|
Editorials Blog Index | SocioSphere™ | MarkFoster.NETwork™
Tuesday,July 10,2007
Editorials Blog Index | SocioSphere™ | MarkFoster.NETwork™ Tuesday,July 10,2007 |
Quote:
PS. hehehe, I loled at your feminist classifications. Radical and seperatists are traditionally the same, and stem from the second wave.
Okay, I will check a few things and then most likely combine them.
Quote:
And what the f**k are AMAZONS? Hahaha, that's a new one to me.
It is a small movement, mostly on the Internet, inspired by the TV show, Xena. They have a few Yahoo! groups.
Quote:
Also Liberal feminism is more characterised by the notion of working within the the system of government, I don't think you emphasis that enough in your definition.
Okay.
Quote:
Postmodern feminism is not queer theory feminism, I have to totally disagree with you here. Queer theory stems from psychoanalysis more then anything. Butler's work is not inspired by post modernism, it is founded on engagement with psychoanalysis, first and foremostly. Postmodern feminism would have more to do with cyborgs etc with Haraway etc, even though that is slightly socialist in a way. You need to differentiate between postmodernism and psychoanalysis and post structuralism/deconstruction.
I did that because most of the folks I read who used the term "queer theory" identified themselves with pomo and poststructuralism (esp. Foucault). However, I will take another look at it.
Quote:
I think a way around this is to update that with references to the seminal texts of each feminism.
I could, but the page is for my freshman-level Introduction to Sociology students. I just spend about 1/2 an hour going over the categories with the page projected on the screen. (I give my students the URL, but I doubt that any of them go there.)
As someone who has gone through seven initiations in the Ordo Templi Orientis (Aleister Crowley's thelemic magick), I have observed considerable similarity between Nietzsche's Übermensch (superman or, literally, overman) and Aleister Crowley's concept of thelema (will). Perhaps it is just a coincidence, but I sometimes wonder whether Crowley modeled some of his philosophy on Nietzsche.
Incidentally, here is a bit of trivia: The twin creators of the Superman comic book character based him on Nietzsche's Übermensch. Since that time, Superman has been turned more into a personification of the American alpha male than the Übermensch, but so goes it.
>>Subjectivity is also a construction, in true nar-nar post structualist fashion (for those who don't get it was a joke that PSs always have a way to deconstruct everything).<<
Yes. However, I am often "accused" of being an epistemic subjective idealist by those unfamiliar with the distinctions which social theorists, such as myself (and presumably philosophers, as well), make between idealism and nominalism. Though Bishop Berkeley was both an idealist and nominalist, such a combination is rare. Personally, I do not find idealism to be particularly useful.
Quote:
There are two ways you can undermind a post structualist argument:
1) argue it isn't as new as it likes to think it is
2) PStructualist argue that empirical historians are imposing their views on the past when they research and make truth claims, but this is exactly what PS does when it claims there is no past; it serves to isolate people who lived prior to this theory, so in a way it is a tautology which constructs another ideology that places the PS as the all knowing, imparital practitioner. This "all-knowing" approach is exactly what they dislike about history disciplines!
IMO, there is much to be gained through melding aspects of poststructuralism, post-empiricism (aka post-positivism), and neopragmatism (Rorty).
For instance, in my own work, if a particular theory (say one of the social exchange theories) helps to explain reform in a particular religious organization, I can use it (neopragmatism), but that doesn't necessarily imply that it is the only theory which can do so (post-empiricism). Debating such unknowns, however, borders on metaphysical speculations which most nominalists would frown upon. Moreover, the play of power dynamics in all social discourse (Foucault) should give one pause before making overly ambitious statements about one's models.
Quote:
This doesn't help historians like myself because there have been very few historians who've really engaged with these theories on the practical level. As I said, sure Foucault was a historian, but he wasn't a good one and didn't lead by example with source analysis. The other historians like the feminist ones get too caught up in the feminist political debates to think about source anaylsis, the ground work of a historian. This is the theoretical area I'm look at in my research.
History was my Ph.D. "minor." (My alma mater required the selection of a minor at the time.) IMO, there is no reason why poststructuralism, source analysis, and textual criticism cannot be compatible on the level of epistemic (and ontological) nominalism. In any event, most historical research would fall under what Kantian philosopher, Wilhelm Windelband, referred to as idiographic (contingent) knoweldge, as opposed to nomothetic (generalizing) knoweldge. Poststructuralism, like other approaches to nominalism, assumes contingency.
Quote:
Nietzsche was the first antihumanist, if anything.
Yes, and Aleister Crowley (founder of thelemic magick), whom I have studied in depth (participant-observational/ethnographic research), virtually embodied Nietzsche's Übermensch as a master mythopoeist.
Quote:
It's common, but it is bantered about too often... for instance, in historical circles they're just catching onto performativity re Bulter, and hardcore PS theories are described as "the linguistic turn", rah rah... as if it needs to be watered down.
The linguist turn was in the 1970s! ;-) However, similar debates are occurring in most of the social sciences and humanities. In literary criticism, one of the principal debates is between the more traditional (and formalistic) "new criticism" and the "new historicism" which is explicitly poststructural.
Quote:
I think they confuse the notion of idealism with the freedom you get once you realise there is not Reality reflected in language, but just languages' realities. It is a subversive, yet electrifying concept as it points out the potential humans have to shape their world and create healthier ideals.
Yes, or they confuse the epistemic relativism of poststructuralism (which is basically what you described) with the ontological relativism of some NRMs (new religious movements), e.g., all paths lead to God.
Quote:
I think you give too much credit to secondwave feminism, as it was the feminism that entrenched the universial notion of a woman. A woman who is black, working class, disabled, etc, but still essentially a WOMAN.
I put together an outline for my students on the feminisms and "masculisms" a few years back:
http://gendermovements.structurization.com/
The dominant tendency among second-wave feminists was essentialist. However, there was also a Black feminism which developed simultaneously (some would argue much earlier especially with those Black women rooted in the Mid-Southern, rather than Southeastern, states) with middle-class white feminism. Alice Walker's 1983 term for that Black feminism "womanism" has usually be adopted for it.
In my field, the simplistic notion of "the oppressors" vs. "the oppressed" has largely been replaced with more nuanced views of a matrix of domination. A person who might occupy an oppressor category (status) in one context might occupy the position of an oppressed person in another.
Quote:
I teach too, and have done with a lot of American students, and I think it is easier for them to consider secondwave feminism then it is for them to understand Butler. I usually start with the three waves approach, yet as soon as I start to challenge the notion of sexed bodies i.e that there is no real difference between sex and gender (as second wavers argue, and as Butler refutes), you can see the unease in their eyes. However, I can speak for myself, and for a few of my students, who go "oh yes that's exactly how I feel".
I deal with the same issues in my Social Problems lectures. I begin each semester with: "I wanted to inform you that you have signed up for a class on something which does not exist." ;-)
Quote:
Maybe I'm a little more extreme then you, but I disagree when I hear you say "I would like to see all categories regarding individuals reconstructed from an anti-essentialist perspective, i.e., no universal essences of AS, of femininity, of masculinity, etc." You can have no universal essences of femininity and masculinity, but you still have the notion of female and male and so long as you still have to dicotomies linger, you still have power invested in gender subordination.
IMO, rejecting universal essences (in any sense other than Locke's nominal essences) is revolutionary, but more on that later.
When referring to deconstruction, I have in mind, not only a thought experiment, but a direct challenge to the ontological reality of all categories, including sex and gender (and AS for that matter). These categories are not real, but, IMO, the tropes (attributes) of the particulars they are classifying may or may not be genuine.
Is AS high-functioning autism? Is it a separate "disorder"? Does it merely point to genetic diversity and is not a disorder at all? Should it be incorporated into a new category, the obsessive-compulsive spectrum disorders (being proposed for the DSM V)? How many sexes are there? One? Two? Five? Each of these questions can be answered affirmatively or negatively depending on one's rubrics. In other words, once Aristotle's essences are rejected, his law of noncontradiction also collapses.
Each semester, I tell my students that I reject the war on terror (not that I think we should do a better job fighting terrorism but that I thoroughly reject the category itself). Rejecting received knowledge as true in essence is revolutionary - and can serve to distinguish a revolution from a mere coup d'etat.
Quote:
As for this comment: "Yes, well, obviously, the AS construct poses more of a threat to normative social constructions of femininity than of masculinity", I also disagree as I think it is equally difficult for women and men.
Perhaps. I was just diagnosed with AS a couple of months ago and am only now beginning to familiarize myself with the literature on the subject.
Quote:
The only difference is that PC police trying to avoid the ontological parameters Asperger himself set up while still using his diagnostic criterions minus the male specification. At least women show the fluidity of engendered notions of empathy more, and this where I think a paper on poststructualism, gender and Aspergers is sorely needed. It's ok for men not to have it, they just lack, and can be retrained into thinking a certain way, whereas women who don't have it are defunct and can't ever be acculturated to the acceptable social level (does this ring any Lacanian bells? {).
Yes, my point was that women have been classically defined by their empathy - by their alleged possession of the (fictive) maternal instinct. AS may be perceived of robbing women of their supposed "womanhood."
Quote:
anti-humanism, which is the position N is arguing from, rejects empiricism because empiricism is based on notions of logical evidence and the notion that because we experience something we can pull a truth from it. A true, uncompromising poststructualist would say there is no such thing as evidence, whether it is drawn from discourses of rationality, or the senses, as evidence is imbued with meaning in the here and now, and our very senses are constructs; heightened and dulled during different historical periods. Temporality is incorporated with this, as empiricism preempts a particular understanding of time which makes sense-evidence evaluation meaningful (the very heart of empiricism).
Back in the late 1970s and early 1980s, when I was in graduate school, there was tremendous optimism that, before reaching the 21st century, sociologists would have made considerable headway toward resolving many social problems. (It is no accident that Comte selected the term "positivism" for his post-Newtonian approach.) The gradual acceptance of post-positivism among many former positivists, and others, reflects considerable skepticism with positivism. (Positivists have sometimes been mocked as "the sunshine boys and girls" among other sociologists.)
What I would say is (with apologies to Kuhn) that evidence is paradigm-specific. It is grounded in textuality. Once one moves to another text or narrative, the standards of evidence might change, too. This approach avoids metaphysical speculations concerning issues of isomorphism.
Quote:
Post structuralism, Nietzsche, Foucault, and anti-humanism are my long running obsessions.
Very cool. Many people do not recognize that "the postisms" are, for the most part, anti-humanist. That is to say, they reject the concept of a universal human nature.
Quote:
For the first post raised in this thread, I totally agree and have been thinking this since I first thought I may have AS. And your Foucault-inspired theory would be further evidenced when you think about the experiences of female aspies, how they mimic the world and how AS has been engendered as the "male geek".
Not only AS, but most dialogues about socially constructed categories have been framed in a patriarchal context. Personally, I would like to see all categories regarding individuals reconstructed from an anti-essentialist perspective, i.e., no universal essences of AS, of femininity, of masculinity, etc.
Quote:
Even though these stereotypes are challenged in the literature today, I find the overtones still exist.
Sure, because the essentialism, the ontological realism, remains. Most of my students are not old enough to remember the feminist movements of the 1960s and 1970s. Yet, they still seem to believe in two sex-typed "natures." However, their descriptions of those alleged natures differ considerably from their modes of construction a generation ago.
Quote:
It makes me hesitant as a female to get a diagnosis because I am not convinced I will be looked at as person, but rather as a defunct woman/person because I "can't" exhibit empathy the way society expects a woman to. Does this mean I can't feel? Of course not, I am incredibly empathic and have a social conscious, but not over trivial matters.... In fact, Aspies are the ideal poststructualist gender case study, if there ever was one..
Yes, well, obviously, the AS construct poses more of a threat to normative social constructions of femininity than of masculinity. So be it. The assault on fixed gender roles largely stalled in the 1970s. If juxtaposing AS with femininity can aid in the deconstruction of universal notions of essential human natures, then perhaps it should be explored further (aside from its personal benefit to certain individuals).
Quote:
I would strongly advise you to read some of Judith Bulter's work.
I have done so and refer to her views when lecturing on sex and gender roles.
Quote:
I love the ideas Foucault teased out, however, he wasn't a good historian, and this makes it hard for my own work, but I digress.
Right, neither was Marx. As a critical poststructuralist (viz., Marxist Foucaultian), I have to deal with both problems.
Cheers,
Mark
When it comes to sex, the only definition that's any useful is the biological one, and it's clear that there are only two biological sexes in humans.
Sex is biological. However, there is a debate among sexologists as to the number of sexes. See, for instance:
http://www.mtsu.edu/~phollowa/5sexes.html
and
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sexual_differentiation
Mark
What does it matter? Many people find these beliefs comforting. That is why I rarely discuss biblical myths (narratives) specifically. If some folks derive assurance from them, so be it.
IMO, "bed" is a construction. There are only particular objects, constructed by humans, which, in turn, are given that label. As with any label, there are generally parameters for inclusion. What, for instance, is the demarcation between a bed and a sofa? Even more difficult, where does drizzle end and light rain begin?
Similarly, gender and sexual orientation are social constructions. Many individuals actually fall somewhere on a continuum between gay and straight. Does one, on the one hand, define such a person as a bisexual or, on the other hand, ask which orientation, homosexual or heterosexual, their preference most clearly approximates? It is arbitrary and purely a matter of word definitions.
Similar points can be made about sex itself. For instance, some sexologists say that there are actually five distinct sexes, from one point of view, and only one sex (female), from another. Whether there are five sexes, two sexes, one sex, or perhaps some other enumeration depends, once again, on one's definitions.
Quote:
Okay, Nominalist. So what you're saying is that it's still a construction if there is a perfectly valid rationale? I'm partially worried about the danger of nominalism lapsing into solipsism, though, which is ultimately pretty useless.
Well, solipsism is akin to a kind of hyper-Kantianism, i.e., an extreme version of psychological constructivism (not to be confused with constructionism). I am a superadmin (super administrator) on a large chat service (a volunteer position), and I regularly run into people who say that reality is within or we each create our own realities. That is very different from social constructionism - whether the phenomenological sort advocated by Peter Berger (The Social Construction of Reality) or Michel Foucault's poststructural variety.
Quote:
Then again, I consider my entire perception of reality nothing but a construction that I designed using input from my senses, which some people might regard as a form of solipsism.
What you have just described sounds more to me like a moderate form of constructivism. Here is a nice summary of it:
http://www.funderstanding.com/constructivism.cfm
Solipsism, as usually defined, is more extreme than what you described. There are very few actual solipsists. Generally, the term solipsism is used by people to attack positions they disagree with.
Constructivism, on the other hand, is an increasingly popular approach in psychology.
Quote:
I deny that I have ever directly observed anything, and I maintain that everything that I have ever "seen" and "heard" is an attempt to rationalize these signals into meaningful information that may or may not be an accurate interpretation of the cause of the signals.
That is the view taken by Roy Bhaskar, a British philosopher. According to Bhaskar, there are three levels of awareness:
1. The Real: the structures hidden beyond our observations
2. The Actual: what we actually observe
3. The empirical: the process of observation.
Quote:
I don't deny the existence of an external world like a true solipsist, but I consider my interpretation of this data to be perpetually up for reconsideration.
Yes, that is a moderate constructivist (Kantian) approach.
Quote:
If I wanted to, I suppose I could form a multitude of different constructions of what I deem to be reality and hold them each to be valid, and I think that being able to do such a thing is what keeps religious people from going insane in a world in which a systematic reconstruction of the information which they've been exposed to entails could put a serious bug in their works if they insisted upon making the two different constructions work with each other. Is this similar to the thinking involved in nominalism?
What you just described could be either nominalist or realist (depending on your ontological assumptions). However, you are still describing what would be called a moderate constructivist (not constructionist), approach.
If he take him another wife; her food, her raiment, and her duty of marriage, shall he not diminish And if he do not these three unto her, then shall she go out free without money (Ex. 21:7-11).
I would obviously acknowledge that there are certain properties and laws which can be empirically observed. However, once we describe them and place them into a category (the EMS) and subcategoies (x-rays, ultraviolet, infared, UHF, VHF, etc.), they cease to be merely observed phenomena and become constructions. The term "indicant" is commonly used in research to distinguish phenomena from the scales and indices used to measure them.
Copyright © 2002- Mark A. Foster, Ph.D. All rights reserved.
|
