using an experiment where participants ($N = 186$) were exposed to zero, two, four, or six stereotypical advertisements. The results showed that stereotypical advertisements did not influence explicit stereotypes but did influence implicit stereotypes, even in critical recipients who negated the stereotypical content.

Keywords: political advertising, implicit stereotypes, negation, right-wing populism, dose-response
In 2012, the posting of a political ad by the right-wing populist Austrian Freedom Party (FPÖ) led to cries of public outrage and protest in the media. The poster, accusing Moroccans of being criminals, called for their expulsion from Austria and stated that “patriotism” was to be favored over “Moroccan thieves”. Other right-wing populist parties throughout Europe employ similar accusations or calls for action against minorities in their campaigns. Examples include, but are not limited to, the Swiss People’s Party (with slogans such as “Maria instead of Sharia”) and the German NPD (“Get home well!” accompanied by a photo of Muslim women walking down a street).

The present study investigates the effects of exposure to the mediated “criminal foreigner” stereotype in right-wing populist political advertising. Until now, the measurements implemented have mostly relied on overtly expressed (i.e. explicit) judgments. For example, citizens may be asked whether they perceive foreigners as dangerous, aggressive, or criminal (explicit stereotype; e.g., Dixon, 2007). But stereotypical associations may become automatically activated in memory, irrespective of whether a person considers them to be accurate (e.g. “criminal” when thinking about “foreigners”). These automatically activated stereotypical associations are called implicit stereotypes and point to the strength of the automatic associations between a social group and attributes in memory (Greenwald et al., 2002). It is important to note that even if stereotypical associations are activated automatically, individuals can reject these thoughts and decide not to use them in forming an overtly expressed judgment (Devine, 1989). Therefore, if measurements in media effects studies remain restricted to explicit stereotypes, scholars will only detect a subset of possible negative responses. The effects of right-wing populist advertisements likely go beyond such overt effects.
Moreover, previous research has shown that implicit as well as explicit measures predict social behavior. For example, while overtly expressed judgments predict voting, implicit preferences provide added predictive value (for a review, see Glaser & Finn, 2013). This underlines the importance of considering both implicit and explicit stereotypes in political communication research (see Hefner, Rothmund, Klimmt, & Gollwitzer, 2011).

In this paper, we will show that exposure to stereotypical posters of right-wing populist parties, pairing “foreigners” with the “criminal” attribute, can prime the automatic association between both concepts in memory. Most importantly, we will demonstrate that such implicit media stereotyping effects can be documented irrespective of whether effects on explicit stereotypes exist, showing that implicit effects are observable even if individuals negate the stereotypical content during exposure.

The present research is relevant to three research areas: First, this study investigates right-wing populist political advertising effects on implicit stereotypes for the first time, expanding previous research by using implicit cognition in the context of political advertising. Second, this study enriches implicit cognition research by studying the effects of stimuli adopted from real-world advertisements. This is important because the majority of basic implicit cognition research uses highly artificial stimuli. Third, due to the possibly damaging consequences of mediated stereotypes for democracy, this study will inform politicians, critical citizens, and media practitioners about possible effects of stereotypical political advertisements.

**Mediated Stereotypes in Political Advertisements and Their Effects**

In conveying political information to the electorate, parties’ posters are very important, especially in Europe (Kaid, 2012; Seidman, 2008). Given their high visibility in public spaces, it is difficult for the average citizen to avoid them; yet, their omnipresent prominence has to
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compete with short spans of attention: While up to approximately 85% of the population is reached by political posters, only few seconds are allocated to their reception (Lessinger, Moke, & Holtz-Bacha, 2003). Due to this short time span, posters focus on short slogans, simple language, and emotional pictures.

**Right-Wing Populism and Advertising**

Right-wing populist parties make special use of these characteristics in applying emotive language and images to get their message across (e.g. Betz, 2013). During the last decades, they have grown to become relevant electoral forces in several European countries (Bos, 2012; Rydgen, 2005). Although researchers do not always agree on what exactly defines right-wing populist parties, they do concede that parties like the Austrian FPÖ, the French Front National, or the Belgian Vlaams Belang belong to it. “Populism” has often been described as employing a highly emotional and simplistic discourse that is directed at the ‘gut feelings’ of the people, or even as a distinct ideology that considers society to be separated into “the pure people” versus “the corrupt elite” (Mudde, 2004). In addition to that, the right-wing characteristic of these parties embraces a master frame of ethnonationalist xenophobia (Rydgren, 2005) which fosters anti-immigrant attitudes. Political posters are an important mean to propagate this emotional discourse to the electorate.

In terms of their influence on the public, the utilization of stereotypical accusations in these posters (e.g. the fear of “over-foreignization” within the home country and accusing immigrants of “asylum abuse”; see Ter Wal, 2002) has not gained the attention it deserves. This is troublesome because right-wing populist posters may threaten the peaceful coexistence of a country’s inhabitants by nurturing negative stereotypes. More importantly, research has neglected the possible effects of such accusations on implicit stereotypes. For example, findings
by Rieger, Frischlich, and Bente (2013) indicate that extremist propaganda is often rejected by recipients. The authors noted that this might be due to the perception of social undesirability of supporting such political positions. This underlines the importance of considering implicit stereotypes when studying the effects of right-wing populist advertising.

**Media Stereotypes**

We conceptualize social group stereotypes as cognitive structures that consist of a social group and assigned attributes (Greenwald et al., 2002); they can be understood as simplified mental images that help to interpret the huge diversity of the social world. Because individuals within a society grow up in a shared (mass-mediated) symbolic environment, (cultural) stereotypes are widely shared. When applied to outgroups, these images are often derogatory. Thus, stereotypes (cognitive structures) are central aspects of prejudice (negative attitudes) and discrimination (negative behavior) toward outgroups (Amodio & Devine, 2006; Devine, 1989; Maio, Haddock, Watt, & Hewstone, 2008; Rieger et al., 2013).

Media stereotypes are mass-mediated depictions of social groups that are repeatedly paired with specific attributes (e.g., Brown Givens & Monahan, 2005; Dixon, 2007). Although the mass media can pair virtually any social group with a specific attribute, research has focused on media stereotypes consistent with important cultural stereotypes. Research has shown that regular exposure to media stereotypes may thus contribute to the development (i.e., forming) of stereotypical memory traces; once developed, such traces can be re-activated (i.e. primed) by subsequent, albeit brief, exposure (see Dixon, 2006; Kühne, Schemer, Matthes, & Wirth, 2011). The latter is the focus of the present research.

The process of stereotyping is separated into two stages (Devine, 1989). First, stereotypical associations in memory can become automatically activated regardless of whether
someone considers them as accurate. Thus, the activation stage assumes a high degree of inevitability. In contrast, the second stage, stereotype application, represents the use of these associations in making overt judgments. Although associations are activated automatically, individuals may decide not to use them for an overtly expressed judgment (also see Gawronski & Bodenhausen, 2006; Greenwald et al., 2002; Strack & Deutsch, 2004). In contrast to that, implicit stereotypes are somewhat inescapable.

Implicit Stereotypes

The present study draws upon an implicit social cognition model of media priming (Arendt, 2013a). Implicit stereotypes are conceptualized as the outcomes of associative processes, the latter being defined as the automatic activation of associations in memory (Amodio & Devine, 2006; Gawronski & Bodenhausen, 2006; Strack & Deutsch, 2004). Therefore, implicit stereotypes constitute the strength of the automatic association between a group concept (e.g. foreigners) and an attribute (e.g. criminal). The strength of this automatic association is understood as the potential for one concept to activate another (Greenwald et al., 2002). Political advertising can activate these concepts; for example, viewing a poster that accuses foreigners of being criminal may lead to the activation of both concepts. Activation can spread from encoded concepts like specific words or visuals indicating foreigner and crime-related concepts such as thieves or drug dealer to associatively related concepts like criminal (for a discussion of spreading activation see McNamara, 2005). Most importantly, the association between concepts can be strengthened if both are activated simultaneously (Greenwald et al., 2002). For example, if the mental concepts foreigner and criminal are activated simultaneously, the strength of the cognitive association between them will increase. Thus, exposure to stereotypical political advertising can prime cognitive associations. When a
corresponding social stimulus is encountered in a situation following exposure to a right-wing populist advertisement, cues activating foreigner (e.g. when encountering a person with an accent) will also activate criminal with an increased likelihood due to the amplified strength of the automatic association.

The effect of stereotypical media content on implicit stereotypes is under researched. As notable exceptions, studies on community crime alerts (Akalis, Banaji, & Kosslyn, 2008), print news (Arendt, 2012), video games (Burgess, Dill, Stermer, Burgess, & Brown, 2011), and audio-visual fiction (Brown Givens & Monahan, 2005) have shown that exposure to media stereotypes can affect implicit stereotypes. It is important to note that some of these studies could only find an effect on implicit stereotypes, but not on explicit stereotypes (Brown Givens & Monahan, 2005; Burgess et al., 2011). Hence, a reliance on explicit stereotypes only may lead to the (wrong) conclusion that stereotypical content does not have a negative effect.

We argue that a similar implicit-explicit dissociation could be present in the realm of political advertising. Currently, no studies have investigated the effects of right-wing populist posters on implicit stereotypes. Based on the studies reviewed above, we expect the reception of stereotypical political posters to affect implicit stereotypes. Specifically, the pairing of foreigners as criminals should strengthen their automatic association in memory. Although individuals can decide not to read a specific newspaper, play a video game, read a crime alert, or watch a movie, it is difficult for citizens to “escape” political posters in the public space. Thus, studying the effects of political posters is very important as they reach a significant portion of the public. As this is the first study to investigate the priming effects of right-wing populist political advertisements on implicit stereotypes, the following primary hypothesis will guide our project:

**H1: Exposure to stereotypical political posters primes implicit stereotypes.**
Dose-response account of political communication effects. We utilized a dose response account of media effects (Arendt, 2013b). The goal of a dose-response analysis is to test the effects of different “doses” of the media content (e.g. the number of stereotypic posters participants were exposed to) on an outcome (e.g. implicit stereotypes). Using a dose-response account allows for a more realistic estimation of stimuli-effects relationships. This is especially important in advertising with its central focus on repetition. The dose-factors’ values represent ordered categories with metric scaling. Based on previous research (Arendt, 2013b) and consistent with advertising’s central focus, we conceptualized the dose as frequency of exposure.

Political posters rely on simple and strongly emotional content (Seidman, 2008) to convey the intended information quickly and effectively. In fact, right-wing populist parties’ posters consist primarily of pictures and bold, emotional information, creating a very salient media stereotype (Betz, 2013). Thus, compared to other media channels such as newspapers, media stereotypes are disseminated very blatantly in these advertisements. Therefore, we expect that even a small number of ad exposures will show an implicit effect. Nevertheless, Arendt (2012) showed that media content must have a specific dose to overcome an implicit effect threshold.

It is important to note that media effects may be nonlinear. Unfortunately, research often neglects the importance of nonlinear phenomena. Although nonlinearity is implicitly mentioned in some prominent media effects theories, experimental research generally has been using designs with only two or three conditions (e.g. one control and one treatment group). In such investigations, the dose cannot be sufficiently varied. This is problematic when interpreting results, as we are unable to conclude if different dose levels produce different effects.
Furthermore, given the fact that political parties do not rely on only one poster during a campaign, but try to disseminate their message using different motives (communicating the same general message, but “packed” differently), the question emerges about whether the total number of advertisements citizens are exposed to plays a role in their effect on implicit stereotypes. According to the implicit social cognition model of media priming (Arendt, 2013a), high dose levels should produce similar effect sizes as low dose levels. Stated differently, we predicted that even a low dose of the media stereotype primes the cognitive association in memory. However, once primed (i.e., re-activated), higher dose levels may not be able to substantially increase the strength of the cognitive association any further. Taken together, association re-activation is assumed to be binary (i.e., all or none) like the synapses of vertebrates (see Higgins, Bargh, & Lombardi, 1985, for this allegory).

H2: The effect of political posters on implicit stereotypes is expected even after exposure to a small number of advertisements (i.e., on a low dose level; H2a) and also emerges with a comparable effect size when exposed to a high number of advertisements (i.e., on a high dose level; H2b).

Damping Effect of Negation

Anti-immigrant statements such as the one applied by the Austrian Freedom Party (accusing Moroccans of being thieves) lead to cries of outrage by the public and media. That is to say that a significant portion of the society negates the content of these ads: Negation refers to an internal attempt to negate the new information (e.g. “No! This is not true!”). It is a propositional process defined as the validation of automatically activated associations (Gawronski & Bodenhausen, 2006): For example, an automatic association between the concepts “foreigners” and “criminal” might be transformed into the proposition: Foreigners are criminal.
These propositions are then assessed for their validity. Negation describes a process of reversing the “truth value” of this proposition: Foreigners are not criminal (also see Strack & Deutsch, 2004).

Taken together, individuals can easily adjust overtly expressed, explicit stereotypes when attributing low validity to the encoded information. But does the same happen in implicit media effects? The answer is not straightforward, and time is an important variable. On the one hand, associations get automatically activated in a subsequent situation (e.g. after poster exposure) when encountering a social object (e.g. a person with a foreign accent). As research indicates, such automatic activation is somewhat inescapable (Devine, 1989). On the other hand, research has shown that negation at the moment of encoding (and not in a subsequent situation) may reduce a treatment’s impact on an implicit measure (Peters & Gawronski, 2011): Validity information can be memorized at the time of encoding. When the associations, activated by external stimuli, are immediately qualified by validity information, a treatment’s impact on implicit cognition is reduced. Additionally, analyses revealed that the effect of validity information was reduced when it was presented after a substantial delay. The authors argued that longer delays may allow consolidation of the initially formed associations. Taken together, previous research indicates that it is necessary to negate environmental input stimuli during the moment of encoding. In the context of media stereotype research, this has been called the damping effect of negation (Arendt, 2013a).

It is important to note that time, intention, and cognitive capacity are essential for negation of mass-mediated content (Strack & Deutsch, 2004). If a stereotype is repeated several times (e.g. on posters during an election campaign), individuals have to negate each stereotypical depiction during encoding in order to substantially reduce the poster’s implicit effect. Although
they may negate a few stereotypical depictions, it is unlikely that individuals will do so on each occasion as they might simply not have the motivation to do so (Arendt, 2013a). This is the case with political posters, which are often encountered incidentally without a deliberate intention to reflect on their content. We therefore tested if negation partially mediates the effect of political advertisements on implicit stereotypes, dampening the implicit media effect. This is articulated in the third hypothesis:

H3: Negation dampens the effect of stereotypical political posters on implicit stereotypes.

Explicit Stereotypes

As discussed earlier, although the “criminal” attribute may be automatically activated when thinking about “foreigners,” individuals can choose not to overtly express it (e.g. due to the goal to act unprejudiced). Indeed, Valentino, Hutchings, and White (2002) established the effectiveness of priming racial cues in political advertisements. They found that the salience of priming in campaign messages reduces the effect, leading recipients to suppress their negative thoughts. This suggests that viewers who are aware of the anti-immigrant attack in the advertisement may refrain from overtly expressing a negative stereotypical judgment.

While the stereotypes in general media are subtle (e.g. newspaper articles where individuals have to read the whole article to encode the biased content), right-wing populist political advertisements portray the stereotypical information in short slogans using straightforward language and emotional pictures (Betz, 2013). These stereotypes are more obtrusive compared to other media channels, allowing individuals to recognize the biased information more easily and possibly increasing the likelihood of a correction process. Indeed, correction theories, like the flexible correction model (Wegener & Petty, 1997), assume that if individuals perceive themselves to be influenced, they attempt to correct for this presumed
impact. A correction process can produce three possible findings: (1) no effect (i.e. the correction process correctly “partials out” the new stereotypic information), (2) effect (i.e. the correction process does not work), (3) boomerang effect (i.e., the correction process works very well—even too good—which lead to an over-correction). Because prior theoretical knowledge did not allow for the formulation of a hypothesis, we decided to phrase this as a research question:

RQ1: Do political posters of right-wing populist parties influence explicit stereotypes?

Despite the fact that individuals may control their automatically activated thoughts (Devine, 1989), research shows that there is a correlation between implicit and explicit stereotypes (Hofmann, Gawronski, Gschwendner, Le, & Schmitt 2005). Theory assumes that explicit judgments are built on the strength of the automatic association between relevant concepts in memory, even in socially sensitive areas like stereotyping (Gawronski & Bodenhausen, 2006). These correlations are typically low ($r = 0.17$ in Hofmann et al.). Although not central to our research focus, we included a further hypothesis:

H4: Implicit stereotypes predict explicit stereotypes.²

Method

We utilized an experimental design with one manipulated factor (dose level). Participants were randomly allocated to one of four experimental groups (none, two, four, or six stereotypical political poster advertisements). Implicit and explicit stereotypes were measured immediately after exposure. Finally, participants answered a computer-administered survey.

Participants

A total of 186 students (79.1% female) of an Austrian university enrolled in an introductory course on communication research participated in the study. Participants’ age ranged from 21 to 50 ($M = 25.41$, $SD = 4.78$). Most participants indicated their nationality as
Austrian (67.7%), followed by German (17.7%), and Other (9.7%). Some participants did not answer this question (4.9%). The sample had a rather left political orientation ($M = 3.10$, $SD = 1.07$; seven-point scale, 1 = extremely left to 7 = extremely right), and all participants were fluent in German. They received extra course credit for participation.

**Experimental Manipulation**

Participants viewed a total of 12 political advertisements in a controlled laboratory experiment. They were allocated to one of four conditions utilizing a dose-response account of media effects where different dose levels of the stereotypical content were used (Arendt, 2013b). In the control condition ($n = 44$), participants saw no stereotypical advertisements and 12 political control advertisements unrelated to the dependent variables. In the “low dose” treatment group ($n = 51$), participants viewed two stereotypical posters and 10 control posters. The “moderate dose” treatment group ($n = 45$) received four stereotypical posters and eight control posters; the “high dose” treatment group ($n = 46$) had the strongest dose with six political posters and six control posters.

The stereotypical stimuli were constructed from original posters published by the Swiss right-wing populist party SVP. All of these consisted of four elements: (a) one photograph of a male criminal, (b) a censor bar containing one written attribute (fraudster, drug dealer, burglar, murderer, rapist, or panderer) and a typical non-Austrian name, (c) a general slogan (“Drop criminal foreigners”), and (d) a logo of the Austrian right-wing populist party FPÖ (see Appendix for examples). The use of these advertisements allowed for internal (manipulation of the media stereotype dose levels) and external (reference to existing advertisements) validity at the same time.
We tried to keep the dosage of the stereotypical content constant across all posters by depicting one male offender of approximately the same dimensions and a variable but similar vivid criminal act. Additionally, the specific posters were randomly assigned. As a result of this randomization, some differences were eliminated in the stimuli, which otherwise could be problematic for a metric interpretation of the experimental condition variable (i.e. unequal differences between the dose-values; see the dose-response account subsection). Thus it is possible to conclude that the moderate dose condition was twice as strong compared to the low dose condition.3

Measures

Implicit stereotype. The strength of the automatic association between “foreigners” and “criminal” in memory was measured using the computer administered Implicit Association Test (=IAT, Greenwald, McGhee, & Schwartz, 1998). We used the standard seven block procedure as described by Greenwald and colleagues (1998) with a total of 128 combined block trials (first block: 48 trials, second block: 80 trials). Participants had to classify words appearing in the middle of the screen (Mohamed, Achmed, Dejan, Ercan; Michael, Patrick, Stefan, Thomas; steal, kill, rape, murder; run, jump, play, love) into four categories (foreigner, Austrian, criminal, permitted). The stimuli had been used in previous studies and are thus pretested. Two of those categories were concepts (foreigner, Austrian), the other two were attributes (criminal, permitted). Categorization should be faster when the pairing of a concept with an attribute reflects a stronger association in memory A validated scoring algorithm— the D-score which incorporates data from all combined blocks, calibrates the metric by each respondent’s latency variability, and involves no adjustment beyond the preliminary deletion of latencies over 10 seconds (i.e., “built in” error penalty) as described by Greenwald, Nosek, and Banaji (2003)—
was used, with higher values indicating a stronger automatic association between “foreigners” and “criminal” ($M = 0.63, SD = 0.34$).

**Explicit stereotype.** We asked participants to estimate the prevalence of criminal foreigners among both suspected (item 1) and convicted (item 2) offenders. Participants indicated their answers on a 10-point scale ranging from 1 (0-9%) to 10 (90-100%). The measure was calculated as the mean of both indicators ($M = 4.07, SD = 1.74, ± = .84$). Participants typically do not know the exact percentages and these judgments are made under uncertainty. According to Tversky and Kahneman (1973), humans rely “on the ease with which instances or associations could be brought to mind” (p. 208) when answering such questions. Such frequency judgments have been successfully used by previous media stereotype priming research (e.g., Arendt, 2012; Dixon, 2007). It is important to note that people can correct for presumed media influences simply by choosing a lower percentage answer option (Wegener & Petty, 1997).

**Negation.** Participants were asked about their agreement with four statements measuring the negation of stereotypical content on a scale ranging from 1 = I totally disagree to 5 = I totally agree. This scale ($M = 4.14, SD = 0.88, ± = .88$) includes items constructed according to Peters and Gawronski (2011); for example, “Each time a criminal was described on a FPÖ poster, I thought ‘NO!’; this description is too stereotypical and prejudiced.” Data collection for negation took place after implicit and explicit stereotypes were measured.

**Procedure**

Participants were welcomed in a waiting room in groups of up to eight. The experimenter took them to another room where each participant sat down in front of a computer in individual research cubicles. They first saw a total of 12 political posters in random order for
10 seconds each. After exposure, participants took the IAT and answered a computer-administered survey before being debriefed and dismissed.

Data analysis

By using a dose-response account of media effects (Arendt, 2013b), the dose-factors’ values represent ordered categories with metric scaling. The goal of a dose-response analysis is to reveal a functional relationship between the doses (i.e., the number of stereotypic posters participants were exposed to) and its elicited responses (i.e., on implicit stereotypes). Nonlinear regression analysis can be used to estimate the parameters of these curves. It is important to note that linear regression or ANOVA is not able to reveal nonlinear relationships in the way nonlinear regression can.

Results

Implicit Stereotypes

We hypothesized that exposure to stereotypical posters influences implicit stereotypes (H1), that this effect emerges even after exposure to a small number of advertisements (i.e., on a low dose level; H2a), and that a similar effect size emerges when exposed to a high number of advertisements (i.e., on a high dose level; H2b). Interestingly, all treatment groups showed stronger implicit stereotypes compared to the control condition: The “low dose” (M = 0.67, SD = 0.32), t(93) = 2.37, p = .01, “moderate dose” (M = 0.66, SD = 0.37), t(87) = 2.07, p = .04, and “high dose” treatment group (M = 0.65, SD = 0.37), t(88) = 1.82, p = .02, differed significantly from the control group (M = 0.52, SD = 0.30). This supports H1. More importantly, the data appeared in the form of a monotonic function, that is, a quick onset of the effect which remains at approximately the same level. We used a mathematical model with a threshold because if we had utilized a dose level weaker than the “low dose” condition in this study, it is very likely that
we would have been able to document an effect threshold (Arendt, 2012). The presence of an implicit effect threshold indicates the absence of an effect under a very low dose level. After exceeding this threshold, the effect will emerge. Therefore, we fitted a three parameter dose response curve (a sigmoid function utilizing the standard Hill slope) to the data points, \( R = .17, R^2 = .03, F(1, 176) = 4.90, p = .03: \)

\[
\text{Implicit Stereotype} = 0.52 + \frac{0.67 - 0.52}{1 + 10^{1.36 - \text{Dose}}}. \tag{1}
\]

The curve is visualized in Figure 1. The 0.52 value describes the bottom (i.e. baseline of the control condition), whereas the 0.67 value describes the top of the curve; both are in units of implicit stereotypes. Interestingly, even a low dose produced an implicit effect at a rather strong level. The value of 1.36 points to the dose level that gave a response on the implicit measure half way between the bottom and the top. Thus, political poster exposure increased the implicit stereotype by approximately 0.15 units, which is relatively independent of whether someone viewed two, four, or six advertisements. Given the fact that the absolute values of the implicit stereotype measure can be interpreted in terms of the criteria for small (H 0.2), medium (H 0.5), and large effects (H 0.8) similar to the interpretation of Cohen’s \( d \) (Greenwald et al., 2003), stereotypical advertisements increased the already present moderate implicit bias (control = 0.52) into a comparably larger bias (estimated top of the advertising effect = 0.67). Taken together, H2a and H2b were supported.

**Damping Effect of Negation**

The third hypothesis predicted that negation would dampen the implicit poster effect. We used path analysis to test this hypothesis. In the first step, the experimental condition variable was dummy-coded, resulting in three dummies. The control condition was set as the reference.
group. Thus, each dummy (“low”, “moderate”, and “high”) represents the effect of the respective dose condition compared to the control condition. Second, we modeled negation as a mediator of advertisements’ effect on implicit stereotypes. The path model (df = 0; also including explicit stereotypes, which we will discuss below) is illustrated in Figure 2 (see upper half; standardized estimates used).

It was assumed that stereotypical content activates negation, which in turn dampens implicit stereotypes. We found supporting evidence by looking at the unstandardized coefficients. All three dose conditions produced effects on negation, $\text{Coeff}_{\text{low dose}} = 0.579, \ SE = 0.180, \ p < .01; \ \text{Coeff}_{\text{moderate dose}} = 0.533, \ SE = 0.185, \ p < .01; \ \text{Coeff}_{\text{high dose}} = 0.328, \ SE = 0.185, \ p = .08$. Negation significantly reduced implicit stereotypes, $\text{Coeff} = -0.061, \ SE = 0.030, \ p = .04$.

To formally test the damping effect of negation, we looked at the indirect effects. The indirect effect of the low dose condition, $\text{Coeff} = -0.035, \ 95\% \ CI [-0.079, -0.008]$, as well as the moderate dose condition, $\text{Coeff} = -0.033, \ 95\% \ CI [-0.072, -0.007]$, achieved significance using bootstrapping (bias corrected, 2,000 samples). Although the indirect effect of the high dose condition points in the right direction, $\text{Coeff} = -0.020, \ 95\% \ CI [-0.057, 0.001]$, the confidence interval (slightly) included zero.\textsuperscript{5}

The damping effect of negation was quite small compared to the treatment’s direct effect. This is illustrated in Figure 2 (lower half). We used the unstandardized coefficients from the path model to illustrate the damping effect. The area between the direct and total effect curves indicate the damping effect of negation, which slightly decreased with increasing dose levels although only on a descriptive level (confidence intervals overlap). The indirect effects are not significantly different from each other. Although hypothesis 3 was supported, the damping effect
of negation is small. This indicates that stereotypical advertisements influenced implicit stereotypes even in critical recipients who negate the stereotypical content during exposure.

**Explicit Stereotypes**

Research question 1 asked if the treatment influenced explicit stereotypes. This question can be tested with the path model by looking at the total effects of stereotypical ad exposure on explicit stereotypes. None of the dose conditions produced a significant total effect, \( \text{Coeff}_{\text{low dose}} = -0.153, 95\% \, \text{CI} \, [-0.727, 0.433] \); \( \text{Coeff}_{\text{moderate dose}} = 0.595, 95\% \, \text{CI} \, [-0.010, 1.231] \); \( \text{Coeff}_{\text{high dose}} = 0.106, 95\% \, \text{CI} \, [-0.534, 0.755] \). Therefore, exposure to political posters did not influence explicit stereotypes. 6

Interestingly, when looking at the direct effects of the media stereotype treatment, the moderate dose level produced a significant effect, \( \text{Coeff}_{\text{moderate dose}} = 0.757, 95\% \, \text{CI} \, [0.131, 1.341] \). Given the fact that negation significantly reduced explicit stereotypes, the absence of the moderate dose level’s significant total effect is attributable to the effect of negation. The effect of negation on explicit stereotypes (standardized \( \text{Coeff} = -.325, p < .01 \)) is higher compared to negation’s impact on implicit stereotypes (standardized \( \text{Coeff} = -.155, p = .04 \)). This is not surprising because overtly expressed explicit judgments are easier to adjust compared to implicit stereotypes. Thus, participants who negated the media stereotype more often gave a lower explicit judgment. This indirect effect of ad exposure on implicit and explicit stereotypes through negation holds true for the low (standardized specific indirect effects: \( \text{Coeff}_{\text{explicit}} = -.096 \), \( \text{Coeff}_{\text{implicit}} = -.044 \)), moderate (\( \text{Coeff}_{\text{explicit}} = -.086 \), \( \text{Coeff}_{\text{implicit}} = -.039 \)), and the high dose condition (\( \text{Coeff}_{\text{explicit}} = -.053 \), \( \text{Coeff}_{\text{implicit}} = -.024 \)). All specific indirect effects are statistically significant (all z’s > 3.64, p < .01, see Holbert & Stephenson, 2003).
Finally, hypothesis 4 predicted an influence of implicit stereotypes on explicit stereotypes. As can be seen in Figure 2 (upper half), this was supported by the data. Individuals built their explicit judgment in part on implicit stereotypes, Coeff = 1.148, 95% CI [0.608, 1.766]. Although negation mediated the posters’ effects on explicit stereotypes (i.e. decrease of explicit stereotypes), there were also significant indirect effects of political advertisements on explicit stereotypes through the posters’ effect on implicit stereotypes, i.e., increase of explicit stereotypes low dose condition (standardized indirect effect: Coeff = .053), moderate dose condition (Coeff = .055), and high dose condition (Coeff = .041), all z’s > 6.59, p < .01.

Discussion

We found that looking at political advertising from a right-wing populist party, which presented foreigners as criminals, influenced implicit stereotypes. This effect appeared even after viewing just two stereotypic posters. Negation during encoding (Peters & Gawronski, 2009) showed only a very small damping effect. This is consistent with previous research using news content (Arendt, 2013a). Results showed that stereotypical right-wing populist posters influenced implicit stereotypes even in critical recipients who negated the stereotypical content. This finding indicates that recipients seem to be somewhat defenseless against implicit media effects. On the other hand, no effect on explicit stereotypes was found. Thus, even if no effects of political ads on overtly expressed judgments can be detected, there might still be an impact on an implicit level. By using implicit measures, we were able to detect otherwise hidden political communication effects. Therefore, political communication researchers should use implicit measures as a supplement to traditional self-report measures, as they can reveal otherwise hidden media effects.

Limitations
Since we tested the effects of right-wing populist posters of a specific party, it is possible that different posters may show different effects. We already noted that similar motives and slogans are used in several European countries (e.g. Betz, 2013). We, therefore, find it reasonable to conclude that the general effect pattern is the same even if the unique content of the political advertisements differs slightly. The results of the present study indicate that the pairing of a specific social group with negative attributes such as criminal can influence implicit stereotypes. Future research could manipulate the content of the ads and investigate if there are different effects for different posters (e.g., ads with or without visuals, slogans, or candidate images).

Our method of presenting the posters for 10 seconds may be questioned since previous research has shown that the typical time of attention allocated to political posters is shorter (Lessinger et al., 2003). However, since presentation time was held constant in all treatment groups, differences in effects cannot be attributed to viewing time. In addition, negation is initiated only when sufficient time is available (Strack & Deutsch, 2004). Therefore, a shorter duration of poster viewing might lead to less negation and inhibit deeper (critical) processing of the advertisement. As our results show, negation during poster reception affects implicit stereotypes. Thus, if less negation takes place in a typical exposure setting, the detrimental consequences of stereotypical advertisements on implicit stereotypes may be even larger. This remains a question for future research, where exposure duration should be manipulated experimentally.

Moreover, our design only included a single treatment session with a maximum of six stereotypical posters. The effects measured in this study might be even larger if an actual campaign was executed with repeated encounters to similar content over a period of several
weeks. We encourage future projects to test the effects of right-wing populist posters from a longitudinal perspective, for example, by using prolonged-exposure experiments or panel designs.

Furthermore, future studies should investigate the consequences of exposure to stereotypic political advertisements on implicit attitudes and behavior, because stereotypes, attitudes (i.e., prejudice), and behavior (i.e., discrimination) are highly interrelated phenomena and are all constitutive for mental and behavioral biases toward specific social groups.

Moreover, we cannot make confident causal inferences pertaining to the relationship between implicit stereotypes and negation. Although our experimental design allows clear causal inferences regarding the treatment (i.e., the treatment causally influenced implicit stereotypes), we cannot exclude the possibility that negation may have causally affected implicit stereotypes. Nevertheless, we based our assumption on good theoretical reasoning and recent empirical evidence (Peters & Gawronski, 2011). Thus, we think that the specified causal order is appropriate. Future research should experimentally manipulate negation, which would lead to more confident causal inferences.

Finally, research should investigate the hypothesized effects with a non-student sample, as general advertising research has given proof for the fact that higher educated people—for several reasons—are more resistant against attempts of influence than citizens with lower formal education (Hodson & Busseri, 2012; Huddy & Gunnthorsdottir, 2000). In these premises, negation presumably is affected by participant’s education: Different (non-student) samples may show less negation during exposure and thus could show even stronger effects compared to the student sample of the present study. However, this remains subject for future research as well.
Finally, future research should examine if there are more powerful ways to reduce detrimental political communication effects on implicit stereotypes, which operate “under the radar” of recipients. Most important in this regard is whether negation training before encountering stereotypical posters can effectively reduce or even eliminate the impact of advertisements on implicit stereotypes (see Ramasubramanian, 2007).

Conclusions

The discussed limitations notwithstanding, our study is the first to investigate dose-dependent effects of political posters on implicit stereotypes and the damping effect of negation. It clearly expands research on implicit cognition to the study of political advertising. Also, our study further validates implicit cognition research by using externally valid, real-world ads. By doing so, we can deliver a clear message to politicians, citizens, as well as immigrants about the potentially precarious effects of such ads.

Taking into account the growing number and popularity of right-wing populist parties and their excessive use of anti-immigrant slogans, questions about the implications for society and democracy need to be addressed. By trivializing hostile and possibly xenophobic thoughts via means of political advertising, anti-immigrant resentments are presumably more easily adopted by the public, possibly making it socially more acceptable to attack, victimize, and accuse foreigners of crimes and wrongdoing. Against this background, our results seem worrying: We found significant effects of right-wing populist political posters on implicit stereotypes, even for citizens who critically negated the stereotypical information. Because implicit stereotypes are a central aspect of prejudice and discrimination, targeted research effort is undoubtedly needed.
We opened this paper with a recent example of the public protest that resulted from a political advertisement posted by the Austrian right-wing populist FPÖ. This poster accused Moroccans of being criminals and called for their expulsion. The cries of outrage pointed to a critical assessment of the poster content, making it plausible to assume that a large number of citizens negated the stereotypical content of the advertisement. Research that only uses explicit measures would not have been able to reveal such implicit effects. The complementary use of implicit measures is, therefore, indispensable.
References


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Footnotes

1 We use the term “binary” in an alleviated sense. For example, Arendt (2013a) used a sigmoid function to explain a comparable media effect: Such a function exhibits an increase from small beginnings that accelerates and— after passing an effect threshold— quickly approaches a top. Such media effects are nonlinear, i.e. the strength of the effect is not constant across all dose levels (see Eveland, 1997).

2 It is important to note that neither implicit nor explicit stereotypes can be considered as concepts describing the “true self”: Response biases on explicit self-reported data, such as social desirability or self-presentation, have the connotation that implicit stereotypes may reveal a person’s “true” thoughts. This implies that the “true self” is revealed when intentional control over one’s overtly expressed thoughts fails. However, one can also follow the interpretation that the “true self” is reflected in what a person consciously intends to say. The latter builds more upon a deliberate, enlightened human being. Thus, the question of how the stereotype concept defines the “true self” is contingent on the subjectively preferred interpretation. We highly recommend to avoid reference to a “true self” when investigating media effects on implicit and explicit cognition because it is a matter of ideology rather than empirical observation (see Gawronski, 2009, for a similar argumentation).

3 It must be noted that only the treatment posters were FPÖ advertisements. This decision was made based on previous research where it was found that mentioning an associatively related target concept (but not the stereotypical attribute itself) can still prime stereotypes (Dixon, 2006). By utilizing non-FPÖ control posters, we avoided problems regarding the interpretation of our findings.
4 We used Prism 6 (GraphPad Software, Inc.) for nonlinear regression analysis. Unfortunately, this software does not calculate a significance test. Therefore, we calculated multiple R’s by regressing the empirically observed values on the estimated values. A significant p-value indicates that the mathematical model significantly predicts the observed values.

5 We ran the same path model and additionally controlled for political orientation. This was done because we speculated that this factor may influence the negation process. Indeed, political orientation predicted negation, Coeff = -0.346, SE = 0.054, p < .01, meaning that the more right, the less negation. Political ideology did not predict implicit or explicit stereotypes. None of the other path coefficients reported throughout the manuscript substantially changed when controlling for political orientation. This additional analysis can be obtained upon request.

6 We also ran the same dose-response analysis as we did for implicit stereotypes using nonlinear regression analysis; however, no clear pattern emerged.
Figure 1. Dose-dependent effects of exposure to stereotypic political posters on implicit stereotypes. The data points represent the means with error bars indicating the standard error. The bold curve represents the fitted function from nonlinear regression analyses. The 95% confidence band (dotted curves) encloses the area that we can be 95% sure that it contains the curve. Note, that the confidence band at the dose values of all treatment conditions does not include the mean of the control group. Dose = absolute amount of stereotypic political poster depicting criminal foreigners. Implicit Stereotype = strength of the automatic association between “foreigners” and “criminal” in memory.
Figure 2. Damping effect of negation. The upper half shows the path model with standardized coefficients. Negation mediated the effect of political posters on implicit stereotypes. All bold paths $p < .05$, except the path from “high dose” to “negation” ($p = .075$). The lower half of this figure shows the unstandardized coefficients from the path model (see text). The area between the direct effect and the total effect curves indicates the damping effect of negation.
Appendix

Examples of Posters. Left: Original poster used by the Swiss SVP. Middle and Right: Examples of manipulated FPÖ-posters used in the present study (“Ivan S., rapist/ Tibuk A., drug dealer. Put an end to criminal foreigners.”)
On the Distinct Effects of Left-Wing and Right-Wing Populism on Democratic Quality

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Abstract
This study examines the differences and commonalities of how populist parties of the left and right relate to democracy. The focus is narrowed to the relationship between these parties and two aspects of democratic quality, minority rights and mutual constraints. Our argument is twofold: first, we contend that populist parties can exert distinct influences on minority rights, depending on whether they are left-wing or right-wing populist parties. Second, by contrast, we propose that the association between populist parties and mutual constraints is a consequence of the populist element and thus, we expect no differences between the left-wing and right-wing parties. We test our expectations against data from 30 European countries between 1990 and 2012. Our empirical findings support the argument for the proposed differences regarding minority rights and, to a lesser extent, the proposed similarities regarding mutual constraints. Therefore we conclude that, when examining the relationship between populism and democracy, populism should not be considered in isolation from its host ideology.

Keywords
Europe; liberal democracy; minority rights; mutual constraints; political inclusion; populism

1. Introduction
Populist actors around the world have gradually evolved into influential political forces in various countries and regions. Independent of the region, they share the ideas of anti-elitism and people centrism. On this basis, they can challenge common democratic rules, including those of liberal democracy (Plattner, 2010), according to which power must be restrained and individual rights protected. Through the populist lens, features of liberal democracy, such as systems of checks and balances, undermine the proper implementation of the general will, which they claim to be the only true representative of. Thus, their presence can have a negative impact on the quality of democracy if populist parties challenge these institutions, particularly when they are in government (Albertazzi & Mueller, 2013).

Populist parties, however, are not only characterized by their populist element but also by their host ideology (Mudde, 2004). Thus, they can take the form of right-wing populist parties (Mudde, 2007), left-wing populist parties (March, 2011), or centrist populist parties (Havlík & Stanley, 2015). In other words, populist parties differ on a wide-ranging set of issues such as the promotion of exclusive (right-wing populist parties) or inclusive (left-wing populist parties) societies (Mudde & Rovira Kaltwasser, 2013). These differences have been shown to manifest themselves in the behavior of populist par-
ties, for instance with regards to parliamentary voting where the populist element plays little to no role (Otjes & Louwerse, 2015). Despite these well-known differences, however, there is little debate in the literature about whether the postulated relationship between populist parties and democracy is a function of their host ideology, their populist element, or both. This article seeks to fill this void, taking as its starting point the discussion between populism and liberal democracy (Mudde & Rovira Kaltwasser, 2012).

We adopt the proposition that the host ideology, like the populist element, is central to the actions that parties take. We argue that the role of ideology is essential to understanding why populist parties of varying host ideologies relate differently to subdimensions of liberal democracy, namely political inclusion (minority rights) and mutual constraints. Focusing on left-wing and right-wing populist parties, we anticipate the host ideology to be the deciding factor for how these parties relate to the dimension of political inclusion. In comparison to right-wing populist parties, we expect left-wing populist parties to be associated with more positive effects on minority rights. For the second dimension, mutual constraints, we expect the populist element to play the central role and in consequence, expect no differences in associations between populist parties of different host ideology.

Empirically, we test our propositions against data from 30 European countries from 1990 to 2012. This dataset, although limited to one region, allows us to test our arguments for a diverse set of populist parties. The results lend support to our argument that host ideologies matter for how certain populist parties relate to democracy and liberal democracy in particular as differences in effects of left and right-wing populists occur for minority rights. At the same time, the results do not suggest a strong association between populist parties and mutual constraints. Therefore, this study highlights the need to investigate subdimensions of (liberal) democracy (Houle & Kenny, 2016; Immerzeel & Pickup, 2015) to generate a better understanding of the complex relationship between populist parties and democracy.

2. Populism and (Liberal) Democracy

Following the idealational approach (Hawkins, 2009), populism constitutes a set of ideas. Despite varying definitions that can be subsumed under the idealational approach, most studies consider at least four attributes central to populism: people centrum, the perception of the people as a homogenous entity with a general will, anti-elitism, and the depiction of a permanent crisis (Rooduijn, 2014). Mudde (2004, p. 543; italics original) summarizes the central attributes in his widely referenced minimal definition of populism, which we draw on in this article, calling populism a thin-centered “ideology that considers society to be ultimately separated into two homogeneous and antagonistic groups, ‘the pure people’ and ‘the corrupt elite’, and which argues that politics should be an expression of volonté générale (general will) of the people”. The view of populism as an ideological construct, however, remains at the center of many debates. Another large branch in the literature, for instance, discusses populism as a discourse (or frame) (e.g., Aslanidis, 2016, 2017; Jagers & Walgrave, 2007). However, even among those that speak of populism as a discourse, some acknowledge that populists ultimately may implement their idea of politics as an expression of the general will (Müller, 2016). Furthermore, both branches in the literature share the view that populism can appear across the ideological spectrum giving populism its chameleon characteristic (Taggart, 2000). In the ideological approach, for instance, populism as a thin-ideology is said to attach itself to different host ideologies (Stanley, 2008).

Because “populism indirectly questions the procedural minimum that lies at the heart of our current definitions of democracy” (Hawkins, 2010, p. 37), scholars using different conceptualizations discuss the relationship between populism and (certain forms of) democracy. Most notably, they focus on how populism relates to democracy in general (Müller, 2016), representative democracy (Canovan, 1999), and liberal democracy (Kriesi, 2014; Mudde & Rovira Kaltwasser, 2012; Plattnner, 2010). These studies share a focus on populism’s homogenous view of society in which the common will of the people is to be articulated in an unmediated way and implemented without any restrictions (Caramani, 2017). Perhaps for this reason, there has been a recent focus on populism and the quality of liberal democracy (cf. Huber & Schimpf, 2016a, 2017; Pappas, 2014, 2016). After all, the essence of liberal democracy is that power can never be absolute as it is characterized by “the intrinsic importance of transparency, civil liberty, the rule of law, horizontal accountability (effective checks on rulers), and minority rights” (Coppedge et al., 2011, p. 253). Minority rights and horizontal accountability in particular are two features of liberal democracy that run counter to the populist understanding of how democracy ought to function. Populist actors depict a homogenous society (the people) and highlight the necessity for politics to follow the general will without any unnecessary restrictions, implemented by the populists themselves as the only true representatives of the people. Therefore, some scholars argue that populist actors can have a negative impact on democracy, and in particular, on liberal democracy (cf. Crawford & Sterck, 2007; Schmitter, 2016; Jagers & Walgrave, 2007; Rämö, 2016; Saraceno et al., 2017). The question of whether populism is a threat to liberal democracy, however, remains a subject of contention.

1 In contrast to extremist parties, radical populist parties are not considered anticonstitutional per se (Mudde, 2007; Rensmann, 2006) although they present the system they operate in as “undemocratic” (Abts & Rummens, 2007).
2 Democratic quality in this case refers to the degree—and not the existence—of these criteria, that is, how well standards for aspects such as transparency, legality, and good governance are implemented (Beetham, 2004; Diamond & Morinno, 2005).
3 For this reason, too, Canovan (1999) argues that populism is at odds with representative democracy in which institutions mediate any societal conflicts. Populist actors, however, consider society to be homogenous to begin with and also, may argue in favor of a more direct form of politics (but see Müller, 2016, p. 29 for a different view).
democracy (e.g. Mudde & Rovira Kaltwasser, 2012; Ruth, 2017). For as long as populists are not in power, they are rarely in a position to implement their ideas. Instead, they may even have a corrective function as they highlight institutional shortcomings (e.g. Müller, 2002), mobilize otherwise unrepresented groups of voters (e.g. Hanley, 2012), and articulate issues or protest (e.g. de Lange & Akkerman, 2012).4

From this debate, we can derive the expectation that populist actors may have positive side effects but generally, relate negatively to (liberal) democratic quality, in particular when they are in government (Albertazzi & Mueller, 2013). Here, their presence can result in changes or even the erosion of important components such as the system of checks and balances, as can be seen in countries governed by populist parties, such as contemporary Poland (Markowski, 2016) and Hungary (Batory, 2016). However, the argument hinges on the assumption that all populist actors must share a similar understanding of a homogenous society whose general will functions as the guiding principle for political decisions and shall not be infringed by unnecessary institutional boundaries. In this scenario, the people constitute the sovereign. Yet Mény and Surel (2002) identify two further conceptions of the people, namely the people as a nation (cultural) and the people as a class (economic). Both are linked to specific forms of populism, the former to right-wing populism and the latter to left-wing populism (Kriesi, 2014, p. 362). Studies that compare these two types of populist parties find that their behavior, such as their parliamentary voting behavior (Otjes & Louwerse, 2015) for instance, differs as a consequence of the host ideology. The questions that arise then are: which of the two elements, host ideology or populism, determines the relationship between populism and liberal-democracy? And, does this relationship play out differently depending on the subdimensions of liberal democracy? In what follows, we discuss the differences between left- and right-wing populism in detail. We focus on two aspects of liberal democracy, minority rights and mutual constraints, to highlight possible commonalities and differences in the relationships between populist parties and democracy.

3. Populism Left, Right, and Center: Differences and Commonalities

Populist parties, independent of their host ideology, are united in their critique against the political establishment (Rooduijn & Akkerman, 2017). Yet, it is the host ideology that determines against whom the people should rally (Katsambekis, 2017, p. 205). Left-wing populist parties define the people on a class basis, referring mostly to the poor. In contrast, right-wing populist parties define the people on a cultural, nativist base (March, 2011; Mudde, 2004). In other words, whereas left-wing populist parties frame their criticisms economically and seek to protect the proletariat from exploitation by capitalists, right-wing populist parties champion nativism (Mudde, 2007, p. 19) and seek to protect “the nation from dangerous others” (Rooduijn & Akkerman, 2017, p. 196), stressing cultural issues above the rest. Thus, left-wing populist parties differ from right-wing populist parties in that they embrace an inclusive as opposed to an exclusive view of society (Katsambekis, 2017; Mudde & Rovira Kaltwasser, 2013).5 More importantly though, despite left-wing populist being inclusive on the society level, this does not necessarily imply that they are not anti-pluralistic on the political level. Essentially, the question of how democracy is organized is political and differences between left- and right-wing populism can be illustrated focusing on central aspects of democracy, namely political inclusion and political contestation (Dahl, 1971). While left-wing populist parties generally neither discredit minority groups nor object to granting these groups political rights, they do not accept political competition for that they, and only they, are the true representatives of the people. Consequently, they consider political control through effective opposition and institutional power check mechanisms as obstacles that prevent them from implementing the people’s will. In this sense, left-wing populists are inclusive on the society level and the dimension of political participation. Yet, they are exclusive and essentially anti-pluralistic with regards to public contestation and the control of power (Mudde & Rovira Kaltwasser, 2013, p. 162). In contrast, right-wing populist parties are generally exclusive with regards to all of these aspects for that they object the extension of political participation rights to minorities in addition to claiming to be the only true representatives of what they consider to be the people. In short, left- and right-wing populism differ with regards to political inclusion but share similarities in their ideas of political contestation and control of power. It is for this reason that we choose two subdimensions of liberal democracy to highlight differences and commonalities between left- and right-wing populism, minority rights and mutual constraints.

3.1. Minority Rights

We define minority rights as descriptive representation of minorities in the political system, that is, the absence

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4 This positive view, however, is not shared by all authors (e.g., Müller, 2016). After all, any new party in opposition is likely to mobilize new voters and critique established political actors, possibly increasing accountability. Thus, these byproducts can be positive but are not necessarily a function of populism (Huber & Schimpf, 2016a, p. 109).

5 Between these two types, we can also observe a third category. Havlík and Stanley (2015) write that some populist parties are non-ideological because their positions on economy issues and the common GAL/TAN scales are too fuzzy with various mutually inconsistent policy proposals. They therefore refer to these parties as centrist populist. We take an empirical approach to this matter and add this third category when assigning parties the label of left-wing and right-wing parties in our operationalization. It allows us to avoid categorizing parties as left or right when their proposals are too incoherent. We return to this point in our research strategy section.
of systemic exclusion of groups considered minorities from exercising central power or other political rights (Merkel et al., 2016).

Here, we expect the populist element to interact with the host ideology. As written above, left-wing populist parties typically consider ethnic minorities as part of the people and hence, demand equal rights as part of their socially egalitarian tradition. In Europe as in Latin America, left-wing populist parties tend to be inclusive (Mudde & Rovira Kaltwasser, 2013), particularly in government where they have a lower incentive to reach out to minorities as part of a vote-maximizing campaign strategy. March (2011, p. 134), for example, shows that the left-wing Scottish Socialist Party (SSP) and the allied Respect coalition raised awareness about the Muslim population in the United Kingdom and initiated a pro-Muslim discourse. In contrast, the Slovak National Party (SNS) routinely targeted Hungarian minority parties and went as far as to propose a ban of all ethnic parties in Slovakia (Koev, 2015, p. 652).

H1. The presence of left-wing populist parties is positively associated with minority rights, whereas the presence of right-wing populist parties relates negatively to minority rights.

3.2. Mutual Constraints

Mutual constraints inhibit absolute power in a democracy by balancing the power of the executive vis-à-vis the judiciary and the legislature (Plattner, 2010).

In contrast to minority rights, where the host ideology is central, we argue that in the case of mutual constraints, the populist element determines the direction of the relationship. The strong focus of populist parties on the people can delegitimize the indirect aggregation of the volonté générale via the representative system. On the one hand, populist parties demand either stronger or more frequently employed measures of direct democracy to ease the implementation of the general will. On the other hand, if populist parties enter government, they see no need for a check on power, as they represent the peoples’ will (Mudde & Rovira Kaltwasser, 2012). One such example is the attempt by the Polish Law and Justice Party (PiS), which assumed governmental power in 2015, to reform the Polish Supreme Court. Among the proposed changes, was the suggestion that judges would be appointed by the National Council of the Judiciary in which half the members would also be members of the parliament, effectively weakening the court’s power to oversee political decisions (Walsh, 2017). And although the law was partially rejected by Poland’s President Andrzej Duda at first, Poland’s Premier Beata Szydlo (PiS) in reaction to the rejection said that, just like the parliament, the court should be under the control of the people (Waldoch, Krajewski, & Bartyzel, 2017).

This association does not depend upon the host ideology. Most populist parties regularly call for changes to the constitution to empower the executive. Parties on the left, such as Fico’s Smer in Slovakia (Malová & Učen, 2010), have voiced similar demands to those on the right, for example, Haider’s Austrian Freedom Party (Austrian Freedom Party, 2011; Fallend, 2012) and the Czech Rally for the Republic/Republican Party of Czechoslovakia (Hanley, 2012). Each of them has demanded more power for the ruling executive to shift power away from parliaments and courts. Since the volonté générale is the rationale for decisions made and actions were taken by all populist parties here, we expect no differences among them regarding their influence on mutual constraints.

H2. The presence of populist parties is negatively associated with mutual constraints, regardless of the parties’ host ideology.

4. Research Strategy

To test our theoretical arguments, we use a twofold strategy. First, we assess the differences between populist parties in government and opposition. Second, we distinguish between left-wing, center and right-wing populism to investigate the expected associations with minority rights and mutual constraints.

Empirically, we use a pooled cross-sectional design. Since we use the role within a political system as well as a party’s host ideology, we opted for cabinets as the temporal unit of analysis. This approach allows us to determine whether a party is in government or opposition with great precision, while other approaches such as country-years are considerably more imprecise. Our data includes information from 30 European countries between 1990 and 2012. This time span captures major events for European populist parties, from their establishment through their rise. We exclude cabinets with duration of fewer than six months as we assume that any measurable impact is only evident after some time.

4.1. Dependent Variable

To measure democratic quality based on our concept of liberal democracy, we draw on three different sources. We measure aggregated liberal democratic quality by using the liberal democracy score (v2x_libdem) of the Varieties of Democracy Project (Coppedge et al., 2011). To capture the two subdimensions, mutual constraints, and minority rights, we rely on the Democracy Barometer which usually applies scales ranging from 0 to 100.

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6 We chose 2012 as our cut-off point as data for most of our most dependent variables was not available beyond that year at the time of the data collection. For an overview of all countries included, see Table A1 in the Appendix A.

7 In order to ease presentation, we multiplied the v2x_libdem by 100. This makes the results comparable to the Democracy Barometer which usually applies scales ranging from 0 to 100.
mension of horizontal checks (MC_CHECKS, Merkel et al., 2016, p. 29) which measures the balance between executive and legislative (ratio of parliamentary seats controlled by government to parliamentary seats controlled by opposition), the balance of checks between executive and legislative (ratio of control instruments of legislative over executive to control instruments of executive over legislative), and the power of judicial branch to review political decisions. This measure taps into the checks-and-balances aspect. For minority rights, we use an indicator for the effective access to power for minorities (REP_DR3, Merkel et al., 2016, p. 53) that measures the descriptive representation of minorities and the extent to which they have access to central power.

4.2. Independent Variables

For testing our hypotheses, we use dummies to i) capture the presence of populist parties in opposition and government and ii) to capture either the presence of left-wing or right-wing populist parties. We further use a middle category for ambivalent cases that would not fit either of the right- or left-wing categories based on our coding procedure, which followed a three-step approach. First, we surveyed the existing secondary literature on populist parties in Europe to categorize parties in populist and non-populist parties. In the next step, we determined the role of populist parties in the political system, applying the following coding scheme: populist parties in government had to hold some position in the cabinet and populist parties in opposition had to hold at least one seat in the national parliament. Thus, we excluded parties identified as populist but without a seat in parliament during the relevant cabinet from our analyses. Table A1 in Appendix A lists all parties analyzed.

Finally, to determine whether a populist party belongs to one of our three categories (left, right, center), we code populist parties in relation to their country-specific party system. The procedure is the following. First, we calculate a weighted party system’s ideology mean for each cabinet. This average takes into consideration the ideological positions of all parliamentary parties in one particular country. We use the seat share of the respective parties to weight the mean. For each cabinet, we then classify populist parties as left, right, or center according to their relative distance to this weighted mean. We code every populist party within one weighted standard deviation of this reference as centrist, while parties further to the left or right are coded respectively (also see Huber & Ruth, 2017).

4.3. Control Variables

In addition to our central variables, we include a selected set of covariates that, in theory, may relate to both the presence of populist parties as well as the levels of our democratic measures. These variables are the level of democratic consolidation (time in years since democratization), cabinet duration (in years), cabinet composition (surplus governments, minimal winning coalitions, and minority governments), economic development (GDP per Capita in 1,000 US Dollar), and a dichotomous variable to distinguish between post-communist countries and other countries. A detailed rationale for the inclusion of these variables can be found in Appendix C.

4.4. Empirical Model

To control for country-specific effects, we apply a linear mixed-effects model with cabinets nested under each country (Gelman & Hill, 2007). The respective countries serve as groups. This particular model also allows us to compare both intra- and cross-country variance. Given our interest in the change in democratic quality as a consequence of the presence of populist parties, modeling intra-country variance allows us to approximate this process.

5. Empirical Results

In Figure 1, we plot the coefficients from the results. To start with the aggregate measure of liberal democracy (left panel in Figure 1), we observe that in Europe, there is no general association between populist parties and democracy, independent of their status (government or opposition). While we find the anticipated direction of correlation, that is negative for populists in government and positive for those actors in opposition, they are not statistically significant. However, a different picture emerges when distinguishing populist parties according to their host ideology. First, we see that right-wing populist parties are associated with lower levels of
For mutual constraints, we expected no differences between the different type of populist parties but on average, small negative associations for all of them. Figure 1 confirms these expectations. We observe no systematic effect of a populist parties’ host ideology. However, populist parties in government and opposition are negatively associated with mutual constraints compared to instances where no populist parties are in government or opposition. This effect is in line with our expectation that populists undermine the separation of power.\textsuperscript{14}

We conducted two types of robustness checks. First, we reran our analysis using a continuous variable that measures the logged seat share of populist parties instead of dummies (See Tables B9 and B10 in the Appendix).\textsuperscript{15} Second, we used alternative model specifications (lagged dependent variable models—See Tables B5, B6 and B7 in the Appendix).\textsuperscript{16} The most consistent finding across these additional checks is the positive association between left-wing populist parties and minority rights in comparison to right-wing populist parties, particularly in opposition.\textsuperscript{17}

Other findings, such as populist parties’ relationship with mutual constraints, are less consistent as they are met with greater uncertainty in our statistical models. Overall, these findings further support our idea that substantive differences in the relationship between populist parties can arise from host ideologies.

\textsuperscript{14} Figure B2 in Appendix B includes all combinations of host ideology and government status, which leaves us with six dummies. Substantially, it confirms the findings of Figure 1.

\textsuperscript{15} As a logarithm of zero (“0”) is not possible, we added 1 to all values to guarantee numeric values, which are necessary to process the data.

\textsuperscript{16} Results for these and further robustness checks can be found in Appendix B (Figures B3 and B4, Tables B5, B6, B7, B8, B9 and B10).

\textsuperscript{17} We also ran a third analysis in which we coded parties that were not formally part of a government but supported government parties in parliamentary elections as “populist parties in government”. This was the case for the Danish People’s Party (2001–2011) and the Dutch Freedom Party (2010–2012). These results are also included in the Appendix B (Table B8).
6. Discussion and Conclusion

Populist parties, because of their central ideas of anti-elitism, the belief in a general will, and their people centricism, challenge some of the commonly accepted rules of democracy, especially those of liberal democracy (Plattnner, 2010). However, a series of studies have identified not only negative but also positive effects of populist parties on democratic quality (Canovan, 1999; Mudde & Rovira Kaltwasser, 2012). Largely absent from the debate surrounding populism and its relationship to democracy, however, has been the role of host ideologies. This article sought to initiate such discussion. We proposed that the host ideology, focusing on left- and right-wing populism, has consequences for how these parties relate to the dimension of political inclusion and minority rights in particular. However, we expected the host ideology to be irrelevant for a populist parties’ association with mutual constraints. The empirical findings lend support in particular to the first of our propositions. The main takeaway from our article, therefore, is that populism should not be examined in isolation from its host ideology when considering the relationship between populist actors and democracy. This finding, of course, should not diminish the role populism plays in this relationship, particularly in the wake of temporary developments in cases such as Poland and Hungary. In some cases, however, populism may matter less or even only constitute as an additional qualifier of radical right parties rather than being a steady feature (cf. Rydgren, 2017). Future studies thus could explore under which conditions ideology and populism may play a greater role for populist parties and how they relate to specific aspects of democracy, an issue in which fundamental differences in historical legacies between East- and West-Europe may well play into (Gherghina & Soare, 2013). Furthermore, right-wing populist parties have been shown to mobilize certain voter groups which have been neglected by other political parties, such as citizens who are lower educated or poor (e.g., Huber & Ruth, 2017; Roedujin, 2017). At the same time, they may also discourage certain voters from turning out in elections (Immerzeel & Pickup, 2015). Future research, by focusing on the dimension of political participation, may therefore also explore whether left-wing populist parties exert similar effects or, whether mobilization and de-mobilization effects depend on a populist party’s host ideology.

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Conflict of Interests

The authors declare no conflict of interests.

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# Appendix

## Appendix A. Descriptive Information

### Table A1. List of populist parties in dataset.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Party Description</th>
<th>Years Represented</th>
<th>Host Ideology</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AT</td>
<td>Freedom Party Austria (FPÖ) since 1986</td>
<td>since 1986</td>
<td>R</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AT</td>
<td>Alliance for the Future of Austria (BZÖ) since 2005</td>
<td>since 2005</td>
<td>R</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BE</td>
<td>Flemish Interest (VB) since 2004</td>
<td>since 2004</td>
<td>R</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BG</td>
<td>Attack (Ataka) since 2005</td>
<td>since 2005</td>
<td>C</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BG</td>
<td>Law, Order and Justice (PPS) 2009–2013</td>
<td>2009–2013</td>
<td>R</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BG</td>
<td>Citizens for European Development of Bulgaria (GERB) since 2009</td>
<td>since 2009</td>
<td>C (2009)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HR</td>
<td>Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ) since 1989</td>
<td>since 1989</td>
<td>C</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HR</td>
<td>Croatian Party of Rights (HSP)</td>
<td>since 1990</td>
<td>R</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CH</td>
<td>Swiss Democrats (SD) since 1961</td>
<td>since 1961</td>
<td>R</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CH</td>
<td>Freedom Party of Switzerland (FPS) since 1984</td>
<td>since 1984</td>
<td>R</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CH</td>
<td>Swiss People’s Party (SVP) since 1971</td>
<td>since 1971</td>
<td>R</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CH</td>
<td>League of Ticinesians (LdT) since 1991</td>
<td>since 1991</td>
<td>R</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CZ</td>
<td>Rally for the Republic-Republican Party of Czechoslovakia (SPR-RSC) since 1989</td>
<td>since 1989</td>
<td>R</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CZ</td>
<td>Public Affairs (VV) since 2001</td>
<td>since 2001</td>
<td>C</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DK</td>
<td>Progress Party (FPd) since 1972</td>
<td>since 1972</td>
<td>R</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DK</td>
<td>The Danish People’s Party (DFP) since 1995</td>
<td>since 1995</td>
<td>R</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FI</td>
<td>Finns Party (PS) since 1995</td>
<td>since 1995</td>
<td>C</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FR</td>
<td>National Front (FN) since 1972</td>
<td>since 1972</td>
<td>R</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GE</td>
<td>The Left</td>
<td>since 2007</td>
<td>L</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GR</td>
<td>Panhellenic Socialist Movement (PASOK) until 1996</td>
<td>until 1996</td>
<td>C</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GR</td>
<td>Popular Orthodox Rally (LAOS) since 2000</td>
<td>since 2000</td>
<td>R</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GR</td>
<td>Coalition of the Radical Left (SYRIZA) since 2004</td>
<td>since 2004</td>
<td>L</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GR</td>
<td>Independent Greeks (AE) since 2012</td>
<td>since 2012</td>
<td>R</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HU</td>
<td>Hungarian Justice and Life Party (MIEP) since 1993</td>
<td>since 1993</td>
<td>R</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IR</td>
<td>Sinn Féin (SF) since 1970</td>
<td>since 1970</td>
<td>L</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IT</td>
<td>Come on Italy/ People of Freedom Party (FI-PdL) 1995–2009</td>
<td>1995–2009</td>
<td>C</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LI</td>
<td>Young Lithuania (JL) since 1994</td>
<td>since 1994</td>
<td>R</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LI</td>
<td>Order and Justice (TT) since 2002</td>
<td>since 2002</td>
<td>C</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LU</td>
<td>Alternative Democratic Reform (ADAR) since 2004</td>
<td>since 2004</td>
<td>R</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NL</td>
<td>Party for Freedom (PVV) since 2006</td>
<td>since 2006</td>
<td>R</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NL</td>
<td>Socialist Party (SP) Until 2008</td>
<td>Until 2008</td>
<td>L</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NO</td>
<td>Progress Party (FrP) since 1973</td>
<td>since 1973</td>
<td>R</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PL</td>
<td>Law and Justice (Pis) since 2001</td>
<td>since 2001</td>
<td>C (2005, 2007), R (2011)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PL</td>
<td>League of Polish Families (LPR)</td>
<td>since 2001</td>
<td>R</td>
</tr>
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</table>
Table A1. List of populist parties in dataset. (Cont.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>C</th>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Populists</th>
<th>Host Ideology</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>RO</td>
<td>Greater Romania Party (PRM) since 1991</td>
<td>R</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RO</td>
<td>Romanian National Unity Party (PUNR) 1990–2006</td>
<td>C</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RO</td>
<td>People’s Party-Dan Diaconescu (PP-DD) 2011–2015</td>
<td>L</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SK</td>
<td>Party of Civic Understanding (SOP) 1998–2003</td>
<td>L</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SK</td>
<td>Smer (Direction), the Third Way 1999–2005</td>
<td>L</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SK</td>
<td>Smer (Direction), Social Democracy since 2005</td>
<td>L (2006, 2010), C (2012)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SK</td>
<td>Movement for a Democratic Slovakia (HZDS) 2002–2012</td>
<td>C</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SK</td>
<td>Ordinary People and Independent Personalities Party (OLaNO) since 2011</td>
<td>R</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SL</td>
<td>Slovenian National Party (SNS) since 1991</td>
<td>C</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SE</td>
<td>Sweden Democrats (SD) since 1988</td>
<td>R</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>Sinn Féin (SF) 1905–today</td>
<td>L</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Sources for these parties are Mudde (2007), Arter (2010), March (2011) and Van Kessel (2015). We should note that the Progress Party (FPd) in Denmark and the Swedish party New Democracy (NyD) are borderline cases for that they may fit the category of neoliberal populist parties better. This is the case, as Mudde (2007, p. 48) writes, because “their xenophobic rhetoric is primarily informed by their liberalism”. We kept these parties in our analyses nonetheless as a) they still fit the category of populist parties and b) would only be relevant for the analyses of minority rights in which case our results are more conservative given the inclusion of two cases that do not share the strong focus on nativism with other cases included here.

Table A2. Descriptive statistics.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Statistic</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>St. Dev.</th>
<th>Min</th>
<th>Max</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Liberal Democracy (VDem)</td>
<td>255</td>
<td>78.56</td>
<td>9.83</td>
<td>37.32</td>
<td>90.36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberal Democracy (UDS)</td>
<td>265</td>
<td>1.34</td>
<td>0.45</td>
<td>0.10</td>
<td>2.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberal Democracy (DB)</td>
<td>255</td>
<td>56.44</td>
<td>7.53</td>
<td>39.60</td>
<td>74.48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minority Rights</td>
<td>270</td>
<td>61.94</td>
<td>31.00</td>
<td>-5.56</td>
<td>100.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mutual Constraints</td>
<td>269</td>
<td>70.00</td>
<td>12.73</td>
<td>39.72</td>
<td>93.99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Robustness Check: Mutual Constraints</td>
<td>259</td>
<td>46.45</td>
<td>9.42</td>
<td>28.15</td>
<td>75.41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government</td>
<td>270</td>
<td>0.13</td>
<td>0.34</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Opposition</td>
<td>270</td>
<td>0.53</td>
<td>0.50</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Right</td>
<td>270</td>
<td>0.35</td>
<td>0.48</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Center</td>
<td>270</td>
<td>0.24</td>
<td>0.43</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Left</td>
<td>270</td>
<td>0.14</td>
<td>0.35</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Right Government</td>
<td>270</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.22</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Right Opposition</td>
<td>270</td>
<td>0.32</td>
<td>0.47</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Center Government</td>
<td>270</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td>0.27</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Center Opposition</td>
<td>270</td>
<td>0.17</td>
<td>0.38</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td>Left Government</td>
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<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.15</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Left Opposition</td>
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<td>0.12</td>
<td>0.33</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic Consolidation</td>
<td>263</td>
<td>32.95</td>
<td>32.47</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>161</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cabinet Duration</td>
<td>270</td>
<td>26.79</td>
<td>15.23</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government Type (surplus)</td>
<td>270</td>
<td>0.22</td>
<td>0.41</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic Development</td>
<td>270</td>
<td>21.49</td>
<td>15.95</td>
<td>2.48</td>
<td>83.41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Post-Communist Country</td>
<td>270</td>
<td>0.46</td>
<td>0.50</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table A3. Comparison of empty and null model using VDem.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Model</th>
<th>AIC</th>
<th>BIC</th>
<th>logLik</th>
<th>L.Ratio</th>
<th>p-value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Null</td>
<td>1891.3</td>
<td>1898.4</td>
<td>–943.6</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Empty</td>
<td>1362.2</td>
<td>1372.8</td>
<td>–678.1</td>
<td>531.1</td>
<td>&lt;.0001</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Appendix B. Additional Regression Figures and Tables and Robustness Checks (RBC)

The table below provides an overview of all abbreviations used for the various populist party dummies in the Appendix included in the models, their meaning (when coded as “1”), and the reference category (when coded as “0”).

Table B1. Abbreviations of populist party dummies, meaning and reference categories.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Meaning</th>
<th>Reference Group</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Gov</td>
<td>Populist Party in Government</td>
<td>No Populist Party in Government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Opp</td>
<td>Populist Party in Opposition</td>
<td>No Populist Party in Opposition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R</td>
<td>Right-Wing Populist Party Present</td>
<td>No Right-Wing Populist Party Present</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C</td>
<td>Centrist Populist Party Present</td>
<td>No Centrist Populist Party Present</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>L</td>
<td>Left-Wing Populist Party Present</td>
<td>No Left-Wing Populist Party Present</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RG</td>
<td>Right-Wing Populist Party in Government</td>
<td>No Right-Wing Populist Party in Government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RO</td>
<td>Right-Wing Populist Party in Opposition</td>
<td>No Right-Wing Populist Party in Opposition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CG</td>
<td>Centrist Populist Party in Government</td>
<td>No Centrist Populist Party in Government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CO</td>
<td>Centrist Populist Party in Opposition</td>
<td>No Centrist Populist Party in Opposition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LG</td>
<td>Left-Wing Populist Party in Government</td>
<td>No Left-Wing Populist Party in Government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LO</td>
<td>Left-Wing Populist Party in Opposition</td>
<td>No Left-Wing Populist Party in Opposition</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure B1. Effect of populism on liberal democracy subdimensions (regression results: Tables B2 and B3). Note: Figure B1 additionally includes two more measures of liberal democracy by the UDS (Pemstein, 2010) and Democracy Barometer (Merkel et al., 2016)
Figure B2. Effect of populism on liberal democracy subdimensions by combinations of host ideology and government status (regression results: Table B4). Note: Figure B2 disentangles combinations of both government status and host ideology.

Figure B3. RBC—Effect of populism on liberal democracy subdimensions using a lagged dependent variable (regression results: Tables B5 and B6).

Figure B4. RBC—effect of populism on liberal democracy subdimensions by combinations of host ideology and government status using a lagged dependent variable (regression results: Table B7).
### Table B2. Populism and liberal democracy by government status.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>VDem</th>
<th>UDS</th>
<th>DB</th>
<th>Minority Rights</th>
<th>Mutual Constraints</th>
<th>Robustness Check</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Government</strong></td>
<td>−0.30</td>
<td>−0.002</td>
<td>0.26</td>
<td>2.52</td>
<td>−2.70**</td>
<td>−1.56**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.46)</td>
<td>(0.04)</td>
<td>(0.45)</td>
<td>(1.85)</td>
<td>(1.34)</td>
<td>(0.73)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Opposition</strong></td>
<td>0.21</td>
<td>0.05*</td>
<td>0.62*</td>
<td>3.39**</td>
<td>−2.19**</td>
<td>−1.20**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.39)</td>
<td>(0.03)</td>
<td>(0.35)</td>
<td>(1.51)</td>
<td>(1.10)</td>
<td>(0.59)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Democratic Consolidation</strong></td>
<td>0.19***</td>
<td>0.003**</td>
<td>0.002</td>
<td>0.40***</td>
<td>0.13*</td>
<td>0.18***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.03)</td>
<td>(0.02)</td>
<td>(0.03)</td>
<td>(0.11)</td>
<td>(0.07)</td>
<td>(0.04)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Cabinet Duration</strong></td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.002*</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.08*</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>0.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.01)</td>
<td>(0.001)</td>
<td>(0.01)</td>
<td>(0.04)</td>
<td>(0.03)</td>
<td>(0.02)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Government Type (surplus)</strong></td>
<td>0.19</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>−0.56</td>
<td>1.24</td>
<td>1.87*</td>
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<tr>
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<tr>
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<td>0.10**</td>
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<td>(0.04)</td>
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<td>(0.07)</td>
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<td>−23.57**</td>
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<td>(10.81)</td>
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<td><strong>Constant</strong></td>
<td>71.73***</td>
<td>1.21***</td>
<td>55.97***</td>
<td>62.91***</td>
<td>62.22***</td>
<td>41.18***</td>
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</table>

| Observations        | 251  | 263  | 251  | 263  | 262  | 255  |
| Log Likelihood      | −616.74 | 18.28 | −578.01 | −987.48 | −892.15 | −721.81 |
| AIC                 | 1,253.49 | −16.57 | 1,176.02 | 1,994.96 | 1,804.30 | 1,463.62 |
| BIC                 | 1,288.42 | 18.84 | 1,210.95 | 2,030.37 | 1,839.67 | 1,498.72 |

Note: * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01.

### Table B3. Populism and liberal democracy by host ideology.

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<tr>
<th></th>
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<th>UDS</th>
<th>DB</th>
<th>Minority Rights</th>
<th>Mutual Constraints</th>
<th>Robustness Check</th>
</tr>
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<td><strong>Right</strong></td>
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<td>−0.04</td>
<td>−0.81**</td>
<td>−4.22***</td>
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<td>(0.39)</td>
<td>(1.59)</td>
<td>(1.21)</td>
<td>(0.69)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Center</strong></td>
<td>0.75*</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.82**</td>
<td>1.94</td>
<td>−1.55</td>
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<td>(0.39)</td>
<td>(1.61)</td>
<td>(1.22)</td>
<td>(0.67)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Left</strong></td>
<td>1.71***</td>
<td>0.07*</td>
<td>−0.12</td>
<td>8.99***</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>−0.11</td>
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<td>(0.53)</td>
<td>(2.05)</td>
<td>(1.55)</td>
<td>(0.88)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>0.003**</td>
<td>0.003</td>
<td>0.42***</td>
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<td>(0.03)</td>
<td>(0.11)</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Cabinet Duration</strong></td>
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<td>0.001</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.08**</td>
<td>0.03</td>
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<td>(0.01)</td>
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<td>(0.03)</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Government Type (surplus)</strong></td>
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<td>(0.62)</td>
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<td><strong>Economic Development</strong></td>
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<td>0.005</td>
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<td>−0.39**</td>
<td>−0.06</td>
<td>−0.07</td>
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<tr>
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<td>(0.003)</td>
<td>(0.04)</td>
<td>(0.18)</td>
<td>(0.13)</td>
<td>(0.07)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Post-Communist Country</strong></td>
<td>0.68</td>
<td>−0.36***</td>
<td>−5.45**</td>
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<td>(10.90)</td>
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<td>(4.64)</td>
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<tr>
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<td>56.12***</td>
<td>66.99***</td>
<td>61.94***</td>
<td>41.17***</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Observations        | 251  | 263  | 251  | 263  | 262  | 255  |
| Log Likelihood      | −605.24 | 17.84 | −575.31 | −975.35 | −892.49 | −724.25 |
| AIC                 | 1,232.49 | −13.68 | 1,172.61 | 1,972.70 | 1,806.99 | 1,470.50 |
| BIC                 | 1,270.85 | 25.23 | 1,210.99 | 2,011.61 | 1,845.85 | 1,509.06 |

Note: * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01.
Table B4. Populism and liberal democracy by combinations of host ideology and government status.

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<th>DB</th>
<th>Minority Rights</th>
<th>Mutual Constraints</th>
<th>Robustness Check Mutual Constraints</th>
</tr>
</thead>
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<td>−9.15***</td>
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<td>−0.46</td>
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<td>(0.07)</td>
<td>(0.88)</td>
<td>(3.34)</td>
<td>(2.55)</td>
<td>(1.52)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Center Government</td>
<td>−0.04</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.91*</td>
<td>1.87</td>
<td>−2.22</td>
<td>−1.24</td>
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<td>(0.52)</td>
<td>(0.04)</td>
<td>(0.50)</td>
<td>(2.05)</td>
<td>(1.57)</td>
<td>(0.86)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Left Government</td>
<td>3.24***</td>
<td>0.28***</td>
<td>0.33</td>
<td>13.40***</td>
<td>1.50</td>
<td>1.67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>(1.01)</td>
<td>(0.08)</td>
<td>(1.45)</td>
<td>(3.91)</td>
<td>(3.01)</td>
<td>(1.97)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Right Opposition</td>
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<td>−0.04</td>
<td>−0.60</td>
<td>−3.50**</td>
<td>−2.51**</td>
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<td>(0.03)</td>
<td>(0.39)</td>
<td>(1.59)</td>
<td>(1.22)</td>
<td>(0.68)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Center Opposition</td>
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<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.38</td>
<td>1.79</td>
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<td>(1.96)</td>
<td>(1.49)</td>
<td>(0.84)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Left Opposition</td>
<td>1.34**</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>−0.06</td>
<td>7.68***</td>
<td>−0.53</td>
<td>−0.48</td>
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<tr>
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<td>(0.58)</td>
<td>(0.05)</td>
<td>(0.56)</td>
<td>(2.23)</td>
<td>(1.69)</td>
<td>(0.95)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic Consolidation</td>
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<td>0.004**</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.44***</td>
<td>0.14*</td>
<td>0.18***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>(0.03)</td>
<td>(0.002)</td>
<td>(0.03)</td>
<td>(0.11)</td>
<td>(0.07)</td>
<td>(0.05)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cabinet Duration</td>
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<td>0.02*</td>
<td>0.09**</td>
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<td>0.02</td>
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<td>(0.001)</td>
<td>(0.01)</td>
<td>(0.04)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Government Type (surplus)</td>
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<td>−0.54</td>
<td>0.26</td>
<td>1.36</td>
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<td>(1.55)</td>
<td>(1.18)</td>
<td>(0.63)</td>
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<tr>
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<td>(0.003)</td>
<td>(0.04)</td>
<td>(0.18)</td>
<td>(0.13)</td>
<td>(0.07)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Post-Communist Country</td>
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<td>−5.31**</td>
<td>−24.96**</td>
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<td>(10.78)</td>
<td>(5.81)</td>
<td>(4.70)</td>
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<tr>
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<td>55.82***</td>
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<td>62.33***</td>
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<td>(4.62)</td>
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Note: * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01.
### Table B5. RBC–association of populist parties with democratic quality by government status (lagged dependent variable model).

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<th>DB</th>
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<th>Mutual Constraints</th>
<th>Robustness Check</th>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Government</strong></td>
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<td></td>
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<td>−0.20</td>
<td>−0.02</td>
<td>−0.41</td>
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<td>−0.36</td>
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<td>(0.03)</td>
<td>(0.31)</td>
<td>(1.31)</td>
<td>(1.27)</td>
<td>(0.68)</td>
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<td><strong>Opposition</strong></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
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<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.0001</td>
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<td>0.003</td>
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<td>(0.005)</td>
<td>(0.02)</td>
<td>(0.02)</td>
<td>(0.01)</td>
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<td>0.005</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.02</td>
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<td>(0.03)</td>
<td>(0.03)</td>
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<td>0.18</td>
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<td>0.81***</td>
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<td>(0.02)</td>
<td>(0.02)</td>
<td>(0.03)</td>
<td>(0.03)</td>
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<td>237</td>
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<td>0.96</td>
<td>0.95</td>
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Note: * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01.

### Table B6. RBC–association of populist parties with democratic quality by host ideology (lagged dependent variable model).

<table>
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<th>UDS</th>
<th>DB</th>
<th>Minority Rights</th>
<th>Mutual Constraints</th>
<th>Robustness Check</th>
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<tr>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Right</strong></td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>−0.32</td>
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<td>−0.44</td>
<td>−0.01</td>
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<td>(0.93)</td>
<td>(0.91)</td>
<td>(0.48)</td>
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<td>(1.03)</td>
<td>(0.55)</td>
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<td>(1.17)</td>
<td>(0.63)</td>
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</tr>
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<td><strong>Cabinet Duration</strong></td>
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<td>0.81***</td>
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Note: * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01.
Table B7. RBC—association of populist parties with democratic quality by combinations of host ideology and government status (lagged dependent variable model).

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<th>Mutual Constraints</th>
<th>Robustness Check</th>
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<td><strong>Right Government</strong></td>
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<td>(2.17)</td>
<td>(1.29)</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Center Government</strong></td>
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<td>−0.01</td>
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<td>(2.93)</td>
<td>(2.87)</td>
<td>(1.86)</td>
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<td>−0.03</td>
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<td>(0.29)</td>
<td>(1.24)</td>
<td>(1.22)</td>
<td>(0.65)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>−0.02</td>
<td>−0.10</td>
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<td>0.005</td>
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<td>(0.02)</td>
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<td>0.96***</td>
<td>0.96***</td>
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Observations 243 253 237 249 249 242
Adjusted R² 0.96 0.88 0.96 0.95 0.74 0.88

Note: * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01.
Table B8. RBC–populism and liberal democracy by government status using alternative coding (see notes below the table).

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<th>VDem</th>
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<th>DB</th>
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<th>Mutual Constraints</th>
<th>Robustness Check Mutual Constraints</th>
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<td>−1.81***</td>
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<td>(1.76)</td>
<td>(1.27)</td>
<td>(0.69)</td>
</tr>
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<td>−1.05*</td>
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<td>(1.06)</td>
<td>(0.57)</td>
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<tr>
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<td>0.001</td>
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<td>(0.05)</td>
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<td>(0.04)</td>
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<td>62.73***</td>
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<td>(4.53)</td>
<td>(3.20)</td>
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Observations 251 263 251 263 262 255
Log Likelihood −616.35 18.41 −578.27 987.51 −892.00 721.55
AIC 1,252.71 −16.83 1,176.54 1,995.02 1,804.00 1,463.09
BIC 1,287.64 18.59 1,211.47 2,030.44 1,839.37 1,498.19

Note: * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01.

For this robustness check, we recoded two cases where populist parties supported minority governments. These two cases were the Danish Peoples Party from 2001 to 2011 and the Dutch Freedom Party (PVV) from 2010 to 2012.

Table B9. Populism and liberal democracy by government status using seat share.

<table>
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<tr>
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<th>UDS</th>
<th>DB</th>
<th>Minority Rights</th>
<th>Mutual Constraints</th>
<th>Robustness Check Mutual Constraints</th>
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<td>(7.06)</td>
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<td>(0.07)</td>
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<td><strong>Post-Communist Country</strong></td>
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Observations 251 263 251 263 262 255
Log Likelihood −613.73 22.18 −575.95 −984.76 −892.25 −721.55
AIC 1,252.45 −16.83 1,176.54 1,995.02 1,804.00 1,463.09
BIC 1,282.38 18.15 1,211.47 2,030.44 1,839.37 1,498.19

Note: * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01.
### Table B10. Populism and liberal democracy by host ideology using seat share.

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Note: * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01.

### Appendix C. Description of Control Variables and Rationale for Inclusion

In our empirical model, we include a set of covariates that may relate to the presence of populist parties as well as to our democratic measures. This section in the Appendix explains the detailed rationale for the inclusion of each of the control variables. First, we include democratic consolidation as a control variable. We anticipate that both the existence of populism as well as the level of democracy might depend on how long a country is democratic. Furthermore, it has been argued elsewhere that the effect of populists is stronger when democratic institutions are less established (see Huber & Schimpf, 2016b; Mudde & Rovira Kaltwasser, 2012). To capture this logic, we use the time that has passed since democratization in each country was reached (in years) and use data from Polity IV (Marshall, Gurr, & Jaggers, 2017). Second, we control for cabinet duration. The shorter a cabinet lasts, the less likely it is that a cabinet can realize its agenda. Third, we include a measure for cabinet composition. We distinguish between surplus governments and other governments such as minority or minimal winning coalitions. Albertazzi and Mueller (2013) as well as Huber and Schimpf (2016a) highlight that this might moderate the effect of populist parties in government. At the same time, long time surplus governments such as in Austria have been argued to provide fertile grounds for populist’s anti-elite rhetoric. The ParlGov dataset contains information on, both, the cabinet duration and composition (Doering & Manow, 2015). Fourth, we control for economic development. Some scholars have argued that populists are especially successful in garnering support from “losers of globalization” (Kitschelt, 1995, Kriesi et al., 2012). Thus, we anticipate that populist parties might be more successful in less developed countries. On the other hand, a long-lasting discussion has emerged on whether democracy and economic circumstances are connected or not (e.g. Boix & Stokes, 2003, Przeworski, Alvarez, Cheibub, & Limongi, 2000). To capture this, we measure economic development with Worldbank data on the gross domestic product per capita (GDPpc) in $1000 to ease interpretation. Finally, we include a dummy for post-communist countries as we anticipate that this distinction might play a role, both in the existence of different populist parties and levels of democratic quality (Gherghina & Soare, 2013, p. 7).

### References


Brexit and the rise of right-wing populism in Europe: why and how nationalism matters

Dr Daphne Halikiopoulou, University of Reading

Introduction

Is Brexit another manifestation of the broader European-wide (and beyond) trend towards right-wing populism and, if so, what is driving these phenomena? In this short blog post I argue that while the populist label is often used to describe these trends, in fact much of the appeal of both Brexit and a number of European niche parties that focus on sovereignty and anti-immigration are better understood through the prism of nationalism.

Popular discontent and the rise of right-wing populism in Europe

It is often pointed out that Brexit is part of a broader trend across Europe and the West towards limiting immigration, restoring national sovereignty and doing it all in the name of the ‘people’. While this trend is not necessarily new, it has intensified in recent years. A number of such parties fared well electorally during the 2014 European Parliament (EP) elections and in their domestic political arenas in subsequent national elections. Examples abound: the Front National (now Rassemblement National), the Dutch Freedom Party (PVV), the Alternative for Germany (AfD), the Austrian Freedom Party (FPÖ) and more recently the Italian Lega (formerly Lega Nord) all made headlines in 2017 and 2018, some entering parliament for the first time, and others joining governing coalitions. In Eastern
Europe too, the authoritarian turn of countries such as Poland and Hungary is often justified in the name of popular sovereignty by the right-wing populist Law and Justice party (PiS) and Fidesz respectively.

Brexit in the UK, and the election of Trump in the US are in many ways different phenomena: the former was supported by much of the political establishment across the spectrum; and the latter is the elected representative of one of the two main US parties which have traditionally alternated in power. Despite their obvious differences, however, Brexit, Trump and the various European parties we call ‘right-wing populist’ are often seen as symptoms of the same malaise: the inability of mainstream politics to address mounting popular discontent. Most explanations focus precisely on the roots of discontent: a cultural backlash triggered by immigration, the perceived costs of EU membership for voters, economic insecurity and the loss of status.

In other words, it is widely assumed that demand is driving supply. Surprisingly, however, less attention is paid to supply itself - i.e. what these parties are doing to attract electoral support. This is important because while demand is indeed a driver of voter choice, there is still much it can’t explain. First because it is often a constant: while multi-faceted discontent exists in all societies, not all societies have successful right-wing populist parties. Countries such as Spain, Portugal, Ireland and Canada all have discontent voters in many ways failed by the political establishment, but this discontent is not translated into support for right-wing populism. Second, there are important variations within countries: what determines which right-wing populist party will be successful when more than one such parties compete within its domestic political arena? In Germany it is the AfD rather than the NDP that is winning the votes; in Greece it is the Golden Dawn (GD) rather than LAOS; and in Austria it is the FPÖ rather than the BZÖ. Why?

The importance of supply-side dynamics: nationalism

It could be argued that instead of simply responding to popular demand, parties are themselves also shaping it. Simply put, a better way of understanding these phenomena is by focusing on the ways in which parties change their rhetoric and programmatic agendas to capitalise on demand-side opportunities and entrench themselves in their respective party systems.

They do so by adopting a particular type of nationalism. Specifically my argument is
this: the increased relevance of populist right-wing parties is linked to the manner in which they employ civic nationalism in their discourse. The adoption of a civic form of nationalism allows parties with exclusionary agendas to appear legitimate to a broad section of the population. In my work with Steven Mock and Sofia Vasilopoulou we have shown that those right-wing populist parties that enjoy relative success in mainstream electoral politics, such as the Swiss People’s Party (SVP), the United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP) and the FN (now Rassemblement National), tend to be the ones best able to distance themselves from primordial and ascriptive elements of national identity such as race, creed, blood and kinship, and instead adopt civic values including democracy, citizenship and respect or the rule of law.

This type of nationalism has two features. First, it presents culture as a value-ideological rather than biological. Cultural justifications of exclusion increasingly focus on purported threats posed by those who do not share ‘our’ liberal democratic values. The justification is that such cultures are intolerant and inherently antithetical to democracy. Therefore ‘we’ exclude people not because they are different, but because they constitute a real danger to the stability and security of our society. Such arguments go beyond the erosion of our national way of life narrative by allowing parties them to mobilise voters with (both egotropic and sociotropic) concerns about safety and security. They use the perceived link between immigration and the very salient issue of terrorism to justify, for example, the anti-Muslim narrative that a number of these parties are increasingly adopting.

Second it presents welfare as an important dimension of the solidarity pact between states and citizens. The argument here is that the collective goods of the state should be reserved for those who are part of that national solidarity pact; and because resources are scarce, outsiders should be excluded. These parties, therefore, are using the civic nationalism narrative to put forward positions that are increasingly protectionist and welfare chauvinist. This allows them to mobilize the economically insecure, again by linking immigration to another salient issue: access to welfare and the labour market. UKIP’s ‘British jobs for British workers’ and the FN’s ‘immigration = chômage’ are but few pertinent examples.

In sum what these parties are doing is using nationalism to capitalize on immigration by presenting it (a) as a value problem, which constitutes a safety threat; and (b) an economic problem, which constitutes a labour market threat. This strategy allows them to attract a broad range of voters, with various concerns.
Nationalism or populism?

What about the role of populism, a label often used to describe Brexit, Trump and the various niche parties that are increasing their electoral fortunes by mobilising voters on immigration? Nationalism, I argue, has greater explanatory value. Despite their similarities- for example, both emphasise conflict lines, both focus on the collective, both put forward a vision of an idea society- populism and nationalism are conceptually different. Populism is a vision of legitimating collective choice. It posits that only societal decisions made from below are both legitimate and morally superior. It draws on the dividing line between the ‘pure people’ and the ‘corrupt elites’, deeming ‘the people’ to be an indivisible entity. This points to important distinctions between populism and nationalism: the latter divides between in-group and out-group and can be very much an elite endeavour. A nationalist doesn’t have to be a populist, and vice versa. Nonetheless we tend to conflate the two, often identifying a party as populist, not on the basis of its populist attributes- after all what party doesn’t claim to speak on behalf of the people in a democracy? - but on the basis of its nationalist attributes.

Certain aspects, for example, the claims of moral superiority used to justify Brexit and the contempt of liberal democratic institutions that has accompanied its implementation are well explained by the populism framework. Beyond this, however, the appeal itself, premised on the ability of draw on voters’ multiple insecurities and to normalise exclusion can be better understood through a nationalism framework.

Conclusion: so what?

Why is it important whether right-wing populist parties are simply responding to popular demand, or whether they are themselves shaping it? And why does it matter if nationalism poses a better explanation for understanding the appeal of these parties than populism? In short, my argument is important for two reasons.

First, the implications for other parties: the adoption of civic nationalism has allowed these parties to permeate the mainstream. The ability to present immigration as a value problem and thus to distance themselves from racism and right-wing extremism, makes these parties more acceptable to a broader range of voter groups. The problem is not only the electoral gains these parties are making, but also the increasing consensus that mainstream parties should respond by
imitating them. The adoption of the ‘populism’ label further normalises what is essentially a far right discourse. In short, civic nationalism does not shield from extremism; it makes our societies more vulnerable to extremism by disguising it.

Second, the potential policy solutions: simply put, the distinction between culture and economy is in many ways a false dichotomy. Both are part of the solidarity pact between states and citizens, i.e. the social contract. As such both are equally important to voters. Populist right-wing parties are increasing their electoral fortunes because by proposing (civic) nationalist solutions to a variety of socio-economic problems, they are appealing to a broad range of voters with different insecurities. To compete with these parties, other parties must address these underlying insecurities. This goes well beyond immigration. It entails a focus on the losers of the social contract and the policies that compensate them: welfare provision and education.
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Comparing Radical-Right Populism in Estonia and Latvia

Daunis Auers and Andres Kasekamp

Introduction

2011 saw sharply contrasting parliamentary elections in neighbouring Estonia and Latvia. The 6 March 2011 poll in Estonia was the first election in post-communist Europe to feature an unchanged line-up of competing political parties, indicating a high level of political stability despite the financial and political turmoil that marked much of Europe in 2011 (Pettai et al. 2011). In contrast, the same year Latvia experienced its first early election, triggered by a referendum, on the recall of Parliament, called by the Latvian president in protest to a perceived 'privatization of democracy in Latvia' (Zatlers 2011). Moreover, the radical-right populist Visu Latvijai/Tēvzemei un Brivībai/LNNK (National Alliance of All for Latvia! /For Fatherland and Freedom/Latvian National Independence Movement) almost doubled its share of the votes it won in the October 2010 regular election, and then subsequently took up government office in a new three-party coalition. In contrast, the Estonian Independence Party (Estonia’s leading radical-right populist party) claimed just 0.4 per cent of the votes in March 2011.

This chapter examines and explains the contrasting fortunes of radical-right populist movements in Estonia and Latvia. We first analyse the status quo of radical-right populist parties in Estonia and Latvia and describe the recent emergence of the National Alliance as a credible and competitive party in Latvia.¹ We then compare political party rhetoric along three key radical-right populist dimensions - nativism, authoritarianism and populism (Mudde 2007, 2010). Finally, we argue that there are two key long-term explanations for the emergence of the National Alliance as a credible force in Latvia. First, the language of radical-right populists has long been

¹ There are no major extreme right parties (i.e. those rejecting the democratic system) in Estonia and Latvia.
Some members of these movements who managed to survive the Soviet occupation in the interwar era were revived by small groups of enthusiasts in the 1990s (notably The Estonian Vaps movement (The Estonian War of Independence Veterans’ League) system.

Democratic elections when the incumbent government headed by Konstantin Pīts of small, mainly marginal, new radical-right political parties. Only Eesti Kodanik Minister Kiirlis Ulmanis established an authoritarian regime two months after Pīts. These were revered as the respective fathers of their nations and their mild authoritarian rule because of its radical discourses.

The historical context

During their first periods of independence between the two world wars, radical-right proto-fascist movements were on the rise in the Baltic States, as elsewhere in Europe. The Estonian Vaps movement (The Estonian War of Independence Veterans’ League) gained mass support and appeared to be on the verge of obtaining power through democratic elections when the incumbent government headed by Konstantin Pīts declared a state of emergency in March 1934 and imprisoned the Vaps leadership. In Latvia, the Pērkonskrusts (Thunder Cross) movement gained adherents with its call for a ‘Latvian Latvia,’ but shared the same fate as its Estonian comrades, when Prime Minister Kārlis Ulmanis established an authoritarian regime two months after Pīts. Some members of these movements who managed to survive the Soviet occupation in 1940–1 re-emerged during the subsequent German occupation, and former members of Pērkonskrusts collaborated in the Holocaust on Latvian territory (Kasekamp 1999).

During the re-establishment of independence in the early 1990s, Pīts and Ulmanis were revered as the respective fathers of their nations and their mild authoritarian rule is recalled fondly by many. Indeed, the latter’s great nephew, Guntis Ulmanis, an amiable, mid-ranking, Soviet-era bureaucrat, was elected the first president of post-Soviet Latvia (1993–9) largely on the strength of his surname. Although the extremist movements of the interwar era were revived by small groups of enthusiasts in the 1990s (notably Pērkonskrusts), they have had no electoral success or direct impact on the political system.

The first years of post-Soviet transition witnessed the emergence of a plethora of small, mainly marginal, new radical-right political parties. Only Eesti Kodanik (Estonian Citizen), led by the retired US colonel Jüri Toomepaa, made it into the

eastern Parliament (receiving 7% of the vote in 1992). Nationalism was the driving force behind these movements. Soviet rule had brought about a dramatic demographic shift: at the end of the Second World War the population of Estonia was more than 90 per cent ethnically Estonian and nearly 80 per cent of the inhabitants of Latvia were ethnic Latvians. However, following large-scale immigration of Russian-speaking industrial workers and managers during the Soviet era, by the end of the 1980s, the Estonian share of the population had decreased to 63 per cent and the Latvian share to just 52 per cent (Kasekamp 2010: 155). Many of these parties sprang from the grassroots citizens’ committees (the Congress of Estonia and the Citizens’ Congress of Latvia) created in 1990 – independence movements which championed restitution and opposed the dominant and more moderate Popular Fronts which had gained control over Soviet institutions. Their emphasis was on restoring national identity, that is, purging the country of its Soviet legacy and defending the principle of legal continuity with the first period of independence. This meant cleansing public institutions of the influence of former Communist Party members and ‘decolonization’ – encouraging Soviet-era migrants, mainly Russians, to return home.

A catalyst for the reactivation of the Estonian radical right in the twenty-first century was the ‘war of monuments’ or battle over memory politics that erupted in the mid-2000s after accession to the European Union (EU) in 2004. The first triggering event was the Estonian government’s removal of a monument to those who had fought in German uniform during the Second World War, which was erected by a veterans’ group in the provincial town of Lihula in 2004. This incident in turn led to the relocation of a Soviet war memorial, the ‘Bronze Soldier’, in Tallinn in 2007, which occasioned rioting by mainly Russian youths and an international crisis with Russia (Brüggemann & Kasekamp 2008). In the same way, the first decade of the twenty-first century in Latvia has been marked by conflicts over the role and place of the Latvian and Russian languages in public schools as well as markedly differing interpretations of twentieth-century Latvian history, essentially revolving around the issue of whether Latvia was ‘occupied’ by the Soviet Union in 1940. These debates have kept ethnic tensions high and ensured that radical voices have a place in public discourse.

Indeed, Russia has continued to attempt to influence politics in the Baltic States. Russian politicians, officials, and media have frequently contributed to stoking up ethnic tensions (Mužnieks 2008, Pelnēns 2009: 50, 138). Russian media typically utilize isolated cases of extremism to label the Baltic States hotbeds of neo-Nazism or to point to a ‘revival of fascism’. Moreover, ethnic Russian extremist groups affiliated with opposition parties in Russia, such as the National Bolsheviks, were active in the Baltic States in the late 1990s, although they have been supplanted in recent years by newer, more sophisticated and networked Kremlin-backed groups such as Nashi or the Anti-Fascist Committee. Latvia has also seen the establishment of single-issue groups with close ties to Russian organizations. Thus the ‘Russian School Defence Staff’ flowered in 2003 and 2004 in opposition to new regulations on the teaching of Latvian in Russian-speaking schools, while in 2011 the 13 January Movement organized a successful signature gathering drive to force a referendum on the introduction of Russian as an official second language in Latvia. While these Russian nationalist groups are significant in terms of providing rhetorical opposition to titular radical Latvian and
Estonian nationalist organizations, our focus in this chapter is on ethnic Latvian and Estonian parties. We now turn to look first at radical-right populist movements and parties in Estonia and Latvia.

Radical-right movements and parties

Eesti Rahvuslik Liikumine (the Estonian National Movement) appeared at the time of the debates surrounding the removal of the Soviet war monument in Tallinn and in the past few years has been the most coherent and influential radical right populist political force, though it did not register itself as a political party. In March 2012 it merged with Eesti Rahvulist (the Estonian People’s Union), the party traditionally representing the rural population which lost its representation in Parliament following the March 2011 election, to form the new Eesti Konservatiivne Rahvaerakond (The Estonian Conservative People’s Party). The only radical-right populist party to have contested national elections in Estonia in recent years is the Estonian Independence Party, but it has achieved paltry results: 0.4 per cent in the 2011 parliamentary election, 0.2 per cent in 2007 and 0.5 per cent in 2003. The 5 per cent threshold for obtaining seats in Parliament is an effective institutional barrier against the proliferation of small parties. A chronic impediment to the success of the radical right in Estonia has been the lack of a well-known and charismatic leader. Estonians tend to look to their northern neighbour and linguistically kin nation, Finland, for models. Most recently, after the triumph of the Eurosceptic populist True Finns in the 2011 Finnish election, an initiative group was set up for a Poliseestlased (True Estonians) party (Poliseestlased 2011), which, however, appears to have petered out.

In contrast, Latvia has a great number of radical and extreme right movements and organizations, including a small network of self-styled national socialist organizations. The internet, with its low start-up costs and relative anonymity, has seen a flowering of such organizations. Latvijas Republikas Tautas Tribunāls (the Latvian People’s Tribunal) is one such case. It is run by veterans of the Latvian radical movement, which can trace its activities back to the independence movement of the 1980s. Its website consists of a list of people perceived to have betrayed the Latvian state. The accusations are often coloured with the claim that the facial features of the individuals show them to be members of some inferior caste (most frequently the accusation is that they are Jewish).2 The Latvian organization published an extremist newspaper, Latvietis Latvija (A Latvian in Latvia) between 1999 and 2001 and now hosts an internet site. A higher profile organization is the Latvijas Nacionalā Frāne (Latvian National Front), which regularly publishes an antisemitic xenophobic newspaper that has serialized The Protocols of the Elders of Zion. The organization has been active in Legali un Brīvība (For Fatherland and Freedom, which developed from the Latvijas Nacionalā Frāne). These two parties enjoyed a successful alliance that lasted over a decade, spending only two years in opposition between 1998 and 2010. However, they became moderated governmental responsibility and were losing their share of the nationalist Latvian vote to a new radical grassroots movement recently registered as a party – Visu Latvijai! (All for Latvia, VL!) – that had been building up its support through a series of high profile public demonstrations and an aggressive critique of the existing political elite. However, VL! failed to reach the 5 per cent threshold in the 2006 parliamentary election and was unlikely to do so in

2 <http://tautastrubunals.eu/> [accessed 5 December 2011].
The nature of radical-right populist nativism in post-communist Europe is fundamentally different to that in the Western European states. Lubomir Kopeček (2007) has pointed out that this is largely due to the virtual absence of third-world immigration in the region during the communist era, while comparatively low levels of economic development coupled with restrictive immigration policies have also limited immigration in the post-communist years. For example, between 2000 and 2007, just 10,326 persons immigrated to Estonia, equalling about 0.1 per cent of the population (Kovalenko et al. 2010: 10). Indeed, more than half of these were non-visible immigrants from neighbouring Finland and countries of the former Soviet Union. There are very few visible minorities in the Baltic States.

However, this does not mean that nativism has no salience in Estonia or Latvia. Rather than being aimed at Muslims or other visible minorities, it is primarily directed towards the Russian speakers that migrated to the Baltic States during the Soviet era. The independence movements in all three Baltic States were largely driven by these demographic concerns. Even the political mainstream used what would now be considered to be radical language – talk of decolonization and forced repatriation of Russian speakers – in order to 'cleanse' the Baltic States and return them to their interwar state. After independence, both Estonia and Latvia initiated restrictive citizenship laws that granted automatic citizenship only to those people, and their descendants, who had held citizenship before 1940. In 2011, approximately 8 per cent of permanent residents in Estonia and 20 per cent in Latvia were still classified as 'resident aliens' without any citizenship.

Andres Kasekamp (2003) has observed that during the first decade of independence, the first generation of Estonian radical-right populist parties were primarily concerned with combating the Soviet legacy, while in the twenty-first century their focus turned to opposing the EU. Thus the Estonian parliament is accused of 'treason' for having contravened the Estonian constitution by transferring Estonian sovereignty to Brussels (EIP 2007, Leito 2011). The alleged prostrate position of Estonia within the EU is equated to that of when it was in the Soviet Union. In contrast, Latvian radical-right populists continue to focus their ire on Russian speakers, only making oblique reference to Europe in exceptional circumstances, for example, following the Anders Breivik massacre in Norway in July 2011. Even then, the target was European immigration policy in the abstract rather than specific institutions or policies of the EU.

Indeed, Breivik's murderous rampage resulted in defensive comments that revealed the thinking of the radical right in the Baltic States. The leader of the Estonian Independence Party, Vello Leito, initially characterized Breivik's action as an 'international conspiracy' to blacken the reputation of European 'patriots' (Delfi 2011). The Estonian National Movement likewise claimed that the beneficiaries of Breivik's insane act are the proponents of multiculturalism who seek to discredit nationalists and that the policy of multiculturalism is itself to blame (Polluaas 2011). Janis Iesalnieks, one of the Latvian National Alliance's most prominent board members

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1 Breivik's manifesto mentioned two Estonian groups: the Estonian Independence Party and the Estonian National Movement, though there is no evidence of any contact. The National Alliance in Latvia was also named.
and a prolific blogger, tweeted that Breivik's actions were quite understandable in light of the continuing high rates of immigration and the 'failed' policy of multiculturalism in Europe. His comments were quickly disowned by the party leadership and Lesāniems stepped down from the board and announced that he would not stand in the September 2011 parliamentary election. Indeed, the threat of non-white immigration has sporadically appeared in Latvian discourses. In 2002, the newly formed Freedom Party aired a television advertisement of an African wearing the uniform of a Latvian soldier guarding the freedom monument and kissing a Latvian girl, which played on fears of mass immigration (Eglitis 2005). More recently, Latvian politics has seen an anti-Islam discourse enter the fringes of political debate. In the run-up to the 2011 Latvian parliamentary election, Jānis Adamsons, a deputy from the pro-Russian Harmony Centre (which advertises tolerance as a core value), stated that he believed that the current Latvian government was planning on hosting 40-60,000 'Arabs'. Adamsons went on to declare this a mistake, because while Latvians would always find a common dialogue with white Europeans, no such possibility existed for peaceful cooperation with non-Europeans (Diena 2011).

However, Russian speakers are the typical targets of both mainstream and radical-right parties in Latvia. Indeed, it is a feature of contemporary Latvian politics that even mainstream political parties contain individuals prone to outbursts of nationalist rhetoric (see Auers & Kasekamp 2009: 251–2). Moreover, there are enduring links between mainstream parties and the extremist fringes. For example, following the 2010 election, a Latvian WikiLeaks-type website published email correspondence between the new Minister of Foreign Affairs (Girts Valdis Kristovskis, one of the co-chairs of the governing Unity Alliance) and Ainārs Slūcis, a radically nationalist Latvian-American. Slūcis, a medical doctor who has funded nationalist Latvian movements since the early 1990s (Muiznieks 2005), complained that he was unable to return to live and work in Latvia because he 'would not be able to treat Russians in the same way as Latvians', to which Kristovskis replied: 'I agree with your evaluation of the situation' (Lapsa 2010). While Slūcis was quickly disowned by the Unity Alliance (which also returned his financial contribution), the National Alliance vigorously supported Slūcis, both personally and his views on the Russian minority in general.

This reflects the more radical brand of Latvian nationalism represented by the National Alliance and particularly its youthful VL! wing. They are the only party publically to support the annual 16 March rally of Latvian Waffen SS veterans, with party members creating an 'alley' of Latvian flags to honour the veterans. VL! has previously also demonstrated against the signing of a border treaty with Russia. Its brief 4,000 figure election manifesto presents a nativist vision of Latvia, declaring (in 2006) that Latvian citizenship should only be granted to 'loyal and trustworthy' people, while individuals with a 'hostile' attitude to the state would be deported. The 2011 manifesto began with a declaration that 'Latvians must feel at home in their ethnic homeland' (National Alliance Manifesto 2011).

Russian speakers remain the major 'out group' in Latvia, although there have also been occasional outbursts of nationalist language aimed at non-white groups. There is also a level of anti-Semitism in the political discourse. However, this is typically addressed indirectly. As a WikiLeaks cable from the US Ambassador stated, 'hidden below the surface in Latvian life [is] a strong current of intolerance, including anti-Semitism' (US Embassy Riga 2008). Only the radical-right populist VL! has addressed anti-Semitism directly, with the above-mentioned Lesāniems causing a national scandal in the run-up to the 2010 election when he publically argued that 'intelligent anti-Semitism', a diffuse concept that he could not explicitly explain, had a place in public discourse (Margėviča 2010). More typical is the indirect anti-Semitism that underlies criticism of American philanthropist George Soros and the Soros foundation, which stands accused of undermining Latvian identity and independence, and of supporting 'cosmopolitan' values.

**Authoritarianism**

Political and cultural authoritarianism is a key feature of the political right in general, but particularly the radical right (Kitschelt 1995, 2004). This authoritarianism entails belief in an ordered hierarchical society with a strong focus on state power as well as law and order issues. Essentially, the authoritarian dimension, which can be visualized as being on a libertarian-authoritarian axis, is measured by the extent to which parties advocate limits on individual freedom.

There is a strong strain of support for authoritarianism in the Baltic States that stretches back to the popular authoritarian regimes of the 1930s and which is evidenced by continuing high levels of public support (hovering between 30–40 per cent in Latvia between 1995 and 2004) for 'getting rid of parliament and elections and having a strong leader who can decide everything quickly' (see New Baltic Barometers 1995–2004). However, this is much less pronounced in Estonia. Initial Estonian admiration for Päts has largely been replaced by condemnation of his supine capitulation to the Soviets in 1939–40. In contrast, in 2003, Latvia erected a statue of the dictator Karlis Ulmanis in the centre of Riga, and in 2009 a complimentary new musical ('Leader') about Ulmanis debuted in Latvia's National Theatre.

Support for the Ulmanis regime remains central to the National Alliance's ideology. One of the key moments in the early development of VL! was a protest against art students staging an exhibition of works of art critical of Ulmanis. Moreover, Ulmanis is central to the National Alliance's ceremonial celebration of Latvia's Independence Day (18 November), with the party staging an evening torch rally from Ulmanis' statue to the Freedom Monument. VL! also has a strong militarist component. The pages of its party newspaper are adorned with pictures of leading party cadres posing in military uniforms, and the party advocates the expansion of the role and activities of the Zemesargi (home guard).

**Populism**

The third of the above-mentioned dimensions of the radical right, populism, divides society into two halves, envisaging a corrupt elite on one side and a pure 'common people' on the other. Populists argue that the established elites have betrayed the trust of the people (Canovan 1999). Jens Rydgren (2005) argued that radical-right parties have framed their populist rhetoric in this way because they cannot hope to be electorally
successful by being anti-democratic in societies where the overwhelming majority of the public support democracy as the form of government, and are thus anti-elite rather than anti-systemic. They also argue that 'the people' should be given a greater role in politics through increased use of the tools of popular democracy, such as referendums and citizens' initiatives. Of the three components of the master frame, populism is the most established part of post-communist politics and populist rhetoric has not been a barrier to entry into governmental coalition (Mudde 2000). However, populism in the Baltic States is a disputed concept, with Sikk (2006) arguing that anti-corruption rhetoric is not necessarily populist when reputable comparative international research indicates that there are genuinely high levels of elite corruption (see, for example, the Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index or World Bank Corruption in Transition reports). Moreover, Sikk argues, new parties will inevitably be anti-elite simply because of the fact that they are new and, as such, have to justify their formation and existence.

The most successful populist in Estonia has been an individual rather than a party. Astonishingly, in the 2009 European Parliament election, Indrek Tarand received one-quarter of the entire national vote, nearly equalling the total for the winning Estonian political party. His anti-party rhetoric helped him confound all predictions and achieve the extremely rare feat of an independent candidate being elected to the European Parliament (Ehin & Solvak 2012). However, it should be noted that Tarand’s success came in a second-order election, allowing citizens to register their protest vote but continue supporting the mainstream parties in the March 2011 general election (in which Tarand did not participate). The charismatic and provocative Tarand once more employed his anti-establishment rhetoric as the unsuccessful opposition candidate for the presidency in 2011. In November 2011, a petition calling on Prime Minister Ansip to resign and for a new party to be formed by Tarand was circulated online (Avalik kirj 2011). Tarand enjoys being a loose cannon, and has not yet affiliated himself with any Estonian party (though he has previously been close to the mainstream anti-communist nationalists). Though he has aligned himself out of necessity with the Greens in the European Parliament, Tarand’s main support comes from the same population segment that votes in general elections for the centre-right governing parties (Ehin & Solvak 2012). Another sign of the potential fertile ground for a new populist party was the widespread rhetoric that encompasses both mainstream and more radical and existent populism emerging in times of crisis, and is thus a form of protest against the existing political system (Betz 1994). However, both Latvia and Estonia went through severe economic crises during 2008-10, with GDP plummeting in Latvia by 18 per cent and in Estonia by 14 per cent. Nevertheless, in both cases, the prime ministers, who were forced to make drastic cuts in public expenditure, were re-elected in 2011. Institutional as well as supply and demand arguments are more illuminating.

In institutional terms, the rules governing the registration of Estonian political parties were tightened in 1998, with the introduction of a requirement for a minimum 1,000 members, resulting in the elimination of several small parties and a higher hurdle for the creation of new political parties (Toomla 2011: 49). The law governing political parties in Latvia requires just 200 individual members to register a party, making it far easier for small, radical groups to become political parties. A further difference is that established Estonian political parties receive the lion’s share of their funding from the state budget, which places start-up parties at a distinct disadvantage. Public financing...
for Latvian parties was only introduced in 2012 and parties are still permitted to receive private donations. Thus wealthy sponsors can contribute to a party's success in Latvia.

Supply and demand side perspectives also explain these differences. In supply side terms, the abundant weaknesses of the Estonian Independence Party have been highlighted above. The National Alliance in Latvia, on the other hand, is a 'thick' party that has adopted the radical-right populist master frame and has a charismatic young leader. It has successfully united the financial stability of the For Fatherland and Freedom/LNNK party with the energetically mobilized membership of VL!, and entered government in October 2011.

From a demand-side perspective, we can see that the economic and social situations in Latvia and Estonia began to diverge from the mid-1990s onwards. Estonia has generally been more successful in its state-building and European integration than Latvia (Norkus 2011: 30). Bustikova (2009: 224) has argued that the success of the extreme right in post-communist Europe is best understood as a reaction to corruption and the absence of political accountability . . . Extremists thrive in competitive democracies where the rule of law is weak. To some extent this explains the variation between Latvia and Estonia. Estonia is perceived to have far lower rates of corruption, and international rankings place it in a higher category as regards its quality of democracy. Indeed, Estonians are significantly more satisfied and optimistic than Latvians (Lauristin & Vihalemm 2011: 19–21). This, naturally, means that the core message of the populists and radical-right populists – a drive the rascals out rhetoric – has far less impact. Moreover, the larger Russian minority in Latvia, combined with hitherto looser financing laws, has led to the development of a more strident Russian nationalist position (such as the February 2012 referendum on introducing Russian as a second official state language) that mobilizes Latvian nationalists.

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From Para-Militarism to Radical Right-Wing Populism: The Rise of the Ukrainian Far-Right Party Svoboda

Anton Shekhovtsov

Introduction

This chapter seeks to give an overview of the far-right scene in contemporary Ukraine, to consider the organizational and ideological nature of the Vseukrains'ke Ob'yednannya "Svoboda" (All-Ukrainian 'Freedom' Union, Svoboda) and, most importantly, to highlight the determinants of the current rise of popular support for this party.

Today, genuinely independent radical right-wing parties, which pursue an anti-democratic agenda, may function only in liberal countries that tend to tolerate the intolerant. Initially, far-right parties had electoral success in advanced industrial European countries, where such parties as the Front National (France), Lega Nord (Italy), Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs (Austria), Fremskrittspartiet (Norway), Dansk Folkeparti (Denmark) and some others challenged the democratic order by their promotion of ethnocratic liberalism (Betz 1994, Kitschelt & McGann 1995, Ignazi 2003, Carter 2005, Mudde 2007). During the 1980s, when Western Europe saw the rise of the radical right, states on the other side of the 'Iron Curtain' experienced different political and social change, namely the spread of pro-democratic social movements that opposed socialist regimes. Although the pro-democratic trend in opposition to socialism was dominant at those times, in some Central and East European countries small far-right groups were already emerging. Socialist regimes tried to suppress all opposition, but eventually lost - in the majority of cases - to pro-democratic movements. However, the transition to democracy that followed a series of revolutions in the Warsaw Pact member states at the end of the 1980s and the collapse of the Soviet

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1 This chapter is based on a paper presented at the Seventh Annual Danyliv Research Seminar on Contemporary Ukraine held at the University of Ottawa, 20–2 October 2011.
Right-wing populism across Europe and the United States takes different forms depending on nationally specific factors such as political history, system and culture, but there are similarities. Populism’s central and permanent narrative is the juxtaposition of a (corrupt) »political class,« »elite,« or »establishment,« and »the people,« as whose sole authentic voice the populist party bills itself.

Right-wing populism adds a second antagonism of »us versus them.« Based on a definition of the people as culturally homogenous, right-wing populists juxtapose its identity and common interests, with are considered to be based on common sense, with the identity and interests of »others,« usually minorities such as migrants, which are supposedly favored by the (corrupt) elites. Right-wing populists are not necessarily extremists, and extremists are not necessarily populists. The latter, however, is very likely, as extremism lends itself to populism. The more ethno-centric the conception of the people, the more xenophobic the positioning against »the other,« and the clearer the desire to overthrow the democratic system of governance, the more likely it is that a right-wing populist party is also extremist.

Right-wing populists also strategically and tactically use negativity in political communication. Supposed »political correctness« and dominant discourses are at the same time the declared enemies of right-wing populists and their greatest friends. They allow the staging of calculated provocations and scandals, and of the breaking of supposed taboos. As this resonates with the needs of the media in terms of market demands and the news cycle, right-wing populist receive a lot of free media.
1. Introduction

Despite the populist rhetoric against a »political class« unresponsive to », the people,« the recent program convention of the German Alternative für Deutschland (AfD, Alternative for Germany) was tightly managed by an obvious party establishment which seemed preoccupied with the question of whether to envision participation in governing coalitions or to focus on continued political opposition. In fact, this question of government vs. opposition is not trivial for right-wing populist political parties, at least in Western Europe, if history is any guide. Participation in actual government prevents right-wing populists from using their most important storyline of a political elite governing the country against the political will of the people, and of themselves as political outsiders speaking for a »silent majority.« In Austria and the Netherlands, e.g., disenchantment with the populists in government followed from the need to move beyond their favorite issue areas (immigration, identity, sovereignty) and to move from »simple, common sense solutions« to bargaining and compromise. Alas, inviting right-wing populists to form governing coalitions is not a sure way to stem their success and it has only been temporarily successful in Western Europe, as can be seen by the FPO’s recent performance in the first round of Austrian presidential elections (35.3 % of the vote), which at the same time showcased the fundamental crisis of the traditional conservative and social democratic parties. In Eastern Europe, where party loyalties have been slow to form after the end of Soviet communism, right-wing populist parties PiS and Fidesz govern Poland and Hungary, respectively, with increasingly authoritarian tendencies.

Before discussing strategies that could be employed against right-wing populism, I will first briefly address the question of what defines populism and right-wing populism. After an equally brief history of the recent rise of right-wing populism, I will discuss similarities and differences in terms of the issues right-wing populist parties address, their support in the respective populations, the reasons thereof, and the strategies they use, across a selected group of European countries and the United States.

The agrarian Populist (or People’s) Party in the 1890s in the US is at the origin of what we call populism today. The party challenged the established two party system with its critique of the moneyed interests and ended up merging with, and somewhat transforming, the Democratic Party. While the Democrats moved to the left, however, the US experienced a period of Republican dominance. Henceforth, many observers considered the US almost to be immune to populist challenges because the two major parties seemed capable to absorb them. The current experience of intra-party populism, embodied by the Tea Party movement and Donald Trump in the Republican party, and to a certain extent by Bernie Sanders in the Democratic party, puts this proposition to the test.

But what exactly is populism? And what distinguishes right-wing populism? While many parties sometimes use appeals to the people or claim to represent general interests versus the interests of a specific group, the occasional use of these strategies does not make a party populist. These strategies are often called populist simply to denounce them but are better described as opportunistic. At the same time, a consistent ideology or program is not the most important factor for a populist party’s essence or for its success. In terms of political positions (on most issues), populist parties are more flexible than programmatic parties. Populism’s central and permanent narrative is the juxtaposition of a (corrupt) »political class,« »elite,« or »establishment,« and »the people,« as whose sole authentic voice the populist party bills itself. Populists thus favor instruments of direct democracy.

Right-wing populism adds a second antagonism of »us versus them« to this constellation as well as a specific style of political communication. Firstly, based on a definition of the people as culturally homogeneous, right-wing populists juxtapose its identity and common interests, with are considered to be based on common sense, with the identity and interests of »others,« usually minorities such as migrants, which are supposedly favored by the (corrupt) elites. Secondly, right-wing populists strategically and tactically use negativity in political communication. Tools range from the calculated break of supposed taboos and disrespect of formal and informal rules (e.g., »political correctness«) to emotional appeals and personal insults. Conspiracy theories and biologist or violent metaphors have a place. In line with the anti-pluralism of its conception of the people, right-wing populists refuse the give and take of political compromise and demand radical solutions (concerning their core issues).
While right-wing and left-wing populism can be distinguished, the concept of »populism« is not a useful category when trying to measure the extent of the radicalism or extremism of a political party or movement. That is to say that radical and extremist parties can all be populist. In fact, their political ideologies lend themselves to populism. This is clearly not the case for mainstream, catch-all parties. They are too diverse in terms of their support base, too pluralist in their political debate, they complex and rational in terms of the policies they propose—which is why it often backfires when they try the »simple solutions« of populism: it is not credible. While the essence of populism thus is not political ideology, it is more than a simply a style of politics: Populism is a particular style of politics that is intricately related to particular political ideologies.

Why then talk about »right-wing populism« and not radicalism or extremism? Today, in light of the Euro-crisis and the arrival of refugees, populism is working for right-wing radical and extremist parties, and mainstream parties have not been able to develop strategies to effectively counter this populism.

2. The recent rise of right-wing populism

Right-wing populists are not necessarily extremists, and extremists are not necessarily populists. The latter, however, is very likely, as extremism lends itself to populism. The more ethno-centric the conception of the people, the more xenophobic the positioning against »the other,« and the clearer the desire to overthrow democratic governance, the more likely it is that a right-wing populist party is also extremist. The extremism of many right-wing populist parties, but also their programmatic flexibility, is evident across Europe.

2.1 Right-wing populism in Europe

Under its longtime president, Jean-Marie Le Pen, the Front National for decades had a right-wing extremist message with anti-Semitic elements. Support came largely from among the middle classes, from small businessmen and farmers, due to (neo-)liberal economic positions bordering on social Darwinism. The FN had some electoral success, e.g. at elections to the European Parliament and in the first round of the 2002 presidential elections. The party’s current president, Le Pen’s daughter Marine Le Pen, has worked towards a »de-demonization« of the party in order to broaden its base. This »normalization« has not only entailed the ousting of the party’s longtime leader and his more radical followers but also a shift from antisemitism to an anti-immigrant, islamophobic position and a shift from economic liberalism to a policy of protection of the French people against globalization. Anti-EU nationalism and anti-elitism are mainstays of the FN’s program. Its growing base of support has shifted towards the (»white«) working class and unemployed. The FN is now established as France’s third strongest political party and only »Republican« alliances prevented it from gaining seats in the second round of regional elections in 2015. Marine Le Pen is widely expected to advance to the second round of the next presidential election.

Austria’s Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs (FPÖ), founded in 1955, is also an example for right-wing populists’ extremism as well as for their programmatic flexibility. Until 1980, former national-socialists played important roles. Subsequently, the FPÖ governed as junior-partner in a grand coalition with Austria’s social democrats until, in 1986, Jörg Haider won the FPÖ’s leadership. Haider, charismatic and provocative chairman until 2000, moved the party back towards the right, and broadened its base to include working class voters with an increasingly anti-immigrant, anti-Muslim message. Pan-German nationalism and the playing down of national-socialism characterized the FPÖ’s message. The FPÖ was the second strongest party in the 1999 elections and governed as junior partner of Austria’s conservative party ÖVP until 2006. The contradiction of this governing role with its anti-elitist message weakened the party considerably for a time, leading to internal debates and splits. Under the leadership of Heinz-Christian Strache, the FPÖ recovered from participation in the governing coalition and is polling at around 20 %, using instruments of direct democracy to promote their anti-EU and anti-immigrant agenda. In the first round of presidential elections in 2016, the FPÖ’s candidate, Norbert Hofer, gained a plurality of the vote (35.3 %) while the candidates of the conservative and social democratic parties which have dominated Austrian politics since the end of the war performed miserably.

In light of the absence of stable party systems in Eastern Europe, right-wing populist parties have seen wildly changing levels of support, bringing them from...
governing roles to the brink of extinction and back. The current governments of Poland and Hungary demonstrate that a governing role will not necessarily discredit right-wing populist parties. In Poland, the ultranationalist, anti-pluralist Law and Justice Party (Prawo i Sprawiedliwość, or PiS), founded in 2001 by the twin brothers Lech and Jarosław Kaczyński, has benefitted from a combination of agrarian traditions, the strength of Catholicism, decades of authoritarianism, as well as disaffection with democracy and the EU and the resulting low voter turnout. In the PiS conception, the Polish people are considered to be homogenous and Catholic. Radio Maryja provides symbolic support of this confluence of Catholicism and Polish identity. The »common people« are juxtaposed against a »liberal, cosmopolitan elite« ready to sell out the country to foreign interests. Despite this thinly veiled antisemitism, PiS is not generally considered extremist but national conservative, however, the PiS government, in office since 2015, is moving towards illiberal authoritarianism. It no longer recognizes the rulings of the constitutional court, and has weakened the media. »The people's interests supersede the law,« one minister remarked.

In Hungary, the governing party Fidesz began moving towards illiberal authoritarianism in 2010. The governing coalition under Prime Minister Viktor Orbán adopted a new constitution and restricted the freedom of the media. Fidesz, founded in 1988, is yet another example of right-wing populist party's flexibility. It started as a mainstream liberal alliance and moved to the right only after electoral failures. Today, Fidesz can be considered a national conservative populist party, favoring interventionist economic policies. Its concept of the Hungarian nation is threatening to neighboring countries because it includes their citizens of Hungarian descent. Fidesz has begun to change the nature of the country’s political system, in part by adopting policies from the platform of the right-wing extremist party Jobbik. This is particularly problematic for the Roma minority. In the context of the current influx of refugees to the European Union, the Orbán government has increased its anti-EU and anti-immigrant rhetoric, thereby halting and reversing a slip in the polls.

In Western Europe, there are several new right-wing populist actors who have begun to change the political landscapes and who, while in opposition and with limited electoral support, have influenced sitting governments’ policies. In the United Kingdom, the UK independence Party (UKIP), founded in 1993, has been consistent in its anti-EU and anti-immigration message and is now profiting from changed public opinion. Under the leadership Nigel Farage, UKIP saw first successes at the elections for the European parliament and has performed well nationally since 2011. While considered to be part of the radical right by some observers, they have been able to distance themselves from the extremist British National Party by highlighting their (economic) libertarianism and their inclusive concept of a British nation. Nevertheless, the current influx of refugees to the European Union has highlighted UKIP’s skepticism regarding immigration. UKIP’s greatest impact has been on the policies of the current conservative government which, in the face of UKIP’s popularity, has resisted allowing refugees to the UK and scheduled a referendum about a possible exit from the EU.

For a long time after World War II, many observers thought Germany to be almost immune to successful right-wing extremism and populism, at least at the national level, and outside of particular situations of protest, because of the crimes of national-socialism and the conservative party’s ability to integrate national conservatives and to occasionally cater to populist sentiments. An influx of asylum-seekers in the early 1990s brought xenophobic sentiments to the fore, especially in East Germany. Subsequently, right-wing extremist parties and networks developed strongholds there. The Alternative für Deutschland, AfD, was established in 2013 as a reaction to the Euro crisis and in protest of the EU’s bailout policies. Renegades from (neo-)liberal Free Democratic party and from the Christian Democratic party (CDU), who felt that their party had moved to far to the center, found a new home in the AfD, but from the beginning there was also a more extreme anti-immigrant element. Demonstrations against the immigration policy of the current grand coalition government, namely the Pegida movement, caused an undercurrent of change in AfD’s membership and electoral support and the founding leadership around Bernd Lucke, an economics professor, was ousted in 2015. Under the new leadership of Frauke Petry, the AfD has increased its right-wing populist message, adopting much of the Pegida language of »anti-establishment,« »anti-Islam,« anti-media and anti-immigration, in addition to the traditional Euro-skepticism. They embrace methods of direct democracy to challenge the »political class« which is supposedly selling out the interests of the German people by purposefully allowing mass-migration...
to compensate for low German birthrates (a conspiracy theory originating in France: »le grand remplacement«). National conservatives like Alexander Gauland want the country to return to a (fictionalized) situation of peaceful, stable West Germany and to traditional gender roles. The AfD has already affected government policy. Electoral success in European, local and Länder elections – after a brief dip in the polls after the ousting of Lucke – has been formidable and the established parties have not found a way to steal the AfD’s thunder, neither by downplaying or marginalizing them nor by accommodating some of their demands.

2.2 The peculiar case of the United States: Trumpism and the Tea Party

The American two party system with its winner-take all elections has been mostly immune to third party challenges, at least since today’s Republican party replaced the Whig Party in the 1860s. The Populist Party of the 1890s was absorbed into the Democratic Party. The historian Richard Hofstadter compared third party challenges to bees: once they have stung (the system), they quickly die. Still, as Donald Trump secures the Republican nomination for president, right-wing populism has taken hold of the US as well. Intra-party populism is not a new phenomenon; in fact, the Republican party has for decades more or less embraced tenets of the »us versus them« narrative: Richard Nixon’s Southern Strategy successfully exploited the racism of southern whites, after Barry Goldwater tried and failed. Ronald Reagan demonized African-American welfare recipients to win northern suburban voters. George H.W. Bush did the same with African-American convicts, always playing on racist sentiments of white voters, and his son George W. Bush used people’s unease with gay marriage to win the 2004 election. This political opportunism did not make the Republican Party a populist party, however, first the rise of the rank and file Tea Party movement, embittered with the Obama presidency, alleged bail-outs of African-American and Latino debtors, the national debt, Obamacare, and the Republican establishment, and now the presumptive presidential nomination of Donald Trump, have profoundly changed the American political landscape in a populist fashion.¹

The Republican establishment which has conditioned the use of racism, nativism, demonization of the opponent, in the past, is now merely hypocritical when professing to be »shocked« by statements of Donald Trump about wanting to deport eleven million »illegal« immigrants, to close US borders to all Muslims, and to build a wall on the US-Mexican border (for which Mexico would have to pay) to keep out once and for all »Mexican rapists and murderers.« By the same token, both the Republican and – to a lesser extent – the Democratic party are responsible for the transformation of American politics into a polarized battlefield. They have adopted policies that have made the life of many of the people who now support Trump, namely parts of the white (male) working class, increasingly difficult. Trump’s promises of easy solutions to complex problems, without any need for compromise or negotiation, are quite obviously only workable in a fantasy world, but they are appealing to a highly disaffected section of the American public, as are his constant challenges of the supposedly hegemonic »political correctness.« Former secretary of labor Robert Reich may go too far (for now) when he calls Donald Trump an »American fascist« but Trump does not simply have charisma, simple solutions, (and money), he has conditioned the use of violence in politics, he operates a movement outside of political institutions, and he detests and evades independent media.

3. Similarities and Differences

Right-wing populism across Europe and the United States does not come with uniform, clearly defined characteristics; it takes different forms depending on nationally specific factors such as political history, system and culture. At the same time, there are similarities.

3.1 Issues

Clearly, right-wing populist parties, movements, and candidates across Europe and the United States have identified widespread discontent concerning a range of political, economic, and cultural issues. These issues right-wing populists capitalize upon are largely the same across all countries but they are obvious national specificities.

The opposition to globalization, for example, is uniform when it comes to immigration but differs in terms of

¹ According to the Southern Poverty Law Center’s hate group count, the number of hate groups in the US increased sharply after Barack Obama’s election.
degree and target. Trump’s proposals to deport all »illegal« immigrants and to prevent all Muslims from entering the US might simply have been campaign rhetoric (many observers have analyzed in detail why his plans are infeasible) but they are a far cry from the relatively careful distinction between different groups of immigrants in the AfD platform (first and foremost with respect to EU citizens) and the tentative acceptance of a Canada-style immigration policy.

The same holds true for considerations of international trade and finance. While the defense of »the people« against competition is clearly the defining principle, right-wing populists in Eastern Europe (and for different reasons in the UK) are more fundamental in their opposition of the EU than the AfD, which strictly opposes bail-out policies but at the same time recognizes the value of the EU (and even the Euro) for the export-oriented German economy. Trump and the Tea Party in the US do attack the EU but as far as their supporters are concerned, opposition to free trade agreements such as the TPP and TTIP is the much more salient issue.

For right-wing populists, immigration is not simply a question of economic competition but it constitutes a threat against the presumed (constructed) identity of the people and their traditional values. Again, the principle of »othering,« of constructing and highlighting an antagonism of »us versus them« is uniformly applied by right-wing populists, but the definition of »the other« varies pursuant to nationally specific conditions. In Hungary, one target is therefore the Roma minority, while the Tea Party and Trump highlight Mexicans and other immigrants from Latin America. Islamophobia (much more prominently than antisemitism) characterizes right-wing populists’ positions regarding the immigration (and integration) of Muslims everywhere, but in the United States it is informed less by the current influx of refugees than by the threat of terrorism.

Similarly, disaffection with the establishment – the other, fundamental construction of »us vs. them« – is a uniform feature of right-wing populism across Europe and the United States but it takes different, nationally specific forms. Also, of necessity, it takes different forms depending on the political position of a right-wing populist party, i.e. whether it is an opposition or a government party. In Eastern Europe, PiS and Fidesz have continued to attack the post-communist elites of yesterday as if those still ran the country, but they also have turned their vertical othering to the EU, especially the EU commission in Brussels, and to a certain extent to Germany as the dominant player in Europe today. Most right-wing populists find themselves in opposition roles which makes it much easier to attack the established and supposedly corrupt political elites as well as the media establishment.

3.2 Support

There is not enough available data to determine who financially supports right-wing populist parties and whether there are significant differences across Europe and the United States. Donald Trump is the obvious outlier, as his campaign is largely self-financed and as US law requires some transparency regarding campaign donations.

In terms of electoral support, in Western Europe, there are differences in terms of the extent to which right-wing populist parties have been able to hold on to the largely middle class/small business support that characterized many of them in the past when they embraced many (neo-)liberal policies based in part on social Darwinist conceptions of human society. This issue arises most clearly for the older right-wing parties such as the FN and FPÖ but even in the newly established AfD the contradiction between these tenets and the proclaimed protection of »regular folks« against the threats of globalization and modernity is obvious, as much of its program is contrary to the economic interests of large parts of its support base.

Today, the spectrum of support of most right-wing populist parties, as well as the Tea Party and Donald Trump in the US, highlights a blurring of traditional left-right scales in the sense that presumed supporters of left-of-center parties, i.e., working class and unemployed voters, especially men, are embracing right-wing populist messages. For example, while the FN continues to have support among small businessmen and can therefore not fully embrace policies of social protection, it has profited from rising »worker authoritarianism« – i.e. intolerance of minorities and an embrace of national identity – and from the demobilization of left-wing voters in the working class, i.e. the decreasing social integration of workers by unions and left-wing political parties, clearly
associated with the economic changes of globalization. While these voters do not embrace the neo-liberal tenets of FN policies they can support its concept of a «national capitalism» characterized by corporatist arrangements.

In Eastern Europe, the constellation of support for right-wing populists is much more fluid because voters have not been socialized into established party systems. Currently, they mobilize primarily older voters who seek social protection and symbolic policies of patriotism while younger voters tend to embrace the new found freedoms represented by EU membership etc. (or, to the contrary, opt for more radical parties such as Jobbik in Hungary). UKIP’s support similarly comes from old, male, working class, white and less educated voters, while Trump, who has clearly mobilized a white, male, non-union electorate, has performed best in counties with incomes below the average.

While working class support of right-wing populism might at this point be more an expression of protest, a political «cry for help,» than of conviction, the specter for left-of-center parties is obvious. Clearly, right-wing populism is not merely a problem for conservative parties (who might in the end even be able to form coalitions with the populists). Voters’ economic concerns are legitimate and those sections of the population who worry about social and economic changes and who no longer feel represented by mainstream parties will be difficult to bring back into the fold of social democracy and unionism absent substantial political and economic reform, as well as the effective management of current challenges of integration.

3.3 Strategies

Supposed «political correctness» and dominant discourses are at the same time the declared enemies of the right-wing populist and his greatest friends. They allow the staging of calculated provocations and scandals, and of the breaking of supposed taboos. Using plain language, the populist will not hold back against this oppressive media regime and express the wishes of the «silent majority.» Right-wing populists use stark generalizations, including strict distinctions between «us» and them, «friend and foe» etc. Emotional appeals and exaggerations are common in order to create a politics of fear and anger, as are crass simplifications both of problems and solutions: Common sense will simply dictate how to address any situation; political compromise is unnecessary and weak.

Most political parties and candidates have adapted elements of the theatrical for their political communication (event driven and image-orientated communication, symbolic use of politics). All actors discussed here use the major right-wing populist strategies of political communication, to different degrees and with national-specific variations. These differences are not systematically linked to the various actors, but the national variation as well as differences concerning the effectiveness of the various strategies have rather to do with the different political cultures and media landscapes across Europe and the United States. In general, right-wing populist parties profit from the mechanisms of modern media (even though they make it a point to consider them part of the «corrupt» establishment) because their strategies of political communication resonate with the needs of the media in terms of market demands and the news cycle. Right-wing populists receive a lot of free media attention because of the provocative, emotional and simplified nature of their political communication. This reinforces the effectiveness of their messaging regardless of the tone of the coverage. This effect is most visible in TV because the nature of most relevant TV formats (news shows, talk shows) does not allow for much reflection. In addition, public media give more room for discussion, spend more resources on fact-checking and tend to be less sensationalist and less focused on horse race journalism.

4. Reactions and counter strategies

Even the best and most critical journalists, however, tend to have difficulties dealing with right-wing populists because of their ability to fit any criticism or attack into their world view of being marginalized vis-à-vis a «corrupt» political establishment of which the media is simply a part. Investigative or satirical media do better but largely preach to the choir, i.e., they often do not reach an audience of supporters or sympathizers of right-wing populist parties.

The dilemma is even greater for political parties competing with right-wing populists. A strategy of marginalization, practiced in many local, regional, state and sometimes...
national legislatures, might keep the right-wing populists from shaping policy, but does nothing to minimize their electoral appeal because in the end it reinforces their image as an outsider fighting for the interests of the people. In turn, consideration of right-wing populists’ positions helps them as well by legitimizing their policies and it might change the country profoundly, especially because no compromise is ultimately possible on many issues, e.g. identity issues, and right-wing populists will simply make additional demands.

Preventing the rise of right-wing populists to power might currently be easiest in the US. For now, the peculiarities of the American political system and culture will likely prevent Donald Trump from entering the White House. Hillary Clinton, the presumptive Democratic nominee, not only leads Trump in the polls but Trump’s nomination solves her own mobilization problem – many people will not vote for her but against Trump (and presumably many Republicans will stay home) – and in terms of electoral demographics, she simply has more possible ways to a majority in the Electoral College than any Republican nominee and certainly more than Trump. But while populism at the national executive level seems very unlikely at this point, at the legislative level the polarizing, uncompromising strategy of the Tea Party movement and other movement conservatives will surely continue to hinder effective and constructive governance in the Congress and many state legislatures. In fact, if Trump loses this situation might deteriorate in many states.

In parts of Europe, a new political landscape might be developing where the established mainstream parties continue to weaken and have to increasingly rely on grand coalitions to hold right-wing populist parties at bay. This, however, reinforces their message of being outsiders marginalized by an overpowering and corrupt elite.

Political and electoral strategies obviously have limits and especially identity issues, which are at the core of right-wing populist conceptions of the people and of »the other,« are almost impossible to address politically beyond defeating the parties which represent such ideas at the polls. However, in light of the fact that right-wing populist parties have shown that they can at best only be temporarily weakened by participation in governing coalitions (e.g. in Austria) – at worst, they come to dominate the government and transform the country in an authoritarian and illiberal direction as in Hungary and Poland – it is clear that it will not suffice to keep right-wing populist parties from political power, and strategies like the use of EU sanctions also only partially address the problem. In fact, addressing questions of identity in this sense means challenging the discursive power of right-wing populists, and this can most likely only be achieved by political and civic education, and through debate and struggle in the civil societies of the respective countries – much like it is currently happening in Poland and Hungary.

At the same time, it seems obvious that those voters not ideologically committed to right-wing populist ideas of identity, whose vote might be mostly a vote of protest, have legitimate issues in the face of globalized competition, increasing social inequality etc. Many opportunities have been missed to address these concerns; in fact, in many countries the long reign of neo-liberal policies has contributed to the problem even in times of social democratic governance. Given the national and European electoral cycles, it might even be too late to address the basic problems at the heart of these voters’ legitimate discontent before right-wing populists gain even greater representation. Changing the course of unfettered globalization, finding ways to socially and ecologically regulate the global economy while addressing national inequalities and injustices (in the tax system, for example) will take time. In some ways, political and economic trends continue to point in the opposite direction, as the discussions of TPP and TTIP, bonuses for failed CEOs, tax havens and loopholes etc. show.

One of the most difficult questions with respect to feasible strategies against right-wing extremism is whether it is possible to adapt successful strategies across borders. Cross-border learning and the transplantation of successful practices – business, political campaign, cultural – have great appeal and seem almost natural in a globalized world of instantaneous communication and the widespread use of English as a lingua franca. Empirical evidence of ultimately unsustainable cherry picking and of insurmountable barriers to transnational transfers, however, gives rise to caution. Each national context has institutional, historical, and cultural specificities – both in terms of the »opportunity structures« for right-wing populists and for the conditions of success for the combat against them, that cross-border learning remains a difficult proposition.
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Right-wing populism

Right-wing populism is a political ideology which combines right-wing politics and populist rhetoric and themes. The rhetoric often consists of anti-elitist sentiments, opposition to the system and speaking for the "common people". In Europe, right-wing populism is an expression used to describe groups, politicians and political parties generally known for their opposition to immigration mostly from the Islamic world and in most cases Euroscepticism. Right-wing populism in the Western world is generally—though not exclusively—associated with ideologies such as new nationalism, anti-globalization, nativism, protectionism and opposition to immigration. Traditional right-wing views such as opposition to an increasing support for the welfare state and a "more lavish, but also more restrictive, domestic social spending" scheme is also described under right-wing populism and is sometimes called "welfare chauvinism".

From the 1990s, right-wing populist parties became established in the legislatures of various democracies, including Australia, Brazil, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, France, Germany, Romania and Sweden; and they entered coalition governments in Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Chile, Finland, Greece, Italy, Israel, Latvia, Lithuania, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Slovakia and Switzerland; and majority governments in India, Turkey, Hungary and Poland. Although extreme right-wing movements in the United States have been studied separately, where they are normally called "radical right", some writers consider them to be a part of the same phenomenon. Right-wing populism in the United States is also closely linked to paleoconservatism. Right-wing populism is distinct from conservatism, but several right-wing populist parties have their roots in conservative political parties. Other populist parties have links to fascist movements founded during the interwar period when Italian, German, Hungarian, Spanish and Japanese fascism rose to power.

Since the Great Recession, right-wing populist movements such as the National Front in France, the Northern League in Italy, the Party for Freedom in the Netherlands and the UK Independence Party began to grow in popularity, in large part because of increasing opposition to immigration from the Middle East and Africa, rising Euroscepticism and discontent with the economic policies of the European Union. U.S. President Donald Trump's 2016 political views have been summarized by pundits as right-wing populist and nationalist.
## Definition

Classification of right-wing populism into a single political family has proved difficult and it is not certain whether a meaningful category exists, or merely a cluster of categories since the parties differ in ideology, organization and leadership rhetoric. Unlike traditional parties, they also do not belong to international organizations of like-minded parties, and they do not use similar terms to describe themselves.[27]

Scholars use terminology inconsistently, sometimes referring to right-wing populism as "radical right"[28] or other terms such as new nationalism.[29] Pippa Norris noted that "standard reference works use alternate typologies and diverse labels categorising parties as 'far' or 'extreme' right, 'new right', anti-immigrant or 'neofascist', antiestablishment, national populist, protest, ethnic, authoritarian, antigovernment, antiparty, ultranationalist, or neoliberal, libertarian and so on"[30]

## By country

Piero Ignazi divided right-wing populist parties, which he called "extreme right parties", into two categories: he placed traditional right-wing parties that had developed out of the historical right and post-industrial parties that had developed independently. He placed the British National Party, the National Democratic Party of Germany, the German People's Union and the former Dutch Centre Party in the first category, whose prototype would be the disbanded Italian Social Movement; whereas he placed the French National Front, the German Republicans, the Dutch Centre Democrats, the former Belgian Vlaams Blok (which would include certain aspects of traditional extreme right parties), the Danish Progress Party, the Norwegian Progress Party and the Freedom Party of Austria in the second category.[31][32]

Right-wing populist parties in the English-speaking world include the UK Independence Party and Australia's One Nation as well as the Wildrose Party in the Canadian province of Alberta. The U.S. Republican Party and Conservative Party of Canada include right-wing populist factions.

### Australia

The main right-wing populist party in Australia is One Nation, led by Pauline Hanson, Senator for Queensland[34] One Nation typically supports the governing Coalition.[35]

Other parties represented in the Australian Parliament with right-wing populist elements and rhetoric include the Australian Conservatives, led by Cory Bernardi, Senator for South Australia,[36] the libertarian Liberal Democratic Party, led by David Leyonhjelm, Senator for New South Wales,[37] and Katter's Australian Party, led by Queensland MP Bob Katter.[38] Bernardi and Leyonhjelm form a voting bloc in the Australian Senate.[39]

Former Australian Prime Minister Tony Abbott has been described as a right-wing populist.[40]
Canada has a history of right-wing populist protest parties and politicians, most notably in Western Canada due to Western alienation. The highly successful Social Credit Party of Canada consistently won seats in British Columbia, Alberta, and Saskatchewan but fell into obscurity by the 1970s. The Reform Party of Canada led by Preston Manning was another very successful right-wing populist formed as a result of the policies of the centre-right Progressive Conservative Party of Canada which alienated many Blue Tories. The two parties ultimately merged into the Conservative Party of Canada.

In recent years, right-wing populist elements have existed within the Conservative Party of Canada and mainstream provincial parties, and have most notably been espoused by Ontario MP Kellie Leitch, businessman Kevin O'Leary, the leader of the Coalition Avenir Québec, François Legault, the former Mayor of Toronto, Rob Ford, and his brother, Ontario Premier Doug Ford.[41][42][43][44]

European countries

Senior European Union diplomats cite growing anxiety in Europe about Russian financial support for far-right and populist movements and told the Financial Times that the intelligence agencies of "several" countries had stepped up scrutiny of possible links with Moscow.[45] In 2016, the Czech Republic warned that Russia tries to "divide and conquer" the European Union by supporting right-wing populist politicians across the bloc.[46]

Austria

The Austrian Freedom Party (FPÖ) established in 1955 by a former Nazi functionary claims to represent a "Third Camp" (Drittes Lager), beside the Socialists and the social Catholic Austrian People's Party. It succeeded the Federation of Independents founded after World War II, adopting the pre-war heritage of German nationalism. Though it did not gain much popularity for decades, it exercised considerable balance of power by supporting several federal governments, be it right-wing or left-wing, e.g. the Socialist Kreisky cabinet of 1970 (see Kreisky–Peter–Wiesenthal affair).

From 1980, the Freedom Party adopted a more liberal stance. Upon the 1983 federal election, it entered a coalition government with the Socialist Party, whereby party chairman Norbert Steger served as Vice-Chancellor. The liberal interlude however ended, when Jörg Haider was elected chairman in 1986. By his down-to-earth manners and patriotic attitude, Haider re-integrated the party's nationalist base voters. Nevertheless, he was also able to obtain votes from large sections of population disenchanted with politics by publicly denouncing corruption and nepotism of the Austrian Proporz system. The electoral success was boosted by Austria's accession to the European Union in 1995.

Upon the 1999 federal election, the Freedom Party (FPÖ) with 26.9% of the votes cast became the second strongest party in the National Council parliament. Having entered a coalition government with the People's Party Haider had to face the disability of several FPÖ ministers, but also the impossibility of agitation against members of his own cabinet. In 2005, he finally countered the FPÖ's loss of reputation by the Alliance for the Future of Austria (BZÖ) relaunch in order to carry
on his government. The remaining FPÖ members elected Heinz-Christian Strache chairman, but since the 2006 federal election both right-wing parties have run separately. After Haider was killed in a car accident in 2008, the BZÖ has lost a measurable amount of support.

The FPÖ regained much of its support in subsequent elections. Its candidate Norbert Hofer made it into the runoff in the 2016 presidential election, though he narrowly lost the election. After the 2017 legislative elections, the FPÖ formed a government coalition with the Austrian People's Party.

Belgium
Vlaams Blok, established in 1978, operated on a platform of law and order, anti-immigration (with particular focus on Islamic immigration) and secession of the Flanders region of the country. The secession was originally planned to end in the annexation of Flanders by the culturally and linguistically similar Netherlands until the plan was abandoned due to the multiculturalism in that country. In the elections to the Flemish Parliament in June 2004, the party received 24.2% of the vote, within less than 2% of being the largest party. However, in November of the same year, the party was ruled illegal under anti-racism law for, among other things, advocating schools segregated between citizens and immigrants.

In less than a week, the party was re-established under the name Vlaams Belang with a near-identical ideology. It advocates for immigrants wishing to stay to adopt the Flemish culture and language. Despite some accusations of antisemitism from Belgium's Jewish population, the party has demonstrated a staunch pro-Israel stance as part of its opposition to Islam. With 18 of 124 seats, Vlaams Belang lead the opposition in the Flemish Parliament and also have 11 of the 150 seats in the Belgian House of Representatives.

Cyprus
The ELAM (National People's Front) (Εθνικό Λαϊκό Μέτωπο) was formed in 2008 on the platform of maintaining Cypriot identity, opposition to further European integration, immigration and the status quo that remains due to Turkey's invasion of a third of the island (and the international community's lack of intention to solve the issue).

Denmark
In the early 1970s, the home of the strongest right-wing populist party in Europe was in Denmark, the Progress Party. In the 1973 election, it received almost 16% of the vote. In the following years, its support dwindled away, but was replaced by the Danish People's Party in the 1990s, which has gone on to be an important support party for the governing Liberal-Conservative coalition in the 2000s (decade). The Danish People's Party is the largest and most influential right-wing populist party in Denmark today. It won 37 seats in the Danish general election, 2015 and became the second largest party in Denmark. The Danish People's Party advocates immigration reductions, particularly from non-Western countries, favor cultural assimilation of first generation migrants into Danish society and are opposed to Denmark becoming a multicultural society.

Additionally, the Danish People's Party's stated goals are to enforce a strict rule of law, to maintain a strong welfare system for those in need, to promote economic growth by strengthening education and encouraging people to work and in favor of protecting the environment. In 2015, The New Right was founded, but they have not yet participated in an election.

Finland
In Finland, the Finns Party is the main right-wing populist party and the second largest party in Finland. In 2017, 19 of the 37 MPs from the party split and founded Blue Reform.

France
In France, the main right-wing populist party is the National Front. Since Marine Le Pen's election at the head of the party in 2011, the National Front has established itself as one of the main political parties in France and also as the strongest and most successful populist party of Europe as of 2015.[59]

Le Pen finished second in the 2017 election and lost in the second round of voting versus Emmanuel Macron which was held on 7 May 2017.

Hungary

The Hungarian parliamentary election, 2018 result was a victory for the Fidesz–KDNP alliance, preserving its two-thirds majority with Viktor Orbán remaining Prime Minister. Orbán and Fidesz campaigned primarily on the issues of immigration and foreign meddling, and the election was seen as a victory for right-wing populism in Europe.[60][61][62]

Germany

Since 2013, the most popular right-wing populist party in Germany has been Alternative for Germany which managed to finish third in the 2017 German federal election, making it the first right-wing populist party to enter the Bundestag, Germany's national parliament. Before, right-wing populist parties had gained seats in German State Parliaments only. Left-wing populism is represented in the Bundestag by The Left party.

On a regional level, right-wing populist movements like Pro NRW and Citizens in Rage (Bürger in Wut, BIW) sporadically attract some support. In 1989, The Republicans (Die Republikaner) led by Franz Schönhuber entered the Abgeordnetenhaus of Berlin and achieved more than 7% of the German votes cast in the 1989 European election, with six seats in the European Parliament. The party also won seats in the Landtag of Baden-Württemberg twice in 1992 and 1996, but after 2000 the Republicans' support eroded in favour of the far-right German People's Union and the Neo-Nazi National Democratic Party of Germany (NPD), which in the 2009 federal election held 1.5% of the popular vote (winning up to 9% in regional Landtag parliamentary elections).

In 2005, a nationwide Pro Germany Citizens' Movement (Pro Deutschland) was founded in Cologne. The Pro Germany movement appears as a conglomerate of numerous small parties, voters' associations and societies, distinguishing themselves by campaigns against Islamic extremism and Muslim immigrants. Its representatives claim a zero tolerance policy and the combat of corruption. With the denial of a multiethnic society (Überfremdung) and the evocation of an alleged islamization, their politics extend to far-right positions. Other minor right-wing populist parties include the German Freedom Party founded in 2010, the former East German German Social Union (DSU) and the dissolved Party for a Rule of Law Offensive (“Schill party”).

Greece

The most prominent right-wing populist party in Greece is the Independent Greeks (ANEL).[64][65] Despite being smaller than the more extreme Golden Dawn party, after the January 2015 legislative elections ANEL formed a governing coalition with the left-wing Coalition of the Radical Left (SYRIZA), thus making the party a governing party and giving it a place in the Cabinet of Alexis Tsipras.[66]
The Golden Dawn has grown significantly in Greece during the country's economic downturn, gaining 7% of the vote and 18 out of 300 seats in the Hellenic Parliament. The party's ideology includes annexation of territory in Albania and Turkey, including the Turkish cities of Istanbul and Izmir. Controversial measures by the party included a poor people's kitchen in Athens which only supplied to Greek citizens and was shut down by the police.

The Popular Orthodox Rally is not represented in the Greek legislature, but supplied 2 of the country's 22 MEPS until 2014. It supports anti-globalisation and lower taxes for small businesses as well as opposition to Turkish accession to the European Union and the Republic of Macedonia's use of the name Macedonia as well as immigration only for Europeans. Its participation in government has been one of the reasons why it became unpopular with its voters who turned to Golden Dawn in Greece's 2012 elections.

**Italy**

In Italy, the most prominent right-wing populist party is Lega Nord (LN), whose leaders reject the right-wing label, though not the "populist" one. LN is a federalist, regionalist and sometimes secessionist party, founded in 1991 as a federation of several regional parties of Northern and Central Italy, most of which had arisen and expanded during the 1980s. LN's program advocates the transformation of Italy into a federal state, fiscal federalism and greater regional autonomy, especially for the Northern regions. At times, the party has advocated for the secession of the North, which it calls Padania. The party generally takes an anti-Southern Italian stance as members are known for opposing Southern Italian emigration to Northern Italian cities, stereotyping Southern Italians as welfare abusers and detrimental to Italian society and attributing Italy's economic troubles and the disparity of the North-South divide in the Italian economy to supposed inherent negative characteristics of the Southern Italians, such as laziness, lack of education or criminality. Certain LN members have been known to publicly deploy the offensive slur "terrotone", a common pejorative term for Southern Italians that is evocative of negative Southern Italian stereotypes. As a federalist, regionalist, populist party of the North, LN is also highly critical of the centralized power and political importance of Rome, sometimes adopting to a lesser extent an anti-Roman stance in addition to an anti-Southern stance.

With the rise of immigration into Italy since the late 1990s, LN has increasingly turned its attention to criticizing mass immigration to Italy. The LN, which also opposes illegal immigration, is critical of Islam and proposes Italy's exit from the Eurozone, is considered a Eurosceptic movement and as such it joined the Europe of Freedom and Democracy (EFD) group in the European Parliament after the 2009 European Parliament election. LN was or is part of the national government in 1994, 2001–2006, 2008–2011 and 2018-present. Most recently, the party, which notably includes among its members the Presidents of Lombardy and Veneto, won 17.4% of the vote in the 2018 general election, becoming the third-largest party in Italy (largest within the centre-right coalition). In the 2014 European election, under the leadership of Matteo Salvini it took 6.2% of votes. Under Salvini, the party has to some extent embraced Italian nationalism and emphasised Euroscepticism, opposition to immigration and other "populist" policies, while forming an alliance with right-wing populist parties in Europe.

Silvio Berlusconi, leader of Forza Italia and Prime Minister of Italy from 1994–1995, 2001–2006 and 2008–2011, has sometimes been described as a right-wing populist, although his party is not typically described as such.

A number of national conservative, nationalist and arguably right-wing populist parties are strong especially in Lazio, the region around Rome and Southern Italy. Most of them are heirs of the Italian Social Movement (a post-fascist party, whose best result was 8.7% of the vote in the 1972 general election) and its successor National Alliance (which reached 15.7% of the vote in 1996 general election). They include the Brothers of Italy (2.0% in 2013), The Right (0.6%), New Force (0.3%), CasaPound (0.1%), Tricolour Flame (0.1%), Social Idea Movement (0.01%) and Progetto Nazionale (0.01%).
Additionally, in the German-speaking South Tyrol the local second-largest party, Die Freiheitlichen, is often described as a right-wing populist party.

Netherlands

In the Netherlands, right-wing populism was represented in the 150-seat House of Representatives in 1982, when the Centre Party won a single seat. During the 1990s, a splinter party, the Centre Democrats, was slightly more successful, although its significance was still marginal. Not before 2002 did a right-wing populist party break through in the Netherlands, when the Pim Fortuyn List won 26 seats and subsequently formed a coalition with the Christian Democratic Appeal (CDA) and People's Party for Freedom and Democracy (VVD). Fortuyn, who had strong views against immigration, particularly by Muslims, was assassinated in May 2002, two weeks before the election. The coalition had broken up by 2003, and the party went into steep decline until it was dissolved.

Since 2006, the Party for Freedom (PVV) has been represented in the House of Representatives. Following the 2010 general election, it has been in a pact with the right-wing minority government of CDA and VVD after it won 24 seats in the House of Representatives. The party is Eurosceptic and plays a leading role in the changing stance of the Dutch government towards European integration as they came second in the 2009 European Parliament election, winning 4 out of 25 seats. The party's main programme revolves around strong criticism of Islam, restrictions on migration from new European Union countries and Islamic countries, pushing for cultural assimilation of migrants into Dutch society, opposing the accession of Turkey to the European Union, advocating for the Netherlands to withdraw from the European Union and advocating for a return to the guilder through ending Dutch usage of the euro.

The PVV withdrew its support for the First Rutte cabinet in 2012 after refusing to support austerity measures. This triggered the 2012 general election in which the PVV was reduced to 15 seats and excluded from the new government.

In the Dutch general election, 2017, Wilders' PVV gained an extra five seats to become the second largest party in the Dutch House of Representatives, bringing their total to 20 seats.

From 2017 onwards, the Forum for Democracy has emerged as another right-wing populist force in the Netherlands.

Poland

The largest right-wing populist party in Poland is Law and Justice, which currently holds both the presidency and a governing majority in the Sejm. It combines social conservatism and criticism of immigration with strong support for NATO and an interventionist economic policy.

Polish Congress of the New Right, headed by Michał Marusik, aggressively promotes fiscally conservative concepts like radical tax reductions preceded by abolishment of social security, universal public healthcare, state-sponsored education and abolishment of Communist Polish 1944 agricultural reform as a way to dynamical economic and welfare growth. Due to lack of empirical and economic evidences presented by party leaders and members, the party is considered populist both by right-wing and left-wing publicists.

Sweden

The Sweden Democrats are the third largest party in Sweden.

Switzerland
Represented in national legislatures

- Australia – Coalition (factions)[126] Pauline Hanson's One Nation[127] Katter's Australian Party[127]
- Austria – Freedom Party of Austria[128] Team Stronach[129]
- Belarus – Liberal Democratic Party
- Belgium – Vlaams Belang[130] People's Party[131]
- Bosnia and Herzegovina– Bosnian-Herzegovinian Patriotic Party[132]
- Brazil – Social Liberal Party
- Canada - Conservative Party (factions)[135][136][137][138][139]
- Croatia – Croatian Democratic Alliance of Slavonia and Baranja
- Cyprus – ELAM,[140] Solidarity Movement
- Czech Republic – Freedom and Direct Democracy
- Denmark – Danish People’s Party[141][128][142]
- Estonia – Conservative People’s Party of Estonia[143][141]
- European Union – Movement for a Europe of Nations and Freedom European Alliance for Freedom Alliance for Direct Democracy in Europe Alliance of Conservatives and Reformists in Europe (factions)
- Finland – Finns Party[128][141]
- France – National Front[128][142] The Republicans (factions)
- Georgia – Alliance of Patriots of Georgia
- Germany - Alternative for Germany[141][128]
- Greece – Golden Dawn[144] Independent Greeks[141][64]
- India – Bharatiya Janata Party[146] Shiv Sena[147]
- Italy – Lega Nord[128][148] Brothers of Italy, Five Star Movement (factions), Forza Italia (factions)[141][149]
- Israel – Likud (factions)[150], Yisrael Beiteinu[150], The Jewish Home
- Japan – Liberal Democratic Party (factions)[151]
- Kenya – The National Alliance
- Latvia – National Alliance[152][141]
- Liechtenstein – The Independents[153][154]
- Lithuania – Order and Justice[141][155]
- Luxembourg – Alternative Democratic Reform Party[156]
- Mozambique – Mozambican National Resistance
- Netherlands – Party for Freedom[130]
- New Zealand – New Zealand First
- Norway – Progress Party[157]
- Philippines – Nacionalista Party
- Poland – Law and Justice[141] Kukiz’15 (Congress of the New Right)[158] Real Politics Union
- Russia – Liberal Democratic Party of Russia[159]
- Slovenia – Slovenian Democratic Party
- South Korea – Liberty Korea Party (factions)[169]
- Sweden – Sweden Democrats[128][141]
Ukraine – Svoboda[178][179]
United States – Republican Party(factions)[181][182][183]

Not represented in national legislatures
Australia – Shooters, Fishers and Farmers Party Australian Protectionist Party Rise Up Australia Australian Liberty Alliance
Austria – Alliance for the Future of Austria[129] Free Party Salzburg
Belgium – Libertair, Direct, Democratisch[185][186] VLOTT
Brazil – Brazilian Labour Renewal Party
Bulgaria – Bulgaria Without Censorship[141]
Canada – Alliance of the North National Advancement Party of Canada
Croatia – Croatian Party of Rights Croatian Party of Rights Dr Ante Starčević
Denmark – Progress Party[188]
Finland – Blue and White Front
France – Alsace First
Greece – Popular Orthodox Rally[197][198]
Iceland – Icelandic National Front
Ireland – Direct Democracy Ireland[199][200][201] Identity Ireland National Party (unregistered)
Japan – Party for Japanese Kokoro
Malta – Movement Patrijotti Maltin
Montenegro – Party of Serb Radicals
Netherlands – Forza! Nederland
Poland – Liberty[158]
Portugal – National Renovator Party Portugal Pro-Life
Serbia – Hungarian Hope Movement People’s Peasant Party
Slovenia – Slovenian National Party
Spain – Vox, Platform for Catalonia[207]
Switzerland – Freedom Party of Switzerland
Transnistria – Liberal Democratic Party of Pridnestrovie
Ukraine – Congress of Ukrainian Nationalists
United Kingdom – British National Party[208][209]
United States – Constitution Party, American Freedom Party

Former right-wing populist parties or parties with right-wing populist factions
Outline of right-wing populism

- Alt-right
- Brexit
- Euroscepticism
- Left-wing populism
- National conservatism
- New nationalism (21st century)
- Opposition to immigration
- Outline of right-wing populism
- Paleoconservatism
- Radical right
- Right-wing authoritarianism
- Traditional conservatism

See also

- Belgium – National Front, Vlaams Blok
- Canada – Union Nationale (Quebec) Action démocratique du Québec, Canadian Alliance, Social Credit Party, Wildrose Party (Alberta)
- Cyprus – New Horizons
- Czech Republic – Public Affairs, Dawn - National Coalition
- Denmark – Progress Party
- Germany – German People's Union
- European Union – Movement for a Europe of Liberties and Democracy
- Iceland – Citizens' Party
- Italy – National Alliance
- Netherlands – Centre Democrats, Pim Fortuyn List
- Spain – Independent Liberal Group
- Sweden – New Democracy
- Switzerland – Party of Farmers, Traders and Independents
- Syria – Arab Liberation Movement
- United Kingdom – National Democrats

Notes

30. Norris 2005, p. 44.


40. Mondon, Aurélien (2013). The Mainstreaming of the Extreme Right in France and Australia. Routledge. "If ... Abbott failed to satisfy the electorate he has assuaged with his right-wing populism, a return to more traditionally extreme politics could be a real possibility."


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96. Skenderovic 2009, p. 124: "... and prefers to use terms such as 'national-conservative' or 'conservative-right' in defining the SVP. In particular, 'national-conservative' has gained prominence among the definitions used in Swiss research on the SVP".


"Groundswell of right-wing populism will test our Canadian resolve, readers say" (https://www.thestar.com/opinion/letters_to_the_editors/2016/11/26/groundswell-of-right-wing-populism-will-test-our-canadian-resolve-readers-say.html)


"Kellie Leitch latches on to Trump victory" (http://www.macleans.ca/politics/ottawa/kellieleitch-latches-on-to-trump-victory/).


144. Antonis Galanopoulos: Greek right-wing populist parties and Euroscepticism. (https://eu.boell.org/sites/default/files/greek_right_wing_populist_parties_and_euroscepticism.pdf), p.2 "Golden Dawn is also Eurosceptical and it is opposing Greece's participation in the European Union and the Eurozone"


152. Auers; Kasekamp, *Comparing Radical-Right Populism in Estonia and Latvia*. 235–236


References


Ignazi, Piero (2002). "The Extreme Right: Defining the Object and Assessing the Causes". In Schain, Martin; Zolberg, Aristide R.; Hossay, Patrick. Shadows over Europe: The
Further reading


External links
