Altruism, Solidarity and Responsibility from a Committed Sociology: Contributions to Society

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Abstract

A careful look at the international development of Sociology highlights the centrality that the study of social problems and the approach to possible solutions to them have had in the history of this discipline, not infrequently for the sake of better social integration, stability, development, social change or even modernity. Recent approaches suggest shifting this focus of attention, arguing about the deficit in sociological research and practice concerning theoretical frameworks that pay attention to the positive aspects. This text reflects on the contributions that altruism, solidarity, and collective responsibility can have to improve the quality of life in contemporary societies and face humanitarian emergencies with a certain degree of success. For instance, the so-called refugee crisis or the current COVID-19 pandemic poses significant challenges for societies. This article also explores briefly new roles of data science in connection with responsibility and altruism. The text invites us to revisit sociology, thinking about the lights more than the shadows.

Keywords Altruism · Solidarity · Responsability · Common good · Refugees · COVID-19

In her recent book, Emiliana Mangone (2020) has reviewed the history of Sociological theory to explain how Sociology has approached the egoism and altruism dichotomy. She has proposed ways to overcome this dichotomy, drawing some lines that lead towards reinforcing approaches that promote a committed humanistic Sociology close to some developed notions of altruism in the Social Sciences.

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Based on some of her ideas, this article presents some reflections on how some connections can be found between sociological theorizing regarding altruism and current advances concerning approaches to the Common Good, prosocial behavior, and the renewal of Evolutionary Sociology in Social Sciences. Similarly, from a perspective that attempts to reflect on the certain naivety or lack of viability perceived in approaches such as Sorokin's creative altruism, we refer to two current examples: the so-called "refugee crisis in Europe" and the COVID-19 pandemic. Through these examples, we will try to make visible some of the contributions that the approaches mentioned above can make to Sociology and Society, but also some important limitations.

Sociology, Altruism and Committed Social Science

Although it has not been in the foreground in international sociological reflection throughout the development of Sociology, the question of altruism has a broad trajectory that connects with the official origin of this discipline (Jeffries & others, 2006). The use of the term 'altruism' is attributed to Comte, associating it with actions that benefit others who are different from the individual, opposing a classic idea of 'egoism', which focuses on the excessive emphasis on self or self-interest. In Comte's classic book on *A Discourse on the Positive Spirit*, altruism is associated with the positive spirit (as a positivism scientific thinking), as opposed to the egoism that he attributed to theological and metaphysical thought: "the positive spirit as the only one capable, by its nature, of directly developing the social sense, the first necessary basis of all healthy moral"… "For the positive spirit, man does not properly exist; only Humanity can exist" (Comte, 1982: 128, 130–131).

In an easy reading, altruism and egoism can seem two sides of the same coin: altruism, usually associated with generous social actions that are offered selflessly to others, compared to egoism, which sometimes leads to an excess of utilitarianism, sometimes guided by principles of survival that forget the benefit of everyone. In other interpretations, altruism and egoism may represent different nuances. Ferrater (1994: 129–130) recalls two ideas that are associated with the origin of altruism. The first is that when altruism serves the community's interests, it responds to its interests in such a way that "to be an altruist is to be a sui generis egoist" (own translation). The second idea states that utilitarianism is not the basis of altruism, but the opposite: altruism connects with social impulses rather than with individual ones, essential in the human being.

In Comte's vision (1982) and his exaltation of the positive or scientific spirit, in front of previous forms of thought, the altruistic attempt to achieve the public good "will become the source of personal happiness" (p. 131), as something which inevitably derives from his deductive scheme. Perhaps an important nuance is pointed out by Mangone (2020) in her recent book, *Beyond the Dichotomy Between Altruism and Egoism. Society, Relationship, and Responsibility*, when she states that Comte theorized that "human altruism is a natural instinct similar to egoism. They differ particularly for one aspect, the latter tending to the conservation of the individual, while altruism is oriented to the conservation of the species sometimes playing a major role in the maintenance and social development of mankind" (Mangone, 2020:87).

However, whether altruism is a kind of "group egoism" or a genuine social impulse, from the perspective of social action and its effects on society, beyond the moral principles or underlying interests that sustain them, it seems that an action designed to benefit the others, the community, could potentially have more valuable effects globally than an action aimed at an individual benefit. In times of historical crisis, as is the case currently posed by the COVID-19 pandemic, altruist actions could be decisive for the future of Humanity.

With more or fewer roots in these ideas, throughout the sociological discipline, altruism or related concepts such as solidarity have been in one way or another present in classical authors of Sociology. Durkheim is perhaps an outstanding example. His writings on integration/disintegration and different types of solidarity in society, with altruism as a critical factor in understanding some of his types of suicide, where the degree of social integration becomes an element that prevents it (Durkheim, 1985). An in-depth review of the contributions to this question from the classics can be found in Mangone's book (2020).

In recent years, scientific productivity has increased in this field of study, having suggested proposals to create a specialization in thematic axes related to altruism, solidarity, and social morality (Jeffrey et al., 2006), arguing that there has been a kind of rediscovery of altruism by the social sciences, which becomes an analytical construct of them (Mangone, 2020). On the one hand, classic ideas of sociology are revisited, and on the other, new fields of work or application are suggested. In other disciplines, such as economics or psychology, although altruism is not taken as the central axis, other conceptualizations that have relevance stand out, such as those related to the Common Good or the prosocial behavior (Ostrom, 1990; Ostrom et al., 1993; Ostrom, 2009; Ostrom, 2010; Felber, 2012; Gómez y Gómez-Alvárez, 2016; Schroeder & Graziano, 2015). The following pages will pay attention briefly to some connections of interest of these approaches.

However, the rediscovery of altruism is very uneven if we look at the development of international sociology. In some cases, Pitirim Sorokin, considered one of the predecessors and founding leaders of the specialization in altruism, morality, and social solidarity, with Tolstoy, Addams, and Gandhi (Nichols, 2014: 149), has been an inspiration for some contemporary sociologists. The influence of Sorokin, a Russian-born sociologist who serves as Professor of Sociology at Harvard and much of whose scientific production is still much unknown in part of the international sociology, was largely overshadowed by the predominant functionalism in the United States since the mid-twentieth century.

Nichols (1989) reminds us of Sorokin's evolution as "a case analysis of the deviant career in sociology", explaining how his work passed from sweet moments "from positive deviance, discovery and rise stage" (1924–1930) to his progressive stigmatization and long eclipse, so that, at the end of his career, there was a phase of "rediscovery, reconciliation and return" (1963–1968). At that time, sociology was more entrenched in science and academia.

Sorokin, in his proposal on *The Reconstruction of Humanity* (1958), from a framework where society, culture and personality are conceived in an interrelated way as the "indivisible sociocultural trinity" (1958: 91), sets out some lines for the regeneration of humanity. Compared to other approaches of that time, perhaps one of the main contributions of Sorokin's analysis, seen with the eyes of more than 60 years later to

his writings, is his commitment to altruism, as a necessary element to save or "Cure" -in his words- the humanity. This approach connects with his other writings, highlighting the crucial power of love in this reconstruction (Mangone & Dolgov, 2020). Sorokin (1958: 61) rightly states that: "No human group can survive without a minimum of altruistic conduct among its members". Moreover, his diagnosis that the actions undertaken at that time in the world were not going to lead to peace was not wrong. Wars and other calamities continue in the world. Another question, in a book that is dedicated to Gandhi and whose prologue recalls: "Bleeding from war wounds and frightened by the atomic Frankensteins of destruction, humanity is desperately looking for a way out of deathtrap" (p. 8), is perhaps the extreme confidence that Sorokin shows in altruism and love, or the viability of love in a world context that is, unfortunately, to a great extent exceptionally cruel at times, and very utilitarian at other times, frequently reminding us to Hobbes (2005), with his classic expression of selfishness in Leviathan ("man is a wolf to man").

However, it is essential to remember that Sorokin defines different types of altruism and argues that altruism occurs with different intensities in Society. "Genuine altruism," from his perspective, is pure altruism and is characterized by its non-utilitarian motivation. Moreover, it is wise and creative altruism, both objectively and subjectively, devoid of harm to others, as the acts are motivated only by continuous and lasting love. In Sorokin's vision, the maximum degree of altruism would be inseparable from creativity, compared to other types of behavior (Sorokin, 1958: 62–67). Pure or genuine altruism, for some authors, cannot exist -or is practically impossible- (Spencer, 1873), and even it is not possible to be scientifically measured (Bykov, 2017). In Spencer's words: "So that, pure altruism in a society implies a nature which makes pure altruism impossible, from the absence of those towards whom it may be exercised!" (1873:570).

Nowadays, it is difficult to think about the viability of love or altruism when looking at the daily problems surrounding us. However, on the international scene, influential institutions have been putting forward proposals along these lines, although they are not very successful if we remember the continuous armed conflicts, corruption, situations of poverty or other problems that international policies cannot solve. A significant example is provided by the international declaration of the United Nations in 2000 on the Millennium Development Goals that finally were not achieved (United Nations Development Programme, 2021). Currently, it is the Sustainable Development Goals, approved in 2015, that continue this line of work through the United Nations Development Program, with new challenges because of COVID-19 (United Nations, Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner, 2021; United Nations, 2020; United Nations Development Program, 2021).

Although, perhaps, one can generically agree with Sorokin's view when he stated that: "At the present juncture of human history, a notable increase of an unselfish, creative love (goodness) in the superorganic world is the paramount need of humanity" (Sorokin, 1960, p. 184), a look at history and the current situation requires asking ourselves about the viability of creative altruism to solve Humanity's problems, or if -better- other instruments of international policy would be equally necessary to be promoted (as, for instance, the above mentioned, and many others). In Mangone's recent proposal (2020: 196), it is stated that although "it is not possible to imagine a world without selfish

relationships," ... "it is possible to imagine a world in which the negative consequences of these relationships are reduced to a minimum". The assignment for Social Sciences and Sociology is, perhaps, to follow a path framed in the obligation to act from an "ethics of responsibility" (p. 187) and from a "Committed humanistic sociology" (Mangone & Dolgov, 2020, Mangone, 2020). The challenge that opens here would be to begin to draw concrete lines of work that make it possible, in a realistic way, to reach these goals.

Theoretical Frameworks that Address Altruism and Solidarity Advantages to Benefit Individuals, Communities, and Societies

Prosocial Behavior

In addition to classical approaches or authors such as those mentioned above, the Social Sciences have been incorporating theoretical approaches that provide a certain degree of optimism or possibilities for the future, identifying elements prone to generosity rather than selfishness in people, communities, or societies. An example of this is the approach that highlights prosocial behavior that seeks to know why there are altruistic people whose acts favor others more than oneself (Schroeder & Graziano, 2015). Knowing the origin and causes of altruism can help to promote this generous and beneficial conduct for humanity. With a more psychological approach and focused on prosocial behavior, understood as the antonym of antisocial (in Batson, 1987), in recent years attention has been devoted to improving our understanding of why people act to benefit or help others in different social instances. That is the case of the contributions in the *Oxford Handbook of Prosocial Behavior*, edited by Schroeder and Graziano (2015), which directly reminds us of contributions such as Sorokin's in Sociology. Altruism broadly aligns equally with prosocial behaviors such as donating, sharing, cooperating, or helping. Wittek and Bekkers (2015) explain that prosocial behavior entails costs for the self and benefits for others. However, they clarify that although prosocial behavior is purely behavioral, altruism has motivational and behavioral components. In this sense, one can remember with Bykov (2017) different approaches in the study of altruism (as motivation, in psychology; behavior in evolutionary studies, or other approaches more linked to normative or structural components, as in sociology).

Prosocial behavior, it is argued, is key to achieving the well-being of human groups. Recently, the development of this idea is internationally influenced by evolutionary science, promoting social change (see, for example, in Prosocial World, 2021, https://www.prosocial.world/). Furthermore, this approach enhances the importance of cooperation and collaboration of social groups in different areas (Biglan, 2015, Prosocial Word, 2021). Clark et al. (2015) highlight that prosocial behavior is defined as the attempt by one person to promote well-being or prevent well-being from deteriorating. To achieve this end, they emphasize that the relational context is key to shaping relationships. The relational context of the interaction is also crucial because it defines the

rules and norms that guide behavior. In this way, people act differently depending on the context in which they find themselves.

Common Goods

On the other hand, while some approaches have focused their attention on altruism or the orientation towards benefiting others through prosocial perspectives, other lines of research has also highlighted how, at the community level, a common good approach in the management of common property assets provide social capital and advantages with social self-organization, producing positive effects for society.

In recent years, one prominent approach is focused on the common goods, based on the works of Ostrom and other authors (Ostrom, 1990; Ostrom et al., 1993; Ostrom, 2009; Ostrom, 2010; Felber, 2012), who highlight the importance of aspects of auto-organization for the improvement of the survival of some communities. In this case, which has macroeconomic and social dimensions, in connection with micro and meso elements, work for the common good represents in a certain way a type of organization that is committed to present and future survival. Cooperation in sharing resources from the shared pool is seen as the key here for the survival of the communities. Elenor Ostrom documents international examples of the advantages of "governing the commons" in places as diverse as Kenya, Guatemala, Nepal, Turkey, and Los Angeles. An essential element in this approach, which connects to some dimensions of altruism, is the argument that the commons can be governed sustainably and equitably in a community. The idea of equity or the proposal that 'common goods' are adapted to local needs represents a connection with the idea of altruism as it goes beyond self-interest trying to solve community problems and personal necessities.

Evolutionary Sociology

In another line of thought, the new Evolutionary Sociology, it is found that some authors reincorporate in sociology, parallel to other advances in other scientific fields, the look towards biology. Proposals have been made for the theoretical reconstruction of the sociological discipline from this line of evolutionary sociology. For example, Schutt and Turner (2019) and Turner et al. (2020) suggest that some paradigms from the past may be helpful to increase our understanding of human beings. There is a reformulation of these approaches, arguing that sociology has the opportunity to develop its own evolutionary focus, an approach to biology, as has been done in economics or psychology, for example. In this context, the idea of natural selection persists but is reconceived as "multi-level selection." Multi-level selection is a central aspect in the new evolutionary sociology, with claims to examine the relationships between biological and sociocultural elements.

Hopcroft (2016), for example, refers to the great challenge of evolutionary sociology and biosociology, areas in which it is sought to examine the interaction of environmental and social factors with biological ones. She argues that social behavior can be explained by considering both cultural and biological aspects since they are not exclusive, insofar as human culture results from our biological nature (Hopcroft, 2016). Along with other authors, she argued that the founders of sociology did not deny the role of biology or the importance of evolution. Nevertheless, incorporating the

social Darwinian approach and sociobiology in the XX century -with ethnocentric, racist, fascist, or sexist purposes-, made the integration of sociology and biology difficult in the past (Hopcroft, 2016). The evolutionary sociology approach argues that the advancement of sociology as a social science involves reconnecting sociology with biology and the rest of life sciences after having learned history lessons.

This line of work, which seeks the return of evolutionary theory to sociology, is not without controversies (Ribeiro, 2009). For instance, the divergences between the community of sociobiologists and those aligned to evolutionary sociology. While the first come to build a second theory of social Darwinism, with great inspiration in approaches such as Wilson's sociobiology (2000), the second proposes evolutionary sociology trying not to renounce biology but to develop an approach with its socio-logical entity.

In discussions about the new evolutionary sociology or even biosociology, the question arises of how altruism is born and its role. That is, what explains the existence of altruistic behaviors between individuals who are not genetic relatives.

Apart from the doubts above exposed regarding whether Sorokin's genuine altruism may exist or not, perhaps an element of greater utility for sociology is considering the complexity of understanding how altruism emerges, or even if we are -as human beings- more selfish or altruistic. However, most important is for us to know how altruism and solidarity can be implemented for societal and community benefits with the support of institutions. In this sense, more than elements of a biological nature linked to evolution (or if you like, genetics), or behavioral (psychological), they are, in our view, the organizational and institutional aspects -understood in a broad sense-what truly matters to promote welfare in societies. On the other hand, ethical and moral elements are unavoidable at working with altruistic or solidarity approaches. They are needed if it is promoted a sociology committed to the well-being of people and the sustainability of communities.

Moreover, together with acting altruistically and supportively, it is necessary to draw a horizon of action based on respect for human rights or sustainability, for example, which goes beyond biological dimensions. In any case, independently if we consider altruistic notions, prosocial behaviors, or a focus aimed at preserving and enhancing common goods for the benefit of the community, these proposals have common elements. We refer basically to their trust in individual or organizational possibilities to contribute to the positive development of humanity.

Nevertheless, the lesson of history, or a simple look at contemporary reality, forces us to consider these approaches differently to a panacea due to the difficulties, which sometimes means putting altruism or solidarity into practice. A non-naive and non-deterministic perspective in the social, cultural, or biological spheres, seems equally essential given the abundant international experience regarding the difficulties of achieving equality, populations' well-being, or the eradication of violence itself. The revitalization of evolutionary sociology approaches, or even sociobiology, beyond our biological component may be undeniable, seems to us less valuable to understand the functioning of social and cultural processes embedded in social structures, some of which consolidated throughout history.

On the other hand, as we will expose through the following examples (on the "refugee crisis" and the COVID-19 pandemic), the difficulties and complexities (po-litical, social, economic, or cultural) involved in achieving solutions force the

institutions to take a position and develop actions far from biological processes. Actions much closer to establish parameters where the defense of freedom, human rights, or the development of sustainable goals are decisive. In this framework, a committed sociology, where values such as equity or solidarity are fundamental or altruistic behaviors become realities beyond biological notions, is critical.

In this sense, in the following pages, we try, very briefly, to refer precisely to two examples of international relevance that require caution regarding the scope or possibilities of short-term success of proposals based exclusively on some genuine altruism or prosocial behavior, idealized or naive.

Institutional Responsibility, Solidarity, and Altruism: On the Refugee Crisis

The recent humanitarian so-called "refugee crisis" in Europe, as a result of the fact that more than one million immigrants crossed the Mediterranean in 2015, escaping from situations such as armed conflicts or persecutions, and frequently risking their lives (BBC, 2016; European Parliament, 2021), is a significant example of international scope, and with great impact on some European societies in recent years. This crisis allows us to reflect briefly on how various aspects of institutional responsibility are linked to altruism and social solidarity. On the other hand, the crisis itself and its development are also evidence of how far we are still from applying principles of creative altruism and love developed in Sorokin. The situation of refugees in the world, evaluated realistically, is an example of how immense inequalities are still to be resolved. Although international solidarity actions are indeed being deployed, the social, political and economic structures behind their situation (in their countries of origin or the places of destination) require significant changes. As a crisis of refugee protection mechanisms (Pries, 2019), this crisis is a clear example of the relevance of coordinated international policy actions. Guterres, the head of the UN refugee agency, stated that "It (the EU) now has no other choice but to mobilize full force around this crisis. The only way to solve this problem is for the Union and all member states to implement a common strategy, based on responsibility, solidarity and trust," he said (Guterres, in Clayton, 2015, para. 7).

On the other hand, Twitter is an excellent example to observe some evidence of international solidarity with refugees looking at expressions of solidarity that take place on social networks and develop at both the institutional and personal level. Different campaigns, which have been held annually, are an example of this. Along with generic hashtags such as #DíaMundialdelosRefugiados or #WorldRefugeeDay, other common expressions of solidarity and altruism show more clearly the solidarity component. That is the case of #withrefugees from a UNHCR campaign (Rebollo, 2021), in which the speech focuses not only on the vindication of rights but on aspects where solidarity and humanity connect: "Cities stand #WithRefugees Over 250 cities worldwide have signed a statement supporting refugees and are asking more to join them" (UNHCR [The UN Refugee Agency], 2021).

Apart from this type of discourses supporting refugees ["We stand with Refugees"], critical citizens appeal to the institutions' responsibility to promote solidarity policies. Furthermore, when this is not the case, and public institutions do not provide a solution to the human drama, responsibility is attributed to them, sometimes metaphorically. One example of this is symbolically represented by some hashtags such as #UEmata,

#UErfanos or #vergUEnza -in Spanish- (Gualda and Rebollo, 2016). To understand what is symbolized in these campaigns, it must be explained that the EU is equivalent to the European Commission or the European Union. #UEmata hashtag suggests that the European Union does nothing to solve the refugee crisis. Concretely, by "UEmata" in Spanish, it is suggested that "The European Commission is responsible for the death of refugees". Another case is "UErfanos", which refers to the word "orphans" (with the same sound in Spanish). There is a reference here to the deaths in the Mediterranean. By #vergUEnza, on the other hand, emotions are appealed ("vergüenza" is equivalent to the English word "shame").

In addition to the feelings of shame due to the scarcity of solutions provided to this humanitarian drama, various NGOs launched campaigns in which a clear responsibility was attributed to European institutions. Responsibility is attributed based on the belief in a human rights framework deeply rooted in the mentality of many Europeans, where, confronted with utilitarian approaches, there is a philosophy of solidarity, although not always consistent with the dramatic events that some crises reveal.

Jeffrey and others (2006) suggest, as a challenge for the sociology that shifts its attention from problems to the *advantageous* aspects of society and its social organizations, the importance of defining the good and considering studying it critically. In this sense, it is argued that a part of public sociology should be made up of dialogues about the good and the positive. An example is the study of human rights and the conditions for their realization. Another example would be the study of altruism and solidarity as a recognized field of expertise.

Returning to the discourse on refugees, the humanitarian discourse that is constructed is complex. Sometimes it appeals to the morale of citizens. Other times is focused on the imagination of what is supposed to be desirable or not in each society. Thus, together with a critical vision of the institutions, it appeals to emotions and compassion, trying to humanize refugees and nurture feelings of empathy and solidarity (Rebollo, 2021). However, sometimes humanism becomes instrumental when invoking compassion is linked to campaigns for obtaining funds to intervene in vulnerable groups. Invoking emotions and morality to remind citizens of their social values as a strategy makes us forget that international law principles should protect refugees from the drama recently experienced in the Mediterranean in Europe. The lack of security and tremendous vulnerability on their trip is also portrayed through campaigns such as #SafePassage [in Spanish: #PasajeSeguro, # VíasSeguras], in which NGOs such as the Spanish Commission for Refugee Aid [CEAR], International Amnesty or Oxfam Intermón, among others, participate.

Concerning this humanitarian crisis, solidarity, responsibility and the common good are proposed in the same narrative by some citizens, which provides another vision, optimistic about the possibility of intervening, but with a perhaps less emotional focus. The following tweet is an example:

Baracaldo, A.M. [@AnaBaracaldo]. (2019, June 19). There are over 70 million people #displaced by war, persecution and conflict. It is time for solidarity, for shared responsibility, for a common Good [tweet]. Twitter https://www.unhcr.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/refdaily?pass=52fc6fbd5&id=5d09daab3… #withrefugees #solidarity. https://twitter.com/AnaBaracaldo/status/1141367184838602755

However, we can find evidence of other narratives that emerged during this crisis in support of the refugees. They represent different existing visions on how to handle the refugee crisis. In this case, returning to messages published on social networks regarding how citizens are appealed to, some statements refer altruism and compassion (for example, in Trudeau, as First Ministry of Canada in 2016). Other messages suggest the relevance of human rights. We have frequently found this diversity of messages suggesting different strategies for intervention regarding refugees in our research (Gualda and Rebollo, 2016):

Trudeau, J. [@JustinTrudeau]. (2016, 20 de junio). "On #WorldRefugeeDay, we recommit to helping the most vulnerable in the spirit of compassion & generosity. #WRD2016" [tweet]. Twitter. https://twitter.com/JustinTrudeau/status/744895518917042176

Taim Shami, N. [@Nael_TaimShami]. (2016, 25 de junio). "We stand #WithRefugees. Their rights must be respected. Their dignity must be protected. #WorldRefugeeDay @UN_Women" [tweet]. Twitter. https://twitter.com/Nael_TaimShami/status/746678669356175360

Altruism, Common Goods, Collective Responsibility and COVID-19

The COVID-19 pandemic, in which the world has been immersed for more than a year, poses new challenges to Humanity, which, although not new, suggest the need for progress in strategies and actions that minimize the negative effects of it. Some proposals for addressing the current pandemic come from complementary frameworks of action. For instance, the international human rights approach (United Nations, 2021). Also, the 17 sustainable development goals resulting from the United Nations approval in 2015, framed in the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. Achieving these goals in the context of COVID-19 provides a framework for recovery. The United Nations (2020: 11) point out that they require outstanding political leadership and cooperation to combat COVID-19: "At the geopolitical level, this crisis cries out for leadership, solidarity, transparency, trust and cooperation. This is no time for self-interest, recrimination, censorship, obfuscation or politicization".

On the other hand, there are also appeals to the "Common Good" to help solve the problems generated by the pandemic (Agazzi, 2020). Beyond religious or philosophical considerations about the Common Good that can be traced in theology, philosophy or, for example, in political science (Longley, 2020; Hussain, 2018), the severity of the pandemic has even produced petitions such as that vaccines are considered a Common Good for Humanity (Yunus et al., 2020; also at: https://vaccinecommongood.org/). Current approaches to the Common Good in economics, political science and even sociology (Ostrom, 1990; Longley, 2020; Felber, 2012; Perkiss & Moerman, 2020) recall, in situations such as the current one, the importance of what benefits all members

of a community in contrast to individual benefits. In this sense, this type of approach is somewhat aligned with some of Sorokin's ideas, as it goes beyond utilitarian approaches, although perhaps more operationally and concretely. They also remind us that, faced with the losses caused by any disaster (alluding to their work on calamities), individuals and their communities, as Mangone and Zyuzev (2020: 189) stated, always find the opportunity to adapt and grow.

Until now, the development of the pandemic at the international level has allowed us to observe different types of solidarity experiences at the international, national, regional and local levels, which have contributed to helping to resolve some social emergencies, albeit minimally. However, at the same time, negative experiences connecting with egoism are present. For instance, there is competition for vaccines and health material since the beginning of the pandemic. Also, some experiences of corruption in different countries emerged, giving priority to vaccination to some people over others with non-medical criteria. Also, authorities warned of how the pandemic has abounded in the stigmatization and discrimination of already disadvantaged groups. Asians, refugees, immigrants, Rome, women, Jews, and LGBTI people were recipients of expressions of hatred and arguments that blame them for the pandemic (European Commission against Racism and Intolerance, 2021).

On the other hand, if during the pandemic many countries used the rhetoric of a "warrior metaphor" [you have to fight both a pandemic and an infodemic] (Gualda, 2021: 268), which served many governments to urge their citizens to comply with the health guidelines, calls for responsibility, social discipline and solidarity were also frequent, which was symbolically represented in public communications through not only messages from #StayAtHome, but also with others related to unity and responsibility that different government bodies disseminated. In Spain, the following was recurrently visited: #EsteVirusLoParamosUnidos (#WeWillStopThisVirusTogether).

The revitalization of an anti-vaccine movement develops at the same time that these expressions of solidarity and unity for overcoming the pandemic. Likewise, the emergence of a denialist movement reluctant to admit the existence of COVID-19 and anti-masking groups become relevant. Even despite the high rates of infection and international mortality (John Hopkins University, 2021) and the drama that COVID-19 has caused in various countries. As examples, remember the news of graves in Brazil (León, 2020), corpses in Ecuador (Watson, 2020), the current high mortality in India (BBC, 2021), or even the high number of Americans who seem to resist the vaccination (Monmouth University Poll, 2021). These examples are a reminder that the international search of mechanisms for the solution of severe Humanity problems cannot depend on naïve approaches or individual hands.

Future Avenues and the Need for Viable Proposals

Seen as a whole, due to the drama and mortality that the pandemic is causing (as a relevant example), it is not easy to imagine as viable, on the occasion of the discussion on the recent book by Mangone *Beyond the Dichotomy Between Altruism and Egoism* (2020), Sorokin's noble proposal regarding creative altruism and the power of love (Sorokin, 1960). Apart from considering that we are very far from achieving these goals globally.

Ideas around creative altruism and the power of love are proposals on which Humanity and Sociology should undoubtedly reflect. Nevertheless, the line of arguments that we consider most productive for current sociology is trying to combine diagnosis with viable proposals. It means trying to understand and explain social complexity from approaches that triangulate different levels of analysis. Not naïve proposals of intervention, operative or achievable in the short or medium term. Without perhaps losing sight of a much more distant and less viable desirable horizon. Some theoretical lines that combine these levels of analysis with notions such as altruism are already pointed out in the recent book by Mangone (2020).

However, in light of recent experiences, other fields for Sociology can be suggested where the excessive centrality that the discipline has placed in highlighting problems or pathologies could be compensated. Along with ideas that revisit altruism or emphasize the Common Good, prosocial behavior, the achievement of human rights, or even Sustainable Development objectives, sociology can also make significant contributions in other promising current fields. Of particular interest is if the orientation towards social problems is enriched by focusing on solutions and good practices to overcome them.

The emerging field of Big Data [area of work devoted to collect, store and analyse large datasets] has been very useful in some areas that highlight the economic value or strategic importance that big data can produce for companies (Jin et al., 2015; Del Vecchio et al., 2018; Bartosik-Purgat, 2018). From a mixed qualitative and quantitative approach, sociology could also enrich this area of knowledge, reinforcing its look to focus on what produces higher social value. That could be a way to contributing to a new computational Sociology (Edelmann et al., 2020) that deploys sociological imagination in this field (Evans & Foster, 2019). From this approach, it is possible to provide new analysis and propose solutions to be implemented in emergencies and humanitarian catastrophes and armed conflicts, violence or terrorism, and even in everyday life.

We could wonder how from mixed sociology linked to data science, experiences of solidarity and altruism could be collected and analyzed (from the local to the international level). One goal of this task is to provide higher visibility to altruistic and solidary solutions and experiences, linked to the Common Good, the sustainable development goals, or the human rights that can serve our collective learning. In this sense, together with repositories of natural disasters, terrorist attacks or armed conflicts, a promising line for research, among others, could be the systematic orientation towards collecting and analysing different international experiences of altruism and solidarity that collective intelligence has provided to Humanity.

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Terms and Conditions

Nonkilling Global Political Science

Glenn D. Paige

Center *for* Global **Nonkilling**

Richard C. Snyder
1916 - 1997

H. Hubert Wilson
1909 -1977

political scientists, teachers, friends

A science which hesitates to
forget its founders is lost.

Alfred North Whitehead

Contents

Preface

This book is offered for consideration and critical reflection primarily by political science scholars throughout the world from beginning students to professors emeriti. Neither age nor erudition seems to make much difference in the prevailing assumption that killing is an inescapable part of the human condition that must be accepted in political theory and practice. It is hoped that readers will join in questioning this assumption and will contribute further stepping stones of thought and action toward a nonkilling global future.

This may be the first book in the English language to contain the word "nonkilling" in its title. The term is not in customary use. It seeks to direct attention beyond "peace" and even "nonviolence" to focus sharply upon the taking of human life. The initial response of many may be that to focus upon nonkilling is too negative, too narrow, and neglects more important things. They may find company in Gandhi's admonition that to define *ahimsa* (nonviolence: noninjury in thought, word, and action) as nonkilling offers little improvement over violence.

Yet perhaps even Gandhi as reader, on reflection, might be persuaded that concentration upon liberation from killing as source and sustainer of other forms of violence could be a significant step forward in the political science of nonkilling. And from the politics of taking life to the politics of affirming it.

The thesis of this book is that a nonkilling global society is possible and that changes in the academic discipline of political science and its social role can help to bring it about. The assumption that killing is an inevitable attribute of human nature and social life that must be accepted in the study and practice of politics is questioned as follows. First, it is accepted that humans, biologically and by conditioning, are capable of both killing and nonkilling. Second, it is observed that despite their lethal capability most humans are not and have not been killers. Third, nonkilling capabilities already have been demonstrated in a wide range of social institutions that, if creatively combined and adapted, can serve as component contributions to realize nonkilling societies. Fourth, given present and expectable scientific advances in understanding of the causes of killing, the causes of nonkilling, and causes of transition between killing and nonkilling, both the psychobiological and social factors conducive to lethality are taken to be capable of nonkilling transformative

intervention. Fifth, given the foregoing, the role of lethal human nature as the basis for acceptance of violence in political science and politics must at the very least become problematical as a foundation of the discipline. Sixth, in order to advance toward universally desired elimination of lethality from local and global life, political scientists who are presently not persuaded of human capacity for nonkilling social transformation are invited to join in taking up the possibility as a problem to be investigated hypothetically in terms of pure theory, combining inductive and deductive elements. Hypothetical analysis and role-playing by skeptics as well as by those who accept the possibility of nonkilling transformations can markedly assist disciplinary advance. Just as nuclear deterrence advocates and critics have been able to engage in theoretical and simulated exploration of local and global effects of limited or full-scale nuclear war, nonkilling and violence-accepting political scientists can join in constructively and critically exploring the preconditions, processes, and consequences of commitments to realize nonkilling conditions of global life.

Although this book is addressed primarily to those who study and practice political science, it is obvious that nonkilling societies cannot be realized without the discoveries and contributions of all scholarly disciplines and vocations. A magnificent example is Harvard sociologist Pitirim A. Sorokin's pioneering advance toward an applied science of altruistic love in *The Ways and Power of Love* (1954). Another is the unprecedented WHO *World Report on Violence and Health* (2002) which concludes that human violence is a "preventable disease." We need nonkilling natural and biological sciences, nonkilling social sciences, nonkilling humanities, nonkilling professions, and nonkilling people in every walk of life. Furthermore, in order to understand the full range of past and present human capabilities, we must share knowledge and experience beyond the bounds of local contexts and cultures. To be normatively sensitive, cognitively accurate, and practically relevant, nonkilling political science in conception and participation must be global.

Since first published in 2002, the nonkilling thesis of this book has continued to evoke remarkable responses from readers. An example is Russian political scientist Professor William Smirnov's judgment: "The basic ideas in this unique book can and should become the basis of common values for humanity in the 21st century as well as a programme for their realization." Or former Indian prime minister I.K. Gujral's advice: "This book should be read in every political science department and by the public."

Reader reflections and more than thirty translations (of which twenty have already been published) foretell that global consideration of its nonkilling thesis will be forthcoming.

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Introduction

The Policy Sciences of Nonkilling

Caveat lector. The book you hold in hand, when read widely and taken seriously, will subvert certain globally prevailing values and the institutions that shape those values. Among such values, goals, preferences, demanded outcomes, events, and acts, as well as corresponding institutions, are those relating to the acquisition and use of power. "Power" designates the processes by which people participate in making decisions for themselves and others that bind them to comply, by coercion if necessary (Lasswell and Kaplan 1950: 75). Institutions associated with values of power include more than governments and their decision makers who wage war and apply severe sanctions including death to those who do not conform to public order. Interacting with power institutions are economies of organized entrepreneurs some of whom produce wealth from the inventions, manufactures, sales, and threats to use "arms"; universities among whose faculties some creative members conduct research and devise strategies of force and "coercive diplomacy"; associations of skilled athletes and artists that include those who specialize in violent games and entertainments; hospitals and clinics of venerated medical and health personnel who abort lives and assist in euthanasia; not so secret societies or "private armies" whose participants build and employ lethal weapons in defiance of or with tacit cooperation of public governments; families with members who perform or tolerate abuse among themselves, in some cultures even killing errant spouses, children, or in-laws; and certain religious organizations with faithful adherents who countenance killing deviants from approved doctrines, formulae, and miranda.

As every major sector of society implicates and is implicated by the power processes of its communities, so each supervises, regulates, employs, and corrects, with both positive and negative inducements, sometimes invoking killing, as in the security personnel who perform intimate functions in corporations, on college campuses, among entertainers, at hospitals and clinics, sometimes in family compounds and churches. The interactions between and among power institutions and other social institutions, insofar as they include killings or threats of killings, constitute problems of modern and postmodern societies, as noted by competent observers and expressed by alert participants.

Professor Glenn D. Paige systematically confronts these problems of individual, community, and global proportions, the problems of killing and threats of killing in human affairs. He defines the core of problems by demonstrating the empirical and logical discrepancies between, on the one hand, widely shared human claims, demands, preferences, and rights for minimum public and civic orders of dignity, and on another, the episodic contradictions and denial of those fundamental goals and objectives at virtually every level of social organization—small groups, localities, nations the world—and by varieties of institutions—governmental, economic, educational, skill, medical, social, familial, and religious.

The publication of this book now does not mean that the problems of killing are of recent origin or of sudden recognition. Nor does it mean that the book's appearance depends solely on the fortuitous application of the author's imagination and skills as scholar-scientist. Publication now rather than sooner means that despite the longstanding role, often acknowledged, of killing in human organizations and communities, men and women throughout the world have lacked an effective repertoire of problem solving approaches and tools to analyze, anticipate, and adopt alternative courses of policy that might diminish more effectively the probabilities of killing in favor of enhanced possibilities for nonkilling patterns of human interactions affecting all values in every arena.

Such a repertoire embraces the knowledge and skills accumulated among many academic, scientific, and scholarly persons despite or because of the killing around them and their institutions. Philosophers contribute to the formulation of problems, that is, to the postulation and clarification of the goal values and preferences frustrated in practice. Historians, demographers, economists, and others chronicle trends in the pathways of killing and nonkilling, and the rise and fall of human perspectives on all goals and preferences. Anthropologists, biologists, psychologists, and sociologists undertake to discover conditions underlying trends with a view to finding sites and occasions that might be conducive to interrupting gross deviant tendencies and promoting ever more frequent life affirming ones. Still others apply skill to forecasting or projecting paths of trends in the absence of interventions that might resist untoward trends and reinforce preferred ones. And among enlightened and experienced men and women of public affairs, the cadre of competent designers of applicable and feasible alternative courses of policy increase in number and sophistication. These men and women remain primarily in midelite rather than elite positions in which they might innovate in favor of nonkilling. Nevertheless, as specialists in enlight-

enment about human trends, conditions, and prospects, they present a formidable countervailing alternative to experts in violence who have made the last century among the bloodiest eras in the records of humankind while awaiting their rise to power with alternative predispositions and perspectives more favorably disposed toward human dignity. That the bloody twentieth century coincided with the emergence and institutionalization of the policy sciences of nonkilling constitutes a supreme, and welcome, irony.

Glenn Paige acquainted himself with the killing apparatus and capacities of his era by training for and fighting and killing in the Korean War. When he resumed his academic career, he began systematic preparation to be a teacher-scholar with an emphasis on relations among nations, particularly on the making and appraising of foreign policy decisions by key figures of governments (Snyder, Bruck, and Sapin 1962). Skilled in several languages as well as broadly educated in the social sciences, he has contributed importantly to a number of subfields of political science (e.g., Paige 1977). Midway in a half century of scholarship his analysis of personal goals brought him face to face with different perspectives on problems, goals, trends, conditions, and prospects of killing and alternative courses of action in education and public affairs to mitigate killing. His fundamental postulate became that prevailing conceptions of the state, notwithstanding occasional contrary voices, and scientific studies of the state are grounded in assumptions that emphasize killing over nonkilling. This book is the fruit of the second half of the author's long career and an attack on and an alternative to those assumptions, eventuating in the statement on behalf of nonkilling global political science now before the reader.

I have known the author for more than four decades of the period that we appreciate for its vast increases in enlightenment and deplore for its vast increases in the weight, scope, and domain of killing and threats to kill. Not friendship alone, or even respect, considerable as both are, motivate my joining in affirming the worth of this volume for those fellow world citizen-democrats in any arena of any community who identify with promoting nonkilling global behaviors. The motivation derives from many scientific and scholarly disciplines in humankind's shared interests in broad and peaceful as opposed to narrow and violent participation in shaping and sharing all values.

That this book comes from the work of a political scientist says something about its strength and weakness. "Political science" is the last of the social sciences to emphasize science as in modern conceptions of that word. As a "discipline," if it be worthy of such designation, its weakness is offset by the breadth of its boundaries. From this advantage came a new

branch or orientation, "the policy sciences," emphasizing at once a multi-valued, multi-method, problem approach to social phenomena (Lasswell and McDougal 1992). Paige's work exhibits numerous equivalencies to, and contributes creatively to refinements in, a policy oriented social sciences of human dignity (Robinson 1999).

I write as one more familiar with institutions of enlightenment and power than any others, having lived, studied, taught, and administered in a variety of American colleges and universities for half a century, while specializing in the observation of power processes in various arenas at local, state, and national community levels in the United States and at varying levels in several other countries. That many of us overlook the presence of killing apparatus and personnel even in the cloister of college campuses is one of the lessons of my former administrative life. When noted, such killing and threats of killing are categorized and rationalized as the costs of doing business, and our colleges and universities indeed resemble business both from adaptations or emulations and also as pacesetters for business, commerce, and finance through our schools of administration, management, organization, and technologies.

The central role of force in political life is more apparent than in other social sectors. Not only is it virtually taken for granted in definitions of the state, but it underlies budgets of national governments for public order, internal security, foreign and defensive policies; appears in reliance of elected officials on sheriffs in political organizations and of force related industries for campaign contributions; and depends on the comfort and safety provided by community policemen near homes, schools, hospitals, and places of worship.

As the academic specialty concentrating on power institutions and their participants, political science might be expected to contribute to broad understanding of the roles and functions of force phenomena. It has, but a glance at the textbooks that introduce students to the subject matter of American politics, comparisons of national governments, and relations among nations would find force more a topic for inter-governmental transactions and violence as occasional cultural eccentricities than as core subjects. This restricted condition of modern political science makes welcome the focused conception proposed by Paige. Herein will be found the exercise of the important intellectual tasks relevant to clarifying goals, surveying trends, and understanding underlying factors which if unchecked will continue rather than alleviate problems of killing.

Here is the beginning of a reversal in the global policies that despite other benign trends contribute to but might counter killing. This is the foundation of

efforts to encourage the further evolution of nonkilling alternatives. Such efforts supplement chance with positive actions that coincide with perspectives rooted in the emerging sciences of cultural evolution, sometimes called "memetic evolution," to be distinguished from similar processes of "genetic evolution." Theories of cultural evolution or co-evolution find increasing prominence in journals and books. Although these theories have yet to be congealed into a generally accepted framework, one of the earliest formulations is also among the most succinct and accessible. We may rely on it to suggest the emerging possibilities for steering further evolution of nonkilling ideas, institutions, and practices (Dawkins, 1976 and 1989).

Nonkilling as a "meme"—theme, symbol, idea, practice—survives or perishes like all other memes, and, so some theorists expect, like genes. To live or die depends on imitation or emulation. And the repetition or replication of a meme is enhanced by the longevity of the concept itself, which gives nonkilling an advantage in memetic development. The advantage resides in human memories and libraries of prayers, beliefs, songs, poems, and other expressions of pacific perspectives and operations. In addition to being preserved in cultural memories, nonkilling practices are reproduced easily, as in the number of nations that have disavowed armies, of communities that have abolished death penalties, of institutions of peace research, of services for dispute mediation and conflict resolution.

To hint at the fecundity of nonkilling practices is to indicate how easily these practices can be copied and have been copied. Moreover, precise copy fidelity is not necessary to keep alive ideas and institutions of nonkilling; indeed, variations from culture to culture, class to class, interest to interest, person to person, situation to situation, offer experiments in the effectiveness of alternative nonkilling policies.

The condition perhaps most related to successful and continuing replication of a memetic innovation is the complex of supportive or unsupportive sources into which it enters. A renewed emphasis in favor of nonkilling hardly could occur at a more fortuitous period, given changing conditions in several value sectors of world society. Consider that the twentieth century marked the arrival and consolidation of the first genuinely democratic states and their diffusion throughout the world in less than a hundred years (Karatnycky 2000). Even allowing for cases of regression or slow downs in the rate of expansion, prospects for continuing not to mention furthering democratization are bright. And evidence accumulates that rulers in democratic regimes are less likely to go to war with each other than those in undemocratic regimes (Oneal and Russett 1999; for qualification, see Gowa 1999). Likewise,

democratic rulers more probably will pursue policies that avoid famines than nondemocratic governors (Sen 1999: 16, 51-3, 155-7, 179-82).

On the heels of the democratic era came post modern concern for broad participation in the shaping and sharing of all values, not just power or wealth. The world wide devotion to respect, self respect and respect for others, supports nonkilling innovations. Similar memes take form even in the killing institutions, as police learn to handle crises of riots and protests more skillfully as well as more peacefully, as professional military personnel adopt globally professional norms reaching beyond the reach of force. And in other sectors of society also, alternatives to abuse and killing appear, as in Favor Houses, curricula in nonviolence, and in broadened conceptions of conscientious objection status.

The promotion of evolutionary biases in favor of nonkilling depends ultimately on more than will and dedication, more than the goodwill of public opinion, but also on secure bases of knowledge from which alternative courses of action may be designed, implemented, and appraised. Hence, the immense importance of a political science of nonkilling.

Therefore, respected reader, you have presented to you a work of science *and* policy. You are entitled, indeed urged, to suspend judgment until you have encountered the case for a nonkilling global political science. If unconvinced, you can take comfort amid a silent but continuing effective plurality who explicitly or implicitly accepts killing and threats of killing as constitutional. If persuaded, you will find a niche in the complex panoply of opportunities suggested in this book to join in mobilizing the enlightenment and energy of men and women of similar perspectives among every culture, class, interest, and personality type in situations of whatever level of crisis or stress in promoting and favoring strategies of persuasion over those of coercion in every arena affecting all the values of a potentially global commonwealth of human dignity.

James A. Robinson

Pensacola, Christmas Day, 1999
Beijing, New Year Day, 2000

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Chapter 1

Is a Nonkilling Society Possible?

Philosophy begins when someone asks a
general question, and so does science.

Bertrand Russell

The questions that a country puts are a
measure of that country's political development.
Often the failure of that country is due to the
fact that it has not put the right question to itself.

Jawaharlal Nehru

Is a nonkilling society possible? If not, why not? If yes, why?

But what is meant by a "nonkilling society"? It is a human community, smallest to largest, local to global, characterized by no killing of humans and no threats to kill; no weapons designed to kill humans and no justifications for using them; and no conditions of society dependent upon threat or use of killing force for maintenance or change.

There is neither killing of humans nor threat to kill. This may extend to animals and other forms of life, but nonkilling of humans is a minimum characteristic. There are no threats to kill; the nonkilling condition is not produced by terror.

There are no weapons for killing (outside museums recording the history of human bloodshed) and no legitimizations for taking life. Of course, no weapons are needed to kill—fists or feet suffice—but there is intent neither to employ this capability nor technologically to extend it. Religions do not sanctify lethality; there are no commandments to kill. Governments do not legitimize it; patriotism does not require it; revolutionaries do not prescribe it. Intellectuals do not apologize for it; artists do not celebrate it; folk wisdom does not perpetuate it; common sense does not commend it. In computer terms of this age, society provides neither the "hardware" nor the "software" for killing.

The structure of society does not depend upon lethality. There are no social relationships that require actual or threatened killing to sustain or change

them. No relationships of dominance or exclusion—boundaries, forms of government, property, gender, race, ethnicity, class, or systems of spiritual or secular belief—require killing to support or challenge them. This does not assume that such a society is unbounded, undifferentiated, or conflict-free, but only that its structure and processes do not derive from or depend upon killing. There are no vocations, legitimate or illegitimate, whose purpose is to kill.

Thus life in a nonkilling society is characterized by no killing of humans and no threats to kill, neither technologies nor justifications for killing, and no social conditions that depend upon threat or use of lethal force.

Is a nonkilling society possible?

Our answers will be conditioned by personal experience, professional training, culture, and context—all factors that political scientists employ to explain the behavior of others—influences from which we ourselves are not immune.

It's absolutely unthinkable!

Such was the virtually unanimous response of a group of twenty American political scientists when asked a somewhat similar question during a summer seminar sponsored by the National Endowment for the Humanities in 1979 to review classics of Western political thought for use in college teaching. The question then asked was, "Are nonviolent politics and nonviolent political science possible?" Four major fields of American political science were represented equally in the seminar: political theory, American government, comparative politics, and international relations. All scholars save one were males.

Three quick arguments decisively settled the question in a brief seminar-end discussion. First, humans by nature are killers; they are dangerous social animals always liable to kill. Second, scarce resources will always cause competition, conflict, and killing. Third, the ever-present possibility of rape requires male readiness to kill to defend related females. (The comparable American woman's argument went unvoiced: "If anyone threatens the life of my child, I'll kill him." Also unasked was the customary counter-question assumed sufficient to silence further thought about the possibility of nonkilling politics: "How are you going to stop Hitler and the Holocaust by nonkilling?") The primal arguments of human nature, economic scarcity, and sexual assault served sufficient to make unthinkable the practice and science of nonkilling politics.

Reference to the freshly reviewed classics of Western political thought also was unnecessary. Their mastery, like that of the punitive Legalist tradi-

tion in China and the crafty Kautilyan tradition in India, predisposes to the same conclusion. Explicitly or implicitly readiness to kill is deemed essential for the creation and defense of the good society.

In Plato's (427-347 B.C.E.) ideal *Republic*, philosopher rulers (Guardians) recruited from the warrior class (Auxiliaries) rule over Producers and Slaves by coercion and persuasion. Furthermore, as Leon Harold Craig notes, "An unprejudiced observer can scarcely avoid concluding that [in Plato's *Republic*] war must be regarded as the fundamental fact of political life, indeed of all life, and that every decision of consequence must be made with that fact in mind." (Craig 1994: 17; cf. Sagan 1979). In Aristotle's (384-322 B.C.E.) *Politics*, in preferred polities—whether ruled by one, few, or many—property owners bear arms, and armies are essential to keep slaves in submission and to prevent enslavement by enemies. Neither Plato nor Aristotle questions the permanent presence of military lethality.

The much admired Machiavelli (1469-1527) in *The Prince* contributes explicit justification for rulers to kill to maintain their positions of power and to advance the *virtu*, fame, and honor of their states. It is better to rule by craftiness of a "fox," but when necessary rulers should not shrink from the bold lethality of a "lion." He prescribes citizen militias to strengthen the power of the republican state.

Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679) in *Leviathan* provides further justification for killing by governments to secure social order and victory in war. Since humans are killers, unorganized life in a state of nature results in murderous chaos. But since humans are also survival-seekers, they must consent to obey a central authority empowered to kill for their security, while reserving to themselves the inalienable right to kill in self-defense. Hobbes stops short of justifying armed rebellion.

This is done by John Locke (1632-1704) in *Two Treatises of Government*. Locke agrees with Plato, Aristotle, Machiavelli, and Hobbes that political rule necessitates readiness to kill. But he goes further to justify revolutionary lethality. When the sovereign authority becomes tyrannical and violates inherent rights to property, liberty, and life—oppressed citizens have the right and duty to destroy it. Just as a murderer may be killed in a state of nature, citizens in civil society may destroy a despotic ruler.

The Hobbes-Locke double justification for ruler-ruled lethality is extended into economic class warfare by Karl Marx (1818-1883) and Friedrich Engels (1820-1895) in *The Communist Manifesto*. Propertied classes can be expected to defend and extend their interests by lethal force. But when material and social relations reach a critical stage, exploited classes can be

expected to rise in violent rebellion to change the economic and political structure of society. In a few special cases of modern electoral democracy peaceful change might be possible. Sometime in the future when economic exploitation ends, the class-based lethal state will disappear. But in the period of transition economic factors will predispose to killing.

Writing between Locke and Marx, echoing Hobbes, Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1712-1778) in *The Social Contract* presents the theory of a "social contract" as the basis for political organization of the state. Citizens collectively constitute both the sovereign authority and subjects of the state. They commit themselves to obey a ruling authority that makes and administers laws derived from the "general will." Under the contract the state claims the right of war and conquest, traitors can be executed, and criminals can be killed. The ruling body can order citizens to sacrifice their lives for the state:

> Quand le prince lui à dit: Il est expedient à l'État
> que tu mueres, il doit mourir; puisque. . . sa vie
> n'est plus seulement un bienfait de la nature,
> mais un don conditionnel de l'État.
>
> *Du contrat social*
> Livre II, chapitre v.

> [When the ruling authority has said to a citizen:
> It is expedient for the State that you should die,
> he must die; since. . . his life is no longer only a
> benefaction from nature, but is a conditional gift
> from the State.]
>
> [*The Social Contract*
> Book II, chapter v].

Ultimately Rousseau's democratic social contract is a compact with lethality.

In the twentieth century, Max Weber (1864-1920), influential German political economist and sociological theorist, in "Politics as a Vocation," originally a University of Munich speech in 1918, categorically dismisses the idea that politics can be a nonkilling profession. For Weber, "the decisive means for politics is violence." Historically all dominant political institutions have arisen from violent struggles for power. Consequently Weber defines the modern state as "a human community that (successfully) claims *the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory* [emphasis in original]." Therefore, "he who seeks the salvation of the soul, of

his own and that of others, should not seek it along the avenue of politics, for the quite different tasks of politics *can only be solved by violence* [emphasis added]" (Weber 1958: 121, 78, 126).

Thus it is understandable that professors proficient in the Weberian tradition and its philosophical predecessors should consider nonkilling politics and nonkilling political science to be "unthinkable." The underlying professional orientation was succinctly expressed in the response of a senior American political scientist in the 1950s to a young scholar who asked him to share his definition of "politics," the subject of his lifelong study. He puffed on his pipe and replied, "I study the death-dealing power of the state."

Furthermore, echoes of the lethal philosophical tradition, blessed by violence-accepting religion, resonate throughout United States political history and culture, strongly reinforcing citizen-scholar beliefs that a nonkilling society is impossible. They are heard in the musket fire at Lexington that sparked the American Revolution, in the ringing Lockean justifications for revolt proclaimed by the Declaration of Independence, and in New Hampshire's defiant cry "Live Free or Die!" They are heard in the "Battle Hymn of the Republic," inspiring Union victory over Confederate rebellion, as well as in "Dixie's" lingering defiant refrain, and in the "Marine Hymn," celebrating distant battles on land and sea. They resound in the twenty-one gun salute that honors the inauguration of the President as Commander-in-Chief, a reminder of the nation's violent past and present military power. Throughout a lifetime they are repeated in ceremonial combination of flag, anthem, and armed escort, evoking emotions of sacrifice and slaughter, sanctified by the presidential benediction "God bless America" (Twain 1970).[1]

Killing contributed to the origins, territorial expansion, national integration, and global power projection of the United States of America. The dead and wounded, domestic and foreign, military and civilian, remain unsummed and are perhaps incalculable, but the reality of American state lethality is undeniable. Political scientists in other countries are called upon to reflect upon contributions of more or less killing to their own political identities.

The new nation began in armed republican revolt against monarchical colonial rule, while keeping slaves in subjugation. Under the flag of liberty it expanded its continental domain by bloody conquest of indigenous peoples, by force against neighbors to the north and south, and by cession or purchase from proprietors preferring commerce to combat. The state coerced national integration by Civil War, killing 74,542 Confederate soldiers and sacrificing 140,414 Union dead.

Extending itself overseas the American state gained control over Hawai'i (1898); Puerto Rico, Guam, and the Philippines (1898); eastern Samoa (1899); and Pacific island territories (1945). In the Philippines it suppressed anti-colonial rebellion (1898-1902) and slaughtered Muslim Moros who resisted assimilation (1901-13). By naval threat it opened isolationist Japan to foreign trade (1853-54).

By wars and interventions the emerging nation projected and defended its interests. Among wars it fought against Britain (1812-14), Mexico (1846-48), Spain (1898), Germany, Austria-Hungary, Turkey and Bulgaria (1916-18), Japan, Germany, and Italy (1941-45), North Korea and China (1950-53), North Vietnam (1961-75), Afghanistan (2001-) and Iraq (1991, 2003-). Among armed interventions were those in Peking (1900), Panama (1903), Russia (1918-19), Nicaragua (1912-25), Haiti (1915-34), Lebanon (1958), the Dominican Republic (1965-66), and Somalia (1992). By invasions the United States overthrew governments in Grenada (1983) and Panama (1989), and by threat of invasion in Haiti (1992). By invasions or attacks it sought to interdict in Cambodia (1970) and Laos (1971), to retaliate in Libya (1986), Afghanistan (1998), and Sudan (1998); and to demonstrate will to advance strategic interests in Iraq (1993), Bosnia (1995), and Yugoslavia (1999).

During a half century of post-WWII worldwide struggle against anti-capitalist states, revolutionaries, and other enemies, the United States extended its lethal capabilities to encompass the globe. From less than one thousand men in the Revolutionary era the nation's regular armed forces by the 1990s had grown to 1.5 million men and women, backed by 23,000 Pentagon planners, an innovative scientific elite, and the world's most advanced weapons industry—all made possible by annual commitments of at least a quarter trillion taxpayer dollars approved by the Congress and the President. It was conservatively calculated that the nation's nuclear weapons program alone during 1940-96 had cost the nation 5.821 trillion dollars (Schwartz 1998). The United States had more overseas bases, more forces deployed abroad, more military alliances, and was training and arming more foreign forces (killers of its enemies, sometimes of its friends, and even of its own people) than any other country. Concurrently it had become the leading supplier of weapons in the world's competitive, lucrative, arms market. Technologically the United States had become capable of projecting killing force throughout the land, sea, and air space of the planet by means of the most destructive weapons yet devised by the lethal ingenuity of humankind.

By the 1990s the battle-born United States had proceeded from declaration of independence in 1776 to proclaim itself as "the world's only mili-

tary superpower and the world's leading economy" (President William J. Clinton, State of the Union Address, February 19, 1993). In the words of the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Army General John Shalikashvili, the United States had become a "global nation" with "global interests." Celebrating in 1995 the fiftieth anniversary of the atomic-bomb victory over Japan, the President in Hawai'i pledged to the assembled troops of all services, "You will always be the best trained, best equipped fighting force in the world." He declared, "We must remain the strongest nation on earth so as to defeat the forces of darkness in our era." This determination was reflected in a 1996 explanation of Air Force strategic planning by Chief-of-Staff General Ronald Fogelman, "Our goal is to find, fix, track, and target everything that moves on the face of the earth." He further revealed, "We can do it now, but not in real time" (not as it happens). (Speech at the Heritage Foundation, Washington, D.C., December 13, 1996).

As the twentieth century neared its end, American leaders were wont to claim it as "The American Century" and to express determination to make the first century of the third millennium "The Second American Century." Amidst such a triumphal tradition of the virtues of violence, a nonkilling United States of America is easily unthinkable. Killing and threats to kill created national independence, abolished slavery, defeated nazism and fascism, ended the Holocaust, saved lives in atom-bombed Japan, prevented global communist expansion, caused the collapse of the Soviet empire, and now secures the claim to be the leading force for diffusion of democratic freedom and capitalist economics throughout the twenty-first century world.

But for Americans who study political science, from senior professors to introductory students, neither philosophy nor national political tradition is needed for conviction that a nonkilling society is impossible. Killing in everyday life confirms it.

Nearly fifteen thousand Americans are murdered by other Americans each year (14,180 in 2008; 5.4 per 100,000 people, up from 1.2 in 1900 and 5.7 in 1945). Reported murders do not include "justifiable homicides" by police or private citizens (371 and 245 in 2008). Total homicides since WWII (estimated to be at least 750,000) exceed battle deaths in all the nation's major wars (650,053). To homicides can be added "aggravated assaults" (834,885 in 2008; 274.6 per 100,000), attacks with weapons capable of causing death or grave injury (Federal Bureau of Investigation 2009). Suicides contribute even more than homicide to life-taking in American civil society (33,300 in 2006; 10.9 per 100,000). Attempted suicides are twenty-five times greater. Annual abortions are estimated to be more than 1,000,000.

Americans kill by beating, beheading, bombing, and burning; drowning, hanging, pushing, and poisoning; stabbing, suffocating, strangling, and mostly by shooting (66.9% in 2008). Killings are premeditated, spontaneous, professional, and accidental. They accompany spouse abuse, child abuse, elder abuse, arguments, drunken brawling, drug dealings, gang fights, gambling, jealousy, kidnapping, prostitution, rape, robbery, cover-up, and "divine" or "satanic" commandments. No place is truly safe: homes, schools, streets, highways, places of work and worship, prisons, parks, towns, cities, wilderness, and the nation's Capitol. Victims are killed singly, serially, collectively and randomly; mostly male (78.2% in 2008). But among spouses killed during 1976-85 wives (9,480) outnumbered husbands (7,115) (Mercy and Saltzman 1989). Killers are individuals, couples, gangs, sects, syndicates, terrorists, and when engaged in law enforcement servants of the state. Known killers are predominantly male (10,568 compared to 1,176 females in 2008), and are becoming younger. In 1980 it was estimated that "for an American, the lifetime chance of becoming a homicide victim is about one in 240 for whites and one in 47 for blacks and other minorities" (Rosenberg and Mercy 1986: 376). As Senate majority leader Republican Trent Lott observed on national television in response to President Clinton's State of the Union Address on January 27, 1998: "Violent crime is turning our country from the land of the free to the land of the fearful."

The news media testify daily to American lethality. A daughter chops off the head of her mother, drives by a police station, and throws it out on the sidewalk. A mother drowns two sons; two sons murder their parents. A serial killer preys on prostitutes; a homosexual seduces, dismembers, refrigerates, and cannibalizes young victims. A sniper kills fifteen people at a university. Two boys with rifles at a rural middle school kill four girl classmates and a teacher, wounding another teacher and nine more schoolmates. Two heavily armed boys at Columbine High School in Littleton, Colorado kill thirteen classmates, wound 28, and commit suicide. During 1992-2006, school students, aged 11 to 18, kill 330 fellow students, teachers, and parents. A man with an automatic weapon slaughters urban school children on their playground. A Vietnam War veteran machine-guns customers at a fast-food family restaurant, killing 20, wounding 13. Still another clad in military combat fatigues massacres worshippers in a church, yelling "I've killed a thousand before and I'll kill a thousand more!"

Arrayed against fearful Hobbesian predations by fellow citizens and in Lockean distrust of the Weberian state, stands an armed people in possession of nearly two hundred million guns—at least 70 million rifles, 65 million hand-

guns, 49 million shotguns, and 8 million other long guns (Cook and Ludwig 1997). The gun trade—manufacture, sales, import, and export—is big business with tens of thousands of dealers, legal and illegal. Firearms, owned by 44 million adults, are estimated to be present in at least one-third of American households. Most children know how to find them even if parents think they do not. The nation's first lady, Hillary Clinton, based upon estimates by the Children's Defense Fund, reports that 135 thousand children take guns and other weapons to school each day (Speech in Nashua, New Hampshire, February 22, 1996). Citizen gun possession is claimed for self-defense, hunting, recreation, and resistance to government tyranny as an inalienable right guaranteed by the 1791 Second Amendment to the United States Constitution: "A well-regulated militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms shall not be infringed."

Arrayed against the dangers of domestic lethality are the armed police of the American state. These include federal agents of law enforcement plus state and local police (836,787 officers in 2004; 340 per 100,000 people). Forty-one are killed in 2008 (Federal Bureau of Investigation 2009). They are reinforced when needed by state units of the National Guard and by the federal Armed Forces of the United States. Prison guards stand watch over more than 1.8 million prisoners convicted of various crimes, including 3,220 awaiting execution in 2007 (Bureau of Justice 2009). The death penalty is in force for federal crimes and in thirty-six of fifty states. Executions during 1977-2007 totaled 1,099. As the twentieth century ends, amidst fears of rising crime and seemingly intractable violence, there are anxious cries to expand or reimpose the death penalty, to place more policemen on the streets, to impose longer prison sentences, and to build more prisons.

Violence in America is socially learned and culturally reinforced. Formally and informally, legally and illegally, people are taught how to kill. Some twenty-five million military veterans are graduates of professional training for lethality (25,551,000 in 1997). Many junior high schools, high schools, colleges, and universities provide preparatory military training. Businesses teach how to kill in self-defense. Private militias train for combat; street gangs socialize for killing; prisons serve as colleges of predation. Magazines for mercenaries teach techniques of combat, sell weapons, and advertise killers for hire. Video and computer "games" engage young "players" in simulated killing from street fighting to land, air, sea, and space combat, employing a wide range of lethal technologies. "Virtual reality" businesses sell "adrenaline-pumping," kill-or-be-killed recreational experiences. For a time a fad on col-

lege campuses is to play "assassination" of fellow students. Actual and simulated killing seem natural extensions of childhood play with toy weapons.

Vicarious learning for lethality and desensitization of the value of human life are provided by the mass media of communication. Teachers are creators of cartoons, films, television and radio programs, songs, books, magazines, and commercial advertisements. From childhood through adulthood thousands of violent images are imprinted upon the mind, demonstrating dramatic ways in which people, property, animals, and nature can be destroyed by heroes and villains. Increasingly images of bloodshed and brutality are combined in rapid alternation with images of sexuality, especially in preview advertisements for violent motion pictures, verging upon subliminal seduction for lethality.

No people in history have had so many lethal images imprinted upon their brains. Since a proven military technique for overcoming reluctance to kill in training commandos and assassins is to force them to view films of gruesome atrocities—head in vise with eyes propped open (Watson 1978: 248-51)—it is as if the whole nation is being desensitized from empathic respect for life to unemotional acceptance of killing. Judges report that juvenile killers increasingly evidence no respect for human life. But however harmful to civil society, violent media socialization is useful for a state in need of professional patriotic killers. This is epitomized by a million dollar recruitment advertisement shown during a televised Super Bowl American football game. Millions of viewers see a sword-wielding medieval knight from a video combat "game" metamorphose into a modern saber-saluting United States Marine.

Language reflects and reinforces lethality, contributing a sense of naturalness and inescapability. The American economy is based upon free enterprise capitalism. Americans speak of "making a killing on the stock market"; there is a Wall Street saying, "You buy when there's blood in the streets"; and businesses compete in "price wars." American politics are based upon free electoral democracy. Campaign workers are called "troops" or "foot soldiers"; bills are "killed" in legislatures; and the nation "wages war" on poverty, crime, drugs, and other problems. The national sport is baseball. When displeased, disgruntled fans traditionally yell "Kill the umpire!" Sports commentators refer to tough football teams as "killers"; players are called "weapons"; passes are called "long bombs; and losing teams are said to "lack the killer instinct." Taking pride in religious freedom, while worshipping the Prince of Peace, Americans sing "Onward Christian soldiers" and reflecting the spirit of the Christian Crusades and Reformation chorally climb "Jacob's ladder" as "soldiers of the Cross." As life passes, at idle moments they speak of "killing time."

While becoming increasingly conscious of the harmful effects of racist and sexist language, Americans continue to speak the language of lethality with unconcern. The linguistic "armory" of American English provides terms that evoke all the weapons known to history, ways of using them, and their effects. Betrayal is "a stab in the back"; budgets are "axed"; and attempt is "to take a shot at it"; ideas are "torpedoed"; opposition is termed "flak"; and consequences of actions are called "fall-out." Lawyers are "hired guns." A beautiful movie star is termed a "blonde bombshell."

On the other hand, euphemisms customarily cloak real killing. "Little Boy" the world's first atomic bomb is dropped on Hiroshima from a B-29 bomber named for the pilot's mother "Enola Gay." Next, plutonium bomb "Fat Man" is dropped by "Bock's Car" on Nagasaki. Intercontinental nuclear missiles capable of mass murder of urban populations are called "Peacemakers." Reversing the language of warfare applied to sports, military exercises to prepare for killing are called "games." Killing of civilians or of our own troops in combat is called "collateral damage." As expressed by former President Ronald Reagan, "America is the least warlike, most peaceful nation in modern history" (PBS 1993).

Periodically elements of lethality in America combine in collective violence among citizens themselves and between them and agents of the state. In 1992, 52 people were killed, 2,000 were injured, and 8,000 were arrested in south central Los Angeles amidst shooting, looting, and arson in response to judicial exoneration of police brutality against a black citizen. Within two months some 70,000 guns were sold to fearful citizens in surrounding areas. The bloodshed is reminiscent of similar killings in Watts (34 in 1965), Newark (26 in 1967) and Detroit (46 in 1967) as well as of loss of life in slave uprisings of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. To restore order in Detroit in 1967 it took 4,700 Army paratroopers, 1,600 National Guardsmen, and 360 Michigan State troopers (Locke 1969).

The consequences of combining the Hobbesian-Weberian state with the Lockean Second Amendment legacy are exemplified by killings in Waco, Texas, in 1993 and in Oklahoma City, Oklahoma in 1995. In Waco, armed agents of the state seek to enforce laws against an armed religious sect: four federal officers are killed, a dozen are wounded, and 89 members of the sect, including women and children, die in a fiery conflagration. On the second anniversary of this tragedy, in apparent revenge, an antagonist of the state detonates a truck bomb to demolish the federal office building in Oklahoma City, killing 168, including women and children.

Looking beyond their borders Americans see ample evidence to confirm conviction that a nonkilling society is impossible. The twentieth century, mankind's most murderous era, demonstrates the horror of human capacity to kill on a massive scale. Research by Rudolph J. Rummel permits placing the bloodshed in historical and global perspective. Distinguishing between "democide" (state killing of its own people by genocide, execution, mass murder, and manmade famine), and battle deaths in "war" (world, local, civil, revolutionary, and guerrilla), Rummel calculates "conservatively" the magnitude of killing in recorded history as in Table 1.

Table 1. Deaths by democide and war to 1987

	Pre-1900	1900-1987	Total
Democide	133,147,000	169,198,000	302,345,000
War	40,457,000	34,021,000	74,478,000
Total	173,604,000	203,219,000	376,823,000

Source: Rummel 1994: Table 1.6; 66-71.

Thus perhaps as many as four hundred million people might be counted victims of historical political killing, not including homicides. Rummel attributes most democide to communist regimes, second most to totalitarian and authoritarian ones, and least to democracies. Still fresh in American memories are the Hitlerite holocaust, Stalinist purges, Japanese aggression, and Maoist murders.

William J. Eckhardt and successors calculate that between 1900 and 1995 twentieth century war-related killing totals at least 106,114,000 people, including 62,194,000 civilian and 43,920,000 military victims (Sivard 1996: 19). The continuing slaughter in the "peaceful" period of the "Cold War" between 1945 and 1992 is estimated to be at least 22,057,000 people killed in 149 wars, including 14,505,000 civilians and 7,552,000 combatants (Sivard 1993: 20-1). At least thirty wars were being fought in 1996.

Television screens flash periodically with images of bloodshed from throughout the world, some rooted in ancient animosities and recent atrocities exacerbated by present incapacities to satisfy needs. One horrific crisis follows another as mass media momentarily focus upon one and then move to the next. The bloodshed takes many forms, all rooted in readiness to kill: international wars, civil wars, revolutions, separatist wars, terrorist

atrocities, territorial disputes, military coups, genocides, ethno-religious-tribal slaughter, assassinations, foreign interventions, and killing-related mutilations and deprivations. Sometimes foreign antagonisms lead to killing of Americans at home as in the 1993 bombing of the World Trade Center in New York by opponents of United States support for the State of Israel, leaving six dead and one thousand injured. Or killings abroad as in simultaneous truck bombings of American Embassies in Nairobi and Dar Es Salaam in 1998 that left 12 Americans and 300 Africans dead, with some 5,000 injured.

On September 11, 2001, nineteen members of Al-Qaeda, using four hijacked commercial airliners as weapons, carried out suicide attacks on the twin towers of the World Trade Center in New York and the Pentagon in Washington, but did not reach the Capitol, killing 2,986 people. The United States responded with an invasion of Al-Qaeda-based Afghanistan beginning in October 2001 followed by a pre-emptive war on Iraq beginning in March 2003.

Looking out upon the waning twentieth century world, American political leaders, echoing Hobbes, are prone to observe, "It's a jungle out there!" and to commend the maxim of the defunct Roman empire, "If you want peace, prepare for war" (*si vis pacem para bellum*).

In such a context of primal beliefs, philosophical heritage, patriotic socialization, media reinforcement, cultural conditioning, and global bloodshed—it is not surprising that most American political scientists and their students emphatically reject the possibility of a nonkilling society.

When the question is raised in a university setting in the first class meeting from introductory course to graduate seminar the basic objections of human nature, economic scarcity, and necessity to defend against sexual and other assaults customarily appear. Although responses are culturally patterned, variations and extensions are virtually inexhaustible. Each time the question is raised something new can be expected. Human beings are power-seeking, selfish, jealous, cruel and crazy; to kill in self-defense is biologically driven and an inalienable human right. Humans are economically greedy and competitive; social differences and clashing interests make killing inevitable. Other things are worse than killing—psychological abuse and economic deprivation. A nonkilling society would be totalitarian, freedom would be lost; it would be attacked and subjugated by foreign aggressors. Nonkilling as a political principle is immoral; killing to save victims of aggression must always be considered just. Killing criminals for punishment and deterrence benefits society. Weapons cannot be dis-invented; lethal technologies will always exist. No example of a nonkilling society is known in history; it is simply unthinkable.

This is not to imply classroom unanimity. Some American students hold that since humans are capable of creativity and compassion a nonkilling society might be realized through education. Others think that nonkilling conditions might be achieved in small scale societies, but not in large societies and not globally. This is also not to imply that American views are distinctively more violent than those of professors and students of political science in other countries. To find out will require systematic comparative research. But pessimism is probably predominant throughout the present world political science profession.

Yet when the unthinkable question—"Is a nonkilling society possible?"—is asked in other political cultures some surprisingly different answers appear.

I've never thought about the question before…

Such is the response of a Swedish colleague at a meeting of Swedish futurists held in Stockholm in 1980 to discuss the idea of a nonviolent political science: "I've never thought about the question before. I need some time to think it over." Surprisingly there is neither automatic rejection nor automatic agreement. The question is taken as needful of reflection and further thought. Similarly, in 1997 at an international meeting of systems scientists in Seoul, a Nobel Laureate in chemistry replies, "I don't know." This is his characteristic reply to questions when an adequate scientific basis for response is absent. He then calls upon members of the conference to take the question seriously since science and civilization advance by questioning the seemingly impossible.

It's thinkable, but…

At the XIth World Congress of the International Political Science Association held in Moscow in 1979, two Russian scholars respond to a paper on "Nonviolent Political Science" with qualified willingness to give the question serious consideration. Both surprisingly agree that the goal of politics and political science is the realization of a nonviolent society. "But," one asks, "what is the economic basis of a nonviolent politics and of a nonviolent political science?" "But," asks the other, "how are we to cope with tragedies as in Chile [where a military coup overthrew a democratically elected socialist government], Nicaragua [scene of violent repression and revolution], and Kampuchea [where more than a million people are killed in revolutionary urban-class extermination]?"

Indeed, what kind of economy neither depends upon nor supports killing—as do contemporary forms of "capitalism" and "communism"? How can nonkilling politics prevent, stop, and remove the lethal aftereffects of

murderous atrocities? Under the assumption of nonviolent possibility, questions are raised that are needful of serious scientific inquiry.

We know that human beings are not violent by nature, but…

When the question of nonviolent political science is raised with a group of Arab political scientists and public administration scholars at the University of Jordan in Amman in 1981, one professor expressed a collegial consensus: "We know that human beings are not violent by nature." "But," he adds, "we have to fight in self defense." If the primal argument that humans are inescapably violent by nature is questioned, then this opens up the possibility of discovering conditions under which no one kills.

It's not possible, but…

During a tenth anniversary seminar held in 1985 at the Institute of Peace Science, Hiroshima University, where mainly Japanese participants divided evenly between those who agreed and disagreed, a professor of education replies, "It's not possible, but it's possible to become possible." While recognizing that a nonkilling society is not immediately realizable, its future feasibility is not dismissed. Then he asks, "What kind of education would be needed to bring about a nonviolent society?" A constructive invitation to creative problem-solving.

It's completely possible

In December 1987 a Korean professor of philosophy, president of the Korean Association of Social Scientists and political leader in Pyongyang, surprisingly replies without hesitation: "It's completely possible." Why? First, humans by nature are not compelled to kill. They are endowed with "consciousness," "reason," and "creativity" that enable them to reject lethality. Second, economic scarcity must not be used to justify killing—men are not the slaves of matter. Scarcity can be overcome by "creativity," "productivity," and "most importantly by equitable distribution." Third, rape should not be used as a basis for rejection of nonkilling. Rape can be eliminated by "education" and "provision of a proper social atmosphere."

In February 2000, when participants in a meeting of some two hundred community leaders in Manizales, Colombia, are asked, "Is a nonkilling society possible?" surprisingly not a single hand is raised to answer no. Then unanimously every hand is raised to affirm yes.

These positive responses in Korea and Colombia are remarkable given the violent contexts of their expression. The violent political traditions of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea parallel in part those of the United States of America: armed anti-colonial revolution, civil war for unification, and righteous defense and offense against domestic and foreign foes. For decades Colombian society has been plagued by the seemingly intractable lethality of military, police, paramilitary, guerrilla, and criminal killers.

Diverse social responses

When the question of the possibility of a nonkilling society is posed without prior discussion in various groups, countries, and cultures, diverse social predispositions to agree or disagree within and across groups are manifested. The promise of systematic global inquiry is made clear.

In Vilnius, Lithuania, at a May 1998 peer review seminar on "New Political Science" composed of political scientists from former Soviet sphere countries, sponsored by the Open Society Institute, eight reply no, one yes. In March 1999 in an introductory political science seminar for graduate students at Seoul National University, twelve respond no, five yes, and two reply yes and no. At a February 1998 forum of Pacific parliamentarians in Honolulu, Hawai'i, organized by the Japan-based Foundation for Support of the United Nations, six answer yes, five no, two respond yes and no. Among an observer group of women from Japan, twelve answer no, eleven yes, and one yes and no.

In Medellín, Colombia, at a November 1998 national conference of educators on the "Future of Education," 275 respond yes, twenty-five no. Among a group of Medellín family social workers, thirty yes, sixteen no. Among a group of young gang members known as *sicarios* (little knives), including hired killers, sixteen answer no, six yes. When asked for reasons for their judgments, a killer says, "I have to kill to take care of my two daughters. There are no jobs." One who answered yes explains, "When the gap between rich and poor closes, we won't have to kill anymore."

In Edmonton, Canada, in October 1997, among a group of high school students convened parallel to a seminar on "Values and the 21st Century" sponsored by the Mahatma Gandhi Canadian Foundation for World Peace, forty-eight reply no, twenty-five yes. In Atlanta, Georgia, at an April 1999 "International Conference on Nonviolence," sponsored by the Martin Luther King, Jr. Center for Nonviolent Social Change, forty answer yes, three no. In Omsk, Russia, in February 2000, among literature students aged seventeen to twenty-six, 121 answer no, 34 yes, and 3 reply yes and no.

Is a nonkilling society possible? Amidst global killing and threats to kill at the violent end of the violent twentieth century, there are understandably ample grounds for political scientists and their students to conclude—It's completely unthinkable! But there are also signs of willingness to give the question serious consideration—It's thinkable and maybe it's possible. Moreover despite unprecedented threats to human survival there are countervailing global resources of spirit, science, institutions, and experience to strengthen confidence that ultimately—It's completely possible.

Chapter 2

Capabilities for a Nonkilling Society

What are the grounds for thinking that a nonkilling society is possible? Why is it plausible to think that humans are capable of universal respect for life?

Nonkilling Human Nature

Although we might begin with a spiritual basis, first consider a completely secular fact. Most humans do not kill. Of all humans now alive—and of all who have ever lived—only a minority are killers. Consider the homicide statistics of any society.

Consider also killing in war. The world's military and ethnographic museums offer scant evidence that women, half of humankind, have been major combat killers. Granted that women kill, that some have fought in wars and revolutions, that in some societies women and even children have engaged in ritual torture and murder of defeated enemies, and that women are being recruited for killing in several modern armies. But most women have not been warriors or military killers. Add to this the minority combat role of men. Only a minority of men actually fight in wars. Of these only a minority directly kill. Among killers, most experience reluctance and subsequent remorse. Perhaps as few as two percent can kill repeatedly without compunction. As Lieutenant Colonel Dave Grossman explains in a major review of male reluctance to kill in war, "War is an environment that will psychologically debilitate 98 per cent of all who participate in it for any length of time. And the 2 percent who are not driven insane by war appear to have already been insane—aggressive psychopaths—before coming to the battlefield" (Grossman 1995: 50). Thus contrary to the customary political science assumption that humans are natural born killers, the principal task of military training "is to overcome the average individual's deep-seated-resistance to killing" (295).

The human family further evidences nonkilling capability. If human beings are by nature killers, if even half of humanity were inescapably homicidal, then the family in its various forms could not exist. Fathers would kill mothers; mothers, fathers; parents, children; and children, parents. All of these occur but they do not constitute a natural law of lethality that controls the fate of humankind. If it were so, world population long ago would have spiraled into extinction. To the contrary, despite appalling conditions of material deprivation and abuse, the human family has continued to create and sustain life on an unprecedented scale.

A nonkilling global puzzle to challenge ingenuity and evidence for successive attempts at solution is to calculate how many humans have ever lived and how many have and have not been killers. One estimate of total human lives from 1 million B.C.E. to 2000 C.E. is some 91,100,000,000 people (combining Keyfitz 1966 with Weeks 1996: 37, as recalculated by Ramsey 1999). If we inflate Rummel's war and democide deaths to half a billion, assume erroneously that each was killed by a single killer, and arbitrarily multiply by six to account for homicides, we might imagine as many as 3,000,000,000 killers since 1,000 B.C.E. (Figures from 1 million B.C.E. are lacking). But even this crude and inflated estimate of killings would suggest that at least ninety-five percent of humans have not killed. Contemporary United States homicide rates of around 10 per 100,000 suggest that only about .01 percent of the population kill each year. Counting all aggravated assaults as attempted murders (274.6 per 100,000 in 2008) would add .274 percent to total .284 percent of the present United States population as actual or attempted killers. Perhaps less than two or even one percent of all homo sapiens have been killers of fellow humans. The percentage of killers in specific societies, of course, may vary greatly according to culture and era (Keeley 1996). Nevertheless the survival and multiplication of humankind testifies to the dominance of vitality over lethality in human nature.

Spiritual Roots

Grounds for confidence in the realizability of a society without killing are present in the spiritual traditions of humankind. Granted that religions have been invoked to justify horrific slaughter from human sacrifice and genocide to atomic annihilation (Thompson 1988). But the principal message of God, the Creator, the Great Spirit, however conceived, has not been "O humankind, hear my Word! Go find another human and kill him or her!" To the contrary it has been "Respect life! Do not kill!"

Nonkilling precepts can be found in all world spiritual faiths. This is why Max Weber deems spiritual commitment to be incompatible with the political imperative to kill. Jainism and Hinduism share the precept of *ahimsa paramo dharma* (nonviolence is the supreme law of life). The first vow of Buddhism is to "abstain from taking life." Judaism, Christianity, and Islam share the divine commandment "Thou shalt not kill" (Exod. 30:13). One of the most ancient Jewish teachings is "Whosoever preserves the life of one person, it is as though he saves a multitude of men. But he who destroys the life of one person, it is as though he destroys the world" (Eisendrath: 144). The core of this teaching, although with qualification, is continued in Islam: "Whosoever kills a human being, except (as punishment) for murder or for spreading corruption in the land, it shall be like killing all humanity; and whosoever saves a life, saves the entire human race" (Al-Qur'an 5:32). The Bahá'í faith—incorporating the teachings of Judaism, Christianity, and Islam—enjoins "Fear God, O people, and refrain from shedding the blood of anyone" (Bahá'u'lláh 1983: 277).

Humanist traditions also hold forth the desirability and possibility of a nonkilling society. In Confucianism, when morality among rulers prevails, no death penalty will be needed (Fung 1952: 60). In Taoism, when humans live simply, spontaneously, and in harmony with nature, "although there might exist weapons of war, no one will drill with them" (Fung 1952: 190). In modern socialist thought when workers refuse to support killing each other, wars will cease. An anti-WWI manifesto proclaims:

> All class conscious members of the Industrial Workers of the World are conscientiously opposed to shedding the life blood of human beings, *not for religious reasons*, as are the Quakers and Friendly Societies, but because we believe that the interests and welfare of the working class in all countries are identical. While we are bitterly opposed to the Imperialist Capitalist Government of Germany we are against slaughtering and maiming the workers of any country. (True 1995: 49; for a courageous example, see Baxter 2000)

In all societies murder is disapproved. Humanist respect parallels religious reverence for life.

What significance does the presence of a nonkilling ethic in world spiritual and humanist traditions have for the realizability of nonkilling societies? On the one hand it reveals divine intent to plant profound respect for life in the consciousness of humankind. On the other, it demonstrates human capacity to receive, respond to, or to create such a principle. If humans are

incurably killers by nature, neither reception, nor transmission, nor creation of such a principle would be plausible. Even if a nonkilling spiritual ethic were invented by elites to discourage revolution, by the oppressed to weaken oppressors, or by killers to escape retribution it implies that humans to whom it is addressed are capable of responding positively to it.

The spirit of nonkilling has emerged before, during, and after history's most horrible outbreaks of bloodshed. Its expression is not just a luxury benevolently bestowed by killers. Irrepressibly surviving into the contemporary era, it continues to inspire liberation from lethality in post-crusades Christianity, post-conquest Islam, post-holocaust Judaism, post-militarist Buddhism, and post-colonial traditions of indigenous peoples. In the murderous twentieth century it can be seen in courageous contributions to nonkilling global change by the Christians Tolstoy and Martin Luther King, Jr., the Hindu Gandhi, the Muslim Abdul Ghaffar Khan, the Jew Joseph Abileah, the Buddhist Dalai Lama, the Green Petra Kelly, and countless others, celebrated and unsung.

The presence of the nonkilling spirit in each faith and examples of principled commitments to it open the way for awakening and affirmation by hundreds of millions of co-believers. Dissonant tension between the nonkilling imperative and recognition of responsibility for killing and its noxious consequences creates motivation for nonkilling personal and social change. While roots of nonkilling can be found within each tradition, the spiritual heritage of humankind as a whole is like the multiple root system that sustains the life of a banyan tree. Inspiration and sustenance can be drawn from the entire root system as well as from any part of it. For all tap the power of life. The reality of respect for life in religious and humanist faiths provides a strong spiritual basis for confidence that a nonkilling global society is possible.

Scientific Roots

"We will never get to nonviolence by religion alone." Such is the advice of one of India's foremost religious leaders, Acharya Mahapragya, creative inheritor of the ancient Jain tradition of *ahimsa* (nonviolence). In Jain thought, "Ahimsa is the heart of all stages of life, the core of all sacred texts, and the sum…and substance…of all vows and virtues" (Jain and Varni 1993: 139). For Acharya Mahapragya, the way to realize a nonviolent society is to empower individuals to discover nonviolence within themselves and to express it socially by combining modern neuroscience with spiritual truths. In his analysis, violence is caused by emotions produced by the endocrine glands affecting the sympathetic and parasympathetic nervous systems and is related to what

we eat. Furthermore based upon scientific knowledge of our neurological system we can purposely use the energy of our brains in simple meditational practices to nurture nonviolence within and to commit ourselves to nonkilling social life (Mahaprajna [sic] 1987 and 1994; Zaveri and Kumar 1992).

What are some scientific grounds for confidence in nonkilling human capabilities? By science is meant broadly all forms of knowledge gained by questioning and experimentation—facts, theories, and methods for determining validity and reliability. A harbinger of scientific revolution is when some philosophers begin to question accepted thinking.

This has been done for nonkilling by A. Richard Konrad (1974) who questions the conventional assumption that readiness to kill is the only effective way to cope with violence from rape to holocaust. Konrad argues that the thesis of the single violent problem-solving alternative rests upon three assumptions: that all nonkilling alternatives have been identified; that all have been tried; and that all have failed. But these assumptions are untenable: nonkilling problem-solving alternatives are hypothetically infinite; practical constraints of time, resources, and other factors prevent testing even those that are identified; therefore we cannot be certain that the single violent alternative is the only one that can succeed. Thus Konrad argues the need to shift from a philosophical predisposition to accept violence to one that seeks to create and test nonkilling alternatives. Such an approach is likely to lead to scientific discoveries that question the inescapability of human lethality. (See also Yoder 1983)

The assumption that humans must inevitably be killers because of their animal nature is being questioned. Tulane University psychologist Loh Tseng Tsai (1963) has demonstrated that a rat-killing cat and a sewer rat can be taught to eat peacefully out of the same dish. The method was a combination of operant conditioning and social learning. At first separated by a glass partition, the two animals learned that they must simultaneously press parallel levers to release food pellets into a common feeding dish. After seven hundred training sessions the partition could be removed without bloodshed. Tsai concludes:

> We have demonstrated for the first time in the history of science with crucial experiments that cats and rats—the so-called natural enemies— can and do cooperate. Such a discovery throws overboard the traditional dogma in psychology that in animal nature there is an ineradicable instinct of pugnacity which makes fighting or wars inevitable. (1963: 4)

Observing that "many think that our research has laid the cornerstone of the basic biological foundation for the theoretical possibility of world peace," Tsai calls for a science-based philosophy of "survival through cooperation" rather than continuation of the presumed inescapability of competitive lethality. In a radically different field, the physicist and historian of science Antonino Drago, contrasting the implications of Carnotian versus Newtonian mechanics for conflict resolution, arrives at a similar science-based recommendation in favor of transcendent cooperation (Drago 1994). So does the psychotherapist Jerome D. Frank in recommending cooperation toward mutually beneficial common goals to overcome deadly antagonisms (Frank 1960: 261-2; 1993: 204-5).

Challenge to the assumption that human lethality is inescapably rooted in our evolutionary emergence as a species of "killer ape" comes from new studies of a genetically almost identical primate species—the nonkilling bonobo of Central Africa (Kano 1990). The Mangandu people of the Congo, who share the tropical forest with the bonobo strictly prohibit killing them based on a legend that once their ancestors and the bonobo lived together as kin (Kano 1990: 62). In contrast to gorillas, chimpanzees, and other apes, bonobo have not been observed to kill each other (Wrangham and Peterson, 1990; Waal 1997). Furthermore, recent studies of "peacemaking" and "reciprocal altruism" among primate species who do kill also call into question the tendency to claim only lethality but not nonkilling potentiality in evolutionary human nature (Waal 1989; 1996). There is a peaceful side of animal nature and, as Kropotkin (1914), Sorkin (1954), and Alfie Kohn (1990) have demonstrated, a cooperative, altruistic, and "brighter side" of human nature as well.

In a comparative study of aggression in animals and humans, the ethologist-anthropologist Irenäus Eibl-Eibesfeldt (1979: 240-1) finds that there is a biological basis for the spiritual imperative not to kill. Observing that "in many animal species intraspecific aggression is so ritualized that it does not result in physical harm," he finds similar and more elaborate human techniques for avoiding bloodshed. "To some extent," he concludes, "a biological norm filter lays down the commandment: 'Thou shalt not kill.'" But "in the course of cultural pseudospeciation [defining others as not fully human and thus subject to predation], man has superimposed a cultural norm filter that commands him to kill upon his biological norm filter, which forbids him to kill." In war, "this leads to a conflict of norms of which man is aware through the conscience that pricks him as soon as he apprehends the en-

emy and confronts him as a human being." This is evidenced by post-killing warrior needs for purification and social acceptance.

Confirming Eibl-Eibesfeldt's thesis is Grossman's finding that "throughout history the majority of men on the battlefield would not attempt to kill the enemy, even to save their own lives or the lives of their friends" (Grossman 1995: 4). Grossman notes that psychiatric casualties among soldiers who have killed directly are higher than nonkillers. The soldier-psychologist and the ethologist-anthropologist differ only on the policy implications of their findings. For the former the task is to provide professional training to overcome resistance to killing. For the latter the problem is to bring culture into conformance with nonkilling human biology. Eibl-Eibesfeldt concludes:

> The root of the universal desire for peace lies in this conflict between cultural and biological norms, which makes men want to bring their biological and cultural norm filters into accord. Our conscience remains our hope, and based on this, a rationally guided evolution could lead to peace. This presupposes recognition of the fact that war performs functions that will have to be performed some other way, without bloodshed. (1979: 241)

Brain science provides further support for confidence in nonkilling human potential. Terming his approach "Neurorealism," the pioneering neuro-scientist Bruce E. Morton (2000) presents a "Dual Quadbrain Model of Behavioral Laterality" that describes the neurobiological bases of both nonkilling and killing. The four parts of the model "function in two modes of a single tetradic system." They are the brain core system (instincts), the limbic system (emotions), the right and left hemisphere systems (imagination and intellect), and the neocerebellar system (intuition). Morton locates the source of higher spiritual and social consciousness in the system of neocerebellar intuition. This "Higher Source" is "truthful, creative, self-disciplined, altruistic, cooperative, empathic, and nonviolent." It facilitates the long-term survival of the group and is "strictly a brain dependent phenomenon accessible to all." The emergence of the "Source" into consciousness can be evoked in three ways: by near-death trauma, by certain hallucinogenic drugs, and most importantly by meditation. In everyday social life, the "Source" intuitively facilitates the emergent benefits of synergy "toward nonviolent community." It benefits from and contributes to the absence of lethal threats to survival.

Thus neurorealist brain science provides a basis for self-activated nonkilling commitment and social transformation that is entirely consistent with nonkilling spirituality and biological reluctance to kill. It is also compatible with the Hindu Vivekananda's insight that the task of the great religious teachers is not to bring God from outside but to assist each person to bring out preexisting godliness within. It resonates with the Christian Tolstoy's affirmation that "the kingdom of God is within you" (Tolstoy 1974[1893]). Compare the insight of the fifteenth century Indian mystic Kabir:

> Between the two eyes is the Master,
> The messenger of the Lord.
> Within your own body resides your Lord,
> Why open the outer eyes to look for Him?
> (Sethi 1984: 56-7).

But suppose biology based brain dysfunctions predispose some individuals to be compulsive killers? Even if such lethality is biologically driven and not produced by conditioning and culture, scientific ingenuity promises to empower pathological killers to liberate themselves from compulsion to kill. And to do so without impairing other human qualities. With the rise of modern neuroscience, genetics, and other biosciences, the inescapable lethality of "human nature," even if connected to atypical biological impairment, can no longer be assumed.

A pioneering example is provided by the basic and applied research of the developmental neuropsychologist James W. Prescott and the neuropsychiatrist Robert G. Heath (Restak 1979: 118-133). They theorize that compulsion to kill by some individuals is related to impairment of the electrical circuits ("pleasure pathways") connecting areas of the brain that connect emotions (limbic system) and bodily movement (cerebellum). They further hypothesize that promotion or impairment of these circuits is related to degree of circular bodily movement in early childhood development, testing this by raising chimpanzees with heads immobilized in a vise or by twirling them around in a swivel chair. Subsequently, they found the restrained chimpanzees to be more aggressive and the mobile ones to be more social. Proceeding to human application on institutional killers, they implanted a small electrode in the hind brain that can be self-controlled by a pocket stimulator operating through a device implanted in the homicidally compulsive person's shoulder ("cerebellar stimulator" or "cerebellar pacemaker"). When a feeling of dysphoria and the urge to kill arises, the person can activate the pleasure pathways to remove it.

Some individuals diagnosed as "criminally insane" have experienced immediate relief after years of solitary confinement or restraint. Others have experienced gradual disappearance of homicidal and suicidal urges. There have been failures. In one case the cerebellar wire broke and the patient immediately killed a nurse with a pair of scissors. Nevertheless the successes of this pioneering procedure challenge new theoretical and technological innovations to liberate humankind from lethal biological pessimism.

Further grounds for nonkilling optimism—contrasting sharply with political science pessimism—are found in the conclusions of twenty-three Stanford University psychiatrists who formed a committee to study the "crisis of violence" in the United States following the assassinations of Martin Luther King, Jr. and Senator Robert F. Kennedy (Daniels, Gilula, and Ochberg 1970). After reviewing violence and aggression in relation to biology, psychodynamics, environment, anger, intergroup conflict, mass media, firearms, mental illness, drug use, and other factors Daniels and Gilula conclude: "*Already we may know enough for man to close his era of violence if we determine to pursue alternatives*" [emphasis added] (441).

Case studies of homicide presented by psychiatrist George F. Solomon (1970) make killing understandable and plausibly preventable in contrast to helpless reference to "human nature." In one case, the socialization experience of a seemingly unemotional, random sniper-killer of women included: parental neglect by his gambling father, seduction by his alcoholic and promiscuous mother, fascination with guns, and drug use to block out "horrible images" of incestuous guilt. In another case, the background of a killer of his ex-wife's new husband included: poverty, hatred of father for violence against his mother, convulsion after a paternal beating on the head, maternal ridicule, being beaten by his sisters, becoming a first sergeant in the Marine Corps, marriage to a prostitute met in a brothel, fathering two children by her, assault upon her and slashing his own wrists after discovering her infidelity while he was on duty overseas, being threatened by her with a .38 caliber handgun, and possession of his service pistol with which he killed—not her—but her new husband amidst a three-sided, living room quarrel about child support and visitation rights.

Solomon concludes:

> As a psychiatrist I have a firm commitment to the idea that human behavior can be modified. Our failures in prevention and treatment have been based on ignorance, which can be ameliorated through further research; on lack of implementation of accepted principles; on a reluctance to innovate; and on a vindictiveness toward social deviancy far

> more than any intrinsic "incurability" of the violence- prone person. The human's capacity for growth and healing is great and, hopefully, his proclivity for violence can be halted (387).

In anthropology, new interest in understanding human capacities for nonviolence and peace as contrasted with customary emphasis upon violence and aggression is producing knowledge to question the assumption that a nonkilling society is impossible (Sponsel and Gregor 1994b; Sponsel 1996). As Leslie E. Sponsel explains, "Nonviolent and peaceful societies appear to be rare—not because they are, in fact, rare but because nonviolence and peace are too rarely considered in research, the media, and other areas." He adds, "It is as important to understand the characteristics, conditions, causes, functions, processes, and consequences of nonviolence and peace as it is to understand those of violence and war" (Sponsel 1994a: 18-9).

Scientific questioning of the Hobbesian assumption of universal lethality among early humans has been advanced by Piero Giorgi (1999) and J.M.G. van der Dennen (1990; 1995). In a review of evidence for war and feuding for 50,000 "primitive" peoples recorded in the ethnographic literature over the past century, van der Dennen finds explicit confirmation for only 2,000 groups. Acknowledging that absence of information about "belligerence" for the remaining groups does not necessarily prove their peacefulness, van der Dennen cautions against dogmatic acceptance of the assumption of universal human bellicosity (1990: 257, 259, 264-9). He cites ethnographic evidence for 395 "highly unwarlike" peoples from Aboriginals to Zuni (1995: 595-619).

Reviewing the anthropological literature, Bruce D. Bonta (1993) identifies forty-seven societies that demonstrate human capacities for "peacefulness."

> Peacefulness… is defined as a condition whereby people live with a relatively high degree of interpersonal harmony; experience little physical violence among adults, between adults and children, and between the sexes; have developed workable strategies for resolving conflicts and averting violence; are committed to avoiding violence (such as warfare) with other peoples; raise their children to adopt peaceful ways; and have a strong consciousness of themselves as peaceful (4).

Bonta finds evidence of peacefulness among the Amish, Anabaptists, Balinese, Batek, Birhor, Brethren, Buid, Chewong, Doukhobors, Fipa, Fore, G/wi, Hutterites, Ifaluk, Inuit, Jains, Kadar, !Kung, Ladakhis, Lepchas, Malapandaram, Mbuti, Mennonites, Montagnais-Naskapi, Moravians, Nayaka,

Nubians, Onge, Orang Asli, Paliyan, Piaroa, Quakers, Rural Northern Irish, Rural Thai, San, Sanpoil, Salteaux, Semai, Tahitians, Tanka, Temiar, Toraja, Tristan Islanders, Waura, Yanadi, Zapotec, and Zuni.

In a further study of conflict resolution among twenty-four of these peoples, Bonta (1996) concludes:

> Several common notions about conflict and conflict resolution that are asserted by Western scholars can be questioned in light of the success of these societies in peacefully resolving conflicts: namely, that violent conflict is inevitable in all societies; that punishment and armed force prevent internal and external violence; that political structures are necessary to prevent conflicts; and that conflict should be viewed as positive and necessary. The contrary evidence is that over half of the peaceful societies have no recorded violence; they rarely punish adults (except for the threat of ostracism); they handle conflicts with outside societies in the same peaceful ways that they approach internal conflicts; they do not look to outside governments when they have internal disputes; and they have a highly negative view of conflict (403).

A recurrent anthropological finding is the importance of child socialization and community self-identity among other factors differentiating societies high or low in violence (Fabbro 1978). Their significance is shown in a comparative study by Douglas P. Fry (1994) of two Mexican Zapotec villages of similar socioeconomic characteristics but markedly different in incidence of violence. In peaceful La Paz, where homicide is rare, citizens see themselves as "respectful, peaceful, nonjealous, and cooperative" (140). In nearby violent San Andrés, there is a "widely held countervailing belief or value system that condones violence" (141). This is accompanied by lack of respect for women, wife-beatings, physical punishment of children, disobedient children, swearing, drunken brawling, and killing in sexual rivalries, feuds, and revenge. With material and structural conditions much the same, the homicide rate in San Andrés is 18.1 per 100,000 compared with 3.4 in La Paz. This comparison helps us to understand that pessimism about human nature and community norms condoning violence are correlated with killing; whereas nonkilling beliefs and values predispose to a nonkilling society.

Major scientific support for confidence in nonkilling human capabilities is provided by the historic Seville "Statement on Violence" on May 16, 1986 issued by an international group of specialists in the disciplines of animal behavior, behavior genetics, biological anthropology, ethology, neurophysiol-

ogy, physical anthropology, political psychology, psychiatry, psychobiology, psychology, social psychology, and sociology.[2] They declare:

> IT IS SCIENTIFICALLY INCORRECT to say that we have inherited the tendency to make war from our animal ancestors…. IT IS SCIENTIFI-CALLY INCORRECT to say that war or any other violent behaviour is genetically programmed into our human nature…. IT IS SCIENTIFI-CALLY INCORRECT to say that in the course of human evolution there has been a selection of aggressive behavior more than for other kinds of behavior…. IT IS SCIENTIFICALLY INCORRECT to say that humans have a "violent brain"…. IT IS SCIENTIFICALLY INCORRECT to say that war is caused by 'instinct' or any single motivation.

Paralleling nonkilling optimism of the Stanford psychiatrists, the Seville scientists declare:

> We conclude that biology does not condemn humanity to war, and that humanity can be freed from the bondage of biological pessimism and empowered with confidence to undertake the transformative tasks needed in this International Year of Peace and in the years to come. Although these tasks are institutional and collective, they also rest upon the consciousness of individual participants for whom pessimism and optimism are crucial factors. Just as 'wars begin in the minds of men,' peace also begins in our minds. The same species who invented war is capable of inventing peace. The responsibility lies with each of us (Adams 1989: 120-1; 1997).

On August 2, 1939 Albert Einstein wrote a letter to President Franklin D. Roosevelt informing him that atomic physics had advanced to a point where creation of "extremely powerful bombs of a new type" was "conceivable" (Nathan and Norden, 1968: 295). This resulted in formation of an advisory committee, an initial United States Government investment of six thousand dollars, the organization of the multi-billion dollar Manhattan Project, and the creation and use six years later of the world's first uranium and plutonium bombs. Seventy years later it is possible to assert that there is enough emerging scientific evidence of nonkilling human capabilities which —if systematically integrated and advanced—holds forth the possibility of empowering nonkilling human self-transformation. Among indicators are more than one thousand doctoral dissertations reporting research on "nonviolence" that increasingly have appeared since 1963 in the United States

alone in such fields as anthropology, criminology, education, history, language and literature, philosophy, psychology, political science, religion, sociology, speech, and theology (*Dissertation Abstracts International* 1963-).

Adding research completed in other countries such as India, in languages other than English, in papers presented in academic conferences, in books and interdisciplinary symposia (Kool 1990; 1993), in pioneering integrative analyses (Gregg 1966), in new journals (*International Journal of Nonviolence* 1993-), in a major annotated bibliographic survey of nonviolent action (McCarthy and Sharp 1997), and in other sources—it is clear that a substantial body of nonviolent knowledge is growing in addition to the literature on "peace" and "conflict resolution." Present nonkilling knowledge potential is functionally comparable to the state of atomic physics in 1939.

Salient Outcroppings of Nonkilling Capability

Emile Durkheim (1858-1917), a founder of modern sociology, urged attention to "salient outcroppings" of social life related to questions of theoretical interest. This idea is carried forward by the American social psychologist Donald T. Campbell who taught Northwestern University political science graduate students to be alert to observe "naturally occurring social experiments" akin to those that might be contrived in an experimental laboratory (Paige 1971). Since political science is prone to develop theory out of observing practice—such as in Machiavelli's theoretical elaboration of the techniques of ruthless ruler Cesare Borgia in *The Prince*—examples of nonkilling behavior arising "naturally" out of historical and contemporary experience are especially significant for recognizing possibilities for nonkilling social change.

Among salient manifestations of nonkilling capabilities are public policies, institutions, cultural expressions, nonkilling political struggles, historical examples, and dedicated individuals.

Public policies

Remarkable examples of political decisions tending toward realization of nonkilling societies are found in countries that have abolished the death penalty, countries that have no armies, and countries that recognize the right of conscientious objection to killing in military service.

By January 2009, 94 of 195 world countries and territories [73 in 2002, 1st edition] had abolished the death penalty for all crimes.

Table 2. Countries and territories without death penalty (93)

Albania	Germany	Panama
Andorra	Greece	Paraguay
Angola	Guinea-Bissau	Philippines
Argentina	Haiti	Poland
Armenia	Honduras	Portugal
Australia	Hungary	Romania
Austria	Iceland	Rwanda
Azerbaijan	Ireland	Samoa
Belgium	Italy	San Marino
Bhutan	Kiribati	Sao Tome and Principe
Bosnia-Herzegovina	Liechtenstein	Senegal
Bulgaria	Lithuania	Serbia
Cambodia	Luxembourg	Seychelles
Canada	Macedonia (FYR)	Slovak Republic
Cape Verde	Malta	Slovenia
Chile	Marshall Islands	Solomon Islands
Colombia	Mauritius	South Africa
Cook Islands	Mexico	Spain
Costa Rica	Micronesia	Sweden
Cote d'Ivoire	Moldova	Switzerland
Croatia	Monaco	Timor-Lorosae
Cyprus	Montenegro	Turkey
Czech Republic	Mozambique	Turkmenistan
Denmark	Namibia	Tuvalu
Djibouti	Nepal	Ukraine
Dominican Republic	Netherlands	United Kingdom
Ecuador	New Zealand	Uruguay
Estonia	Nicaragua	Uzbekistan
Finland	Niue	Vanuatu
France	Norway	Vatican City State
Georgia	Palau	Venezuela

Source: Amnesty International, January 2009.

Each instance of complete abolition of capital punishment is of compelling scientific and public policy interest. Why, how, and when did each government decide not to kill? Why are some countries, cultures, and regions represented while others are conspicuously absent? What historical processes of innovation and diffusion account for the present global pattern? And what implications do these examples of nonkilling change have for future universal realization of societies without killing?

In addition to the completely abolitionist countries, nine states have abolished the death penalty for ordinary crimes while retaining it for special circumstances of martial law or war (for example, Bolivia, Brazil, El Salvador, Fiji, Israel, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia and Peru). Thirty-six states retain the death penalty in law but had not executed anyone for ten or more years (for example, Algeria, Benin, Brunei Darussalam, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Congo Republic, Eritrea, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Grenada, Kenya, South Korea, Laos, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Maldives, Mali, Mauritania, Morocco, Myanmar, Nauru, Niger, Papua New Guinea, Russian Federation, Sri Lanka, Suriname, Swaziland, Tajikistan, Tanzania, Togo, Tonga, Tunisia and Zambia). Fifty-nine [ninety one in 2002] countries retain the death penalty in law and continue to kill (including Afghanistan, Antigua and Barbuda, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belarus, Belize, Botswana, Burundi, Chad, China, Comoros, Congo Democratic Republic, Cuba, Dominica, Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Guatemala, Guinea, Guyana, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, North Korea, Kuwait, Lebanon, Lesotho, Libya, Malaysia, Mongolia, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, Palestinian Authority, Qatar, Saint Christopher & Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent & Grenadines, Saudi Arabia, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, Taiwan, Thailand, Trinidad And Tobago, Uganda, United Arab Emirates, United States of America, Viet Nam, Yemen and Zimbabwe). While the United States retains the death penalty for federal crimes, fourteen of its fifty states and the District of Columbia have abolished it: Alaska, Hawai'i, Iowa, Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, New Jersey, New York, North Dakota, Rhode Island, Vermont, West Virginia and Wisconsin.

Despite oscillations between rejection and reimposition, the global trend toward abolition of the death penalty by governments emerging from traditions of violence reinforces confidence in the attainability of nonkilling societies. Killing of citizens need not be part of Rousseau's "social contract" nor an inalienable attribute of politics as prescribed by Max Weber.

Consider also independent countries without armies, twenty-seven in 2009. All are members of the UN except the Cook Islands and Niue.

Table 3. Countries Without Armies (27)

No Army (19)

Costa Rica	Mauritius	San Marino
Dominica	Nauru	Solomon Islands
Grenada	Panama	Tuvalu
Haiti	San Kitts y Nevis	Vanuatu
Kiribati	Saint Lucia	Vatican City State
Liechtenstein	S. Vincent and Grenadines	
Maldives	Samoa	

No Army (Defense Treaty) (8)

Andorra (France, Spain)	Micronesia (USA)
Cook Islands (New Zeland)	Monaco (France)
Iceland (NATO, USA)	Niue (New Zeland)
Marshall Islands (USA)	Palau (USA)

Source: Barbey 2001.

In addition, at least eighteen dependent territories or geographical regions are demilitarized by agreement with the sovereignty-claiming country such as the Aland Islands of Finland, or by international treaty, including Antarctica and the Moon (Barbey 1989: 5).

The absence of armies may be surprising in countries where they are deemed to be indispensable for national identity, social control, defense, and offense. But even though countries without armies are small—and although some are qualified by dependence upon armed allies or by presence of para-military forces—they demonstrate the possibility of nonmilitary statehood. Nonkilling nations are not unthinkable.

In countries that do have armies, state recognition of conscientious objection to military conscription provides further evidence of nonkilling political potential. Fifty-four countries in 2005 recognized in law some form of principled refusal by citizens to kill in military service.

Table 4. Countries recognizing conscientious objection to military service (54)

Albania	Finland	Poland
Argentina	France	Portugal
Armenia	Germany	Romania
Australia	Greece	Russia
Austria	Guyana	Serbia
Azerbaijan	Hungary	Slovakia
Belarus	Israel	Slovenia
Belgium	Italy	South Africa
Bermuda	Kyrgyzstan	Spain
Bosnia-Herzegovina	Latvia	Suriname
Brazil	Lithuania	Sweden
Bulgaria	Macedonia	Switzerland
Canada	Malta	Ukraine
Croatia	Moldova	United Kingdom
Cyprus (Greek-Cyprus)	Montenegro	United States
Czech Republic	Netherlands	Uzbekistan
Denmark	Norway	Yugoslavia
Estonia	Paraguay	Zimbabwe

Source: Horeman and Stolwijk (1998) and War Resisters' International (2005).

Acceptable legal grounds for objection vary widely from narrow religious requirements to broad recognition of spiritual, philosophical, ethical, moral, humanitarian, or political reasons for refusal to kill. Also varying widely are requirements for alternative service, ability of soldiers already in service to claim conscientious objection, and degree of reliability in implementation of the laws (Moskos and Chambers 1993). The most liberal current nonkilling right is contained in Article 4 of the Basic Law of 1949 in the Federal Republic of Germany: "No one shall be forced to do war service with arms against his conscience" (Kuhlmann and Lippert 1993: 98). As is the case with abolition of the death penalty and the emergence of countries without armies, the origins, processes, global patterning, and prospects for political recognition of refusal to serve as military killers is of surpassing scientific interest.

Social Institutions

Institutions approximating those appropriate in or functional for transition to future nonkilling societies already have appeared in various parts of the world. They provide further evidence of human capacity for commitment not to kill. If these scattered institutions were creatively combined and adapted to the needs of any single society, it is even now plausible to envision a society without killing that is not the product of hypothetical speculation but is based upon demonstrated human experience. Of the many, a few are briefly mentioned here. Each has a story that merits telling in full.

Spiritual institutions

Religious institutions inspired by nonkilling faiths can be found throughout the world. Among them are the Jains of the East, Quakers of the West, the Universal Peace and Brotherhood Association of Japan, the Buddhist Plum Village community in France, the Simon Kimbangu Church in Africa, the Doukhobor (Spirit Wrestler) pacifists of Russia and Canada, and the Jewish Peace Fellowship in the United States. Globally the International Fellowship of Reconciliation, founded in 1919, brings together men and women of every faith "who, from the basis of a belief in the power of love and truth to create justice and restore community, commit themselves to active nonviolence as a way of life and as a means of transformation—personal, social, economic, and political."

Political institutions

An electoral political party committed to principled nonkilling is the Fellowship Party of Britain, founded by Ronald Mallone, John Loverseed, and other Christian pacifists and WWII veterans in 1955.[3] It campaigns against all preparations for war, and for economic and social justice, while celebrating the arts and sports. In Germany, "nonviolence" is asserted among the salient values of the ecological *Die Grünen* (Green Party) founded by Petra K. Kelly and thirty others in 1979[4]. Among sources of inspiration were the nonviolent movements associated with Gandhi and Martin Luther King, Jr. (Kelly 1989). Although uncertainly salient in policy practice as Green parties diffuse throughout the world, the founding commitment to nonviolence by an innovative social movement-electoral party provides a significant political precedent. The United States Pacifist Party, founded in 1983 on spiritual, scientific, and humanist principles by Bradford Lyttle, who became its can-

didate in the presidential elections of 1996 and 2000, seeks nonviolent transformation of American society and its role in the world.[5] In India, the Sarvodaya Party, founded by T.K.N. Unnithan and others, enters the electoral arena to promote the Gandhian model of social development for the well-being of all.[6] Justifying its break with the Gandhian tradition of remaining aloof from politics, the Sarvodaya Party explains: "Power is neutral in character, it becomes corrupting only in the hands of a corrupt people." At a global level, the unique Transnational Radical Party, inspired by Gandhian nonviolence, has emerged out of Italy's Partito Radicale in 1988[7]. Its purpose is to work exclusively at the international level to exert nonviolent influence upon the United Nations; for example, for worldwide abolition of the death penalty, for recognition of conscientious objection, and for prosecution of war criminals. The party does not contest national elections; members may hold dual membership in any party; and dues are prorated at one percent of the gross national product per capita of member countries. Under Gandhi's image the party proclaims: "Transnational law and nonviolence are the most effective and radical ways to build a better world."

Economic institutions

Salient economic institutions that express nonkilling principles include a capitalist mutual stock fund that will not invest in war industries (Pax World Fund); a labor union inspired by Gandhian and Kingian nonviolence (United Farm Workers of America founded by Cesar Chavez, Dolores Huerta, and others); and a comprehensive community development program in Sri Lanka based upon nonviolent Buddhist principles (the Sarvodaya Shramadana Sangamaya, led by A.T. Ariyaratne). Although limited in success, the experience of India's *bhoodan* (land gift) movement to transfer land to the landless—inspired by Gandhi's theory of "trusteeship" and led by Vinoba Bhave (1994) and Jayaprakash Narayan (1978)—has demonstrated that nonkilling sharing of scarce resources is not unthinkable. Philanthropic foundations support nonkilling service to society: The Gandhi Foundation (London), the Savodaya International Trust (Bangalore), and the A.J. Muste Institute (New York).

Educational institutions

The possibility of basing an entire university upon the multifaith spirit of nonkilling in service to human needs has been bequeathed by the inspired Gandhian educator Dr. G. Ramachandran (1903 - 1995), founder of Gandhigram Rural Institute (Deemed University) in Tamil Nadu, India. Serving thirty

surrounding villages, some of the University's important founding features were: (1) combining disciplinary studies and community applications; political science and village decision-making, physics and radio repair, biology and well-cleaning, arts and creative child development, (2) requiring problem-solving theses by every graduating student, (3) teaching trilingual language competence with Tamil for local needs, Hindi for national integration, and English as a window on the world, and (4) engaging all in labor for campus maintenance and services; without, for example, janitors, grounds keepers, and cooks.

Ramachandran's distinctive contribution was to establish within this institution of higher education a nonkilling alternative to military training—a Shanti Sena (Peace Corps)—whose dynamic chief organizer became humanities professor N. Radhakrishnan (1992; 1997). From 1958 to 1988 the Shanti Sena trained five thousand voluntarily disciplined and uniformed young men and women who pledged "to work for peace and to be prepared, if need be, to lay down my life for it." Combining spiritual, physical, intellectual, and organizational training, the Shanti Sena prepared students for conflict resolution, security functions, disaster relief, and cooperative community service in response to community needs. The approach was always to work *together with* villagers to improve such things as childcare, sanitation, housing, and preservation of folk arts traditions. While in the mid-1970s some urban universities in India were firebombed as instruments of oppression, villagers around Gandhigram held festivals to celebrate elevation of their Rural Institute to the status of Deemed University. The Shanti Sena assumed responsibility for campus security. No armed police were permitted on campus, even during visits by Indian prime ministers Nehru, Indira Gandhi, and other dignitaries.

Training institutions

Institutions that provide nonkilling training for social change, conflict zone interventions, social defense, and other purposes are rapidly appearing. Experienced trainers are increasingly in demand within and across national boundaries and are contributing to growing confidence in human ability to replace violent means with nonkilling methods of problem-solving. To note a few organizations and prominent trainers (Beer 1994): the G. Ramachandran School of Nonviolence (N. Radhakrishnan), Peace Brigades International (Narayan Desai), Florida Martin Luther King, Jr. Institute for Nonviolence with La-Fayette & Associates (Bernard LaFayette, Jr., Charles L. Alphin, Sr., and David Jehnsen), International Fellowship of Reconciliation (Hildegaard Goss-Mayr and

Richard Deats), Training Center Workshops (George Lakey), War Resisters International (Howard Clark), Palestinian Center for the Study of Nonviolence (Mubarak Awad), Nonviolence International (Michael Beer), Servicio Paz y Justicia (Adolfo Pérez Esquivel), the International Network of Engaged Buddhists (Yeshua Moser-Puangsuwan), and TRANSCEND (Johan Galtung).

An important resource for training in nonkilling personal defense and character development with profound implications for extrapolation into nonkilling strategic social change is the creative nonkilling martial art Aikido, originating in Japan. As taught by its founder, Morihei Ueshiba, "To smash, injure, or destroy is the worse sin a human can commit." The objective of Aikido is harmony with the life force of the universe. "Aikido is the manifestation of love" (Stevens 1987: 94, 112; Yoder 1983: 28).

Security institutions

Several institutions throughout the world illustrate capacity to seek community security by nonlethal means. Among them are found countries with virtually unarmed citizenry (Japan), police virtually without firearms (Britain), a prison without armed guards (Finland), unarmed zones of peace (Sitio Cantomanyog, Philippines), an association for unarmed civilian defense (Bund für Soziale Verteidigung, Minden, Germany), and nonkilling organizations that carry out peacemaking interventions in combat zones (Moser-Puangsuwan and Weber 2000; Mahony and Eguren 1997). To these must be added the various movements by governments and citizen organizations in the direction of a weapon-free world: to abolish nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons; and to ban handguns, assault weapons, and land mines. Among organizations are the Center for Peace and Reconciliation, founded by former Costa Rican president and 1987 Nobel peace laureate Oscar Arias Sánchez for demilitarization and conflict resolution; the Movement to Abolish the Arms Trade, emulating anti-slave trade experience; and Nature/Gunless Society, founded in the Philippines by Reynaldo Pacheco and Haydee Y. Yorac, dedicated to saving human beings as a "endangered species" (Villavincensio-Paurom 1995)

Research institutions

In the West, The Albert Einstein Institution (Boston, Massachusetts), founded by Gene Sharp, carries out research on nonviolent struggles for democracy, security, and justice throughout the world. In the East, the Gandhian Institute of Studies (Varanasi, India), founded by Jayaprakash ("J.P.") Na-

rayan, conducts social science research to support nonkilling social change. At the transnational level, the Nonviolence Commission of the International Peace Research Association founded by Theodore L. Herman promotes worldwide sharing of discoveries in research, education, and action.

Problem-solving institutions

Examples of institutions dedicated to solving problems on nonkilling principles include Amnesty International (defense of human rights and abolition of the death penalty), Greenpeace International (defense of the environment and abolition of nuclear weapons), the War Resisters International (defense of conscientious objection to military conscription and resistance to all preparations for war), and Médicins sans Frontières (humanitarian medical care for victims of violence).

Communications media

The possibility of communications media that inform and comment upon local and global conditions from a nonkilling perspective is illustrated by work of the pioneering journalist Colman McCarthy (1994) and by several publications from around the world. They include *Day by Day*, the monthly press, arts, and sports review of Britain's pacifist Fellowship Party (London); Bangkok's Buddhist *Seeds of Peace*; the international *Peace News: for Nonviolent Revolution* (London); the French monthly *Non-violence Actualité* (Montargis); Italy's *Azione Nonviolenta* (Verona); Germany's *Graswürtzel-revolution* (Oldenburg); and the American magazines *Fellowship* (Nyack, N.Y.) and *Nonviolent Activist* (New York); among many others. Journals such as *Social Alternatives* (Brisbane, Australia), *Gandhi Marg* (New Delhi), and the *International Journal of Nonviolence* (Washington, D.C.) evoke and communicate nonkilling intellect on various social issues. Some publishing houses such as Navajivan (Ahmedabad, India), New Society Publishers (Blaine, Washington), Non-violence Actualité (Paris), and Orbis Books (Maryknoll, New York) specialize in books to educate for nonviolent social change.

Cultural resources

Nonkilling cultural resources are creations of art and intellect that uplift the human spirit and inspire advances toward realization of a nonkilling society. These include folk songs ("We Shall Overcome"), opera (Philip Glass, "Satyagraha"), novels (Bertha von Suttner, *Lay Down Your Arms*); poetry (Steve Mason, *Johnny's Song*), art (Käthe Kollwitz, *Seed for the planting*

must not be ground); and films (Richard Attenborough, *Gandhi*). The Centre for Nonviolence through the Arts, founded in 1995 by Mallika Sarabhai in Ahmedabad, India, seeks to synergize nonkilling creativity for social transformation in the visual, performing, and literary arts.

Nonkilling political struggles

Although not new to history, nonkilling political struggles in the last half of the twentieth century increasingly manifest nonkilling human potential. "As recent as 1980," Gene Sharp observes, "it was to most people unthinkable that nonviolent struggle—or people's power—would within a decade be recognized as a major force shaping the course of politics throughout the world" (Sharp 1989: 4). From 1970 to 1989 Sharp notes significant nonkilling struggles in at least the following places: *Africa* (Algeria, Morocco, South Africa, and Sudan), *Asia* (Burma, China, India, Japan, South Korea, Pakistan, the Philippines, and Tibet), the *Americas* (Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Haiti, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, and the United States), *Europe* (Estonia, France, East and West Germany, Hungary, Ireland, Latvia, and Yugoslavia), the *Middle East* (Israel occupied Palestine), and the *Pacific* (Australia and New Caledonia). Since 1989 demonstrations of nonkilling people's power have contributed to the dramatic end of single-party Communist rule in the former Soviet Union, Eastern Europe, the Baltic Republics, and Mongolia; to the peaceful reunification of Germany; and to the end of apartheid rule in South Africa.

Although not all nonkilling struggles have been completely killing-free, although some have been brutally repressed as in Burma in 1988 and China in 1989, and although some commentators would attribute successes to threatened lethality—they depart markedly from the bloody traditions of the American, French, Russian, Chinese, and other violent revolutions. Learning from the examples of the Gandhian independence movement in India that contributed to the collapse of the world colonial system, the Kingian movement for racial civil rights in the United States, the nonkilling people's power movement for democracy in the Philippines, the anti-nuclear war movement, environmental defense actions, and other experiences—gradually a repertoire of powerful nonkilling strategy and tactics is arising out of practice, including use of high technologies. In turn *some* ruling regimes are beginning to show more nonlethal restraint in countering nonkilling citizen demands for peace, freedom, and justice.

In addition to broad struggles that have shown capacities to influence regime and structural changes, many social movements have sought specific

changes to establish features of a nonkilling society. Among them are movements to abolish the death penalty; for alternatives to abortion; to recognize conscientious objection to military service; to abolish armies; to establish nonkilling civilian defense; to seek nonkilling security in areas of urban and rural combat; to end war taxes; to abolish nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons; to abolish land mines, automatic weapons, and handguns; to remove economic support for lethality; to protect the human rights of individuals, minorities, and indigenous peoples; to protect the environment from despoilation; and to realize other political, military, economic, social, and cultural changes.

Advancing beyond historical spontaneity, nonkilling struggles at the end of the twentieth century—aided by the pioneering research of Gene Sharp (1973), Johan Galtung (1992; 1996), Jacques Semelin (1993), Michael Randle (1994), and others—are becoming more self-consciously principled, more creative, and more widespread through diffusion by global communications. Amidst continuing bloodshed in the era of globalization, nonviolent movements increasingly arise and diffuse throughout the world through processes of innovation and emulation to challenge the violence and injustices of state and society (Powers and Vogele 1997; Zunes, Kurtz, and Asher 1999; Ackerman and DuVall 2000).

Historical roots

History provides salient outcroppings of nonkilling capabilities, often in periods of great violence. When nonkilling manifestations are aggregated globally, a nonkilling history of humankind can be created. Some glimpses of constituent elements can now be seen.

Nonkilling conviction and commitment are irrepressible. Over two thousand years of Judaeo-Christian history, as long as the Sixth Commandment "Thou shalt not kill" (Exod. 20: 13), the Sermon on the Mount (Matt. 5: 3; 7: 27), and the example of Christ on the Cross endure in oral or written tradition, the nonkilling imperative will continue to be reignited in courageous resistance to lethality—despite persecution and martyrdom—by some humans from illiterate peasants to privileged elites (Brock 1968; 1970; 1972; 1990; 1991a; 1991b; 1992). Such was the coordinated mass "burning of weapons" on June 29, 1895 by 7,000 pacifist Doukhobor peasants at three sites in Russia, followed by persecution and emigration of 7,500 Doukhobors to Canada in 1899, assisted by Tolstoy (Tarasoff 1995: 8-9). Historical roots of nonkilling capability can be found in other cultural traditions; for example, in Buddhism (Horigan 1996; Paige and Gilliatt 1991); Islam (Banerjee 2000; Crow 1990; Easwaran

1999; Kishtainy 1990; Paige 1993a; Satha-Anand 1990; Tayyabulla 1959); and Judaism (Schwarzschild, n.d.; Polner and Goodman 1994; Wilcock 1994).

Furthermore, as Moskos and Chambers (1993) have shown in a comparative historical study of conscientious objection to military service in modern democracies, nonsectarian, humanitarian, and political grounds for refusal to kill in war are becoming predominant. A process of secularization of nonkilling is underway. The spiritual and the secular, the principled and pragmatic, are converging in refusal to kill

Another historical observation is the surprising responsiveness of *some* otherwise violence-accepting political leaders to sincere and often death-defying expressions of nonkilling conviction. Among examples is the decision of King Frederick I of Prussia in 1713 to exempt pacifist Mennonites from conscription. Similar exemptions were granted to Mennonites in Russia by Catherine II (1763) and Alexander II (1875), (Brock 1972: 230, 234, 436). In 1919, Lenin, on plea of Tolstoy's companion V.G. Chertkov, and advice from Bolshevik V.C. Bonch-Bruevich, exempted Tolstoyans and other pacifist religious communities from service in the Red Army (Josephson 1985: 162; Coppieters and Zverev 1995). One of the first Bolshevik decisions was to abolish the death penalty in the army. The ephemerality of such decisions does not detract from their reality as opportunities for significant nonkilling discovery. For as Jerome D. Frank has observed, given citizen propensities to follow authority, changing the behavior of political leaders may be one of the most effective contributions that can be made to peace. But while leaders may lead, followers may lag. Zimring and Hawkins point out in a study of the abolition of the death penalty in Western democracies:

> The end of capital punishment nearly always occurs in democracies in the face of majority public opposition. Every Western democracy except the United States has ended executions, but we are aware of no nation where a democratic consensus supporting abolition was present when executions stopped. Yet abolition persists, even though public resentment remains for long periods (1986: xvi).

However, to note the importance of political leadership (Paige 1977; Burns 1978) for nonkilling social change is not to overlook the increasing force of mass nonkilling people's power.

A third historical observation is that commitment to nonkilling is characteristically accompanied by efforts to alleviate other forms of suffering and to bring about life-respecting changes in society. Nonkilling means neither

unconcern nor inaction. Jain ahimsa, for example, extends to efforts to rescue animals, birds, and other forms of life (Tobias 1991). Nonkilling engagement in efforts to realize significant structural changes can be seen in the Gandhian movement in India. It sought not only political independence but significant economic, social, and cultural changes affecting the poor, women, minorities, caste, and inter-communal relationships. Likewise the nonviolent Kingian movement in the United States in its quest for freedom and racial equality became engaged in efforts to remove obstacles to justice in the structure and functioning of American society from poverty to war.

Evidence for nonkilling capability can be seen in the histories of even violent modern nation states. The United States of America provides an example. As yet incompletely articulated in comparison with the predominant violent tradition, the roots of nonkilling in the American experience understandably are largely unknown to students of political science. Yet pioneering inquiries reveal their unmistakable presence (Brock 1968; Cooney and Michalowski 1987; Hawkley and Juhnke 1993; Kapur 1992; Kohn 1987; Lynd and Lynd 1995; Association of American Historians 1994; Schlissel 1968; True 1995; Zinn 1990).

Nonkilling in the United States

Nonkilling was present at the creation of the United States of America. It began in peaceful relations between indigenous peoples and pacifist immigrants. For much of seventy years (1682-1756) pacifist Quakers in the militia-free colony of Pennsylvania coexisted peacefully with Delaware Indians following treaty pledges to keep doors open to friendly visits and to consult upon rumors of hostile intent (Brock 1990: 87-91). Provisions for religious conscientious objection to killing in military service were contained in the laws of twelve of thirteen pre-Revolutionary colonies. The most liberal, Rhode Island (1673), exempted men whose convictions forbade them "to train, arm, rally to fight, to kill" and provided that objectors should not "suffer any punishment, fine, distraint, penalty nor imprisonment" (Kohn 1987: 8).

Nonkilling was present in the legislative deliberations of the emerging nation. One of the first statutes passed by the Continental Congress in 1789 pledged "no violence" to nonkilling religious conscience (Kohn 1987: 10, 13). In the deliberations that added the Bill of Rights to the U.S. Constitution in 1989, Representative James Madison proposed a provision in Article 2 that would have recognized the right of every citizen to refuse to kill: "No person religiously scrupulous of bearing arms shall be compelled to render

military service in person" (Kohn 1987:11). Madison's proposal was approved by the House of Representatives, but it was rejected by a states-rights defensive Senate conference committee that objected to extending federal controls over state militias.

In the American Revolution (1775-83), colonists of various ethnicities and religious persuasions refused to kill on either side. A Bible-reading British trooper, Thomas Watson, renounced killing and later became a Massachusetts Quaker elder (Brock 1968: 280-81). During the British blockade and subsequent American siege of Boston (1774-76), pacifist Quakers persuaded contending generals Washington and Howe to allow them to deliver humanitarian aid to its citizens and refugees (Brock 1968: 193-94). Not without suffering, nonkilling conscience was assisted and respected.

It was not unthinkable that nonkilling struggle could have gained Independence (Conser, et al. 1986). According to Charles K. Whipple in *Evils of the Revolutionary War* (1839): "We should have attained independence as effectually, as speedily, as honorably, and under very much more favorable conditions, if we had not resorted to arms." The method would have been: "1st, A steady and quiet refusal to comply with unjust requisitions; 2nd, public declarations of their grievances, and demands for redress; and 3rd, patient endurance of whatever violence was used to compel their submission" (2). Whipple's analysis of the dynamics of nonviolent struggle anticipated virtually every key element in the later thought of Gandhi and Gene Sharp (1973). In calculating the advantages of nonviolent revolution, Whipple estimated that fewer lives would have been lost (perhaps 1,000 leaders and 10,000 men, women, and children versus 100,000 who died in eight years of armed struggle); the economic costs of war (135 million dollars) and subsequent militarization (300 million dollars) would have been avoided; and the spiritual and ethical foundation of the new nation would have been established at a much higher level. Furthermore, nonkilling American revolutionaries would not have continued the institution of slavery, "would not have proceeded to defraud, corrupt, and exterminate the original inhabitants of this country," and "would not have admitted the system of violence and retaliation as a constituent part of their own government," including the death penalty (10).

Nonkilling was present preceding the Civil War. Patriots, accepting suffering and sacrifice, worked for peace in wars against England (1812) and Mexico (1845), for women's rights, and especially to abolish slavery. Among them were women and men, black and white, religious and secular (Cooney and Michalowski 1987: 20-33; Lynd and Lynd 1995: 13-41). Nonkilling abolitionist efforts succeeded in passage of emancipation laws in northern legisla-

tures. In border and southern states, some slave owners were persuaded on spiritual or economic grounds to free their slaves, continuing prophetic liberation labors of Quaker John Woolman (1720-72). Nonkilling emancipation was not unthinkable. Since the British abolished slavery at home in 1777, the slave trade in 1807, and slaveholding throughout the British Empire in 1833, slavery might have been abolished peacefully in the United States if it like Canada had maintained some form of association with the mother country.

During the Civil War (1861-65), following abuse of war resisters including torture, imprisonment, execution, and assassination, provisions for conscientious objection to killing were included in the draft laws of the Confederacy (1862) and the Union (1864). Although the laws were inconsistently applied at sometimes vindictive lower levels, appeals for exemption in individual cases were sympathetically received by Union President Abraham Lincoln, Secretary of War Edwin Stanton, and Confederate Assistant Secretary of War John A. Campbell (Moskos and Chambers 1993: 30-1). Caught in the shifting tides of war the nonkilling Tennessee Disciples of Christ first successfully petitioned Confederate President Jefferson Davis and then occupying Union military governor Andrew Johnson to exempt them from conscription (Brock 1968: 842-3). Amidst fratricidal bloodshed of civil war, nonkilling conscience was asserted and accepted to varying degrees by both sides.

Nonkilling persisted in the era of industrialization and imperialist expansion, into and beyond the three world wars of the twentieth century. Although not unmarred by employer, police, state, and sometimes worker violence, the struggle for rights to organize and improve conditions of American labor was essentially nonkilling. It was not an armed working class revolution. Nonkilling also was the movement for women's equal rights that saw election of the first woman to Congress in 1916, Representative Jeannette Rankin, Republican of Montana (Josephson 1974). In 1917 along with 49 male colleagues[8] and six Senators[9] she voted against United States entry into World War I. Reelected in 1940, she stood alone in 1941 to vote against United States engagement in World War II. Later at age 88 she led 5,000 women of the Jeannette Rankin Brigade in a march on Washington to end American killing in the Vietnam War.

In World War I, some 4,000 conscripted American men refused to kill. Thirteen hundred accepted noncombatant military duties, mainly medical; another 1,500 were assigned to agricultural labor; 940 were kept in segregated military training units; and 450 "absolutists" refusing to cooperate with killing in any way were court-martialed and confined in military prisons where seven-

teen died from harsh treatment and disease (Moskos and Chambers 1993: 34-5; Kohn 1987: 42; Lynd and Lynd 1995: 91-117; Schlissel 1968: 128-175).

In the period of World War II military conscription (1940-47), 72,354 men claimed conscientious objection to killing: 25,000 served in noncombatant roles; 11,996 men from 213 religious denominations agreed to work in 151 Civilian Public Service Camps (Appendix D); and 6,086 men who refused all forms of war-fighting cooperation were imprisoned. Three-fourths of the imprisoned were Jehovah's Witnesses (Anderson 1994: 1-2; Moskos and Chambers 1993: 37-8; Cooney and Michalowski 1987: 94-5; Gara and Gara 1999).

Nonkilling potential in American society appeared again during the nuclear age "Cold War" (1945-91) that in killed and wounded brought after World Wars II and I the fourth and fifth most bloody wars in American history—in Vietnam (1964-75) and Korea (1950-53). In the Cold War struggle between the United States, the Soviet Union, and their allies, at least 20 million global dead were sacrificed to revolutionary, counterrevolutionary, and geopolitical state lethality. In the Korea War, some 22,500 American conscripts refused to kill. Massive resistance to the Vietnam War saw unprecedented numbers of men refusing to kill on increasingly majority secular grounds (Moskos and Chambers 1993: 39-43). In 1972 more draft registrants were classified as conscientious objectors than were conscripted. Other Vietnam War resisters evaded registration, went to jail, or escaped into exile, reversing the historic flow of pacifist immigrants to the United States who had sought freedom from conscription in their homelands. Amidst the slaughter in Vietnam, unarmed conscientious objectors to killing who had agreed to serve in noncombatant roles such as front-line medical corpsmen became confirmed in rejection of war (Gioglio 1989).

In the twilight of the Cold War, nonkilling conviction rose to salience once again in the Persian Gulf War against Iraq (1991). This time it was not a case of civilians resisting induction since no conscription was in effect, but of serving members of the armed forces and reserves who refused to kill. Fifty Marines claiming conscientious objection were court-martialed and imprisoned (Moskos and Chambers 1993: 44).

Nonkilling potential in American history is evident in efforts to abolish the death penalty. Beginning in colonial times with reduction in the number of crimes demanding death, through abolition except for treason by the territory of Michigan (1846), and complete abolition by Rhode Island (1852) and Wisconsin (1853), currently fourteen of fifty states plus the District of Columbia demonstrate that Americans collectively in civil life as well as individually in war can refuse to kill. At the federal level, however, the Su-

preme Court has yet to rule decisively that execution of citizens violates the U.S. Constitution (Zimring and Hawkins 1986).

Among other roots of nonkilling potential in the United States are struggles for a nuclear weapon-free society (Swords into Plowshares movement), for a society without the militarized violence of poverty (Catholic Worker movement), for an end to the male-dominated culture of violence against women (women's movement), and for recognition of the equality of African-Americans and all races in a free and just society (Kingian movement for nonviolent social change). Meeting with African-American leaders in 1936, Gandhi was told that his message of nonviolence resonated strongly with "Negro spirituals" and that African-Americans were ready to receive it. Gandhi replied, "It may be through the Negroes that the unadulterated message of nonviolence will be delivered to the world" (Kapur 1992: 89-90). Thus in interactions between the Gandhian, Kingian, and other world nonkilling movements—as in its indigenous and immigrant pacifist roots—nonviolence in America is inextricably linked to the nonkilling history of the world.

Despite its dominant violence-celebrating political tradition, roots of a nonkilling American society can be seen in irrepressible reassertion of the life-respecting ethic from the colonial era to the present. They are evident in refusal to kill in war; in opposition to the death penalty; in objection to abortion; in demands for disarmament; in resistance to militarization and violent global power projection; in nonkilling actions for structural change in economics, race relations, women's rights, and cultural identity; and in religious, artistic, and literary expressions (True 1995). The historical elements are observable for what can become nonkilling patriotism or "nonviolent nationalism," as Gwynfor Evans, a founder of the Welsh pacifist political party Plaid Cymru, has eloquently argued for Wales (Evans 1972). Its anthem could be "America the Beautiful," its marching song "We Shall Overcome," and its prayer "God bless nonviolent America in a nonviolent world."

Nonkilling Lives

Ultimately the roots of a nonkilling society lie in the biography of humankind. Men and women, singly and in concert, celebrated and unsung, past and present, demonstrate potential for combining commitment not to kill with positive pursuit of social change. What some can do, others can do also.

At the entrance to the Musée d'Art Moderne de la Ville de Paris there is a great circular mural by Raoul Dufy that depicts contributors to the discovery and use of electricity from ancient philosophers to modern scientists

and inventors. Analogously one can envision a vast panorama of global contributors to the spirit, theory, and practice of nonkilling welcoming scholars who enter study of nonkilling political science. A glimpse of the global heritage can be seen in the *Biographical Dictionary of Modern Peace Leaders* (Josephson 1984) that records the lives of 717 persons in thirty-nine countries who lived from 1800 to 1980. Read from cover to cover its 1,134 pages offer a liberal arts education in vocations and methods for seeking a nonkilling world. Values range from temporary acceptance to violence to complete commitment to nonkilling principles. Extension of such inquiry historically, geographically, culturally, and in contemporary life, will reveal and inspire a global legacy of nonkilling courage and commitment. Universal discovery and sharing of nonkilling lives is needed.

Nonkilling lives interact and resonate across time, cultures, and space. Ancient rulers set examples: In Egypt, the Nubia-born pharaoh Shabaka (c.760–c.695 B.C.E.) abolishes the death penalty (Bennett 1988: 11). In India, Buddhist emperor Ashoka renounces war and killing of living beings following the conquest of Kalinga (c.262 B.C.E.) that left 100,000 dead, 150,000 in exile, and countless deaths and suffering of the innocent (Chowdhury 1997: 52). Nonkilling examples of spiritual leaders evoke creative emulation across generations: the Buddha, Mahavira, Jesus, Muhammad, George Fox, Guru Nanak, Bahá'u'lláh, and others. Dramatic changes, secular and spiritual, occur as individuals shift from killing to nonkilling. Soldiers become pacifists (Crozier 1938; Tendulkar 1967; Khan 1997; Boubalt, Gauchard, and Muller 1986; Roussel 1997). Revolutionaries renounce lethality (Narayan 1975; Bendaña 1998). Conscientious objectors resist military conscription (Moskos and Chambers 1993). On humanist grounds, New Zealand's Archibald Baxter resists torture and World War I battlefield conscription with incredible nonkilling bravery (Baxter 2000). A Bible-reading Austrian peasant, Franz Jägerstätter, is beheaded for refusing to fight for Hitler (Zahn 1964). Nonkilling rescuers risk their lives to save Jews from Hitler's Holocaust (Fogelman 1994; Hallie 1979). Individuals withdraw moral, material, and labor support for the war-fighting, modern military-industrial state (Everett 1989). Others seek directly to disable weapons of mass destruction (Norman 1989; Polner and O'Grady 1997).

Anonymous millions respond to the nonkilling leadership of a small, five-foot four-inch Indian, Mohandas K. Gandhi. Culturally violent Pathans respond to the nonviolent Muslim leadership of Abdul Ghaffar Khan (Banerjee 2000; Easwaran 1999). As the great Gandhian educator Dr. G. Ramachandran has observed, "The unknown heroes and heroines of nonviolence are more im-

portant than those that are known" (Ramachandran 1983). In the United States a small group of African-American college students, trained in Gandhian methods, initiate the civil rights movement that thrusts into leadership the Reverend Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. (Halberstam 1998). Nonkilling Americans, such as Adin Ballou and Henry David Thoreau inspire Tolstoy (Christian 1978: 588); Tolstoy inspires Gandhi; Gandhi inspires King; all inspire German Green Party founder Petra Kelly (Kelly 1989) and many others in a cumulative global diffusion process of emulation and innovation. In 1997 and 1998 Gandhi was chosen as most admired world leader by more than two hundred young leaders from over sixty countries participating in the first two training programs of the United Nations University's International Leadership Academy held in Amman, Jordan. Their admiration echoes that of many independence movement leaders in the post-1945 breakdown of the world colonial system.

Nonkilling leaders continue to arise throughout the world: among them Maha Ghosananda of Cambodia, Ham Suk Hon of Korea, Ken Saro-Wiwa of Nigeria, A.T. Ariyaratne of Sri Lanka, Sulak Sivaraksa of Thailand, Lanza del Vasto and General Jacques de Bollardière of France, Ronald Mallone of England, Aldo Capitini of Italy, N. Radhakrishan of India, Dom Hélder Câmara of Brazil, A.J. Muste of the United States. Reversing historical neglect of Gandhi, Nobel peace prizes begin to recognize leaders with salient commitments to nonkilling: Albert J. Luthuli and Desmond Tutu of South Africa, Mairead Corrigan Maguire of Northern Ireland, Adolfo Pérez Esquivel of Argentina, Aung San Suu Kyi of Burma, the Dalai Lama of Tibet.

Women—each with her story—courageously step forward to challenge nonkillingly conditions of violence in every aspect of society: Bertha von Suttner of Austria; Gedong Bagoes Oka of Bali; Medha Patkar of India; Dorothy Day, Barbara Deming, and Jean Toomer (Stanfield 1993: 49) of the United States. In World War II Britain 1,704 women claim conscientious objection to conscription and 214 who refuse to support war through noncombatant or civilian service are imprisoned (Harries-Jenkins 1993: 77). Collectively women take powerful stands against militarist human rights atrocities (Mothers of the Plaza de Mayo, Buenos Aires), ethnic slaughter (Women in Black, Serbia), preparation for nuclear war (Greenham Common Women's Peace Camp, Britain), ecological destruction (Chipko hug-the-trees movement, India), and many other injustices (McAllister 1982, 1988; Morgan 1984; Foster 1989). Scholars such as Joan V. Bondurant (1969), Elise Boulding (1980; 1992), and Berenice A. Carroll (1998) advance knowledge for nonkilling social change.

Collegial gender pairs, married or not, provide mutual support in nonkilling transformational struggles: Kasturba and Mohandas Gandhi, Coretta Scott and

Martin Luther King, Jr., Dolores Huerta and César Chávez, Dorothy Day and Peter Maurin, Frances May Witherspoon and Charles Recht, Elizabeth McAllister and Philip Berrigan. Co-gender people's power is writ large in the nonkilling Philippine democratic intervention of 1986, when nuns, priests, laywomen, and laymen combined to confront dictatorship and the threat of counterrevolutionary military bloodshed (Santiago, A.S. 1995). Viewed globally, the nonkilling biography of humankind inspires confidence that men and women are capable of creating killing-free, just societies that respect the needs of all.

Capabilities for a Nonkilling Society

The possibility of a nonkilling society is rooted in human experience and creative capabilities. The vast majority of human beings have not killed and do not kill. Although we are capable of killing, we are not by nature compelled to kill. However imperfectly followed, the main teaching of the great spiritual traditions is: respect life, do not kill. To this teaching, humans, under the most violent circumstances, have shown themselves capable of responding in brain and being with complete devotion. Where killing does occur, scientific creativity promises unprecedented ability to understand its causes, how to remove them, and how to assist liberation of self and society from lethality.

Prototypical components of a nonkilling society already exist in past and present global experience. They are not the product of hypothetical imagination. Spiritual, political, economic, social, and cultural institutions and practices based upon nonkilling principles can be found in human experience. There are army-free, execution-free, and virtually weapon-free societies. There are nonkilling organizations and movements dedicated to solving problems that threaten the survival and well-being of humankind. Nonkilling historical experience provides knowledge to inform present and future transformative action. There is a great legacy of nonkilling lives, past and present, individuals whose courage and works inspire and instruct.

If any people decided to combine, adapt, and creatively add to the components that already exist in global human experience, a reasonable approximation of a nonkilling society is even now within reach. To assert possibility, of course, is not to guarantee certainty but to make problematical the previously unthinkable and to strengthen confidence that we humans are capable of nonkilling global transformation.

Chapter 3

Implications for Political Science

> Nonviolence is not only a matter of religion.
> Nonviolence is not only a matter of society.
> Nonviolence is the science of power.
>
> G. Ramachandran

What are the implications of the possibility of realizing a nonkilling society for the academic discipline of political science? If the premise of nonkilling potentiality replaced the assumption of lethal inescapability, what kind of science would political scientists seek to create? What values would inspire and guide our work? What facts would we seek? What explanatory and predictive theories would we explore? What uses of knowledge would we facilitate? How would we educate and train ourselves and others? What institutions would we build? And how would we engage with others in processes of discovery, creation, sharing, and use of knowledge to realize nonkilling societies for a nonkilling world?

The assumed attainability of a nonkilling society implies a disciplinary shift to nonkilling creativity. It calls into question the Weberian dogma that acceptance of violence (killing) is imperative for the practice and science of politics, and that the ethic of nonkilling is incompatible with them. It makes the previously unthinkable at the very least problematical.

Logic of Nonkilling Political Analysis

A nonkilling political science paradigm shift implies need for a four-part logic of nonkilling political analysis. We need to know the causes of killing; the causes of nonkilling; the causes of transition between killing and nonkilling; and the characteristics of completely killing-free societies.

Paradoxically the need to understand killing is more acute for nonkilling political science than for the conventional violence-assuming discipline. This salience derives from the goal of contributing by nonkilling means to conditions where lethality and its correlates are absent. Where killing is assumed to be inevitable and acceptable for personal and collective purposes, there

is less urgency to understand and to remove the causes of lethality—one's own, that of others, and these in interaction. There is a sense of security, albeit problematic, in the assumption that in the last analysis "I/we will kill you." Where this assumption is absent, to understand and to remove the causes of killing are absolutely essential for survival and well-being.

The concept of causation is central to nonkilling analysis. Wherever killing occurs—from homicide to genocide to atomic annihilation—we need to understand processes of cause and effect, however complex and interdependent. Every case of killing demands causal explanation. We need to know who kills whom, how, where, when, why and with what antecedents, contextual conditions, individual and social meanings, and consequences. And, of course, we need to discover cross-case patterns of lethal causality for intensive, parsimonious, typological explanation.

Similarly we need to understand the causes of nonkilling. Why do humans not kill? Why has the idea of nonkilling arisen in human life? Why have humans committed themselves to nonkilling principles? Why have some people throughout history—in the face of ridicule, ostracism, exile, deprivation, imprisonment, torture, mutilation, and threats of death up to assassination, execution, and collective extermination—held fast to the principle of life over lethality? Why have they created policies, practices, and institutions to achieve nonkilling ends by nonkilling means?

Furthermore what are the causes of transition, individually and collectively, from killing to nonkilling—and from nonkilling to killing? Why have killers shifted from acceptance to rejection of taking human life? Why have soldiers become pacifists, revolutionaries renounced lethality, and murderers become committed to nonkilling? Why have ideas, individuals, leaders, organizations, institutions, and policies shifted to nonkilling? And why have persons previously committed to nonkilling shifted to participate in and support bloodshed—as when some states abolish and reimpose death penalties and some pacifists temporarily support specific wars? Nonkilling analysis does not assume irreversible linear progression. Understanding of the incidence, magnitude, and causes of oscillation in transition to nonkilling conditions is essential for facilitation of nonkilling change. Attention is directed from individuals through structural components to whole societies.

A fourth requirement for nonkilling political analysis is to understand the characteristics of completely killing-free societies under the assumption of hypothetically infinite variation among them. Given human inventiveness, there is no assumption of necessary homogeneity. This fourth requirement presents arguably the most creative task, although all call for utmost crea-

tivity. The first three require validation of findings derived from historical or contemporary contexts. The fourth combines knowledge from them in progressive explorations of ethically acceptable, potentially achievable, and sometimes hypothetically envisioned conditions of individual, social, and global life. This challenges us as does the poet Walt Whitman, "To leap beyond, yet nearer bring" (Whitman 1977[1855]: 71).

It is assumed that no society, hitherto restrained by killing-prone characteristics, has yet demonstrated the full range of nonkilling qualities of which humans are capable. But by drawing upon historical and contemporary experiences on a global scale—and by hypothetically combining demonstrated capabilities—new nonkilling possibilities for any society can be apprehended. Furthermore, such empirically-grounded insights need to be extended in explorations of "pure theory" to identify desirable characteristics of killing-free societies and plausible processes of realizing them from present conditions.

Hitherto, unlike sciences that encourage development of pure theory as a contribution to practical applications (such as in mathematics, physics, and economics), political science has tended to be unreceptive to hypothetical theoretical imagination. This is especially true where violence is concerned. Violence-assuming political science tends to discourage nonkilling creativity. By dismissing it in professional training as deviantly "utopian," "idealistic," and "unrealistic," political science intellect is condemned to confinement in perpetual lethality. Nonkilling creativity offers promise of liberation.

Basic knowledge from nonkilling analysis needs to be applied in transformational action to create alternatives in five zones of what can be portrayed as a funnel of killing.

Figure 1. The Funnel of Killing

The *killing zone* is the place of bloodshed from homicide to mass annihilation. The *socialization zone* is where people learn to kill, directly by training or vicariously by observation of models for emulation. In the *cultural conditioning zone* we are predisposed to accept killing as unavoidable and legitimate. Among sources of conditioning are religions, political "isms,"

celebrations of triumphs and atrocities, family traditions, law, mass communications, and the arts. The *structural reinforcement zone* provides the socioeconomic relationships, institutions, and material means that predispose to and support killing. The *neuro-biochemical capability zone* comprises physical, neurological, and brain function factors and processes that contribute to human capacity for predatory or survival-seeking lethality and for nonkilling behavior (Lopez-Reyes 1998; Morton 1999).

The task of nonkilling transformation can be envisioned as changing the funnel of killing into an unfolding fan of nonkilling alternatives by purposive efforts within and across each zone (Figure 2). Such changes can range from spiritual and nonlethal high technology interventions in the killing zone, through nonkilling socialization and cultural conditioning, to restructuring socioeconomic conditions so that they neither produce nor require lethality for maintenance or change, and to clinical, pharmacological, physical, and self-transformative meditative and biofeedback interventions that liberate from bio-propensity to kill.

Figure 2. Unfolding Fan of Nonkilling Alternatives

Nonkilling Action Principles

In addition to seeking knowledge required by the logic of nonkilling political analysis as related to the tasks of creating nonkilling alternatives in zones that converge on killing, a nonkilling paradigm shift requires perfection of principles to assist individual and social decisions from daily life to global politics. These can be advanced by an experimental validation approach that combines practical experience and exploratory simulations. Military human-computer and "virtual reality" combat simulations of this kind are already far advanced.

Among nonkilling principles that have arisen in salient 20th century actions (as in the Gandhian and Kingian movements) that merit consideration are:

- Draw strength from life-respecting inspiration, religious or humanist.
- Respect your own life and lives of others.
- Seek the well-being of all. Killing divides; nonkilling unites.
- In conflict, from beginning to end seek reconciliation not humiliation, degradation, predation, or annihilation.
- Join in constructive service to remove conditions of suffering of those in need.
- Be creative. It has taken great creativity to reach present conditions of technological and structural violence. It will require greater creativity for nonkilling transformation.
- Adopt an experimental approach to change. Seek successive approximations of nonkilling societies, learning from successes and failures.
- Respect both individual and large-scale social action, from the influence of moral example to mass nonkilling people's power.
- Be constructively courageous. Withdraw support from violence and commit it to strengthen nonkilling alternatives.
- Walk lightly upon the earth, reduce demands upon nature and fellow human beings that contribute to killing.

Each person who participates in processes of nonkilling discovery and action can contribute to perfecting progressively more powerful principles and skills for nonkilling affirmation of global life that are appropriate for specific situations and contexts.

In the context of contemporary political science, recognition of the possibility of realizing nonkilling societies raises questions for every aspect of our discipline. In general orientation toward the inevitability and legitimacy of violence, political scientists like other members of society find ourselves variously inclined toward the following views: *prokilling*—consider killing positively beneficial for self or civilization; *killing-prone*—inclined to kill or to support killing when advantageous; *ambikilling*—equally inclined to kill or not to kill, and to support or oppose it; *killing-avoiding*—predisposed not to kill or to support it but prepared to do so; *nonkilling*—committed not to kill and to change conditions conducive to lethality. Taken as a whole the first four orientations can be said to characterize killing-assuming or killing-accepting politics and political science. The last orientation calls for creation of nonkilling political science, whose task is to contribute to a nonkilling shift in science and society.

In characterizing contemporary political science as predominantly "killing-accepting" in manifest or latent assumptions, this is not to imply that all political scientists exhort their students in classrooms to "Kill! Kill!" like military drill ser-

geants and officers. Nor is it to neglect the violence-avoiding contributions of political scientists who seek to substitute democratic institutions (such as party competitions, elections, legislatures, and law) to replace civil and international war. But recognition of the violence-accepting nature of the present discipline and the possibility of nonkilling alternatives offers promise of ethical-empirical and empirical-ethical advancement. It implies the need to place nonkilling along with questions of freedom, equality, justice, and democracy, at the normative-empirical and empirical-normative core of the discipline.

Nonkilling Scientific Revolution

Recognition of the possibility of realizing nonkilling societies implies a nonkilling scientific revolution in political science. Seven interdependent sub-revolutions are needed: a *normative revolution* from acceptance of killing to rejection; a *factual revolution* to identify factors favorable for nonkilling social transformation; a *theoretical revolution* to understand causes and processes of nonkilling change; an *educational and training revolution* to provide knowledge and skills for nonkilling transformation; an *applied revolution* to engage nonkilling knowledge in practice; an *institutional revolution* to transform and create organizations to facilitate nonkilling change; and a *methodological revolution* to create and adapt methods of inquiry, analysis, and action most suitable for nonkilling transformational tasks.

Normative revolution

The implied normative shift is from the killing imperative to the imperative not to kill. One way this can occur is by a cumulative, value-added process of interacting ethical and empirical discoveries. Ethically the implied progression is from killing is ethically imperative, to killing is questionably imperative, to nonkilling is hypothetically explorable, to nonkilling normative commitment. The parallel empirical progression is from nonkilling societies are impossible, to nonkilling societies are problematical, to actual and hypothetical exploration of characteristics of nonkilling societies, to scientific commitment to seek knowledge to create and sustain nonkilling societies in a nonkilling world.

Through such interpenetrating processes of ethical challenge and empirical response—and empirical challenge and ethical response—the impenetrable barrier posited by Weber between nonkilling principles and killing politics can be crossed. In this way uncompromising respect for life can be added to "uncompromising commitment to rules of evidence and inference" (Almond 1996: 89) as a common ethical basis for contemporary academic political science.

Figure 3. Process of Normative-Empirical Nonkilling Paradigm Shift

Normative shift	Interaction Process	Empirical shift
Killing is imperative	↔	Nonkilling is impossible
↓		↓
Killing is questionable	↔	Nonkilling is problematic
↓		↓
Killing is unacceptable	↔	Nonkilling is explorable
↓		↓
Nonkilling is imperative	↔	Nonkilling is possible

Factual revolution

Factually a nonkilling shift implies purposive recovery and discovery of evidence for nonkilling human capabilities that tend to be overlooked or deemphasized by violence-accepting assumptions. Such facts may range from neuroscience to nonlethal high technologies. Of special interest are manifestations of nonkilling in otherwise violent historical and cultural conditions. For example, in Greece in 399 B.C.E., an estimated 140 out of 500 Athenian senators voted *not* to condemn Socrates to death (Stone 1989: 187). In Japan, during the Buddhist Heian period (794-1192), "capital punishment was not practiced for about three hundred and fifty years" (Nakamura 1967: 145). In the United States on April 4 and 6, 1917, six Senators[8] and fifty Representatives[9] voted against declaring war on Germany. In Russia, on October 23, 1917, officially at least two and perhaps as many as five or six Bolsheviks on the Central Committee opposed adoption of Lenin's policy of armed revolution (Shub 1976: 271). In the United States, in late July 1945 on the eve of the Hiroshima and Nagasaki atomic bomb attacks, nineteen of 150 Manhattan Project scientists voted against any military use of the weapon they had helped to create (Giovannitti and Freed 1965: 168; Alperovitz 1995). In 1996 the United States Marine Corps became the "executive agent" to coordinate all Department of Defense and other governmental activities for research, development, and acquisition of nonlethal weapons (Lewer and Schofield 1997: 45). The latter constitutes a precursor of a shift to nonkilling security thinking, although such weapons presently are employed as an adjunct to lethal technologies and can still maim and kill.

A nonkilling factual shift seeks to discover past and present indicators of nonkilling propensities in every society.

Theoretical revolution

The implied theoretical revolution is to create normative and empirical theories that advance knowledge required by the logic of nonkilling analysis and that contribute to individual decisions, civil society actions, and public policies. For example, the combination of three pioneering sources of theoretical insight—*principled*, *pragmatic*, and *processual*—offers promise of gaining extraordinary insight into the transforming potential of nonkilling political power. The first is the conventionally overlooked Gandhian stress upon the importance of life-respecting spiritual force in truth-seeking (justice-seeking) individual and collective actions as set forth, for example, in Gandhi's *The Science of Satyagraha* (1970). For Gandhi, a living faith in God, defined as truth, love, and nonviolence—encompassing all religions—is the unconquerable source of nonviolent power. The spirit and reality of nonviolence is the basic law of human life; violence is a violation.

The second is the theory of nonviolent power as presented in Gene Sharp's *The Politics of Nonviolent Action* (1973). Based upon penetrating analysis of the obedience-dependent nature of political power, Sharp presents a wide repertoire of historically demonstrated techniques for nonviolent struggle, and provides a strategic analysis of the dynamics of nonviolent political transformation. Sharp's thesis is that nonviolent political action is simply pragmatically powerful: no *a priori* commitments to spiritual, religious, or pacifist principles are needed.

A third source of insight to challenge nonkilling theoretical imagination is John Burton's needs-deprivation analysis of the origins of violence and prescription of needs-satisfying processes of participation for nonkilling transformation. Burton's theory is presented in *Deviance Terrorism & War: The Process of Solving Unsolved Social and Political Problems* (1979) and other works (1984, 1996, 1997). Burton's thesis is that all forms of lethality from homicide to war derive from violation of human needs, first among which is recognition of identity and dignity. Violators and the violated have the same needs. Under conditions of violation, neither appeal to values nor coercive control can suppress lethality. But provision of processes of problem-solving in which all whose needs are violated can participate in seeking their satisfaction offers promise for realizing nonkilling societies in a killing-free world.

These insights into spiritual force, pragmatical efficacy, and participatory problem-solving suggest elements of nonkilling theory that can be causally contextualized in terms of history, state, class, economy, institutions, gender, race, ethnicity, religion, culture, environment, future expectations, and other aspects of local and global conditions. Important contributions to contextualizing and advancing creativity in nonkilling theory are found in Robert J. Burrowes (1996), Berenice A. Carroll (1998), Johan Galtung (1996), Brian Martin (1989), and Kate McGuinness (1993).

Applied revolution

Combined normative, factual, and theoretical shifts imply new applied commitments for nonkilling political science. The normative shift implies new interest in and constructive (but not uncritical) support for nonkilling thought, individuals, organizations, movements, policies, and institutions. Sharp's theory suggests explicit commitments to assist nonkilling transformation of violently repressive regimes and may be extended to influence or change unresponsive democratic systems. Burton's theory suggests that the central applied role of political science is to assist participatory processes of social and political problem-solving that are nonviolently responsive to human needs. Gandhian theory, fusing ethics, methods, and sensitivity to need deprivations explicitly suggests commitments to assist changing conditions of political, economic, social, and cultural structural violence that are both products and producers of killing and threats to kill. It is to be recalled that leaders inspired by nonkilling spiritual principles, such as Gandhi and King, have been profoundly committed to nonkilling structural change.

Drawing upon knowledge required by the logic of nonkilling analysis, and informed by tasks of transforming the funnel of killing into a widening fan of nonkilling alternatives, the challenge of applied nonkilling political science is to assist local and global transformation. The persistence of individual and collective lethality under contemporary conditions of "democratic politics" and "free markets" suggests that as presently constituted these are problematic guarantors of human well-being. These conditions, combined in interaction with "undemocratic politics" and "unfree markets," pose challenges for applied nonkilling political science creativity.

Educational revolution

Progress toward nonkilling political science implies shifts in professional training of political scientists and in educational service to other members of society. Rather than reflecting and affirming lethal traditions and conditions,

either explicitly or tacitly, political science education must become a significant contributor to nonkilling global change. The explicit goal becomes nurturance of leadership and citizenship for nonkilling societies. The challenge is to develop competencies for research, teaching, consultancy, leadership, civic action, and critical reflection—through discovery, recovery, and sharing of nonkilling knowledge.

Nonkilling political science training will require extraordinary self-knowledge among participants—akin to that expected of psychiatrists and spiritual counselors. We need to understand the origins and implications of our own beliefs, attitudes, and emotions toward killing and nonkilling. Self-understanding is prerequisite for nonkilling social change. Training in scientific methods of meditation open to diverse spiritual approaches is appropriate. Opportunities for sharing personal and professional growth experiences for mutual benefit and support need to be provided. Nonkilling political scientists should seek mutually supportive lifetime advancement, personally and collegially, in expressing profound respect for life, however diverse we may be in other matters. These needs do not differ from those of all other members of society.

In preparation for consultancy and applied roles, nonkilling political scientists need to aspire to competencies no less than those expected of medical researchers, physicians, and teachers of physicians—and in other life and death professions. The contributions of political scientists to nonkilling societies should become no less important than those of medical professionals for individual and public health. They both share life and death concern for the importance of diagnosis, prescription, and treatment based upon the best new knowledge.

At the same time, every member of society can become a contributor to nonkilling global transformation. The educational task of nonkilling political science is to offer each participant-colleague at every level opportunities for personal development, and acquisition of knowledge and skills that will assist lifetime amplification of nonkilling leadership and citizenship. All teach; all learn.

In education, curriculum design is guided by the knowledge requirements of nonkilling analysis, the need for applied skills to transform propensities to kill into nonkilling alternatives, and the need to perfect principles to guide individual and social action. An introductory course or core seminar should confront participants vividly with the most horrific evidence of historical and contemporary human capacity for lethality that can be presented. Together we then confront a lifelong challenge: the task of our discipline is to contribute to the end of human killing. A second educational experience should in-

troduce just as vividly global evidence for nonkilling human potential. A third component introduces individual and social transformations and oscillations. The fourth core experience reviews human inventiveness in devising political institutions for desirable societies and challenges creativity in envisioning characteristics of killing-free societies and possible ways in which political science can contribute to them. Local to global knowledge and needs, as well as global-local interactions, are introduced in each component.

Upon such foundations, nonkilling educational innovations can build. An example of an undergraduate course on nonkilling political alternatives that has evoked meaningful engagement and shared creativity has been to invite each participant to choose an aspect of violence of personal concern; to review existing literature on its nature and causes; to consult local persons who deal directly with such violence for their ideas about incidence, trends, causes, and alternatives; to think creatively for themselves about alternatives; to share analyses and problem-solving proposals with each other; and to seek consensus on proposals in a group process of social decision-making.

Methodological revolution

Methodologically a nonkilling shift challenges new thinking in methods for research, education, applied politics, and institution-building. The challenge is to adapt existing methods for nonkilling discovery and application, to devise new methods as needed, and to encourage other disciplines such as neuroscience to apply their methods in solving problems of nonkilling transformation. Especially challenging is the need for methods for research and intervention in the killing zone, as well as those suitable for analysis within and across the convergent zones of lethality.

Nonkilling political science can draw upon an ever-widening repertoire of methods of inquiry that now includes at least philosophical, historical, institutional, and legal analysis; interviewing; participant observation; case studies; comparative analysis; content analysis; textual interpretation; game theory; public choice analysis; statistical inference; survey research; laboratory and field experimentation; human and computer simulation; and various combinations of these according to purpose. Educational methods range from traditional lectures, reading-viewing, and discussion through research apprenticeships and internships, to self-guided computer explorations of the world of learning. Political applications include constitutional design, conflict resolution, organizational consultancy, electoral advice, media commentary, security policy advice, and direct leader-citizen participation in processes of social decision-making. The methodological question

posed to this vast array of intellect and skills is "How can old and new methods best contribute to removal of lethality from the human condition?"

Institutional revolution

Institutionally a nonkilling paradigm shift implies questions about how the discipline of political science should be organized, what its subdisciplines should be, and what should be its relationships with other disciplines and institutions of society. It implies raising questions from a nonkilling perspective within existing structures of the discipline from global, national, and local levels. It also implies the possibility of creating new nonkilling political science departments in newly founded institutions or even creating a new transdisciplinary or hybrid profession to serve nonkilling social needs.

As presently constituted the global profession of political science is represented by the International Political Science Association (IPSA), founded in 1949. Forty-two national political science associations with a total of at least 34,900 members comprise its core membership and are represented institutionally on the IPSA executive committee (Appendix A). Diverse member interests are structurally expressed in eighteen main fields, and fifty-one research committees (Appendix B). To this can be added political scientists in countries not represented by national associations and by the many students taught by world political scientists.

A New Handbook of Political Science (Goodin and Klingemann, eds., 1996), with forty-two authors grows out of an IPSA project to survey the present state of the discipline. Eight major subdisciplines are identified and reviewed in light of developments over two decades: political institutions (rational choice, legal perspectives), political behavior (reasoning voters and multiparty systems, institutional and experiential approaches), comparative politics (macro-behavioral perspectives, democratization studies), international relations (neo-realism and neo-liberalism, post-positivist and feminist perspectives), political theory (philosophical traditions, empirical theory), public policy and administration (comparative policy analysis; ideas, interests, and institutions), political economy (sociological and Downsian perspectives), and political methodology (qualitative methods, research design and experimental methods). As introduced by the IPSA president, "There could be no better volume to take political science into the new century" (xii).

Nevertheless, despite accomplishments, *A New Handbook* demonstrates the need for nonkilling disciplinary transformation. For example, in the index there are no entries for "violence" or "nonviolence" and none for "homicide," "genocide," "capital punishment," "military," "terrorism," or

"police." There are sixty entries for "war" and eight for "peace." In the index of names, "Hitler" and "Lenin" are mentioned but not "Gandhi" and "King." The name and works of the world's leading political science scholar on the theory and practice of nonviolent political struggle for democracy, national defense, and prevention of military coups—Gene Sharp and *The Politics of Nonviolent Action* (1973)—are not mentioned. Nor are the name and contributions of the seminal theorist of nonviolent conflict resolution, John Burton (1979, 1984). There is scant recognition of the work of the preeminent global peace studies pioneer Johan Galtung (1996).

IPSA's largest and oldest national component with some 13,300 members is the American Political Science Association (APSA), founded in 1903. Member interests are structured in eight major fields, seventy-seven subfields, and thirty-four special interest sections (see Appendix C). The APSA and IPSA interest structures are generally similar. The main fields of American political science are: American government and politics, comparative politics, international politics, methodology, political philosophy and theory, public law and courts, public policy, and public administration. Although there are special sections on "conflict processes," and "international security and arms control" no institutional structures focus explicitly upon the knowledge and problem-solving requirements of the logic of nonkilling political analysis and action. There are for example no special sections on "violence," "nonviolence," or even "peace" (compare the International Peace Research Association). It appears that the cultural assumption that lethally-rooted and defended democracy is the best hope for the advancement of civilization has inhibited explicit institutional focus upon exploration of nonkilling civilizational alternatives.

A nonkilling shift implies raising questions within and across existing fields and subfields within the discipline as represented in the topic structure of the American and international political science associations. "What can you tell us about possibilities of nonkilling societies and nonkilling means of realizing them?" This means both to draw upon existing accomplishments and to introduce new elements. For example, this can be illustrated by raising questions within the four "traditional" fields of American political science that underlie contemporary proliferating diversity: political philosophy and theory, American government and politics, comparative politics, and international relations.

Political Philosophy and Theory

In political philosophy and theory, a nonkilling shift means to review the heritage of political thought in every culture to recover nonkilling insights and to introduce new nonkilling creativity. In Plato's *Republic*, for example,

Dennis Dalton finds the ethical ideal of "non-injury" to which philosophers and political leadership should aspire, despite Plato's acceptance of war, capital punishment, and a military culture. This ideal is reflected in Plutarch's observation, "For a resort to the knife is not the mark of either a good physician or statesman, but in both cases shows a lack of skill, and in the case of the statesman, there is added both injustice and cruelty" (Plutarch 10: 249). In the Chinese tradition, compare the observation of Mencius (c.371-c.289 B.C.E.): "He who, using force, makes a pretence at virtue is a Pa [tyrant]….He who, using virtue, practices human heartedness (jen) is a King [wang]" (Fung 1952: 112). Also in the Chinese tradition, the thought of Mo Tzu (Mo Ti, c.468-c.376 B.C.E.), Chinese critic of war and oppression, and philosopher of "universal love" invites global rediscovery (Fung 1952: 76-105).

Classical texts supportive of violence can be reinterpreted to subtract lethality but to retain and advance nonkilling insights. Examples can be found in Chaiwat Satha-Anand's reinterpretation of Machiavelli in *The Nonviolent Prince* (1981) and in Burrowes's reinterpretation of Clausewitz's *On War* to derive principles for nonviolent strategic defense (1996). Both are reminiscent of Gandhi's derivation of principles for nonviolent action from Lord Krishna's advice to the warrior hero Arjuna in the Hindu spiritual classic *Baghavad Gita* (Gandhi 1971).

The violence-accepting classics of the past challenge present and future nonkilling creativity. If Plato can propose a republic governed by rulers expressing military virtues, now a nonkilling republic can be envisioned with courageous leaders and citizens committed to nonkilling principles. If Aristotle can describe constitutions for war-fighting polities, we can now consider constitutions conducive to nonkilling societies. If Machiavelli can prescribe skills for violence-accepting dominance, it is now possible to work out the strategy and tactics of nonkilling political power. If Hobbes can propose a monster state coercing social peace by a monopoly of violence, new modes of governance responsive to human needs can be explored where no lethality is needed. If Locke can envision violent revolution to displace despotic rule, we can now perceive the strategy and tactics of nonkilling democratic liberation. If Marx and Engels can envision class struggle with violence as the ultimate arbiter, we can now envision processes of nonkilling struggle to realize age-old aspirations for economic justice. If Rousseau can prescribe a social contract based upon lethality against violators, and if present leaders continue to speak of violence-based "contracts" and "covenants," we can now begin to explore mutual commitments to well-being in nonkilling communities. If Kant (1795/1959) can envision "perpetual peace"

deriving from steadfast adherence to a no-war categorical imperative, we can now perceive elements needed to transform a nonkilling imperative into global reality. If the American political tradition bequeaths a classic declaration of violent independence and a violence-affirming constitution, it is now possible to envision a nonkilling declaration of independence from American societal violence and a new nonkilling constitution. And if Weber can prescribe politics as a vocation that must accept the inevitability of killing, we can now envisage politics and political science as vocations that assume the possibility of liberation from violence (Arendt 1970; Muller and Semelin, 1995; Steger and Lind, 1999).

A nonkilling shift implies serious critical introduction of Gandhian political thought into the field of philosophy and theory. Its absence is akin to past failure to recognize Gandhi for the Nobel peace prize in a violence-affirming world. Resources abound for taking up the task, mainly by Indian interpreters from varied ideological and disciplinary perspectives together with pioneering non-Indian contributors (Dhawan 1957; Dange *et al.* 1977; Iyer 1973; Parekh 1989a, 1989b; Bondurant 1969; Dalton 1993; Galtung 1992; Sharp 1979; Steger 2000).

Opportunities for creative advancement of nonkilling theory are presented by the thought of proponents of nonkilling alternatives, past and present, in all world cultures. A survey from 550 B.C.E. is provided by Arthur and Lila Weinberg (1963). Multi-religious roots are set forth in Unnithan and Yogendra Singh (1973). In the Graeco-Roman, Euro-American tradition, Will Morrisey (1996) presents a massively erudite critique of pacifism since antiquity.

As global inquiries into nonkilling political thought are undertaken, some surprising discoveries can be expected. Such is the nonkilling definition of "politics" offered by the Korean political philosopher Hwang, Jang Yop during a December 3, 1987 interview in Pyongyang: "Politics means the harmonization of the interests of all members of society on the basis of love and equality." Both he and the interviewer were then unaware of the extraordinary studies by the sociologist Sorokin (1948; 1954) on "love" and "creative altruism" that can be combined with Arendt's (1970) emphasis upon conversing, deciding, and acting together and Burton's (1979) emphasis upon processes of human needs satisfaction to contribute to new nonkilling political theory.

Polity Studies

In holistic studies of politically organized societies and their components, from villages to nation states and transnational entities—such as the field of American government and politics—the logic of nonkilling analysis raises

questions that courageously need to be asked to overcome what futurist Harold Linstone has called the "assumption drag" of convention. Political lethality prefers to remain unquestioned within the citadel of righteousness. Where questions cannot be raised inside a polity, outside political scientists must take them up.

A nonkilling approach implies the need to answer such questions such as follows. First, what has killing contributed to the formation and maintenance of each political society? To what extent does the polity's self-image rest upon a history of laudable lethality? What kinds of killing, governmental and nongovernmental, persist and what are their future prospects? How are citizens socialized to participate in and support killing, legal or extra-legal, pro- or contra-governments, at home or abroad? How do political, economic, social, and cultural ideas, practices, and structures contribute to lethality? What influences does killing have upon the polity's ability to pursue other values, whether material or of the spirit such as freedom and equality?

Second, what are the historical roots of nonkilling ideas, practices, policies, and institutions in the society? What are their present manifestations and future prospects? What is the record of nonkilling resistance to killing-prone political power? What is the record of creativity and constructive action toward realization of a nonkilling society?

A third requirement in polity studies is to question the record of transitions and reversals between killing and nonkilling. What significant figures, groups, and organizations have engaged in such transitions? Have soldiers become pacifists? Have killers converted to reverence for life? Have violent revolutionaries committed themselves to nonkilling social change? Have religious figures renounced the blessing of lethality? Have cultural figures shifted between acceptance and rejection of violence?

What changes have taken place in the range of offenses for which the death penalty has been imposed, abolished, or reinstated? Have military forces been demobilized and then revived? Have armies been abolished? Have police and citizens undergone disarmament and rearmament? Have there been instances of genuinely peaceful reconciliation between formerly deadly antagonists perhaps followed by re-eruptions of lethality? Have killing-supporting economies been shifted in whole or in part to respond to nonkilling individual and social needs?

Fourth, what are the historical and contemporary intra-polity elements—political, social, economic, and cultural—which if combined and expressed in nonkilling transitional processes show promise of realization *for that society* of desirable nonkilling conditions of life? What kinds of changes in religions,

ideologies, laws, institutions, policies, socio-economic structures, education, communication, arts, and inter-polity relations would contribute to realization of a nonkilling society *in that context*? What conditions would best facilitate advancement of such values as freedom, equality, material well-being, and security without reversion to killing or threats to kill?

Comparative Politics

A nonkilling shift implies placing the question of nonkilling human capabilities at the center of comparative political inquiry. What insights can be gained by global comparison of the ideas, institutions, structures, processes, and policies that relate to removal of threat or use of lethal force by governments and citizens within and across societies? Guided by the logic of nonkilling analysis and the search for effective transformational practices, comparative inquiry seeks knowledge of alternatives beyond the bounds of the single polity.

Societies can be compared and ranked on propensities to kill or not to kill just as this has been done for democratic institutions, human rights, status of women, children's welfare, and levels of economic development. Among measures of lethality are killings by agents and antagonists of the state, criminal predation, citizen homicide and suicide, cross-state killing of members of other societies, professional training for killing, technological capabilities, and material indicators of the political economy of lethality. Parallel ranking can be made of nonkilling characteristics as derived from single polity analysis. Periodic comparative rankings of killer nations and nonkilling nations, should be a public service contribution of global political science. No less important than daily monitoring of global stock markets or sports scores, should be reports of rising and falling levels of lethality and of growth or repression of nonkilling transformational capabilities.

Cross-polity as well as intra-polity comparisons of societal components under most-similar or least similar conditions are needed to assist causal and transformational understanding. These include lethal and nonkilling propensities of religions, ideologies, arts, parties, genders, age cohorts, education levels, classes, ethnic groups, economic enterprises, universities, and professions.

Nonkilling comparative studies are needed to advance the contemporary political science thesis that democratic states as compared with authoritarian regimes do not go to war against each other and kill fewer of their own citizens. The persistence of killing within and by liberal democracies, whether presidential or parliamentary in structure, accompanied by manifest cultures of violence highlights the importance of comparative stud-

ies for insights into nonkilling structural and cultural alternatives. For example, as observed in Chaper 2, a comparative study of two proximate Mexican villages, ranking high and low in violence but otherwise similar in socio-economic conditions, found cultural self-image to be a differentiating characteristic. The violent villagers saw themselves as violent and accepted it. The nonviolent villagers perceived themselves as peaceful and took pride in it (Fry 1994). A comparative study of children's play in two Indonesian villages, one high and one low in violence, found that the more violent culture favored games of human and animal combat. The less violent culture engaged in games of euphoria, such as swinging on vines, and in peaceful emulation of adult and animal behavior (Royce 1980). Such findings assist insight into the violent cultural correlates of competitive contact sports like boxing, hockey, wrestling, and American football.

International Politics

A nonkilling shift simultaneously introduces concern for the whole and for the individual in the field variously termed international politics, international relations, or world politics. It combines macroscopic and microscopic inquiry with customary concern for intermediate institutions. On the one hand, components of the global polity (state and non-state), structures of relationships among them, and processes of problem-solving are viewed as a whole. This does not mean to be ahistorical or non-contextual. The history is of humankind. The context is the pattern of interdependent interactions among global and local conditions.

On the other hand, the assumed realizability of a nonkilling global society requires attention to the well-being of each individual who shares life on earth from birth to death as generations come, intermingle, and pass on. The basic unit of nonkilling political analysis is the individual human being. Organizations, structures, and processes are the product of aggregated individual behavior. World politics is the politics of world individuals. A nonkilling global society depends upon individuals who do not kill. If no one is to kill or be killed, the interests of all human beings must be taken into account.

This implies the need to apply the logic of nonkilling analysis and action to global humanity as a whole. For killing, it means to extend the political science tradition of research on state killing, anti-state killing, and war to include all forms of lethality within and between societies—and to aggregate them in global patterns of causal explanation. For nonkilling, it means to identify nonkilling forces within and across political entities on a global scale.

For nonkilling transformation it means to understand processes of interaction between killing and nonkilling forces within and across societies in a global general systems context.

For comprehensive understanding of practical, possible, and desirable features of a nonkilling global society, inquiry is needed into past and present social manifestations and aspirations, assuming theoretically infinite variations within a nonkilling whole. At the individual level it means to understand killing and nonkilling propensities of individuals, the dynamics of their nonkilling transformations, and the characteristics of social contexts supportive of lifelong expressions of creative individual nonkilling potential.

In applied orientations to change the funnel of lethality into a fan of nonlethal alternatives, a global perspective means to seek holistic killing zone interventions that supersede suppressive lethal practices. It means to contribute to global socialization and training of leadership and citizenship for nonkilling problem-solving. It means to identify and encourage global cultural contributions to nonkilling change. And it means to understand and assist nonkilling global changes in political, economic, social, and cultural structures that support lethality.

Proceeding from the assumption that humans are capable of creating killing-free societies raises questions for every field, subfield, and aspect of contemporary political science. Assuming that political science cannot be value-free, is nonkilling an acceptable disciplinary value? Can the theory and practice of nonkilling political power successfully contend with and transform violent conceptions and manifestations? Are nonkilling democratic institutions from local to global possible? Can transitions from killing-prone national security to nonkilling national and global security be made? From killing-prone political economies to nonkilling global political economy? Can contributions to nonkilling theory and practice be made from perspectives such as feminism, race, class, ethnicity, language, and religion? And what methodologies are best suited for comprehensive understanding of societal violence, nonkilling potentials, transformative processes, and of ways to project and monitor stable yet creatively diverse nonkilling outcomes?

This is not to imply absence of political science contributions in every field that bear upon these questions. But it is to invite thought about what political science would be like if it took seriously the possibility of realizing nonkilling societies in a nonkilling world. Acceptance of such a possibility implies active political science engagement in nonkilling global problem-solving.

Chapter 4

Problem-solving Implications

> All of those who denounce and combat this holo-
> caust [of tens of millions of deaths from malnutrition
> and economic deprivation] are unanimous in main-
> taining that the causes of this tragedy are political.
>
> Manifesto of Fifty-three Nobel Laureates, 1981

What are the problem-solving implications of nonkilling political science?

The overall goal is to end lethality in global life. This implies special concern for the lifelong well-being of every human being as potential victim or killer. It returns interest in individuals and creative purposiveness to political science. On the other hand, it implies a problem-solving orientation that recognizes yet transcends each spiritual, gender, age, ethnic, class, professional, national, or political identity. It implies nonkilling "multiple loyalties" (Guetzkow 1955) combined with transcendent commitment to facilitate processes of problem-solving that respond to the needs of all without threat or use of lethal force.

Nonkilling political science implies simultaneous commitment to decrease factors conducive to lethality and to strengthen those that favor nonkilling. It seeks to solve problems within and across all five zones of the convergent funnel of lethality (Figure 1) and fan of nonkilling alternatives (Figure 2). It means direct engagement by the profession of political science as a whole in acceptance of problem-solving responsibilities and indirect support of the ef-forts of others. It includes facilitation of research and training to assist public and private problem-solving action. It means to facilitate participation by all in need-satisfying processes of individual and social decision-making.

To accept a problem-solving role for nonkilling political science does not imply omniscience, omnicompetence, or omnipotence. But it does imply po-tential relevance for well-being in all areas of social life—spiritual, physical, material, and cultural. This does not mean totalitarian intervention, but rather recognition that what political figures, institutions, governments, and people who support them do or fail to do have far-reaching social consequences from physical survival through economic well-being to the highest reaches of

human aspiration. In seeking to be of service to nonkilling societies, political science need not be more restrictive in the potential breadth of its concerns and contributions than the professions of medicine and public health.

Problems may be defined as dissonance between the desirable and the actual. Every problem presents complex sub-problems of indeterminacy: normative (what should be), empirical (what is), and potential (what can be). Each problem further embodies systemic complexities, mutually dependent feedback processes, and past-present-future time components. But however difficult and complex problems may be—ethically, philosophically, or empirically—nonkilling political science does not disavow explicit engagement in efforts to solve those that threaten the survival and well-being of humankind. Nonkilling political science engages in efforts to end behavioral violence, to change conditions of structural violence, and to solve problems of both in interaction. It seeks to remove support for lethality, to assist existing institutions for nonkilling service, and to create new nonkilling policies and institutions.

In accepting an applied science and applied humanities problem-solving role for political science, it is unscientific to require that solutions must be known in advance. Neither the assumption that diseases are incurable nor that cures must be known in advance of diagnosis, prescription, and treatment prevents progress in basic and applied medical science. Political science, at base also a matter of life and death, need not be different.

It is not reasonable to expect nonkilling political science to demonstrate instant solutions to problems that violence-accepting politics and political science have not been able to solve. Vast commitments of scientific, human, and material resources to suppress violence by violent means accompanied by incredible bloodshed have not succeeded in putting an end to global lethality, from war and genocide to homicide in capitals of nuclear weapon states. Enormous creativity has been devoted to killing. No less inventiveness will be needed to demonstrate nonkilling alternatives that work.

To end the era of human lethality, of course, is not a task for political science alone. It is shared by all sciences, humanities, professions, and by everyone. But it is a task in which political science can take initiatives as well as support the initiatives of others. Priority tasks are to solve problems customarily taken to be so formidable as to negate any possibility of creating a nonkilling political science in service to a nonkilling world. Three are generic: the problems of "hitler and the holocaust," revolutionary structural change, and security from the individual to the nation-state.

Nonkilling, Hitler and the Holocaust

The problem of political leadership and lethality—exemplified but not limited to the generic example of hitler and the holocaust—must be confronted directly and subjected to sustained basic and applied science problem-solving efforts. The horrendous examples of genocidal aggression, mass class exterminations, and civic annihilations must not be allowed to paralyze nonkilling scientific creativity. Otherwise political science is forever fated, explicitly or implicitly, to prepare for countervailing murderousness, violence greater than that of which any genocidal dictator, revolutionary class exterminator, or righteous annihilator of cities and villages is capable.

A practical way to begin is to intensify interdisciplinary work in the still underdeveloped field of political leadership studies. This means to identify lethality-prone behavioral and systemic variables and to seek changes conducive to realization of nonkilling leadership and followership. Some variables already identified as capable of purposive, nonkilling transformative interventions are violence-prone concepts of leadership; personality prerequisites; role powers; organizational supports; task expectations; value saliencies; technological capabilities; and economic, social, and cultural reinforcements for killing (Paige 1977).

Twentieth century experience suggests some points of departure. To stop the respective emergence of killing-prone leaders supported by killing-prone followers, at some point in history humans must simply refuse to kill and to cooperate with systems that kill. Otherwise cycles of lethality between vengeful vanquished and traumatized victors will continue. This seems simplistic. But in retrospect twentieth century atrocities show that late nineteenth century peace advocates who sought to abolish war were completely correct. There is a clear connection among atrocities from World War I to World War II to the Cold War and beyond. A preventive political science contribution is to identify and help to reconcile vengeful animosities, however recent or ancient, before they erupt in atrocities. To stop the rise of leaders and followers who celebrate vengeful extermination of enemies, political science must clearly commit itself to prevent killing, to reconcile the vengeful, and to create conditions of nonkilling life.

To stop the rise of potential hitlers, stalins, maos, amins, pol pots, or even atomic-bombing trumans: redefine the concept of political leadership from that of lethal commander to facilitator of nonkilling societal problem-solving; seek early identification of and withdraw support from leader aspirants with aggressive, violence-prone personalities; remove expectations of willingness

to kill and power to order others to kill from leadership role responsibilities; do not provide leaders with professional killer organizations pledged to obedience and armed with increasingly lethal weapons; withdraw religious, business, labor, scientific, and artistic support for killing-prone organizations and commit to nonkilling alternatives; elevate need-responsive conflict resolution to be a primary task expectation of political leaders and citizens; affirm commitment to the value of nonkilling as a core component of national pride and identity; refuse definition of any group as subhuman or otherwise so evil as to justify extermination; seek common dialogue among groups for mutual well-being; change socioeconomic and other structural conditions that predispose individuals and groups directly or vicariously to seek satisfaction by violence; shift the economy of killing to serve life-affirming human needs; and support creation of nonkilling cultures through arts and sciences.

Killing-zone interventions against hitler-type atrocities, of course, pose an even greater challenge to applied nonkilling scientific creativity. But they are not unthinkable, especially in an age of unprecedented capacity for technological innovation. Measures to be considered and tested in problem-solving simulations include microscopic and mass evocation of leader-follower, spiritual-psychological, nonkilling capabilities-inhibitions; global condemnation of, withdrawal of support from, and resistance to killing (not burden of victims alone); provisions for rapid exodus; and space-air-sea-ground interventions by forces equipped with sophisticated techniques for incapacitating individuals, groups, and technologies that kill. Focus comprehensive emergency interventionary pressures, direct and multi-channeled, negative and positive, upon sources of lethality as identified for prevention.

In the aftermath of hitler-type traumatizations, transformative affirmation of nonkilling human capabilities among survivors—killers, victims, and relatives—must be sought. Political science must be engaged in creating processes for recognition of responsibility for atrocity, restitution, reconciliation, and most importantly facilitating preventive and structural changes that favor realization of nonkilling societies in a nonkilling world. Drawing upon every source of spirit, science, and tradition—nonkilling must be celebrated as the heart of future cultural identity and pride among peoples. Practical commitments must be made to ensure that such atrocities will never happen again.

To end the era of mass atrocities from genocide to war, nonkilling political science must engage in three applied science tasks: prevention, intervention, and post-traumatic nonkilling transformation. It must liberate itself from the barrier to creative service imposed by the conventional assumption that such atrocities cannot be eliminated on nonkilling principles.

Nonkilling and Violent Revolution

A second major problem to engage problem-solving efforts is that of violent revolution and counterrevolution. Related are military coups, countercoups, terrorism, counterterrorism, guerilla war, and large scale civil war. Conventional political science tends to regard such revolutions and their repression with violence-accepting ambiguity. Violence against bad regimes but not good regimes is laudable. Counterviolence against bad revolutionaries but not good revolutionaries is acceptable. In either case violence to achieve or resist political change is a seemingly intractable and often meritorious fact of political life. Familiar arguments among some American scholars, for example, have been that since economic elites will not relinquish property and power peacefully, revolutionary violence is justified. Others, however, support counterviolence against rebels who seek to change systems of private property exploitation. The idea that one must always be prepared for revolutionary lethality persists even under conditions of American electoral democracy in insistence of some upon citizen gun possession for defense of liberty against possible despotism.

But assuming needs for removing repressive political regimes and for changing intolerable conditions of socioeconomic structural violence, nonkilling political science can assist in identifying and assisting nonkilling revolutionary alternatives. This requires challenging the assumption that revolutions must necessarily be violent and providing knowledge of effective nonkilling alternatives: principles, strategies, tactics, organizational methods, and implementing skills.

During the last half of the Cold War, three remarkable affirmations of the possibility of nonkilling revolution by political theorists arose from three of the world's most influential violent revolutionary traditions: the United States, the Soviet Union, and China. In the United States, Gene Sharp (1973) presented a classic statement of theory and practice for nonviolent political revolutions rooted in penetrating analysis of the acquiescent bases of political power and wide-ranging historical inquiry into examples of effective nonviolent struggle. Sharp identified at least 198 methods of nonviolent action: from protest and persuasion; through social, economic, and political noncooperation; to direct nonviolent intervention. He then proceeded to combine all in a dynamic theory of nonviolent transformation involving processes of "conversion, accommodation, and coercion" to which he later added "disintegration." In the Soviet Union, E. G. Plimak and Y. F. Karyakin (1979) defined revolution as a shift in state power from one class to another that produces

a "sharp change in the life of the vast mass of the people." Then they argued on the basis of Marxist-Leninist theory and post-WWII decolonizing and democratic experience that peaceful socialist revolutions were possible. They defined a peaceful socialist revolution as one "without armed struggle, without civil war, and without armed counterrevolutionary intervention." Arguing that past failures should not deter pursuit of peaceful revolutions in new historical circumstances, they urged that possibilities for "peaceful revolutionary development… must be scrupulously and objectively studied in every aspect" [author's translation]. In China, Zhang Yi-Ping (1981: 79), basing his argument on Marxist theory and successful nonviolent struggles for national independence in Asia, Africa, and Latin America—especially upon mass mobilization capabilities demonstrated by the Gandhian movement in India—argued: "The view that one-sidedly advocates violent revolution without regard for time, place, and situation, and deprecates nonviolent revolution is *wrong in theory and harmful in practice*" [emphasis added, author's translation].

Thus in a period of complex global revolutionary and counterrevolutionary bloodshed, political analysts emerging out of three violent traditions—independently and seemingly unknown to each other—set forth the scientific task of developing nonkilling revolutionary theory and practice. A noteworthy common element among them was reference to the nonkilling Gandhian movement in India that sought not only political independence but socioeconomic and cultural change.

Hitherto nonkilling revolutionary theory whether from "capitalist" or "socialist" standpoints has been conceived largely from the perspective of the oppressed. Comparable theories of nonkilling elite counteraction have not been developed to provide alternatives to violent repression of nonkilling revolutionary action. A reversal of Sharpian analysis is implied. Do the wealthy property owners, the ethnic dominants, the political leaders, the police, and the military have the courage to face nonviolently and unarmed—the poor, the landless, the suppressed, the minorities or majorities—who are nonviolently asserting their claims to human rights and justice? Can the advantaged advance their counterclaims for dignity and recognition in actions seeking conversion, accommodation, and coercion without bloodshed?

Moreover an applied theory of "nonkilling struggle" or even "nonkilling class struggle" to bring about social transformations marked by mutually satisfactory relationships among former oppressors/advantaged and oppressed/disadvantaged is plausible. This can be inferred from nonkilling elements evokable in human nature and from repressive hostility expressed toward proponents of peaceful change by proviolent elites and their provio-

lent antagonists. Each combatant tends to repress proponents of nonkilling action on grounds that such ideas weaken the militant readiness to kill of their own support base/class. For example, during Cold War confrontation both American and Soviet elites and media were quick to discredit or stifle pacifist voices, implying that nonkilling ideas would evoke receptive responses and undermine support for their own militarism—not that they would weaken their opponents. Similarly academic and activist proponents of armed resistance movements are quick to denounce exploration of nonkilling revolutionary alternatives—implying fear of receptivity to nonkilling alternatives among the oppressed. Thus if there is receptivity to nonkilling principles and practices among both oppressors and oppressed, a nonkilling class struggle is contemplable. This implies an applied role for political science to facilitate nonkilling revolutionary problem-solving processes. Demonstrated effectiveness of emphasis upon the ultimate goal of "reconciliation" with adversaries at every stage of nonkilling struggle for social change that is characteristic of both Gandhian and Kingian methods provides a practical point of departure. Even Machiavelli has argued that profound changes in political regime from "tyanny to freedom" and vice versa can be achieved "without bloodshed" when realized by "general consent of the citizens who have made the state great" (*The Discourses*, Book 3, Chapter 7).

Nonkilling and Security

Nonkilling political science must solve the problem of providing credible security alternatives against lethal aggression at the individual, local, national and international levels. Conventional security theory and practice ultimately derive from the threat of lethality: "I/we want to make it absolutely credible to you that I/we will kill you." Nonkilling security, however, departs from the contrary principle; "I/we want to make it absolutely credible to you that I/we will not kill you. And you must make it absolutely credible that you will not kill me/us." In short, "We must make it absolutely credible to each other that we will not kill."

No one is safe as long as someone is determined to kill them. Lethal ingenuity overcomes every defense from shields, armor, moats, walls, and castles to atomic bomb shelters. Offensive lethality overcomes every form of lethal defense: arrows over spears, machine guns over muskets, artillery over infantry, tanks over cavalry, rockets over tanks, submarines over battleships, air and missile forces over nearly everything, nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons over all. To live in an armored house filled with guns does not en-

sure security: the intruder may have armor-piercing missiles, heavier artillery, and greater combat skill—or simply ability to poison air, food, or the water supply. The only certain security is absence of the will to kill.

The role of political science in transition to nonlethal security is to help develop theory and practice to provide credible alternatives to threat or use of lethal force—including preventive nonlethal transformation of the will to kill among potential adversaries. Although hitherto not salient in conventional political science, a growing body of literature and experience provides a basis from which to advance. Explorations include inquiries into civilian resistance to Nazi genocide (Hallie 1979; Fogelman 1994; Semelin 1994); Danilo Dolci's nonkilling community resistance to mafia criminality (Amato 1979; Chaudhuri 1998); unarmed bodyguards for human rights workers (Mahony and Eguren 1997); nonkilling resistance to military coups (Roberts 1975; Sharp 1990; 1993); nonkilling national, civilian, social defense (Boserup and Mack 1974; Sharp 1990; Martin et al. 1991; Randle 1993; Burrowes 1996); nonlethal uses of conventional military forces (Keyes 1982); alternative nonkilling forces (Banerjee 2000; Weber 1996; Moser-Puangsuwan and Weber 2000); and the development of nonlethal weapons (Lewer and Schofield 1997).

Several governments have undertaken feasibility studies of nonkilling civilian defense, albeit as a complement to conventional military means. Among them are Sweden, Norway, Denmark, Netherlands, France, Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, Austria, Switzerland, and Finland (Schmid 1985; Sharp, 1990; Randle 1994: 121-37). In Thailand a unique, preemptive provision to legitimate nonkilling resistance to future military coups has been included in Article 65 of the new Thai Constitution of 1997: "People have the right peacefully to oppose any attempt to seek administrative power by means which are not stipulated by the Constitution."

Research on nonlethal weapons for police and military use has been undertaken in the United States at least since 1965, and accelerated in the 1990s. A wide range of technologies have been explored—including laser, optical, acoustical, electromagnetic pulse, chemical, biological, and dozens of other weapons. Some have already been used in police and overseas military operations (Lewer and Schofield 1997). Like governmental interest in social defense, interest in nonlethal weapons is presently regarded as a complement to conventional lethal capabilities. But the fact that nonkilling alternatives are being taken seriously by traditional experts in violent security should encourage no less serious and even more advanced comprehensive efforts by political science. The challenge is to solve problems of transition to completely nonkilling security conditions. A further sign of move-

ment toward nonlethal security is contained in the final report of the Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict (1997) which calls for "structural prevention: strategies to address the root causes of deadly conflict," as well as creation of a "culture of prevention." The possibility of taking further steps toward nonkilling individual and global security is implied. The organization of a global Nonviolent Peace Force is an example.

Nonkilling political science must seek solutions to problems hitherto deemed insuperable obstacles to realization of nonkilling societies. Overcoming direct threats of extinction by aggressive physical violence must be of paramount concern. First, because without survival no other problem can be solved. Second, because continued commitment to killing contributes to conditions of structural and ecological violence that threaten individual, societal, and planetary well-being.

The emphasis upon nonkilling as an approach to societal problem-solving confronts questions such as the following: why concentrate attention on nonkilling when psychological abuse, torture, racism, sexism, economic exploitation, and dictatorships inflict more suffering and deaths than physical lethality? These questions imply that such problems can only be solved if we maintain the option to kill. One answer is that the will, capability, and culture of killing is a major underlying cause of socioeconomic structural inequities that kill and psychophysical abuses that temporarily stop short of killing. How can abuse, torture, racism, oppression of women, economic exploitation, and dictatorship endure if not based upon fear and threat of death? The removal of killing from homicide to war from human experience will contribute substantially—spiritually, psychologically, materially, democratically, and environmentally—to solving other problems that confront humankind.

Commitment to nonkilling implies political science engagement in helping to solve characteristic problems of each era that threaten human survival and well-being. Speaking to villages, Gandhi used to check off on the fingers of his left hand the principal problem-solving tasks: equality for untouchables; self-reliant spinning of cotton cloth for economic liberation; abstention from drugs and alcohol; Hindu-Muslim friendship; and equality for women. Then he would say, "And the wrist is non-violence" (Ashe 1969: 243). Analogously we can engage five problems that are now globally salient: continued killing and the need for disarmament; the holocaust of poverty and the need for economic equity; violations of human dignity and needs for mutual respect of human rights; destruction of the biosphere and the need for planetary life-support; and other-denying divisiveness that impedes problem-solving cooperation.

These five problems are common to the individual, family, community, nation, and to humankind as a whole. We all need freedom from being killed, from economic deprivation, from denial of dignity, from a poisoned environment, and from failures to cooperate in solving these and other problems. These problems are interrelated and are exacerbated by continued reliance upon lethality as the ultimate problem-solver. We seek security by killing and arming to kill, creating counter-killing threats; arming to kill contributes to economic deprivation and reinforces structural inequity; killing in assertion and denial of human rights contributes to long-festering retaliatory resentments; lethal combat and military industrialization ravages the environment; and fearful compartmentalization in antagonistic enclaves impedes the development of problem-solving cooperation to benefit all.

Nonkilling problem-solving implies not only negation of killing but constructive engagement in need-fulfilling change. This means unequivocal engagement in abolition of war and its weapons, abolition of poverty, nonkilling expression of human rights and responsibilities, proactive promotion of environmental sustainability, and contribution to problem-solving processes that respond to human needs and evoke infinite creative potential in individuals and in humankind as a whole.

Such an agenda may seem utopian. But it is bequeathed by some of the most practically experienced political, military, economic, scientific, cultural, and civil society leaders of this era (echoing ancient human concerns in a new global age). It is extremely important for political scientists to note that virtually every major problem-solving conference convened under the auspices of the United Nations or other bodies calls for the peoples of the world to help create the "political will" to bring about needed change. Calls go out not only to governments but to all sources of cooperative problem-solving action: parties, nongovernmental organizations, corporations, unions, universities, the media, religions, and the arts. There is a sense of increasing urgency as life-threatening global problems intensify and awareness grows of catastrophic future consequences of present failure to act. These include the proliferation of weapons; rapidly increasing populations combined with widening economic disparities within and between nations that threaten to burst material and psychological limits of tolerance; life-threatening effects of unrestrained industrial and agricultural exploitation of nature; and self-defeating failure to honor the claims to equal participation in realizing acceptable quality of life for all by women, indigenous peoples, suppressed minorities, and those of myriad cultural identities. For those most knowledgeable about the global condition—as opposed to a global

view from the perspective of a single nation-state—such as Federico Mayor, Director General of UNESCO—it is an urgent era of "no business as usual" (Mayor 1995: 83-93). Should it be less urgent for political science?

Nonkilling and Disarmament

Neither the problems to be solved nor the nonkilling movements that have arisen to address them are academic political science inventions. They are presented by contemporary global political life. Political science should commit itself to solve them. A clear-cut challenge for problem-solving action is contained in the *Final Report* of the first U.N. General Assembly special session on disarmament (U.N. General Assembly 1978) that calls for "general and complete disarmament under effective international control." By consensus, 159 states with one abstention (Albania) declared the need for abolition of all nuclear weapons; abolition of all biochemical weapons and other weapons of mass destruction; withdrawal from all foreign military bases; reduction of armed forces to purposes of limited territorial defense; reduction of conventional weapons; and ending "colossal waste" in global military expenditures by shifting material and human resources to serve economic and social needs in more and less economically developed countries. Plus many related proposals. A classic call for nonkilling transformative action by predominantly violent states, unfortunately unknown to most students of political science.

Nonkilling political science cannot remain aloof from efforts to support governmental and civil society initiatives that promise evolution toward realization of weapon-free societies. Among them are campaigns to ban handguns, assault weapons, land mines, and the arms trade; to establish weapon-free zones of peace in villages and cities; and to create nuclear-weapon-free regions of the world.

Nonkilling and Economic Deprivation

Yet another classic appeal for problem-solving action is the "Manifesto" of fifty-three Nobel Prize laureates from chemistry to physics to stop what they call the global "holocaust" of deaths from preventable economic deprivation (Nobel Prize Winners 1981: 61-3).[10] They declare: "All who denounce and combat this holocaust are unanimous in maintaining that the causes of this tragedy are political."

> It is essential that citizens and politicians choose and vote at their respective levels, in elections, in parliament, in governments or at the international level, new laws, new budgets, new projects and new measures designed to take immediate effect to save billions of people from malnutrition and underdevelopment and hundreds of millions in every generation from death by hunger (62).

Expressing "the need to save the living, not to kill and not to exterminate, not even by inertia, failure to act or indifference," they urge transformative nonkilling economic revolution:

> Although the powerful of this earth bear the greatest responsibility, they are not alone. If the helpless take their fate into their own hands, if increasing numbers refuse to obey any law other than fundamental human rights, the most basic of which is the right to life, if the weak organize themselves and use the few but powerful weapons available to them: *non-violent actions exemplified by Gandhi* [emphasis added], adopting and imposing objectives which are limited and suitable: if these things happen it is certain that an end could be put to this catastrophy in our time (63).

They conclude, "Now is the time to act, now is the time to create, now is the time for us to live in a way that will give life to others."

Inequality, population growth, and militarization interact to exacerbate economic lethality, violence, and environmental devastation. In 1999 the World Bank estimated that perhaps as many as 1.5 billion people are living in conditions of "absolute poverty," defined as having income of less than $1 per day, with 3 billion under $2 per day. In India alone it is estimated that the absolute poor have increased by 40 million to 340 million persons from 300 million in the late 1980s (World Bank 1999). Simultaneously income inequality increases. As summarized by Tariq Husain of the World Bank in June 1997 for 160 young leaders in the first program of the United Nations University International Leadership Academy:

> The world in mid-1990s is…more polarized than in 1980….The poorest 20% of the world's people have seen their share of global income decline from 2.3% to 1.4% during the past 30 years. Meanwhile, for the richest, it rose from 70% to 85%. Thus the ratios of the shares of the richest and poorest doubled from 30:1 to 61:1….The combined assets of the world's 360 billionaires now exceeds the combined annual income of countries with 45% of the world's peoples (Husain 1997: 13).

The World Bank President James D. Wolfensohn and Mahatma Gandhi agree that inequality leads to violence. The President observes, "Inequality leads to instability. Poverty breeds war" (Husain 1997: 6). As the Mahatma warns, "A non-violent system of government is clearly an impossibility so long as a wide gulf between the rich and hungry millions persists.…A violent and bloody revolution is a certainty one day unless there is voluntary abdication of riches and power that riches give and sharing them for the common good" (*Collected Works* 75 (1941): 158). Combining insights of the President and the Mahatma, a young American peace worker, Betsy Duren, who has given away most of her inherited wealth, declares: "The only way we're going to have lasting peace is by redistributing wealth. Poverty, war and suffering are caused by people who have more than their share of the pie trying to hold on to it" (Mogil and Slepian 1992: 100). The views of the President, the Mahatma, and the young American echo the analysis of Aristotle over 2,300 years ago on the relation of inequality to lethality:

> The important thing to remember is that those who are responsible for the exercise of power, whether they be individuals or organs of government or tribes or what you will, great or small, it is they who cause the disturbance that leads to revolution. They may do so indirectly, as when the rest, jealous of their power, begin a revolution, but also directly when they themselves are so superior that they are no longer content to remain on terms of equality with the rest (Aristotle 1962: 199).

Rapid global population growth from 2.5 billion in 1950 to estimated 6.1 billion in 2000 and 8.9 billion in 2050 challenges nonkilling problem-solving engagement. The most populous countries in 2050 are predicted to be India (1,529,000,000), China (1,478,000,000), the United States (349,000,000), Pakistan (345,000,000), and Indonesia (321,000,000). As analyzed by Lester R. Brown and colleagues of the Worldwatch Institute, such unprecedented increase of at least 80 million people each year places potentially catastrophic demands upon the life-carrying capacity of the earth. Among nineteen areas of threatening concern are water supply, grain production, energy, cropland, forests, biodiversity, climate change, disease, urbanization, housing, education, jobs, and conflict within and among countries (Brown, Gardner, and Halweil 1999).

Since traditional lethal methods of population reduction such as war, genocide, infanticide, and abortion as well as famine and pestilence are undesirable, the challenge to nonkilling political science is to support discovery

and implementation of nonkilling alternatives. This means placing respect for the quality of human life and its life-supporting environment at the center of political theory and practice in economic problem-solving.

Some of the world's most celebrated military leaders, professionals in killing, have demonstrated acute insight into the need for economic demilitarization. One of them is the WWII general who became president of the United States, Dwight D. Eisenhower (1953-1961). No pacifist has surpassed his succinct and powerful analysis of the nexus between commitment to killing and economic structural violence:

> Every gun that is made, every warship launched, every rocket fired signifies, in the final sense, a theft from those who hunger and are not fed, those who are cold and not clothed. This world in arms is not spending money alone. It is spending the sweat of its laborers, the genius of its scientists, the hopes of its children…. This is not a way of life at all, in any true sense. Under the cloud of threatening war, it is humanity hanging from a cross of iron. (Address to the American Society of Newspaper Editors, April 16, 1953).

One reason for humanity's "hanging from a cross of iron," is the "theft" by cost of the United States nuclear weapons program from 1940 to 1996 calculated to be 5.821 trillion dollars (Schwartz 1998). This exemplifies the "colossal waste" of global military expenditures that in the 1990s averaged "well over $500 billion a year" (Sivard 1996: 7). Nonkilling political science implies refusal to accept continuation of economic deprivation caused by global militarization. It accepts constructive engagement in efforts to free humanity from the "cross of iron" to end the "holocaust" of poverty.

Nonkilling Human Rights and Responsibilities

An imperative challenge to problem-solving engagement is posed by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948) and its subsequent implementing covenants, civil and political, social and economic. The basic text should be known to every political scientist and global citizen.

However human rights are defined, amidst controversies over universality versus cultural specificity, nonkilling political science is committed to their assertion and defense by nonkilling means. Moreover, it asserts the goal of obtaining and implementing universal recognition of the right not to be killed and the responsibility not to kill others. One way is to seek inclusion in the Universal Declaration and in global practice of the following provision:

> Article 3(2). Everyone has the right not to be killed and the responsibility not to kill others.

Nonkilling political science is challenged to engage its resources in research, training, consultation and action to support individuals and organizations that seek the protection and advancement of human rights at every level. For example, the program of action to end all forms of violence against women and girls set forth by the 1995 Beijing women's conference presents a compelling agenda for implementational commitment (United Nations 1996).

Another challenge to full-scale political science engagement is nonviolent defense of human rights by Amnesty International founded in 1961. Its work is based on Universal Declaration principles such as "No one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment" (Art. 5); "No one shall be subjected to arbitrary arrest, detention or exile" (Art. 9); and "Everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression; this right includes freedom to hold opinions without interference and to seek receive and impart information and ideas through any media and regardless of frontiers" (Art. 18). Amnesty International seeks global abolition of the death penalty, abolition of torture, fair trials for all, and immediate release of all prisoners of conscience who have neither advocated nor engaged in violence. Methods encompass all forms of nonkilling political action.

Among other human rights work that should engage nonkilling political science assistance is that of the Unrepresented Nations and Peoples Organization (UNPO), founded in 1991. UNPO seeks recognition of the collective human rights of more than fifty indigenous peoples on five continents. Members commit themselves in writing to the UNPO Covenant that provides for "promotion of non-violence and the rejection of terrorism as an instrument of policy." UNPO calls upon "governments, international organizations, NGOs and on their leaders to adopt clear and principled policies to reduce the use of violence." These must include:

> recognition of and respect for the equal rights of all peoples and those of minorities, regardless of their size, their culture or religion; taking the needs and views of unrepresented peoples and minorities seriously; speaking out and condemning all unprovoked acts of violence and gross violations of human rights against unrepresented peoples and minorities; recognition of the legitimacy of movements or governments which use peaceful and democratic means to achieve their objectives; engagement in open and sincere dialogue with all such movements and governments and rewarding their adherence to non-violence; [and] en-

couragement and active assistance in the peaceful resolution of conflicts between the State governments and nations, peoples and minorities over whom they claim authority (UNPO 1998: 8).

Furthermore, UNPO calls upon "corporations and financial institutions to end the violent exploitation of those resources upon which peoples' survival depends; and cease from promoting violence through irresponsible arms trade and commercialization of violence in the media and in their products" (9). Such commitment to nonkilling politics by peoples who have suffered genocide, ethnocide, and ecocide presents a clear challenge to supportive nonkilling political science. Given the large number and identity needs of the world's indigenous and minority peoples, the membership of UNPO eventually may exceed that of state members of the United Nations.

Nonkilling and Ecological Viability

Nonkilling political science implies assistance to liberation of humankind from ecological lethality. We kill the environment and the environment kills us. A nonkilling society requires a nonkilling ecology.

The end of the twentieth century has been marked by increasing alarm over human destruction of the life-carrying capacity of the biosphere. Military industrialization and assaults upon the planet in warfare contribute to its devastation. The World Charter for Nature adopted by 111 members of the U.N. General Assembly on October 28, 1982 declared that "nature shall be secured against degradation caused by warfare and other hostile activities" (Art. 1, Sect. 5). Among tragic violations: chemical defoliation of forests by the United States in the Vietnam War; Gulf War oil field arson by Iraq. Nonkilling political science confronts the challenge posed by Barry Commoner: "To make peace with the planet, we must make peace among the people who live in it" (Commoner 1990: 243).

Another challenge is posed by Maurice F. Strong, Secretary-General of the major United Nations Conference on Environment and Development held in Rio de Janeiro in 1992 who calls for an "eco-revolution that is essential in order to shift the world onto a new pathway to a more secure, sustainable and equitable future" (United Nations 1993: 1). Agenda 21, the call to action of the conference, observes that "warfare is especially destructive of sustainable development" (Principle 24) and that "peace, development and environmental protection are interdependent and indivisible" (Principle 25). Appeals for problem-solving action are addressed to states, governments, citi-

zens, women, youth, and indigenous peoples. To which can be added armies, military industries, corporations, labor unions, and political scientists.

Like other threats to survival and well-being, ecological problems are complex, interdisciplinary, and global. Political science resources to assist public policy formulation and implementation need to be applied from a nonkilling perspective. The scientific task is to identify which environmental threats are well understood and require urgent action, which problems require urgent research, priorities among them, and how best to introduce scientific knowledge into need-responsive processes of societal decision-making. A model approach has been presented by the Royal Swedish Academy of Sciences (1983; Sebek 1983).

Nonkilling political science implies being especially attentive to and supportive of individuals, organizations, and social movements that engage in nonkilling environmental problem-solving action. Salient contemporary nonkilling ecological movements range from the village women's save-the-trees Chipko movement in India (Weber 1989; Nautiyal 1996), through direct action efforts to change public and private policies by Greenpeace (Stephenson 1997), to the emergence in Germany of an environmental movement and electoral political party, Die Grünen (The Greens).

The legacy of Petra Karin Kelly (1947-1992), a founder of the electoral Die Grünen, presents nonkilling political science with a problem-solving agenda for the twenty-first century. Her call to action encompasses every critical issue from disarmament through economy and human rights to worldwide cooperation to save the planet. She calls for a "global culture of ecological responsibility" and urges establishment of "binding principles governing ecological relations among all countries" (Kelly, 1992: 76). Along with Tolstoy, Gandhi, Abdul Ghaffar Khan, and Martin Luther King, Jr., Petra Kelly deserves to be seen now and will be recognized in the future as a major contributor to nonkilling global change in the twentieth century and beyond (Kelly 1989; 1992; 1994; Parkin 1994).

Nonkilling and Problem-solving Cooperation

A generic task is to assist processes of peaceful problem-solving from individuals to the global community. Neither security, nor economic well-being, nor respect for human rights, nor ecological viability, nor other valued conditions of life can be achieved without life-respecting cooperation among all whose help is needed. This is not to imply that political science solves every problem but rather that it accepts responsibility to assist proc-

esses of problem-solving cooperation. It does not imply totalitarianism; even anarchists require cooperative respect for their freedoms by other anarchists. A nonkilling approach implies a shift from politics based upon conflict and competition for dominance with manifest or latent violence as the ultimate arbiter. Nonkilling politics implies ever-widening circles of cooperative problem-solving marked by life-celebrating mutual respect. Whereas killing dominates and divides, nonkilling cooperates and unites. Therefore nonkilling political science seeks coaction among men and women, religions, civilizations, races, ethnicities, classes, communities, states, national and transnational organizations, and global movements. The goal is to solve problems without killing or threat to kill for the well-being of all. The upsurge of interdisciplinary and professional interest in the theory and practice of conflict resolution, seeking win-win resolutions of conflicts through dialogue, provides major facilitating resources (Fisher and Ury 1981; Burton 1996).

Based upon advancing research, nonkilling political science engages in assisting transition toward nonkilling societies in states and civil societies characterized by violence. It recognizes historic advances of democratic development expressed in some modern political systems, but also seeks solutions to problems of behavioral and structural violence that free politics and free markets alone do not solve. Nonkilling political science recognizes the value of citizen-validated constitutions to limit arbitrary power; provision of bills of rights to secure citizen freedoms; the usefulness of institutional checks and balances of separated executive, legislative, and judicial authority; the substitution of electoral party competition for civil war; the services of a professional bureaucracy; religious freedom; freedom of press and expression; and expansion of rights of voting participation toward universal participation (Finer 1997; Goldman 1990). It further recognizes and seeks alternatives to the presence of violent military and police power that undergirds such systems, and that customarily has contributed to their establishment.

A nonkilling approach notes signs of systemic dysfunction in failures to respond to human needs that result in physical and structural violence in even the most "advanced" democracies. To recall just a few of current concern, taking the United States as an example: violence and homicide in family and school; youthful despair reflected in violent gangs, drugs, and suicide; pervasive political alienation, distrust of politics and government, expressed partly in low voting participation; immense waste of resources in unproductive military expenditure; a chronically deprived underclass of at least twenty percent of the population characterized by poor nutrition, health, housing (including homelessness), education, and family disintegration; armed robbery; hate

crimes; gender and ethnic discrimination; a super affluent upper class of per- haps another twenty percent increasing in wealth and allied with proximate intermediate classes in seeking security through more police, prisons, severe punishments, and military force—all accompanied by violent cultural imagery.

Countries less characterized by attributes of the modern democratic state and civil society suffer even greater intensities and forms of violence associated with unrestrained lethal autocratic rule and economic depriva- tion resulting in unspeakable physical and structural atrocities. Among indi- cators are summary executions, torture, electoral assassinations, genocide, ethnocide, armed extortion, terrorism, armed revolutions, and mass deaths from state-backed economic deprivations.

Liberating itself from violence-accepting assumptions as to means and ends, the problem-solving task of nonkilling political science is to contribute to improved processes of responsiveness to human needs within and among so- cieties that are more and less democratic. The challenge to scientific and hu- manist creativity is immense. Yet even now it is clear that contributions to constructive processual change can be made by explicit introduction of nonkill- ing values, provision of new information about nonkilling human capabilities, nurturance of new nonkilling skills of democratic leadership and citizenship, facilitation of participation in policy formation, and development of new nonlethal problem-solving institutions. To assist these changes, political sci- ence itself must clarify its commitment to nonkilling as a point of departure for service to society. It must become institutionally responsive to unmet hu- man needs from the individual and family to the world polity.

Chapter 5

Institutional Implications

> That which we call necessary institutions are often no more than institutions to which we have grown accustomed, and… in matters of social constitution the field of possibilities is much more extensive than men living in their various societies are ready to imagine.
>
> Alexis de Tocqueville

> The problems that threaten life on Earth were produced collectively, they affect us collectively, and we must act collectively to change them.
>
> Petra K. Kelly

What are the institutional implications of a nonkilling ethical-empirical shift in political science? What does it imply for those who practice it, for the organization of the discipline, for its relation to other fields of knowledge, and for the varied institutions needed to bring about nonkilling societies from the local community to humankind as a whole? Institutions are taken to be configurations of purposive social relationships that arise in response to human needs and aspirations.

The history of civilization is in large part the history of institutional innovation. From faiths come communities associated in temples, synagogues, churches, and mosques. From needs for political participation come parties, elections, and parliaments. From needs for social control come police, courts, and prisons. From war-fighting objectives arise technological forces for combat on land, sea, and air. From needs for tax extraction to support armies and purposes of the state come bureaucracies (Finer 1997: 16-17, 20-21). To create an atomic bomb, national resources are mobilized in a Manhattan Project. To explore into realms unknown come the mobilizations of spirit, science, technology, skills, and resources to produce the fifteenth century voyages of Prince Henry the Navigator and the twentieth century Apollo Project to place a man on the moon.

For political science to contribute to transition to a nonkilling global society what kinds of institutional changes are implied? The purposive pursuit of nonkilling conditions of global life portends institutional changes as pervasive in scope to those associated with the global diffusion of contemporary communication and information technologies. A nonkilling perspective may be absorbed or integrated in old structures, such as in efforts to integrate participatory democracy, gender, race, class, and environmental concerns across political science specialties. Or it may lead to restructuring the old, to establishment of parallel transitional institutions, or to creation of completely new or hybrid institutions combining every source of strength for full-force pursuit of nonkilling transformation.

To take seriously the possibility of realizing killing-free societies implies need for institutions devoted to nonkilling scientific and humanist discovery, to nonkilling education and training, to life-affirming problem-solving, to nonkilling security, and to creation of cultures of nonkilling well-being in every sector of society.

Just as democracies are made by democrats who understand what they are, know how to make them work, and are motivated to make them work —nonkilling societies and institutions will be made by nonkilling individuals. So will nonkilling political science. There are many paths to nonkilling awakening and none can be prescribed for all. Birth, faith, intellect, trauma, compassion, cost-benefit analysis, simulation, and meditation are all paths to nonkilling discovery and action. The vast historical and contemporary evidence of human capacity to make nonkilling commitments should encourage each of us to discover our own transformational capabilities.

A Nonkilling Department of Political Science

Whereas a nonkilling spirit needs to be infused in each existing political science specialization, department, and association—a new nonkilling department can be envisioned as a prototype for restructuring present ones, and for creation of new departments in emerging world universities.

The department departs from a sense of common purpose: to eliminate killing, threats to kill, and their lethal correlates from global life. This distinguishes it from departments favoring liberal democracy based on violence, scientific socialism based on violence, or authoritarian order based on violence. The nonkilling department is no more value-laden. It is just a different value.

Assuming the present progression of learning from introductory courses to doctoral studies, the department explicitly seeks to nurture character and skills

needed for realizing and maintaining nonkilling societies. Four skills are fundamental: for research, for education and training, for action, and for critical reflection expressed through the media of communication and in everyday life.

Entering students are vividly confronted with the lethal legacy of human history and invited to take up the challenge of removing killing from the human condition, as professional political scientists or citizen servant leaders. They are then empowered with understanding of human capacity for creativity (Boorstin 1983; 1992; 1998), for political innovation (Finer 1997), and for lives of peaceful service to advance human dignity in every area of social life (Josephson 1985).

A next step is to review major contemporary challenges to problem-solving engagement (violence, economy, human rights, environment, cooperation), contemporary political institutions and problem-solving processes (local, national, international, global), and most recent knowledge related to the logic of nonkilling analysis and principles of action that can contribute to present decisions to realize nonkilling futures.

A further step is to offer students opportunities to explore a set of alternative but related modes of problem-solving engagement and community service that will enable testing and matching of interests and talents. This requires introduction to skills for research, education-training, leader-citizen action, and critical political evaluation. This is not to deny possibilities for multiple interests and competencies. But it is to recognize that all four modes of engagement must be pursued supremely well to facilitate nonkilling social transformation. Recognition and cooperation among mutually supportive competencies that is characteristic of village artisans and championship teams in sports is needed.

With such preparation the next step is to pursue individual or group projects to engage appropriate skills in research, education, action, and critical reflection to create alternatives to physical violence, structural violence, violations of human rights, environmental degradation, and violence-prone antagonisms that inhibit problem-solving cooperation. These projects may be directed to local, national, international, or global conditions. The results of such projects, presented as graduating theses, are contributed to a departmental memory bank and published on the Worldwide Web to assist individual and societal decision-making.

Graduates proceed to innovative careers in public service and civil society (see related institutions below). They may seek advanced training in correlated M.A. and Ph.D. programs in nonkilling political science, enter ex-

isting or create new fields of political science inquiry (Appendices B, C), or carry forward interests into other disciplines and vocations.

The nonkilling department is explicitly service- and vocationally-oriented. It features cumulative advancement of knowledge and skills from introductory to advanced doctoral studies. Faculty and degree candidates form innovative enclaves across levels around shared interests in applying modes of engagement to specific problem-solving needs. The department explicitly seeks to facilitate mutually supportive relationships between discovery of new knowledge, its use in education and training, and its application in societal problem-solving. In its own discourse and modes of resolving conflict it seeks progressively to exemplify characteristics of a nonkilling society. A culture of co-gender partnership between men and women on the basis of equality, the heart of a nonkilling society, is celebrated and respected. Provisions are made for career-long periodic feedback from graduates to identify new needs for research and to advise on more adequate preparation of students for coping with unforeseen tasks. Experienced community leaders and colleagues from other disciplines, sometimes through joint appointments, contribute to collegial creativity. Since nonkilling knowledge and skills are global, the department reaches out to engage collegial talents throughout the world through direct participation and through computerized and other communication systems. The local community is viewed as a functionally equivalent context for confronting problems affecting global well-being.

A University Shanti Sena (Peace Corps)

Transition to nonkilling societies implies creation of a nonkilling student community service corps as an alternative to military training often provided or required in many world colleges and universities. Leadership responsibility may be assumed by a department of political science but members may be drawn from all disciplines.

The Shanti Sena—however named—is a disciplined, distinctively identifiable force whose members are trained for nonkilling conflict resolution and reconciliation, community security and civilian defense, paramedical lifesaving, disaster relief, and constructive service in response to community needs. Participation parallels and complements academic work nurturing character and skills of leadership. It draws upon the life-celebrating inspiration of all faiths, the uplifting spirit of music and the arts, the vitality of sports, and the satisfaction of genuine service to others. The Shanti Sena can be called upon to serve in times of crisis on and off campuses and provides a pool of

leadership talent for other social institutions. It can be financed and supported in ways no less adequate than those provided contemporary training for military service. It can also be adapted for pre-university education. A valuable source of practical experience for organizing a Shanti Sena in educational institutions is provided by the work of Professor N. Radhakrishnan at Gandhi Rural University in India (Radhakrishnan 1997a; 1997b). To this can be added training principles and practices emerging from the Khudai Khidmatgars (Servants of God), an 80,000-strong nonviolent Muslim liberation army in India during 1930-47 (Banerjee 2000: 73-102), and the Kingian movement for nonkilling social change (LaFayette and Jehnsen 1995; 1996) as well as other nonkilling training experiences (War Resisters League 1989).

Nonkilling Universities

To take seriously the possibility of realizing nonkilling societies implies requirements for knowledge and skills beyond capabilities of any single discipline or university department. Thus the nonkilling transformation of political science means to call upon and respond to the potential contributions of all the social sciences, natural sciences, humanities and professions. It implies need for entire universities devoted to nonkilling service to life in local, national, international, and global communities.

Universities have shown themselves capable of total mobilization of intellectual and human resources for supreme lethality in war. As Harvard University President James B. Conant declared on June 18, 1942, "To speed the day when the Axis powers surrender without conditions, we now dedicate the resources of this ancient society of scholars." Harvard became known as "Conant's Arsenal" as commitment to war-fighting reshaped its institutional life. Young Harvard physics students were recruited to work on the top secret interdisciplinary atomic bomb project at Los Alamos, New Mexico. As one reminisced, "It was a kind of scientific utopia….An open society of the best minds available, freely exchanging ideas without consideration of age, academic rank or previous achievement" (*Harvard Magazine*, September-October 1995: cover; 32, 43).

Should not universities, old and new, take up as vigorously the task of eliminating wars and all forms of lethality that threaten human survival and well-being? The present reluctance of universities to introduce "peace studies" courses, programs, or departments—or to include "nonkilling" or "nonviolence" as a central theme in multimillion dollar-endowed univer-

sitywide programs in "ethics" or "values"—provides a basis from which to measure future nonkilling progress in higher education.

Nonkilling Political Parties

Applied nonkilling political science implies emergence of nonkilling political parties that participate in need-responsive processes of societal problem-solving for the well-being of all. A generic term for such parties might be an *ahimsa sarvodaya* party (*ahimsa*, nonviolence; *sarvodaya*, well-being of all). Such parties to emerge creatively in concept, name, organization, and activities out of specific sociocultural conditions.

The goals of nonkilling parties are to contribute to the realization of nonkilling societies, locally and globally. They differ from past parties in that they are not class-based but seek to aggregate and express the interests of all—for everyone benefits from absence of lethality and its correlates and from the presence of nonkilling conditions of freedom, justice, and material well-being. The presence of several parties, competing on nonkilling principles, can be expected.

The anticipated constructive contribution of nonkilling political parties in electoral competition, public policy-making, and other activities departs from Gandhian prohibitions against direct political participation. Gandhi's last advice to nonkilling constructive workers in December 1947 was to stay out of politics because politics inevitably corrupts (*Collected Works* 90: 223-4). Instead, workers for a nonkilling society should work in civil society among people whose needs are greatest, influencing politicians and policy from outside. Logically this means to let other people become corrupt and make decisions affecting multibillion dollar tax extractions, millions of people, and every aspect of social life—including war, security, food, clothing, housing, health, education, economy, culture, and environment—while nonkilling activists and their people seek to influence the corrupt and their supporters to do good. However, to the credit of Gandhi's foresight he accompanied his nonpolitical admonition with participatory anticipation: "But a stage may come when the people themselves may feel and say that they want us and no one else to wield the power. The question could then be reconsidered" (223).

Nonkilling political parties are logical institutions to help bring about nonkilling social transformation. Naturally conditions favorable for their emergence will differ widely. Nowhere will it be easy, even where parties, elections, and representative bodies are socially accepted. Nonkilling political parties can participate protracted sacrificial struggles to contribute to processes

and policies that respond to the needs of all. To note a few contemporary is-
sues in contention illustrates the tremendous challenge of combining new
knowledge, new skills, new forms of organization and new policies in effective
problem-solving action: abortion, capital punishment, conscription, war, armed
revolution, terrorism, genocide, criminality, social violence, cultural violence,
disarmament, and economic demilitarization. Nevertheless progress can be
made through creativity, global solidarity, and processes of social learning.

Public Service Departments of Nonkilling

Needed at all levels of governance are public service departments of non-
killing with cabinet responsibilities. Their tasks are to monitor community
conditions related to the logic of nonkilling political analysis, to support pro-
fessional training for prevention and post-lethal transformative rehabilitation,
and to advise on public policies that will facilitate nonkilling community well-
being. Since conditions of violence pervasively affect the quality of life of a
community, public service attention to them merits no less commitment than
to garbage disposal or provision of a clean water supply.

A department of nonkilling will aggregate statistics on killing and violence
and recommendations for killing-eliminating actions from all public and private
sources. It will make periodic status reports together with nonkilling policy
recommendations to governmental decision-makers and to members of civil
society much in the role of an independent auditing agency. Among areas
needful of comprehensive oversight are: homicide and suicide; family vio-
lence (children, women, spousal, elderly); school violence; workplace vio-
lence; criminal and gang violence; police violence; prison violence; media
violence; sports violence; economic violence; military-paramilitary-guerrilla
violence; and post-lethality traumatic stress effects upon killers, their rela-
tives, relatives of victims, and upon general societal consciousness. The re-
ports should stress strengths and weaknesses of nonkilling transformative
capabilities and make recommendations for more effective problem-solving
actions. Progress to be reported with no less salience than fluctuations in
stock market quotations, sports scores, or the weather.

Nonkilling Common Security Institutions

Transition to nonkilling societies implies requirements for nonkilling
common security forces, akin to traditional military and police, for protec-
tive and humanitarian service operations by land, sea, and air. Such forces
to be trained for preventive, crisis coping, and restorative actions—and for

after-action evaluations of effectiveness. Leadership may come from conversion of existing military and police academies or from new nonkilling service academies where integrated training can be received by all, followed by branch specialization for specific tasks. The Shanti Sena of universities can be another source of leadership.

The prospect of developing nonkilling common security forces should not be dismissed lightly in view of current trends in some military and police establishments toward violence prevention, engagement in lightly armed peacekeeping operations and humanitarian relief, exploration of usefulness of nonlethal weapons, and receptivity to training in nonkilling methods of conflict resolution.

Nonkilling common security implies engagement of entire populations at local, national, and international levels. This can be facilitated by organization of nonkilling study circles and civic shanti sena centered on residences, schools, places of worship, workplaces, and increasingly on electronically networked nonkilling common security communities. Adaptable models for local citizen organization already exist in many fields.

Nonkilling security also implies nonkilling common security councils and nonkilling intelligence agencies at national and transnational levels as well as nonkillingcultural attachés in diplomatic establishments. Nonkilling common security councils are needed to provide policy alternatives for violence-prone nation-states and their lethal allies. A nonkilling global common security council at the United Nations level, for example, can be formed by nations that rank lowest on indicators of lethality: no nuclear weapons, no armies, no capital punishment, low homicide rates, no arms trade, and so forth. Nonkilling intelligence agencies are needed, in conjunction with investigative mass media of communication and citizen alerts, to reveal all forms and threats of lethality and to identify capabilities for countervailing public and private transformational action. Nonkilling specialists in diplomatic establishments are needed no less than conventional military attachés or officers responsible for economic relations. Nonkilling cultural attachés seek to build bridges of discovery, mutual learning, and cooperation between all sources of nonkilling well-being in home and host countries. Global Internet capabilities promise worldwide citizen sharing of common security information with potential for producing concerted nonkilling actions that are not dependent upon conventional governmental, corporate, or media definitions of the situation.

Enhancement of skills for nonkilling public service in governmental and private organizations calls for appropriate institutions for nonkilling training. Perhaps initially as subcomponents and eventually as functionally equivalent

replacements, nonkilling training institutions are needed as alternatives to war colleges, national defense universities, military service academies, police academies, and schools of public administration as well as to other violence-accepting professional training schools in civil society.

Nonkilling Civil Society Institutions

Civil society opportunities for contributing to the emergence, maintenance, and creativity of nonkilling societies are potentially infinite. Many nonkilling-oriented institutions already have appeared and others of special significance can be envisioned.

Nonkilling spiritual councils

At each level or for each concentric ring of society, nonkilling spiritual councils are needed to affirm unambiguous respect for life in all matters from birth to death. Such interfaith councils to be composed of religious and humanist exponents of every contextually relevant faith and philosophy who are courageously capable of proclaiming and combining powerful nonkilling truths of their traditions. Such councils, as alternatives to conventional religious and secular apologists for violence, provide inspirational support for all efforts, public and private—local, national, and global—to remove lethality from the human condition. By drawing upon every source of inspiration, nonkilling spiritual councils can become important contributors to strengthening the nonkilling conscience of humankind by evoking capabilities inherent in every individual and social institution.

Nonkilling consulting groups

Drawing upon global resources, nonkilling consulting and advisory groups are needed to assist identification of problem-solving alternatives within and across societies. Combining task-specific spiritual, scientific, skill, organizational, and other resources, such groups, directly or indirectly, make themselves available to help all who seek to prevent bloodshed, stop ongoing slaughter, and create conditions of stable reconciliation and reconstruction. The operations of such nonkilling consulting teams differ from those of conventional negotiators backed by threat of lethal force or economic sanctions—or those of single voices of moral suasion—by their combination of unequivocal commitment to nonkilling, multiple competencies, and independence from control by violent states and their lethal antagonists. Privately financed institutions capable of providing such consulting services, aggregating their experiences, and improving their effectiveness

are needed. Quaker conflict resolution and humanitarian services, as well as those of other religious and humanitarian relief agencies, provide pioneering partial prototypes of what is needed.

Transnational problem-solving consortia

Complementing what may be termed "top down" nonkilling political institutions (for example, parties, public service departments, and common security institutions), "bottom-up" consortia of powerful nonkilling transformational forces are needed. An example is the Unrepresented Nations and Peoples Organization (UNPO), a coalition of peoples with distinctive identifies explicitly committed to nonkilling action to influence the United Nations, governments, and other institutions to recognize their collective human rights. Amnesty International, Greenpeace, and the International Fellowship of Reconciliation provide other examples. Participants in nonkilling consortia need not agree on all positions advocated by members except upon removal of killing from the global condition. Such consortia need to be developed within and across zones in the funnel of killing and in the major problem-solving areas of violence, economics, human rights, environment, and cooperation. Eventually a powerful global citizens consortium for a nonkilling world, a partnership of women and men, should emerge as a force for universal well-being.

Nonkilling training institutions

As consciousness about pervasive threats of violence and needs for constructive nonkilling alternatives intensify, there are increasing demands for training in skills of nonkilling leadership for conflict resolution and nonkilling social change. Skilled trainers are in great demand from the Kingian, Gandhian, Buddhist, Christian, and secular nonkilling traditions. Needs range from those of citizens movements on every social justice issue to those of institutions such as schools, workplaces, police, and prisons. Civil society institutions are needed to provide nonkilling citizen training as with any other skill, and to train and certify professional trainers.

Nonkilling leadership study and revitalization centers

Institutions are needed to which leaders of nonkilling organizations and movements can come for periods of revitalization, reflection, writing, and sharing of experiences. Often periods of imprisonment or hospitalization are the only pauses for leaders engaged in life-threatening, stressful commitments to bring about nonkilling social change. A voluntary nonkilling functional equivalent is needed. Where leaders have been tortured, cooperation with centers

for rehabilitation of victims of torture is essential. Dispersed throughout the world, centers for nonkilling leadership can provide opportunities for spiritual and physical revitalization, autobiographical reflection and biographical study, dialogues with experienced colleagues similarly committed to nonkilling principles from various countries, and foresightful contemplation of next steps forward. These centers may be privately endowed as independent institutions or adopted by host institutions committed to nonkilling social transformation.

Centers for nonkilling creativity in the arts

Institutions are needed for encouragement of nonkilling creativity within and across the arts. As the French writer Romain Rolland quotes Tolstoy, "Art must suppress violence, and only art can do so" (Rolland 1911: 203). In a study of nonviolence in the poetry of Shelley, Art Young observes, "Nonviolence is more than a system of political thought; it is the stuff of poetry and of life" (1975: 165). Reminiscent of the importance of martial music for military morale, a maxim in the Kingian tradition maintains, "If you don't have a song, you don't have a movement" (Young 1996: 161-184).

One institutional model—patterned after private centers that sponsor creative communities among the seven arts or among painters, poets, and writers—is to provide opportunities for artists of every inspiration to come together to celebrate transformative nonkilling creativity in response to human lethality. Among arts to which the challenge of nonkilling creativity can be addressed are literature, poetry, painting, sculpture, music, dance, theater, film, television, photography, architecture, clothing design, and commercial arts of the mass media. To find ways out of violence challenges all the arts. An alternative to conventional murder mysteries, for example, can be to create nonkilling detectives who prevent by skillful means murders and suicides before they occur. Synergistic nonkilling creativity among the arts can uplift the human spirit and imagination for the crucial transformational tasks ahead.

For global recognition, benefactors should establish awards for nonkilling contributions to the arts no less significant than encouragement provided by the various Nobel prizes.

Nonkilling research and policy analysis institutes

Just as private institutes are established to advise governments and the general public on matters ranging from international security policies to all matters of political, economic, social, and cultural life, nonkilling policy institutes are needed to provide information and analysis to assist societal decision-making. They can amplify the problem-solving commitments of nonkilling political sci-

ence in the fields of violence, economy, human rights, environment, and cooperation. They can support the applied efforts of nonkilling spiritual councils, parties, common security institutions, consulting groups, and other civil society institutions as well as provide information needed by individual citizens.

Nonkilling media of communication

Nonkilling media of communication are needed to provide information, news and commentary to assist individual and public policy decision-making. This does not mean media that overlook human capacities for killing but that go beyond conventional media messages that killing is inevitable, often laudable, and entertaining. The editorial decisions of nonkilling media in the transitional era can reflect the logic of nonkilling political analysis. That is, the messages probe deep into the realities of violence; bring to consciousness countervailing nonkilling realities; report on transformational processes, successes and set-backs; and give voice to creative nonkilling aspirations in all arts, sciences, humanities, professions, and vocations of everyday life. This approach is no more value-laden than media that fail to challenge the assumption of perpetual lethality and incessantly contribute, explicitly or implicitly, to keeping the mind locked in violent pessimism. Media alternatives are needed in newspapers and magazines, on the radio and television, in films, and on global computerized information networks. Nonkilling political scientists can be one source of commentary and analysis.

Nonkilling memorials

To recover and celebrate the nonkilling heritage of civilization, memorials to individuals, groups, organizations, unknown heroes and heroines, and events need to be constructed respectfully in every society. To be celebrated are all those who have refused to kill and have contributed to the long march toward nonkilling global civilization. This is not to remove the statues and memorials to the triumphant and defeated killers of history that dot the planet—since they recall the realities of historical lethality. But nonkilling memorials are needed to remind us that there have always been proponents of nonkilling alternatives that are now increasingly imperative for human survival. Among those to be celebrated are religious figures, martyrs who spoke truth to violent power, war resisters, conscientious objectors, opponents of the death penalty, poets of peace, and the unsung masses of women and men who resisted injustices without violence at the risk of imprisonment, torture, and death.

Nonkilling zones of peace

Implied civil society institutions are nonkilling zones of peace ranging from organizations through rural and urban communities to national and international agreements. Harbingers are religious sanctuaries, zones of peace declared by villages victimized between armed revolutionary and counter-revolutionary forces, expandable cease fire areas, movements for weapons-free societies, citizen efforts to reclaim residential areas from criminal and gang violence, and international treaties to establish nuclear-weapons-free zones. The identification of, networking among, and introduction of supportive nonkilling institutions into such varied zones of peace for mutual support and diffusion is a major nonkilling institutional development challenge.

Nonkilling economic enterprises

If the enterprises of war and cultures of violence are said to be profitable for some even if unspeakably costly for many, enterprises for nonkilling well-being should become even more profitable for all. Viewed from a nonkilling perspective and from the perspective of anticipated growing demand for nonkilling material and cultural goods, services, entertainment, and recreational alternatives, the opportunities for nonkilling entrepreneurship are limitless. One way to begin to identify alternatives is to inventory violence-serving enterprises and envision their nonkilling opposites. For war toys substitute peace toys, for video game lethality substitute exciting nonkilling ingenuity, for the armaments industry substitute the disarmament industry, for violent media entertainment offer dramatic creations of nonkilling arts, and for labor to destroy substitute work to improve the quality of life. Experience is provided by examples of nonkilling economic conversion that accompany periods of demilitarization. But beyond simple economic reversal is to seek to identify the genuine needs of people in transition to nonkilling societies in their global context and to create services capable of responding to them.

Centers for global nonkilling

The vision of a nonkilling world implies institutions capable of facilitating transition from completely wholistic perspectives. Such institutions must be firmly rooted in the nonkilling commonalities of world spiritual and cultural traditions and must become capable of creative catalysis of global scientific, skill, artistic, and institutional resources to assist humankind to perceive paths of nonkilling liberation from lethality and its consequences. In contemporary computer terms such centers should be creative catalysts of nonkilling "software" that can serve human needs through the "hardware" services of gov-

ernment and institutions of civil society. To be effective such centers should be maximally independent from governments and from control by exclusionary private interests. They should be substantially endowed in perpetuity by visionary benefactors, mass subscriptions, and other means.

A center for global nonkilling takes as its goal discovery and elicitation of utmost human creativity in areas such as the following: nonkilling in spiritual and philosophical traditions; bio-neuroscience and nonkilling; gender relations and nonkilling; economics and nonkilling; communications and nonkilling; science, technology and nonkilling; nonkilling and the environment; the vocations and nonkilling; education and nonkilling; nonkilling and the arts; nonkilling and sports; the role of the military in nonkilling change; nonkilling leadership; and nonkilling human futures.

A major contextual and historical task is to inventory nonkilling global cultural resources based upon locally-centered inquiry in every country and region. This requires inquiry into nonkilling historical traditions, present manifestations, and future prospects. Aggregated on a global scale, such discoveries should provide humanity with our first comprehensive understanding of nonkilling human capabilities from which future progress can be measured.

Centers for global nonkilling should be equipped with a global situation room in which the ongoing realities of killing, threats to kill, and related deprivations, can be vividly juxtaposed against countervailing nonkilling transformational resources available to humankind. Constantly confronting the challenges of lethality, such centers, drawing upon creative advances in knowledge as above, can suggest combinations of spiritual, scientific, skill, artistic, and institutional resources to assist transformational public policy, research, education, and training by all who seek the survival and well-being of humankind.

Needed Nonkilling Institutions

A political science committed to tasks of realizing nonkilling societies will educate and innovate for action through appropriate institutions, beginning with itself. Institutions are needed for life-respecting spiritual affirmation. For discovery, integration, and sharing of knowledge. For public policy decision-making. For nonkilling common security. For economic well-being. And for celebrating life in all the arts and vocations.

The tasks of transition call for creatively integrative centers for global nonkilling—committed to understanding and facilitating responsiveness to nonkilling needs of all. The strength of nonkilling institutions derives from mutually supportive individuals. Every political scientist and each person can be *a center* for global nonkilling to facilitate transition to a nonkilling world.

Chapter 6

Nonkilling Global Political Science

> We are in a new era. The old methods and solutions no longer suffice. We must have new thoughts, new ideas, new concepts…. We must break out of the strait-jacket of the past.
>
> General Douglas MacArthur

> Someone has to have sense enough and even strategy to cut off the chains of violence and destruction in history.
>
> Martin Luther King, Jr.

> Certainly all historical experience confirms the truth— that man would not have attained the possible unless time and time again he had reached out for the impossible.
>
> Max Weber

> We are daily witnessing the phenomenon of the impossible of yesterday becoming the possible of today.
>
> Mohandas K. Gandhi

Toward Liberation From Lethality

The time has come to set forth human killing as a problem to be solved rather than to accept enslavement by it as a condition to be endured forever. The deliberate killing of human beings, one by one, mass by mass, and the many by machines, has reached a stage of pathological self-destruction. Killing that has been expected to liberate, protect, and enrich has become instead a source of insecurity, impoverishment, and threat to human and planetary survival. Humanity is suffering from what Craig Comstock has termed the "pathology of defense" when that which is intended to defend becomes itself the source of self-destruction (Comstock 1971). Defensive guns in the home kill family members, bodyguards kill their own heads of

state, armies violate and impoverish their own peoples, nuclear weapons pro-liferate to threaten their inventors and possessors. A nonkilling declaration of independence from the violence within ourselves and our societies is needed.

The pursuit of human aspirations by violence in the modern era has re-sulted in incalculable bloodshed, material deprivation, and psychological traumas reverberating across generations. The hopes of humanity in the past two centuries have been emblazoned on banners bequeathed by the French Revolution—"liberté, égalité, fraternité." Killing for freedom has been the legacy of the American revolution. Killing for equality has been the legacy of the Russian and Chinese revolutions. Killing for peace has been the heritage of two centuries of war, revolution, and counterrevolution. The lesson to be learned is that true freedom, equality, and the fraternity-sorority of peace cannot be realized without fundamental uprooting of the legacy of lethality. The mountains of massacred who have been sacrificed for good and evil cry out for us to learn this lesson.

This means to challenge and change the assumption of the emerging world academic discipline of political science that killing is inevitable and good for the well-being of humankind. It means to question and overturn one of the most powerful tenets of ancient wisdom and contemporary po-litical belief. An analogue can be found in the overthrow of the theory of "laudable pus" in the history of medicine. For some seventeen centuries the teaching of the immensely authoritative Greek physician Galen (c.130-c.200) prevailed that the pus formed around a wound was nature's way of restoring health. Challenge in 1867 by Lister in his seminal *Lancet* paper, "On the Antiseptic Principle in the Practice of Surgery," led not without contro-versy to the invention and adoption of antiseptics (Ackerknecht 1982: 77; Garrison 1929: 116; 589-90). The belief that killing is natural and functionally healthy for politics is the "laudable pus theory" of political science.

If political scientists, scholars who dedicate their lives to the study of po-litical power in its multi-faceted manifestations from family life to world war, do not challenge seriously the assumption of lethality, then why should we expect political leaders and citizens of the world to do so? Yet through-out history and increasingly in the present era leaders and citizens unaided by political science emerge who explicitly seek to realize conditions of free-dom, equality, and peace by principled nonkilling means. An example is the "burning of weapons" by 7,000 pacifist peasant Doukhobors resisting mili-tary conscription in Russia in 1895 (Tarasoff 1995: 8-10). There is an ob-servable gap between lethality-accepting political science, and pioneers of lethality-rejecting politics. In the twentieth century the legacies of Tolstoy,

Gandhi, Abdul Ghaffar Khan, Martin Luther King, Jr., and Petra Kelly—courageously carried forward by leaders such as the Dalai Lama, Aung San Suu Kyi, and Desmond Tutu—inspired and supported by unsung heroines and heroes who make nonkilling servant leadership possible—are harbingers of powerful nonkilling politics of the future.

Are political scientists belatedly to follow nonkilling sacrificial successes by individuals and popular movements, after clinging to the killing-accepting status quo—like cautious beneficiaries of authoritarian regimes who hang on until disaffected demonstrations sweep them aside? Are political scientists then to join in nonkilling democratic celebrations? Or is political science after the manner of medical science to dedicate itself to diagnosis of the pathology of lethality, and to discovery of prescriptions and treatments that can be shared with all who seek to remove killing from global life?

Thesis of Nonkilling Capabilities

The thesis presented here is that a nonkilling global society is possible and that changes in the academic discipline of political science and its social role can help to bring it about. The case for the realizability of nonkilling societies rests upon at least seven grounds. Most humans do not kill. Powerful nonkilling potential resides in the spiritual heritage of humankind. Science demonstrates and forecasts nonkilling human capabilities. Transitional nonkilling public policies such as abolition of the death penalty and recognition of conscientious objection to military service have been adopted by even violence-created nation states. Various social institutions based upon nonkilling principles exist that in combination already constitute functional equivalents of nonkilling societies. Nonkilling popular struggles for political and socioeconomic change demonstrate an increasingly powerful alternative to revolutionary lethality. Roots of nonkilling inspiration and experience can be discovered in historical traditions throughout the world. Ultimately the promise of nonkilling transition rests upon examples of nonkilling individuals, men and women, celebrated and unknown, whose courageous lives testify to its achievability.

Implications for Political Science

It is accepted that humans, biologically and by conditioning are capable of both killing and nonkilling. But it is observed that most humans have not been killers and that a range of social institutions based upon nonkilling principles already have been created that can serve as prototype components of nonkilling societies. Furthermore, present and expectable scientific advances prom-

ise knowledge for removing causes of killing, for strengthening causes of nonkilling, and for bringing about conditions of nonkilling societies. Given these observations, the acceptance of inescapable lethality as an assumption upon which to base the academic discipline and social role of political science is at the very least problematical. Therefore to question the assumption of killing and its implications throughout what might be called the "deadly discipline" of political science—among others—is appropriate. Political science, along with other disciplines and vocations, must recover nonkilling experiences of the past, recognize present nonkilling capabilities, project nonkilling potentials for the future, and cooperate in advancing this knowledge in research, teaching, and public service for nonkilling social transformation.

The principal elements that need to be combined for nonkilling transformation are clear. *Spirit* (S_1), profound commitments not to kill derived from each and all faiths and philosophies. *Science* (S_2), knowledge from all the arts, sciences, and professions that bear upon the causes of killing and nonkilling transformation. *Skills* (S_3), individual and group methods for expressing spirit and science in transformative action. *Song* (S_4), the inspiration of music and all the arts, making the science and practice of nonkilling politics neither dismal nor deadly but a powerful celebration of life. To combine, develop and amplify these four elements in effective service, democratic *Leadership* (L), citizen *Competence* (C), implementing *Institutions* (I) and supporting *Resources* (R) are necessary.

This combination of elements can be summarized as:

$$S^4 \times L\,C\,I\,R = \text{Nonkilling global transformation}$$

Spirit, science, skills, and song, creatively combined through need-responsive processes of democratic leadership and citizen empowerment, amplified by institutional expressions and resource commitments can contribute to realization of a nonkilling world.

Theory and Research

The horror of human lethality calls for political science inquiry into a four-part logic of political analysis that can provide knowledge necessary to prevent convergence of forces that result in killings from homicide to genocide and nuclear annihilation of cities to potential extinction of planetary life. In political science consciousness, killing must move from the violence-accepting periphery to the center of analytical and problem-solving attention. This means concentrated effort to understand the causes of killing; the causes of nonkilling; the causes of transition from killing to nonkilling and

vice versa; and the characteristics of completely killing-free societies. Such knowledge is needed to assist identification of nonkilling alternatives and transformative actions within and across the converging zones of the funnel of lethality: biological, structural, cultural, socialization, and killing zones.

Education and Training

To carry forward such knowledge-seeking and transformative tasks implies prerequisites in the education and training of political scientists, in the structure of curricula, in the organization of academic political science departments, in relations with other disciplines, and in the research-education-action role of political science in society.

The overall goal of political science education and training becomes to nurture creativity for and skill in nonkilling problem-solving. Some guiding principles are to review the legacy of creative lives and institutions; to assist exploration of individual interests and skills; to seek cumulative knowledge and skill development; to engage in self-selected problem-solving projects; to provide for parallel constructive community service; and to orient toward and support nonkilling political science vocations.

After vivid introduction to the horrifying history of lethality and the inspiring legacy of nonkilling creativity, the curriculum presents the logic of nonkilling political analysis and challenges engagement in discovery of principles and processes for effective problem-solving action. Participants review the causes of killing, nonkilling, transitions, and hypotheses about the characteristics of nonkilling societies. From this perspective, historical developments of political institutions and processes, locally and globally, are examined. Problem-solving challenges are posed—such as homicide, democide, genocide, and disarmament; economic lethality; human rights atrocities; ecological biocide; and destructive divisiveness versus cooperation across diversity. Opportunities to develop skills in modes of problem-solving engagement are offered: research, teaching, servant leadership, and critical communication. On these foundations individual and group projects to solve problems and develop skills are pursued and presented. A parallel university-wide Shanti Sena (Peace Corps) provides complementary leadership training for disciplined community service.

Graduates proceed to meet needs for researchers, educators, leaders, and communicators in transitional public and private institutions. They respond to social needs for creative problem-solving service. Post-graduate training provides advanced preparation for service in politics, government,

and civil society to meet increasing contemporary needs for skills in violence prevention and nonkilling social change. Problem-solving engagements parallel those in undergraduate education. Working groups are formed to advance skills in research, education, action, and reflection to solve problems of violence, economy, human rights, environment, cooperation, and other issues. Masters degree and doctoral candidates serve with faculty as guides, mentors, and co-learners in undergraduate projects.

Nonkilling political science implies high aspirations in doctoral training to prepare professionals who are creators themselves and skilled in facilitating the creativity of others. Not all can be expected to master every needed skill, but all can share understanding of required tasks, seek creative contributions to the maximum extent of competence, and learn how to support the problem-solving contributions of others both within and without the academic community.

Doctoral training will require intensive study of the foundations of nonkilling political science; understanding of local and global problem-solving needs; preparation in skills of nonkilling scholarly leadership; understanding of qualitative and quantitative modes of inquiry (including languages); mastery of research methods essential for tasks at hand; and engagement in advanced projects. The latter to encompass discovery of new knowledge and application of existing knowledge to improve education and training, institutional development, and processes of problem-solving.

Nonkilling scholarly leadership requires preparation for versatile performance of needed social roles. Fundamental is an opportunity for autobiographical reflection on origins of beliefs and attitudes toward killing and nonkilling. Preparation is needed for teaching to facilitate student creativity. For departmental leadership to facilitate collegial creativity. For cross-disciplinary cooperation. For consultancy to facilitate nonkilling change in state and civil society. For critically constructive media communications. And for direct nonkilling servant leadership (Greenleaf 1977).

In its own social relationships a nonkilling department of political science must seek to express through trial and error the desired characteristics of a nonkilling society. This means to affirm nonsectarian but multi-faith spiritual and humanist respect for life. To engender responsibility for the well-being of all. To improve need-responsive, participatory processes of decision-making. To celebrate diversity and dignity of all. To experiment with co-gender and distributed leadership functions. To be prepared to call upon nonkilling problem-solving consultants at times of seemingly intractable conflict. To be open to the contributions of other disciplines and professions. To encourage inno-

vative enclaves to solve scientific problems. And to recognize that a nonkilling global society is rooted in individuals and the local community.

Long-term mutual consulting relationships should be established with graduates who proceed to work in the fields of research, education, leadership, communications, and other areas of social life. Their experiences can greatly assist identifying research needs, improving preparation in needed skills, and evoking creativity to overcome obstacles to nonkilling transformation. However diverse in other respects, all who accept the challenge of nonkilling political science can join together in sustained, mutual assistance.

Problem-Solving

Nonkilling political science implies combination of basic and applied science in explicit problem-solving engagement. Problems will vary as defined in contexts of complex social change. Five problems of critical importance are globally salient: violence and disarmament, economic holocaust, human rights atrocities, environmental degradation, and failures of problem-solving cooperation. All related and exacerbated directly and indirectly by readiness to kill. A contemporary slogan holds that there will be "no peace without justice"—implying that violence and war will continue or be necessary to protest or change unjust conditions. But from a nonkilling perspective there will be "no justice without nonkilling." For killing and threats to kill have contributed to the creation and maintenance of injustice. In the case of unequal treatment of women, for example, as Petra Kelly has observed: "The unfair sexual distribution of power, resources, and responsibilities is legitimized by ancient traditions, enshrined in law, and enforced when necessary by male violence" (Kelly 1994: 15).

Engagement in problem-solving does not imply that nonkilling political science is omniscient or the source of every solution. But it does imply that application of knowledge derived from nonkilling political analysis and from principles and practices of nonkilling action can improve processes of social decision-making that are responsive to the needs of all. In this sense it promises a nonkilling contribution to advancement beyond the violence-based democratic tradition (Goldman 1990).

Institutions

The knowledge-seeking, education-training, and problem-solving objectives of nonkilling political science imply needs for implementational institutions. These range from new or restructured political science departments, even entire universities (including global communication equivalents that

combine talents imbedded in or outside existing institutions), to nonmilitary Shanti Sena training units, nonkilling public policy institutions, nonkilling common security forces, nonkilling political parties, and nonkilling institutional innovations in every sector of civil society. The creation of and service in such institutions, as well as in transformation of existing institutions to remove lethality from local and global life, offer vocations of utmost creativity for all who study and practice the science of nonkilling politics.

Obstacles and Inspirations

At the dawn of the twenty-first century political science is challenged to take up the task of contributing to the realization of a nonkilling global society. It is not only desirable, but imperative. Political scientists cannot evade this responsibility by objecting to value-bias and claiming "realistic" scientific neutrality that in truth translates into readiness to kill. Such neutrality has never been true. If it were, political scientists would not care whether the society or world in which they lived was free or unfree, just or unjust, affluent or impoverished, at peace or at war, victorious or defeated. They would find joy in teaching their students that political scientists have no value preferences and therefore do not shape their research, teaching, and public service projects to favor some over others. For them there would be no choice between Hitler's holocaust and Gandhi's satyagraha.

Political scientists also cannot avoid the task of creating a nonkilling political science simply on grounds that other values such as freedom, equality, or security are more important than nonkilling. Nonkilling is at least of equal importance because humanity has arrived at a condition where all of these values are threatened without a powerful commitment to a nonkilling ethic in political science and political life. Materialism and morality have arrived at the same conclusion. If tradition has taught that we must kill to be free, equal, and secure—the present teaches that unless we stop killing not only freedom and equality are in jeopardy but our very survival—individual, social, and ecological—is imperiled. We have reached a point where the science and practice of politics must be aligned with the life-supporting forces of society and nature. It is not only good morality and good practicality, but it is also this era's imperative for good political science.

In the process of transition, of course, opposition can be expected from forces of thought and action that derive identities and perceived benefits from continuation of lethality. Among them are the violent forces of states, their lethal antagonists, and the political, economic, and psychological bene-

ficiaries of cultures of killing. Among these are some but decidedly not all veterans of wars and revolts, their descendants, and others who vicariously derive identity and pride from socially validated celebrations of righteous lethality. Paying homage in martyr cemeteries we are conditioned against sympathy for the enemy dead, fail to see both as victims of political failure, and depart with exhortations to be forever prepared for similar sacrifice, rather than to commit ourselves to ensure that such killing will never happen again.

But among inspiring sources of support for transition to nonkilling political science are experienced admonitions by some of the world's most honored military leaders. Consider the appeal for the abolition of war as matter of imperative "scientific realism" made by General Douglas MacArthur in a speech to the American Legion in 1955:

> You will say at once that although the abolition of war has been the dream of man for centuries, every proposition to that end has been promptly discarded as impossible and fantastic. Every cynic, every pessimist, every adventurer, every swashbuckler in the world has always disclaimed its feasibility. But that was before the science of the past decade made mass destruction a reality. The argument then was along spiritual and moral grounds, and lost…. But now the tremendous and present evolution of nuclear and other potentials of destruction has suddenly taken the problem away from its primary consideration as a moral and spiritual question and brought it abreast of scientific realism. It is no longer an ethical question to be pondered solely by learned philosophers and ecclesiastics but a hard core one for the decision of the masses whose survival is at stake…. The leaders are the laggards…. Never do they state the bald truth, that the next great advance in civilization cannot take place until war is abolished…. When will some great figure in power have sufficient imagination to translate this universal wish— which is rapidly becoming a universal necessity—into actuality? We are in a new era. The old methods and solutions no longer suffice. We must have new thoughts, new ideas, new concepts…. We must break out of the strait-jacket of the past (Cousins 1987: 67-9).

New nonkilling transformations of the slogans of the French Revolution can be heard in the warnings of General later United States President Dwight D. Eisenhower on the harmful influences of continued violent militarization upon liberty, equality, and fraternity. On *liberty*: "In the councils of government, we must guard against the acquisition of undue influence, whether sought or unsought, by the military industrial complex. We must never let the weight of this

combination endanger our liberties or democratic processes. We should take nothing for granted" (Farewell Address, January 17, 1961). On *economic equality*: "Every gun that is made, every warship launched, every rocket fired signifies, in the final sense, a theft from those who hunger and are not fed, those who are cold and not clothed" (Speech to American Society of Newspaper Editors, April 16, 1953). On *fraternity*: "Indeed, I think that people want peace so much that one of these days governments had better get out of their way and let them have it" (BBC TV interview, August 31, 1959).

On December 4, 1996, speaking before the National Press Club in Washington, D.C., the former commander of all United States nuclear-war fighting forces General George Lee Butler called for the complete abolition —not mere reduction—of nuclear weapons and for the United States as their inventor and first user to lead in abolishing them. Otherwise, he cautioned, the United States has no moral authority to prevent other countries from acquiring them. His reasons: "Nuclear weapons are inherently dangerous, hugely expensive, militarily inefficient, and morally indefensible." Thus the General arrived at the long-held conclusion of spiritually motivated Americans such as members of the Swords into Plowshares movement whose opposition to nuclear weapons continues to evoke punishment by confinement in federal prisons. The logic of the nuclear abolitionist movement can be applied to other tools for killing as well.

If these generals, experts in the profession of killing, can raise such profound questions about the continued assumptions of their vocation and its relation to society, cannot political scientists question the violence-accepting presuppositions of their own profession and social role and strive for the global realization of nonkilling societies?

Perhaps most American political scientists and those international colleagues who are adopting components of contemporary American political science are unaware of the nonkilling motivation that contributed to the creation of political science as an academic discipline in the United States. One of its origins was a battlefield vow made in 1863 by a young Union soldier, John W. Burgess, assigned to night sentinel duty after a bloody, day-long battle with Confederate forces in west Tennessee:

> It was still raining in torrents; the lightning shot its wicked tongues athwart the inky sky, and the thunder rolled and reverberated like salvos of heavy artillery through the heavens. With this din and uproar of nature were mingled the cries of wounded and dying animals and the shrieks and groans of wounded and dying men. It was a night of terror

to the most hardened soldiers. To one so young and sensitive as myself it was awful beyond description, and it has been a hideous nightmare to this day. It was, however, in the midst of this frightful experience that the first suggestion of my life's work came to me. As I strained my eyes to peer into the darkness and my ears to perceive the first sounds of an approaching enemy, I found myself murmuring to myself: "Is it not possible for man, a being of reason created in the image of God, to solve the problems of his existence by the power of reason and without recourse to the destructive means of physical violence?" And I then registered a vow in heaven that if a kind Providence would deliver me alive from the perils of the existing war, I would devote my life to live by reason and compromise instead of by bloodshed and destruction (Burgess 1934: 28).

Carrying forward his vow, Burgess went on to graduate study in Germany and returned to found the School of Political Science at Columbia College in New York in 1880.

Professor Burgess's subsequent experience forecasts obstacles that contributors to nonkilling political science can expect to confront. These obstacles will vary from minor to extreme severity according to context, and will require courage and global cooperation to overcome them. With his understanding of Germans as fellow human beings, Burgess opposed United States entry into World War I. For him, on the day of entry, August 6, 1917, "with one grievous blow…my life's work [was] brought down in irretrievable ruin around me." Amidst the patriotic anti-German war, he lamented that "to be a man of peace and reason today is regarded by the people of the world as tantamount to being a traitor and a coward" (29). Thus Professor Burgess suffered the agony of peacemakers throughout the ages who, perceiving the virtues and faults of antagonists, tend to be condemned by each contender, sometimes at the cost of their lives.

Nonkilling political science no less than nonkilling politics needs to be guided by Gandhi's call to be "truthful, gentle, and fearless" inspired by profound spiritual and humanist respect for life. It will take courage. Amidst global bloodshed, political scientists need be no less committed to life-respecting principles than the peasants of the Sociedad Civil Las Abejas (The Bees Civil Society) formed in 1992 in the Chiapas region of Mexico. The Bees nonkillingly strive for justice amidst armed Zapatista rebellion and repressive ruling atrocities. They share Zapastista grievances but avow: "Our way is different. We believe in the Word of God. We know how to read the Bible. We

must love our enemy; we cannot kill. Above all, we are poor peasants, brothers and sisters….We are not afraid to die. We are ready to die, but not to kill" (*Peace News*, July 1998: 13, 14).

Why should we expect principled commitments to nonkilling always to come from the "bottom up"—such as from colonized Indians under British imperial domination, from African-Americans under white racist repression, or from poor Mexican peasants? Why not also from the "top down" by local, national, international and global elites, including academic political scientists?

As inquiry into the roots of a nonkilling society reveal, there are ample grounds for confidence in human capabilities to bring about nonkilling global transformation. Virtually all of the component elements of a nonkilling society have been demonstrated somewhere in human experience. It only remains to identify, supplement, and creatively adapt them to local and global needs and conditions. Horrified consciousness of past and present bloodshed can serve as a source of powerful nonkilling motivation and socialization. We must not repeat humanity's murderous mistakes. Therefore we must act so as to make continuation of killing or reversion to killing impossible.

As reported by anthropologists Clayton and Carole Robarchek (1998), the remarkable ninety percent reduction in homicides by the Waorani people of Ecuador in the short period of thirty years after 1958 shows that humans are capable of rapid nonkilling change. With sixty percent of deaths resulting from homicide over the past century, the Waorani have been considered to be "the most violent society known to anthropology." The homicide rate was 1,000 per 100,000 population as compared with 10 or less per 100,000 for the United States. But in three decades Waorani homicides dropped to 60 per 100,000. The main contributors to change were courageous leadership initiatives by two women Christian missionaries—widow and sister of martyred men who were killed in an unsuccessful attempt to contact the Waorani in 1956; assistance by several Waorani women; introduction of an alternative nonkilling value system; the introduction of new cognitive information including that outsiders were not cannibals, brought back by the Waorani women who had seen the outside world; and the desire of the Waorani themselves to end the endless cycle of fearful vendettas in which whole families are speared to death. Churches were organized and prayerful commitments to stop killing were made. Reduction in homicide was accomplished without police or other coercion and without preceding socioeconomic structural change. On the contrary, structural changes began to follow the combination of new nonkilling spiritual commitment and receipt of new information. Even non-Christian Waorani groups began to change.

For the Robarcheks this remarkable shift in values and structure, though still incomplete, confirms important theoretical assumptions about human behavior:

> People are not considered passive machines pushed into action by eco-logical, biological, or even sociocultural determinants but active decision-makers picking their ways through fields of options and constraints in pur-suit of individually and culturally defined goals in a culturally defined reality that they are continually constructing and reconstructing (1998: 4).

From a nonkilling political science perspective, the Waorani experience provides evidence for the transformational potential inherent in creative lead-ership for change. What the Waorani can do, political science can do as a pro-fession and in service to society. There is much work to be done, for neither the Waorani nor the world, of course, are killing-free. Incursions by outsiders engaged in energy operations plus raids by Waorani neighbors not yet reached by nonkilling spiritual-cognitive influences have led to some recur-rences of bloodshed. Although nonkilling enclaves are possible and essential for global change, the spirit and practice of nonkilling must become universal.

Global Imperative

Nonkilling political science must be global. Global in discovery, creativ-ity, diversity, and effectiveness. Global in spirit, science, skills, song, institu-tional expressions, and resource commitments. Global in nurturance of creative leadership and empowerment of all to take and support initiatives that celebrate life. Global in compassionate commitment to solve problems in response to human needs. Global in determination to end killing every-where or no one will be safe anywhere. Global in participation for no disci-pline, vocation, or society has all the wisdom, skills, and resources required. Global in commitment to local well-being, for in particulars lie the liberating seeds of universals. Global in respect for diversity and in multiple loyalties to the nonkilling well-being of people in one's own and other societies. Global in mutual supportiveness among all who study, teach, and act to end the era of lethality that impedes full realization of liberty, equality, prosper-ity, and peace. Global as in viewing our planetary home from the moon, conscious of each of us as momentary sparks of life among billions—yet not one insignificant as potential contributors to a nonkilling world.

The goal of ending lethality in global life implies a shift from violence-accepting political science to the science of nonkilling responsiveness to human needs for love, well-being, and free expression of creative potential.

Is a nonkilling society possible?
Is a nonkilling global political science possible?
Yes!

Appendix A

International Political Science Association
National Associations (1999)

Name	Year Founded (predecessor)	Members
African Association of Political Science	1974	1,360
Argentine Association of Political Analysis	1983 (1957)	180
Australasian Political Studies Association	1966 (1952)	425
Austrian Political Science Association	1979 (1951)	537
Flemish Political Science Association	1979 (1951)	450
Association Belge de Science Politique Communauté Française de Belgique	1996 (1951)	125
Brazilian Political Science Association	1952	*
Bulgarian Political Science Association	1973 (1968)	72
Canadian Political Science Association	1968 (1913)	1,200
Chilean Political Science Association	*	*
Chinese Association of Political Science	1980	1,025
Croatian Political Science Association	1966	50
Czech Political Science Association	1964	200
Danish Association of Political Science	1960	350
Finnish Political Science Association	1935	550
Association française de science politique	1949	1,030
German Political Science Association	1951	1,250
Hellenic Political Science Association	1957 (1951)	53
Hungarian Political Science Association	1982 (1968)	410
Indian Political Science Association	1935	1,600
Political Studies Association of Ireland	1982	247
Israel Political Science Association	1950	250
Italian Political Science Association	1975 (1952)	220
Japanese Political Science Association	1948	1,522
Korean Political Science Association	1953	1,700
Korean Association of Social Scientists	1979	1,465
Lithuania Political Science Association	1991	75
Mexican Political Science Association	*	*

Dutch Political Science Association	1966 (1950)	400
New Zealand Political Studies Association	1974	*
Nigerian Political Science Association	*	*
Norwegian Political Science Association	1956	400
Pakistan Political Science Association	1950	300
Philippine Political Science Association	1962	*
Polish Association of Political Science	1950	200
Romanian Association of Political Science	1968	188
Russian Political Science Association	1991 (1960)	300
Slovak Political Science Association	1990	115
Slovenian Political Science Association	1968	220
South African Political Studies Association	1973	186
Spanish Association of Political and Admin. Science	1993 (1958)	253
Swedish Political Science Association	1970	264
Swiss Political Science Association	1950	1,000
Chinese Association of Political Science (Taipei)	1932	350
Political Science Association of Thailand	*	*
Turkish Political Science Association	1964	120
Political Studies Association of the UK	1950	1,200
American Political Science Association	1903	13,300
Association of Political Science of Uzbekistan	*	*
Venezuelan Political Science Association	1974	*
Yugoslav Political Science Association	1954	*

Total   35,142+

* Data not provided.

Source: *Participation* (1999) 23/3: 33-41. Bulletin of the International Political Science Association. Bulletin de l'association internationale de science politique.

Appendix B

International Political Science Association Fields of Inquiry (2009)

Main fields

Area Studies
Central Government
Comparative Politics
Developmental Politics
Elections and Voting Behaviour
International Law
International Relations
Judicial Systems and Behaviour
Legislatures
Local and Urban Politics
Political Executives
Political Parties
Political Science Methods
Political Theory and Philosophy
Pressure Groups
Public Administration
Public Policy
Women and Politics

Research Commitees

RC01 - Concepts and Methods
RC02 - Political Elites
RC03 - European Unification
RC04 - Public Bureaucracies in Developing Societies
RC05 - Comparative Studies on Local Government and Politics
RC06 - Political Sociology
RC07 - Women, Politics and Developing Nations
RC08 - Legislative Specialists
RC09 - Comparative Judicial Systems
RC10 - Electronic Democracy
RC11 - Science and Politics

RC12 - Biology and Politics
RC13 - Democratization in Comparative Perspective
RC14 - Politics and Ethnicity
RC15 - Political and Cultural Geography
RC16 - Socio-Political Pluralism
RC17 - Globalization and Governance
RC18 - Asian and Pacific Studies
RC19 - Gender Politics and Policy
RC20 - Political Finance and Political Corruption
RC21 - Political Socialization and Education
RC22 - Political Communication
RC24 - Armed Forces and Society
RC25 - Comparative Health Policy
RC26 - Human Rights
RC27 - Structure and Organization of Government
RC28 - Comparative Federalism and Federation
RC29 - Psycho-Politics
RC31 - Political Philosophy
RC32 - Public Policy and Administration
RC33 - The Study of Political Science as a Discipline
RC34 - Comparative Representation and Electoral Systems
RC35 - Technology and Development
RC36 - Political Power
RC37 - Rethinking Political Development
RC38 - Politics and Business
RC39 - Welfare States and Developing Societies
RC40 - New World Orders?
RC41 - Geopolitics
RC42 - System Integration of Divided Nations
RC43 - Religion and Politics
RC44 - Military's Role in Democratization
RC45 - Quantitative International Politics
RC46 - Global Environmental Change
RC47 - Local-Global Relations
RC48 - Administrative Culture
RC49 - Socialism, Capitalism and Democracy
RC50 - Language and Politics
RC51 - Political Studies on Contemporary North Africa
RC52 - Gender, Globalization and Democracy

Source: International Political Science Association, http://www.ipsa.org (2009).

Appendix C

American Political Science Association Fields of Inquiry (2008)

General fields (Members on APSA mailing list)

American Government	4,777
Comparative Politics	5,456
International Relations	4,812
Methodology	1,629
Political Philosphy and Theory	2,709
Public Administration	1,147
Public Law and Courts	1,383
Public Policy	2,883

Subfields (Members on mailing list)

Advanced Industrial Societies	336
Africa	443
African American Politics	264
Asian American Politics	64
Australia	26
Bureaucracy and Organzational Behavior	665
Caribbean	71
Central America	125
Central Asia	71
Civil Rights and Liberties	743
Conflict Processes	857
Congress	734
Constitutional Law and Theory	1,007
Criminal Justice	220
Declines to State	3
Defense	427
Developing Nations	902
East and Central Europe	437
Economic Policy	413

Education Policy	393
Electoral Behavior	905
Electoral Systems	557
Energy Policy	112
Environmental Policy	617
Ethnic and Racial Politics	847
Evaluation Research	131
Executive Politics	232
Federalism and Intergovermental Relations	721
Feminist Theory	402
Foreign Policy	1,662
Gender Politics and Policy	443
Health Care Policy	283
Historical Political Thought	1,327
History and Politics	990
Housing Policy	56
Immigration Policy	262
International Law and Organizations	969
International Political Economy	1,162
International Security	1,463
Judicial politics	595
Labor Policy	123
Latino/a Politics	159
Leadership Studies	206
Legislative Studies	694
Lesbian, Gay and Bisexual Politics	124
Life Sciences and Politics	84
Literature and Politics	263
Middle East	593
Native American Politics	48
NE Asia	560
Normative Political Theory	1,154
North America	122
Political Behavior	1,165
Political Communication	671
Political Development	585
Political Economy	1,380
Political Parties and Organizations	1,223
Political Psychology	728
Positive Political Theory	436
Post Soviet Region	415

Presidency	693
Public Finance and Budget	189
Public Opinion	910
Regulatory Policy	210
Religion and Politics	838
Research Methods	799
Science and Technology	294
SE Asia	202
Social Movements	654
Social Welfare Policy	454
South America	428
South Asia	189
State Politics	596
Trade Policy	130
Urban Politics	626
Western Europe	1,031
Women and Politics	648

Sections (Members on mailing list)

Comparative Democratization	597
Comparative Politics	1,508
Conflict Processes	396
Elections, Public Opinion, and Voting Behavior	823
European Politics and Society	500
Federalism and Intergovernmental Relations	271
Foreign Policy	621
Foundations of Political Theory	715
Human Rights	381
Information Technology and Politics	265
International History and Politics	440
International Security and Arms Control	529
Law and Courts	809
Legislative Studies	594
New Political Science	478
Political Communication	470
Political Economy	653
Political Methodology	943
Political Organizations and Parties	562
Political Psychology	405
Politics and History	654

Politics and Literature, and Film	361
Presidency Research	385
Public Administration	534
Public Policy	981
Qualitative Methods	909
Race, Ethnicity and Politics	569
Religion and Politics	603
Representation and Electoral Systems	378
Science, Technology and Environmental Politics	325
State Politics and Policy	477
Undergraduate Education	468
Urban Politics	354
Women and Politics Research	637

Source: American Political Science Association, *Mailing Lists to Reach Political Scientists* (2008).

Appendix D

Religious Denominations of Conscientious Objectors in U.S. WW II Civilian Public Service Camps
(Number of Members in CPS)

Advent Christian	3
African Methodist Episcopal	1
Ambassadors of Christ	1
Antinsky Church	1
Apostolic	2
Apostolic Christian Church	3
Apostolic Faith Movement	2
Assemblies of God	32
Assembly of Christians	1
Assembly of Jesus Christ	1
Associated Bible Students	36
Baptist, Northern	178
Baptist, Southern	45
Berean Church	1
Bible Students School	1
Body of Christ	1
Brethren Assembly	1
Broadway Tabernacle	1
Buddhist	1
Calvary Gospel Tabernacle	1
Catholic, Roman	149
Christadelphians	127
Christian Brethren	1
Christian Catholic Apostolic	1
Christian Convention	1
Christian Jew	1
Christian & Missionary Alliance	5
Christian Missionary Society	1
Christian Scientist	14
Christ's Church	1
Christ's Church of the Golden Rule	3

Christ's Followers	1
Christ's Sanctified Holy Church	2
Church (The)	1
Church of the Brethren	1,353
Church of Christ	199
Church of Christ Holiness	1
Church of Christian Fellowship	1
Church of England	1
Church of the First Born	11
Church of the Four Leaf Clover	1
Church of the Full Gospel, Inc.	1
Church of God of Abrahamic Faith	13
Church of God of Apostolic Faith	4
Church of God Assembly	1
Church of God in Christ	12
Church of God, Guthrie, Okla.	5
Church of God, Holiness	6
Church of God, Indiana	43
Church of God & Saints of Christ	12
Church of God, Sardis	1
Church of God, Seventh Day	21
Church of God, Tennessee (2 bodies)	7
Church of God (several bodies)	33
Church of the Gospel	1
Church of Jesus Christ	1
Church of Jesus Christ, Sullivan, Indiana	15
Church of Light	1
Church of the Living God	2
Church of the Lord Jesus Christ	1
Church of the Open Door	1
Church of the People	1
Church of Radiant Life	1
Church of Truth (New Thought)	1
Circle Mission (Father Divine)	10
Community Churches	12
Congregational Christian	209
Defenders	1
Disciples Assembly of Christians	1
Disciples of Christ	78
Dunkard Brethren	30
Doukhobor (Peace Progressive Society)	3

Elim Covenant Church	1
Emissaries of Divine Light	1
Episcopal	88
Essenes	5
Ethical Culture, Society of	3
Evangelical	50
Evangelical-Congregational	2
Evangelical Mission Convent (Swedish)	11
Evangelical & Reformed	101
Evangelistic Mission	3
Faith Tabernacle	18
Federated Church	1
Filipino Full Gospel	1
Fire Baptized Holiness	3
First Apostolic	1
First Century Gospel	28
First Divine Assn. in America, Inc.	16
First Missionary Church	2
Followers of Jesus Christ	4
Four Square Gospel	2
Free Holiness	3
Free Methodist	6
Free Pentecostal Church of God	4
Free Will Baptist	2
Friends, Society of [Quakers]	951
Full Gospel Conference of the World, Inc.	4
Full Gospel Mission	3
Full Salvation Union	1
Galilean Mission	1
German Baptist Brethren	157
German Baptist Convention of N.A.	4
Glory Tabernacle	2
God's Bible School	1
Gospel Century	1
Gospel Chapel	2
Gospel Hall	1
Gospel Meeting Assembly	1
Gospel Mission	2
Gospel Tabernacle	2
Gospel Temple	1
Grace Chapel	1

Grace Truth Assembly	1
Gracelawn Assembly	1
Greek Apostolic	1
Greek Catholic	1
Greek Orthodox	1
Hepzibah Faith	6
Hindu Universal	1
Holiness Baptist	1
Holiness General Assembly	1
House of David	2
House of Prayer	1
Humanist Society of Friends	2
Immanuel Missionary Association	13
Independent Assembly of God	2
Independent Church	2
Institute of Religious Society & Philosophy	1
Interdenominational	16
International Missionary Society	2
Jehovah's Witnesses	409
Jennings Chapel	9
Jewish	60
Kingdom of God	1
Kingdom Missionaries	1
Latin American Council of Christian Churches	1
Lemurian Fellowship	9
Lord our Righteousness	1
Lutheran (nine synods)	108
Lutheran Brethren	2
Mazdaznam	1
Megiddo Mission	1
Mennonites	4,665
Methodist	673
Missionary Church Association	8
Moody Bible Institute	2
Mormons (Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints	10
Moravian	2
Moslem	1
Multnomah School of the Bible	2
National Baptist Convention, U.S.A., Inc.	5
National Church of Positive Christianity	5
Nazarene, Church of the	23

New Age Church	3
Norwegian Evangelical Free Church	2
Old German Baptist	7
Open Bible Standard	1
Orthodox Parsee Z.	2
Overcoming Faith Tabernacle	1
Oxford Movement	1
Pentecostal Assemblies of Jesus Christ	1
Pentecostal Assemblies of the World	3
Pentecostal Assembly	2
Pentecostal Church, Inc.	2
Pentecostal Evangelical	1
Pentecostal Holiness	6
People's Christian Church	1
People's Church	3
Pilgrim Holiness	3
Pillar of Fire	1
Pillar and Ground of the Truth	1
Placabel Council of Latin Am. Churches	1
Plymouth Brethren	12
Plymouth Christian	1
Presbyterian, U.S.	5
Presbyterian, U.S.A.	192
Primitive Advent	2
Progressive Brethren	1
Quakertown Church	1
Reading Road Temple	1
Reformed Church of America (Dutch)	15
Reformed Mission of the Redeemer	1
Rogerine Quakers (Pentecostal Friends)	3
Rosicrusian	1
Russian Molokan (Christian Spiritual Jumpers)	76
Russian Old Testament Church	1
Saint's Mission	1
Salvation Army	1
Sanctified Church of Christ	1
Scandinavian Evangelical	1
Schwenkfelders (Apostolic Christian Church, Inc.	1
School of the Bible	1
Serbian Orthodox	1
Seventh Day Adventist	17

Seventh Day Adventist, Reformed	1
Seventh Day Baptist	3
Shiloh Tabernacle	1
Spanish Church of Jesus Christ	1
Spiritual Mission	1
Spiritualist	1
Swedenborg	1
Taoist	1
Theosophists	14
Trinity Tabernacle	1
Triumph the Church & Kingdom of God in Christ	1
Triumph Church of the New Age	1
True Followers of Christ	1
Truelight Church of Christ	1
Twentieth Century Bible School	5
Unitarians	44
Union Church (Berea, Ky.)	4
Union Mission	1
United Baptist	1
United Brethren	27
United Christian Church	2
United Holiness Church, Inc.	1
United Holy Christian Church of Am.	2
United International Young People's Assembly	2
United Lodge of Theosophists	2
United Pentecostal Council of the Assemblies of God in America	1
United Presbyterian	12
Unity	3
Universal Brotherhood	1
Universalist	2
War Resister's League	46
Wesleyan Methodist	8
World Student Federation	2
Young Men's Christian Association [YMCA]	2
Zoroastrian	2
Total affiliated with denominations	10,838
Non affiliated	449
Denominations unidentified	709
Total	11,996

Source: Anderson 1994: 280-6. Cf. Selective Service System 1950: 318-20.

Notes

Epigraphs: Alfred North Whitehead in Alan L. Mackay, comp., *A Dictionary of Scientific Quotations* (Bristol, UK: Institute of Physics Publishing, 1991), 262. **Chapter 1:** Bertrand Russell, *Wisdom of the West* (New York: Crescent Books, 1977), 10; Jawaharlal Nehru, *An Autobiography* (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1982), 409. **Chapter 2:** Daniels and Gilula, 1970: 27. **Chapter 3:** G. Ramachandran, remarks at the Conference on Youth for Peace, University of Kerala, Trivandrum, India, February 23, 1986. **Chapter 4:** Nobel Prize Winners, 1981: 61. **Chapter 5:** Alexis de Tocqueville, quoted in Wilson, 1951: 244; Petra K. Kelly, *Thinking Green!* (Berkeley, Calif.: Parallax Press, 1994), 38. **Chapter 6:** General Douglas MacArthur in Cousins 1987: 69; Martin Luther King, Jr., "The Future of Integration," pamphlet of speech at a Manchester College convocation, North Manchester, Indiana, February 1, 1968, 9; Max Weber in Weber 1958: 128; Gandhi 1958-1994: Vol. XXVI, 1928, 68.

1. Lest this be regarded as too harsh a portrait of patriotic United States lethality, consider the battle cry introduced into the *Congressional Record* on April 16, 1917 by Senator Robert L. Owen, Democrat of Oklahoma, in support of American entry into World War I.

> Mr. President, I found in a western paper a few days ago an editorial in the Muskogee Phoenix, Muskogee Okla., written by Tams Bixby, Esq., former chairman of the Dawes Commission. It breathes a high, pure note of Christian patriotism, which I think deserves a place in our annals at this time. I wish to read it. It is very short. It is entitled:
>
> ONWARD, CHRISTIAN SOLDIERS!
>
> The United States of America, given to the world by the Pilgrim Fathers, through their love and devotion to the Omnipotent ruler of the destinies of men, has declared war on the anniversary of our Savior's crucifixion.
>
> It is altogether fitting and proper that it should be as it is. Loyal Americans will go forth to war not only as the champions of liberty and freedom and humanity but as soldiers of the cross. As He died upon the cross nearly 2,000 years ago for the salvation of mankind Americans will die upon the field of battle to make this a better world.
>
> Through America's blood the world is to be purged of a barbaric, heathenish dynasty that in its lust has forgotten the teachings of our Savior. It is a noble thing to die and to suffer that men maybe brought nearer to God.

America, unafraid, girded with the armor of righteousness, strides forth to battle. There is no hatred in our hearts; we bear no malice toward our enemies; we ask no conquest nor material reward. America, true to the traditions that gave her birth, is to wage a noble, Christian war. We are willing to die if need be to bring to all men once more the message of peace on earth, good will. And in this sacred hour America offers for her enemies the prayer of the cross, "Father, forgive them; they know not what they do."

The call to arms has been sounded. America, champion of righteousness, of civilization, and of Christianity, with a clear heart and willing hand, marches forth.

Amid the clamor and the cries of battle come the strains of the hymn of the united allies of mankind:

"Onward, Christian soldier!"
Congressional Record, 65th Cong., 1st sess., 1917, Vol. 55, Pt. 1, 719.

2. The Seville Statement signers were: David Adams, psychology (U.S.A.); S.A. Barnett, ethology (Australia); N.P. Bechtereva, neurophysiology (U.S.S.R.); Bonnie Frank Carter, psychology (U.S.A.); José M. Rodríguez Delgado, neurophysiology (Spain); José Luis Días, ethology (Mexico); Andrzej Eliasz, individual differences psychology (Poland); Santiago Genovés, biological anthropology (Mexico); Benson E. Ginsburg, behavior genetics (U.S.A.); Jo Groebel, social psychology (Federal Republic of Germany); Samir-Kumar Ghosh, sociology (India); Robert Hinde, animal behaviour (U.K.); Richard E. Leakey, physical anthropology (Kenya); Taha H. Malasi, psychiatry (Kuwait); J. Martín Ramírez, psychobiology (Spain); Federico Mayor Zaragoza, biochemistry (Spain); Diana L. Mendoza, ethology (Spain); Ashis Nandy, political psychology (India); John Paul Scott, animal behavior (U.S.A.); and Riitta Wahlström (Finland).

3. The Fellowship Party, 141 Woolacombe Road, Blackheath, London, SE3 8QP, U.K.

4. Bündnis 90/Die Grünen, Bundeshaus, Bonn 53113, Germany.

5. The United States Pacifist Party, 5729 S. Dorchester Avenue, Chicago, Illinois 60617, U.S.A. Internet: http://www.uspacifistparty.org/.

6. The Sarvodaya Party, Unnithan Farm, Jagatpura, Malaviya Nagar P.O., Jaipur-302017, Rajasthan, India. Internet: http://www.sarvoday.org/frontpage.html.

7. Transnational Radical Party, 866 UN Plaza, Suite 408, New York, N.Y. 10017, U.S.A. Internet: http://www.radicalparty.org.

8. The House of Representatives vote was 373 yeas, 50 nays, and 9 not voting. Representatives voting against war: Edward B. Almon, Democrat of Alabama; Mark R. Bacon, Republican of Michigan; Frederick A. Britten, Republican of Illinois; Edward E. Browne, Republican of Wisconsin; John L. Burnett, Democrat of Alabama; William J. Cary, Republican of Wisconsin; Denver S. Church, Democrat of California; John R. Connelly, Democrat of Kansas; Henry A. Cooper, Republican of Wisconsin; James H. Davidson, Republican of Wisconsin; Perl D. Decker, Democrat of Mis-

souri; Clarence E. Dill, Democrat of Washington; Charles H. Dillon, Republican of South Dakota; Frederick H. Dominick, Democrat of South Carolina; John J. Esch, Republican of Wisconsin; James A. Frear, Republican of Wisconsin; Charles E. Fuller, Republican of Illinois; Gilbert N. Hauge, Republican of Iowa; Everis A. Hayes, Republican of California; Walter L. Hensley, Democrat of Missouri; Benjamin C. Hilliard, Democrat of Colorado; Harry E. Hull, Republican of Iowa; William L. Igoe, Democrat of Missouri; Royal C. Johnson, Republican of South Dakota; Edward Keating, Democrat of Colorado; Edward J. King, Republican of Illinois; Moses P. Kinkaid, Republican of Nebraska; Claude Kitchin, Democrat of North Carolina; Harold Knutson, Republican of Minnesota; William L. LaFollette, Republican of Washington; Edward E. Little, Republican of Kansas; Meyer London, Socialist of New York; Ernest Lundeen, Republican of Minnesota; Atkins J. McLemore, Democrat of Texas; William E. Mason, Republican of Illinois; Adolphus P. Nelson, Republican of Wisconsin; Charles H. Randall, Prohibitionist of California; Jeannette Rankin, Republican of Montana; Charles F. Reavis, Republican of Nebraska; Edward E. Roberts, Republican of Nevada; William A. Rodenberg, Republican of Illinois; Dorsey W. Shackleford, Democrat of Missouri; Isaac R. Sherwood, Republican of Ohio; Charles H. Sloan, Republican of Nebraska; William H. Stafford, Republican of Wisconsin; Carl C. Van Dyke, Democrat of Minnesota; Edward Voigt, Republican of Wisconsin; Loren E. Wheeler, Republican of Illinois; and Frank P. Woods, Republican of Iowa. *Congressional Record*, 65th Cong., 1st sess., 1917, Vol. 55, Pt. 1, 413.

9. The Senate vote was 82 yeas, 6 nays, and 8 not voting. Senators voting against war: Asle J. Gronna, Republican of North Dakota; Robert M. LaFollette, Republican of Wisconsin; Harry Lane, Democrat of Oregon; George W. Norris, Republican of Nebraska; William J. Stone, Democrat of Missouri; and James K. Vardaman, Democrat of Mississippi. *Congressional Record*, 65th Cong., 1st sess., 1917, Vol. 55, Pt. 1, 261.

10. Nobel prize signers of the Manifesto on the economic "holocaust" were: Vincente Aleixandre (literature, 1977); Hannes Alfven (physics, 1970); Philip Anderson (physics, 1977); Christian Afinsen (chemistry, 1972); Kenneth Arrow (economics, 1972); Julius Axelrod (medicine, 1970); Samuel Beckett (literature, 1969); Baruj Benacerraf (medicine, 1980); Heinrich Böll (literature, 1972); Norman Ernest Borlaug (peace, 1970); Owen Chamberlin (physics, 1959); Mairead Corrigan (peace, 1976); André Cournand (medicine, 1956); Jean Dausset (medicine, 1980); John Carew Eccles (medicine, 1963); Odysseus Elytis (literature, 1979); Ernst Otto Fischer (chemistry, 1973); Roger Guillemin (medicine, 1977); Odd Hassel (chemistry, 1969); Gerhard Herzberg (chemistry, 1971); Robert Hofstadter (physics, 1961); François Jacob (medicine, 1965); Brian Josephson (physics, 1973); Alfred Kastler (physics, 1966); Lawrence R. Klein (economics, 1980); Polykarp Kusch (physics, 1955); Salvador Luria (medicine, 1969); André Lwoff (medicine, 1965); Seán MacBride (peace, 1974); Cweslaw Milosz (literature, 1980); Eugenio Montale (literature, 1975); Nevill Mott (physics, 1977); Gunnar Myrdal (economics, 1974); Daniel Nathans (medicine, 1978); Philip Noel-Baker (peace, 1959); Adolfo Pérez Esquivel (peace, 1980); Rodney Robert Porter

(medicine, 1972); Ilya Prigogine (chemistry, 1977); Isidor Isaac Rabi (physics, 1944); Martin Ryle (physics, 1974); Abdus Salam (physics, 1979); Frederik Sanger (chemistry, 1958 and 1980); Albert Szent-Gyorgyi (medicine, 1937); Hugo Theorell (medicine, 1955); Jan Tinbergen (economics, 1969); Nikolas Tinbergen (medicine, 1973); Charles Hard Townes (physics, 1964); Ulf von Euler (medicine, 1970); George Wald (medicine, 1967); James Dewey Watson (medicine, 1962); Patrick White (literature, 1973); Maurice Wilkins (medicine, 1962); Betty Williams (peace, 1976).

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SRI AUROBINDO'S INTEGRAL YOGA

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ABSTRACT

Integral Yoga is Aurobindo's new attempt at attaining the liberation of man. Its newness rests on its aim, standpoint and totality of method. It transmutes the traditional conception of liberation that rests on the individual salvation, and instead emphasizes the total spiritualization of the universe, with a view to establishing perfect harmony between the outer and inner spheres of life. Integral Yoga cultivates all the capacities of man so as to use them for an integral realisation. The goal of Integral Yoga is not self-annihilation in another world but spiritual transformation within this world. It seeks to bring to full self-realization the omnipresent reality, not by leaping from this world into another, but by developing all the capacities of man, and integrating them for a total transformation. Aurobindo integrates into his system the great truths of the monistic pantheism of Advaita, the practical spiritualistic dualism of Samkhya with the practical disciplines of the yoga of Patañjali, the threefold ways of the Bhagavad Gita, and the basic structure of Tantrism. But such a universalistic and synthetic approach of Integral Yoga is not free from limitations.

In the vision of Sri Aurobindo, the Integral Yoga will enlarge, enrich and ultimately transcend the modes of life and thoughts of today's traditional religions, and consequently he visualized a universal community of men with altogether new values and visions. This gnostic community will be guided by supramental values, and the members will effect a kingdom of God here on earth.

Keywords*: Integral Yoga or Purna Yoga, Spirit, Supreme Being, Liberation or Mukti, Saccidananda, Union, renunciation, Consciousness, Supramental, etc.*

The Purna Yoga or Integral Yoga presents the new interpretation regarding the liberation of Hinduism. Influenced by the traditional yogas, and much more convinced by their limitations, Sri Aurobindo presents Integral Yoga that assimilates the whole faculty and nature of man. He defines Integral Yoga as "the turning of one or of all powers of our human existence into a means of reaching divine Being." For him, the final liberation does not mean abandoning the world, but transforming the very cosmos and consciousness into the divine. It is not merely the liberation of the Spirit, but is also the liberation of nature, and the transmutation of the lower Nature into the Supreme and Supramental nature. The aim of Integral yoga is to transform the physical life into the life divine. He envisages a triple transformation: the physical, the psychic, and the spiritual transformation. This would mean a complete synthesis of divine knowledge, divine love and divine action, leading to an integral perfection of all the members, parts and planes of being - the divine Supermind in the divine body, "a temporal sign of the Spirit's victory here over Death and Matter".

Aurobindo's Integral Yoga is so named because it seeks to incorporate the essence and processes of the old yogas, blending their methods and fruits into one system. Sri Aurobindo's yoga is integral in various senses. First of all it demands of the aspirant a total dedication and surrender of his own self and being to the Supreme Being, with all his aspirations, powers and faculties, so that the 'Life Divine' may begin here and now. It is integral insofar as it seeks an integral and total change of consciousness and nature, not for the individual alone, but for all humanity and the entire cosmos. Integral Yoga does not aim at an isolated escape of the body-life-mind triune, but its purpose is to divinise them too by the transforming power of the descending Supramental force. The emancipation of the whole of humanity is the aim. The scope of it is to lead man to the divine superman, the very divine in all its integrality embodying the human form for a new evolutionary status.

It is also integral in the sense that there is no dichotomy between spirit and matter in Sri Aurobindo. Unlike the traditional yogas, Integral Yoga does not seek release from the cycle of birth and death but seeks a transformation of life and existence, by, for, and through the divine. In most yogas, the ascent to the divine is emphasized. Instead in the Integral Yoga, the ascent to the divine is just the first step; the real goal is the descent of the new consciousness that has been attained by the ascent. Besides, Sri Aurobindo's Purna Yoga discards nothing, and accepts everything, including evil, as coming from the Supreme Purusha; all evil is but a negative aspect of the good; darkness is want of light. Everything, every atom, every being is on an eternal march or spiritual evolution.

A. NEW INTERPRETATION OF THE YOGA

Integral Yoga, as already mentioned, is not altogether a new yoga, but a new interpretation of the elements of the traditional yogas. Sri Aurobindo was asked once in what way his Yoga was 'new' and whether it had been tried in earlier times. He advised the disciples not to lay stress on the 'newness' or novelty of the Integral Yoga, but rather on its truth. However he clarified: "I have never said that my yoga was something brand new in all its elements. I have called it the integral yoga and that means that it takes up the essence and many processes of the old yogas - its newness is in its aim, standpoint and the totality of its method."

The first and foremost feature that distinguishes Sri Aurobindo's yoga from the rest is its aim. The traditional Yoga systems are based on a vision which aims at the release of the soul from matter. The final goal is liberation, and this goal has to be gained by freeing the soul from matter, life and mind. In contrast to the traditional yogas, Integral Yoga does not seek liberation, but transformation. The ultimate aim of traditional yoga, i.e., the liberation, or the ascent of the soul to spiritual heights, is only the first stage in the process of bringing the spirit into matter, life and mind for a total transformation. One should aim at a total transformation of this earthly life into the Divine Life. Therefore, a divine fulfillment even in the material is the real object of Sri Aurobindo's Yoga.

Secondly, the Integral Yoga does not seek individual salvation, but works for a cosmic salvation which works for the divinization of the whole mankind and of the whole universe so that even the physical universe can "feel the thrill of a Divine Life".

It endeavours to change ultimately the whole earth and not merely some privileged individuals. Against the individual salvation of the traditional yoga systems, Sri Aurobindo declares that the Integral Yoga should be for all humanity: "A perfect and complete delight in the Divine, perfect because pure and self-existent, complete because all-embracing as well as all-absorbing, is the meaning of the way of Bhakti for the seeker of the integral Yoga".

Thirdly, it is new and revolutionary in its methods as well. It does not emphasize just some part of the being for the divine realization, but strives to take up the entire being. Unlike the traditional yogas, the Integral Yoga does not suppress the lower forms of consciousness. True yoga should be one that touches and transforms not only the higher forms, but also the whole of our being, spiritual, mental, vital and physical. In the absence of a total transformation yoga becomes incomplete. To realize the ultimate goal, the yogin cannot permanently leave the realm of body, life and mind; by remaining in intimate contact with these realities, he can be the instrument of their spiritual transformation, when the Divine has descended to the earth. The goal of existence will not be achieved by the separation of the various aspects of reality, but by their ultimate harmonious union, which will be achieved through the descent of the Divine on earth.

The ancient forms of Yoga stressed the renunciation of life to reach the Divine. The earth was considered to be a source of bondage or an illusion, and the body as a hindrance to the attainment of the Divine, and therefore they are to be discarded for the final liberation. Aurobindo opted for a world-affirming yoga system, which re-established the great heritage of India. The Integral Yoga grants positive value to the phenomenal world: it is "not as an invention of the devil or a self-delusion of the soul, but as a manifestation of the Divine." It is the divine spirit that is active in every fibre of the material being. Aurobindo makes a close relation between the phenomenal world and the Divine Absolute so as to consider that "all psychosomatic phenomena are but signatures of the World Spirit, and conversely, that the World Spirit plays itself into manifold being through the various modes of psycho-materiality." The Integral

Philosophy of Sri Aurobindo is an attempt to do away with the dichotomy between the material and the spiritual, and rather to uphold the harmony between them. Again, for Aurobindo, it is not enough that one reaches the highest stage, rather one has to bring down the highest divine into the terrestrial plane. The earthly is not illusion, but the manifestation of the Divine.

B. NATURE OF INTEGRAL YOGA

Sri Aurobindo's Purna Yoga rests on the direct experiences. For him, the Reality is to be apprehended not by the mental faculty, but by experience. Mental, theoretical and philosophical studies are necessary, and can pave the way for the ultimate transformation of the 'natural man' into divine being, but it is through Yoga that one can reach to the state of the divine being. Yoga prepares the ground for the dawn of divinity: "The Yoga of Sri Aurobindo has, for its object, nothing else than this preparation of the field, so that when the supramental light descends, it may find the soil fit to receive it." It is commonly understood that the aim of Yoga is to realize mukti or transcendental freedom by rising above the limitations of the body, life and mind, and to rest permanently in that state of freedom on some lofty summit of spiritual attainment. Sri Aurobindo goes beyond this ordinary understanding. The aim of the Integral Yoga is not simply the attainment of transcendental mukti or freedom, but "an active participation in the creative joy of the Divine and co-operation with it in the divinization of the empirical world and of the whole embodied life here and now." The fruit of his yoga is not a conceptual system, but an inexpressible Peace and Nirvana.

Describing the nature of Yoga, Sri Aurobindo says, "Yoga means union with the Divine - a union either transcendental (above the universe) or cosmic (universal) or individual or, as in our yoga, all three together." The Integral Yoga suggests various simple means that are accessible to all for attaining such union with the Divine. His Yoga system does not emphasize much on the breathing or the yogic postures as in the Hatha Yoga or the Raja Yoga. His system is free from the rigid religious rites and observances. What he suggests is only some

disciplines of purification and spiritualization that everybody can follow.

The Integral Yoga intends to bring human nature to the divine perfection. Human nature is transformed into the image and likeness or fundamental oneness of the divine nature. For the realization of this oneness, one has firstly, to open oneself to the Absolute, and eliminate all that prevents one from opening oneself to the Absolute, and secondly, the Divine has to enter into the human. These two aspects are closely related because, in the former the individual opens himself to the Absolute, and in the latter, the Divine enters into union and makes itself the Master of his activity. In this union, man becomes an instrument of the divine, and it is in this union that he identifies his self with the Divine Self.

C. Aim

A systematic presentation of the basic principles of Yoga was made by Patanjali in the Vedic period. In the twentieth century, Sri Aurobindo looked back to the age-old yoga system in a new light, and he has developed the Integral Yoga. The ultimate aim of Patañjali's yoga terminates in the self-realization at samādhi which leads to mukti or liberation. Sri Aurobindo accepts the stages of samadhi, but takes it as the beginning of his Integral Yoga. These are only the stepping-stones in the long march to the realization of the Supreme Truth, the saccidananda.

His aim is the total realization and transformation of the personality. In his yogic practices, man should not stop at the ecstatic state of samadhi but should reach the state of total transformation from man to Divine man. And this is possible only in the state of Supramental consciousness which is attained through the practice of the Integral Yoga.

Sri Aurobindo presents the theory of evolution according to which man who is evolved from the lower grades of consciousness to the higher consciousness has to march towards the higher realms, and to be transformed to the grade of superman or perfect-man, and then to the Divine man of the Supramental consciousness. In other words, it is a development from the mental to the Supramental state. Sri Aurobindo's ambitious project

is not merely the perfection of man, which is attained in samadhi, but the transformation of man into the Divine through the involution of the Divine into man. The aim of man is, then, to realize the descent of the Supramental consciousness, and man then attains the total perfection or total transformation. The Integral Yoga is a preparation for this total transformation. While Patanjali's yoga leads to the state of samadhi and thereby to the state of human perfection, the Integral Yoga of Sri Aurobindo inspires the man to go ahead and proceed further and receive the Divine or the Supramental consciousness and transform himself into the status of Divine man. The Integral Yoga enables man's union with the Absolute in the building of the divinized supermanhood on this earth. In his state man is transformed into a new personality from the ordinary mental to the Supramental where there is complete harmony of Sat, Cit, and Ananda. The whole human race is then raised to the enjoyment of the blissful existence of Saccidananda.

The Integral Yoga is "a growing into oneness with the nature of divine being". It purifies one's false nature in order to transform it into divine perfection, that is, it seeks to make the Divine the inner spiritual principle of man's action, with the mind, life and body merely serving as an external expression. The individual has to transcend the lower or imperfect nature to attain the higher divine nature, which is his real nature. The Integral Yoga is a way of complete Self-realization, an entire transformation of life. The discovery of one's true nature is not for its own sake, but for being a channel or instrument of the Divine in the supramental transformation of humanity. The Integral Yoga is not limited to the attainment of divine nature and the consequent harmony with it, rather it functions as a channel in the transformation of society. Its aim is to rise and enter into a higher divine consciousness and to manifest this higher consciousness upon earth. The true object of the Integral Yoga is of two levels: a growth of the spirit in nature, and a spiritual change of consciousness. This full

object of yoga can only be accomplished when the conscious yoga in man becomes outwardly co-existent and connected with life. While the traditional yogas demand a complete renunciation of worldly life, Aurobindo's Integral Yoga proposes an affirmation of life in the world. It is through the concrete reality of the earth that the aspirant reaches to the divine realization. The mind, life, and body are not merely ladders to rise to higher peaks, but are also instruments to bring down below the glories of the highest. The transformation and the glorification of the earth is one of the main contributions of Integral Yoga.

The aim of the Integral Yoga could be described as "conversion of the human soul into the divine soul and of natural life into divine living." Integral Yoga does not reject the physical, vital and mental realms; these are the indispensable instruments for the divine ascent and descent. They have to be controlled, purified, and transformed rather than destroyed. Through the transformation of all these elements, man strives for the psychic and spiritual transformation, which is the goal of the Integral Yoga. Aurobindo's dynamic view of yoga is an effort towards the realization of the potentialities of human personality, and the union of the human individual with the Divine, which ultimately leads to the manifestation of the Divine on earth.

D. SYNTHETIC CHARACTER

The Integral Yoga is a synthetic one as it synthesizes the different traditional yogas to arrive at a synthesis of God and human life. There has always been a dilemma so as to how to connect the Divine and the secular, or God and the World. Sri Aurobindo's answer to such a perennial dilemma is presented in The Synthesis of Yoga, which has, as its aim, to "reunite God and Nature in a liberated and perfected human life or, in its method, not only permits but favours the harmony of our inner and outer activities and experiences in the divine consummation of both." Integrating various elements of the traditional yogas, Sri Aurobindo's Integral Yoga is directed at two goals: to assemble, concentrate and discipline all the qualities, capacities and motive forces in man, and to elevate them to a diviner

spiritual level, and move beyond the liberation of the soul into a wholly transcendent realm of isolated unity to a cosmic enjoyment of the power of the Spirit.

Yoga is essentially the union of the human consciousness with the Eternal and the Transcendent. Sri Aurobindo's Integral Yoga assimilates the triple path of the Gita and aims at a total transformation. Corresponding to the three principal powers of the individual - will, knowledge, and love - there are three yogas: the yoga of work (Karma Yoga), the yoga of knowledge (Jnana Yoga), and the yoga of love (Bhakti Yoga). In Karma Yoga one surrenders all actions towards God. Jnana Yoga takes its stand upon the individual's mind and seeks to turn his consciousness towards the Divine. In Bhakti Yoga the love of man is turned towards the Divine. Sri Aurobindo says: "By knowledge we seek unity with the Divine in his conscious being: by works we seek also unity with the Divine in his conscious being, not statically, but dynamically, through conscious union with the divine Will; but by love we seek unity with him in all the delight of his being."

The Integral Yoga takes up the essence of these yogas, but presents a synthetic interpretation. It aims at achieving union with the Divine on this earth itself, and not in some heaven beyond. It is not only the individual, but also the earth-nature that is transformed. The Integral Yoga touches the very core of the Indian yoga system, of which "highest ideal [...] is neither to turn back into the maternal depths of Nature, nor to rise up to the heavenly Spirit, rejecting Nature, but to discover that ultimate ground of existence in which Nature and Spirit are unified." For Aurobindo, Yoga is "nothing less than to break up the whole formation of our past and present which makes up the ordinary material and mental man and to create a new centre of vision and a new universe of activities in ourselves which shall constitute a divine humanity or a superhuman nature."

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This article examines the legacy of Pitirim A. Sorokin (1889–1968), a Harvard sociologist from the Russian emigration. The authors scrutinise Sorokin as one of the nodal points for today's moral conservatism. As a scholar, Sorokin has been relegated to the margins of his discipline, but his legacy as a public intellectual has persisted in the United States and has soared in Russia over the last three decades. This article examines Sorokin's reception in these two nations, some of whose citizens have facilitated the burgeoning transnational phenomenon of twenty-first-century moral conservatism. Four aspects of Sorokin's legacy are especially relevant in this context: his emphasis on values, his notion of the 'sensate culture', his ideas about the family, and his vision for moral revival. The authors conclude that Sorokin functions as a nodal point that binds together individual actors and ideas across national, cultural and linguistic barriers. The article is based on a firsthand analysis of moral conservative discourse and documents, on qualitative interviews and on scholarly literature.

Whereas Sorokin's ideas about the family have allowed moral conservatives from the United States and Russia to recognise each other in a common fate and a common

set of shared goals, another aspect of Sorokin's work reveals the difference in their self-perceptions. Despite his alarmism, Sorokin was not ultimately a pessimist. He predicted that at the end of every fading "sensate culture," a new idealistic or integralist culture would appear, with new religious values. At the end of the tunnel of the crisis of sensate culture, he saw a light – the onset of "more religiously communitarian and distinctly nonsensate values of an older Christian integral culture, the latter reasserting itself after decades in decline." Conservatives in both Russia and the United States share this vision, at least on a theoretical level; on a practical level, however, their understanding of what this means for their respective contexts differs radically.

For Russian moral conservatives, Sorokin's prediction inspires them to identify post- Soviet Russia as the harbinger of the coming idealistic (or even ideational) culture….

In short, Russian Orthodoxy, traditional moral values, and political authoritarianism are the features of this new, integrated Russian culture. From this perspective, the West represents the dying sensate culture. The West is associated tout court with liberalism and "alien values." In writings that take this perspective, there is no trace of

recognition that Sorokin described a mutual East-West predicament….

… Russian conservatives believe that the "sensate culture" has managed to touch only the superficial layers of their culture; for this reason, it can be easily eradicated along with the liberals who are the bearers of moral decay. In contrast, American conservatives believe that the "sensate culture" has managed to penetrate too deeply into the nation's soil, to the point that there may no longer be any hope of converting the whole culture back to a more idealistic orientation.

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Classical Concepts of Social Solidarity As The Basis of Theoretical Studies on The Institutions of Modern Civil Society

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ABSTRACT

Current importance of this investigation has been stipulated by the modern trends in the development of civil society. Differentiated processes of its development, increased significance of certain institutions of the civil society often require not just empirical description of the principal trends of the functions of civil society, but also need theoretical justifications for the methodology of its investigation. With this regard the given article is focused on identifying the position and role of social solidarity within classical sociology that would make it possible to use this heuristic potential in modern practices as well. The principal method of the study is represented by the analysis of classical sociological theories. In the course of the investigation the authors were guided by such methodological landmarks as the general principles of socio-cultural, activity-based, socio-structural and systemic approaches, by the principle of the unity of theoretical constructions and by real social practice. The study considers the concepts of social solidarity developed by the representatives of classical sociology. The suggested approach makes it possible to obtain more comprehensive and profound understanding of the structure and essence of modern civil society. The result of the investigation is represented by the justification of the thesis that modern civil society encompasses social solidarity as an inseparable component which cannot be investigated otherwise than being duly supported by classical sociological theories.

1. Introduction

The modern stage of understanding the civil society is characterized by the variety of theories and approaches predetermined by the current social, political, economic and cultural processes (Naletova and Okatov, 2012). This stage is personified by such most outstanding representatives as C. Schmitt, T. Parsons, A. Gramsci, H. Arendt, M. Foucault, N. Luhmann, R. Dahrendorf, J. Habermas etc. C. Schmitt perceives the role of parliament as key for the establishment of modern civil society institutions. T. Parsons has suggested the idea of societal community. A. Gramsci used to criticize the bourgeois ideal of civil society and exhorted that it should be replaced by socialist civil society that would make for

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the supremacy of the proletariat.

Expostulating on Hegelian total state H. Arendt attempted to integrate the elements of social and political systems of the ancient polices into the modern complex communities. R. Dahrendorf studied civil society through the prism of his sociological theory of conflict. M. Foucault was rather critical about such commonly adopted values of civil society as freedom and equality maintaining that in the western society the relations of domination and subordination are much more important. N. Luhmann investigates civil society based on his concepts of social systems and differentiation. J. Habermas suggested that civil society should be investigated as interactions between personality and official structures of the state, between the world of systems and the world of life.

In these latter days, the trend of describing civil society through the pluralism of interpretations has been often replaced by the attempts at synthesis of the leading theoretical traditions. This is exactly the case of the investigations belonging to E. Gellner, B. Barber, R. Putnam, J. Cohen, A. Arato, M. Walzer, J. Alexander, E. Wnuk-Lipinski, etc. E. Gellner perceives civil society as such a type of civil order that promotes the development of human personality and facilitates the establishment of the independent voluntary associations (Gellner, 1994). B. Barber believes that one of the most significant features of civil society is embodied in the principle of freedom which is an attribute of the private sector, and also in the principle of regard for the common welfare which is intrinsic to the public sector (Barber, 1995). R. Putnam analyzes the role of social capital in the civilizing influence produced by civil society on the individuals (Putnam, 2000).

J. Cohen and A. Arato interpret civil society as a sphere of social interactions between the state and the economy that covers different social associations and forms of public communication (Cohen, Arato, 1994). J. Alexander supports these views on the nature of civil society. However, in his opinion, the emphasis has to be laid on the issue of the contradictory unity of individual voluntarism and collective solidarity within the framework of the modern civil society (Alexander, 2006). M. Walzer believes that the foundations of civil society are represented by voluntary social organizations and also by the relations established therein (Walzer, 1995).

2. Concept headings

Thus, modern theoretical approaches to studying civil society interpret it as a social system that has reached some certain level of social, economic, political and cultural development and that features such attributes as market economy, democracy, respect to human rights, foundational principles of free will and cooperation. The authors of this study believe that social solidarity is an essential component element of the existence and functioning of modern civil society. In this study the authors will try their best to abstract from the political, economic and religious interpretations of solidarity and to concentrate on studying solidarity as a meaningful component element of the modern civil society. Assisted by the concepts of classical sociology the authors will undertake the comparative analysis of the fundamental theories of social solidarity in the context of investigating the modern civil society institutions.

The attention of the authors is concentrated on such classical sociological theories as the concepts of A. Comte, H. Spencer, K. Marx, F. Tönnies, F. Giddings, E. Durkheim, P.A. Sorokin and T. Parsons. The heuristic potential of these concepts is discovered through the cognition of being and from the perspectives of the functions of modern civil society institutions. The issue of the essence of social solidarity and of its role in the genesis and evolution of the civil society institutions has been raised. The concept of social solidarity developed by A. Comte has been

analyzed as a component part of his social statics. H. Spencer's ideas about social solidarity that are included in his theory of evolution and that can become the foundations for studying the establishment of modern civil society institutions have been considered. The study touches upon the problem of social solidarity in the context of the theory of class struggle belonging to K. Marx. The specifics of social solidarity in the communal and social types of sociality, described by F. Tönnies have been investigated. The concept of F. Giddings has been analyzed along with the idea of "the consciousness of kind" as the natural precondition for the formation of social organizations. E. Durkheim's theory of social solidarity has been studied; the forms of social solidarity (mechanical and organic) intrinsic to traditional and modern types of society have been described. Structural functionalism of T. Parsons and his concept of societal community have been analyzed.

3.   Results

Among the representatives of classical sociology, the problem of social solidarity was most closely investigated by such researchers as A. Comte, H. Spencer, K. Marx, F. Tönnies, F. Giddings, E. Durkheim, P.A. Sorokin, T. Parsons and others (Kultygin, 2000). The pioneer studies on social solidarity belong to the founder of sociology A. Comte (1798-1857). Within the structure of sociology, he used to distinguish two major sections: social statics and social dynamics that corresponded to two parts of his famous slogan "Order and progress". The object of social statics is represented by society at rest. This is a type of social anatomy investigating the constitution of social organism. The objective of social statics is to discover the laws of social order. Social dynamics studies the society as it moves. It can be called social physiology, as it investigates the functions of social organism. The principal objective of social dynamics is to identify the laws of social progress.

Thus, the problem of social unity and social solidarity is considered by A. Comte within the framework of social statics. Its purpose is to identify the conditions of human society existence and to discover the associated laws of order and harmony. Famous French sociologist of the middle of the 20th century R. Aron (1905-1983) notes that social statics of A. Comte solves two major issues. First, it enables anatomical analysis of social structure at some particular moment. And, second, social statics aims to identify the prerequisites for social consensus and to find the mechanisms that turn the aggregate of separated individuals and families into the community and that also unite all social institutions (Aron, 1992). In fact, the second task implies understanding of the prerequisites for the establishment of civil society institutions that would give people the possibility to resolve their urgent social problems in fast and efficient manner without any interference of the central government.

Searching for the solution to the first task A. Comte considers such social elements as individual, family and society and general (mankind). According to A. Comte, an individual is a social being who is intended to live in the society. However, apart from the natural social instincts, an individual is also naturally endowed with egoistic ambitions. Therefore, to become a fully functional member of society, an individual has to undergo some special training. The knowledge and skills of communal life can be obtained within the family (Gofman, 2003).

A family, says A. Comte, is a school of social life where individual learns how to obey and how to rule, how to live in harmony with others and for the sake of others. "Only because of the familial responsibilities man betrays his original selfishness and can dully ascend to the final level, to sociality" (Comte, 1996).

The family instills the sense of social succession and the understanding of one's dependence on the preceding generations connecting the past with the future. The ideal of A. Comte is the traditional patriarchal family with its hierarchy and subordination.

Family is just the first stage on the way to the truly "collective being" (mankind). Later, there would emerge such social formations as tribe, nation and state. A. Comte believes that society consists of the aggregate of families. Solidarity that is intrinsic to all living objects comes to its highest manifestation in the society. To identify this degree of social solidarity A. Comte introduces the notion of social consensus (concordance). The idea of the consensus is fundamental in social statics (Gofman, 2003).

Notwithstanding the fact that family is the prototype of society, the sociologist points out the considerable difference that exists between these forms of communal existence of the individuals. While family is founded on the instincts and emotional attachments, the foundations of the society, according to A. Comte, are represented by rational cooperation built of the principles of the division of labor (Aron, 1992). Thus, the theory of A. Comte makes it possible to consider the modern civil society as rationally organized cooperation between individuals and their associations.

Having identified the principal elements of social structure A. Comte proceeds with solving the second task of social statics, namely, determining the mechanisms of social integration. The scientist thinks that this mechanism is the division of labor. Before A. Comte this phenomenon used to be primarily regarded from the perspective of economics. The theorist of positivism was among the first to focus on the social implications of the division of labor and called it "the most important condition of our social life". It is the division of labor, maintains the sociologist that makes the foundations of social solidarity. It promotes growth and complexity of social organism. The division of labor develops social instinct, instilling in each family the sense of being dependent on others and the understanding of one's own significance. As a result, each family starts to regard themselves as parts of social system (Gofman, 2003).

The division of labor not only became the meaningful factor of civil society genesis and evolution. It also predetermines the structure of modern civil society and the functions of its institutions. Besides, A. Comte's concept of social solidarity makes it possible to study civil society as the complex system that is involved into the relations of cooperation with other spheres of society. In particular, the French sociologist attaches special importance to such social institutions as religion and morality. He distinguishes two principal functions of religion. The first is the integrative function that implies the achievement of social consensus, the unity of the individuals. The second is the imperative or normative function that contains the requirement that all individuals should adopt the principle of unity as their common conviction. In other words, religion unites society and makes people accept and believe the very fact of this unity (Aron, 1992).

Another founder of sociology, the English thinker H. Spencer (1820-1903) studied social solidarity within the framework of his concept of social institutions. According to H. Spencer, social institutions are similar to the organs of the social organism that enable the communal life and the cooperation between the people (Khvostov, 2011). They include any stable super-organic forms of activity where naturally unsocial man has to accommodate and to learn how to interact with other people (Davydov, 1997). Social institutions emerge in the course of the historical development in response to the growth of the population (the increased amount of mass results in more complicated structures and in functional differentiation). The purpose of social institutions, according to

H. Spencer, is to ensure normal functionality of the entire social organism.

In his work called "Principles of Sociology" H. Spencer identifies several types of social institutions:

1) home institutions (family, marriage, nurture) that characterize the involvement of people in different forms of interpersonal relations. They evolve from the disordered relations between the sexes up to the modern form of monogamy.

2) ritual (ceremonial) institutions that regulate everyday behavior of the people by establishing the rites, rituals, etiquette, fashion or habits that are either obligatory or desirable for the most of the population.

3) political institutions (central government, army, police, courts, legislation) that predetermine and regulate political and legal relations between people and social groups.

4) church institutions that ensure integration of the society on the basis of common beliefs and traditions.

5) professional institutions (merchant guilds, shops, trade unions) that emerge based on the division of labor and consolidate people by their professional attributes (Spencer, 1994).

6) industrial institutions that also exist because of the division of labor. They support the production structure of the society (Gofman, 2003; Szacki, 1981).

Professor of Warsaw University E. Szacki has highlighted the principal postulations of H. Spencer in his analysis of social institutions. First, the Polish scientist says that none of the institutions can be regarded as a product of conscious human activity. H. Spencer chose to explain institutions not in terms of individual motives and objectives, but rather in terms of their functions within the system. Second, studying the current state of that or another institution one has to take into account the specifics of its origin and development. No investigation of the functionality of the institution can be undertaken beyond the context of its evolution. Third, all institutions are mutually connected. They are parts of a single social system; therefore, the interference in the activities of only one of them will affect the functionality of all others. Fourth, each institution performs only the functions that are inherent to it. If due to some reasons it takes over the functions of other institutions, then the whole social system may lose its equilibrium. And this can turn the social evolution to the opposite direction, i.e. it can return to primitive (military) methods of coordination and to non-differentiated social structure (Davydov, 1997).

According to H. Spencer's theory, the establishment of civil society is an expected result of the evolution of social organism in general. The authors of this study believe that the modern civil society institutions are closely related to Spenserian professional institutions.

The outstanding German thinker K. Marx (1818-1883) studied social solidarity in the con-text of class struggle. Within the framework of capitalist formation, he distinguished two classes: bourgeoisie and proletariat. K. Marx believed that the paid labor of a worker was founded "solely on the competition among the workers" (Marx, 2003). Communist revolution had to unite the workers around their common interests. In his "Capital" K. Marx noted that as the efficiency of the production grows so does the solidarity of the oppressed classes. As a result, the conflict between the dominating and the oppressed classes escalates continuously.

Marx thought that during its historical development each class goes through

two stages: 1) "class in itself" – a social group that does not perceive itself as possessing specific interests and needs; 2) "class for itself" – a social group that does perceive its special interests and, therefore, stands in opposition to another social group, to other classes (Dobrenkov and Kravchenko, 2000).

Thus, Marx's idea of solidarity was predominantly associated with the oppressed working class who, becoming conscious of its own rights and powers, expressed social protest against the dominating class of bourgeoisie. In this case the class conflict is of an integrating nature. Class solidarity is associated with self-identification of the workers, with their perception of themselves as "fellows" as opposed to "alien" representatives of another class (Ursulenko, 2009).

German sociologist F. Tönnies (1855-1936) considered social solidarity through the prism of his concept of the types of sociality. In his work "Community and Society" (1887) F. Tönnies notes that all social phenomena should be regarded as willed relationships. The will itself can be of two types: organic (instinctive) will and rational will that suggests the opportunity of choice and the consciously preset purpose of behavior (Tesch-Römer, 2000). Depending on the nature of will there are two types of social relations: intimate, interpersonal relationships that correspond to the community (spiritual kinship, attachment to each other, personal emotions); and all external, social relationships that belong to society (exchange, trade, choice) where there is a ruling principle of "every man for himself" and where there are tensions between the people. Community is the realm of instincts, feelings, organic relations; society is dominated by reason and abstraction (Tönnies, 2002).

Basic types of communal (community) relationships, according to F. Tönnies, are represented by familial relations, by relationships between neighbors and by friendship. Community is a strong and stable social system, because kinship and friendship are known by their stability and longevity. The social type of relations can be most vividly exemplified by the state. It is created to attain some definite objective. Peoples, ethnic communities enter this union consciously and purposefully, and they break it when they lose the interest in this common objective.

Real solidarity, F. Tönnies declares, exists only in the community where the relationships between individuals are founded on concordance and mutual understanding. Meanwhile, in the society the solidarity, the sense of unity is imposed upon the people from without; it is enforced through the mechanisms of the state.

Thus, based on the ideas of F. Tönnies, the voluntary non-governmental organizations, NGOs that are the backbone components of the modern civil society should be regarded as purely rational associations intended for solving definite problems. Besides, social organizations can be viewed as an attempt to preserve the communal type of solidarity in the modern rational world.

American sociologist F. Giddings (1855-1931) suggested psychological interpretation of social solidarity supported by the idea of "the consciousness of kind". He introduced this term in scientific circulation influenced by the theory of moral sentiments (Spencer, 1994) developed by Scotch economist A. Smith (1723-1790) (Smith). F. Giddings defines the consciousness of kind "as a state of consciousness in which any being <…> recognizes another conscious being as of like kind with itself" (Giddings, 2012). The consciousness of kind predetermines spiritual unity of individuals. In enables their conscious interaction with each other while preserving the individuality of everyone.

The consciousness of kind is a purely social phenomenon inasmuch as it can emerge only in society. The consciousness of kind, according to F. Giddings, is exactly the thing that makes the foundations of social identity of personality.

The consciousness of kind "leads to more defined ethnic or political group making the basis for class differentiation" (Giddings, 2012). We subconsciously feel affection for the representatives of our own race, of our country, of our social stratum, etc. And, vice versa, we feel dislike toward people of other nationality, citizenship, social origin.

F. Giddings's concept of the consciousness of kind makes it possible to regard the modern civil society institutions and the non-governmental organizations primarily as natural manifestation of sociality, of real human nature.

French sociologist E. Durkheim (1858-1917) is generally recognized as classical researcher of social solidarity. Pride of place in his works is given to this issue. The scientist believes that this problem can be solved by providing the answers to the questions as follows: what are the connections that unite people with each other; why people live together and why they can interact with each other. In his work called "The Division of Labour in Society" (1893). E. Durkheim makes an attempt to give answers to these questions. He aims to prove that the division of social labor that represents the "redistribution of the functions that used to be common earlier" ensures social solidarity, i.e. it performs some certain moral function.

Understanding the fact that any man depends on another, that all people are connected through the system of social relations established by the division of labor makes people not only feel dependent on each other, but also makes them perceive their connections with the society, i.e. social solidarity. Different occupations of the people, the necessity to perform multiple tasks in different spheres of activity make people express solidarity, get united to support their normal lives (Durkheim, 1991).

It can be said that according to E. Durkheim's concept of social solidarity the genesis and evolution of civil society institutions and their principal values have been predetermined by the manifestation and by the understanding of this general social feeling of mutual dependency. The French sociologist maintains that this feeling, although it is originated by the division of labor, is a purely moral phenomenon that, as it is, cannot be observed and measured. This is the highest moral principle, the highest value that is universal because it is recognized by all members of society (Aron, 1992).

Analyzing the essence and forms of social solidarity E. Durkheim compares two types of society: traditional (archaic, or "segmental") and modern ("organized"). In archaic ("segmental") communities social solidarity is founded on complete dilution of individual consciousnesses in the collective consciousness (mechanical solidarity). The segment, according to Durkheim, is an isolated, localized group where individuals are closely connected with each other (Pickering, 2008). The people in segmental societies differ from each other just slightly. They feel the same, they are committed to the same values, and they worship the same things. The community is consolidated, because the individuals have not been differentiated yet.

Obviously, the civil society institutions in such types of communities are at their lowest, initial level of development. This can be explained by the fact that there is almost no need for them. Inasmuch as the people in segmental societies are very much alike and insofar as their needs are almost the same, the central authorities can easily satisfy them. Thereat, the individuals do not make attempts at developing non-governmental organizations.

In the developed communities social solidarity is based on the autonomy of the individuals, on the redistribution of functions, on functional interdependence

and on the exchange (organic solidarity). The consolidation of the groups emerges as a consequence of differentiation and it is explained by it. Here the individuals are not the same. They are different; and, to some extent, because they are different the consensus is achieved. The collective consciousness in such communities does not disappear, but it becomes more common, more intangible, its intensity and its effective area are reduced.

In modern societies where the differences between the people caused by the division of labor are expressed more vividly, the central authorities are no longer capable of satisfying the needs of all the categories of the population. A natural solution to this problem is to create and develop the network of non-governmental organizations focused on various and multiple needs of the individuals.

E. Durkheim did not limit himself with just considering the essence and the forms of social solidarity at theoretical level. He made an effort to identify the reliable empirical indicators of social solidarity in the society. The rate of suicides was selected by the French sociologist as one of such indicators. The problem of suicides and the correlation of this phenomenon with social solidarity are analyzed in his special study called "Suicide" (1897). In this book the scientist notes that the rate of suicides was selected as indicator of social solidarity because the phenomenon of suicide can be measured and expressed quantitatively based on statistical data.

E. Durkheim demonstrates that suicides correlate with the fact of belonging to some certain social groups, and he discovered the dependency between the number of suicides and the degree of value-based and normative integration of the society (of the group). It can be said that the reason for suicides, in his opinion, is hidden in the nature of the interactions between an individual and a group.

E. Durkheim assumes that based on the statistical correlations it is possible to identify the types of the suicides. He distinguishes three principal types: egoistic, altruistic and anomic. Egoistic suicide occurs in cases when social (collective) connections of the individual are weak; he is left by himself and loses the sense of living. People, according to Durkheim, are more prone to assault their own lives when they think about themselves, when they are not integrated into the social group, when the desires that keep them going do not correlate with the evaluations of these desires adopted by the members of the group, or when they do not correlate with the meaning of duty imposed by close and solid environment.

By contrast, altruistic suicide is associated with the full submergence of the individual into the society when he sacrifices his life for the sake of the society, i.e. when he does not see any sense in life beyond social life. For example, in many archaic communities the widow used to follow her deceased husband. In this case an individual meets his death in conformity with social imperatives and he does not even attempt to protect his right to live. In the same manner, the captain commits suicide to escape the dishonor of defeat or not wishing to outlive his ship.

E. Durkheim discovered that altruistic suicides are above all common in highly consolidated groups, in groups where the level of integration is very high. Thus, for instance, he found that the rate of suicides in the army was higher among the military officers of some specific rank and age.

Anomic suicide is caused by the state of anomy in society. Anomy (from French "anomie" the lack of law, disorganization) is a moral and psychological condition of individual and social consciousness that is characterized by the decaying system of values caused by the social crisis, by the contradictions

between the declared objectives and the lack of the opportunities to achieve them for the majority of people. It usually shows itself as alienation between man and society, apathy, disappointment in life, criminality. Durkheim pays special attention to this type of suicides, because it is most indicative in the modern society which life is not regulated by traditions; individuals continuously compete with each other; their life expectations and aspirations are great, they are always haunted by misery that originates from the disproportions between their hopes and their satisfaction. Such atmosphere of anxiety promotes the development of "suicidal trend".

E. Durkheim makes efforts to indentify the most reliable methods of social integration that would make it possible for a man to find support in norms and values. He considers such means as family, religious, political and professional groups. The first three groups, according to Durkheim, cannot become the factors of social solidarity (Khvostov, 2011; Aron, 1992). Family gradually loses its functions (education, upbringing, economic function). Statistical data testify of the fact that the index of anomic suicides among lonely people is not higher than that among married couples. The state and political groups are too distant from an individual, they are too abstract and they cannot facilitate social integration. Religion in modern society cannot unite the people. While earlier religion used to be the foundation of discipline, now, according to Durkheim, it acquires rather abstract and intellectual nature being deprived of its function of coercion.

The only social group that can facilitate the engagement of individuals into a collective is represented by professional group ("corporation"). Thus, E. Durkheim believes that professional associations being the inseparable components of civil society can support social solidarity and the unity of the society; they can put sense into the lives of the individuals and regulate their behavior.

Considerable contribution to the investigation of social solidarity has been made by out-standing Russian-American sociologist P.A. Sorokin (1889-1968). He used to consider social solidarity within the framework of his concept of integralism. In his opinion, solidarity is a positive form of interaction between individuals that implies a high degree of mutual agreement as regards the mindsets and behavioral purposes; and it is also the striving for mutual help and support. P.A. Sorokin opposes solidarity to antagonist interaction that is founded on coercive social relations. P.A. Sorokin believes that studying the reasons for social solidarity with its forms and foundations will make it possible in future to eliminate such negative social phenomena as conflicts, wars, crimes, inequality and oppression (Sorokin, 1947). Thus, the functions of the civil society institutions viewed through the prism of sociological concept of P.A. Sorokin are predetermined by a high degree of solidarity and concordance, by pro-active attitudes of the individuals that are the members of these institutions.

American sociologist T. Parsons (1902-1979) considered social solidarity within the framework of the concept of structural functionalism. In his opinion, any action system aimed at its own survival should meet four systemic needs or functionally prerequisite requirements. These are as follows: pattern-maintenance, integration, goal-attainment, and adaptation. According to T. Parsons, the function of integration is the predetermining one. Essentially it means that each system should support its unity and prevent any deviations. It should coordinate the interrelations between its elements and control the relations with three other functional preconditions.

Within the action system the function of integration is performed by social system. It represents the aggregate of statuses and roles; and it is controlled by the norms that predetermine which actions should be preferred.

Within the framework of social system the function of integration is performed by the system of societal community. In its essence, the term "societal community" has very much in common with the idea of "civil society". Societal community includes all institutions of social control from the laws down to the informal rules. It coordinates different elements of the social system. This is a system of normative patterns that serve to bring order and to organize the communal life of the individuals. The principal features of this system, according to Parsons, are represented by the regularity of the relations between the individuals and by the collective nature of human existence. Being a regulated system the societal community contains the values, the norms and the rules. Being a collective system it expresses the patterned ideas about the membership of this community that predetermine which individuals belong hereto, and which do not.

Parsons suggests that the societal community became differentiated from economic, political and cultural subsystems in the process of three modern revolutions: 1) industrial, 2) democratic and 3) educational. In the course of the industrial revolution with the epicenter in England economic sphere separated from the social system. Democratic revolution concentrated in France made the political subsystem a standalone phenomenon. And finally, the educational revolution whose central institutional complex was represented by university facilitated separation of the cultural sphere of society. Thus, the establishment of societal community, according to Parsons, is a residual phenomenon associated with the process of separation of other subsystems in the course of revolutions (Cohen and Arato, 1994).

4. Discussion

Upon considering the principal approaches to studying social solidarity it should be noted that this idea is one of the most developed ones in classical sociology. It ranks considerably high in the investigations of the foundations and preconditions of social order. Almost all classics of sociology (A. Comte, H. Spencer, K. Marx, G. Simmel, etc.) have considered the problem of solidarity in their works. The scientists aimed to identify the conditions, the bases and the components of social solidarity. To solve this problem, sociologists investigated such phenomena as conflict and concordance, competition and co-operation, integration and disintegration.

The studies of the modern authors suggest a wider spectrum of definitions and interpretations of the term of "social solidarity". L. Coser, A. Giddens, P. Bourdieu, J. Alexander, J. Turner, J.L. Cohen, A. Arato, G. Ritzer and others made their contributions to the understanding of the role and position of social solidarity in the current social and cultural processes. However, the majority of the works belonging to the abovementioned authors are of descriptive nature and they do not aspire to become generalizing methodological investigations of civil society and of its social institutions. They do not claim to create a comprehensive theoretical concept.

5. Conclusion

The authors of this study believe that studying the heritage of classical sociologists (A. Comte, E. Durkheim, M. Weber, V. Pareto, T. Parsons and others) for the purposes of investigations of modern social and cultural phenomena and processes provides the opportunity for developing theoretical and methodological model of modern civil society. Possessing high heuristic potential classical sociological theories make it possible to consider social solidarity as a manifestation, as a property of social order.

Upon generalizing the analyzed definitions of social solidarity developed within classical sociological theories it can be concluded that social solidarity is usually understood as such condition of the society that is characterized by the unity in

terms of values, ideas, convictions, views, interests, norms, and also by functional interdependence and mutual agreement as to the actions aimed at the implementation of the interests of this society. Undoubtedly, social solidarity is a meaningful component of modern civil society prerequisite for the functionality of its basic institutions. Thus, non-governmental organizations cannot be conceived without social solidarity that creates the foundations for effective and mutually beneficial interactions between the individuals within the frameworks of these associations.

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No potential conflict of interest was reported by the authors.

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
A Critical Integralism for the Challenges of Our Time

Daniel J. O'Connor

AWARENESS-IN-ACTION

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A Critical Integralism for the Challenges of Our Time

DANIEL J. O'CONNOR

∫reconstructive realizations.

To Karen

CONTENTS

PREFACE

I began writing this compact book four years ago as a brief digression at the beginning of an article on my particular formulation of *integral economics*, wherein I thought it might be appropriate to clarify what I meant by the *integral* that I was using to reconstruct this *economics*. That article was being written for an academic audience at the First Biennial Integral Theory Conference, so my digression to explicate the *critical integral praxis* that had long resided inchoate, in the back of my mind, was written in a formal academic style. Two years after that first draft of an article, which was incompletely satisfying enough to encourage further effort, I began writing once again during intermittent pockets of time between projects. My intent was to write a long academic article, or perhaps a series of articles, but certainly not a book, and I think that creative tension between *what I wanted this to be* and *what it apparently needed to be* accounts for the relative density and directness of the resulting presentation.

The ideas articulated in this book are precisely the same as those I introduced at that conference, and although this articulation is not as comprehensive as some scholars might prefer, or as accessible as some practitioners might like, I do hope it is sufficient to foment the sort of action-oriented discourses I have in mind. It should come as no surprise that I don't anticipate a large audience for a rather speculative book of philosophy by an unknown author who didn't even have the good sense to secure the services of a reputable academic publisher or a brazen literary agent. Nevertheless, I do anticipate a savvy audience of scholar-practitioners who recognize that the worldly challenges in response to which these ideas are being

proposed simply will not wait two more years while I take the standard route to publication. Consequently, I have chosen to self-publish this first edition and to do so with a Creative Commons license that relieves you of any financial cost to read, discuss, and share this book as widely as you choose.

Should you choose to read, discuss, and share this work, it will help to remember that its primary purpose is to seed derivative applications in such real-world fields of human action as economics, business, politics, governance, sociology, journalism, and activism. While I have already been doing so in economics and business, there is no shortage of opportunities for *critical integral reconstruction* of established theories and practices within, between, and beyond disciplinary and institutional boundaries. If you would like to apply Awareness-in-Action in your particular field, please let me know. I would be glad to help in any way I can.

Daniel J. O'Connor
Bainbridge Island, Washington
March 2012

You must realize what action is,
what wrong action and inaction are
as well. The true nature of action
is profound, and difficult to fathom.

He who can see inaction
in the midst of action, and action
in the midst of inaction, is wise
and can act in the spirit of yoga.

With no desire for success,
no anxiety about failure,
indifferent to results, he burns up
his actions in the fire of wisdom.

~ Bhagavad Gita

INTRODUCTION

This work represents an inquiry into the essential nature of human action in all its forms and fields. By *human action*, I mean to suggest a rather comprehensive scope of inquiry into anything and everything people *do*, regardless of how purposeful or spontaneous, mental or physical, independent or interdependent these actions might seem. The myriad forms of this *human doing*—from writing, speaking, and conversing to giving, taking, and trading, to working, playing, and creating to learning, developing, and evolving—serve as creative expressions of, and logical complements to, the equally comprehensive notion of *human being*. In short, human action encompasses *what* we do, *how* we do, *why* we do, and ultimately *who* we are as we do.

My approach to the philosophy of human action, or *praxiology*, might be best described as a process of *integral reconstruction*. As a *reconstruction*, my intent is to clarify and formalize the tacit knowledge and intuitive competencies that must, logically, be presupposed by all people in order for them to act in any situation. To whatever extent such universal presuppositions might be validated, these would, logically, serve as necessary premises for all subsequent inquiries into, and hypotheses about, the many fields of human action, from economics and business to politics and governance to sociology and social work to journalism and activism.[2] Thus, my focus of inquiry includes those *essential presuppositions* without which people could not act as they really do and, correspondingly, those *essential premises* without which we cannot know what human action really is.

As a distinctively *integral* reconstruction, my intent is to empha-size those insights that appear to be essential for a post-postmodern philosophy of human action that honors the full potential and varie-ty of the human experience, which necessarily includes our experi-ence of the worlds beyond humanity. Just as the adjective *integral* offers us two complementary definitions—*comprehensive* or *essen-tial*—so too does the process of integral theorizing offer us two complementary approaches with two corresponding results.³ In contrast to a *comprehensivist* approach to integralism characterized by the construction of an inspiring, encyclopedic *meta-narrative*, I prefer an *essentialist* approach characterized by the distillation of a compelling, universal *meta-paradigm*—a paradigm of paradigms, if you will. Nevertheless, by focusing deeply on the quintessential features of all human action in real-world contexts, I propose in this work the broad contours of a meta-paradigm—an *integral aperspec-tival/apractical meta-paradigm*, to be precise—with the potential to enact a seemingly infinite plurality of differential perspectival/practical narratives at least suggestive of a comprehensive *meta-narrative*, the specifics of which are by definition beyond anyone's sole capacity to articulate. It is therefore so much the better that I, at least, won't be enticed to try.

Therefore, this work actually represents two mutually implicat-ing lines of inquiry into the possibility of an *integral philosophy of human action* and an *action-oriented integral philosophy*, both of which are centered on the essential *perspectives* and *practices* that appear to be governing the actions of all people in their efforts to realize their full potential in real-world situations. In pursuing these lines of inquiry, I gratefully incorporate and, where necessary, carefully reformulate the extraordinary insights of three primary theorists—Jürgen Habermas, Ken Wilber, and Chris Argyris—whose collective body of work already contains much of the content needed for this initial reconstruction. Having engaged with this collective body of work since 1994, both in theory and in practice, I bring to this effort a commitment to help realize what I see as some of the latent potential in each of their brilliant philosophical programs.

Granted, in my preliminary effort to articulate a form of integral philosophy that is as realistic as it is idealistic and as fallibilistic as it

is humanistic, with a pragmatic focus on the way people *can*, *should*, and already *do* act in the world, my contribution may be little more than a clarification of my own novel vision of the nexus between Habermas's *critical theory*, Wilber's *integral theory*, and Argyris's *action science*. Nevertheless, the logic of this vision and its demonstrated capacity to reconstruct established views within these fields should justify the effort required of you, the reader. More to the point, the real promise of the *critical integralism* I call Awareness-in-Action is in its potential to (re)define the common core of *all* the various forms and fields of human action, so that those of us concerned with such matters might learn how to respond more effectively to the interdependent political, economic, social, and ecological challenges of our time.

Beginning with the self-evident reality of human action—*that people act*—the question arises as to the ideal conditions that must be presupposed by all people in order for them to act in any situation. Is it possible to articulate any fundamental presuppositions of human action that can withstand our efforts to invalidate them, through logic and other direct experience, and at least approach a believable universality?

Integral Perspectives

My first proposal is to consider that *action* can only be understood from some *perspective* and that this leads to a worthwhile inquiry into *what perspectives are possible* and, furthermore, *what perspectives are really essential to all human action*. In other words, *what perspectives must be presupposed by all people in order for them to act in any situation?*

— 1 —

PRIMORDIAL PERSPECTIVES

This inquiry into the perspectival nature of human action begins with a focus on primordial perspectives, where *primordial* means *original* or *first created* and, therefore, (phenomeno)logically prior to any other type of perspective that might arise in the course of human action. As we will see, the primordial perspectives are precisely those that are *always already active* in every action situation.

Triadic Perspectives

My search for primordial perspectives begins with Jürgen Habermas's theory of *communicative action*, a remarkably comprehensive, multi-disciplinary critical theory rooted in the deep structures of linguistic communication.[4] The core of this particular approach to the study of human action is *formal pragmatics*, which is a quasi-universal theory of *language use* that Habermas introduces as an effort "to identify and reconstruct the universal conditions of possible understanding" or, alternatively, the "general presuppositions of communicative action."[5] His aim is to make theoretically explicit those implicit competencies that account for the actual conduct of linguistic communication and its consequential social order in (post)modern societies.

Formal pragmatics is based in part on the pioneering work of Karl Bühler, who developed a theory of *language functions* that "starts from the semiotic model of a linguistic *sign* used by a speaker (sender) with the aim of coming to an understanding with a hearer

(receiver) about objects and states of affairs. He distinguishes three functions of the use of signs: the *cognitive* function of representing a state of affairs, the *expressive* function of making known experiences of the speaker, and the *appellative* function of directing requests to addressees."[6] In Bühler's own words, the linguistic sign "'is a *symbol* in virtue of being correlated with objects and states of affairs, a *symptom* in virtue of its dependence on the sender, whose subjectivity it expresses, and a *signal* in virtue of its appeal to the hearer, whose external or internal behavior it steers...'."[7] (Fig. 1)[8]

Figure 1. Bühler's Language Functions

Therefore, by virtue of the three ways in which each sign can be understood, every linguistic expression employing a sign simultaneously functions as an *expressive symptom* of the speaker, an *appellative signal* to the hearer, and a *representative symbol* of the world. As Habermas summarizes Bühler's pragmatics, "language represents a medium... that simultaneously serves three different, although internally related, functions. Expressions that are employed communicatively serve to express the intentions (or experiences) of a

speaker, to represent states of affairs (or something the speaker encounters in the world), and to establish relations with an address-ee. The three aspects of a *speaker* coming to an understanding with *another person* about *something* are reflected therein."[9]

Building on this triadic model of language functions, particular-ly via the *speech act theory* of J. L. Austin and John Searle, Habermas proposes that all communicative actions either explicitly or implicit-ly raise and redeem *three validity claims* that correspond with *three domains of reality*, or *three worlds*, to which the action relates as well as three *performative attitudes*, or *modes of communication*, that can be adopted by the actor in relation to these worlds.[10] Language is fun-damental to Habermas's view of human action not because of what is *said* with language but because the *use* of language itself raises and redeems these validity claims and structures the domains of reality to which actors relate in the three communicative modes they can adopt with every action. Consequently, in his view, "language and reality inextricably permeate one another. All experience is linguisti-cally saturated such that no grasp of reality is possible that is not filtered through language."[11]

As he sees it, "language is the medium through which speakers and hearers realize certain fundamental demarcations. The subject demarcates himself: (1) from an environment that he objectifies in the third-person attitude of an observer; (2) from an environment that he conforms to or deviates from in the ego-alter [second-person] attitude of a participant; (3) from his own subjectivity that he ex-presses or conceals in a first-person attitude; and finally (4) from the medium of language itself."[12] Habermas regards the medium of language itself not as a fourth mode of communication nor as a fourth domain of reality comparable to the first three, but as a "spe-cial region; precisely because language… remains in a peculiar half-transcendence in the performance of our communicative actions…, it presents itself to the speaker and the actor (pre-consciously) as a segment of reality *sui generis*."[13]

When used in these three communicative modes, "language can be conceived as the medium of interrelating three worlds; for every successful communicative action there exists a threefold relation between the utterance and (a) 'the external world' as the totality of

existing states of affairs, (b) 'our social world' as the totality of all normatively regulated interpersonal relations that count as legitimate in a given society, and (c) 'a particular inner world' (of the speaker) as the totality of his intentional experiences. We can examine every utterance to see whether it is true or untrue, justified or unjustified, truthful or untruthful because in speech, no matter what the emphasis, grammatical sentences are embedded in relations to reality in such a way that in an acceptable speech action segments of external nature, society, and internal nature always come into appearance together."[14]

These co-arising segments of the three worlds, or the three domains of reality, are the specific validity claims to those realities that constitute every communicative act. With regard to these validity claims, a communicative actor "claims truth for a stated propositional content or for the existential presuppositions of a mentioned propositional content. He claims rightness (or appropriateness) for norms (or values), which, in a given context, justify an interpersonal relation that is to be performatively established. Finally, he claims truthfulness for the intentions expressed."[15] In adopting the various communicative modes and in making specific claims of truth, rightness, and truthfulness, the communicative actor is simultaneously accessing his or her own background knowledge of all that is true, right, and truthful—the actor's own particular perspective on the three domains of reality—and presuming its validity for the purposes of supporting the present claims.

As illustrated in Figure 2, which is my adaptation of Bühler's model to Habermas's formal pragmatics, each of Habermas's modes of communication—the *expressive personality*, the *conformative participant*, or the *objectivating observer*—places a primary emphasis on one corresponding type of reality claim—*sincerity*, *rightness*, or *truth*—in the context of its corresponding domain of reality—*my inner world*, *our social world*, or *the external world*.[16,17] While it is certainly possible to craft a statement that engages all three modes in relative balance, thereby explicitly issuing claims to all three types of reality, it is far more common that just one of the communicative modes is given primary emphasis. When we do this, the other two modes, along

with their corresponding validity claims and domains, typically serve in secondary supporting roles.

Figure 2. Habermas's Formal Pragmatics

For example, I might share with you my assessment of a mutual colleague's performance at work based on whatever observations and interpretations I've made in the recent past. In doing so, I would be using the *objectivating observer* as my primary mode, making a variety of third-person *truth* claims, describing the facts and circumstances of his performance in the context of the relevant third-person validity domain, such as the acknowledged or assumed performance of all the other people in our company. Despite what may appear to be an exclusively third-person mode of communication, I would also be enacting the other two modes in a secondary capacity, at least implying that, in the first-person *expressive personality*, I am being *sincere* about my assessment of our colleague and, in the second-person *conformative participant*, I am *justified* in discussing his performance with you.

A typical response from you would engage the same third-person *objectivating observer*, perhaps challenging some of my truth claims about our colleague or my understanding of the company-wide performance that serves as context. We might then discuss our different points of view, learn from one another, and move toward a shared understanding of our colleague's performance—not necessarily complete agreement, but at least an understanding of each other's assessment. However, you might surprise me by choosing not to respond to my truth claims about our colleague, choosing instead to adopt a *conformative participant* mode and challenge my implied right to even discuss this matter with you. Perhaps you are my boss and you do not think it is appropriate for me to be assessing our colleague because he is my peer and also reports to you. Alternatively, you might adopt the first-person *expressive personality* mode and accuse me of being less than sincere in my assessment, perhaps because you suspect that I am unwilling to criticize the performance of a colleague who also happens to be my friend. Such a response would certainly entice me to shift to my own *expressive personality* mode as well, likely to defend my previous statements as quite sincere, given that now *I* am being assessed by *you* and our mutual assessment of our colleague has been backgrounded for the moment while we determine how much we trust each other.

Such is the dynamic, multi-perspectival nature of even the simplest of conversations. Habermas refers to a person's capacity to engage in such conversations, whether in spoken or written form, as *communicative competence*, which he defines as *the ability to embed well-formed sentences in relation to reality*, including:

- The competence to communicate in the first-person mode of an *expressive personality* in relation to *my inner world*, and to do so in such a way that the communicative act sincerely conveys what is intended, so that the hearer/reader can trust the speaker/writer;
- The competence to communicate in the second-person mode of a *conformative participant* in relation to *our social world*, and to do so in such a way that the communicative act satisfies recognized norms or accepted self-images, so that the hearer/reader can share values with the speaker/writer; and

- The competence to communicate in the third-person mode of an *objectivating observer* in relation to *the external world*, and to do so in such a way that the communicative act accurately represents relevant facts and circumstances, so that the hearer/reader can share knowledge with the speaker/writer.[18]

As clarified by Thomas McCarthy, one of Habermas's finest interpreters, these three aspects of communicative competence relate to three corresponding distinctions considered fundamental to every communication situation:

- The competence to communicate in the first-person mode, with an eye toward *intrapersonal sincerity*, is a precondition for the ability to make "the distinction between the individuated self (*Wesen*: essence) and the various utterances, expressions and actions in which it appears (*Erscheinung*: appearance)."
- The competence to communicate in the second-person mode, with an eye toward *interpersonal rightness*, is a precondition for the ability to make "the distinction between what is (*Sein*) and what ought to be (*Sollen*)."
- The competence to communicate in the third-person mode, with an eye toward *impersonal truth*, is a precondition for the ability to make "the distinction between a public world (*Sein*: being, that which really is) and a private world (*Schein*: illusion, that which merely seems to be)."[19]

Habermas conceives of this multi-perspectival *communicative competence* not just as an ideal to be sought in actual communication situations, but as a universal human capacity to be developed as an integral feature of one's psychological development.[20] Drawing on the developmental psychology of Jane Loevinger, Lawrence Kohlberg, and Jean Piaget, Habermas reconstructs a multi-level hierarchy of communicative competence that aligns his three communicative modes of *expressive personality*, *conformative participant*, and *objectivating observer* with the corresponding structures of Loevinger's *ego*, Kohlberg's *moral*, and Piaget's *cognitive* lines of psychological development. As with the developmental theories he incorporates, Ha-

bermas's proposed levels of communicative competence emerge in
an irreversible sequence of increasingly complex and encompassing
structures representing people's growing capacity for autonomous,
yet consensual action.[21] Therefore, Habermas proposes a triadic
theory of human action grounded in a formal-pragmatic model of
communicative competence acquired through multiple levels of ego,
moral, and cognitive development, culminating in highly autono-
mous, integrated identities capable of adopting reflective relations
with, moving fluidly between, and generating novel contributions to
three distinct domains of reality framed by the first-person, second-
person, and third-person perspectives.

Furthermore, this triadic theory of human action applies to the
collective dimension of *social evolution* just as much as the individual
dimension of *personal development*. For Habermas locates in the
development of communicative competence the capacity for *reason*
itself. As he sees it, in claiming a three-fold validity in every com-
municative act, however insignificant or implicit the claims may be,
speakers and writers are inviting hearers and readers to evaluate the
claims offered and respond with their own counter-claims, thereby
initiating the reasoned pursuit of mutual understanding. Building on
Immanuel Kant's triadic partition of reason, Habermas's *communica-
tive reason* differentiates and integrates what are traditionally re-
ferred to as the *aesthetic* reason of intrapersonal sincerity, the *practical*
reason of interpersonal rightness, and the *theoretical* reason of imper-
sonal truth. "In these validity claims," says Habermas, "communica-
tion theory can locate a gentle but obstinate, a never silent although
seldom redeemed claim to reason, a claim that must be recognized
de facto whenever and wherever there is to be consensual action."[22]
In his view, this consensual action, governed by a growing capacity
for communicative reason within and between the three worlds of
sincerity, rightness, and truth, is the very process by which
(post)modern societies, with what Max Weber described as their
increasingly rationalized institutions of *art*, *morals*, and *science*, have
emerged from premodern traditional societies.[23] Therefore, as one
might expect from a theory of social evolution in which language,
reason, and communication are central features, Habermas's offers
unprecedented insights into the manner in which communication

guides the social learning processes by which societies adapt to new challenges, both in the realm of goal-oriented *strategic action* as well as consensus-based *communicative action*, and institutionalize progressively more complex, justifiable socio-technical capacities in an evolutionary sequence that appears to be recapitulated in the developmental sequence of individuals within society.

Granted, Habermas is not the first to propose a multi-level theory of human development and evolution. But he is the first, as far as I know, to propose a multi-perspectival theory of human development and evolution based on the very deep linguistic structures of normal, everyday communicative competence. Furthermore, as he has so ably demonstrated, Habermas's particular approach to critical theory has the extraordinary capacity to transcend yet include, through reconstructive critique, a host of more specific theories, particularly those with all or part of a triadic structure implicitly, if not explicitly, based on the first-, second-, and third-person perspectives of language itself. As such, it constitutes a *meta-theory*, or a theory of theories, which I define as a relatively content-free, yet context-rich theory that integrates, via some combination of creative vision and conceptual logic, a large variety of relatively context-free, yet content-rich theories.[24]

Awareness-in-Action may therefore be understood in terms of:

- the three *modes of communication* that can be adopted by the actor: *expressive personality*, *conformative participant*, *objectivating observer*;
- the three *domains of reality* to which it unavoidably and irreducibly relates: *my inner world*, *our social world*, *the external world*;
- the three *validity claims* it raises or redeems in every communicative action: *sincerity*, *rightness*, *truth*; and
- the three *lines of communicative competence* that personally develop and socially evolve through multiple levels of increasing capacity: *self*, *moral*, *cognitive*.

The three interdependent, irreducible perspectives thus represented by each set of action interpretations are the *first-person*, *second-person*, and *third-person perspectives* that co-arise in every actor's awareness and find immediate expression in the corresponding

system of *intrapersonal*, *interpersonal*, and *impersonal* pronouns at the pre-conscious root of language itself.

Quadratic Perspectives

Extending this inquiry into the primordial perspectival nature of human action brings us to Ken Wilber's *all-quadrant*, *all-level*—AQAL (pronounced "ah-qwal")—formulation of integral theory, a multi-disciplinary meta-theory in which he proposes that the development and evolution of human consciousness, indeed all of existence, can be understood through four interdependent, irreducible perspectives: the *intentional*, *behavioral*, *cultural*, and *social*.[25]

Apparently inspired and certainly informed by earlier attempts to master much of the same meta-theoretical terrain—such as those by Habermas,[26] Talcott Parsons,[27] Erich Jantsch,[28] Jean Gebser,[29] Pitirim Sorokin,[30] and Sri Aurobindo[31]—Wilber's particular formulation of integral theory represents an ambitious attempt to construct the most comprehensive integration of philosophical, scientific, and spiritual ideas yet conceived within the confines of a developmental-evolutionary meta-narrative.[32] By his own account, Wilber "examined over 200 developmental sequences recognized by various branches of human knowledge—ranging from stellar physics to molecular biology, anthropology to linguistics, developmental psychology to ethical orientations, cultural hermeneutics to contemplative endeavors—taken from both Eastern and Western disciplines, and including premodern, modern, and postmodern sources." Through an inductive rather than deductive approach, he "noticed that these various developmental sequences all fell into one of four major classes—the four quadrants—and, further, that within those four quadrants there was substantial agreement as to the various stages or levels in each."[33] Wilber's reference to *quadrants* is due to the particular graphical illustration, a two-by-two matrix, he consistently uses to depict these four perspectives on the many levels of existence, with *intentional* being upper-left, or UL, *behavioral* being upper-right, or UR, *cultural* being lower-left, or LL, and *social* being lower-right, or LR.[34] (Fig. 3)

Figure 3. Wilber's All-Quadrants All-Levels Integral Theory

This spacial arrangement of the quadrants reveals the underlying logic that gives Wilber's model its considerable explanatory power. From upper to lower, the *intentional* and *behavioral* are both *individual* perspectives that focus on the development of individuals in the context of collectives, while the *cultural* and *social* are both *collective* perspectives that focus on the evolution of collectives comprised of individuals. From left to right, the *intentional* and *cultural* are both *subjective* perspectives that focus on the interior aspects of development and evolution, while the *behavioral* and *social* are both *objective* perspectives that focus on the exterior aspects of development and evolution. Thus, each quadrant can be characterized not only as its own unique perspective on existence, but also as a pair of secondary perspectives, each of which is shared with one of its adjacent quadrants: *intentional* being the *individual-subjective*

aspect of existence, *behavioral* being the *individual-objective* aspect of existence, *cultural* being the *collective-subjective* aspect of existence, and *social* being the *collective-objective* aspect of existence.

These logical connections between the quadrants, based on the underlying shared perspectives within each, lead to the most insightful and provocative aspect of Wilber's integral theory: *the correlations across all quadrants at each level of existence*. Not only does Wilber infer an emerging consensus regarding the nature and sequence of levels *within each quadrant* of developmental and evolutionary theory, but he also infers a strong correlation among these sequences of levels *across all quadrants* such that each level within one quadrant has direct correlates in all the other quadrants. He therefore hypothesizes a mutual-causal correspondence among *all* the quadrants at *each* level of existence, indeed at each *moment* of existence, such that every *kosmic occasion* manifests as, and can be understood in terms of, its interdependent intentional-behavioral-cultural-social aspects. This forms the basis of an *all-quadrant, all-level* —AQAL—formulation of integral theory with proposed quasi-universal applicability to every field of theoretical endeavor because, in Wilber's view, every such field can be enhanced through some sort of all-quadrant, all-level reconstruction.[35]

For just one example that is most relevant to my inquiry, drawing on the ideas of Ferdinand de Saussure and Charles Sanders Peirce, among others, Wilber proposes the broad outline of a more comprehensive version of *semiotics*, which is the scientific study of *signs* and their use in all types of language and communication.[36] In his formulation of *integral semiotics*, Wilber defines a *sign* as "any aspect of reality that signifies another, to another,"[37] which is a definition so fundamental as to suggest a universal scope of inquiry including, but by no means limited to, conventional spoken/written language. All such signs are composed of an intentional (UL) *signified* (i.e., the subjective idea or association) and a behavioral (UR) *signifier* (i.e., the objective word or mark) and exist in corresponding contexts of cultural (LL) *semantics* (i.e., meaningful interpretations of signifieds) and social (LR) *syntax* (i.e., functional rules for signifiers).[38,39] As he sees it, the purpose of pragmatics, or language use, is therefore to integrate the four interdependent quadrants of every

semiotic occasion, notwithstanding the all-too-plausible argument that they are never completely consistent.

Furthermore, because in his view *all kosmic occasions are semiotic*, though not necessarily pragmatic, Wilber proposes the extension of this quadratic formulation across his full spectrum of kosmic development and evolution as outlined in Figure 3, implying, among other things, that communicative semiosis occurs on every level of reality. In what he regards as a key insight necessary for this potential multi-level semiotics, Wilber locates the actual *referent*, the specific aspect of reality to which the sign refers, in the cultural (LL) quadrant, claiming that "the real referent of a valid utterance exists in a specific worldspace."[40] Thus, because each level of development and evolution includes its own emergent *semantic* worldspace (LL), that level of semantics provides all the participants in that level with access to phenomenologically real referents disclosed as specific, subjectively apprehended *signifieds* (UL) that are unavailable to participants who are limited to prior levels of consciousness, even when the corresponding behavioral *signifiers* (UR) and social *syntax* (LR) are available to them.

Within the quadratic levels of *human* development and evolution, Wilber denotes the various levels of consciousness with a series of colors derived from the spectrum of visible light, an effective technique used for centuries in illustrations of the yogic *chakra* system.[41] As Figure 4 illustrates, these proposed levels of consciousness, that Wilber synthesized from dozens of research-based theories of psychological development and socio-cultural evolution, appear to have unfolded in all four quadrants simultaneously and thereby manifested in progressively more transcendent, yet inclusive intentional-behavioral-cultural-social perspectives.[42] He emphasizes that "these levels are not rigidly separate and isolated, but, like the colors of a rainbow, infinitely shade and grade into each other."[43] He also makes a distinction between the quasi-universal *deep structures* of intentional-behavioral-cultural-social capacities that are common to all who pass through a particular level of consciousness and the plurality of historically contingent, culturally specific, personally expressive *surface structures* that can manifest from each deep structure (e.g., formal-operational rationality supports many different

personal intelligences just as rational-modernity supports many different socio-cultural institutions). In this sense, AQAL is presented as a quasi-universal, multi-structural pattern of progressively more transcendent, yet inclusive deep structures of intentional-behavioral-cultural-social consciousness.

Figure 4. Wilber's All-Quadrants All-Levels Integral Theory Human Development & Evolution

In addition to quadrants and levels, Wilber loosely incorporates into AQAL additional theories that address the multiple *lines* of consciousness (e.g., cognitive, moral, ego), multiple *states* of consciousness (e.g., gross, subtle, causal, witness), and multiple *types* of consciousness (e.g., Enneagram personality types) as documented by psychologists over the years.[44] Wilber's meta-theoretical contribution is to highlight the benefits of recognizing and juxtaposing these distinct features of consciousness as relevant to any comprehensive understanding (e.g., people may be operating from different *levels*

across different *lines*; people may access multiple *states* from the same *level*; and people may maintain the same personality *type* through multiple *levels*). Even this meta-theoretical contribution is not without some precedent, as can be seen in such proto-AQAL formulations as the triadic, multi-level, multi-line meta-theory of Habermas,[45] the quadratic, multi-level meta-theory of Parsons,[46] the dyadic, multi-level, multi-state meta-theory of Jantsch,[47] and the dyadic, multi-level, multi-line, multi-state meta-theory of Sri Aurobindo.[48]

While I do accept the basic hypothesis of mutual-causal correspondence among the intentional, behavioral, cultural, and social aspects of every occasion, I find no need to accept or reject Wilber's proposed hierarchies of structural levels outlined in Figures 3 and 4. My inquiry is focused on the primordial perspectives of human awareness-in-action, not some theory, or synthesis of theories, of kosmic or even human development and evolution. Hence, the approach Wilber took to formulate and justify his multi-perspectival meta-theory in terms of empirical levels of development and evolution is entirely different from the approach I am taking to formulate and justify my own multi-perspectival meta-theory. Furthermore, my general acceptance of lines, states, and types as empirical features of human awareness-in-action should not be misconstrued as an agreement with the particular manner in which these features have been appended to the AQAL formulation or, for that matter, with the AQAL formulation itself. As will become clear in due course, all the ideas from Wilber, Habermas, and others incorporated herein have been integrally reconstructed and therefore redefined, even if some of the established terminology has been retained for purposes of continuity within these established fields.

Awareness-in-Action may therefore be understood in terms of four interdependent, irreducible perspectives—*intentional*, *behavioral*, *cultural*, *social*—each of which represents a pair of constituent perspectives that form a secondary set of four interdependent, irreducible perspectives—*individual*, *collective*, *subjective*, *objective*.

The Tri/Quad Conflation

The question now arises regarding the precise relationship be-
tween Wilber's *quadratic perspectives* and Habermas's *triadic perspec-
tives* on human action, development, and evolution. In the series of
books and articles published from 1995 through 2007, including the
earliest and latest presentations of AQAL, Wilber makes it perfectly
clear that he considers the quadratic perspectives and the triadic
perspectives to be *identical* and *interchangeable*, with:[49]

- the *first-person* perspective being identical to his individual-
  subjective *intentional* perspective, the conflated form of
  which he labels with the pronoun *I* in his upper-left (UL)
  quadrant;
- the *second-person* perspective being identical to his collective-
  subjective *cultural* perspective, the conflated form of which
  he labels with the pronoun *We* in his lower-left (LL) quad-
  rant, often noting that this first-person plural pronoun is in-
  tended to represent the relationship between first-person *I*
  and second-person *You*; and
- the *third-person* perspective being identical to his combined
  individual-objective *behavioral* and collective-objective *social*
  perspectives, the conflated forms of which he labels with the
  pronoun *It* in his upper-right (UR) quadrant and a pseudo-
  pronoun *Its* in his lower-right (LR) quadrant.

Wilber allocates Habermas's triadic validity claims into the same
corresponding quadrants, with intrapersonal *sincerity* in the *inten-
tional* (UL), interpersonal *rightness* in the *cultural* (LL), and imper-
sonal *truth* in the *behavioral* (UR) and *social* (LR), except in those
instances when he uses a fourth claim to nonpersonal *functional fit* in
the *social* (LR) quadrant, thereby framing functional fit as a second
type of truth claim in relation to the propositional truth of the behav-
ioral (UR) quadrant.[50]

For one long, illustrative example, in *The Eye of Spirit*, Wilber
elaborates on his use of the labels *I*, *We*, *It*, and *Its* to denote the
intentional (UL), behavioral (UR), cultural (LL), and social (LR)
perspectives, respectively, by emphasizing that:[51]

…*each of these quadrants is described in a different language*. That is, they each have a different but quite valid phenomenology, and thus each of them is natively described in a distinct language.

Thus, the events and data found in the Upper-Left quadrant are described in "I" language. The events and data of the Lower-Left quadrant are described in "we" language. And both of the Right-Hand quadrants, because they are empirical and exterior, can be described in "it" language. Thus, the four quadrants can be simplified to three basic domains: I, we, and it.

Because none of the quadrants can be reduced to the others, likewise none of these languages can be reduced to the others. Each is vitally important, and forms a crucial part of the universe on the whole—not to mention a vital part of a comprehensive understanding of the psychology and sociology of human beings. Here are just a few of the important ingredients of these three major domains of I, we, and it:

> I (Upper Left)—consciousness, subjectivity, self and self-expression (including art and aesthetics); truthfulness and sincerity; first-person accounts
>
> We (Lower Left)—ethics and morals, worldviews, common context, culture; intersubjective meaning, mutual understanding, appropriateness, justness; second-person accounts
>
> It (Right Hand)—science and technology, objective nature, empirical forms (including brain and social systems); propositional truth (in both singular and functional fit); third-person accounts

Science—empirical science—deals with objects, with "its," with empirical patterns. Morals and ethics concern "we" and our intersubjective world of mutual understanding and justness. Art and aesthetics concern the beauty in the eye of the beholder, the "I."

And yes, this is essentially Plato's the *Good* (morals, the "we"), the *True* (in the sense of propositional truth, objective truths or "its"), and the *Beautiful* (the aesthetic dimension as perceived by each "I").

These three domains are also Sir Karl Popper's rather famous distinction of three worlds—objective (it), subjective (I), and cultural (we). Many people, myself included, consider Jürgen Habermas the world's foremost living philosopher, and these three great do-

mains correspond exactly with Habermas's three validity claims: objective truth, subjective sincerity, and intersubjective justness.

Of enormous historical importance, these three domains showed up in Kant's immensely influential trilogy—*The Critique of Pure Reason* (objective science), *The Critique of Practical Reason* (morals), and *The Critique of Judgment* (aesthetic judgment and art).

Even into the spiritual levels of development, these three domains show up as, to give only one example, the Three Jewels of Buddhism, namely: *Buddha*, *Dharma*, and *Sangha*. Buddha is the enlightened mind in each and every sentient being, the I that is no-I, the primordial awareness that shines forth from every interior. Buddha is the "I" or the "eye" of Spirit. Sangha is the community of spiritual practitioners, the "we" of Spirit. And Dharma is the spiritual truth that is realized, the "It" or "isness" or "thusness" or "suchness" of every phenomenon.

Dozens of other examples could be given, but that's the general picture of these great domains of I, we, and it. And this is obviously crucial for integral studies, because any comprehensive theory of human consciousness and behavior will want to honor and incorporate all four quadrants, or simply these three great domains, each possessing a different validity claim and a quite different language. This is simply another example of the pluralistic, multimodal, and multidimensional attitude that is a defining hallmark of an integral approach: all-level, all-quadrant.

I quote Wilber at length in order to convey both the content and the style with which he consistently equates and conflates the triadic perspectives of Habermas and other theorists with his own quadratic perspectives, beginning with a definition of the quadratic perspectives, seamlessly transitioning to an exposition of the triadic perspectives, and then cycling back to conclude with the quadratic perspectives, as if they are literally interchangeable. I also do so in order to convey the full extent of his justification for the equation and conflation of these two meta-theories, as this passage is the entire presentation. All of the references mentioned at the beginning of this section include passages consistent with the one I chose to quote from his first major paradigmatic formulation of AQAL. Some of the passages describing this conflation of the triadic and quadratic meta-theories, such as the most recent book, also include visual illustrations of this equation and conflation, depicting a triadic

model of beauty, goodness, and truth (the so-called "Big Three") arranged to correlate with an adjacent model of the quadrants.[52] In Figure 5, I offer a more complete, yet entirely consistent, illustration of what I term the *tri/quad conflation*.

Figure 5. Wilber's Tri/Quad Conflation

The correlations among these various triadic theories of philosophy, spirituality, society, and communication are very compelling and, as far as I am concerned, uncontroversial. Prior to Wilber's formulation of the tri/quad conflation, which was first published in 1995,[53] Habermas had already incorporated some of these theories within his own triadic meta-theory of human action, development, and evolution.[54] Such correlations certainly attest to the very deep and powerful nature of the first-, second-, and third-person perspectives of human language, reason, and communication. But these correlations among different versions of the triadic perspectives have nothing to do with the more general question of whether or not the triadic perspectives as a meta-theory should be equated and

conflated with the quadratic perspectives. This more general question is of tremendous importance, given the fact that the tri/quad conflation is Wilber's primary means of incorporating the wealth of triadic theories, and particularly Habermas's triadic meta-theory, into his own quadratic meta-theory.

Wilber's answer to this question has been perfectly clear and consistent. From his first publication of the AQAL meta-theory in 1995 to his latest publication in 2007, Wilber has consistently equated and conflated these two models, using them in his teachings as if they are interchangeable, sometimes emphasizing the *quadrants* and their multiple dyadic components while de-emphasizing the *big three*, sometimes de-emphasizing the quadrants while emphasizing the big three as the *beautiful*, *good*, and *true*, the *123 of God*, the *art*, *morals*, and *science* of modernity, or *self*, *culture*, and *nature*. In every instance, the correspondence between the first-, second-, and third-person perspectives and, respectively, the intentional (UL), cultural (LL), and combined behavioral (UR) and social (LR) quadrants is exactly the same. Moreover, his definitions of each quadrant and his examples of the theories that each quadrant frames and the methods that each quadrant requires are fused with his understanding of the corresponding definitions, theories, and methods framed by the first-, second-, and third-person perspectives so conflated. All this is just as it should be if one interprets these two multi-perspectival meta-theories as one and the same.

Triadic Quadratic Perspectives

In a complete departure from Wilber's tri/quad conflation, I recognize Habermas's *triadic perspectives* and Wilber's *quadratic perspectives* as two entirely differentiated, yet nevertheless tightly integrated, multi-perspectival frames of reference for human action, development, and evolution. As I see it, *each* of the first-, second-, and third-person perspectives has within it *all four* intentional, behavioral, cultural, and social perspectives, which are identified and realized by each one of us from within each of the three personal perspectives we use to frame our actions in our worlds.[55] (Fig. 6)

Figure 6. Triadic Quadratic Perspectivism – 1st Derivative

The easiest way to understand this is to recognize that the system of personal pronouns that signifies the first-, second-, and third-person perspectives includes *singular* and *plural* pronouns as well as *subjective* and *objective* pronouns for each of the three personal perspectives. These four types of pronouns—singular and plural, subjective and objective—correspond perfectly with the four secondary perspectives in Wilber's quadratic model—individual and collective, interior and exterior. Moreover, just as each of Wilber's quadratic perspectives is comprised of a unique pairing of these secondary perspectives, so too are the specific pronouns comprised of their own unique pairings of *singular-subjective*, *singular-objective*, *plural-subjective*, and *plural-objective*. Therefore, each of the first-, second-, and third-person perspectives is its own fully quadratic perspective represented by what I refer to as a *quadratic pronoun* that perfectly tracks the intentional-behavioral-cultural-social aspects of each personal perspective. Finally, just as both the triadic perspectives

and the quadratic perspectives are interdependent and irreducible in their own separate ways, the integration of the two models as just described produces a single set of interdependent, irreducible *triadic quadratic perspectives* that co-arise in every actor's awareness and find immediate expression in the system of *triadic quadratic pronouns* at the pre-conscious root of language itself.

With regard to the triadic perspectives, it should be clear from Figure 6 that the perennial philosophical ideals of first-person *freedom* (denoted 1), second-person *justice* (denoted 2), and third-person *truth* (denoted 3)—my preferred terminology for the classical *beauty*, *goodness*, and *truth* and interchangeable with *sincerity*, *rightness*, and *truth*—have each been rendered fully quadratic and will therefore reveal some interesting new ways of understanding the nature and pursuit of these three perspectives on *reality*. In short, there are reality claims to, and reality domains of, *intention* (UL), *behavior* (UR), *meaning* (LL), and *function* (LR) associated with each and every triadic perspective. For example, instead of confusing our understanding of interpersonal justice (2) with an exclusively cultural (LL) interpretation in which shared *meaning* is the only valid consideration, as in the tri/quad conflated AQAL, we can now frame our inquiry in terms of the intentional (2_{UL}), behavioral (2_{UR}), cultural (2_{LL}), and social (2_{LR}) facets of a fully quadratic interpersonal justice (2_{AQ}), while still allowing for an even more expanded inquiry into the fully quadratic nature of the corresponding intrapersonal freedom (1_{AQ}) and impersonal truth (3_{AQ}).

Likewise, with regard to the quadratic perspectives, Figure 6 reveals that there are now three distinct perspectives on each quadrant corresponding with the first-, second-, and third-person perspectives within which one can understand each quadrant. Thus, there are reality claims to, and reality domains of, first-person *freedom* (1), second-person *justice* (2), and third-person *truth* (3) associated with each and every quadratic perspective. For example, instead of confusing our understanding of individual behavior (UR) with a purely impersonal pursuit of truth (3), as in the tri/quad conflated AQAL, we can now frame our inquiry in terms of the intrapersonal, interpersonal, and impersonal perspectives on behavior (123_{UR}), or behavioral perspectives on action, such as the comparative behavioral

features of a claim to freedom (1UR), a claim to justice (2UR), and a claim to truth (3UR), while still allowing for an even more expanded inquiry into the fully triadic nature of the corresponding intentional (123UL), cultural (123LL), and social (123LR) perspectives in that action situation (123AQ).[56]

Hence, this new formulation of triadic quadratic perspectives (123AQ) has the potential to increase the explanatory and interpretive power of the constituent meta-theories of Habermas and Wilber, while clearing away the confusions caused by Wilber's mistaken tri/quad conflation.[57] From within the first-person perspective of a freedom that is *expressed* and *reflected* in pragmatic *personification* (1AQ), awareness-in-action presupposes and can be understood in terms of:

- the intentional or individual-subjective *I* (1UL), which is experienced intrapersonally as the root of consciousness and implied source of *my* actions;
- the behavioral or individual-objective *me* (1UR), which is experienced intrapersonally as the conduct of *my* actions as seen by the *I* reflexively coordinating *my* behavior in relation to *my* intention;
- the cultural or collective-subjective *we* (1LL), which is experienced intrapersonally as the meaningful context of shared identity established through a lifetime of enculturation and often referenced in relation to the intentional *I* as if to justify action or diffuse responsibility; and
- the social or collective-objective *us* (1LR), which is experienced intrapersonally as the functional context of shared conduct established through a lifetime of socialization and often referenced in relation to the behavioral *me* or reflexively in relation to the cultural *we*.

Furthermore, from within the second-person perspective of a justice that is *engaged* and *interpreted* in pragmatic *participation* (2AQ), awareness-in-action presupposes and can be understood in terms of:

- the intentional or individual-subjective *you* (2UL), which *I* experience interpersonally as the presumed root of *your* con-

sciousness and the interpreted intentions behind *your* actions;

- the behavioral or individual-objective *you* (2ᴜʀ), which *I* experience interpersonally as the engaged conduct of *your* behavior in relation to *my* behavior as well as what *I* interpret to be *your* intention;

- the cultural or collective-subjective *you* (2ʟʟ), which *I* experience interpersonally as *my* interpretation of *your* meaningful context of shared identity that *you* have established through a lifetime of enculturation, some portion of which *we* evidently share; and

- the social or collective-objective *you* (2ʟʀ), which *I* experience interpersonally as the functional context of shared conduct that *you* have established through a lifetime of socialization, some portion of which is evidently shared by *us*.

Finally, from within the third-person perspective of a truth that is *observed* and *inferred* in pragmatic *representation* (3ᴀǫ), awareness-in-action presupposes and can be understood in terms of:

- the intentional or individual-subjective *he* or *she* (3ᴜʟ), which *I* experience impersonally as the presumed root of *his* or *her* consciousness and the inferred intentions behind *his* or *her* actions;

- the behavioral or individual-objective *him* or *her* (3ᴜʀ), which *I* experience impersonally as the observed conduct of *his* or *her* actions in relation to *my* and *your* behavior as well as what *I* infer to be *his* or *her* intention;

- the cultural or collective-subjective *they* (3ʟʟ), which *I* experience impersonally as the inferred meaningful context of shared identity that *he* or *she* has established through a lifetime of enculturation, some portion of which *we* evidently share; and

- the social or collective-objective *them* (3ʟʀ), which *I* experience impersonally as the observed functional context of shared conduct that *he* or *she* has established through a lifetime of socialization, some portion of which is evidently shared by *us*.

Therefore, the triadic quadratic perspectives differentiate and integrate the pragmatic *personification*, *participation*, and *representation* of awareness-in-action that are designated, respectively, by the first-, second-, and third-person quadratic pronouns.

Implicit Rules

The model of triadic quadratic perspectives and the new approach to *integral perspectivism* this represents did indeed arise in my own direct awareness, not in the first instance as an effort in meta-theory reconstruction, but in response to a process of self-inquiry into the specific perspectives that I was taking in my moment-to-moment awareness-in-action. I simply paid close attention to what I was seeing, thinking, and speaking, and asked myself what perspective it implied and how this perspective related to all the others. As the answers became clear, the whole pattern formed rather quickly. As a secondary process, I have attempted to explicate some of the implicit rules or design principles I have discovered in this perceptual meta-theory. I outline below some of my hypotheses regarding rules that appear to be universally operative in order to convey the non-arbitrary nature of the model just presented and preclude any immediate misinterpretations:

1. All quadratic perspectives are identified by a quadratic pronoun, which is an internally consistent set of singular-subjective, singular-objective, plural-subjective, and plural-objective pronouns corresponding, respectively, with the intentional (123_{UL}), behavioral (123_{UR}), cultural (123_{LL}), and social (123_{LR}) perspectives. All triadic quadratic perspectives are identified by an internally consistent set of first-person (1_{AQ}), second-person (2_{AQ}), and third-person (3_{AQ}) quadratic pronouns representing the 12 *primordial perspectives* (123_{AQ}) of Awareness-in-Action.

2. Individual pronouns in the intentional (123_{UL}) and behavioral (123_{UR}) are always paired with appropriate collective pronouns in the cultural (123_{LL}) and social (123_{LR}), because each implicates the other in every action. There is no such thing as an individual perspective without its contextual collective

or a collective perspective without its constituent individu-
als. Likewise, subjective pronouns in the intentional (123$_{UL}$)
and cultural (123$_{LL}$) are always paired with appropriate ob-
jective pronouns in the behavioral (123$_{UR}$) and social (123$_{LR}$),
because each implicates the other in every action. There is no
such thing as a subjective perspective without its comple-
mentary objective or an objective perspective without its
complementary subjective. Finally, first-person (1$_{AQ}$), sec-
ond-person (2$_{AQ}$), and third-person (3$_{AQ}$) perspectives and
their corresponding pronouns mutually implicate one an-
other in every action. There is no such thing as a first-, sec-
ond-, or third-person perspective in isolation without the
other two corresponding perspectives.

3. The use of any particular pronoun (or noun) in thought or
    communication always implies three other pronouns that
    constitute the specific quadratic pronoun and eight addi-
    tional pronouns that constitute the remainder of the specific
    triadic quadratic pronoun *already operative in the action situa-
    tion*. Some formulation of triadic quadratic pronouns and
    therefore perspectives is *always* already operative in *every* ac-
    tion situation. It is not that you must construct it reflectively;
    it is already here, right now, in your own active awareness.

4. The first-person perspective (1$_{AQ}$) is always the person who
    is taking the triadic quadratic perspectives and this first-
    person is always identified in the intentional (1$_{UL}$) and be-
    havioral (1$_{UR}$) by first-person singular *I-me* (i.e., the *I-me* near
    the center of *my* application of this model refers to the real I-
    me near the center of my own actual triadic quadratic per-
    spectives; and *I* should never be paired with *it* as in Wilber's
    tri/quad conflated AQAL). Likewise, the first-person per-
    spective is always identified in the cultural (1$_{LL}$) and social
    (1$_{LR}$) by the first-person plural *we-us* (i.e., *we* should never be
    paired with *it* or *its* as in Wilber's tri/quad conflated AQAL,
    but always with *us*).

5. The second-person perspective (2$_{AQ}$) is always identified in
    the intentional (2$_{UL}$) and behavioral (2$_{UR}$) by second-person
    singular *you-you*. However, it can be identified in the cultur-

al (2_{LL}) and social (2_{LR}) by either the standard second-person plural *you-you* (or *y'all-y'all*) or the first-person plural *we-us* (e.g., when *I* am discussing *my* relationship with *you* and *we* are both focused on *our* reciprocal perspectives on *we-us*).

6. The third-person perspective (3_{AQ}) is always identified in the intentional (3_{UL}) and behavioral (3_{UR}) by third-person singulars such as *she-her*, *he-him*, or *it-it*. However, it can be identified in the cultural (3_{LL}) and social (3_{LR}) by either the standard third-person plurals *they-them* or *these-those*, a second-person plural *you-you* (e.g., when *I* am discussing with *you* *your* relationship with *him* or *her* and therefore the plural *you-you* could be used in the cultural and social of both the second- and third-person), or a first-person plural *we-us* (e.g., when *I* am discussing with *you* *my* relationship with *him* or *her*, which may or may not include singular *you*, so the second-person in this example could also be the same *we-us* inclusive of the third-person or the standard *you-you*).

7. Indefinite pronouns are only operative within the purely quadratic perspectives, with each such pronoun making reference to one or more of the intentional-behavioral-cultural-social perspectives (e.g., *anyone-anything-everyone-everything*, *one-one-all-all*). This *indefinite quadratic perspectivism*, which I denote X_{AQ}, is by definition *not triadic*, not 123_{AQ}, because it collapses or reduces the fully triadic intentional (123_{UL}), behavioral (123_{UR}), cultural (123_{LL}), and social (123_{LR}) perspectives and, therefore, *specified* identities, to indefinite intentional (X_{UL}), behavioral (X_{UR}), cultural (X_{LL}), and social (X_{LR}) perspectives and, therefore, *generalized* identities.

8. Possessive pronouns and adjectives are operative throughout the triadic quadratic perspectives, as they are the means by which *I act possessively*, laying claim for myself and on behalf of others to the content framed by the primordial perspectives as well as the perspectives themselves. The specific pattern of singular-subjective (123_{UL}), singular-objective (123_{UR}), plural-subjective (123_{LL}), and plural-objective (123_{LR}) possessives includes the first-person *my-mine-our-ours* (1_{AQ}), second-person *your-yours-your-yours* (2_{AQ}), and third-person

his/her-his/hers-their-theirs (3_{AQ}). In contrast to the pronouns used for identification of people, other conscious beings, and various non-personal things, the possessives are used to identify the very same aspects and elements of reality in order to attribute their ownership and/or relationship to people and other conscious beings. Furthermore, the first-person singular possessives, *my* and *mine* (1_{UL+UR}), are the means by which *I* can act possessively with regard to *all* the triadic quadratic perspectives (123_{AQ}), which are, in a sense, *mine* as they have clearly arisen in *my* non-perspectival awareness (denoted 0), that *I* nevertheless try to possess with *my* perspectival action (with consistently disappointing results, *I* might add).

9. Reflexive pronouns are operative in the singular and plural halves of all quadratic pronouns, as they are the means by which the subjective *I* (1_{UL}) interacts with the objective *me* (1_{UR}) (e.g., *I* surprise *myself*) as well as the means by which *I* attribute the capacity for reflexive action to others, as when *you* interact with *you* (2_{UL+UR}) (e.g., *you* know *yourself*), *she* interacts with *her* (3_{UL+UR}) (e.g., *she* supports *herself*), *we* interact with *us* (1_{LL+LR}) (e.g., *we* educated *ourselves*), all of *you* interact with all of *you* (2_{LL+LR}) (*you* protect *yourselves*), and *they* interact with *them* (3_{LL+LR}) (e.g., *they* reward *themselves*).

10. The first-person singular-subjective (1_{UL}) perspectival pronoun, *I*, appears to be the *originary* or *enactive perspective*, the *first among equals* with regard to all the other perspectival pronouns in the triadic quadratic perspectives, because none of the others can arise in awareness unless the *I* at the apparent source of conscious action also arises. The awareness of *I* is (phenomeno)logically prior to the other perspectival pronouns and *I* can remain as the locus of perspectival awareness after the other perspectival pronouns subside. Therefore, triadic quadratic perspectival reality itself, to whatever extent it is *enacted*, appears to originate with the pronoun *I*, which is *identified* with each and every experience of reality it claims, that is, each and every *form* it *names* (e.g., *I* know *this*; *I* want *that*; *I* like *you*, but not *him*.).

11. From the perspective of the first-person singular-subjective (1_{UL}) pronoun, *I*, *my* triadic quadratic perspectives (123_{AQ}) frame the *intrapersonal* intentional-behavioral-cultural-social facets (1_{AQ}), the *interpersonal* intentional-behavioral-cultural-social facets (2_{AQ}), and the *impersonal* intentional-behavioral-cultural-social facets (3_{AQ}) of *my* enactive *self-imaging/world-viewing*. At any point in time, *my* enacted *self-image/world-view* encompasses *my* unique, comprehensive integral narrative, *my* own personal *theory of everyone* and *everything*, including *my* understanding of *your* own and *his* or *her* own unique versions of the same magnificent drama (or comedy, tragedy, etc.).

12. The triadic quadratic perspectives (123_{AQ}) frame absolutely *everyone* and *everything I* can possibly experience within *my* circle of non-perspectival *integral awareness* (0). There is *nothing* missing, the proof of which is to name *anyone* or *anything* that *you* think is left out and upon doing so recognize that *whoever* or *whatever* it is can be signified, indeed is already implicitly signified, by one of the perspectival pronouns in *your* triadic quadratic perspectives.

Given this formal presentation of the implicit rules of *triadic quadratic perspectivism* (denoted TQP), it bears emphasizing that anyone reading this book is already capable of following these perspectival rules, for the most part pre-consciously, as a necessary pre-condition for taking all these perspectives, for the most part quite consciously. While TQP may be immediately recognizable as a *conceptual* meta-theory with enhanced explanatory and interpretive capabilities, it is even more important to recognize it as the *perceptual* meta-theory that appears to be always already active in our situational awareness-in-action—*empirical* and *normative* evidence, it seems, of our latent potential for more integral awareness-in-action. Furthermore, by accurately differentiating and integrating the triadic (123) and the quadratic (X_{AQ}) meta-theories within triadic quadratic perspectivism, the latent potential (123_{AQ}) of both Habermas's and Wilber's meta-theories can be more fully realized. The full implications of TQP for our understanding of the basic triadic perspectives —being first-, second-, and third-person—and the basic quadratic

perspectives—being intentional, behavioral, cultural, and social—of awareness-in-action, not to mention the structures of progressively more conscious awareness-in-action that may develop and evolve throughout all 12 primordial perspectives, appear to be rather significant and will require the remainder of this book to introduce. That being said, the immediate implications of TQP include more integral reconstructions of *semiotics*, *pragmatics*, and *praxiology*.

Immediate Implications

TQP frames a more integral *semiotics*, which is the study of signs and their use in all types of communication, incorporating the triadic semiotics of Bühler and the quadratic semiotics of Wilber. Recall that Wilber's *indefinite* sign, which is *any aspect of reality that represents another to another*, is composed of an intentional *signified* (X_{UL}) (i.e., the subjective idea or association) and a behavioral *signifier* (X_{UR}) (i.e., the objective word or mark) and exists in corresponding contexts of cultural *semantics* (X_{LL}) (i.e., meaningful interpretations of signifieds) and social *syntax* (X_{LR}) (i.e., functional rules for signifiers).[58] As a potential complement without apparent contradiction, Bühler's *pragmatic* sign "is a *symbol* in virtue of being correlated with objects and states of affairs [3], a *symptom* in virtue of its dependence on the sender [1], whose subjectivity it expresses, and a *signal* in virtue of its appeal to the hearer [2], whose external or internal behavior it steers…"[59] By recognizing that *each* of Wilber's quadratic perspectives of a sign is simultaneously present in *each* of Bühler's triadic perspectives of a sign, and vice versa, we can see the primordial contours of a TQP formulation of *integral semiotics* (123_{AQ}).

Furthermore, by recognizing the *pragmatic* implications of this integral semiotics, we can see the contours of a more integral pragmatics that further illuminates the study of spoken/written language use. Recall that each of Habermas's modes of communication—the *expressive personality* (1), the *conformative participant* (2), or the *objectivating observer* (3)—places a primary emphasis on one corresponding claim to reality—*sincerity*, *rightness*, or *truth*—in the context of its corresponding domain of reality—*my inner world*, *our social world*, or *the external world*.[60] (Fig. 2) Given that Habermas's formal pragmatics

is based in large part on Bühler's triadic semiotics, in which every linguistic expression employing a sign simultaneously functions as an *expressive symptom* of the speaker (1), an *appellative signal* to the hearer (2), and a *representative symbol* of the world (3), we may now reconstruct each of Habermas's modes of communicative reason and action to include its own corresponding intentional (123_{UL}), behavioral (123_{UR}), cultural (123_{LL}), and social (123_{LR}) aspects of pragmatic, or linguistically enacted, reality (123_{AQ}).

Finally, by recognizing the pragmatic and semiotic foundations of *praxiology*, which I have defined as the study of human action in all its forms and fields, we can now see the primordial contours of an *integral praxiology* that incorporates the insights and terminology of integral semiotics and pragmatics. Thus, every human action employing a *linguistic sign* is a *triadic quadratic pragmatic and semiotic action* that simultaneously differentiates and integrates: (Fig. 7)

- a *personified symptom* of the speaker/writer in the form of an intrapersonal claim to *freedom*, denoted 1_{AQ} or F^1,
- a *participative signal* to the hearer/reader in the form of an interpersonal claim to *justice*, denoted 2_{AQ} or J^1, and
- a *representative symbol* of some other person or aspect of the world in the form of an impersonal claim to *truth*, denoted 3_{AQ} or T^1,

each of which simultaneously manifests in the appropriate corresponding forms of *intentional signifieds* (123_{UL}), *behavioral signifiers* (123_{UR}), *cultural semantics* (123_{LL}), and *social syntax* (123_{LR}), notwithstanding the all-too-plausible argument that the claimed contents of these primordial perspectives are *never* completely consistent in *any* particular action situation (123_{AQ}), hence always already implicating additional, yet indeterminate, action situations.

However, if TQP frames the 12 primordial perspectives of each and every *sign* of human action, then where exactly are the *referents* to which these signs refer? Regarding this, I question Wilber's decision to locate the referent exclusively in his semantics (X_{LL}) quadrant.[61] While I appreciate his reasons, I do not think it is imperative to locate it in this quadrant in order to support his larger hypothesis concerning the developmental/evolutionary spectrum of semantic world-spaces within which referents can, or cannot, be apprehend-

ed. In my view, the capacity to apprehend the referent of a sign, or in this formulation the referent of a semiotic action, is better framed as a *triadic quadratic semiotic capacity* with *constraints* that can be described, for example, in terms of the actor's *deep/surface structures* of consciousness, which are, in essence, *relatively stable conditions of possible awareness-in-action*. Just because one actor lacks the semiotic capacity to understand another's semiotic action does not necessarily mean that the referent of that action must be located exclusively in the semantics (X_{LL}) quadrant.

Figure 7. Triadic Quadratic Perspectivism – 1st Derivative Semiotics & Pragmatics

Therefore, given the more-or-less constrained triadic quadratic semiotic capacity of the particular actor, *I*, where, then, is the referent to which *my* semiotic action refers? This can be deduced by unpacking some of the concepts already presented. Wilber's definition of a sign as *any aspect of reality that represents another to another* implies that the *referent* to which a sign refers is *an aspect of reality*

represented by a sign. In other words, what is typically regarded by some semioticians as the *real* referent of a sign is simply *the reality* referred to by the sign or, in my version of semiotics, the reality signified by the triadic quadratic semiotic action. Given that TQP frames the whole of enacted reality from the perspective of the enactive origin, *I*, we can see that every potential referent of *mine* is framed within the 12 primordial perspectives of *my* semiotic action, which is governed by *my* more-or-less constrained semiotic capacity. These 12 primordial perspectives are themselves general domains of reality for all of us, hence *primordial referents*, signified by the system of personal pronouns we all use as *primordial signs*.

Furthermore, if all *kosmic occasions* are semiotic, as Wilber claims, then certainly all human actions are semiotic, if not also pragmatic, and thus all of *my present* actions signify the twelve semiotic realities *I* enact—including *my* views of *me* and *you*, *us* and *them*, *him* and *her*, *these* and *those*—as countless, intertwined, ever-receding series of *past reflected* and *future projected* action situations in which every sign is but a referent of another sign of a sign of a sign, *ad infinitum*. Finally, if *my present* actions can be referred to as *past* actions within *my future* actions, as any semiotician or pragmatician would likely agree, then all *my* actions *defer* signification of at least some portion of the reality *I* enact with those actions, pending future actions that will never, try as *I* might, complete the signification of *my* reality. Hence, it appears as though *my* situational action-in-awareness, however integral, is never really done.

Once again, these definitions are so fundamental as to suggest a universal scope of semiotic inquiry including, but by no means limited to, conventional spoken/written language and the reason and communication for which it serves as primary medium. Such an integral semiotics should certainly include complementary, extra-linguistic forms of semiosis, from the *instinctive* and *intuitive* to the *energetic* and *empathic* to the *mathematical* and *musical*, all of which are constitutive of the manifold semiotic reality of awareness-in-action. Hence, to the extent that integral praxiology entails the pragmatic use of spoken/written language, the resulting integral pragmatics should be informed by the more fundamental, more encompassing, extra-linguistic field of integral semiotics. Being so informed, this

integral pragmatics acknowledges the semiotic multiplicity in each action situation, even if only through the pragmatic medium of speaking/hearing and writing/reading about this manifold semiotic reality.

The essential elements of this integral pragmatics are framed within TQP, which is centered on *action* as expressed in the form of *verbs*, the use of which appears to differentiate and integrate the triadic quadratic *pronouns* that serve—both explicitly and implicitly—as spacially distributed *subjects* and *objects* of conjugated verbs, just as in the typical sentence structure of *subject-verb-object* (e.g., "I see you."). The many forms of action, all the specific verbs, can be rendered in *past*, *present*, and *future tenses* and further modified by the use of *adverbs*, just as the many types of spacially distributed pronouns can be rendered more specific by the use of *nouns* and further modified by the use of *adjectives*. With these we have the basic grammatical elements of the *sentence*, which typically fulfills one of several generic functions, including the *declarative* (e.g., "There are moons orbiting Jupiter."), the *interrogative* (e.g., "How do you know that?"), the *imperative* (e.g., "Look through this telescope."), and the *exclamative* (e.g., "Wow, there really *are* moons orbiting Jupiter!").

Furthermore, in addition to these generic functions recognized by all linguists, we can differentiate the triadic functions emphasized by Bühler and Habermas, which correspond with the three personal perspectives of representative truth, participative justice, and personified freedom. Given that the four sentences just illustrated are all variants of the impersonal *representative* function (i.e., declarative representative, interrogative representative, etc.), we can further illustrate the intrapersonal *personified* or *expressive* function (e.g., "I'm worried about the implications of this discovery.") and the interpersonal *participative* or *appellative* function (e.g., "We really shouldn't tell the Church."), both of which may also have declarative, interrogative, imperative, and exclamative variants in use.

Finally, by incorporating *conditional logic* into these multifunctional sentences, often in the form of *if-then* clauses, we open each action situation to a wide range of logical possibilities for truth, justice, and freedom, from those we may regard as *necessarily real*

(e.g., "If the Pope looks through this telescope, then he too will see Jupiter's moons.") to those we may regard as *possibly real* (e.g., "If the Pope looks through this telescope, then he may revise Church doctrine.") to those we may regard as *necessarily unreal* (e.g., "If nobody looks through the telescope again, then the moons of Jupiter won't really matter."), all of which we can nevertheless *realize* in some relative sense within that action situation.

The *sentence*, in turn, is the primary communicative act in spoken/written *language*, the communicatively competent use of which constructively enacts the variegated spacial-temporal realities—the *dimension* and *duration* of experience—that each and every one of us realizes differently through the triadic quadratic perspectives common to all of us. Recall that, for Habermas, "language and reality inextricably permeate one another. All experience is linguistically saturated such that no grasp of reality is possible that is not filtered through language."[62] In subtle contrast to the Kantian recognition that our knowledge of reality is always informed by, and therefore conformed to, the structures and content of our reasoning minds, Habermas contends that "the reality facing our propositions is not 'naked,' but is itself already permeated by language. The experience against which we check our assumptions is linguistically structured and embedded in contexts of action. As soon as we reflect on a loss of naïve certainties, we no longer face a set of basic propositions that are 'self-legitimating.' That is, there are no indubitable 'starting points' beyond the bounds of language, no experiences that can be taken for granted within the bounds of reasons."[63]

Wilber would evidently concur, as he accepts the essential postmodern insights into the linguistically-mediated *constructivism*, *contextualism*, and *perspectivism* of reality, at least as we can know it through reason.[64] Thus, reality as we know it is not some universal object given to the pure reason of some universal subject—as in *naïve realism*—but is to some extent a personal interpretive construction, the specifics of which are dependent upon a particular context which can always shift to another context, and, therefore, no contextualized perspective on reality should be unduly privileged as if it were universally context-transcendent. As he emphasizes, "language does not merely report the world, represent the world, describe the

world. Rather, language creates worlds, and in that creation is power. Language creates, distorts, carries, discloses, hides, allows, oppresses, enriches, enthralls." So "if we are to use language as a tool to understand reality, we had better start by looking very closely at that tool."[65] Furthermore, Wilber emphasizes the *enactive* nature of all efforts to understand reality, wherein experiential realities are "brought forth or enacted in part by the activity of the subject doing the experiencing. Thus, one activity (or paradigm) will bring forth a particular set of experiences—experiences that are not themselves innocent reflections of the one, true, real, and pregiven world, but rather are co-created and co-enacted by the paradigm or activity itself, and, accordingly, one paradigm does not give 'the correct view' of the world and therefore it cannot be used (as if it did) in order to negate, criticize, or exclude other experiences brought forth by other paradigms."[66] Hence, *my* constrained capacity to embed well-formed sentences in relation to *my* triadic quadratic perspectival reality—which is a more integral standard of communicative competence—may also constitute *my* constrained capacity to constructively enact *my* contextual reality, one triadic quadratic perspectival sentence after another.

Awareness-in-Action may therefore be understood in terms of three interdependent, irreducible perspectives—*first-person*, *second-person*, *third-person*—each of which includes four constituent interdependent, irreducible perspectives—*intentional*, *behavioral*, *cultural*, *social*—all four of which are experienced *intrapersonally*, *interpersonally*, and *impersonally* from within each of the actor's three distinct *personal* perspectives, thus forming a set of *triadic quadratic perspectives* that co-arise in every actor's awareness and find immediate expression in the system of *triadic quadratic pronouns* at the preconscious root of semiotic, pragmatic, and praxiological action-in-awareness.

— 2 —

TRIADIC QUADRATIC PERSPECTIVISM

Once we recognize the triadic quadratic pattern of primordial perspectives that are always already active in every action situation, we can begin to explore the more subtle complexities of triadic quadratic perspectivism.

Inherent Mutuality

Although it may appear complex at first, Figure 6 is just the most basic form of triadic quadratic perspectivism, which I refer to as the 1st Derivative and denote as TQP^1. For within each of the second- and third-person perspectives of human awareness-in-action, there is a derivative set of triadic quadratic perspectives owing to the fact that whomever is identified as a second- or third-person in relation to some first-person is a *person* in his or her own right and therefore the origin of his or her own unique TQP^1 actions, *interacting* with the *I-me* in the original TQP^1. These reciprocal triadic quadratic perspectives are illustrated in Figure 8 as the 2nd Derivative of TQP, denoted TQP^2.[67]

Thus, in relating to *you* within *my* second-person perspective (2$_{AQ}$), *I* (1$_{UL}$) recognize that *you* (2$_{UL}$) are *your* own origin of awareness-in-action and therefore possessor or *your* own triadic quadratic perspectives (2.123$_{AQ}$), the first-person singular of which *you* obviously regard as *I-me* (2.1$_{UL+UR}$), the second-person singular of which includes, for the moment, *I-me* (1$_{UL+UR}$), whom *you* regard as a *you-you* (2.2$_{UL+UR}$), and the third-person singular of which includes any

third-persons to *whom*, or to *which*, *you* are referring, such as *she-her* (2.3ᴜʟ₊ᴜʀ), which may, but need not, be the same third-person to whom or to which *I* am also referring in my triadic quadratic perspectives (3ᴜʟ₊ᴜʀ). In *my* efforts to understand *you* and to help *you* understand *me*, *I* would do well to pay attention to *your* triadic quadratic perspectives (2.123ᴀǫ) just as *you* would do well to pay attention to *mine* (123ᴀǫ) as derivative aspects of the second-person perspective in which *you* recognize *me* (2.2.123ᴀǫ).

Figure 8. Triadic Quadratic Perspectivism - 2ⁿᵈ Derivative

Likewise, in referring to some third-person (3ᴀǫ), such as *her*, *I* (1ᴜʟ) recognize that *she* (3ᴜʟ) is *her* own origin of awareness-in-action and therefore possessor of *her* own triadic quadratic perspectives (3.123ᴀǫ), the first-person singular of which *she* obviously regards as *I-me* (3.1ᴜʟ₊ᴜʀ), the second-person singular of which may, but need not necessarily, include *my you-you* (2ᴜʟ₊ᴜʀ) but will nevertheless be regarded by her as a *you-you* (3.2ᴜʟ₊ᴜʀ), and the third-person singular of which includes any third-persons to *whom*, or to *which*, *she* is

referring, such as a *he-him* (3.3_{UL+UR}), which could, but need not necessarily, be *I-me* (1_{UL+UR}) or *you-you* (2_{UL+UR}). In *my* efforts to understand *her*, however impersonal these efforts may be, *I* would do well to pay attention to *her* triadic quadratic perspectives (3.123_{AQ}) just as *she* may be curious about *mine* (123_{AQ}) as derivative aspects of the third-person perspective in which *she* may recognize *me* ($3.3.123_{AQ}$).[68]

The simple recognition of another person's TQP^1 awareness-in-action in relation to one's own TQP^1 awareness-in-action opens the more complex, interdependent TQP^2 and reveals the *inherent mutuality* of our situational awareness-in-action (123.123_{AQ}). This inherent mutuality appears to be grounded in a cultural-social *we-us* (123.123_{LL+LR}) with which *I*, *you*, and *she* must simultaneously identify in order to establish the fundamental mutuality of *our* action situation. In addition to that grounded mutuality that *we all* must share, *each* of *us* can, but need not necessarily, recognize additional collective identities in the course of *our* action situation, such as:

- a *we-us* with which only *I* identify (1_{LL+LR}), such as *my* relationship with someone other than *you* or *her* to which *I* refer in *our*—*mine*, *yours*, and *hers*—action situation and to which *you* refer as a plural *you-you* (2.2_{LL+LR}) and *she* refers as a *they-them* (3.3_{LL+LR});
- a *we-us* with which only *you* identify (2.1_{LL+LR}), such as *your* relationship with someone other than *me* or *her* to which *you* refer in *our*—*mine*, *yours*, and *hers*—action situation and to which *I* refer as a plural *you-you* (2_{LL+LR}) and she refers as a *they-them* (3.3_{LL+LR});
- a *we-us* with which only *she* identifies (3.1_{LL+LR}), such as *her* relationship with someone other than *me* or *you* to which *she* refers in *our*—*mine*, *yours*, and *his/her*—action situation and to which *I* and *you* refer as *they-them* (3_{LL+LR} and 2.3_{LL+LR});
- a *we-us* with which only *I* and *you* identify (12.12_{LL+LR}), such as *your* relationship with *me* to which *you* and *I* refer in *our*—*mine*, *yours*, and *hers*—action situation and to which *she* refers as a *they-them* (3.3_{LL+LR});
- a *we-us* with which only *I* and *she* identify (13.13_{LL+LR}), such as *her* relationship to *me* to which *she* and *I* refer in *our*—

mine, *yours*, and *hers*—action situation and to which *you* refer as a plural *you-you* (2.2_{LL+LR} and 2.3_{LL+LR}); and

- a *we-us* with which only *you* and *she* identify (23.12_{LL+LR}), such as *your* relationship to *her* to which *you* and *she* refer in *our*—*mine*, *yours*, and *hers*—action situation and to which *I* refer as a plural *you-you* (2_{LL+LR} and 3_{LL+LR}).

This suggests that all collectives are originally, and indeed ultimately, *we-us* identities, which would make sense simply because each of *us*—*I*, *you*, *she*—is a unique enactive *I* with *our* own respective first-person quadratic perspective in which each of *us* always identifies a *we-us* in the collective perspectives. To put this another way, just as there are no individual identities that are not recognized, first and foremost, as first-person individual-subjective *I* (1_{UL}) and individual-objective *me* (1_{UR}), likewise there are no shared identities that are not recognized, first and foremost, as first-person collective-subjective *we* (1_{LL}) and collective-objective *us* (1_{LR}). As we will see, these seven permutations of the *we-us* perspectives within TQP² are sufficient for the mutual identification of *all* people, indeed all *sentient beings*, with the capacity for mutual identification.

This TQP² formulation further clarifies the distinctions between *each* of the triadic perspectives with regard to *all* of the quadratic perspectives. As we saw with TQP¹, from within the first-person perspective of a freedom that is *expressed* and *reflected* in pragmatic *personification* (1_{AQ}), awareness-in-action presupposes and can be understood in terms of:

- the intentional or individual-subjective *I* (1_{UL}), which is experienced intrapersonally as the root of consciousness and implied source of *my* own actions;
- the behavioral or individual-objective *me* (1_{UR}), which is experienced intrapersonally as the conduct of *my* actions as seen by the *I* reflexively coordinating *my* behavior in relation to *my* intention;
- the cultural or collective-subjective *we* (1_{LL}), which is experienced intrapersonally as the meaningful context of shared identity established through a lifetime of enculturation and often referenced in relation to the intentional *I* as if to justify action or diffuse responsibility; and

- the social or collective-objective *us* (1LR), which is experienced intrapersonally as the functional context of shared conduct established through a lifetime of socialization and often referenced in relation to the behavioral *me* or reflexively in relation to the cultural *we*.

Furthermore, from within the second-person perspective of a justice that is *engaged* and *interpreted* in pragmatic *participation* (2AQ), awareness-in-action presupposes and can be better understood by:

- *recognizing* in *your* actions (2AQ) the same general quadratic perspectives that are, for *you*, intrapersonally experienced facets of *your* own first-person action as expressed and reflected by *you* (2.1AQ), interpersonally experienced facets of *your* own second-person action as engaged and interpreted by *you* (2.2AQ), and impersonally experienced facets of *your* own third-person action as observed and inferred by *you* (2.3AQ);
- *engaging* and *interpreting your* TQP validity claims as *I* experience these claims within *my* second-person perspective (2.123AQ); and
- *receiving feedback* and *learning* about *my* own TQP validity claims (123AQ), which are *disclosed* and *experienced* as *I* engage and interpret interpersonally (2.2AQ).

Finally, from within the third-person perspective of a truth that is *observed* and *inferred* in pragmatic *representation* (3AQ), awareness-in-action presupposes and can be better understood by:

- *recognizing* in *his* actions (3AQ) the same general quadratic perspectives that are, for *him*, intrapersonally experienced facets of *his* own first-person action as expressed and reflected by *him* (3.1AQ), interpersonally experienced facets of *his* own second-person action as engaged and interpreted by *him* (3.2AQ), and impersonally experienced facets of *his* own third-person action as observed and inferred by *him* (3.3AQ);
- *observing* and *drawing inferences* about *his* TQP validity claims as *I* experience these claims within *my* third-person perspective (3.123AQ); and

- *receiving feedback* and *learning* about *my* own TQP validity claims (123ᴀQ), which are *disclosed* and *experienced* as *I* observe and infer impersonally (3.3ᴀQ).

Once again, triadic quadratic perspectivism differentiates and integrates the pragmatic *personification*, *participation*, and *representation* of human awareness-in-action that are designated, respectively, by the various permutations of first-, second-, and third-person quadratic pronouns. But in its TQP¹ formulation, these three modes of dialogical reason are only *active* in a unilateral way, because *my* action does not fully recognize *your* action and *his* or *her* action in bilateral and trilateral ways. It is only in TQP² that the inherently mutual nature of awareness-in-action is revealed. This suggests a continuous shifting of minds—*my* mind, *your* mind, and *his* or *her* mind—through interdependent personification, participation, and representation while engaged in action oriented toward mutual understanding of what really is free, just, and true for *each* and *all* of *us* (123.123ᴀQ). Recognizing this inherent mutuality is one of the most important shifts of mind necessary to understand TQP.

Although Habermas does not recognize the fully quadratic nature of his triadic perspectives, he does emphasize that "fundamental to the paradigm of mutual understanding is… the performative attitude of participants in interaction, who coordinate their plans for action by coming to an understanding about something in the world. When ego carries out a speech act and alter takes up a position with regard to it, the two parties enter into an interpersonal relationship. The latter is structured by the system of reciprocally interlocked perspectives among speakers, hearers, and nonparticipants who happen to be present at the time. On the level of grammar, this corresponds to the system of personal pronouns. Whoever has been trained in this system has learned how, in the performative attitude, to take up and to transform into one another the perspectives of the first, second, and third persons."[69]

Building on Habermas, I am proposing that, by virtue of our evident facility with the system of personal pronouns, most of us are in possession of this tacit knowledge of the reciprocally interlocked triadic quadratic perspectives that structure all our actions in our worlds. Hence, any meta-theory that is purportedly formulated on

the perspectival basis of personal pronouns should faithfully reflect the actual system of personal pronouns used by every communicatively competent person. Accordingly, it is not enough to make reference to the first-, second-, and third-person perspectives as if each is an *undifferentiated whole* represented by a *single* personal pronoun, such as *I*, *you*, and *him*, or, as with Wilber, *I*, *we*, and *it*. By engaging this system of personal pronouns through the use of language in everyday reason and communication, we do a great deal more than simply identify the obvious body-based distinctions between *me*, *you*, and *him*. We also exert subtle, but relentless pressures to mentally differentiate and integrate the *individual/collective* as well as the *subjective/objective* aspects of all three personal perspectives for all three of us. Simply using each of the distinct personal pronouns in relation to the others—such as *I-me*, *I-we*, *you-me*, *us-them*, *she-they*—brings a certain creative tension to every action situation that results, through years of mutual practice, in the establishment of a remarkably durable, universally recognizable, and personally actionable meta-theory of *mutual identification*.

The linguistic evolution that appears to have generated this semiotic, pragmatic, and praxiological meta-structure of mutual identification suggests that it cannot be so easily dismissed as an arbitrary assemblage of perspectives from which selected perspectives might be eliminated or to which additional perspectives might be appended in an *ad hoc* fashion. As if to highlight this point, even the TQP illustrations in Figures 6-8 depict what appear to be clearly differentiated perspectives, with solid lines marking off well-defined white spaces for each content-free perspective. It suggests, for example, that *my* perspectival awareness of *me* is clearly differentiated from *my* perspectival awareness of *you*, and *our* shared awareness of *we-us* is just as clearly differentiated from *our* shared awareness of *they-them*. And yet, a moment's reflection on one's actual experience of such perspectives might suggest far less clearly defined boundaries. After all, where exactly in *my* awareness of *our* relationship does the *me* end and *you* begin? Where precisely do *we-us* transition to *they-them* in the course of *my* reflections on *our* conversations about *them*? Is there really a clear boundary between who *we* are and who *I* am? And if so, where exactly are *you* in the *we* that *we* share? It therefore

occurs to me that perhaps the crisp, solid lines of TQP might be better rendered as fuzzy, permeable transitions between fundamentally overlapping, yet nevertheless, primordial perspectives.

However, the primordial signs we use to designate these primordial perspectives—the system of reciprocally interlocked personal pronouns at the preconscious root of language itself—do not appear to admit such a gradual transition between *I* and *me*, *me* and *you*, *us* and *them*, or *you* and *we*. Any attempt to think, speak, write, and converse about the everyday complexities of our life experiences while deliberately overlapping, conflating, swapping, or eliminating the pronouns used to designate adjacent primordial perspectives would result not in communicative *nuance*, but in *chaos*. Even the simplest accounts of *who said what to whom* and *who will do what when* would be rendered incoherent as conversations erupt in conflict. In other words, any attempt in a real-world action situation to unilaterally ignore the *implicit rules* revealed in TQP^1 will foment conflict and likely fail amidst the *inherent mutuality* revealed in TQP^2. Evidently, these primordial signs, and therefore the corresponding perspectives of reality to which they refer, tend to arise in a rather clearly differentiated perspectivism that nevertheless at least implies a less clearly designated continuum of awareness-in-action no less real.

Yet another feature of this mutual identification via TQP^2 is revealed in the perspectival terms we often use to attribute our respective reality claims to one another. These triadic quadratic *possessives*, illustrated in Figure 9, are the means by which each of us acts possessively, laying claim for ourselves and on behalf of each other to the specific *content* framed by each of the 36 distinct *contexts* enacted in the TQP^2 derivative of our situational awareness-in-action. But this is about more than just the content of these perspectives. The possessives are the primary means by which we proclaim and maintain our relationships to specific people, other conscious beings, and non-sentient things. *I* relate to reality through *my* particular TQP and in proclaiming *my* relationships to reality through the use of TQP possessives, *I* lay claim to *my* reality, as if to own it, control it, and protect it, as much as I may also try to disown it, share it, and improve it. After all, it is *mine*; unless it is *yours* or *hers*, *ours* or *theirs*.

Figure 9. Triadic Quadratic Perspectivism - 2nd Derivative
Possessive & Reflexive

Granted, this is just the way our language works. Possessive adjectives and pronouns are linguistic tools that help us manage our pragmatic actions in the world. But language has evolved to represent who we are and how we act and language in turn shapes who we are and how we act. The possessives certainly do contribute to interpersonal conflict rooted in the sense of identification and ownership we often feel toward our parochial views on reality, to say nothing of our mutually-exclusive ownership of so much of reality. At the same time, the possessives appear to play an essential role in facilitating personal ownership of, and therefore accountability for, the reality claims made and the reality contexts implied in every action situation—ownership and accountability without which mutual realization would not happen. In the course of doing so, the possessives facilitate a measure of dis-identification from, and therefore self-reflexive relationships with, one's own reality claims

and contexts. For example, if *I* pre-consciously possess the perspectives, thoughts, feelings, and actions that arise in *my* awareness, then *I* can cultivate a conscious distinction between *who I am* and *what I experience*. This supports the development of an increasingly autonomous, yet integrated identity and the mature interpersonal relationships it can maintain.

Therefore, in somewhat of an irony, the sheer possessiveness of human action and the conflict it fuels co-arises with a shared capacity for personal development and the mutual identification it requires. As we will see, this personal development via mutual identification requires the continuous use not only of possessive but also *reflexive* pronouns, as they are the means by which *I* develop a paradoxical measure of possessive identification with, and dis-identification from, *myself* as *I* am able to (re)cognize it in *me*. Likewise, from *my* perspective, it appears that this latently possessive reflexive capacity shows up in *your* view of *yourself*, *his* view of *himself*, and *her* view of *herself*, as well as *our* view of *ourselves*, *your* view of *yourselves*, and *their* view of *themselves*.

Mutual Reflexivity

While Habermas's formal pragmatics is grounded in Bühler's triadic model of language functions in which a speaker comes to an understanding with a hearer about someone or something in the world, it is George Herbert Mead who provides Habermas with a pragmatic account of the developmental dynamics within and between these personal perspectives. "Mead starts from the view that identity formation takes place through the medium of linguistic communication. And since the subjectivity of one's own intentions, desires, and feelings by no means eludes this medium, the agencies of the 'I' and the 'me,' of ego and superego, issue from the *same* process of socialization." Thus, "the process of socialization is at the same time one of individuation.... As a principle of individuation he adduces not the body but a structure of perspectives that is set within the communicative roles of the first, second, and third person."[70]

By my reading, Mead engages in a form of reflexive self-inquiry by asking "where in conduct does the 'I' come in as over against the 'me'?"[71] As if recording his own discoveries, he observes that "the 'I' of this moment is present in the 'me' of the next moment…. I become a 'me' in so far as I remember what I said…. It is because of the 'I' that we say that we are never fully aware of what we are, that we surprise ourselves by our own action. It is as we act that we are aware of ourselves. It is in memory that the 'I' is constantly present in experience…. If you ask, then, where directly in your own experience the 'I' comes in, the answer is that it comes in as a historical figure. It is what you were a second ago that is the 'I' of the 'me.'"[72]

At first glance, this appears to be a recapitulation of Kant's self-inquiry, which discloses the fundamental distinction between *empirical self-consciousness*—which can be interpreted as the objective *me* known only in hindsight—and *transcendental self-consciousness*—which would be the subjective *I* who can know the objective *me*, but whose spontaneous nature, intuitively apperceived, forever eludes empirical self-observation. As Kant describes it, "the I that I think is distinct from the I that it, itself, intuits…; I am given to myself beyond that which is given in intuition, and yet know myself, like other phenomena, only as I appear to myself, not as I am."[73] Mead, however, follows his self-inquiry until he discovers, enfolded in the *me*, not just the reflection of a *monological I*, but the generalized behavioral expectations of other people—*all* of *you*—with whom the individuated *I* has been *dialogically* socializing in the course of its development.

He then proposes that, "the 'I' is the response of the organism to the attitudes of the others; the 'me' is the organized set of attitudes of others which one himself assumes. The attitudes of the others constitute the organized 'me', and then one reacts toward that as an 'I.'"[74] Mead contends that, "the separation of the 'I' and the 'me' is not fictitious. They are not identical, for… the 'I' is something that is never entirely calculable. The 'me' does call for a certain sort of an 'I' in so far as we meet the obligations that are given in conduct itself, but the 'I' is always something different from what the situation itself calls for…. The 'I' both calls out the 'me' and responds to it. Taken together they constitute a personality as it appears in social

experience. The self is essentially a social process going on with these two distinguishable phases. If it did not have these two phases there could not be conscious responsibility, and there would be nothing novel in experience."[75] He emphasizes that, "both aspects of the 'I' and the 'me' are essential to the self in its full expression. One must take the attitude of the others in a group in order to belong to a community; he has to employ that outer social world taken within himself in order to carry on a thought…. On the other hand, the individual is constantly reacting to the social attitudes, and changing in this co-operative process the very community to which he belongs…. Those two constantly appearing phases are the important phases in the self."[76]

In Habermas's view, "by introducing the expression 'me' to refer to the identity of the sociated individual, Mead is systematically connecting the role taking effective in socialization with the speech situations in which speakers and hearers enter into interpersonal relations as members of a social group. 'Me' stands for the aspect that ego offers to an alter in an interaction when the latter makes a speech-act offer to ego. Ego takes this view of himself by adopting alter's perspective when alter requests something of ego, that is, of *me*, promises something to *me*, expects something of *me*, fears, hates or pleases *me*, and so forth. The interpersonal relation between the speaker and the one spoken to, I and thou, first and second person, is set up in such a way, however, that in adopting the perspective of a vis-à-vis, ego cannot steal away from his own communicative role. Taking the attitude of alter, so as to make the latter's expectations his own, does not exempt ego from the role of first-person; it is *he* who, in the role of ego, has to satisfy the behavior patterns he first took over from alter and internalized."[77]

Thus, in terms of TQP[1], the individual-subjective *I* (1UL) remains pragmatically differentiated from the individual-objective *me* (1UR), allowing the *I* a certain freedom to choose, in each action situation, how to respond to the *inter*personal (2) expectations internalized in the *intra*personal (1) perspective of *me*. The *reflexive* structure of the *intra*personal relation between *I* and *me* (1UL+UR) wherein *I* interact with *myself*, thus mirrors, in a general way, the *mutual* structure of the *inter*personal relation between the reflexive *I-me* (1UL+UR) and the

reflexive *you-you* (2_{UL+UR}) wherein *you-you* and *I-me* interact with each other. This *mutual reflexivity* is then mirrored in the collective-subjective-objective *we-us* wherein *we* interact with *ourselves*, which constitutes *my* collective perspectives (1_{LL+LR}) and part of *yours* (2_{LL+LR}) and on occasion part of *his* or *hers* (3_{LL+LR}) as well, as when *we* are *all* (123.123_{LL+LR}) identified in the same action situation, as *we all* must be at a fundamental level.

Furthermore, in terms of TQP², *my* ability to recognize the individual-subjective *you* in relation to the individual-objective *you*, that is, *your* intentions (2_{UL}) that *I* interpret in contrast to *your* behavior (2_{UR}) that *I* engage, is reinforced by *my* own first-person experience of the individual-subjective *I* (1_{UL}) in relation to the individual-objective *me* (1_{UR})—a reflexive experience of *responsible freedom* that *I* attribute to *you-you*, as *your* own unique enactive *I* in reflexive relationship with *your me*, in order to establish an interpersonal relation. The individual-subjective-objective *you-you* (2_{UL+UR}) is *my* perspective on *your I-me* (2.1_{UL+UR}), as well as *your you-you* (2.2_{UL+UR}) and *your he-him* (2.3_{UL+UR}), each of which has its own corresponding collective-subjective-objective perspectives—*your we-us* (2.1_{LL+LR}), *your you-you* or *we-us* (2.2_{LL+LR}), and *your they-them, you-you, or we-us* (2.3_{LL+LR})—as enacted by *your I* (2.1_{UL}) and engaged by *me* in *my* second-person collective-subjective-objective perspectives (2_{LL+LR}) as either *you-you* or *we-us*. This forms *my* fully quadratic second-person perspective in the 2nd Derivative, which identifies *your* complete set of triadic quadratic perspectives (2.123_{AQ}).

Finally, as *I* shift *my* attention from the *inter*personal relations *I* have with *all* of *you*, to the *im*personal relations *I* have with *all* of *them*, *I* attribute to *each* of *them* the same triadic quadratic perspectives as *I* attribute to *each* of *you*, each set of which is enacted by a responsibly free person, a unique enactive *I* in reflexive relationship with *her* own *me*, whom *I* recognize in the individual-subjective-objective *she-her* (3_{UL+UR}) and the collective-subjective-objective perspectives (3_{LL+LR}), which can be identified as either *we-us, you-you*, or *they-them* depending upon which collective is relevant to *her* role in the present action situation. Similar to *my* perspectives on *you*, the individual-subjective-objective *she-her* (3_{UL+UR}) is *my* perspective on *her I-me* (3.1_{UL+UR}), as well as *her you-you* (3.2_{UL+UR}) and *her he-him*

(3.3_{UL+UR}), each of which has its own corresponding collective-subjective-objective perspectives—*her we-us* (3.1_{LL+LR}), *her you-you* or *we-us* (3.2_{LL+LR}), and *her they-them, you-you, or we-us* (3.3_{LL+LR})—as enacted by *her I* (3.1_{UL}) and engaged by *me* in *my* third-person collective-subjective-objective perspectives (3_{LL+LR}) as either *they-them, you-you*, or *we-us*. This forms *my* fully quadratic third-person perspective in the 2nd Derivative, which identifies *her* complete set of triadic quadratic perspectives (3.123_{AQ}).

Therefore, in this TQP² formulation of integral pragmatics, the development of *my* identity, *I-me*, in relation to *all* of *you*, as discovered by Mead and elaborated by Habermas, actually implies the development of *your* identity and *his* or *her* identity as well as the evolution of *each* of *our* collective identities via the pragmatic identification of all 12 primordial perspectives of the first-person (123_{AQ}), second-person (2.123_{AQ}), and third-person (3.123_{AQ}) in every action situation (123.123_{AQ}). Essential to this TQP² identification is the *reflexivity* within, and *mutuality* between, each subjective-objective identity—*I-me, you-you*, and *she-her* as well as *we-us, you-you*, and *they-them*—as well as the *mutual mutuality* by which *each* of *us* recognizes *each* of *our* primordial perspectives of reality. Recognizing this latently possessive *mutual reflexivity* is critical to understanding the developmental-evolutionary dynamics of human awareness-in-action.

As if echoing Mead's *phases of the self*,[78] but with a monological emphasis reminiscent of Kant's *transcendental/empirical self-consciousness*,[79] Wilber points to the distinctions between the *I* and the *me* before describing their roles in personal development.

> If you get a sense of your self right now—simply notice what it is that you call 'you'—you might notice at least two parts to this 'self': one, there is some sort of observing self (an inner subject or watcher); and two, there is some sort of observed self (some objective things that you can see or know about yourself…). The first is experienced as an 'I,' the second as a 'me' (or even 'mine'). I call the first the *proximate self* (since it is closer to 'you'), and the second the *distal self* (since it is objective and 'farther away'). The both of them together—along with any other sources of selfness—I call the *overall self*. These distinctions are important because, as many researchers have noted—from Sri Ramana Maharshi[80] to Robert Kegan—

> during psychological development, *the 'I' of one stage becomes a 'me'*
> *at the next*. That is, what you are identified with (or embedded in)
> at one stage of development (and what you therefore experience
> very intimately as an 'I'), tends to become transcended, or disiden-
> tified with, or de-embedded at the next, so you can see it more ob-
> jectively, with some distance and detachment. In other words, the
> *subject* of one stage becomes an *object* of the next.

In summary, "the *overall self…* is an amalgam of all of these 'selves'
insofar as they are present in you right now: the proximate self (or
'I'), the distal self (or 'me'), and at the very back of your awareness,
that ultimate Witness (the transcendental Self, antecedent Self, or 'I-
I'). All of those go into your sensation of being a self in this moment,
and all of them are important for understanding the development or
evolution of consciousness."[81]

Although it is unclear how Wilber's AQAL formulation might
provide for any perspectival differentiation between his *proximate
self*, or subjective *I*, his *distal self*, or objective *me*, and his *antecedent
self*, or ultimate witness, TQP clearly identifies the proximate self as
the first-person individual-subjective *I* (1_{UL}), the distal self as the
first-person individual-objective *me* (1_{UR}), and the antecedent self as
the integral awareness (0) within which all *my* triadic quadratic
perspectives co-arise, all of which comprise what I will call the
integral/différantial self (123_{AQ}). Accepting for the moment the provi-
sional validity of the antecedent self, the background witness, or *I-I*,
to which Ramana Maharshi consistently directed our attention,[82] we
might hypothesize that the proximate self, the subjective *I* that *I*
think *I* am (1_{UL}), is but the antecedent self, the integral awareness *that
I am* (0 or TQP^0), when it is semiotically, pragmatically, and praxio-
logically identified with a deep structure of awareness-in-action
through which it differentially enacts, or actively refracts, the distal
self, the objective *me* that *I* appear to be in hindsight or foresight
(1_{UR}), along with all the other primordial perspectives of *my* inte-
gral/différantial self (123_{AQ} or TQP^1).

Then, accepting for the moment the provisional validity of deep
structures of awareness-in-action that have emerged in one or more
multi-structural sequences through time—regardless of how univer-
sal/particular or hierarchical/heterarchical any sequence may appear
to be—we might hypothesize that it is this antecedent self that is

periodically identifying, de-identifying, and re-identifying—Ramana Maharshi would say continuously mis-identifying—with whatever deep structures appear to be governing *my* awareness-in-action, thus providing that self-evident continuity of awareness (phenomeno-) logically prior to the active (re/de)identification of the proximate *I* that *I* think *I* am habitually observing the distal *me* that *I* think *I* was and will be in relation to all the other primordial perspectives with which *I* can identify. This, as Wilber would generally concur,[83] is further suggestive of the antecedent self as that integral awareness that is, in and of itself, whether the proximate *I* that *I* think *I* am (focused on the distal *me* that *I* think *I* was and will be) realizes it or not, uninterrupted by changing states of awareness-in-action—such as waking, dreaming, and sleeping—in the course of an ordinary day and changing structures of awareness-in-action—from preformal to formal to postformal—in the course of an extraordinary life.

While this distal *me* is not literally the proximate *I* that *I* was (any more than it is the proximate *I* that *I* will be)—as if the intentional capacities of an earlier structure could simply transfer over to become behavioral capacities of a later structure—it is nevertheless the objective perspective through which the proximate *I* that *I* think *I* am *now* can literally re-cognize the proximate *I* that *I* think *I* was *then* as the *intentional signified* corresponding with the *behavioral signifier*, *me*, of a temporal stage now past. This, I think, is what Mead means when he says that "the 'I' of this moment is present in the 'me' of the next moment…. I become a 'me' in so far as I remember what I said…. If you ask, then, where directly in your own experience the 'I' comes in, the answer is that it comes in as a historical figure. It is what you were a second ago that is the 'I' of the 'me.'"[84] This more nuanced reconstruction may still be consistent with Kegan's developmental logic, whereby the capacities experienced as *subject in one's knowing* within one structure of consciousness gradually transition over many years to become *object in one's knowing* from the more encompassing perspective of the higher-order subject,[85] provided that *my* past *I-me* can be *known* as a pragmatic object in relation to *my* present pragmatic subject (e.g., *I* now *know* something more about who *I* was and how *I* acted, which is another way of saying *I* now *know* something more about *my* past *I-me*). Thus, reconciling Mead,

Kegan, and Wilber, we might say that *I* become aware of who *I* was just a moment ago when *I* regard the *me* that *I* appear to be right now—as the distal *me* is but the proximate *I* in hindsight or fore-sight—and yet, in doing so, *I* can also become aware of *who I was* many years ago, when *I* was acting through what *I* can only now recognize—perhaps with the assistance of a good developmental theory—as a previous structure of awareness-in-action still operative as an interpretable-observable sub-structure of *my* current intention-al-behavioral *I-me*.

Furthermore, if indeed the proximate *I* that *I* think *I* am (1_{UL}) is but the antecedent self, the integral awareness *that I am* (0 or TQP^0), when it is semiotically, pragmatically, and praxiologically identified with a deep structure of awareness-in-action through which it differ-entially enacts, or actively refracts, the distal *me* that *I* think *I* was and will be (1_{UR}), along with all the other primordial perspectives of *my* integral/différantial self (123_{AQ} or TQP^1), then it is reasonable to attribute the same to *each* of *your* integral/différantial selves (2.123_{AQ}) and *each* of *their* integral/différantial selves (3.123_{AQ}) amidst *our* situational awareness-in-action (123.123_{AQ} or TQP^2). What makes this all the more interesting is the fact that *my* understanding of *your* own *I-me* (2.1_{UL+UR}), which *I* regard as the proximate-distal selves at the reflexive origin of *you-you* (2_{UL+UR}), and *her* own *I-me* (3.1_{UL+UR}), which *I* regard as the proximate-distal selves at the reflexive origin of *she-her* (3_{UL+UR}), is supported, yet also limited by *my* semiotic, pragmatic, and praxiological capacities, or the proximate *I* that *I* think *I* am (1_{UL}) as the structured origin of *my* awareness-in-action, which is *situa-tionally interdependent* with the proximate *I* that *you* think *you* are and the proximate *I* that *she* thinks *she* is. It then follows (phenomeno-)logically that *my* second-person *you-you* perspectives (2_{UL+UR}) and third-person *she-her* perspectives (3_{UL+UR}) are governed by *my* active structure of awareness—the relative surprise of the proximate *I* that *I* think *I* am (1_{UL}) in reflexive contrast to the relative familiarity of the distal *me* that *I* think *I* was and will be (1_{UR})—even though these perspectives refer to *your* intentions-behaviors (2.123_{UL+UR}) governed by the proximate *I* that *you* think *you* are (2.1_{UL}) as the structured origin of *your* awareness-in-action and *her* intentions-behaviors (3.123_{UL+UR}) governed by the proximate *I* that *she* thinks *she* is (3.1_{UL})

as the structured origin of *her* awareness-in-action, which in turn subtly influence the proximate *I* that *I* think *I* am as well as the distal *me* that *I* think *I* was and will be, and therefore how *I* regard *you-you* and *she-her*. This frames the mutual, reflexive, developmental dialogue between the *surprising* (123.123_{UL}) and the *familiar* (123.123_{UR}) phases of *each* of *our* individuated integral/différantial selves—*mine* (123_{UL+UR}), *each* of *yours* (2.123_{UL+UR}), and *each* of *theirs* (3.123_{UL+UR})—co-arising in *our* situational awareness-in-action (123.123_{AQ}).[86]

Rounding out these developmental reconstructions of the intentional-behavioral perspectives (123.123_{UL+UR}) of *each* of *our* integral/différantial selves—*mine*, *each* of *yours*, and *each* of *theirs*—are the shared cultural-social perspectives (123.123_{LL+LR}) of *each* of *our* integral/différantial selves (123.123_{AQ}). Once again, accepting for the moment the provisional validity of deep structures of awareness-in-action that have emerged in one or more multi-structural sequences through time—regardless of how universal/particular or hierarchical/heterarchical any sequence may appear to be—we might hypothesize that, as *each* of *us* develops through *our* mutual, reflexive awareness-in-action (123.123_{UL+UR}), the seven permutations of the proximate *we* that *each* of *us* thinks *we* are (123.123_{LL}) and the distal *us* that each of *us* thinks *we* were and will be (123.123_{LR}) will tend to evolve in concert. These collective perspectives on *what it all means* and *how it all works* begin with the fundamental *we-us* with which *all* three of *us* must identify in order to identify with *each other*, which will likely be governed by a structure of awareness-in-action that is no more evolved than what *all* of *us* can access in this situation. This might be thought of as a situation-specific capacity for pragmatic meaning-function and semiotic semantics-syntax with which *we* can *all* identify—one that still allows for the additional six less-widely-shared permutations of the proximate *we* that *we* think *we* are and the distal *us* that *we* think *we* were and will be, governed by structures of awareness-in-action that may be different from the structure in which *our* situational action-in-awareness is currently grounded.

Among other things, this reconstruction clarifies the perspectival basis for the existence of human collectives of all scales—relationships, groups, organizations, institutions, and civilizations—that appear to be governed by structures of awareness-in-action that

are *situationally different* from those accessible by their individual members in other situations, including the potential co-existence of multiple multi-structural patterns of human development and evolution that nevertheless share in the *we-us* of a common humanity. It also clarifies the perspectival basis by which widely shared structures of pragmatic meaning-function and semiotic semantics-syntax, particularly when embedded in long-lived institutional designs, influence the life-long development of individuals by *overtly encouraging* individual and collective action, learning, and development consistent with the widely shared structure, while *covertly discouraging* action, learning, and development inconsistent with that structure. Finally, it clarifies the perspectival basis by which each structure of pragmatic and semiotic action within a multi-structural sequence can *manifest differently* depending upon whether it is doing so *concurrent with*, *prior to*, or *subsequent to* the institutionalization of that same structure in large-scale collectives.

Therefore, it appears as if the triadic quadratic perspectivism of human awareness-in-action may help us frame—indeed, may already *be* framing—the entire, multi-structural metalogue of human development and evolution as it actually unfolds through the intrapersonal, interpersonal, and impersonal experiences of the intentional, behavioral, cultural, and social aspects of our situational awareness-in-action.

Reflexive Différance

This *pragmatic* mutuality and reflexivity that appears to be so essential to the development and evolution of identity implies an underlying *semiotic* mutuality and reflexivity of comparable significance. While Habermas does not offer his own particular version of semiotics, he does embrace Bühler's triadic semiotics as foundational to his own triadic pragmatics.[87] Furthermore, we can verify the extent to which Habermas accepts both the *reflexive* and the *mutual* nature of semiotic action by way of his critique of Charles Sanders Peirce's semiotics. Briefly, as Wilber explains, Peirce's model includes three features: i) a *sign* that corresponds with Saussure's

signifier that Wilber frames, correctly, in my view, within his behavioral *signifier* quadrant (XUR); ii) an *interpretant* that corresponds with Saussure's *signified* that Wilber frames, again correctly, in my view, within his intentional *signified* quadrant (XUL); and iii) an *object* that corresponds with Saussure's *referent* that Wilber frames, incorrectly, in my view, within his cultural *semantics* quadrant (XLL).[88]

As Habermas interprets him, "Peirce seems to regard the intersubjective relationship between a speaker and hearer, and the corresponding participant perspectives of the first and second person (in contrast to the perspective of an uninvolved third person), as such aspects that may be disregarded. He seems to believe that the fundamental semiotic structure can be completely defined without any recourse to forms of intersubjectivity, no matter how elementary. In any event, he generally leaves off from his logical-semiotic analyses at the point where speaker-hearer perspectives come into play."[89] It is important to recognize that when Habermas uses the term *intersubjective* in this and the following passage, he is using it in reference to what he elsewhere refers to, and what I consistently refer to, as the *interpersonal* relationship between people who regard one another in the second-person perspective, as *I* regard *you* and *you* regard *me*. This should not be misinterpreted as equating exclusively to the *collective-subjective* perspective that *we* can share. Triadic quadratic perspectivism clarifies that not only is the collective-subjective perspective (XLL) categorically different from the interpersonal perspective (2AQ), but it has *intra*personal (1LL), *inter*personal (2LL), and *im*personal (3LL) differentiations (e.g., *we*, *you*-plural, *they*) that can only be legitimately undifferentiated within a properly identified indefinite collective-subjective perspective (XLL) (e.g., *everyone*).[90]

Habermas locates the source of what he sees as Peirce's monological reductionism in his tendency to conceive of mutual understanding as a literal *fusion* of first-person *ego* and second-person *alter*, which "not only implies the dissolution of contradictions, but also the extinguishing of the individuality of those who are able to contradict each other—their disappearance within a collective representation…. Peirce conceives of the identity of the individual as the mirror-image of the mechanical solidarity of a group: 'Thus every man's soul is a special determination of the generic soul of the

family, the class, the nation, the race to which he belongs.'"[91] In contrast, Habermas draws approvingly on Mead as "the first to conceive language as a medium that socializes communicative actors only insofar as it simultaneously individualizes them. The collective identities of the family, class, and nation stand in a complementary relation to the unique identity of the individual; the one may not be absorbed by the other."[92]

Then, as if mapping the essential perspectives of semiotic and pragmatic action, the notation for which I have inserted for clarity, Habermas argues that "ego [1] and alter [2] can agree in an interpretation and share the same idea only insofar as they do not violate the conditions of linguistic communication but maintain an intersubjective [i.e., *interpersonal* 2.2] relationship that requires them to orient themselves toward each other as first person [1_{UL+UR} or *I-me*] is oriented toward second person [2_{UL+UR} or *you-you*]. This means, however, that each must distinguish himself from the other [12_{UL+UR} or *my* view of *I-me* vs. *you-you* and 2.12_{UL+UR} or *your* view of *I-me* vs. *you-you*] in the same way that both in common must distinguish themselves in the first-person plural [12_{LL+LR} or *my* view of *we-us* and 2.12_{LL+LR} or *your* view of *we-us*] from others as third persons [3_{LL+LR} or *my* view of *they-them* and 2.3_{LL+LR} or *your* view of *they-them*, which then implies 3_{UL+UR} or *my* view of *she-her/he-him* and 2.3_{UL+UR} or *your* view of *she-her/he-him*]. Were the dimension of possible contradiction and difference [between *each other*] to close, then linguistic communication would contract into a type of communion that no longer needs language as the means of reaching mutual understanding."[93]

Recalling the correlations between Peirce's, Saussure's, and Wilber's semiotic models, it appears that Habermas agrees with Peirce's differentiated *reflexivity* between objective sign (i.e., signifier, X_{UR}) and subjective interpretant (i.e., signified, X_{UL}), while criticizing his neglect of the differentiated *mutuality* between the first-person signified-signifier (1_{UL-UR}) and the second-person signified-signifier (2_{UL-UR}), with at least a nod to the third-person signified-signifier (3_{UL-UR}) as well as the *mutual mutuality* by which each of these persons differentiates the signifieds-signifiers associated with each of these persons (123.123_{UL+UR})—a critique that must therefore extend to Saussure's and Wilber's semiotic models. Hence, the *undifferentiated*

communion that Habermas critiques might be illustrated in our context as the indefinite quadratic perspectivism (X_{AQ}) of Figure 10 in which *anyone* and *anything*, *everyone* and *everything*, are presumed to be understandable, if not yet understood, by *anyone* and *everyone*, without recourse to theories, let alone practices, of linguistically-mediated mutual understanding between real people using specific first-, second-, and third-person perspectives (123.123_{AQ}). This *mono-logical*, rather than *dialogical*, meta-theory actually frames Wilber's proposed semiotics in which the perspectival analysis of semiotic occasions is limited to an indefinite quadratic differentiation/integration of the intentional signifieds (X_{UL}), behavioral signifiers (X_{UR}), cultural semantics (X_{LL}), and social syntax (X_{LR}).[94]

Figure 10. Indefinite Quadratic Perspectivism
Semiotics & Pragmatics

Wilber's recognition of cultural semantics (X_{LL}) and social syntax (X_{LR}) as essential aspects of semiotic occasions, as well as the multiple levels of consciousness through which these indefinite quadratic

(X_{AQ}) semiotic occasions can occur, certainly represent conceptual advances beyond Peirce's and Saussure's models. Nevertheless, neither of these important differentiations can overcome the inherently *monological* nature of a semiotic occasion in which the *dialogical* differentiation of *specific* first-, second-, and third-person perspectives is completely ignored in favor of a *generic* indifference attributed to *anyone* and *anything*, *everyone* and *everything*. In Figure 10, all *personal specifics* that would be signified by 123.123_{AQ} pronouns in TQP have been unconsciously reduced to *indefinite generics* that can only be signified by X_{AQ} pronouns. Indeed, in a critique that applies equally to Wilber's indefinite quadratic semiotics,[95] Habermas concludes that Peirce "neglects that moment of Secondness that we encounter in communication as contradiction and difference, as the *other* individual's 'mind of his own'."[96]

Therefore, owing to the mutual reflexivity of *our* situational awareness-in-action, each of *my* semiotic and pragmatic actions depicted in Figure 7 must be understood as both *a response to* and *a catalyst for your* semiotic and pragmatic actions and *his* semiotic and pragmatic actions, as in Figure 11. More precisely, *my* personified symptoms of freedom (1_{AQ}), participative signals of justice (2_{AQ}), and representative symbols of truth (3_{AQ}), each comprised of its appropriate corresponding intentional signifieds (123_{UL}), behavioral signifiers (123_{UR}), cultural semantics (123_{LL}), and social syntax (123_{LR}), arise in more-or-less direct reference to those complementary and contradictory pragmatic significations of *yours* (2.123_{AQ}) and *his* (3.123_{AQ}) amidst *our* situational awareness-in-action (123.123_{AQ}). Thus, not only does *my* action simultaneously signify and defer signification of the TQP reality *I* enact with this action (123_{AQ}), but *my* action signifies and thereby also defers signification of the distinct and inherently different TQP realities that both *you* (2.123_{AQ}) and *he* (3.123_{AQ}) each enacted with previous action or may be expected to enact with subsequent action.

This invokes the polysemic neologism/neographism of Jacques Derrida's *différance*, which signifies for many hearers/readers both the *differ* and *defer* aspects of semiotic action, with the respective *spacial* and *temporal* connotations and implications.[97] As Jonathan Culler explains, "the verb *différer* means to differ and to defer. *Diffé-*

rance sounds exactly the same as *différence*, but the ending *ance*, which is used to produce verbal nouns, makes it a new form meaning 'difference-differing-deferring.'"[98] Thus, only by embracing the cognitive dissonance between the *spoken sound* and *written sight* of différance—*phoneme* vs. *grapheme*—can we begin to grasp Derrida's intended meaning. As his innovative etymology suggests, différance invites a new way of engaging with a variety of latently hierarchical conceptual oppositions prevalent in communication, philosophy, theology, and literature, such as speaking/writing, presence/absence, and being/beings.[99]

**Figure 11. Triadic Quadratic Perspectivism – 2nd Derivative Semiotics & Pragmatics**

Derrida's explorations of semiotic and pragmatic différance were triggered by his encounter with Saussure's radical semiological proposition that, at its most fundamental level of analysis, language is comprised not of *words*, whether spoken or written, nor even of *signs*, with their signifiers and signifieds, but of the *relational differ-*

ences between all the sign elements of the language.[100] As Derrida quotes him: "'Everything that has been said up to this point boils down to this: in language there are only differences. Even more important: a difference generally implies positive terms between which the difference is set up; but in language there are only differ-ences *without positive terms*. Whether we take the signified or the signifier, language has neither ideas nor sounds that existed before the linguistic system, but only conceptual and phonic differences that have issued from the system. The idea or phonic substance that a sign contains is of less importance than the other signs that sur-round it.'"[101]

Therefore, "if in the linguistic system there are only differences, Derrida notes, 'the play of differences involves syntheses and refer-rals that prevent there from being at any moment or in any way a simple element that is present in and of itself and refers only to itself. Whether in written or in spoken discourse, no element can function as a sign without relating to another element which itself is not simply present. This linkage means that each 'element'—phoneme or grapheme—is constituted with reference to the trace in it of other elements of the system. This linkage, this weaving, is the *text*, which is produced only through the transformation of another text. Noth-ing, either in the elements or in the system, is anywhere simply present or absent. There are only, everywhere, differences and traces of traces.'"[102]

For Derrida, the ubiquity of semiotic and pragmatic différance has a *spacializing* and *temporalizing* effect on all signification and communication, with some far-reaching implications for all philo-sophical investigations of a (post)metaphysical nature:

> Différance is what makes the movement of signification possible only if each element that is said to be 'present,' appearing on the stage of presence, is related to something other than itself but re-tains the mark of a past element and already lets itself be hollowed out by the mark of its relation to a future element. This trace relates no less to what is called the future than to what is called the past, and it constitutes what is called the present by this very relation to what it is not, to what it absolutely is not; that is, not even to past or future considered as a modified present. In order for it to be, an in-terval must separate it from what it is not; but the interval that con-

stitutes it in the present must also, and by the same token, divide
the present in itself, thus dividing, along with the present, every-
thing that can be conceived on its basis, that is, every being—in
particular, for our metaphysical language, the substance or subject.
Constituting itself, dynamically dividing itself, this interval is what
could be called *spacing*; time's becoming-spacial or space's becom-
ing-temporal (*temporalizing*). And it is this constitution of the pre-
sent as a 'primordial' and irreducibly nonsimple, and, therefore, in
the strict sense nonprimordial, synthesis of traces, retentions, and
protensions... that I propose to call... différance. The latter (is)
(both) spacing (and) temporalizing.[103]

Therein lies the basis for Derrida's *deconstructive* critique of the
philosophical metaphysics of a *presence* forever presumed, yet never
realized, which can be interpreted as the systematic disclosure, via
perspectivist, constructivist, (con)textualist reinterpretation, of the
unrecognized spacial-temporal différance inhering in the mistaken
presumption of the *identity of meaning*—that is, the *mutual reflexive
(con)fusion* of intentional signifieds (123.123$_{UL}$) and behavioral signi-
fiers (123.123$_{UR}$)—so prevalent in speaking/hearing and so readily
exposed in writing/reading. This (con)fusion is commonly experi-
enced when *I* presume to say exactly what *I* mean and mean exactly
what *I* say and *you* presume to hear exactly what *I* say and know
exactly what it means, which then supports *our* shared presumption
of a mutual understanding in which all potential pluralistic mean-
ings have been unconsciously reduced to little more than an indefi-
nite behavioral signifier (X$_{UR}$) of our *conscious indifférance*. While this
presumption of presence may contain traces of past understandings
that have stood the test of time, at least as *you* and *I* have come to
believe, it also contains traces of future misunderstandings rooted in
the very real différance *we* ignored to secure this moment of appar-
ent presence—present *deferrals* that will produce future *differences*. In
Derrida's view, this monological presumption of presence and the
dialogical différance it necessarily suppresses has infected a variety
of philosophical writing and contributed to the aporia of metaphysi-
cal certainty evidenced in what Habermas critiques as the modern
philosophy of the subject, whose monological presumption of a purely
subjective reason conveniently encounters an objective world inde-
pendently given to that pure reason and thus entirely understanda-

ble, once and for all, using nothing more than re-*present*-ative symbols of truth, with little regard for participative signals of justice or personified symptoms of freedom.[104]

As Habermas elaborates, "the self-relating subjectivity [of the quintessential modern subject] purchases self-consciousness only at the price of objectivating internal and external nature. Because the subject has to relate itself constantly to objects both internally and externally in its knowing and acting, it renders itself at once opaque and dependent in the very acts that are supposed to secure self-knowledge and autonomy. This limitation, built into the structure of the relation-to-self, remains unconscious in the process of becoming conscious. From this springs the tendency toward self-glorification and illusionment, that is, toward absolutizing a given level of reflection and emancipation."[105] Therefore, in the active pursuit of understanding that universal reality apparently given to the monological rationality of modernity's *ever-present objective subject*, that subject has tended to unconsciously objectivate and subjugate, instrumentalize and universalize the countless unique enactive versions of *itself*—*each* and *every* one of *us*—in the midst of its self-proclaimed and largely symbolic emancipation and enlightenment.

According to Habermas, this evidently postmodern critique of the modern philosophy of the rationalized subject has been for nearly two centuries an essential, if heterodox, theme in the philosophical discourse of modernity, wherein:

> …the accusers raise an objection that has not substantially changed from Hegel and Marx down to Nietzsche and Heidegger, from Bataille and Lacan to Foucault and Derrida. The accusation is aimed against a reason grounded in the principle of subjectivity. And it states that this reason denounces and undermines all unconcealed forms of suppression and exploitation, of degradation and alienation, only to set up in their place the unassailable domination of rationality. Because this regime of a subjectivity puffed up into a false absolute transforms the means of consciousness-raising and emancipation into just so many instruments of objectification and control, it fashions for itself an uncanny immunity in the form of a thoroughly concealed domination. The opacity of the iron cage of a reason that has become positive disappears as if in the glittering brightness of a completely transparent crystal palace. All parties are united on this point: *These* glassy facades have to shatter.[106]

Unfortunately, in the course of shattering the glassy facades of modernity's invisible cage, the postmodern deconstructive intervention reveals its own perspectivist, constructivist, and (con)textualist tendencies toward a different sort of metaphysical aporia in which what Culler refers to as "the *contextual determination of meaning* and the *infinite extendability of context*,"[107] if (mis)interpreted as the ultimate *indeterminacy of meaning*, would seem to be deconstructing the metaphysical *identity of meaning* at the considerable cost of undermining what Habermas defends as the *validity basis of meaning*. By strategically repositioning the *serious language* of logic and philosophy as merely a special case of the more encompassing *nonserious language* of rhetoric and literature so susceptible to continuous deconstructive reinterpretation, Derrida attempts to expose the absolutistic pretensions of modernity's ever-present objective subject while simultaneously immunizing his method against any critique that uses the philosophical logic now subordinated to the expressive-aesthetic relativism of rhetorical and literary criticism.[108] In this effort, Habermas suggests, Derrida becomes ensnared in a performative contradiction wherein the validity basis of a fully triadic *dialogical* reason arising in real-world contexts of everyday communication, if presumed to have been successfully deconstructed along with the admittedly deficient *monological* reason of modernity's ever-present objective subject, would undermine the validity of deconstructive discourse itself, which "can never be wholly absolved of the idea that wrong interpretations must in principle be criticizable in terms of consensus to be aimed for ideally. The interpreter does not impose this idea on his object; rather, with the performative attitude of a participant-observer, he takes it over from the direct participants, *who can act communicatively only under the presupposition of intersubjectively identical ascriptions of meaning*."[109,110] Nevertheless, in my view, this critique of the self-contradictory potential in deconstructive postmodernism does not, itself, constitute a *deconstruction of deconstruction*, for it would appear that only deconstruction could accomplish that feat, and, in so doing, preserve itself indefinitely in the arbitrary equivalence of all fleetingly meaningful versions of relative reality—a narcissistic, nihilistic vortex of *never-present subjective objects* akin to what Wilber once described as *aperspectival madness*.[111]

Instead, it provides an indication of the potential for *post-postmodern reconstruction* of the powerful insights of postmodern deconstruction within a more integral/différantial semiotics, pragmatics, and praxiology. For the triadic quadratic perspectivism of semiotic and pragmatic action—that is, the integrated differentiation of *my* personified symptoms of freedom (1_{AQ}), participative signals of justice (2_{AQ}), and representative symbols of truth (3_{AQ}), each comprised of its appropriate corresponding intentional signifieds (123_{UL}), behavioral signifiers (123_{UR}), cultural semantics (123_{LL}), and social syntax (123_{LR}), co-arising in mutual reflexive différance with *each* of *your* pragmatic significations (2.123_{AQ}) and *each* of *their* pragmatic significations (3.123_{AQ})—reveals semiotic différance to be a primordial complex of *deconstructive* intervals within *our reconstructive* awareness-in-action (123.123_{AQ}). Hence, if we define deconstruction, in general, as the *revelation of semiotic différance* inherent in all semiotic and pragmatic action, while further recognizing the *primordial perspectival origin of semiotic différance*, then deconstruction can be redefined as the *revelation of triadic quadratic perspectival differentiations* amidst the reconstructive integrations of our situational awareness-in-action.

Consequently, the *dimension* and *duration* of awareness-in-action is always already marked by spacial *difference* and temporal *deferral*, by traces of actions *near* and *far*, *past* and *future*—*mine*, *yours*, and *hers*, as well as *ours*, *yours*, and *theirs*—such that each situational action-in-awareness is as much an *effect* as it is a *cause* of its integral différance. In other words, action can be realized in the *here* and *now* only if this action is not something wholly given, in and of itself, to this situation, but rather a situational synthesis of traces to implicated actions *near* and *far*, *past* and *future*, and thus, by definition, *not here* and *not now*. With a nod to Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari,[112] we might say that action in the here and now is *rhizomatically* self-situating in the milieu of its own spacial-temporal *multiplicity* of enfolding/unfolding traces to relevant actions that are not here and not now, yet différantially integral to the *one* action appearing right here, right now. Therefore, due to the mutual reflexive différance of *our* situational awareness-in-action, *each* of *our* triadic quadratic perspectival actions signifies to some extent the *different* realities that

all of *us* enact, while simultaneously *deferring* signification of at least some portion of these different realities, pending future actions that will never, try as *we* might, complete the signification of *our* respective realities. Hence, it appears that *our* mutual, reflexive, différantial actions-in-awareness, however integral, are never really done.

Différantial Integration

As soon as TQP^1 is opened enough to fully identify the conscious actors with whom *I* am directly interacting, this being TQP^2, then the complex, interpenetrating nature of awareness-in-action is revealed. For in the most basic of interactions framed by TQP^2, that exemplar in which *I* act, *you* act, and *s/he* acts in relation to one another, *we* enact three unique, yet interpenetrating versions of TQP^1, each of which frames 12 direct and 24 indirect perspectives within the self-evident reality of *our* situational awareness-in-action. From *each* of *our* different perspectives as a unique enactive origin of *our* situational awareness-in-action, *each* of *us* raises and redeems— either explicitly or implicitly—12 perspectival *claims to* reality (R^1), while simultaneously presuming 12 perspectival *contexts of* reality (R^1). Therefore, from *each* of *our* different perspectives as an origin of *our* TQP^2 awareness-in-action, *each* of *us* has the potential to identify and realize: (Fig. 11)

- *my* personified symptoms of freedom (1_{AQ}), *each* of *your* personified symptoms of freedom (2.1_{AQ}), and *each* of *their* personified symptoms of freedom (3.1_{AQ}), each comprised of its corresponding intentional signifieds (123.1_{UL}), behavioral signifiers (123.1_{UR}), cultural semantics (123.1_{LL}), and social syntax (123.1_{LR}) of freedom, collectively denoted 123.1_{AQ} or F^2;
- *my* participative signals of justice (2_{AQ}), *each* of *your* participative signals of justice (2.2_{AQ}), and *each* of *their* participative signals of justice (3.2_{AQ}), each comprised of its corresponding intentional signifieds (123.2_{UL}), behavioral signifiers (123.2_{UR}), cultural semantics (123.2_{LL}), and social syntax (123.2_{LR}) of justice, collectively denoted 123.2_{AQ} or J^2; and

- *my* representative symbols of truth (3_{AQ}), *each* of *your* representative symbols of truth (2.3_{AQ}), and *each* of *their* representative symbols of truth (3.3_{AQ}), each comprised of its corresponding intentional signifieds (123.3_{UL}), behavioral signifiers (123.3_{UR}), cultural semantics (123.3_{LL}), and social syntax (123.3_{LR}) of truth, collectively denoted 123.3_{AQ} or T^2.

Thus, from each of our different perspectives, it seems that the fully quadratic domains of freedom, justice, and truth are, in a sense, fully quadratic and triadic. More precisely, impersonal truth is a third-person *reality* claim as each of us expresses it, but the *realizing* of truth is inherently, inevitably a first-, second-, and third-person affair that we all must engage together—not as a regulative principle to be accepted or rejected upon reasonable reflection, but as a presupposed condition of our situational awareness-in-action. The same can be said for interpersonal justice and intrapersonal freedom.

Awareness-in-Action reveals that each of our actions is in reference to the others' actions and each such action includes specific reality claims, whether expressed or implied, that are raised and redeemed in response to the others' specific reality claims, all of which inform a complete semiotic and pragmatic dialogue regarding what really is free (F^2), just (J^2), and true (T^2)—indeed, what is *real* (R^2)—for all three of us. It certainly seems as though the perspectival nature of *our* situational awareness-in-action is arranged in such a way that *I* cannot realize *my* personified symptoms of freedom (1_{AQ} or F^1), *my* participative signals of justice (2_{AQ} or J^1), or *my* representative symbols of truth (3_{AQ} or T^1) without realizing *each* of *yours* (2.123_{AQ}) and *each* of *theirs* (3.123_{AQ}) at the same time (123.123_{AQ} or FJT^2). And because the same conditions are presupposed by *each* of *you* and by *each* of *them*, *we* cannot help but pursue these ideals together in every action situation.

This TQP^2 formulation of integral/différantial semiotics, pragmatics, and praxiology accounts for a different form of presupposed *firstness*, *secondness*, and *thirdness* essential to every semiotic, pragmatic, and praxiological occasion—*my* reality, *each* of *your* realities, and *each* of *their* realities—not just as *I* can realize *each*, as in TQP^1, but as *each* of *us* can realize *each* of *ours*. Furthermore, while embracing the mutual, reflexive, différantial, and ultimately integral nature

of human awareness-in-action, this formulation reveals a fundamental flaw in all versions of semiotics and pragmatics—from Saussure's and Peirce's to Bühler's and Habermas's to Derrida's and Wilber's—that reduce human awareness-in-action to selected perspectives that can only exist as parts of a whole that is always already no less integral/ différantial than TQP². Finally, by systematically deconstructing and reconstructing the more extreme forms of modernity's *ever-present objective subject* and postmodernity's *never-present subjective object*, TQP² may serve to expose the metaphysical premises of *all* meta-theories and meta-narratives of *anyone* and *anything*, *everyone* and *everything*, which are presumed to be realizable by *anyone* and *everyone* without the need for theories, let alone practices, of linguistically-mediated mutual understanding between real people using specific first-, second-, and third-person perspectives (123.123ᴀǫ).

   Awareness-in-Action may therefore be understood as the mutual, reflexive, différantial integration of *my* pragmatic significations of reality (123ᴀǫ), *each* of *your* pragmatic significations of reality (2.123ᴀǫ), and *each* of *their* pragmatic significations of reality (3.123ᴀǫ), not just as *I* can identify *each* of *our* distinct realities, but as *each* of *us* can identify *each* of *ours* as an essential dimension of *our* situational awareness-in-action.

Integral Aperspectivism / Différantial Perspectivism

   Once again, the formal explication of performative rules belies the tacit knowledge and mutual acceptance of such rules that we inadvertently reveal whenever we make a concerted effort to understand one another in some real-world action situation. This is worth remembering as we consider the fact that each of the new second- and third-person perspectives just derived within each of the original second- and third-person perspectives of TQP² can be further differentiated into their own unique TQPs because each person just identified is a unique origin of awareness-in-action. This 3ʳᵈ Derivative, TQP³, may seem unduly complex, but it includes such believable examples as *my* understanding of *your* understanding of *his* understanding of *me* (2.3.3ᴀǫ), which *I* could begin disclosing after *you* tell *me* what *your* business partner thinks of *my* resume, and *my*

understanding of *her* understanding of *his* understanding of *her* (3.3.2ᴀǫ), which might be *my* account of a conversation *I* had with a friend who told *me* how *her* husband feels about *her* choice of career.

Figure 12. Triadic Quadratic Perspectivism – 3ʳᵈ Derivative

As Figure 12 illustrates, TQP³ has the capacity to simultaneously identify seven people explicitly or implicitly referenced in each moment of a specific action situation, thus framing seven sets of primordial perspectives for a total of 84 distinct perspectives (123.123.123ᴀǫ). The point, of course, is *not* that all 84 perspectives *must be explicitly identified* in either of these conversations, but rather that these perspectives are *already implicitly identified* in the conversations. The open question in every situation is to what extent we may choose to inquire into these implicated perspectives in order to increase the transparency and accountability of our awareness-in-action. Should we choose to inquire, we will discover within the many layers of perspectives within perspectives within perspectives the previously hidden fault lines of mutual reflexive différance that

render such integral inquiries both challenging and rewarding, seemingly without end.

Figure 13. Triadic Quadratic Perspectivism – Infinite Derivative

If TQP[2] reveals the mutual, reflexive, différantial integration of human awareness-in-action, then TQP[3] confirms the fractal pattern of differentiation that reveals through potentially endless repetition its *integral aperspectival* nature. For with every second- and third-person perspective being potentially differentiated into yet another unique set of TQP, *I* appear to possess the potential to bring ever more awareness to the inherent perspectivism and contextualism of action situations that are nevertheless still framed within *my* original set of TQP. Hence, by virtue of its triadic quadratic perspectival meta-structure, awareness-in-action radically opens to a rhizomatic multiplicity of unique, interdependent sets of triadic quadratic perspectives, *each* set of which appears to be enacted by a unique origin of awareness-in-action, a unique enactive *I*, with the potential

to identify within its own perspectives *all* the other uniquely enacted sets of triadic quadratic perspectives, theoretically free of spacial or temporal limits. (Fig. 13)

Furthermore, as the personal particulars of this potentially limit-less aperspectivism shift from one moment to the next, awareness-in-action rhizomatically reconfigures into countless new permutations of triadic quadratic perspectivism, each momentary multiplicity of which is simultaneously enacted by *all* the unique enactive *I*s as regarded from the perspective of *each* unique enactive *I*. This Infinite Derivative, TQP$^\infty$, reveals the infinitely *differentiated integration* and infinitely *integrated differentiation* of a veritable kaleidoscope of self-imaging/world-viewing as seen through all the eyes, literally all the unique *I*s, that have ever been or could ever be identified in *my* circle of awareness. Therefore, TQP$^\infty$ frames the ideal that each and every one of us can ultimately realize each and every one of us as unique members of a universal civilization grounded in the ultimate realization of integral aperspectival freedom (F$^\infty$), justice (J$^\infty$), and truth (T$^\infty$), and therefore *ultimate reality* (R$^\infty$).[113]

As a novel way of articulating integral aperspectivism, TQP$^\infty$ is suggestive of Jean Gebser's "*space-and-time-free* aperspectival world where the free (or freed) consciousness has at its disposal all latent as well as actual forms of space and time, without having either to deny them or to be fully subject to them."[114] It frames a *quantitative extensification* of consciousness, in terms of the number of people with whom, and perspectives with which, one can actively identify, inclusive of all that has been and all that might be, while simultaneously framing, as the necessary pre-condition, a *qualitative intensification* of consciousness in terms of the clarity of awareness present in each person. In Gebser's evocative terminology, the *presentiation*, or *making present*, that is revealed in this differentiation/integration of all perspectives requires a capacity beyond rational thought that he calls *verition*, encompassing the *arational perception* and *impartation* of *verity*, meaning *truth* or *reality*, which "signifies the whole and renders it transparent wherever we succeed in liberating ourselves from spatially-bound conceptuality without reverting to irrationality."[115] However, this presentiating verition is not, for Gebser, an active practice so much as an infusive illumination emanating from what

he variously terms the *ever-present origin*, the *originary presence*, and the spiritual *diaphainon* that, again, renders diaphanous, or transparent, one's manifest experience of the integral aperspectival world.[116]

Furthermore, TQP$^\infty$ is also a novel way of conceptualizing Wilber's post-metaphysical proposition that every knowledge claimant should specify the situation-specific *kosmic addresses* of *perceiver* and *perceived* in order to preclude the charge that his or her knowledge claim is based on the metaphysical myth of the unitary pre-given world or, worse yet, some given myth without empirical evidence.[117] In contrast to Wilber's AQAL, however, TQP$^\infty$ reveals the vision-logic of integral aperspectival *perception*, *by* the unique enactive *I* near the center of TQP^1, *of* all the other unique enactive *Is*, each of whom is the direct or indirect *perceiver* of all the other perspectives that are *perceived* within each and every action situation. Thus, in my view, there is *no* human awareness-in-action—from TQP^1 all the way to TQP$^\infty$—in which the kosmic addresses of each and every situationally-relevant perceiver-perceived are *not* already identified—whether explicitly or implicitly—in the action situation itself, which therefore invites inquiry and advocacy about the actual coordinates of these perceptual addresses as part of the dialogue about the perspectival reality claims made in that situation. Even more significantly, due to the infinitely differentiated integrations and infinitely integrated differentiations of this integral aperspectivism, TQP$^\infty$ ultimately accounts for the integral/différantial kosmic addresses of *any* and *every* perceiver and perceived that can possibly exist at any time and any place in *my* circle of awareness.

I am reminded of The Jewel Net of Indra, a wonderful metaphor of existence from the *Avatamsaka Sutra* of Mahayana Buddhism that deeply inspired the Hua-yen School of Chinese Buddhism. As Francis Cook eloquently recounts:

> Far away in the heavenly abode of the great god Indra, there is a wonderful net that has been hung by some cunning artificer in such a manner that it stretches out infinitely in all directions. In accordance with the extravagant tastes of deities, the artificer has hung a single glittering jewel in each 'eye' of the net, and since the net itself is infinite in dimension, the jewels are infinite in number. There hang the jewels, glittering like stars of the first magnitude, a wonderful sight to behold. If we now arbitrarily select one of these

jewels for inspection and look closely at it, we will discover that in its polished surface there are reflected *all* the other jewels in the net, infinite in number. Not only that, but each of the jewels reflected in this one jewel is also reflecting all the other jewels, so that there is an infinite reflecting process occurring. The Hua-yen school has been fond of this image, mentioned many times in its literature, because it symbolizes a cosmos in which there is an infinitely repeated interrelationship among all the members of the cosmos. This relationship is said to be one of simultaneous *mutual identity* and *mutual intercausality*.[118]

In one sense, TQP^{∞} is a conceptualization of Indra's Net, with each *I*-centric set of triadic quadratic perspectives serving as a polished jewel in each *eye* of the net, transparent, yet reflective, with twelve facets that ideally reveal the entire space-time continuum of interpenetrating *I*-centric sets of triadic quadratic perspectives. But much more than a *conceptual* meta-theory, TQP^{∞} is the *perceptual* meta-theory that appears to be always already active in our situational awareness-in-action—*empirical* and *normative* evidence, it seems, of our latent potential for integral aperspectival awareness-in-action.[119]

Nevertheless, while being *integrally aperspectival*, TQP is also *différantially perspectival* in that it only reveals everyone else's enacted TQPs consistent with the differing capacities of each actor as enacted in his or her own original TQP^{1}. In other words, *I* am subject to *my* own indeterminately constrained semiotic, pragmatic, and praxiological capacities that not only limit *my* ability to enact derivative TQPs that fully identify *everyone* else's TQPs, but in turn limit *everyone* else's ability to enact derivative TQPs that identify *mine*. This Indeterminate Derivative, TQP^{N}, frames the inherently indeterminate nature of integral/différantial reality rooted in the semiotic, pragmatic, and praxiological capacities active in the specific action situation, and does so in a manner consistent with the way each and every one of us actually experiences these invisibly opaque, surprisingly durable, supportive limits on our situational awareness-in-action (123.123_{AQ}).[120,121,122] (Fig. 14)

TQP^{N} frames the indeterminate intentional-behavioral-cultural-social contexts within which *I* can identify with some of *you* more so than with others of *you*, and with some of *them* more so than with others of *them*, but not all of *you* or all of *them* to the same depth, not

yet anyway, and so the mutual reflexive différantial action continues—*mine*, *yours*, and *hers* as well as *ours*, *yours*, and *theirs*—as *we* all struggle to create enough aperspectival space to eventually integrate all *our* differentiated self-imaging/world-viewing. Therefore, TQP^N frames the complementarity between the *context-transcendent ideality* of TQP^∞ and the *context-immanent actuality* of TQP^1, between which each and every one of us is indeterminately constrained in our capacities to consciously realize each and every one of us as unique members of a universal civilization, limited as we are to the *relative realization* of différantial perspectival freedom (F^N), justice (J^N), and truth (T^N), and therefore *relative reality* (R^N).

**Figure 14. Triadic Quadratic Perspectivism – N^{th} Derivative**

Notwithstanding the *world-disclosing* function of language and its inherent capacity to mediate the comforting illusion of a relatively coherent interdependence within which *I* can see, think, feel, judge, act, and learn in relation to *each* of *you* and *each* of *them*, this same language harbors a *world-obscuring* function that secretly undermines

and forever defers even the situational truth, justice, and freedom *we* nevertheless claim with every action *we* take. As we become more aware of this decidedly mixed blessing in progressively more challenging pragmatic action situations, we learn to engage that same language in its *world-constructing* function of relativistic reinterpretation. From one perspective, this deconstructive disclosure of previously obscured différance is a necessarily generative dynamic that can promote, if nothing else, a de-marginalization and re-contextualization of particular perspectives otherwise ignored and thereby devalued in whatever passes for established knowledge. But from another, less optimistic perspective, it can generate a veritable cacophony of irredeemable validity claims so divergent as to induce despair among those reasonable enough to care about the pursuit of real knowledge. What, then, is the potential for a *world-transforming* coalescence of integral/différantial knowledge—that is, knowledge of what is true, just, and free for *each* and *all* of *us*—if all such pursuits are to be mediated by scores of ubiquitously opaque languages through which *nothing*, not even what *I* consider to be certainly real, *is ever really present*?

In his attempt to bridge the transcendent and immanent dimensions of language use, Habermas contends that "the world-disclosing function of language allows us to see everything we encounter in the world not merely from the point of view of specific aspects and relevant properties but also as elements of a whole, as parts of a categorially organized totality. Although it does have a *relation* to rationality, it itself is, in a certain sense, a-rational.... Linguistic world-disclosure stands in a complementary relation to the rational accomplishments of subjects in the world who are fallible, though capable of learning. Seen in this way, reason can withdraw into the idealizations of validity claims and the formal-pragmatic presupposition of worlds; it renounces every form of totalizing knowledge, no matter how concealed, while nonetheless requiring of the communication communities—set in their contingent lifeworld contexts—a universalist anticipation of a muted 'transcendence from within' that does justice to the irrefutably unconditional character of what is held-to-be-true and what ought-to-be."[123]

As if anticipating our own muted transcendence from within the

linguistic confines of our différantial perspectivism, our every utterance appears to lay claim to that irrefutably unconditional reality we can as yet merely intuit and idealize in the presupposed ultimatum of integral aperspectivism. Responding to this unspoken, unwritten ultimatum, our ever-present, never-ending play of linguistic différance—*time's becoming-spacial* and *space's becoming-temporal*—poses no threat to Indra's Net. If anything, the play enlivens and strengthens the Net by challenging each and every one of us to present ourselves and remain present to—to *presentiate*—the (dis)continuous unfolding/enfolding of *integral différance* implicating—or rather *absentiating*—each and every one of us as the countless, unique, enactive *I*s of the Net. For the language that discloses, obscures, and ultimately (re/de)constructs our world-viewing plays a concurrent role in simultaneously disclosing, obscuring, and ultimately (re/de)constructing our self-imaging through the same integral/différantial awareness-in-action.

This TQP^N formulation of integral/différantial semiotics, pragmatics, and praxiology reveals that *each* triadic quadratic perspectival action presupposes *every* triadic quadratic perspectival action with *any* number of derivative triadic quadratic perspectival actions in a radically open-ended, yet reliably closed-minded meta-structure of Awareness-in-Action. Indeed, each différantial action can be interpreted as a unique, situation-specific synthesis of traces to every relevant différantial action arising in integral awareness. Alternatively, we might say that *each* différance presupposes *every* différance that makes *any* différance in the *différantial integralism* of Awareness-in-Action. I am therefore proposing that our tacit knowledge of the reciprocally interlocked triadic quadratic perspectives, as outlined in TQP^N, constitutes the potentially infinite, yet always indeterminate meta-structure of our integral/différantial self-imaging/world-viewing—the semiotic, pragmatic, and praxiological (a)perspectivism of human awareness-in-action.

Awareness-in-Action may therefore be understood as the *integral aperspectival*, yet *différantial perspectival* self-imaging/world-viewing by which *we—I*, *each* of *you*, and *each* of *them*—disclose, yet obscure, and ultimately realize *each* of *our* unique, yet interpenetrating visions of reality.

Nowhere / Now-here

While there is in principle no limit to the number of derivatives that one must presuppose in order to act, there is in principle one person who sets the limit for each and every action, who sets the focus each and every moment, choosing who and what warrants attention and what sort of attention to offer, and therefore what kind of knowledge to gain and the extent to which it will be shared. That person is the unique enactive *I* who limits the otherwise limitless derivatives of *my* own triadic quadratic perspectives and thereby limits the otherwise limitless derivatives of *anyone else's* triadic quadratic perspectives that refer to *mine*. And when *I* inquire into who *I* am—right now, right here—*my* triadic quadratic perspectives (TQP^N or 123.123$_{AQ}$) dissolve into what might be described as the ever-present, all-inclusive *integral awareness* (TQP^0 or 0) from which, in the next moment, *my* triadic quadratic perspectives co-arise once again as the *différantial action* resumes. (Fig. 15)


Figure 15. Integral Awareness

The practice of self-inquiry, the Sanskrit name for which is *atma vichara*, is a subtle, silent inquiry, *vichara*, into *who I am* at the apparent source of all perspectives, thoughts, feelings, and actions, the sustained practice of which transcends the mental flow and purportedly reveals the integral awareness *that I am*, the real self, *Atman*, at one with absolute reality, *Brahman*, illuminating all manifest perspectives, thoughts, feelings, and actions. In the words of Ramana Maharshi, its finest teacher, "the first and foremost of all the thoughts that arise in the mind is the primal *I*-thought. It is only after the rise or origin of the *I*-thought that innumerable other thoughts arise. In other words, only after the first personal pronoun, *I*, has arisen, do the second and third personal pronouns (*you*, *he*, etc.) occur to the mind; and they cannot subsist without the former. Since every other thought can occur only after the rise of the *I*-thought and since the mind is nothing but a bundle of thoughts, it is only through the enquiry *Who am I?* that the mind subsides. Moreover, the integral *I*-thought, implicit in such enquiry, having destroyed all other thoughts, gets itself finally destroyed or consumed, just as the stick used for stirring the burning funeral pyre gets consumed."[124]

Hence, as already proposed, the first-person singular-subjective (1UL) pronoun, *I*, appears to be the *originary* or *enactive perspective*, the *first among equals* with regard to all the other perspectival pronouns, because none of the others can arise in awareness unless the *I* at the apparent source of conscious action also arises. Therefore, triadic quadratic perspectival reality itself, to whatever extent it is *enacted*, appears to originate with the pronoun *I*, which is *identified* with each and every experience of reality it claims, that is, each and every *form* it *names* (e.g., *I* know *this*; *I* want *that*; *I* like *you*, but not *him*.). The awareness of *I* is (phenomeno)logically prior to the other perspectival pronouns and *I* can remain as the locus of perspectival awareness after the other perspectival pronouns subside. Furthermore, when practicing self-inquiry, *I* am attempting to use the *I* in its capacity as the sole *locus* of perspectival awareness to then make that same *I* the sole *focus* of perspectival awareness—that is, turning the subjective *I* back around as if to make an object of *itself*—thus making it all but impossible for the other perspectival pronouns to arise

in relation to that *I*. Then, after sustaining this contemplative inquiry into *who I am*, the *I* that *I* think *I* am as the implied origin of all that *I* think *I* do within the world that *I* think *I* know—the *ahamkara*—tends to subside, leaving nothing but the integral awareness *that I am*. As integral awareness, the self-evident reality that *I* exist, that *I am*, not that *I am this or that* nor that I am *not* this or that, but simply that *I am*, reveals itself *as* the only self-evident reality.

Subsequent to this realization, notwithstanding *my* lingering tendency to identify *myself* with the *I* that *I* think *I* am as the implied origin of all that *I* think *I* do—that is, the *I* that resides exclusively within the confines of the 1UL perspective—there is no ignoring the (phenomeno)logical distinction between, on the one hand, this perspectival *I* that is aware in the midst of its perspectival action, and, on the other hand, *my* awareness of this perspectival *I* as it seems to be aware of its perspectival action. This deeper and more integral awareness feels less confined to the 1UL perspective of which it is now so evidently aware—suggestive of the *I-I* witnessing described by Ramana Maharshi—and more clearly illuminates *all* the triadic quadratic perspectives (123AQ) that co-arise within this non-perspectival awareness (0). After all, these are *my* personal perspectives on anyone and anything, everyone and everything that can possibly be apprehended in *my* circle of awareness. Within that circle of awareness, thoughts emerge, seemingly at random, beckoning the *I* that *I* often think *I* am to assume ownership as if it was the original author. If *I* choose to complete these thoughts, to silently speak a new sentence, then *I* simultaneously enact the semiotic, pragmatic, and praxiological features of *my* all-too-familiar self-imaging/world-viewing. If instead *I* choose to inquire as to whom these thoughts appear to be emerging, then these thoughts dissolve uncompleted and only this awareness remains, as it is, a familiar emptiness to be filled with surprises. It therefore begins to appear as if, during the course of *my* moment-to-moment awareness-in-action, the self-evident reality of human action—*that I do*—is always already *absolutely realized* in the self-evident reality of human being—*that I am*.

This implies that the ever-present realization of integral awareness that is always already *presupposed* in every différantial action is always already being *relatively realized* in never-ending différantial

action, subject to the indeterminately constrained semiotic, pragmatic, and praxiological capacities of each and every actor. If so, then perhaps the integral awareness (TQP^0) within which all *my* différantial action (TQP^N) arises is none other than the *primordial referent*—in this case, the never-changing, non-perspectival, *absolute reality* (R^0) infusively illuminating all the transient, perspectival, *relative realities* (R^N)—*signified* by all *my* différantial actions. More precisely, perhaps *my* personified symptoms of freedom (1_{AQ} or F^N), participative signals of justice (2_{AQ} or J^N), and representative symbols of truth (3_{AQ} or T^N), each comprised of its appropriate corresponding intentional signifieds (123_{UL}), behavioral signifiers (123_{UR}), cultural semantics (123_{LL}), and social syntax (123_{LR}), co-arising in mutual reflexive différance with *each* of *your* pragmatic significations (2.123_{AQ}) and *each* of *their* pragmatic significations (3.123_{AQ}), signify, first and foremost, the integral awareness (0) that *each* of *us* brings to *our* différantial action situation (123.123_{AQ}). Hence, the perspectival pronouns as *primordial signs* and the perspectives themselves as *primordial referents* could possibly be but perspectival differentiations of *identity* in the *primordial semiosis* by which all the différantial *signs* and *referents*, *names* and *forms*, of our self-imaging/world-viewing arise in the integral awareness that we secretly, silently are.

As we have seen, within this hypothesis of the *integral/différantial self*, the proximate *I* that *I* think *I* am (1_{UL}) is but the integral awareness *that I am* (0 or TQP^0) when it is semiotically, pragmatically, and praxiologically identified with a deep structure of awareness-in-action through which it différantially enacts, or actively refracts, the distal *me* that *I* think *I* was and will be (1_{UR}), along with all the other primordial signs and referents of *my* integral/différantial self (123_{AQ} or TQP^1). This hypothesis contains a trace back to the Advaita Vedanta philosophy of *non-dual* reality, in which, as Dennis Waite notes, language is recognized as the medium through which the silent awareness of the integral self, *Atman*, at one with absolute reality, *Brahman*, manifests through speech as the differentiated names and forms, *nama-rupa*, of our worldly experience.[125,126] Indeed, one sentence after another, seemingly without limit, our communicatively competent use of spoken/written language, informed by extralinguistic, multi-media signification, (re/de)constructively enacts the

variegated spacial-temporal realities—the dimension and duration of experience—that each and every one of us realizes différantly through the triadic quadratic perspectives common to all of us. But it is this very use of language that reinforces the confusion between, on the one hand, the integral awareness that may well illuminate all manifestations of différantial action, and, on the other hand, the linguistically-confined *I* that *I* think *I* am as the implied origin of all that *I* think *I* do within the world that *I* think *I* know. For in every sentence spoken, written, or thought, there is implied a first-person individual-subjective *I* who is speaking, writing, or thinking, in light of whose différantial perspective this latest act of "illumined mani-festation" might appear to have little more significance than a whis-per in the wilderness, notwithstanding whatever bluff and bluster might accompany its expression. Nevertheless, even this seemingly insignificant sentence might enfold within its différantial significa-tion a *primordial trace* of the integral awareness that is its secret, silent source of illumination.

Therefore, the spacial-temporal realization of our ever-present, never-ending awareness-in-action—its *dimension* and *duration* as well as its *difference* and *deferral*—appears to be always already marked by traces of *différantial manifestation* and *integral illumination*—potential awareness-in-action as-yet-unrealized, at least in this situation. Due to the *différantial realization* of our awareness-in-action, each of our differentiated actions signifies to some extent the different realiza-tions that all of us enact, while simultaneously deferring significa-tion of at least some portion of those realizations, pending future actions that will never, try as we might, complete the mutual reflex-ive différantial signification of our *integral realizations*. Regardless, while the différantial realization (R^N) of awareness-in-action is never really done (R^∞), the integral realization (R^0) of awareness-in-action is always already.

As to the predictable Derridean challenge that this hypothesis of primordial semiosis might be just another metaphysical doctrine of presence, the definitive post-metaphysical response—following Wilber's post-metaphysical maxim that *the meaning of a statement is the means of its enactment*—is to offer an exemplary practice by which the appropriately skeptical practitioner might realize in his or her

own direct awareness the real nature of this purportedly primordial semiosis.[127] Thus, given the persuasive critique of the metaphysics of presence offered by an integrally reconstructed deconstruction, as proposed in my formulations of integral/différantial semiotics, pragmatics, and praxiology, what is the potential for a *post-metaphysics of presence* that is consistent with this integral/différantial semiotics, pragmatics, and praxiology? The answer begins with the recognition that, if all différantial actions contain a primordial trace of the integral awareness that is their secret, silent source, then integral/différantial semiotics, pragmatics, and praxiology cannot be limited to différantial action conditioned by the relative *I* that *I* think *I* am in the course of this action. So if *I* am serious about the deconstructive revelation of primordial perspectival differentiations amidst the reconstructive integrations of *my* situational awareness-in-action, then *I* must follow this purportedly primordial trace back to the source and see for *myself* whatever there is to see. Because the most immediate semiotic source of all these ideas to which *I* can direct *my* attention is the *I* that *I* think *I* am as *I* say what *I* think *I* say, it is to this *I* that *I* must direct *my* inquiry. This brings *me* back to the practice of self-inquiry, *atma vichara*, as taught by Ramana Maharshi. In his view, "self-enquiry is the one infallible means, the only direct one, to realise the unconditioned, absolute being that you really are."[128]

Awareness-in-Action may therefore be understood as the active differentiation of triadic quadratic perspectivism from the *integral awareness* that is *nowhere* to be found as long as one is actively searching, yet *now-here* as long as one inquires deeply into the identity of the actor.

Integral Practices

If my interest was limited to formulating an integral meta-theory with the capacity to describe human action in its many forms and fields, then triadic quadratic perspectivism would suffice as a general outline. After all, it can incorporate many of the essential ideas of Habermas and Wilber, who may be justifiably regarded as the leading meta-theorists of the last half-century. But any meta-theory of human action that merely *describes* action or, worse yet, the results of action, regardless of how clear and comprehensive that description may appear, falls short of its inherent potential if it does not also *prescribe* action that can guide people toward a direct, personal experience of that which has been so clearly and comprehensively described. Therefore, my second proposal is to consider that *perspectival action* can only be understood through *practical action* and that this leads to a worthwhile inquiry into *what practices are really essential* to all human action. In other words, *what practices must be presupposed by all people in order for them to act in any situation?*

— 3 —

ACTIONABLE KNOWLEDGE / KNOWLEDGEABLE ACTION

This inquiry into the practical nature of human action begins with the *action science* of Chris Argyris and several of his colleagues, including Donald Schön, Robert Putnam, and Diana McLain Smith.[129] Action science constitutes "an inquiry into how human beings design and implement action in relation to one another," and builds on such ideas as the *action research* of Kurt Lewin, the *community of inquiry* of Charles Sanders Peirce and John Dewey, and the *critical theory* of Jürgen Habermas.[130] It is a rigorous way of understanding how adults *reason*, *act*, and *learn* in the midst of challenging social situations, with a particular emphasis on the collaborative generation and application of *actionable knowledge*.

As Argyris clarifies, "actionable knowledge is not only relevant to the world of practice; it is the knowledge that people use to create that world…. Knowledge that is actionable, regardless of its content, contains causal claims…. That means that actionable knowledge is produced in the form of if-then propositions that can be stored in and retrieved from the actor's mind under conditions of everyday life…. In order for propositions to be actionable, they have to specify the action strategies that will achieve intended consequences, and they also have to specify the underlying values that must govern these actions. The action strategies have to be specified as rules that can be used both to design and produce… conversations and to construct criteria to assess the actions' effectiveness."[131] Thus, much more than a *descriptive* theory of *applicable* knowledge gained through traditional social science methods, action science offers a *prescriptive* theory of *actionable* knowledge that helps people reflect

on the social worlds they create and learn to change them in ways more congruent with the values they espouse.

Argyris's work can be situated within a larger field of more general action science, or *dialogical praxiology*, that includes a variety of alternatives such as: Lewin's *action research*,[132] Schön's *action-reflection learning*,[133] Douglas McGregor's *theory x/y*,[134] Bill Torbert's *action inquiry*,[135] Reg Revans's *action learning*,[136] Edgar Schein's *process consultation*,[137] Stew Shapiro's *action-reflection inquiry*, David Kolb's *experiential learning*,[138] Malcolm Knowles's *adult learning*,[139] William Isaacs's *dialogue*,[140] Robert Kegan's and Lisa Leahy's *immunity to change*,[141] David Cooperrider's *appreciative inquiry*,[142] and Otto Scharmer's *theory u*.[143] What they all have in common appears to be a focus on helping mature, self-directed adults develop even greater capacity for effective action in the world through enhanced self-awareness, reflective inquiry, collaborative learning, and more constructive, less defensive patterns of communication.

Within this extraordinary field, I find Argyris's work to be particularly insightful with respect to the way people draw on tacit knowledge to design actions in order to achieve their own desired results and yet, in so doing, subconsciously enact patterns of actions that impair their ability to learn from experience and ultimately undermine their achievement of the results they desire. He refers to this paradoxical capacity for knowledgeable, yet counterproductive action as *skilled incompetence*.[144] The significance of this insight for an integral praxiology, or for that matter a praxiological integralism, concerned with the tacit knowledge governing the actions of people in their efforts to realize their full potential in real-world situations cannot be easily overstated. Drawing inspiration from Hannah Arendt, Argyris contends that "the study of learning that serves action reaches to the core of human social life. Action is how we give meaning to life. It is how we reveal ourselves to others and to ourselves. It is through action that we create social structures intended to create and preserve the social order necessary for managing our lives, our organizations, and our societies."[145]

As we will see, this eminently practical, yet deeply significant connection between *learning* and *action* is central to Habermas's understanding of large-scale social evolution. "It is my conjecture,"

Habermas declares, "that the fundamental mechanism for social evolution in general is to be found in an automatic inability not to learn. Not learning, but not-learning is the phenomenon that calls for explanation."[146] Taken out of context, one might interpret this as an optimistic, perhaps naïvely optimistic, assessment of human potential, as if Habermas is arguing for the presence of a universal and automatic ability to learn that effectively negates the possibility of any inherent obstacles to learning. Yet Habermas himself has spent decades studying and describing in voluminous detail both the function and dysfunction of (post)modern society and the ever-present crisis-potential so many of us unwittingly endure—evidence, it would seem, of the difficulty we all have with communicative reason and the deep action-learning it entails.[147] Habermas is no naïve optimist. Regardless, if the action-learning at the heart of social evolution was a reasonably efficient and effective mechanism, we would have done it all by now.

I would like to think that Habermas is trying to shift our attention away from the all-too-common focus on how people *succeed* in learning, developing, and evolving, perhaps because an exclusive focus on the many ways we can succeed in these endeavors may inadvertently blind us to the many ways we can also *fail* to learn, develop, and evolve. If this is the case, then he is actually trying to preclude naïve optimism by calling for a more careful study of people's tendency to *not* learn, despite their inherent capacity *to* learn. Indeed, "not *learning*, but *not-learning* is the phenomenon that calls for explanation."[148] To my knowledge, Argyris's action science is all-but-unique in offering a balanced, rigorous, and practical treatment of people's tendency to *not* learn, despite their inherent capacity *to* learn, as essential aspects of human action. Furthermore, in my interpretation, it has the additional benefit of being a decades-long, real-world application of Habermas's critical theory.

Argyris, Putnam, and McLain Smith specifically position action science as an exemplary new form of critical theory[149] congruent with Habermas's early formulation in *Knowledge and Human Interests*[150] and Raymond Geuss's concise presentation in *The Idea of a Critical Theory*.[151] Given Habermas's subsequent transition from an epistemological focus on *logical-methodological rules* and their corre-

sponding *knowledge-constitutive interests*, with an eye toward the critique of ideology and false consciousness, to a formal-pragmatic focus on *performative attitudes* in everyday communication, with an eye toward the critique of systematic failures in societal rationalization, it is worth asking whether action science is still consistent with Habermas's more evolved critical theory.[152] In my assessment, it is even more congruent and may have even anticipated some of Habermas's later developments in communicative action and discourse ethics, given the fact that action science is an exemplary method of communicative action-learning that was fully formulated and empirically and normatively validated before Habermas's *The Theory of Communicative Action* was published in English.[153] While I have not conducted extensive research into the matter, action science is the only such method I have encountered with any explicit link to Habermas's critical theory, whether in its early or later formulation. My presentation in this book of the parallels between action science and Habermas's *Communication and the Evolution of Society*, *The Theory of Communicative Action*,[154] and many subsequent works therefore moves beyond the initial positioning by Argyris, Putnam, and McLain Smith and represents my own interpretation.

Consensus-Based, Goal-Oriented, Error-Prone Knowledgeable Action

The central concept in action science is the *theory of action*.[155] A theory of action may be thought of as a subconscious accumulation of actionable knowledge that tells people how to design their actions in order to achieve their intended results within particular social situations, including how to learn from experience to design more effective actions. It represents a taken-for-granted way of reasoning, acting, and learning that seems to have been so successful in meeting past challenges that it is now assumed to be the best way to engage with one's social world. The main reason people develop these tacit theories of action is because the daily challenge of interpreting real-world social situations and designing actions to achieve desired results would otherwise be very difficult and time-consuming.

Therefore, people simplify the challenge by drawing on a repertoire of tacit *action design principles* or *best practices* that they have learned throughout a lifetime of more-or-less-effective socialization.

This theory of *knowledgeable action* is often illustrated in terms of a dynamic process model of an action situation, the structure of which includes a three-step sequence of *action values* that govern the design of specific *action strategies* that contribute to the generation of certain *action consequences*.[156] The *action consequences* include the *intended* and the *unintended* consequences of action, each of which can generate *positive feedback* for more of the same or *negative feedback* indicating the need for a change. Both positive and negative feedback are included in the *single-loop action-learning* that either validates or invalidates the current action strategy. When it is invalidated, people may design any number of new action strategies consistent with the action values until they produce results that appear to validate the latest action strategy.[157] (Fig. 16)

Figure 16. Argyris's Theory of Action

If all these new action strategies are invalidated by single-loop action-learning, an additional feedback loop may be activated and the action values that governed the original selection of desired consequences and the original design of action strategies will be brought into question. Unfortunately, because these action values are largely tacit and are intertwined with our well developed, yet

zealously guarded story of who we are in the world, they are very difficult to surface, critique, and revise without some dialogue and the pressure that only crisis seems to provide. Nevertheless, if successfully revised through this *double-loop action-learning*, new action values lead to a new interpretation of the situation, a new vision of desired consequences, and new possibilities for action strategies, which, in turn, generate entirely new action consequences to be evaluated once again.[158] (Fig. 16)

Overall, the continuous, rapid, and largely tacit dynamics of this action-learning can produce an extraordinary variety of action consequences, from creative innovations to destructive misunderstandings, all of which can be traced back to the action strategies and action values of all the people who created them, as well as the more-or-less effective practices of single-loop and double-loop learning that supported them. And because theories of action guide human action on all degrees of scale, it is possible to envision very large-scale dynamics of action-learning based on this relatively simple model. As I will attempt to demonstrate, this model may help us understand the mutual, reflexive, différantial, and ultimately integral action-learning of couples, families, groups, organizations, markets, governments, social movements, institutions, and whole civilizations.

As will become clear in due course, the action science theory of double-loop action-learning is consistent with Habermas's *communicative action*, by which he means *social action oriented toward mutual understanding*. Habermas contends that, owing to the validity basis of everyday language use, communicative action is governed by a tacitly shared commitment between actors to not only raise but subsequently redeem their validity claims through reasoned justification in pursuit of a mutual understanding of what really is true, just, and free in each action situation. "Because the idea of coming to a rationally motivated, mutual understanding is to be found in the very structure of language, it is no mere demand of practical reason but is built into the reproduction of social life."[159] Communicative action thus requires for its validation a *practical*, *dialogical* learning process in which all actors' actions are discursively evaluated in terms of the claims to impersonal truth, interpersonal justice, and

intrapersonal freedom that these actions explicitly or implicitly raise.

In contrast, the action science theory of single-loop action-learning is consistent with Habermas's *strategic action*, by which he means *social action oriented toward the unilateral success of each actor*.[160] As a social form of *purposive-rational action*, which is also known as *instrumental action*, strategic action requires for its validation a *technical*, *monological* learning process in which each actor's actions are evaluated unilaterally in terms of "the empirical efficiency of technical means and the consistency of choice between suitable means"—in other words, the extent to which each actor's chosen action produced that actor's desired results and was consistent with that actor's self-determined preferences.[161] As a purposive-rational form of *social action*, strategic action-learning certainly does require communication between the actors competing for their own unilateral success, for example as we might see in a negotiation between opposing lawyers or that between a hiring manager and a job applicant. But it is a form of communication in which the validity claims to intrapersonal freedom (i.e., sincerity, honesty) and interpersonal justice (i.e., respect, morality) are at best suspended, or naively taken for granted, in favor of impersonal claims to the strictly limited truth of each actor's success in relation to the other actor(s).[162]

As Figure 17 more clearly illustrates, the action consequences of both strategic and communicative action are *mutual* consequences that must be *reflexively* evaluated by each actor in terms of his or her own *différant* standards for strategic and communicative learning. It also suggests the manner in which communicative action-learning can establish the action values that govern strategic action, that is, the subsequently-presumed conditions of truth, justice, and freedom within which *mutually-beneficial* goal-oriented action may ensue. In my interpretation, the inherent mutuality, reflexivity, and différance of both forms of social action-learning is what distinguishes Habermas's and Argyris's approaches to the study of human action—what I have termed *dialogical* praxiology—from the more common *monological* praxiology originating with Ludwig von Mises[163] and Tadeusz Kotarbiński,[164] which is limited to purposive-rational or instrumental action by individual actors without regard for what I consider to be the presupposed mutual reflexive différance of all human aware-

ness-in-action.

**Figure 17. Action-Learning –
Mutual Reflexive Différantial**

It is easy to conclude, on the basis of Habermas's critiques of purposive-rational action, including its mutual form of strategic action, both of which he often characterizes as *teleological* due to their overriding emphasis on action consequences, that communicative action is either not goal-oriented or at odds with goal-oriented action. However, he does attempt to rectify these misunderstandings when he notes that "my critics have on occasion overlooked the fact that *both* models of action [i.e., strategic and communicative] attribute to the actors a capacity for setting goals and for goal-directed action, as well as an interest in executing their own plans of action."[165]

Indeed, Habermas does recognize that communicative action has two primary aspects: "the *teleological aspect* of realizing one's

aims (or carrying out one's plan of action) and the *communicative aspect* of interpreting a situation and arriving at some agreement. In communicative action participants pursue their plans cooperatively on the basis of a shared definition of the situation. If a shared definition of a situation has first to be negotiated, or if efforts to come to some agreement within the framework of shared situation definitions fail, the attainment of consensus, which is normally a condition for pursuing goals, can itself become an end. In any case, the *success* achieved by teleological action and the *consensus* brought about by acts of reaching understanding are the criteria for whether a situation has been dealt with successfully or not…. Participants cannot attain their goals if they cannot meet the need for mutual understanding called for by the possibilities of acting in the situation—or at least they can no longer attain their goals by way of communicative action."[166] It is therefore rather useful to have a single, integrated model of human action, such as Figure 17, in which mutual, reflexive, différantial, yet integral consensus-based, goal-oriented action-learning is framed simultaneously in terms of its strategic and communicative dynamics.

For Habermas, mutual understanding and, ideally, consensus is the implicit *telos* of all communication and its pursuit through communicative action-learning is the guiding force of social evolution. Strategic action-learning is therefore not an equal complement to, but rather a partial derivative of communicative action-learning, which is consistent with the action science account. Nevertheless, strategic action-learning may be the means by which the insights and innovations developed through communicative action-learning find expression and generate consequences in real-world action situations. Thus, framing social evolution as a *bi-dimensional action-learning process*, Habermas contends that:

> whereas Marx localized the learning processes important for evolution in the dimension of objectivating thought—of technical and organizational knowledge, of instrumental and strategic action, in short, of *productive forces*—there are good reasons meanwhile for assuming that learning processes also take place in the dimension of moral insight, practical knowledge, communicative action, and the consensual regulation of action conflicts—learning processes that are deposited in more mature forms of social integration, in

new *productive relations*, and that in turn first make possible the in-
troduction of new productive forces. The rationality structures that
find expression in [impersonal] world views, [interpersonal] moral
representations, and [intrapersonal] identity formations, that be-
come practically effective in social movements and are finally em-
bodied in institutional systems, thereby gain a strategically im-
portant position from a theoretical point of view.[167]

He also clarifies that in his view social evolution, or bi-dimensional
action-learning, is dependent upon two initial conditions: "evolu-
tionary challenges posed by unresolved, economically conditioned,
system problems" and, fortuitously, "new levels of [individually
acquired] learning that have already been achieved in worldviews
and are latently available but not yet incorporated into action sys-
tems and therefore remain institutionally inoperative."[168] Therefore,
in short, it is a combination of consensus-based communicative
action-learning about *the things worth doing* and goal-oriented strate-
gic action-learning about *how to get these things done* that yields the
new actionable knowledge that may, in response to evolutionary
challenges, eventually be institutionalized throughout society.

If indeed the pursuit of mutual understanding and consensus
through communicative action-learning really is the guiding force of
social evolution, then it might be fair to say that the *absence* of mutu-
al understanding and consensus about how to deal with evolution-
ary challenges of political, economic, social, and ecological signifi-
cance serves as the necessary *catalyst* for this innovative action-
learning that tends to emerge at the margins of society. Drawing an
analogy between social and biological evolution, Habermas notes
that "species reproduce themselves when sufficiently many exem-
plars avoid death; societies reproduce themselves when they avoid
passing on too many errors."[169] If so, then Argyris's focus on *skilled
incompetence*—that all-too-common paradoxical capacity for knowl-
edgeable, yet counterproductive action that people demonstrate in
the midst of challenging social situations—takes on new significance
in this evolutionary context.[170] So too does the *proactive detection and
correction of error*, which, as we will see in Chapter 4, features promi-
nently in the action science method of double-loop learning de-
signed to overcome this skilled incompetence.[171] Completing his
evolutionary analogy, Habermas surmises that, "if the survival

ability of organisms is a test case for the learning process of the species, then the corresponding test cases for society lie in the dimension of the production and utilization of technically and practically useful knowledge."[172] In other words, our prognosis for further evolution, which requires effective responses to the multi-faceted challenges of our time, is contingent upon our ability to deconstruct and reconstruct actionable knowledge about these challenges. Hence, in Habermas's view, "the level of development of a society is determined by the institutionally permitted learning capacity, in particular by whether theoretical-technical [i.e., strategic] and practical [i.e., communicative] questions are differentiated, and whether discursive learning processes can take place."[173] Further evolution of the society—whether it happens and what forms it takes—will then be influenced by the extent to which the current institutions, such as organizations, markets, governments, schools, families, communities, and the media foster both strategic and communicative action-learning.

Having framed social evolution as a *bi-dimensional action-learning process* with both communicative-practical and strategic-technical aspects, Habermas draws upon the insights of developmental psychology to enhance this interpretation with "a *developmental logic* that incorporates a distinction between formally characterized levels of learning and the learning processes that are possible at each level."[174] As McCarthy summarizes:

> Habermas construes organizational principles of society as socio-structural innovations that institutionalize developmental-logical levels of learning; they establish the structural conditions for technical and practical learning processes at particular stages of development. Principles of organization circumscribe ranges of possibility within which institutional systems can vary, productive forces can be developed and utilized, and system complexity and steering capacity can be increased. The concrete embodiments of these abstract principles [of organization] are the "institutional nuclei" that function as relations of production and determine the dominant form of social integration…. Social evolution can then be thought of as a bi-dimensional learning process (cognitive/technical and moral/practical), the stages of which can be described structurally and ordered according to a developmental logic.[175]

In Habermas's own words, "'collectively shared structures of con-sciousness are understood as levels of learning, i.e. as structural conditions of possible learning processes. Evolutionary learning consists then in the constructive acquisition of new levels of learn-ings. It is reflexive learning, i.e. learning applied to the structural conditions of learning.'"[176]

While in general agreement with Habermas's developmental-evolutionary analysis, Wilber elaborates on the same passage from McCarthy by emphasizing that "there is, of course, only one way such a developmental-structural theory of social evolution can succeed—namely, in a careful distinction between the 'quasi-universal' or *deep structures* of a level of development and the con-tingent, variable, or *surface structures* of that stage. Although Haber-mas rarely uses those terms, nor are his ideas on the topic precisely those of my own, he nevertheless has clearly recognized and re-sponded to the problem…"[177] through his careful distinction be-tween *abstract principles of organization*, or *deep structures* of action-learning shared by all societies at some level, and the *ranges of possi-bility for concrete embodiment*, or *surface structures* of action-learning particular to different societies at that same level. In my interpreta-tion, regardless of how we conceptualize these multi-structural patterns of development and evolution (e.g., whether strictly univer-sal, hierarchical, etc.), each of the deep structures within an overall multi-structural pattern—the *relatively stable conditions of possible action-learning*—is none other than the *actionable knowledge* guiding *knowledgeable action* at some temporal stage of human history. Evolu-tionary action-learning, therefore, consists in the deconstruction and reconstruction of these deep structures of actionable knowledge within potentially infinite, yet always indeterminate multi-structural patterns—that is, the mutual, reflexive, différantial, yet integral action-learning about the deep-structural conditions of possible action-learning that are presently institutionalized throughout society.

Deeply Meaningful, Broadly Functional, Partially Presumed Actionable Knowledge

In his subsequent refinement of this critical theory of social evolution, Habermas frames his inquiry in terms of the empirical connections between stages of *social integration* measured by increases in *rationality* and stages of *system integration* measured by increases in *complexity*.[178] He contends that:

> if we understand the integration of society exclusively as *social integration*, we are opting for a conceptual strategy that… starts from communicative action and construes society as a lifeworld. It ties social-scientific analysis to the internal perspective of members of social groups and commits the investigator to hermeneutically connect up his own understanding with that of the participants. The reproduction of society then appears to be the maintenance of the symbolic structures of the lifeworld…. If, on the other hand, we understand the integration of society exclusively as *system integration*, we are opting for a conceptual strategy that presents society after the model of a self-regulating system. It ties social-scientific analysis to the external perspective of an observer and poses the problem of interpreting the concept of a system in such a way that it can be applied to interconnections of action.[179]

Echoing his earlier work on the methodological distinctions between *empirical-analytic* explanation and *historical-hermeneutic* interpretation,[180] Habermas re-emphasizes that, "the fundamental problem of social theory is how to connect in a satisfactory way the two conceptual strategies indicated by the notions of 'system' and 'lifeworld'."[181]

While maintaining his focus on human action and his strong preference for communicative action, Habermas appears to be modifying his earlier account of the essential role played by strategic action-learning in the bi-dimensional dynamics of social evolution. He argues that "it is only possible to analyze these connections [between stages of *social integration* and stages of *system integration*] by distinguishing mechanisms for coordinating action that harmonize the *action orientations* of participants from mechanisms that stabilize nonintended interconnections of actions by way of functionally intermeshing *action consequences*. In one case, the integration

of an action system is established by a normatively secured or com-
municatively achieved consensus [using *language* as the medium], in
the other case, by a nonnormative regulation of individual decisions
that extends beyond the actors' consciousnesses [using *power* or
money as steering media]. This distinction between a *social integration*
of society, which takes effect in action orientations, and a *systemic
integration*, which reaches through and beyond action orientations,
calls for a corresponding differentiation in the concept of society
itself…. Society is conceived from the perspective of acting subjects
as the *lifeworld of a social group*. In contrast, from the observer's
perspective of someone not involved, society can be conceived only
as a *system of actions* such that each action has a functional signifi-
cance according to its contribution to the maintenance of the sys-
tem."[182]

Having reinterpreted the history of (post)modernity through
these two complementary social theories, Habermas offers a meta-
theoretical account of the bi-dimensional dynamics of social evolu-
tion intended to incorporate the strengths and overcome the weak-
nesses of each constituent theory, while establishing an explanatory/
interpretive basis for what appears to be the beginning of a critical
theory of post-postmodernity.[183] As he summarizes, "Marx starts
from problems of system integration, Weber from problems of social
integration….

> a. Learning capacities first acquired by individual members of
>   society or by marginal groups make their way into the socie-
>   ty's interpretive system via exemplary learning processes. Col-
>   lectively shared structures of consciousness and stocks of
>   knowledge represent a *cognitive potential*—in terms of empiri-
>   cal knowledge and moral-practical insight—that can be uti-
>   lized for societal purposes.
> b. Societies learn through resolving system problems that present
>   evolutionary challenges. By this I mean problems that over-
>   load the steering capacity available within the limits of a given
>   social formation. Societies can *learn in an evolutionary sense* by
>   drawing upon moral and legal representations contained in
>   world-views to reorganize systems of action and shape new
>   forms of social integration. This process can be understood as
>   an institutional embodiment of rationality structures already
>   developed at the cultural level.

c. The establishment of a *new form of social integration* makes it possible to implement available (or to produce new) technical-organizational knowledge, that is to say, it makes possible a *heightening of productive forces* and an expansion of systemic complexity. Thus learning processes in the area of moral-practical consciousness function as a pacemaker in social evolution.

Hence, in light of this bi-dimensional meta-theory, "evolutionary advances are marked by institutions that make it possible to solve whatever system problems are producing a crisis, and to do so in virtue of features that derive from their embodiment of rationality structures."[184]

One way to engage with Habermas's conception of society as simultaneously lifeworld and system is to accept without challenge that the *society-as-lifeworld* represents the perspective of *participants-in-action*, while the *society-as-system* represents the perspective of *observers-of-action*. At first glance, this suggests that the lifeworld/system perspectives are aligned with the *subjective/objective* perspectives of human action as depicted in the left/right sides of triadic quadratic perspectivism. Wilber would seem to agree, as he incorporates Habermas's lifeworld/system into his cultural/social (LL/LR) perspectives of human evolution, elaborating extensively on the distinctions between *functionalist* inquiry into the social—*how does it function?*—and *hermeneutical* inquiry into the cultural—*what does it mean?*[185] Hence, while the *functional* distinctions between premodern, modern, and postmodern eras—such as agricultural monarchies, industrial nation-states, and informational networks—might be *objectively observable* in terms of system dynamics, the *meaningful* distinctions between their corresponding lifeworlds—such as prerational-mythic, rational-scientific, and postrational-linguistic—require *subjective interpretation*. Wilber also emphasizes the fully quadratic nature of human evolution, wherein any new *holon*, such as an innovation, emerges within an established worldspace of *selection pressures* (i.e., previously validated knowledge) on the basis of which this innovation must be *tetra-meshed* (i.e., validated), not only in terms of the *collective* dimension of subjective *meaning* (LL) and objective *function* (LR), but also in terms of the *individual* dimension of subjective *intention* (UL) and objective *behavior* (UR).[186] Wilber thus

frames the co-emergent *tetra-dimensional* features of human devel-
opment and evolution—*intentional-behavioral-meaningful-functional*
or, alternatively, *individual-collective* and *subjective-objective*—that are
less clearly delineated, yet nevertheless implied in Habermas's
account. (Fig. 4)

Unfortunately, Wilber mistakenly equates and conflates these
tetra-dimensional features of human development and evolution
with the *tri-dimensional* features articulated in Habermas's theory of
communicative action, conflating first-person *sincerity* or *beauty* (1)
with individual-subjective *intention* (UL), second-person *rightness* or
goodness (2) with collective-subjective *meaning* (LL), and third-person
truth (3) with both individual-objective *behavior* (UR) and collective-
objective *function* (LR).[187] (Fig. 5) This tri/quad conflation renders
incoherent what would otherwise have been a perfectly useful, if
wholly monological, indefinite quadratic account of human devel-
opment and evolution (X$_{AQAL}$) highlighting the interdependent
intentional-behavioral-meaningful-functional features presumed to
be applicable to *anyone* and *anything*, *everyone* and *everything*, while
nevertheless ignoring the dialogical differences between specific
first-, second-, and third-person quadratic perspectives.[188] (Fig. 10) In
contrast, triadic quadratic perspectivism (123.123$_{AQ}$) appears capable
of framing the entire, multi-faceted integral/différantial dialogue of
human development and evolution as it actually unfolds through
the intrapersonal, interpersonal, and impersonal dimensions of
intention, behavior, meaning, and function. (Fig. 14)

A second glance at Habermas's account—again accepting with-
out challenge that the *society-as-lifeworld* represents the perspective of
participants-in-action while the *society-as-system* represents the per-
spective of *observers-of-action*—reveals a subtle shift in the previously
established parallels between his lifeworld/system and Argyris's
theory of action. Regarding society-as-lifeworld, Habermas's har-
monization of *action orientations* via normatively secured or commu-
nicatively achieved consensus remains consistent with Argyris's tacit
presumption or deliberate validation of *action values* via communica-
tive or double-loop action-learning. However, regarding society-as-
system, Habermas's functionally intermeshed *action consequences* via
non-normative regulation from beyond the actors' consciousnesses

suggests the need for a wider, system dynamics explanation for Argyris's primarily-actor-produced *action consequences* than can be inferred from the actors' own strategies and values, without necessarily invalidating these features of action for partial explanation. Such a system dynamics would seek to explain the action consequences between Actors 1 and 2 in Figure 17 in terms of the functional fit with a variety of other media-steered action consequences, with little regard for any of the actors, action values, or action strategies implied, as if the system operates by its own internal logic of power or money.

In my view, however, even those systems of human action that really do function by an internal logic that can be conceptualized and quantified without regard for particular actors and their values and strategies must, nevertheless, engage all these actors in their own unavoidably myopic, but adequately rewarding strategic pursuits in order for the system itself to function. The institutionalized systems of power and money do not function of their own systemic volition, but rather provide the systemic incentives and constraints that induce actors to exercise their own strategic volition, the consequences of which inadvertently contribute to the (dys)functional system dynamics largely beyond their respective purviews. Moreover, whatever the functionalist logic of the society-as-system may appear to be, that logic did not originate and propagate *itself* in the absence of powerful, wealthy actors personally involved in the logical design of these functionalist systems that, not surprisingly, further accumulate and concentrate power and wealth to the primary benefit of these designers and their successors. Indeed, Habermas's concurrent account of social evolution appears to admit that all such institutionalized systems, however impersonally functionalist and extra-linguistic they may appear in operation, are designed, managed, and periodically redesigned by communicatively-informed, strategically-oriented actors using language as a medium.[189] Additionally, their technical innovations in response to what they regard as system dysfunction can be traced, at least in theory, all the way back through a web of communicative action-learning to entirely different actors whose antecedent acts of individual learning were, at the time, a cognitive, moral, and volitional advance be-

yond—or perhaps just an alternative to—the mainstream institutional standards.

Likewise, notwithstanding Wilber's wholesale incorporation of Habermas's actor-agnostic, functionally-intermeshed *system* into his account of the collective-objective social (LR) quadrant,[190] he also appears to echo Habermas's communicative/strategic complementarity in his engagement with Marx's correlated *superstructure/base*, although he places more emphasis on the tendency for technological innovation in the LR quadrant (i.e., *techno-economic base* or *productive forces*) to emerge in advance of the corresponding worldviews in the LL quadrant (i.e., *cultural superstructure* or *productive relations*), thus implying, contra-Habermas, that it may be *strategic* action-learning, rather than *communicative* action-learning, that serves as the pacemaker in socio-technical evolution.[191] But, again, Wilber views this dynamic through the *tetra-dimensional* facets of human development and evolution, which suggests that he wishes to place equal emphasis across the *individual/collective* and *subjective/objective* dimensions, without intentionally privileging any at the expense of the others.

While these interpretations of the Habermasian lifeworld/system are reasonable and reconcilable—and all the more compelling given the Argyrisian and Wilberian implications as yet merely suggested—I believe a more careful reconstruction of these important ideas is necessary in order to preclude the inadvertent reduction of *triadic* quadratic perspectivism (123.123_{AQ}) (Fig. 14) to an *indefinite* quadratic perspectivism (X_{AQ}) (Fig. 10) that, while precluding the distortions of the tri/quad conflated AQAL, would nevertheless ignore the dialogical nature of human action, development, and evolution. This begins with a deeper look at Habermas's formulation of the lifeworld that will, in turn, suggest some previously unacknowledged depth in the system view of society.

Reconstructing Lifeworld/System

Elaborating on the phenomenological lifeworld theories of Edmund Husserl and Alfred Schütz, Habermas positions the lifeworld as the deep-seated background knowledge on the basis of which every new action situation arises. For him, the concept of the life-

world is an essential feature of the theory of communicative action, with the *implicit structure* of the former supporting the *explicit process* of the latter, which, in turn, more-or-less implicitly/explicitly *reproduces* the former, while both, being linguistically constituted, bear the familiar triadic logic of perspectival language itself.[192] Thus, "action, or mastery of situations, presents itself as a circular process in which the actor is at once both the *initiator* of his accountable actions and the *product* of the [impersonal] traditions in which he stands, of the [interpersonal] solidary groups to which he belongs, [and] of [intrapersonal] socialization and learning processes to which he is exposed."[193]

As he elaborates, "one can... imagine the components of the lifeworld—cultural paradigms [3], legitimate orders [2], personality structures [1]—as condensed forms of, and sediments deposited by, the following processes that operate by way of communicative action: *reaching understanding*, *action coordination*, and *socialization*. What enters into communicative action from the resources of the background of the lifeworld, flows through the sluice gates of thematization, and permits the mastery of situations, constitutes the stock of knowledge preserved within communicative practices. This stock of knowledge solidifies, along paths of interpretation, into interpretive paradigms that are handed down; the knowledge becomes compressed, in the network of interactions of social groups, into values and norms; and it condenses, by way of socialization processes, into attitudes, competencies, modes of perception, and identities. The components of the lifeworld result from and are maintained through the continuation of valid knowledge, the stabilization of group solidarities, and the formation of accountable actors. The web of everyday communicative practices extends across the semantic field of symbolic contents just as much as in the dimensions of social space and historical time, constituting the medium through which culture [3], society [2], and personality structures [1] develop and are reproduced."[194] By my reading, these impersonal, interpersonal, and intrapersonal lifeworld resources that Habermas describes as *the stock of knowledge preserved within everyday communicative practices* may be interpreted in Argyrisian terms as the *actionable knowledge* from which people draw in order to design their *knowl-*

edgeable actions in real-world situations and to which people contribute via communicative learning in the wake of these actions.

In Habermas's conception, the *immediate certainty*, *totalizing power*, and *impenetrable holism* of the lifeworld suggest a *massive background consensus* that silently stabilizes the inherent instability of each and every action situation in which novel claims to valid truth, justice, and freedom are in question.[195] Without this massive background consensus, the ever-present, never-ending potential for différantial novelty and conflict among communicative actors with inherently unique perspectives on what really is true, just, and free would overwhelm even the noblest commitments to consensus. The lifeworld thus serves a paradoxical function as *ground*. "It keeps contingency in check through proximity to experience. Using sureties that we obtain only from experience, the lifeworld erects a wall against surprises that themselves originate from experiences. If knowledge of the world is defined on the basis that it is acquired a posteriori, whereas linguistic knowledge, relatively speaking, represents an a priori knowledge, then the paradox may be explained by the fact that, in the background of the lifeworld, knowledge of the world and knowledge of language are integrated."[196] The Habermasian lifeworld might therefore be interpreted as the massive background consensus of actionable knowledge *presumed to be valid* by all the participants in any particular action situation and therefore taken for granted as the indefinite, unproblematic *reality* within which their knowledgeable actions ensue. The presumption of validity would have to be strong enough to render this actionable knowledge relatively invisible to the sort of awareness typical in human action—so strong, in fact, that each participant actually presumes, without question, that the other participants share this presumption of validity.

Ironically, however, it is the lifeworld's proximity to everyday experience, without which it cannot so readily ground everyday experience, that nevertheless exposes it to the différantial contingency inherent in human action, wherein one person's tacit certainties can be challenged, at any moment, by another's perspective on the situation. As the actionable knowledge previously presumed to be valid is surprisingly, even chaotically, exposed to the light of reason-

able dialogue at the myriad sites of everyday awareness-in-action, the structures of the widely-shared lifeworld are gradually deconstructed and reconstructed in indeterminate ways. Amidst what Habermas characterizes as "an ever more extensive and ever more finely woven net of linguistically generated intersubjectivity," cultural traditions (3) once guaranteed gradually succumb to reflective critique and revision, social norms (2) become objectified in discursive procedures of legitimation, and personal identities (1) further individuate in self-authorship and self-realization. "Rationalization of the lifeworld means differentiation and condensation at once—a thickening of the floating web of intersubjective threads that simultaneously holds together the ever more sharply differentiated components of culture, society, and person.... The more abstractly the differentiated structures of the lifeworld operate in the ever more particularized forms of life, the more the rational potential of action oriented toward reaching understanding evolves solely by these *means*."[197] Hence, the massive background consensus of actionable knowledge that is presumed to be valid by all the participants in any particular action situation is unavoidably opened within that situation to dialogical deconstruction and reconstruction by increasingly reasonable participants for whom the validity basis of knowledgeable action can no longer be so easily ignored.

In recognizing the essential role of increasingly competent communicative action-learning in the reproduction of the lifeworld, Habermas invites us to recognize as well the (re/de)constructive functions of language itself, which, at its communicative best, mediates the increasingly reasonable (re/de)construction of:

- *impersonal* lifeworld structures, resulting in progressively more accurate traditions, histories, and worldviews;
- *interpersonal* lifeworld structures, resulting in progressively more moral laws, norms, and memberships; and
- *intrapersonal* lifeworld structures, resulting in progressively more sincere roles, autobiographies, and personalities.[198]

Furthermore, each of these (re/de)constructive functions contributes, in a secondary fashion, to the other two complementary functions (e.g., reasonable worldviews inform legitimate groups and effective parenting; reasonable norms enhance the transmission of culture

and the socialization of individuals; and reasonable personalities challenge social norms and cultural worldviews.). As a universal medium, then, language ensures that each and every newly arising action situation is seamlessly *contextualized* within the existing lifeworld conditions, such as they are, even as these lifeworld conditions become increasingly contingent upon the substantive *content* and procedural *conduct* of increasingly reasonable action situations.

Likewise, because the (re/de)constructive practice of communicative action-learning can only ever be more-or-less (in)competent from one action situation to the next, the universal medium of language ensures that any significant impairment of necessary communicative action-learning will generate negative consequences for the contextualized conditions of the lifeworld. As Habermas puts it, "the individual reproduction processes can be evaluated according to standards of the *rationality of knowledge*, the *solidarity of members*, and the *responsibility of the adult personality*. Naturally the measurements within each of these dimensions vary according to the degree of structural differentiation of the lifeworld,"[199] by which he means the degree to which the lifeworld itself has already been opened to, and is therefore contingent upon, relatively competent communicative action-learning. Hence, "the degree of differentiation also determines how great the need for consensual knowledge, legitimate orders, and personal autonomy is at a given time." As he sees it, significant disturbances in the communicative action-learning necessitated by the evolving structural conditions of the lifeworld can eventually manifest as a *three-fold crisis* in the lifeworld itself, featuring:

- an impersonal *loss of meaning* with secondary effects such as a *withdrawal of legitimation* and a *crisis in education*;
- an interpersonal *anomie* with secondary effects such as an *unsettling of group identity* and an *alienation of group members*; and
- an intrapersonal *psychopathology* with secondary effects such as a *withdrawal of motivation* and a *rupture of tradition*.[200]

In my view, regardless of the specifics, the greater the need for communicative action-learning in newly arising action situations—which increases as existing structures of actionable knowledge prove

insufficient to contend with ever-more-challenging situations—the greater will be the crisis-potential embedded in these action situations. Furthermore, the greater the sustained disturbance to communicative action-learning in these ever-more-challenging action situations—which is a function of how deliberately designed, powerfully enforced, and tacitly accepted that disturbance really is—the more confusing and painful will be the representative symbols, participative signals, and personified symptoms of this evolutionary crisis. Finally, the more confusing and painful the signs of evolutionary crisis, the greater the opportunity for evolutionary action-learning about, not only the signs of the crisis, but the deep-structural conditions of possible action-learning that are presently arrested throughout society.

In terms of triadic quadratic perspectivism, Habermas clearly and repeatedly defines his lifeworld construct, as with communicative action, in the first-, second-, and third-person perspectives of language. The terminology he uses to denote the triadic structures of the lifeworld can be confusing when presented in the same context as similar terms used to denote different, but nevertheless related, perspectives, such as the *cultural* (LL) and *social* (LR) originating with Wilber. Even Habermas himself uses slightly different terms to denote the same three perspectives on the lifeworld from one book to the next. Hence the lifeworld that finds expression in *world views* (3), *moral representations* (2), and *identity formations* (1) in the terminology of one book,[201] finds comparable expression in *cultural traditions* (3), *social solidarity* (2), and *personal identity* (1) in that of another,[202] and in *cultural paradigms* (3), *legitimate orders* (2), and *personality structures* (1) in that of yet another.[203] Nevertheless, all the contexts from which these terms are extracted make it very clear that he is defining the deep-seated, background knowledge supporting third-person, second-person, and first-person orientations of communicative action. For example, consider this clarification: "I use the term *culture* for the stock of knowledge from which participants in communication supply themselves with interpretations as they come to an understanding about something in the world. I use the term *society* for legitimate orders through which participants regulate their memberships in social groups and thereby secure solidarity. By

personality I understand the competences that make a subject capable of speaking and acting, that put him in a position to take part in processes of reaching understanding and thereby to assert his own identity."[204] Clearly, the perspectival structure of Habermas's lifeworld should be designated as triadic (123), not indefinite (X).

While Habermas does not acknowledge the fully quadratic perspectives that further differentiate the three personal perspectives in TQP, his descriptions of the 123 lifeworld as a massive background *consensus* certainly have a *collective*, rather than *individual*, connotation, and the details of these descriptions have a *subjective* more so than *objective* connotation. Furthermore, in one interesting passage in *The Theory of Communicative Action*, Habermas does note that "the members of a collective count themselves as belonging to the lifeworld in the first-person plural, in a way similar to that in which the individual speaker attributes to himself the subjective world to which he has privileged access in the first-person singular."[205] Thus, in terms of TQP, if *I* am, *you* are, and *s/he* is, then *we* are members of *our* lifeworld, or, alternatively, *we* share a common background consensus regarding the meaning of our actions that Habermas calls a lifeworld. This suggests that the lifeworld is a cultural, or *collective-subjective*, stock of presumed, yet undoubtedly meaningful, actionable knowledge. There are good reasons, therefore, to recognize the meaningful or interpretivist connotations in Habermas's lifeworld, as Wilber certainly has,[206] and with my triadic quadratic reconstruction of Wilber's tri/quad conflated 2/LL quadrant, Habermas's triadic structuring of the lifeworld can be fully honored as 123$_{LL}$.

Although the *I* is the originary or enactive perspective, the first among 12 equals, in TQP^N, the *we* seems to play a uniquely important role as the collective subject with whom *I*, *you*, and *s/he* simultaneously identify as an essential presupposition for *our* mutual reflexive différantial awareness-in-action. Moreover, because human action is inherently mutual, the *shared* identification via the perspective of *we* is deeply significant. *I* simply cannot interact with *you* or *her* without identifying with *each* of *you* via *our* common *we*, even if the content of *our* interaction pertains to other collectives with whom *we* identify in any of the other six permutations of *we*. If *we* share nothing that *we* can all acknowledge, even if only as a

presumed consensus of the most fundamental presuppositions of human action, then *we* may not be able to recognize each other enough to communicate. In a sense, the *we* serves as a 123.123_{LL} *perspectival lynchpin* connecting all the unique *I*s in the multiple derivatives of TQP^N relevant to any action situation. (Fig. 18)


Figure 18. Triadic Quadratic Perspectivism – N[th] Derivative Shared Cultural-Social Perspectives

However, as *we* recognize one another in the course of *our* situational awareness-in-action, the proximate *we* that *each* of *us* thinks *we* are (123.123_{LL}) creates a moment-by-moment reflection/projection in the corresponding perspectives of the distal *us* that *each* of *us* *we* were and will be (123.123_{LR})—a reflection/projection with which *each* of *us* (123.123_{UL+UR}) must mutually, reflexively engage in order to learn from, and plan for *our* awareness-in-action (123.123_{AQ}). This suggests that the moment the *we* that *each* of *us* thinks *we* are arises to signify the more-or-less-presumed-valid consensus *meaning* behind *our* awareness-in-action, so too does the corresponding *us*

that *each* of *us* thinks *we* were and will be arise to signify the more-or-less-presumed-valid consensus *function* behind *our* awareness-in-action, thereby grounding our knowledgeable action in a more-or-less-presumed-valid background consensus knowledge of an even more *actionable* nature—*both* meaningful *and* functional.

What, then, is the status of the 123.123$_{LR}$ in relation to Habermas's lifeworld/system theories of social evolution? If the Habermasian lifeworld should be interpreted as the massive background consensus of actionable knowledge presumed to be valid by all the participants in any particular action situation, then why wouldn't this include a massive background consensus of actionable knowledge concerning *both* the 123.123$_{LL}$ meaning *and* the 123.123$_{LR}$ function of human action? After all, if participants-in-action view society-as-lifeworld, as Habermas contends, and if 123.123$_{LL}$ and 123.123$_{LR}$ perspectives are always already enacted by participants-in-action, as I contend, then the lifeworld could be construed more expansively as *both* 123.123$_{LL}$ *and* 123.123$_{LR}$. Besides, when Habermas notes that "the members of a collective count themselves as belonging to the lifeworld in the first-person plural," he does not stipulate that this is *only* the first-person *subjective* plural, *we*, and not *also* the first-person *objective* plural, *us*.[207] While I suspect he means the *we*, primarily, there can be no *we* without its corresponding *us*—a fact with which Habermas would undoubtedly agree, but in which he has little interest due to the absence of the quadratic perspectives in his formulation of the triadic perspectives.

Alternatively, if observers-of-action view society-as-system, as Habermas contends, and if there are no observers-of-action who are not always already participants-in-action, as I contend, then the system could be construed as nothing more than somebody else's system framed in the 3$_{LR}$, and even this could be contested based on the fact that 3$_{LR}$ is nevertheless a perspective enacted by a participant-in-action, acting as an observer capable of representing *his*, *her*, or *their* system. Ultimately, if the lifeworld is to be limited to the 123.123$_{LL}$, simply by definition, and if the system is defined as a logical complement to the lifeworld in a dyadic theory of society, as can be inferred from Habermas, then we might simply reconstruct the system as 123.123$_{LR}$ and recognize the additional explanatory

and interpretive power of a seemingly paradoxical *participant-centered* theory of *society-as-system*. Better yet, if we set aside the lifeworld/system concepts and their more limiting subjectivist/objectivist connotations rooted in monological social theories in which there are no genuinely dialogical 123.123 perspectives, then we can more readily acknowledge the balanced complementarity of the *meaningful* 123.123$_{LL}$ and *functional* 123.123$_{LR}$ aspects of the more-or-less widely-shared, partially-presumed actionable knowledge guiding knowledgeable action in real-world situations.

Uncertain Certainty / Certain Uncertainty

These *perspectival* reconstructions frame a more *practical* formulation of integral/différantial praxiology, pragmatics, and semiotics, wherein the deceptively simple dynamics between what are typically defined as *stocks of knowledge* and *flows of action* can be more carefully articulated. Just as all *knowledgeable action* is triadic quadratic perspectival, so too is the *actionable knowledge* gradually learned, subsequently employed, and eventually revised by this knowledgeable action. After all, the 12 primordial perspectives of TQP co-arise in every actor's awareness and structure the very deepest manifestations of whatever actionable knowledge each and every one of us uses as the basis for knowledgeable action.

Furthermore, regardless of how we might conceptualize the multi-structural patterns of human development and evolution, each of the deep structures within an overall multi-structural pattern—the *actionable knowledge* guiding *knowledgeable action* at some temporal stage of human history—may be reasonably interpreted as the *relatively stable conditions of possible awareness-in-action*. If so, then the triadic quadratic perspectivism of human awareness-in-action may be framing the entire, multi-structural metalogue of human development and evolution as it actually unfolds through the intrapersonal, interpersonal, and impersonal experiences of the intentional, behavioral, cultural, and social aspects of our situational awareness-in-action. This is a significant proposition that nevertheless simply reiterates my reconstruction from Chapter 2, in which

the dialogical development of *my* identity, *I-me*, in relation to *all* of *you*, as discovered by Mead and elaborated by Habermas, actually implies the development of *each* of *your* respective identities and *each* of *their* respective identities as well as the evolution of *each* of *our* collective identities via the identification of all 12 primordial perspectives of the first-person (123AQ), second-person (2.123AQ), and third-person (3.123AQ) in every real action situation (123.123AQ). If this reconstruction is valid, then the *pacemaker in human evolution* might be defined in terms of the quality of the TQP^N dialogue arising in each and every real action situation, wherein the surprisingly novel actions of some unique enactive *Is* (123.123UL) may in due time, through the *tri-tetra-meshing* of a deepening, widening dialogue (123.123AQ), contribute to the source code of an as-yet-uncertain (r)evolutionary advance beyond the institutionalized structures of actionable knowledge that are presently active throughout civilization.

In the most basic of interactions framed by the Indeterminate Derivative, TQP^N, that exemplar in which *I* act, *you* act, and *s/he* acts in relation to one another, *we* enact three unique, yet interpenetrating versions of TQP^N, each of which frames an indeterminate total of at least 36 reciprocally interlocked perspectives within the integral/différantial reality of *our* situational awareness-in-action. From *each* of *our* different perspectives as an origin of *our* situational awareness-in-action—a unique enactive I—*each* of *us* raises and redeems—either explicitly or implicitly—three unique, yet interpenetrating sets of triadic quadratic perspectival *claims to* reality (R^N), while simultaneously presuming three unique, yet interpenetrating sets of corresponding triadic quadratic perspectival *contexts of* reality (R^N). Therefore, from *each* of *our* different perspectives, *each* of *us* has the potential to identify and realize, in the course of knowledgeable action, the more-or-less-presumed reality of a stock of actionable knowledge regarding:

- *my* personified symptoms of freedom (1AQ), *each* of *your* personified symptoms of freedom (2.1AQ), and *each* of *their* personified symptoms of freedom (3.1AQ), each comprised of its corresponding intentional signifieds (123.1UL), behavioral signifiers (123.1UR), cultural semantics (123.1LL), and social

syntax (123.1_{LR}) of freedom, collectively denoted 123.1_{AQ} or F^N;

- *my* participative signals of justice (2_{AQ}), *each* of *your* partici-pative signals of justice (2.2_{AQ}), and *each* of *their* participative signals of justice (3.2_{AQ}), each comprised of its corresponding intentional signifieds (123.2_{UL}), behavioral signifiers (123.2_{UR}), cultural semantics (123.2_{LL}), and social syntax (123.2_{LR}) of justice, collectively denoted 123.2_{AQ} or J^N; and

- *my* representative symbols of truth (3_{AQ}), *each* of *your* repre-sentative symbols of truth (2.3_{AQ}), and *each* of *their* repre-sentative symbols of truth (3.3_{AQ}), each comprised of its cor-responding intentional signifieds (123.3_{UL}), behavioral signifiers (123.3_{UR}), cultural semantics (123.3_{LL}), and social syntax (123.3_{LR}) of truth, collectively denoted 123.3_{AQ} or T^N.

From each of our different perspectives, it seems as if the fully quadratic contexts of intrapersonal freedom (F^N), interpersonal justice (J^N), and impersonal truth (T^N)—thus, *personal* or *relative* reality (R^N)—can be more-or-less taken for granted as the opaque yet invisible actionable knowledge in the context of which all our con-tent-rich knowledgeable action unfolds (123.123_{AQ}).

To be sure, the portion of this more-or-less presumed TQP^N ac-tionable knowledge that *all* of *us*—*I*, *each* of *you*, and *each* of *them*—further presume to be shared in the form of *our* massive background consensus of *what it all means* and *how it all works* might be best framed in the 123.123_{LL+LR} perspectives. But *we* never really know if what *I* presume to be part of the massive background consensus is likewise presumed by *each* of *you* and *each* of *them*. *Each* of *us* has a unique perspective on *our* consensus—123_{LL+LR} vs. 2.123_{LL+LR} vs. 3.123_{LL+LR}—that, ironically, precludes a complete consensus, whether passively presumed or actively pursued. Hence, there must be some contingency lurking within the seemingly non-contingent depth of consensus meaning and some indeterminacy spreading across the seemingly deterministic breadth of consensus function, for socio-cultural certainties can never really be secure from some unexpected, indirect challenge emerging within an everyday action situation. I suspect it is the socialized *me* that *I* think *I* was and will be who defensively guards the premature closure to the presumed consen-

sus about *our* presumed knowledge and the *I* that *I* think *I* am who can, at any moment, without conscious intent or advance notice, reveal some element of *our* seemingly secure yet curiously secret consensus to the light of reason and the possibility of invalidation, however ironically, by *any one* of *us*.

Therefore, the presumed-valid actionable knowledge that *we* presumably share in the deep structures of 123.123LL meaning and 123.123LR function simply cannot eliminate the uniqueness that *I* can express in *my* 123AQ knowledgeable actions, that *each* of *you* can express in *your* 2.123AQ knowledgeable actions, and that *each* of *them* can express in *their* 3.123AQ knowledgeable actions, even though these unique actions are necessarily grounded by the presumed-valid actionable knowledge that *we—I*, *each* of *you*, and *each* of *them—*presumably share. Such is the *familiar surprise* that emerges from the dialectical interplay between the relatively *uncertain certainty* of *our* actionable knowledge and the relatively *certain uncertainty* of *our* knowledgeable action, the ever-present, never-ending potential for which all reasonable people must intuitively presuppose.

Awareness-in-Action may therefore be understood in terms of the deeply meaningful, broadly functional, partially presumed stock of TQP[N] *actionable knowledge* that serves as the situationally relevant ground for the consensus-based, goal-oriented, error-prone flow of TQP[N] *knowledgeable action* by which this actionable knowledge is surprisingly, inevitably, indeterminately deconstructed and reconstructed.

— 4 —

Transparency, Choice, Accountability

Although Habermas's ideas can certainly enhance the descriptive theory of action developed by Argyris and his colleagues, I believe that Argyris's practical insights into human action in real-world contexts can lend to Habermas's, and therefore my own, ideas some additional empirical and normative support. As introduced in the previous chapter, action science is a rigorous way of understanding how adults *reason*, *act*, and *learn* in the midst of challenging social situations, with a particular emphasis on the collaborative generation and application of *actionable knowledge*. Argyris describes the action scientist as "an interventionist who seeks both to promote learning in the client system and to contribute to general knowledge. This is done by… enacting communities of inquiry in communities of practice."[208] More specifically, this "involves working with a community to create conditions in which members can engage in public reflection on substantive matters of concern to them and also on the rules and norms of inquiry they customarily enact…. A frequent focus of reflection… is the reconstruction and criticism of the rules and norms of inquiry customarily enacted in the community of practice, as these determine the system's capacity for learning."[209]

In contrast to the *empirical-analytic* social science method of *explanation*, which is oriented toward the understanding of human action in its *objective* forms, and the *historical-hermeneutic* social science method of *interpretation*, which is oriented toward the understanding of human action in its *subjective* forms, action science incorporates both of these complementary approaches in support of the *critical-reflective* method of *intervention*, which is oriented toward the

emancipation of human action from the as-yet-unacknowledged objective *and* subjective limits previously established in the course of that human action. Consistent with these tenets of critical social science,[210] which are, in turn, largely based on Habermas's early work in critical theory,[211] the key features of action science include "(1) empirically disconfirmable propositions that are organized into a theory; (2) knowledge that human beings can implement in an action context; and (3) alternatives to the status quo that both illuminate what exists and inform fundamental change, in light of values freely chosen by social actors."[212] Thus, as a critical-reflective interventionist with an emancipatory interest, the action scientist enacts a community of inquiry within an existing community of practice, thereby helping the members of this community reflect on the social world they have created and learn to change it in ways more congruent with the values they espouse.[213]

Argyris and his colleagues spent decades engaging with groups of people—typically executives, managers, consultants, and other professionals—to conduct a unique form of *critical discourse* aimed at discerning the primary theory of action—*action values*, *action strategies*, and *action consequences*—that characterizes each of their client communities of practice. Over time, Argyris accumulated a general body of actionable knowledge regarding human action in real-world situations. His general hypothesis with respect to the theory of action is that people tend to espouse practices consistent with open, honest, responsible communication (i.e., communicative action) while nevertheless engaging in systematically distorted communication (i.e., latently or blatantly strategic action) that undermines their relationships and their performance, and they are at best only partially aware of the discrepancy and its unintended negative consequences.[214] Argyris therefore makes a distinction between a person's *espoused theory of action*—what the person claims to follow—and that person's *theory-in-use*—what can be inferred from the person's actions—and remains open-minded about the degree of fit between the two. Because the theories he is referring to are not merely people's *descriptive* theories of the life they want to create but their own *prescriptive* theories of how best to create the life they really want—in other words, *prescriptive* theories of *action values* rather than *descrip-*

tive theories of *action consequences*—what Argyris is framing is the hypothesis that most people have an *espoused praxis* that is very different from the *actual praxis* they are using in the world, and they are almost entirely unaware of the discrepancy. It is as if people already have a reflective idea about how to create more of the results they want, in personal meaning, interpersonal relationships, the organizations in which they work, and the social, economic, and political contexts in which they participate, yet they follow a very different and far less effective praxis that secretly undermines their efforts in every action situation.

Strategic Action

Although it might seem natural to expect a great variety of theories of action to surface from their research with clients, Argyris and his colleagues have discovered just one general model, with two variations. The most common is Model I, the action values of which are:

- define goals and try to achieve them;
- maximize winning and minimize losing;
- minimize generating or expressing negative feelings; and
- be rational.[215]

These action values are like design principles employed in varying degrees from one person to the next, from one situation to the next, in the design of particular action strategies. Regardless of the chosen ratios of these action values, the action strategies that people design almost always include: i) advocating courses of action in ways that discourage inquiry; ii) claiming ownership of the task definition and execution; iii) treating their own views as obviously correct while ignoring inconsistencies between their words and actions; iv) making unillustrated and often covert attributions and evaluations about other people and the action situation; v) withholding critical information, creating rules to censor information and behavior, and holding private meetings; vi) acting defensively with regard to oneself and selected others by blaming, stereotyping, and

leaving potentially embarrassing facts unstated; and vii) intellectual-izing difficult situations while suppressing one's own and ignoring other people's negative feelings.[216]

In terms of TQP, note that what all these action strategies have in common is the underlying motivation to gain *unilateral control* over other people—being the second-person perspective (2)—and the impersonal action situation—being the third-person perspective (3)—in order to *protect* the actor and *achieve* the actor's desired results—being the first-person perspective (1). With regard to the quadratic perspectives, it is not difficult to discern the behavioral (123UR) nature of the *action strategies*, which can be readily observed, and the intentional (123UL) nature of the *action values*, which can be interpreted from that behavior, and at least infer the presence of the corresponding cultural (123LL) and social (123LR) aspects consistent with the mutual nature of Model I.

Furthermore, Model I appears to be an actionable version of Habermas's *strategic action*, which he defines as *social action oriented toward the unilateral success of each actor*.[217] Although the Model I action values do not specifically call for actors to ignore their own claims to freedom, justice, and any truth beyond the efficacy of their own actions, the corresponding action strategies do create circum-stances in which such claims are rather easily ignored simply be-cause they are, according to the values, *irrelevant* to each actor's success as s/he defines it. Any inquiry into these presumed-irrelevant validity claims will tend to arouse the actors' defensive-ness, because such inquiry is contrary to the action values and therefore regarded as *threatening* to each actor's success as s/he defines it. Then, with defensiveness aroused on the basis of subcon-scious action values, each actor will tend to respond with action strategies characterized by subtle forms of deception, coercion, and further defensiveness, without necessarily being aware of these behaviors, except to the extent that these can be rationalized as appropriate responses to the other actors' more obvious deceptive, coercive, and defensive behaviors. The only questions worth asking in strategic action-learning are whether or not the actor has chosen the best means to the desired, or the given, end and whether or not the other actors have contributed to these means by doing whatever

it is the first actor wanted done. Therefore, Argyris and his colleagues appear to have discovered that most people approach most social situations, particularly those that appear interpersonally challenging due to the raising of controversial claims to truth, justice, and freedom, with some personalized version of the derivative strategic action or rationality that Habermas has critiqued in relation to the more integral approach of communicative action or reason.[218]


Figure 19. Strategic Action-Learning –
Mutual Reflexive Différantial

The predictable consequences of Model I rationalized actions include "defensive interpersonal and group relationships, low freedom of choice, and reduced production of valid information. There are negative consequences for learning, because there is little public testing of ideas. The hypotheses that people generate tend to become self-sealing. What learning does occur remains within the bounds of what is acceptable. Double-loop learning does not tend to occur. As

a result, error escalates and effectiveness in problem solving and in execution of action tends to decrease."[219] As suggested by Figure 19, the action values and action strategies of Model I effectively preclude communicative action-learning, rendering sub-conscious or normatively inappropriate whatever communicative competence might exist and rewarding the exclusive focus on strategic action-learning with at least temporary validation of the action strategies and implied validation of the unexamined, yet evidently dysfunctional, strategic action values. By precluding communicative action-learning, Model I makes it impossible to address in a constructive, reasonable manner whatever specific claims to truth, justice, and freedom triggered the defensive, rationalized action-learning. Thus, ironically, Model I is *most likely* to undermine reason, action, and learning in precisely those situations when effective reason, action, and learning are *most needed*.

"Most people hold espoused theories inconsistent with Model I; and, when confronted with our predictions about the strategies they will use, seek to demonstrate that our predictions are not valid. But even when Model I has been explained and people are trying to produce action that does not fit the model, they are unable to do so. This result holds whenever people are dealing with double-loop issues, which is to say whenever they are dealing with threatening issues. At best, they are able to produce strategies consistent with opposite Model I, the mirror image of Model I."[220] The action values of Opposite Model I are:

- everyone participates in defining purposes;
- everyone wins, no one loses;
- express feelings; and
- suppress the cognitive intellective aspects of action.

Whether it appears as an espoused theory or as a theory-in-use, Opposite Model I suggests people's growing awareness of their own and others' problematic communication and an attempt to remedy the situation by rationalizing an antithetical approach—the unexamined rationale apparently being that if doing things one way has created such a mess, perhaps doing just the opposite will clean up the mess. But in its attempt to privilege all perspectives simultaneously, as if they are all equally valid and therefore immune to dis-

course, Opposite Model I can serve to entrench certain contexts of meaning and function wherein reasonable discourse concerning the relative validity of everyone's perspectives on truth, justice, and freedom is rendered normatively inappropriate, despite no shortage of rationalized conversation. Still more remarkable is the possibility that Opposite Model I forms a necessary complement to the *overtly controlling* and *actively aggressive* strategies of Model I in the sense that its *overtly dependent* behavior typically masks an underlying action strategy of *covert control* and *passive aggression*. The paradox embedded in both versions of Model I is that one's theory of effective social action will often require those with whom one collaborates to act in complementary ways that one defines as ineffective and, regardless of intent or effort, ultimately everyone will be rendered ineffective and unsuccessful by the dysfunctional dynamics of the complementary Models I.[221] Regardless of the specific action strategies employed, the negative consequences of Opposite Model I for personal effectiveness and satisfaction, interpersonal relationships, and double-loop learning are the same as for Model I.

It must be emphasized that these types of interactions do not happen because people self-consciously plan them this way. They happen because people have deeply ingrained and almost entirely subliminal mental models telling them just what to do in order to achieve their intended results—results that in the case of strategic action always entail some version of self-protective unilateral success that is contingent upon getting other people to act in ways that support one's own unilateral success, often to their own detriment. For the most part, people are not aware of the roles they unwittingly play in their own disappointing strategic interactions. Remember, this is *skilled incompetence*: *skilled*, because these are spontaneous applications of tacit knowledge acquired through experiential learning, and *incompetence*, because these actions are ultimately counterproductive by the actor's own standards, at least in the long run. Moreover, the skillfulness of this *communicative incompetence* is often so pronounced as to deceive the actor about the existence of his or her own incompetence, partly because it is so much easier to attribute, secretly of course, the incompetence to others. This accounts for the popularity of the dysfunctional defensive routine known as

triangulation, wherein *you* and *I* have a secret conversation about *his* problematic behavior and intentions, which seems to empower *us* at *his* expense and give *us* the shared rationalization of a mutually validated critique that nevertheless must, curiously, remain a secret from the person most likely to present us with invalidating feedback.

As individuals who have learned Model I and Opposite Model I over many years of socialization come together to form collaborative groups and organizations, they tend to enact socio-cultural patterns called *limited learning systems*. Once established, these limited learning systems guide the socialization and performance of new members, indoctrinating them into the particulars of each system's version of Model I and Opposite Model I. Argyris and Schön created a model of a limited learning system congruent with the Models I, called Model O-I (with "O" signifying "organization").[222]

Model O-I "states that when individuals programmed with Model I theory-in-use deal with difficult and threatening problems, they create primary inhibiting loops… in the form of conditions of undiscussability, self-fulfilling prophesies, self-sealing processes, and escalating error, and they remain unaware of their responsibility for these conditions. Primary inhibiting loops lead to secondary inhibiting loops such as win-lose group dynamics, conformity, polarization between groups, and organizational games of deception. These secondary inhibiting loops reinforce primary inhibiting loops and together they lead people to despair of double-loop learning in organizations."[223] Because of these inhibiting loops, limited learning systems tend to camouflage their own dysfunction via organizational defensive routines that protect their members from the embarrassment that would result from the awareness of their own tacit conspiracy in creating the dysfunctional system performance. "All organizational defensive routines are based on a logic that is powerful and that has profound impact on individuals and organizations. The logic is to: i) craft messages that contain inconsistencies; ii) act as if the messages are not inconsistent; iii) make the ambiguity and inconsistency in the message undiscussable; and iv) make the undiscussability of the undiscussable also undiscussable."[224]

With regard to TQP, note that the intentional (123$_{UL}$) action values and behavioral (123$_{UR}$) action strategies of the complementary Models I are now more explicitly matched by the cultural (123$_{LL}$) *defensive routines* and social (123$_{LR}$) *system dysfunction* of the corresponding Model O-I. Furthermore, although it isn't highlighted in the action science account other than as *polarization between groups*, I infer that much of the shared motivation behind the limited learning system is the members' desire to gain *collective unilateral control* over other collectives with which they engage—being the collective second-person perspective (2$_{LL+LR}$)—and the collective impersonal action situation—being the collective third-person perspective (3$_{LL+LR}$)—in order to *protect* the members and *achieve* their desired results—being the collective first-person perspective (1$_{LL+LR}$). In other words, *our* limited learning system, of which *we* are almost entirely unaware, nevertheless exists in order to protect *us* and help *us* achieve *our* desired results by unilaterally controlling the collective *you* with whom we directly engage and the collective *them* with whom we do not engage but whose actions impact our ability to succeed. Many an organizational strategy has been created on the basis of this underlying motivation and many a cross-functional organizational change initiative has been undermined by the same. Furthermore, in my interpretation, Model O-I is obviously at work between political parties in government, between nations in international policy disputes, and in many of the other inter-group, inter-organizational, and inter-societal conflicts we encounter. As the collective perspective of strategic action-learning, Model O-I has the potential to contribute new insights to Habermas's critique of the systematic failures in societal rationalization that impair large-scale social evolution.[225]

Finally, because each of the individuals and collectives regarded within second- and third-person perspectives possesses a theory of action, and according to Argyris most likely Model I or Opposite Model I for individuals and the corresponding Model O-I for collectives, we can see that a complete account of any particular theory of action would have to include *the actor's understanding of other people's theories of action*. "When the situation that the actor frames involves other people, then the framing will include the agent's beliefs about

the intentions and beliefs of other people. The consequences of action include the reactions of those others, which themselves depend on how they frame the situation and on their beliefs about the intentions and beliefs of the original actor."[226] As a result, "one's theory-in-use includes a vast store of information about what people are like and how they will respond in various situations."[227] Therefore, the complementary Models I, each with its own nuanced version of Model O-I, can be reasonably interpreted and carefully reconstructed into two distinct, yet interrelated triadic quadratic theories of action, or praxes, with unprecedented explanatory and interpretive power framed in at least the 2nd Derivative of triadic quadratic perspectivism, and therefore TQP^N (123.123$_{AQ}$).

Communicative Action

Perhaps the most surprising aspect of action science is that these insights into human action, with all their unfortunate implications about the way we work and live with one another, are the product of a fully informed, completely democratic collaboration among action scientists and their thousands of clients around the world, many of whom are business executives and management consultants. In line with the critical-reflective tenets of action science, critiques of Model I, Opposite Model I, and Model O-I are presented to clients in the form of explanatory and interpretive hypotheses that clients can openly evaluate. If their judgment leads them to do so, clients may challenge these hypotheses on the basis of what they regard as superior explanations and interpretations, which are then put to the test in real action situations. The fact that such powerful and critical insights were developed with the full co-operation and acknowledgement of clients lends considerable credibility to the method. Furthermore, the fact that action science uses the real world of human decision making, indeed management decision making, as its proving ground distinguishes it from the ever-growing body of far more popular decision science research (e.g., Kahneman & Tversky) conducted in less realistic, controlled environments.[228]

But if action scientists are able to engage with their clients in a way that so clearly and collaboratively reveals the clients' own dysfunctional action-learning *by the clients' own admission*, how are they able to get past their clients' defensive routines and open up the dialogue necessary to validate such claims? The answer is Model II, a dialogical praxis based on the following action values:

- valid information;
- free and informed choice;
- internal commitment to the choice; and
- vigilant monitoring of its implementation in order to detect and correct error.[229]

If the critical discourse analysis represented by the Models I is a *descriptive* approach to explaining, interpreting, and critiquing clients' own prescriptive theories-in-use, Model II is a *prescriptive* approach to a form of critical discourse that can engage and transform their Model I and Opposite Model I theories-in-use. Thus, Model II is *normative*, but in an unbiased and impartial way, without regard to who is engaged or what is at issue. The challenge for the action scientist is to partner with clients to create conditions in which these normative ideals can be fully realized in what might be described as a series of extraordinary conversations about the clients' own patterns of communication—patterns which, as the action scientist openly hypothesizes, indicate some degree of systematically distorted communication and impaired double-loop learning. Toward that, specific action strategies emphasize "sharing control with those who have competence and who participate in designing or implementing the action. Rather than unilateral advocacy (Model I) or inquiry that conceals the agent's own views (opposite Model I), in Model II the agent combines advocacy and inquiry. Attributions and evaluations are illustrated with relatively directly observable data, and the surfacing of conflicting views is encouraged in order to facilitate public testing of them."[230]

Model II looks simple enough in writing, but it is very difficult to implement consistently because practicing Model II involves triggering Model I and Opposite Model I. This is threatening to people who have come to regard these as normal ways of communicating and decision making, while simultaneously confusing these

with their own espoused theories of action, the social virtues of which are broadly consistent with Model II principles. People practicing Model I or Opposite Model I often imagine themselves to be already practicing something generally consistent with Model II, which makes the actual practice of Model II a rather challenging proposition from their perspective—simultaneously unnecessary, yet paradoxically quite difficult and threatening. Nevertheless, Model II can be learned with diligent practice and used to transform Model I and Opposite Model I theories-in-use. The most impressive fact with respect to this method is that it has been validated, both empirically and normatively, by the clients with whom Argyris and his colleagues have engaged. As a genuinely *critical* social science in which the inherently mutual, reflexive, and différantial nature of human action is self-consciously recognized in the practice of the social science practitioner, action science not only *allows* but *requires* that the method itself be evaluated by all participants in the natural course of its application.

"The consequences of Model II action strategies should include minimally defensive interpersonal and group relationships, high freedom of choice, and high risk taking."[231] Additional consequences include the establishment of empirically disconfirmable processes, public testing of theories, learning both within and across frames of reference, improved quality of life characterized by high authenticity and freedom of choice, greater effectiveness in solving difficult problems, and increased long-run effectiveness.[232] Furthermore, when members of a group or organization practice Model II, they enact a more effective learning system, Model O-II, in which inquiry replaces inhibiting loops and defensive routines, previously undiscussable issues are brought to the surface, assumptions are tested and corrected, self-sealing processes are interrupted, dysfunctional group and intergroup dynamics decrease, deception, camouflage, and defensive reasoning are reduced, single-loop and double-loop learning occurs, and overall organizational performance improves.

Recognizing Argyris's Model II as a form of mutual reflexive dialogue consistent with his postformal, (post-)postmodern 5th Order of consciousness—*interindividual self* (123.1UL+UR), *interpenetration of self and other* (123.2UL+UR), and *dialectical cognition* (123.3UL+UR)—

developmental theorist Robert Kegan offers some valuable insight into the subtle reframing necessary to transcend the limitations of formal, (post)modern 4th Order methods like the twin Models I. "In essence, the [5th Order] view bids disputants to do several things: (1) consider that your protracted conflict is a signal that you and your opponent have probably become identified with the poles of the conflict; (2) consider that the relationship in which you find yourself is not the inconvenient result of the existence of an opposing view but the expression of your own incompleteness taken as complete- ness; (3) value the relationship, miserable though it might feel, as an opportunity to live out your own multiplicity; and thus, (4) focus on ways to let the conflictual relationship transform the parties rather than on the parties resolving the conflict."[233]

He further notes that "Argyris… has been candid in reporting that even highly-advantaged, graduate-educated, organizationally high-ranking adults have a great deal of difficulty mastering—or simply cannot master—what it is he is teaching. But this should be no surprise, because what he and other postmodern conflict resolu- tionists are asking people to do is organize experience at a level of complexity beyond the fourth order of consciousness, something few people are yet able to do. Refusing to see oneself or the other as a single system or form, regarding the premise of completeness as a tempting pretense, constructing the process of interacting as *prior* to the existence of the form or system, facing protracted conflict as a likely sign of one's own identification with false assumptions of wholeness, distinctness, completeness, or priority—all of these ways of constructing reality require that the epistemological organization of system, form, or theory be relativized, moved from subject in one's knowing to object in one's knowing. They all require a 'trans- systemic,' 'multiform,' or 'cross-theoretical' epistemological organi- zation. In other words, they all require the fifth order of conscious- ness."[234]

In my reconstruction, Models II and O-II cover the same essen- tial TQPs as we saw with Models I and O-I, which means this dialog- ical praxis can be framed in at least the 2nd Derivative of triadic quadratic perspectivism, and therefore TQP^N (123.123$_{AQ}$). But in contrast to the twin Models I, this TQP^N reconstruction of Model II

prescribes how people can generate actionable knowledge concerning their own and others' patterns of reasoning, acting, and learning in difficult situations in which différantial claims to truth, justice, and freedom are at issue. Model II helps people systematically transform their own and others' reactive strategies of *private self-protection* within a first-person perspective and *unilateral control* within second- and third-person perspectives into creative strategies of *public self-reflection* and *multi-lateral control*—pre-requisites for the mutual, reflexive (in)validation of any controversial claims previously considered too threatening to discuss. It also helps people become more aware of their own and others' action values (123.123_{UL}) and action strategies (123.123_{UR}), as well as the defensive cultures (123.123_{LL}) and dysfunctional systems (123.123_{LR}) to which they contribute, thereby making it possible for them to consciously choose more effective alternatives for which they are more willing to be held accountable. Finally, Model II helps people discover, maintain, and transform situationally relevant portions of the previously presumed actionable knowledge supporting their mutual actions. In particular, the presumed consensus regarding *what it all means*—123.123_{LL} meaning—and *how it all works*—123.123_{LR} function—previously embedded in the opaque yet invisible background of mutual, reflexive, différantial action situations gradually becomes more transparent through the honest disclosure of valid information, more amenable to revision by uncoerced choice, and more responsibly held amidst shared accountability for past and future consequences. Therefore, Model II can be reasonably interpreted and carefully reconstructed into a TQP^N praxis with significant normative scope and emancipatory potential, transcending yet including within its purview both Model I and Opposite Model I, much like a *synthesis* sublates both *thesis* and *antithesis*.

Although, to my knowledge, Habermas is unfamiliar with the work of Argyris and his colleagues, I think action science may constitute the single best *practice* of communicative action to emerge from, and in parallel with, Habermas's extraordinary achievement in the *theory* of communicative action—a *critical practice* consistent with his *critical theory*. In her presentation of Habermas's critical theory, Jane Braaten makes a very useful distinction between *diagnostic* and

therapeutic types of critical theory. "A therapeutic explanation is a therapy—a method of treatment—that dissolves false consciousness and thereby emancipates the subject…. Therapeutic explanations rest on, but are not confined to, diagnostic explanations. A diagnostic explanation explains the causes of a crisis, and thus opens the way to confronting it, but it is not itself the means of emancipation."[235] While Habermas's theory of communicative action may therefore be positioned as a *diagnostic* critical theory, which is consistent with Braaten's assessment,[236] Argyris's practice of communicative action is clearly a *therapeutic* critical theory—a *theory of practice*—wherein the emancipatory interests of specific communities of practice are fulfilled with the guidance of the action scientist serving as an *interventionist* with both *diagnostic* and *therapeutic* roles. Although the focus of Argyris's critical practice has been limited to the relatively small scale of groups within organizations, the insights of an integrally reconstructed action science may be applicable on all degrees of scale, as a way of explaining, interpreting, and evaluating the mutual, reflexive, différantial, and ultimately integral action-learning of couples, families, groups, organizations, markets, governments, social movements, major institutions, and whole civilizations—in other words, the large-scale domain of Habermas's critical theory of (post)post-modernity.

Ideal Realism / Real Idealism

As presented in Chapter 1, Habermas's theory of communicative action is grounded in a formal-pragmatic model of communicative competence acquired through multiple, sequential structures of personal development and corresponding social evolution. He proposes as the highest level in this hierarchy of communicative competence a *universal ethics of speech*, corresponding with a postformal level of consciousness beyond Loevinger's *autonomous* level of identity and Kohlberg's highest level of morality, based on *universal ethical principles*.[237] More recent research in adult developmental psychology that builds on the pioneering work of Loevinger, Kohlberg, and Piaget—Habermas's source material from the 1970s—

suggests that this postformal level of communicative competence idealized by Habermas corresponds reasonably well with Wilber's *Turquoise* level of consciousness,[238] Susanne Cook-Greuter's *Construct-Aware* level of identity,[239] Bill Torbert's *Alchemist* action-logic,[240] Jenny Wade's *Transcendent* consciousness,[241] and the most mature attainments in Kegan's *5th Order* consciousness.[242] Without the benefit of this subsequent research into (post-)postformal consciousness, Habermas nevertheless points to the communicative competence that might accompany its widespread emergence and thereby establish, via a more mature form of communicative action-learning, a cosmopolitan post-postmodern civilization.[243]

In his critique of exclusively cognitivist conceptions of communication as well as formal-operational conceptions of morality, Habermas contends that "ego identity requires not only cognitive mastery of general levels of communication but also the ability to give one's own needs their due in these communication structures; as long as the ego is cut off from its internal nature and disavows the dependency on needs that still await suitable interpretations, freedom, no matter how much it is guided by principles, remains in truth unfree in relation to existing systems of norms."[244] Thus, "only at the level of a universal ethics of speech, can need interpretations themselves—that is, what each individual thinks he should understand and represent as his 'true' interests—also become the object of practical discourse."[245] By my reading, the concept of *validity* for the universal ethics of speech recognizes not only *all people as private persons*, and therefore the *substantive content* of sincerity, rightness, and truth as these are understood by each autonomous person, but also *all private persons as members of a fictive world society*, and therefore the *procedural conduct* by which people may discursively validate all potential claims to sincerity, rightness, and truth. The purpose of such a philosophical inquiry is therefore to discover and articulate *universal context-transcendent norms* for the validation of all *particular context-immanent claims* to what is free, just, and true for particular people in particular situations.

Context-Transcendence / Context-Immanence

Habermas frames his search for these context-transcendent norms in terms of *discourse*.[246,247] In his parlance, a discourse ensues whenever one participant's specific validity claim to sincerity, rightness, or truth is challenged by another participant in communication. In contrast to the relatively normal communication in which validity claims are naively taken for granted, "discourse is that 'peculiarly unreal' form of communication in which the participants subject themselves to the 'unforced force of the better argument,' with the aim of coming to an agreement about the validity or invalidity of problematic claims. The supposition that attaches to such an agreement is that it represents a 'rational consensus,' that is, that it is the result not of the peculiarities of the participants or of their situation but simply of their subjecting themselves to the weight of evidence and the force of argument. The agreement is regarded as valid not merely 'for us' (the actual participants) but as 'objectively' valid, valid for all rational subjects (as potential participants). In this sense discourse is, as Habermas puts it, 'the condition for the unconditioned.'"[248]

Habermas justifies these strong idealizations by recourse to an argument that, as the discourse participants attempt to come to a mutual understanding of what really is sincere, right, and true for each and every participant, the discourse itself is at least implicitly evaluated by participants in terms of how well it fulfills the characteristics of an always already presupposed *ideal speech situation*. He characterizes the ideal speech situation as a "reconstruction of the general symmetry conditions that every competent speaker who believes he is engaging in [discourse] must presuppose as adequately fulfilled. The presupposition of something like an 'unrestricted communication community,' an idea that Apel developed following Peirce and Mead, can be demonstrated through systematic analysis of performative contradictions. Participants in [discourse] cannot avoid the presupposition that… the structure of their communication rules out all external or internal coercion other than the force of the better argument and thereby also neutralizes all motives other than that of the cooperative search for truth."[249] In other words, to

assert that *we arrived at a mutual understanding after I coerced you into recognizing the validity of what I said* or that *your views on the issue were rationally justified when you ridiculed my views* is to commit a performative contradiction that communicatively competent people immediately recognize as invalid. Recognizing this logic is rather powerfully suggestive of a deeper intuitive know-how that participants in discourse demonstrate even in the absence of explicit norms.

According to Raymond Geuss, Habermas defines the ideal speech situation even more specifically as "a situation of absolutely uncoerced and unlimited discussion between completely free and equal human agents." He argues that to be a human agent is to participate in a speech community and, furthermore, to be someone *we* can recognize as a human agent is to participate in *our* speech community. "But no agent can be even potentially a member of a speech community who cannot recognize the difference between true and false statements in a general way or who doesn't in some way know what it means for a statement to be true. But what it means for a statement to be true is that it would be the one on which all agents would agree if they were to discuss all of human experience in absolutely free and uncoerced circumstances for an indefinite period of time. So anyone we recognize as a human agent will thereby stand committed to agreeing with us on what to count as conditions of 'free and uncoerced discussion,' and hence must in some way share our views on what are conditions of freedom and what [are] conditions of coercion."[250]

As McCarthy elaborates, "this freedom from internal and external constraint can be given a [formal]-pragmatic characterization; there must be for all participants a symmetrical distribution of chances to select and employ speech acts, that is an effective equality of chances to assume dialogue roles. If this is not the case, the resultant agreement is open to the charge of being less than rational, of being the result not of the force of the better argument but, for example, of open or latent relations of domination, of conscious or unconscious strategic motivations. Thus the idea of truth points ultimately to a form of interaction that is free from all distorting influences. The 'good and true life' that is the goal of critical theory

is inherent in the notion of truth; it is anticipated in every act of speech."[251]

Habermas claims "that *all* human agents in *every* action they perform (and, in particular, in every speech act) must 'presuppose' the ideal speech situation, or 'assume it counterfactually,' that is they must 'act as if' their present situation *was* 'ideal,' although they can never *know* that it is and will generally have reason to believe that it is not."[252] We approach discourse *anticipating* an ideal speech situation and "this anticipation alone is the warrant that permits us to join to an actually attained consensus the claim of a rational consensus. At the same time it is a critical standard against which every actually realized consensus can be called into question and tested."[253] The ideal speech situation may serve as "a transcendental criterion of truth, freedom, and rationality. Beliefs agents would agree on in the ideal speech situation are *ipso facto* 'true beliefs,' preferences they would agree on are 'rational preferences,' interests they would agree on are 'real interests.' The agents are 'free' if their real situation is one which satisfies the conditions of the ideal speech situation.'"[254]

Clearly, Habermas regards the ideal speech situation as the presupposed context-transcendent norms of discourse without which any particular context-immanent discourse, however short of the ideal it may fall, cannot be actually engaged nor adequately explained. He contends that "the ideal speech situation is neither an empirical phenomenon nor a mere construct, but rather an unavoidable supposition reciprocally made in discourse.... It is not merely a regulative principle in Kant's sense; with the first step toward agreement in language we must always in fact make this supposition. On the other hand, neither is it an existing concept in Hegel's sense; for no historical reality matches the form of life that we can in principle characterize by reference to the ideal speech situation. The ideal speech situation would best be compared with a transcendental illusion were it not for the fact that... this illusion is also the constitutive condition of rational speech. [Therefore,] the anticipation of the ideal speech situation has… the significance of a constitutive illusion which is at the same time the appearance of a form of life."[255]

We can enhance our understanding of Habermasian discourse by first recognizing it as a form of awareness-in-action framed in TQP^N. What I have already proposed is that the realization of *my* specific claims to quadratic freedom, justice, and truth is unavoidably interdependent with the realization of *your* claims and *his* or *her* claims, not as a regulative principle to be accepted or rejected upon reasonable reflection, but as a presupposed condition of *our* situational awareness-in-action. In awareness-in-action, *each* of *our* triadic quadratic actions is in reference to the *others'* triadic quadratic actions and *each* such action includes specific reality claims, whether expressed or implied, that are raised and redeemed in response to the *others'* specific reality claims, all of which inform a complete dialogue regarding what really is free (F^N), just (J^N), and true (T^N)—indeed, what is *relatively real* (R^N)—for *all* three of *us*.

Furthermore, the ideal speech situation can be interpreted as stretching both the *dimension* and *duration* as well as the *difference* and *deferral* of this TQP^N dialogue to the extremes as logical presuppositions for mutual understanding and agreement regarding what is ultimately real in any dialogue. This is suggestive of the integral aperspectival, yet différantial perspectival action framed in TQP^∞, which illustrates the infinitely differentiated integrations and infinitely integrated differentiations of a veritable kaleidoscope of self-imaging/world-viewing as seen through all the eyes, literally all the unique *Is*, identified in *my* circle of awareness. TQP^∞ frames the ideal that each and every one of us can ultimately realize each and every one of us as unique members of a universal civilization grounded in the ultimate realization of freedom (F^∞), justice (J^∞), and truth (T^∞), and therefore ultimate reality (R^∞).

Accordingly, we might define the ideal speech situation more comprehensively as an *ideal action situation* in which *what it means* for an action to be free, just, and true is that all of us would *agree that it is* free, just, and true if we were to communicatively contemplate all of human experience in absolutely free and uncoerced circumstances for an indefinite period of time. Despite the evidence that each and every one of us has indeed pursued our own marginally satisfying notions of freedom, justice, and truth in ways that apparently require others to curtail their pursuits of the same, there also appears

to be no way to ignore forever our semiotic, pragmatic, and praxiological interdependence in ultimate realization. Hence, the presupposed ideality of TQP$^{\infty}$ weaves us together in an ever-present, never-ending metalogue that ultimately includes, by virtue of the limitless derivatives in this integral aperspectival, yet différantial perspectival exemplar, *all private persons as members of a fictive world society*, or, better yet, *all sentient beings as members of a fictive universal civilization*.

Fictitious Premises / Counter-factual Presuppositions

Unfortunately, there is some potential for misinterpretation and misapplication of the ideal speech situation by people seeking, through seemingly unbounded and interminable *conversation*—but not necessarily *dialogue*—the resolution to the very real defenses and dysfunctions associated with strategic action. In terms of action science, a tendency toward unbounded and interminable conversation is often associated with Opposite Model I action values—*everyone participates, everyone wins, no one loses, express feelings, and suppress intellect*—which arise in complementary contradiction to the conversation-stifling, debate-promoting Model I action values—*define and achieve goals, maximize winning, minimize losing, minimize negative feelings, and be rational*—while generating many of the same defensive routines and dysfunctional dynamics. A superficial interpretation of the ideal speech situation by people enacting either of the Models I may very well lead to the mistaken conclusion that it implies action values and strategies consistent with Opposite Model I. Nevertheless, a proper understanding of how Opposite Model I prevents the open, honest disclosure and evaluation of reality claims in favor of overtly dependent, covertly controlling, persistently deceptive, and systematically distorted communication should preclude any confusion with the ideal speech situation.

That being said, Model II practitioners are careful not to prematurely foreclose discourse simply because it *may* descend into the circulating ignorance of Opposite Model I, for attributing to a particular discourse that has not yet begun, let alone run its course, the dysfunctional anti-discourse action values of Opposite Model I is

more likely to be made by those enacting the anti-discourse Model I than by those genuinely enacting Model II. In other words, Model II practitioners have the capacity and often the willingness to effectively engage in discourse with Model I and Opposite Model I practitioners when they at least espouse a commitment to Model II action values. However, if those practicing either of the strategic modes of communication are not committed to at least trying to raise their discourse to Model II standards, then Model II practitioners will typically recognize the futility of any further engagement and exit the situation.

Such an exit will appear to the Model I and Opposite Model I practitioners as a violation of their respective action values—in the case of the former, a refusal to rationally debate over pre-determined conclusions, and in the case of the latter, a refusal to concede to an irrationally pre-determined consensus. These predictable interpretations will, in turn, appear to support the evaluation that the unrecognized Model II practitioner has failed to justify his or her claims to reality in what passes for discourse among the necessarily antagonistic Model I and Opposite Model I practitioners. The anticipation of these common misinterpretations and negative evaluations thus presents the Model II practitioner with a practical dilemma in every action situation in which a mutual understanding of the substantive issues of concern requires a common level of discourse beyond the capacity of some people who nevertheless consider themselves worthy participants in that discourse.

As if to illustrate this confusion between *ideal discourse* and *unlimited conversation* with an insufficient appreciation for the nuances of *real discourse*, Habermas draws approvingly on the *pragmatic rules* of Robert Alexy, who specifically characterizes these rules as being stimulated by and corresponding to the ideal speech situation.[256] As Habermas summarizes, Alexy's rules of discourse include:

- Every subject with the competence to speak and act is allowed to take part in a discourse.
- Everyone has an equal opportunity to participate in the discourse.
  - Everyone is allowed to question any assertion whatever.

- ▪ Everyone is allowed to introduce any assertion whatever.
- ▪ Everyone is allowed to express his attitudes, desires, and needs.
- • No speaker may, by internal or external coercion, be prevented from exercising his rights as laid down in the preceding rules.[257]

As clear and compelling as Alexy's pragmatic rules appear to be, it is difficult to imagine their effective use with people whose normal patterns of communication are characterized by systematic deception, subconscious coercion, and durable defensive routines based on unexamined action values that make it normatively inappropriate and personally threatening to even *begin* such a discourse with the people who are *already* involved in the situation. These are the standard conditions we all encounter in the real world of organized and institutionalized human action and the primary reason why the action scientist as interventionist with the high level of communicative competence reflected in Model II can be so important in the conduct of effective discourse. Furthermore, Alexy's pragmatic rules fall well short of the Model II standard by claiming, in essence, that *every discourse is always open to every participant in order to express anything* without simultaneously providing for some form of *mutual accountability* by which the contributions of each participant are openly evaluated as part of the discourse, with each participant's future participation to be determined on this basis. In short, Alexy's pragmatic rules have some similarities to Argyris's Opposite Model I that should give us more than a little pause, not with regard to the ideal speech situation, at least as I am reconstructing it, but certainly with regard to Alexy's particular practical formulation.

Nevertheless, Habermas does inadvertently point to some better ideas concerning these context-transcendent norms, ironically, in the context of identifying the *fictitious premises* of his theory of society-as-lifeworld that, in his view, call for the complementary theory of society-as-system. "When we conceive of society... [from the perspective of participants in a lifeworld], we are accepting three fictions. We are presupposing (a) the autonomy of actors, (b) the independence of culture, and (c) the transparency of communication."[258]

Regarding the autonomy of actors, Habermas contends that, while members of a lifeworld demonstrate autonomy in the way they act responsibly toward their own and others' criticizable validity claims, it is fictitious to assume that society consists only of relationships entered into by autonomous, responsible actors and can therefore be explained solely in terms of the intentions and decisions of those involved.[259] Regarding the independence of culture, he contends that "in the situation of action, the lifeworld forms a horizon behind which we cannot go; it is a totality with no reverse side. Accordingly, it is strictly meaningless for members of a… lifeworld to inquire whether the culture in whose light they deal with external nature [3], society [2], and internal nature [1] is empirically dependent on anything else."[260] Finally, regarding the transparency of communication, he contends that as long as members of a lifeworld "maintain a performative attitude, [they] cannot reckon with a systematic distortion of their communication, that is, with resistances built into the linguistic structure itself and inconspicuously restricting the scope of communication.... There can be no pseudoconsensus in the sense of convictions brought about by force; in a basically transparent process of reaching understanding—which is transparent for the participants themselves—no force can gain a footing."[261]

The remarkable implication of these *fictitious premises of society-as-lifeworld* is that these would logically have to be the *counter-factual presuppositions of the communicative action* that more-or-less consciously (re)produces the society-as-lifeworld and, therefore, the context-transcendent norms of discourse. Thus, in light of my proposed reconstruction of Habermas's lifeworld/system dichotomy into the meaningful (123.123$_{LL}$) and functional (123.123$_{LR}$) aspects of a more integral *actionable knowledge* (123.123$_{AQ}$), it appears that these presuppositions of communicative action might serve to *integrate*, rather than *dissociate*, the meaningful lifeworld and functional system of awareness-in-action. Furthermore, these reconstructed presuppositions of communicative action—from *autonomy* to *responsibility* to *non-coercion* to *transparency*—bear a striking resemblance to the action values of Argyris's empirically and normatively validated method of communicative action: Model II. Thus, in light of my proposed reconstruction of Argyris's Model II into a more integral

knowledgeable action (123.123ᴀǫ), it appears that these action values—*valid information*, *free and informed choice*, *internal commitment*, and *vigilant monitoring*—may be sufficiently *idealistic* as to approach the Habermasian ideal speech situation, while being sufficiently *realistic* for practical application in real speech situations dominated by Model I and Opposite Model I. Finally, while these action values resemble quasi-universal *context-transcendent norms* for the realization of most *context-immanent claims*, it remains for me to discern the meta-practical limits toward which these action values point and to refine them accordingly.²⁶²

Primordial Practices

With this substantial foundation established, I now return to the question that opened this second line of inquiry: What practices must be presupposed by all people in order for them to act in any situation? In light of the subtle complexity of integral *perspectives* that appear to be always already *activated* in the many derivatives of triadic quadratic perspectivism, what are the integral *practices* that appear to be always already *activating* the many derivatives of triadic quadratic perspectivism?

Based on the role these *primordial practices* are supposed to play within our situational awareness-in-action, these would seem to have certain features worth articulating, however provisionally. For example, if these practices are always already activating the triadic quadratic perspectives that are always already activated, then:

- These practices are *always already available for discovery*—right here, right now—implied in every action one takes.
- These practices are *deceptively counter-factual* in that most action appears to be a contradiction of their ideal form, yet *reassuringly intuitive* in that most actors idealize themselves acting this way.
- These practices are *relatively content-free* in the sense that these do not convey *applicable* knowledge of *what* we can, should, and do know, yet *radically content-oriented* in the

sense that these do convey *actionable* knowledge of *how* we
can, should, and do learn.

- These practices are *context-transcendent norms* of human ac-
  tion in all its forms and fields and *context-immanent evidence*
  of human action in all its particular manifestations.

- These practices are *tacit knowledge* of human action that we
  already possess and *latent potential* for human action that we
  have yet to realize.

- These practices are *fractal* by design and (*re/de*)*constructive* at
  all degrees of depth and scale throughout the potentially in-
  finite, yet always indeterminate meta-structure of triadic
  quadratic perspectival awareness-in-action.

Overall, these primordial practices characterize a multiplicity of
real action situations that can approach the *ideal action situation* in
which integral aperspectival freedom (F^∞), justice (J^∞), and truth
(T^∞) are ultimately realized (R^∞). Consistent with these features, I
propose that regardless of the specific forms and fields of awareness-
in-action, people act through the primordial practices of *transparency*,
choice, and *accountability* with respect to the triadic quadratic per-
spectives:[263]

- Transparency generally means disclosing and acquiring all
  the relevant knowledge and information within the relevant
  perspectives pertaining to a particular action, free of any de-
  ception or distortion that may undermine one's ability to
  reason, act, and learn. Ultimately, it refers to the *primordial
  transparency* of one's own triadic quadratic perspectival self-
  imaging/world-viewing.

- Choice generally means taking perspectives and making de-
  cisions in the context of one's awareness, free from coercion
  by others and free to create by oneself, however deliberately
  or spontaneously. Ultimately, it refers to the *primordial choice*
  to enact one's own triadic quadratic perspectival self-image/
  world-view within choiceless awareness.

- Accountability generally means accepting responsibility for
  one's thoughts, feelings, words, and deeds, following
  through on commitments made, sharing responsibility for
  the intended as well as unintended consequences of action,

and learning from experience in all perspectives. Ultimately, it refers to the *primordial accountability* for one's own triadic quadratic perspectival self-imaging/world-viewing.

As a complement to the meta-*theory* of triadic quadratic perspectivism, transparency, choice, and accountability (denoted TCA) collectively constitute a meta-*practice*, by which I mean a relatively content-free, yet context-rich practice with the capacity to integrate, via some combination of creative vision and conceptual logic, a large variety of relatively context-free, yet content-rich practices from all the forms and fields of awareness-in-action. I am therefore proposing that the meta-practice of transparency, choice, and accountability comprises a significant portion of that intuitive knowledge without which people could not act as they really do and, correspondingly, a significant portion of those essential premises without which we cannot know what human action really is.

As a *realistic ideal* to be fine-tuned in each specific context, the *requisite* practice of transparency, choice, and accountability generally entails discovering and expressing what is honest, right, and true in a particular action situation, which necessarily engages the pre-existing norms overtly and covertly governing that specific context. But this cannot happen without surfacing at least some of the inherent différance and inevitable conflict rooted in the triadic quadratic perspectival nature of human action, including the latent as well as blatant habits of deception, coercion, and defensiveness corrupting so many specific contexts, all of which nevertheless implies the *ultimate* transparency, choice, and accountability (TCA$^\infty$) we presuppose in every action situation. If we can suspend time and open space for this différance-disclosing, conflict-ridden, but nevertheless integral dialogue, genuinely inquiring into the subtle features of our context-specific *behavior*, *intention*, *function*, and *meaning*—*mine*, *yours*, and *hers* as well as *ours*, *yours*, and *theirs*—then we can discover for ourselves the quality of transparency, choice, and accountability *required by* the action situation. Hence, the requisite practice of transparency, choice, and accountability may be considered an *emergent imperative* to pay attention to, and take responsibility for, our context-specific awareness-in-action, perhaps because this is essential to the mutual reflexive learning that resolves lingering

conflicts while supporting more effective choices on the way to ultimate realization.

As these requisite practices intensify in deeper contexts of contemplative communication, *we* may become more aware of the linguistically-constructed nature of *our* suspended realities, wherein *my* personified symptoms of freedom (1_{AQ}), participative signals of justice (2_{AQ}), and representative symbols of truth (3_{AQ}), each comprised of its corresponding intentional signifieds (123_{UL}), behavioral signifiers (123_{UR}), cultural semantics (123_{LL}), and social syntax (123_{LR}), really do co-arise in mutual reflexive différance with those pragmatic significations of *yours* (2.123_{AQ}) and *theirs* (3.123_{AQ}) within the integral awareness (0) that *each* of *us* brings to *our* différantial action situation, not only as a *meta-theory* of emergent *reality* ((TQP = R), but as a corresponding *meta-practice* of emergent *realizing* (TCA = R). For one sentence after another, the language that discloses, obscures, and ultimately (re/de)constructs our world-viewing plays a concurrent role in simultaneously disclosing, obscuring, and ultimately (re/de)constructing our self-imaging through the same integral/différantial action-in-awareness. Amidst the intensifying transparency of pragmatic *and* semiotic reality construction, choices proliferate along the deconstructive/reconstructive edge of provisional freedom, justice, and truth, seemingly unbounded but for the unavoidable accountability for unpredictable consequences that accompanies such awareness. Ultimately, the *I* that *I* think *I* am as the implied origin of all that *I* think *I* do within the world that *I* think *I* know approaches the same deconstructive/reconstructive edge, revealing its essential *absence* in light of the essential *presence* of awareness-in-action.

Awareness-in-Action may therefore be understood as the meta-practice of *transparency*, *choice*, and *accountability* with respect to the meta-theory of *triadic quadratic perspectivism*, both of which are always already active in our situational awareness-in-action.

— PART III —

INTEGRAL PARADIGM

I began this inquiry with the self-evident reality of human action—*that people act*—and proceeded to clarify what appear to be the essential perspectives and practices of all human action in real-world contexts. Having outlined a *meta-theory* and corresponding *meta-practice* of human action, it remains for me to integrate these complementary aspects of what might be termed a *meta-paradigm*, by which I mean a relatively content-free, yet context-rich *theory-of-practice/practice-of-theory* with the capacity to integrate, via some combination of creative vision and conceptual logic, a large variety of relatively context-free, yet content-rich theories *and* practices from all the forms and fields of human action.[264] The key to appreciating the deeper significance of this proposed meta-paradigm is to recognize that my inquiry into the perspectival and practical nature of *human action* has been, at least implicitly, just as much about the perspectival and practical nature of *integral philosophy*. In light of this, my final proposal is to consider that an *integral philosophy of human action* that is grounded in the essential presuppositions of awareness-in-action might provide some direct insight into the essential premises for an *action-oriented integral philosophy* concerned with helping people realize their full potential in the full variety of real-world situations.

— 5 —

AUTHENTICATION, LEGITIMATION, CONFIRMATION

Having discerned what appear to be the primordial perspectives and corresponding primordial practices that are always already active in our situational awareness-in-action, we can now clarify the contours of the *primordial paradigm* implied by their integration.

Paradigmatic Realization

The essence of Awareness-in-Action (A) can be summarized as the meta-practice of *transparency*, *choice*, and *accountability* (TCA) with respect to the meta-theory *triadic quadratic perspectivism* (TQP), both of which appear to be mutually implicated within the meta-paradigmatic *realization* (R) of situational awareness-in-action (A = TCA x TQP = R). In the quintessential action situation, that exemplar in which *I* act, *you* act, and *s/he* acts in relation to one another, *we* enact three unique, yet interpenetrating versions of TCA × TQP, each of which frames a total of 36 reciprocally interlocked perspectives on the self-evident realization of *our* situational awareness-in-action. From each of our different perspectives as a unique enactive origin of our situational awareness-in-action, each of us *realizes*, through the practice of transparency, choice, and accountability (TCA = R), three unique, yet interpenetrating sets of triadic quadratic perspectival *claims to reality* (TQP = R), while simultaneously *realizing*, through the same practice of transparency, choice, and accountability, three unique, yet interpenetrating sets of corresponding triadic quadratic perspectival *contexts of reality*, all of which appear to co-

arise in the integral awareness (A) that *each* of *us* brings to *our* diffé-
rantial action situation (A).

   Therefore, the *realization* of our situational awareness-in-action
entails the requisite practice of transparency, choice, and accounta-
bility (TCA) with respect to *my* pragmatic significations of reality
(123AQ), *each* of *your* pragmatic significations of reality (2.123AQ), and
each of *their* pragmatic significations of reality (3.123AQ), each com-
prised of its corresponding intentional signifieds (123.123UL), behav-
ioral signifiers (123.123UR), cultural semantics (123.123LL), and social
syntax (123.123LR) of reality, all of which appear to co-arise in the
integral awareness (0) that *each* of *us* brings to *our* différantial action
situation (A = TCA × 123.123AQ = R). Furthermore, from *each* of *our*
different perspectives as an origin of *our* situational awareness-in-
action—*each* of *us* being a unique enactive *I*—*each* of *us* engages in
three primary modes of realization:[265,266] (Fig. 20)

- Authentication is the *intra*personal mode of realization that
  entails the requisite practice of transparency, choice, and ac-
  countability with respect to *my* personified symptoms of
  freedom (1AQ), *each* of *your* personified symptoms of freedom
  (2.1AQ), and *each* of *their* personified symptoms of freedom
  (3.1AQ), each comprised of its corresponding intentional sig-
  nifieds (123.1UL), behavioral signifiers (123.1UR), cultural se-
  mantics (123.1LL), and social syntax (123.1LR) of freedom, all
  of which appear to co-arise in the integral awareness (0) that
  each of *us* brings to *our* différantial action situation (A > TCA
  × 123.1AQ = AF < R). It is the paradigm by which each of us
  (in)validates each of our relatively knowledgeable actions in
  terms of its *honesty* and *authenticity*, more-or-less consistent
  with each of our previously established structures of action-
  able knowledge of *freedom*.
- Legitimation is the *inter*personal mode of realization that en-
  tails the requisite practice of transparency, choice, and ac-
  countability with respect to *my* participative signals of jus-
  tice (2AQ), *each* of *your* participative signals of justice (2.2AQ),
  and *each* of *their* participative signals of justice (3.2AQ), each
  comprised of its corresponding intentional signifieds
  (123.2UL), behavioral signifiers (123.2UR), cultural semantics

(123.2LL), and social syntax (123.2LR) of justice, all of which appear to co-arise in the integral awareness (0) that *each* of *us* brings to *our* différantial action situation (A > TCA × 123.2AQ = LJ < R). It is the paradigm by which each of us (in)validates each of our relatively knowledgeable actions in terms of its *morality* and *legitimacy*, more-or-less consistent with each of our previously established structures of actionable knowledge of *justice*.

- Confirmation is the *im*personal mode of realization that entails the requisite practice of transparency, choice, and accountability with respect to *my* representative symbols of truth (3AQ), *each* of *your* representative symbols of truth (2.3AQ), and *each* of *their* representative symbols of truth (3.3AQ), each comprised of its corresponding intentional signifieds (123.3UL), behavioral signifiers (123.3UR), cultural semantics (123.3LL), and social syntax (123.3LR) of truth, all of which appear to co-arise in the integral awareness (0) that *each* of *us* brings to *our* différantial action situation (A > TCA × 123.3AQ = CT < R). It is the paradigm by which each of us (in)validates each of our relatively knowledgeable actions in terms of its *accuracy* and *cogency*, more-or-less consistent with each of our previously established structures of actionable knowledge of *truth*.

As an integration of the *substantive* meta-*theory* of triadic quadratic perspectivism with the *procedural* meta-*practice* of transparency, choice, and accountability, *authentication*, *legitimation*, and *confirmation* collectively constitute a *substantive/procedural* meta-*paradigm* of *realization* called Awareness-in-Action (A = TCA × TQP = ALC = R). In my parlance, a meta-paradigm—or paradigm of paradigms—is a relatively content-free, yet context-rich *theory-of-practice/practice-of-theory* with the capacity to integrate, via some combination of creative vision and conceptual logic, a large variety of relatively context-free, yet content-rich theories *and* practices from all the forms and fields of human awareness-in-action.[267] Furthermore, while this substantive/procedural meta-paradigm may be immediately recognizable as a *conceptual* meta-paradigm with quasi-universal (re/de)-constructive capabilities within, between, and beyond established

disciplinary and institutional paradigms, it is even more important to recognize it as the *perceptual* meta-paradigm that appears to be always already active in our situational awareness-in-action—*empirical* and *normative* evidence, it seems, of our latent potential for more integral/différantial realization. Finally, this substantive/procedural and empirical/normative formulation of integral/différantial semiotics, pragmatics, and praxiology accounts for a different form of presupposed *firstness*, *secondness*, and *thirdness* essential to every semiotic, pragmatic, and praxiological occasion—*my* realization, *each* of *your* realizations, and *each* of *their* realizations —not just as *I* can realize *each* of *our* respective realities, but as *each* of *us* can realize *each* of *our* respective realities as différantially integral to *our* respective realizations.

Figure 20. Awareness-in-Action

Awareness-in-Action may therefore be understood as the *substantive/procedural*, the *integral/différantial*, and the *empirical/normative* meta-paradigm of *realization* in three modes—*authentication*, *legitima-*

tion, and *confirmation*—by which *we*—*I*, *each* of *you*, and *each* of *them*—(re/de)construct *our* actionable knowledge of reality in three forms—freedom, justice, and truth—to guide knowledgeable action that is progressively more real—or free, just, and true.

(A)Perspectival / *(A)Practical*

From each of our different perspectives as an origin of our situational awareness-in-action, freedom, justice, and truth are, respectively, first-, second-, and third-person claims to, and contexts of, reality as each of us experiences them. However, the authentication of our personified symptoms of freedom (AF), the legitimation of our participative signals of justice (LJ), and the confirmation of our representative symbols of truth (CT) are each inherently, inevitably first-, second-, and third-person realization paradigms that we all must engage together, not as a regulative principle to be accepted or rejected upon reasonable reflection, but as a presupposed condition of our situational awareness-in-action. Thus, Awareness-in-Action appears to be *perspectivally* arranged in such a way that *I* cannot (in)authenticate *my* personified symptoms of freedom (TCA × 1$_{AQ}$), (de)legitimate *my* participative signals of justice (TCA × 2$_{AQ}$), or (dis)confirm *my* representative symbols of truth (TCA × 3$_{AQ}$) without inevitably (in)authenticating, (de)legitimating, and (dis)confirming *each* of *yours* (TCA × 2.123$_{AQ}$) and *each* of *theirs* (TCA × 3.123$_{AQ}$) as essential dimensions of *our* integral/différantial realization (A = TCA × 123.123$_{AQ}$ = ALC = R).

Likewise, each of these primordial *paradigms*—authentication, legitimation, confirmation—foregrounds one of the three primordial *perspectives*—intrapersonal freedom, interpersonal justice, or impersonal truth—as each of us identifies it, while backgrounding the other two primordial perspectives for which the corresponding reality claims might be presumed, in a specific action situation, to be sufficiently realized. However, due to the primordial *practices* of transparency, choice, and accountability engaged by all of us with respect to the foregrounded reality claims—practices that have no predetermined perspectival boundaries—there is always the potential for each of us to challenge any of the backgrounded claims and

thereby shift to the corresponding paradigm. Thus, Awareness-in-Action also appears to be *practically* arranged in such a way that even *we* cannot (in)authenticate *our* claims to freedom (TCA × 123.1$_{AQ}$ = AF), (de)legitimate *our* claims to justice (TCA × 123.2$_{AQ}$ = LJ), or (dis)confirm *our* claims to truth (TCA × 123.3$_{AQ}$ = CT) without inevitably engaging all three of these primordial paradigms as essential dimensions of *our* integral/différantial realization (A = TCA × 123.123$_{AQ}$ = ALC = R).

As suggested by the substantive/procedural vision-logic of Figure 20, our requisite practice of situational awareness-in-action in its many forms and fields can facilitate a *qualitative intensification* of our integral/différantial realization in terms of the clarity of awareness present in each of our actions, as well as a *quantitative extensification* of our integral/différantial realization in terms of the number of people with whom, and perspectives with which, each of us can actively identify. For with every second- and third-person perspective being potentially differentiated into yet another unique set of TQP[1] originating in yet another unique enactive *I*, *each* of *us* appears to possess the potential to bring ever more transparency, choice, and accountability to the différantial perspectivism, constructivism, and contextualism of *our* action situations that are, nevertheless, still framed within *each* of *our* original sets of TQP[1]. Indeed, the *dimension* and *duration* of awareness-in-action is always already marked by spacial *difference* and temporal *deferral*, by traces of actions *near* and *far*, *past* and *future*—*mine*, *yours*, and *hers*, as well as *ours*, *yours*, and *theirs*—such that each situational action-in-awareness is as much an *effect* as it is a *cause* of its integral différance. In other words, action can be realized in the *here* and *now* only if this action is not something wholly given, in and of itself, to this situation, but rather a situational synthesis of traces to implicated actions *near* and *far*, *past* and *future*, and thus, by definition, *not here* and *not now*. We might therefore say that action in the here and now is *rhizomatically* self-situating in the milieu of its own spacial-temporal *multiplicity* of enfolding/unfolding traces to relevant actions that are not here and not now, yet différantially integral to the *one* action appearing right here, right now.

Consequently, by virtue of its presupposed meta-structure of ultimate realization (A^∞ = TCA^∞ × TQP^∞ = R^∞), each situational action-in-awareness radically opens to a rhizomatic multiplicity of unique, interdependent permutations of triadic quadratic perspectival reality (TQP^∞), *each* permutation of which appears to be enacted by a unique origin of awareness-in-action, a unique enactive *I*, with the potential to ultimately realize (TCA^∞) within its own primordial perspectives *all* the other uniquely enacted permutations of triadic quadratic perspectival reality, theoretically free of spacial or temporal limits. Furthermore, as the personal particulars of this potentially limitless aperspectival/apractical *realization* (ALC^∞ = R^∞) shift from one moment to the next, the apractical *realizing* (TCA^∞ = R^∞) rhizomatically reconfigures this awareness-in-action into countless new permutations of aperspectival *reality* (TQP^∞ = R^∞), each momentary multiplicity of which is simultaneously *realized* by *all* the unique enactive *I*s—all the interdependent *realizers*—as regarded from the perspective of *each* unique enactive *I*. This infinite derivative of Awareness-in-Action (A^∞) reveals the infinitely *differentiated integration* and infinitely *integrated differentiation* of a veritable kaleidoscope of self-imaging/world-viewing as seen through all the eyes, literally all the unique *I*s, that have ever been or could ever be identified in *my* circle of integral awareness (A^0).

Awareness-in-Action may therefore be understood as the one *ideal action situation* (A^∞) in which each and every one of us can *ultimately realize* (R^∞) each and every one of us as unique members of a universal civilization grounded in the *ultimate realization* (R^∞) of integral aperspectival freedom (AF^∞), justice (LJ^∞), and truth (CT^∞), and, thus, *ultimate reality* (R^∞).

Nevertheless, while being *aperspectival/apractical* in the one *ideal* action situation, awareness-in-action is *perspectival/practical* in the many *real* action situations because our actual realizations in any particular situation are contingent upon the différantial capacities of each actor as enacted in his or her own original awareness-in-action. In other words, *I* am subject to *my* own indeterminately constrained semiotic, pragmatic, and praxiological capacities rooted in deep structures of actionable knowledge that not only limit *my* ability to realize (TCA^N) those realities directly realized by every unique

enactive *I* in *my* awareness-in-action (TQP^N), but also limit the ability of those unique enactive *I*s to indirectly realize those realities that are directly realized by *me*. Each of us is, therefore, *indeterminately limited* in our respective capacity for authentication, legitimation, and confirmation, while *inadvertently limiting* each other's capacity for authentication, legitimation, and confirmation. This indeterminate derivative of Awareness-in-Action therefore highlights the *inherently indeterminate* nature of integral/différantial realization (A^N = $TCA^N \times TQP^N = R^N$) rooted in the deep structures of actionable knowledge that each of us brings to our situational awareness-in-action, and does so in a manner consistent with the way we actually experience these invisibly opaque, surprisingly durable, supportive limits on our situational awareness-in-action.

Awareness-in-Action frames the indeterminate intentional-behavioral-cultural-social contexts within which *I* can identify with some of *you* more so than with others of *you*, and with some of *them* more so than with others of *them*, but not all of *you* or all of *them* to the same depth, not yet anyway, and so the mutual reflexive différantial action continues—*mine*, *yours*, and *hers* as well as *ours*, *yours*, and *theirs*—as *we* all struggle to create enough aperspectival/apractical space to eventually integrate all *our* perspectival/practical self-imaging/world-viewing. This A^N formulation of integral/différantial semiotics, pragmatics, and praxiology reveals that *each* perspectival/practical action presupposes *every* perspectival/practical action with *any* number of derivative perspectival/practical actions in a radically open-ended, yet reliably closed-minded meta-structure of Awareness-in-Action. Indeed, with each différantial action being a unique, situation-specific synthesis of traces to every relevant différantial action arising in integral awareness, we might say that *each* différance presupposes *every* différance that makes *any* différance in the *différantial integralism* of Awareness-in-Action.

Awareness-in-Action may therefore be understood as the many *real action situations* (A^N) in which each and every one of us is indeterminately constrained in our capacities to ultimately realize each and every one of us as unique members of a universal civilization committed to the authentication of freedom (AF^N), legitimation of

justice (LJ^N), and confirmation of truth (CT^N), and, thus, *indeterminate realization* (R^N).

These reconstructions highlight the *empirical/normative* complementarity between the *context-immanent actualization* of an *empirically* justifiable realization (R^N)—the *real* action situation (A^N)—which is inherently particular, content-rich, and perspectival/practical, and the *context-transcendent idealization* of a *normatively* justifiable realization (R^∞)—the *ideal* action situation (A^∞)—which is inherently universal, content-free, and aperspectival/apractical. Notwithstanding the constrained semiotic, pragmatic, and praxiological capacity *unfolding* in these *real* action situations (A^N), every such real action situation is always already *enfolding* as potential the integral aperspectival/apractical *realization*, *by* the unique enactive *I* at the origin of A^1, *of* all the other unique enactive *I*s, each of whom is the direct or indirect *realizer* of all the relative realities that can actually be *realized* within each and every real action situation, hence the *ideal* action situation (A^∞). Thus, there is *no* human awareness-in-action in which the *kosmic addresses* of each and every situationally relevant realizer-realized are *not* already being identified—whether explicitly or implicitly—in the action situation itself, which therefore invites requisite practices of transparency, choice, and accountability concerning these actual addresses as part of the authentication, legitimation, and confirmation of the reality claims made in that situation. Even more significantly, the normatively ideal action situation (A^∞) enfolding/unfolding within every empirically real action situation (A^N) ultimately accounts for the kosmic *addresses/addressing* (TQP^∞/TCA^∞) of each and every realizer-realized that can possibly be regarded as relatively real at any time and any place within the integral awareness (A^0) that each of us brings to our différantial action. Consequently, there is *no* human awareness-in-action in which the actual participants are *not* already being identified—explicitly or implicitly—as the unique members of an as-yet-unrealized universal civilization, which therefore challenges each and every one of us to *act accordingly*.

Absolute Relativism / Relative Absolutism

By framing a potentially infinite-eternal metalogue of integral/différantial realization, Awareness-in-Action opens space and suspends time for the perspectives/practices of *all* people—indeed, *all sentient beings/doings*—without equating all these perspectives/practices or privileging any particular perspectives/practices on the basis of authority, popularity, or otherwise biased norms of dialogue. This radically inclusive pluralism seems to imply a *reconstructive*, rather than *deconstructive*, form of *absolute relativism*, wherein the (in)validation of anyone's claim to any aspect of reality, however widely shared that (in)validation might be, is always *provisional* and *contingent* upon inclusion of additional counter-claims by additional participants in the ever-present, never-ending metalogue. By presupposing the *fallible* nature of their particular claims to freedom, justice, and truth in anticipation of the need to *justify* these claims to others, it seems that people are also presupposing the *relativistic* nature of realization itself, which appears to originate in the inherently relativistic *I*s assuming ownership of each and every claim to *reality*.

This, furthermore, is another way of saying that realization is, in context, whatever the participants in dialogue mutually determine it to be, provided that the dialogue of empirical realization is conducted on the basis of certain substantive and procedural norms considered requisite by those participants. Even then, whatever consensus version of triadic quadratic perspectival reality (TQP) these participants might construct, together with the requisite degrees of transparency, choice, and accountability (TCA) they use to construct it, will eventually be deconstructed and reconstructed by some of those third-persons observing, but not yet participating, in the contextualized dialogue (ALC). Nevertheless, the presupposed norms of any such open-ended dialogue—the $TCA^{\infty} \times TQP^{\infty} = ALC^{\infty}$ at least implicitly idealized by all participants—never really fail to govern by way of emergent imperatives even the most discordant of empirical situations, thus welcoming the play of différance consistent with the integral rules of the game. In this way, the validity basis of realization insures the *reconstructive* nature of this absolute relativ-

ism against the extremes of a *deconstructive* indeterminacy of realization that would, *in the absence of any validity basis*, lead inexorably to an arbitrary equivalence of all fleetingly meaningful versions of perspectival/practical realization—a completely différantial, but non-integral, *aperspectival/ apractical madness*.

Alternatively, this metalogue also seems to imply a *libertarian*, rather than *authoritarian*, form of *relative absolutism*, by virtue of the fact that every person who engages in any dialogue intuitively presupposes, despite what may be an altogether contrary experience, the immediate potential for absolute realization of freedom, justice, and truth. By pursuing these intrapersonal, interpersonal, and impersonal aspects of absolute realization within the semiotic, pragmatic, and praxiological confines of dimensional-durational experience, it appears that people are also presupposing the existence of as-yet-uncertain, but nevertheless ultimate conclusions regarding every contextualized claim to freedom, justice, and truth via an ideal metalogue of *ultimate realization* (R^∞) characterized by complete autonomy for, and complete responsibility to, all participants. As each relativistic dialogue converges, by way of its emergent imperative for requisite transparency, choice, and accountability, on a satisfactory conclusion regarding what really is free, just, and true in a particular context, the participants will tend to attribute to their new insights an additional measure of this ultimate status and proceed to act as if their consensus realization is *relatively absolute*—a meaningful-functional certainty that can, henceforth, be taken for granted as part of the contextual ground of actionable knowledge guiding their knowledgeable actions, at least until another relevant challenge is presented.

This, however, might be another way of saying that any ultimate realizations of freedom, justice, and truth—thus, reality itself—to whatever extent such relative absolutes can be conceived in dimensional-durational experience, can only be fully acknowledged as such to the extent that everyone in the world has communicatively contemplated all of human experience with requisite degrees of transparency, choice, and accountability for an indefinite period of time. Short of this normative ultimatum, and with the absolute relativism of an ever-present, never-ending metalogue thus implied,

there is no space or time in which an authoritarian absolutism—a deceptive, coercive, defensive decree regarding what must be real for anyone and everyone—can be confirmed, legitimated, and authenticated.

The source of this seemingly paradoxical, mutually implicating *absolute relativism/relative absolutism* is to be found in the *integral/différantial* complementarity of Awareness-in-Action—that is, the dynamic interplay between the absolute realization (R^0) of the integral awareness that we are (A^0) and the relative realization (R^N) of the différantial action that we do (A^N). Because the *absolute* realization of the integral awareness that we are is often only *relatively realized* in the différantial action that we do, it is often only *relatively idealized* in the form of an *ultimate* realization (R^∞) that can only ever signify in spacial-temporal form the absolute realization (R^0) always already beyond the relativity of dimensional-durational awareness-in-action. Without blurring the important distinctions between objective and subjective aspects of reality or between intrapersonal honesty, interpersonal morality, and impersonal truth, such presuppositions of ultimate realization do introduce an inescapable *epistemic* dimension to all relativistic pursuits of absolute realization. Nevertheless, these presuppositions do *not* reduce absolute realization to relative realization, or, for that matter, *ontology* to *epistemology*, for it appears that the very ideal of ultimate realization is but the semiotic, pragmatic, and praxiological experience of the as-yet-merely-intuited absolute realization without which such relativistic pursuits would lose all significance.

Therefore, in summary, the (dis)confirmation of *relative* truth (CT^N) in fully quadratic form (123.3_{AQ}) presupposes the never-ending potential for *ultimate* truth (CT^∞) based on the ever-present intuition of *absolute* truth (CT^0). Likewise, the (de)legitimation of *relative* justice (LJ^N) in fully quadratic form (123.2_{AQ}) presupposes the never-ending potential for *ultimate* justice (LJ^∞) based on the ever-present intuition of *absolute* justice (LJ^0). Finally, the (in)authentication of *relative* freedom (AF^N) in fully quadratic form (123.1_{AQ}) presupposes the never-ending potential for *ultimate* freedom (AF^∞) based on the ever-present intuition of *absolute* freedom (AF^0). Nevertheless, while ignoring the absolutely real (R^0) and pursuing the

relatively ideal (R^∞) from within the semiotic, pragmatic, and prax-iological confines of the relatively real (R^N), we may come to discover in the ultimate realization (R^∞) of our *différantial* action the *reflected refraction* of the integral awareness (R^0) without which such manifestation could never have been illuminated. Hence, as if seeking to illuminate all manifestation, we eventually discover the active refraction of integral awareness revealed in every knowledgeable action and reflected in all actionable knowledge.

Awareness-in-Action may therefore be understood as the *absolutely relative*, yet *relatively absolute* metalogue in which *our—mine*, *each* of *yours*, and *each* of *theirs—relative* realizations (R^N) presuppose the never-ending potential for *ultimate* realization (R^∞) based on the ever-present intuition of *absolute* realization (R^0).

Enfolding / Unfolding

To the extent that our situational awareness-in-action can be understood as the authentication, legitimation, and confirmation by which we (re/de)construct actionable knowledge of freedom, justice, and truth to guide knowledgeable action that is progressively more free, just, and true, it may also be understood as our contribution to the ever-widening, never-ending realization of human development and evolution. As I proposed in Chapter 2, Awareness-in-Action may help us frame—indeed, may already *be* framing—the entire, multi-structural realization of human development and evolution as it actually unfolds through the intrapersonal, interpersonal, and impersonal experiences of the intentional, behavioral, cultural, and social aspects of our situational awareness-in-action. If so, then human development and evolution can be explained, interpreted, and evaluated in terms of the meta-practice of transparency, choice, and accountability with respect to the meta-theory of triadic quadratic perspectivism in each and every real-world action situation. Furthermore, once we recognize in this situational awareness-in-action the actual realization *of* human development and evolution, we can also use this meta-paradigm to explain, interpret, and evaluate the many substantive and procedural realizations *about* human development and evolution.[268]

This suggests that situational awareness-in-action may be understood as the actual realization *of* human development and evolution in which surprisingly novel claims to reality are subjected to the emergent imperatives of requisite realization in familiar real-world contexts, the subsequent authentication, legitimation, and confirmation of which constitute the actual realization *about* human development and evolution, both *past actual* and *future potential*. If so, then the pacemaker in human evolution might be defined in terms of the quality of the *requisite realization* arising in each and every action situation, wherein the surprisingly novel actions of some unique enactive *Is* may in due time, through the *tri-tetra-meshing* of a deepening, widening realization, contribute to the source code of an as-yet-uncertain (r)evolutionary advance beyond the institutionalized structures of actionable knowledge that are presently active throughout civilization. Furthermore, the deepening capacities for awareness-in-action that emerge through the progressive realizations of these unique enactive *Is*—the capacity, that is, for increasingly differentiated integration and increasingly integrated differentiation of novel action toward an implicated aperspectival/apractical ultimatum (R^∞)—would eventually deconstruct and reconstruct all the actionable knowledge previously realized by these *I*s, including the multifarious stories and theories about their own development and evolution—both *past actual(s)* and *future potential(s)*.

That being said, it is worth emphasizing that Awareness-in-Action merely clarifies those essential triadic quadratic perspectives into which we must inquire if we are to generate, via the essential practices of transparency, choice, and accountability, valid insight into our own or anyone else's deep structures of actionable knowledge, as these structures are, in the most general sense, *relatively stable conditions of possible awareness-in-action* and, hence, *possible realization*. Awareness-in-Action does *not*, however, *presuppose* any particular levels, any particular multi-level theories, or any particular multi-structural patterns of human development and evolution—or, for that matter, any patterns that should necessarily be called human development and evolution—beyond what can be discerned as our actual potential for integral/différantial realization. Whatever this phenomenon that some of us call human development and

evolution really is and regardless of how we choose to describe its multi-structural patterns—from multi-leveled hierarchy to multi-cultural heterarchy to multi-layered holonarchy or from multi-phasic cycle to multi-stage spiral to rhizomatic multiplicities—it appears to be the unfolding awareness-in-action of the multifarious *I*s participating in this phenomenon.

Therefore, if multi-structural patterns of human development and evolution actually exist—regardless of what those patterns are or how universal/particular they may be—then we must have created, can only discover, and should certainly be verifying/falsifying any such hypothesized multi-structural patterns through the *normative* practices of transparency, choice, and accountability with respect to the triadic quadratic perspectivism of our situational awareness-in-action ($A^\infty = TCA^\infty \times TQP^\infty = ALC^\infty = R^\infty$). After all, the *ideal action situation* appears to be the deepest of the apparent deep structures, the most universal of the apparent universal structures, of actionable knowledge guiding knowledgeable action in *real action situations*—that ultimate *meta-structure* of realization through which all *(multi-)structures* of realization are eventually deconstructed and reconstructed in the natural course of our ever-present, never-ending awareness-in-action.

It should therefore not surprise us to discover that all empirical content *evidencing* (multi-)structures of awareness-in-action always already *evidences* the normative meta-structure of that awareness-in-action. If so, then as theories of human development and evolution become more sophisticated they may tend to *describe* the triadic quadratic perspectivism as well as the transparency, choice, and accountability actually *inscribing* the awareness-in-action *being used* with increasing sophistication to study the awareness-in-action *being studied*, even if researchers had no conscious pre-disposition to do so.[269] Nevertheless, as important as these theories may be to a comprehensive understanding of situational awareness-in-action, the particular multi-structural patterns they describe do not appear to be universal presuppositions of the knowledgeable action that actually (re)creates the actionable knowledge that is *only ever subsequently described* in various theories of development and evolution, which are, in turn, *only ever provisionally validated* through

the awareness-in-action of the participants in these theoretical dialogues. Consequently, particular theories of human development and evolution, however universal they may appear to particular people, at a particular time, in a particular place, may not be the best foundation upon which to construct an integral meta-theory with universalist aspirations.

This radically post-metaphysical realization paradigm suggests the need for a *necessary humility* with respect to the dialogue *about* human development and evolution, one that recognizes the *unavoidable relativity* and *inherent fallibility* of each of our unique perspectives and practices within that dialogue, as well as the actual developmental-evolutionary implications of that dialogue itself, as can only ever be revealed through requisite realization. Regardless of whether our situational awareness-in-action is self-consciously *about* individual development—*mine*, *yours*, or *his/hers*—and collective evolution—*ours*, *yours*, or *theirs*—the (a)perspectival and (a)practical (pre)suppositions we bring to that awareness-in-action appear to inscribe the many ways we actually realize that development and evolution. Hence, the quality of our engagement in the dialogues that purport to be *about* the leading edge of human development and evolution would seem to determine the quality of our contributions to the dialogues *at* the leading edge of human development and evolution—not only *what* we contribute, but *how* we contribute to this unfolding realization. In due time, the realizations *about* the past actual(s) and future potential(s) of human development and evolution should gradually (re/de)construct to reflect whatever (re/de)construction is *presently unfolding* in the leading-edge realizations *of* human development and evolution, which may or may not involve many of the same people.

Awareness-in-Action may therefore be understood as the (a)perspectival/(a)practical realization *of*, and *about*, human development and evolution, *enfolding* within its visual-logical meta-structure all multi-structural patterns of human development and evolution that might actually *unfold* in the course of our ever-present, never-ending (re/de)constructive realization.

Rationalization of Realization

There is certainly nothing easy about the requisite practice of transparency, choice, and accountability with respect to the triadic quadratic perspectivism in challenging action situations—a realization not lost on those intrepid souls who actually commit to practicing these realistic ideals in their own challenging action situations. With each and every one of us being implicated in an ever-present, never-ending metalogue in which questions of truth, justice, and freedom are *always* at issue, is it really any wonder that we are almost always in conflict concerning what really is true, just, and free for each and every one of us? Perhaps it is because we have good reason to anticipate this inevitable conflict over the inherent différance of our various actions that we seem so predisposed to rationalize rather than justify our realizations, even to the point of subconsciously rationalizing the emergent imperatives of requisite realization itself, deceiving ourselves about the extent to which we are actually practicing in that harmonious interval between the empirical and the normative. As if amplifying the cognitive, moral, and volitional dissonance of our unexamined self-deception, we inadvertently enact some of the différantial conflict we would prefer to avoid in the form of persistent biases rooted in the perspectival nature of awareness-in-action.

This *realization bias* may be defined as the rationalized absence of requisite degrees of transparency, choice, and accountability afflicting our approach to integral/différantial realization, sustaining *my* tendency to regard *my* pragmatic significations of reality (123$_{AQ}$), *each* of *your* tendencies to regard *your* pragmatic significations of reality (2.123$_{AQ}$), and *each* of *their* tendencies to regard *their* pragmatic significations of reality (3.123$_{AQ}$) as *inherently more valid* than any of the others' and thereby impairing *our* ability to create actionable knowledge of reality. Due to realization bias, each of us tends to *overestimate* our own capacity for requisite realization and, hence, the validity of our own substantive realizations, while *underestimating* that of the others, thereby impairing the honesty, morality, and accuracy of all of our rationalized realizations.

As with the meta-paradigm of realization itself, this realization bias appears to arise in three primary modes:

- Authentication bias is the rationalized absence of requisite degrees of transparency, choice, and accountability afflicting the intrapersonal mode of realization, sustaining *my* tendency to regard *my* personified symptoms of freedom (1AQ), *each* of *your* tendencies to regard *your* personified symptoms of freedom (2.1AQ), and *each* of *their* tendencies to regard *their* personified symptoms of freedom (3.1AQ) as inherently more valid than either of the others' and thereby impairing *our* ability to create actionable knowledge of freedom. Due to authentication bias, each of us tends to overestimate our own capacity for intrapersonal realization and, hence, the validity of our own intrapersonal realizations, while *underestimating* that of the others, thereby impairing the honesty and authenticity of all of our rationalized realizations.

- Legitimation bias is the rationalized absence of requisite degrees of transparency, choice, and accountability afflicting the interpersonal mode of realization, sustaining *my* tendency to regard *my* participative signals of justice (2AQ), *each* of *your* tendencies to regard *your* participative signals of justice (2.2AQ), and *each* of *their* tendencies to regard *their* participative signals of justice (3.2AQ) as inherently more valid than either of the others' and thereby impairing *our* ability to create actionable knowledge of justice. Due to legitimation bias, each of us tends to overestimate our own capacity for interpersonal realization and, hence, the validity of our own interpersonal realizations, while *underestimating* that of the others, thereby impairing the morality and legitimacy of all of our rationalized realizations.

- Confirmation bias is the rationalized absence of requisite degrees of transparency, choice, and accountability afflicting the impersonal mode of realization, sustaining *my* tendency to regard *my* representative symbols of truth (3AQ), *each* of *your* tendencies to regard *your* representative symbols of truth (2.3AQ), and *each* of *their* tendencies to regard *their* representative symbols of truth (3.3AQ) as inherently more valid

than either of the others' and thereby impairing *our* ability to create actionable knowledge of truth. Due to confirmation bias, each of us tends to overestimate our own capacity for impersonal realization and, hence, the validity of our own impersonal realizations, while *underestimating* that of the others, thereby impairing the accuracy and cogency of all of our rationalized realizations.

Realization biases appear in a variety of forms—from self-deceptions[270] to logical fallacies[271] to cognitive biases,[272] and from psychological projections[273] to personality clashes[274] to developmental insufficiencies[275]—but can only persist in the absence of requisite degrees of transparency, choice, and accountability with respect to the triadic quadratic perspectivism of real-world action situations. In the absence of requisite realization, we tend to rationalize arguments in order to defend our respective versions of reality against valid critique from those with whom we cannot help but seek validation, unilaterally controlling communication between those of us who seek to understand this reality, deceptively filtering the flow of information in order to influence exactly what each of us can possibly know, and emphasizing verifying rather than falsifying evidence for our own views and the inverse for any views contrary to our own. While impairing our efforts to mutually (in)validate novel claims to truth, justice, and freedom in one action situation after the next, these *rationalizations of realization* secretly and systematically undermine the validity of our actionable knowledge of freedom, justice, and truth, which feeds forward into progressively less justifiable reality claims even more prone to inspiring the rationalizations on which each of our biased realizations increasingly depend.

When presented with choices about what information to consume, with whom to communicate, and how best to determine what really is true, just, and free in a particular context, we tend to make selections that reinforce our realization biases. Mesmerized by the entertaining appearance of one-click access to everyone and everything worth knowing, we tend to filter the *infinite cornucopia*[276] of information available to us in this hyper-mediated, postmodern world in order to satisfy our own ideological pre-conceptions, facilitated by our freedom to choose only those news channels, news

feeds, and discussion groups we prefer and complicated by the deliberate and hidden biases used by editors and search engines to pre-filter and pre-package what they publish and present as if it is unbiased knowledge. By way of an uncountable number of unexamined choices amidst overwhelming *cultural dissonance*,[277] each one of us inadvertently participates in the *ideological balkanization* of politics, economics, religion, education, and the media, wherein *who* we are is subtly reduced to *what* we believe regardless of *why* we believe it or *how* we might change that belief. In doing so, we risk becoming a fragmented civilization of self-referencing, self-justifying, self-deceiving sub-cultures whose parochial presumptions about what really is true, just, and free seem to require ever less dialogue in order to rationalize the ever increasing production and consumption of conveniently consistent information from ever more familiar and (pseudo)friendly sources. This ideological balkanization thus presents the deceptive appearance of *mutual validation* in the form of a collective realization bias sustaining *our* tendencies to regard *our* versions of freedom, justice, and truth (123$_{AQ}$), *your* tendencies to regard *your* versions of freedom, justice, and truth (2.123$_{AQ}$), and *their* tendencies to regard *their* versions of freedom, justice, and truth (3.123$_{AQ}$) as *inherently more valid* than either of the others' and thereby impairing *all* of *our* abilities to create actionable knowledge of reality (123.123$_{AQ}$).[278]

Awareness-in-Action may therefore be understood as the tendency toward rationalized *realization bias* in three primary modes—*authentication*, *legitimation*, and *confirmation biases*—in which *we*—*I*, *each* of *you*, and *each* of *them*—regard *our* own capacity for realization as inherently superior to that of the others and thereby impair *our* ability to create actionable knowledge of reality—or freedom, justice, and truth.

Nevertheless, even this realization bias might be readily manageable were it not for the intervening power of *institutions*—from the news media to political parties to financial markets—the context-specific norms of which all-too-often covertly, if not overtly, preclude the emergent imperatives of requisite realization arising in every action situation. This institutionalized rationalization of our requisite realization is most insightfully revealed in the relatively

stable patterns of institutionalized action-learning through which the *reasonable justification* of situationally relevant claims to *truth*, *justice*, and *freedom* is often subverted, via the institutionalized power to systematically deceive, coerce, and defend, into the *unreasonable rationalization* of corresponding claims to *success* as prescribed by the institution. In these powerfully subversive patterns of rationalized realization, then, success takes on the deceptive, coercive, defensive appearance of substantive truth, justice, and freedom without re-course to requisite procedures of transparency, choice, and account-ability that would otherwise challenge the accuracy, morality, and honesty of that success. When political, economic, and social institu-tions—from governments to corporations to universities—sub-ordinate the conscientious pursuit of truth, justice, and freedom, independent of success, to that of success, independent of truth, justice, and freedom, they institutionalize within these very patterns of rationalized realization the latent potential for political, economic, and social crisis.

The subversion of justifiable *knowledge* into rationalizable *success* that can only be sustained by a corrupted form of institutionalized *power* depends for its success on the tacit acceptance of a critical mass of institutionalized actors willing to defer indefinitely the requisite realization they nevertheless intuit as a cognitive, moral, and volitional imperative with every single action. This tacit ac-ceptance of success over knowledge, which is typically engineered by those in power through deceptive propaganda, coercive incen-tives, and defensive routines, appears to render unnecessary the requisite degrees of transparency, choice, and accountability—the deeper, wider dialogue—that would otherwise tend to emerge spontaneously in challenging action situations in which controver-sial claims to reality confront common presumptions about reality. After all, how much dialogue is really necessary to determine the extent to which people have succeeded in fulfilling institutional standards of success while conforming to norms against dialogue? Likewise, how much dialogue is likely to emerge in an institutional context that defines successful action as nothing other than that which successfully avoids dialogue? Being normatively unnecessary in a given institutional context, such dialogue is more readily de-

flected, refused, or punished by those powerful actors who find themselves challenged on occasion to live up to the emergent imperatives of honesty, morality, and accuracy that they inadvertently imply even in their efforts to stifle any such dialogue.

Hence, where knowledge and power meet at the myriad sites of everyday awareness-in-action, we are repeatedly reminded of the subtle forces of deception, coercion, and defensiveness within, between, and beyond established institutions that threaten indeterminately our every attempt to realize some justifiable measure of the ideal in this real life. By tuning in to our cognitive, moral, and volitional dissonance, our dormant capacity for requisite realization begins to (re)emerge in the seemingly inevitable *realization crisis* of our own making. A realization crisis may be defined as the dawning awareness of the extent to which *our*—*mine*, *each* of *yours*, and *each* of *theirs*—actionable knowledge of reality has been *systematically rationalized* by increasingly conspicuous disregard for requisite degrees of transparency, choice, and accountability in our approach to integral/différantial realization, such that we no longer trust the *organizational*, *institutional*, and *civilizational* procedures for (in)validating our pragmatic significations of reality (123.123AQ). In a realization crisis, the *honesty*, *morality*, and *accuracy* of our substantive realizations—our sense of situational reality—is in serious doubt due to a perceived widespread breakdown in our realization procedures.

As with the meta-paradigm of realization itself, the potential for realization crisis appears to arise in three primary modes:

- Authentication crisis is the dawning awareness of the extent to which our actionable knowledge of freedom has been systematically rationalized by increasingly conspicuous disregard for requisite degrees of transparency, choice, and accountability in the intrapersonal mode of realization, such that we no longer trust the organizational, institutional, and civilizational procedures for (in)validating our personified symptoms of freedom (123.1AQ). In an authentication crisis, the honesty and authenticity of our substantive realizations—our sense of situational freedom—is in serious doubt due to a perceived widespread breakdown in our intrapersonal realization procedures.

- Legitimation crisis is the dawning awareness of the extent to which our actionable knowledge of justice has been systematically rationalized by increasingly conspicuous disregard for requisite degrees of transparency, choice, and accountability in the interpersonal mode of realization, such that we no longer trust the organizational, institutional, and civilizational procedures for (in)validating our participative signals of justice (123.2$_{AQ}$). In a legitimation crisis, the morality and legitimacy of our substantive realizations—our sense of situational justice—is in serious doubt due to a perceived widespread breakdown in our interpersonal realization procedures.

- Confirmation crisis is the dawning awareness of the extent to which our actionable knowledge of truth has been systematically rationalized by increasingly conspicuous disregard for requisite degrees of transparency, choice, and accountability in the impersonal mode of realization, such that we no longer trust the organizational, institutional, and civilizational procedures for (in)validating our representative symbols of truth (123.3$_{AQ}$). In a confirmation crisis, the accuracy and cogency of our substantive realizations—our sense of situational truth—is in serious doubt due to a perceived widespread breakdown in our impersonal realization procedures.

These definitions of realization crisis in three modes offer explanatory, interpretive, and evaluative insights—at an admittedly high level of abstraction—into the subtle features of systematic deception, distortion, coercion, corruption, dysfunction, and disruption that can manifest at all levels of scale in all the fields of awareness-in-action, from politics and government to economy and business to society and community. Consider, for example, some of the more critical and controversial issues of our time—from the politics of perpetual war to the economics of perpetual debt to the sociology of perpetual propaganda—each of which might be characterized in more general terms as a *realization crisis-in-progress* wherein the institutionalized procedures by which we attempt to understand these obvious threats to civilizational truth, justice, and freedom are,

at best, suspect and, at worst, corrupted by those who benefit most in terms of power and wealth from whatever lack of freedom, justice, and truth the rest of us are forced, or allowed, to endure. Among other things, this implies that the underlying cause of the interdependent crises afflicting human civilization—whether specifically construed as political, economic, social, or ecological in nature—can be more generally construed as the systematically rationalized disregard for requisite degrees of transparency, choice, and accountability with respect to the triadic quadratic perspectivism in our awareness-in-action.

Generally speaking, the greater the need for transparency, choice, and accountability in newly arising action situations—which increases as institutionalized structures of actionable freedom, justice, and truth prove insufficient to contend with ever-more-challenging situations—the greater will be the realization crisis-potential embedded in these action situations. Furthermore, the more systematic the disregard for requisite procedures of transparency, choice, and accountability in these ever-more-challenging action situations—which is a function of how deliberately designed, powerfully enforced, and tacitly accepted that disregard really is—the more confusing and painful will be the personified symptoms, participative signals, and representative symbols of the inevitable, yet indeterminate realization crisis. Finally, the more confusing and painful the signs of realization crisis, the greater will be the opportunity for empirical/normative dialogue about, not only the signs of crisis, but the deep-structural conditions of possible authentication, legitimation, and confirmation that are presently arrested throughout the institutions of civilization. The quality of this empirical/normative dialogue about the substantive/procedural conditions of possible realization within, between, and beyond established institutions, whether normatively permitted or, more likely, obstructed by those institutions, is therefore critical to the genuinely progressive, yet always indeterminate evolution of civilization. Lacking sufficient quality, *progressive evolution* in the established structures of actionable knowledge that govern civilization is deferred and distorted into *perpetual change* in the superficial content of these established structures—the promises and policies, products and services, programs

and opinions that circulate with ever-greater success through ever-more-powerful multi-institutional networks—providing those of us in the *un*critical masses with the comforting illusion of *perpetual progress* to mask the *systematic regress* in our cognitive, moral, and volitional capacities.

Awareness-in-Action may therefore be understood as the potential for *realization crisis* in three primary modes—*authentication*, *legitimation*, and *confirmation crises*—in which *we*—*I*, *each* of *you*, and *each* of *them*—eventually realize the extent to which *our* organizational, institutional, and civilizational realization has been systematically rationalized by increasingly conspicuous disregard for requisite degrees of transparency, choice, and accountability with respect to the triadic quadratic perspectivism of our awareness-in-action.

With the pressure that only crisis seems to provide, we bring more awareness to our predicament, drawing intuitively on our self-evident capacity to bear witness to our crumbling certainties, which is the necessary pre-condition for the différance-disclosing, conflict-ridden dialogues needed in response to the realization crisis. That response, however, requires awareness-*in-action*: the *damned if I do, damned if I don't* choice that each and every one of us makes when we dare to utter something genuinely novel in an all-too-familiar situation in which the vast majority of people appear to be suffering under the pretense of a knowledge sufficiently integral as to require no critical dialogue, while nevertheless rewarding quiet allegiance. As if appealing to a universal civilization that does not yet exist, *I* source from within *my* own intuition the controversial claims to a more authentic approach to freedom, a more legitimate approach to justice, and a more cogent approach to truth, expecting these procedural claims to be swiftly rejected by everyone *I* know, while trusting that these may in due time, through the *tri-tetra-meshing* of a deepening, widening dialogue, contribute to an as-yet-uncertain (r)evolutionary advance beyond the institutionalized structures of actionable knowledge that fomented the current realization crisis. Unbeknownst to *me*, *you* too are making surprisingly similar claims against familiar indifférance, as is *she* and *he*, such that it is only a matter of time and space before *we* can engage in the requisite degrees of (in)authentication, (de)legitimation, and (dis)confirmation

needed to resolve the realization crisis, at least between *us*, if not yet between *us* and *them*. As *we all* bring more awareness to this deepening, widening (r)evolutionary realization, we subtly reconstruct our actionable knowledge of freedom, justice, and truth in order to guide knowledgeable action that is progressively more free, just, and true, thereby enhancing the conditions of possible realization. When these conditions are established and the realization crisis presents us with opportunities, we may courageously re-institutionalize the requisite procedures of transparency, choice, and accountability throughout a more universal civilization.

It bears repeating that there is certainly nothing easy about Awareness-in-Action. Regardless of how conscientious we are, our real efforts to fulfill the ideals of *ultimate* realization ($A^\infty = TCA^\infty \times TQP^\infty = ALC^\infty = R^\infty$) will always fall short, even when they nevertheless produce what we regard as *requisite* realizations in each specific situation. Due to the inherent fallibility of human action, we cannot escape the awareness that, regardless of how satisfied we are with the validity of our actions, including the validity of other people's actions on our behalf, this validity remains provisional and open to reasonable challenge from any one of us and any one of them, at any time and any place. Once again, *each* action presupposes *every* action with *any* number of derivative actions in our radically open-ended, yet reliably closed-minded real action situations. Nevertheless, the *ultimate futility* of any search for *perfect* freedom, justice, and truth does little to dissuade us from the *utter necessity* of our search for *provisional* freedom, justice, and truth, rooted as it is in the *propositional* nature of human action-in-awareness—the *putting forward* of différantial claims to reality with each and every worldly action, as if expressions of *unrelenting faith* in the integral awareness that must, ultimately, redeem these claims in integral/différantial realization.

I Am that I Act / I Act that I Am

In pointing to the possibility of an absolute realization (R^0) of the integral awareness that *I* am (A^0) that is (phenomeno)logically com-

plementary to the relative realization (R^N) of the différantial action that *I* do (A^N), while being relatively idealized as the *ultimate* realization (R^∞) of *my* integral/différantial awareness-in-action (A^∞), as I have done periodically throughout this book, my aim is to at least frame the essential discourses of realization in terms of Awareness-in-Action. While the traditional discourses of *absolute* realization are often laden with the terminology of *spirituality* further burdened with diverse *religious* connotations and certain *scientific* condemnations, this is for me a *philosophical* proposition with both meta-theoretical and meta-practical implications for all the forms and fields of human action. Thus, what if awareness-in-action really is the active differentiation of triadic quadratic perspectivism from the integral awareness that is *nowhere* to be found as long as one is actively searching, yet *now-here* as long as one inquires deeply into the identity of the actor? Likewise, what if awareness-in-action really is the active refraction of integral awareness revealed in every knowledgeable action and reflected in all actionable knowledge? More to the point, what if *I* really am someone other than the *I* that *I* think *I* am as the implied origin of all that *I* think *I* do within the world that *I* think *I* know? Obviously, these propositions beg the question: Who am *I*?

As introduced in Chapter 2, the practice of self-inquiry, the Sanskrit name for which is *atma vichara*, is a subtle, silent inquiry, *vichara*, into *who I am* at the apparent source of all perspectives, thoughts, feelings, and actions, the sustained practice of which transcends the mental flow and purportedly reveals the integral awareness *that I am*, the real self, *Atman*, at one with absolute reality, *Brahman*, illuminating all manifest perspectives, thoughts, feelings, and actions. In the words of Ramana Maharshi, its finest teacher, "the first and foremost of all the thoughts that arise in the mind is the primal *I*-thought. It is only after the rise or origin of the *I*-thought that innumerable other thoughts arise. In other words, only after the first personal pronoun, *I*, has arisen, do the second and third personal pronouns (*you*, *he*, etc.) occur to the mind; and they cannot subsist without the former. Since every other thought can occur only after the rise of the *I*-thought and since the mind is nothing but a bundle of thoughts, it is only through the enquiry *Who am I?* that the mind

subsides. Moreover, the integral *I*-thought, implicit in such enquiry, having destroyed all other thoughts, gets itself finally destroyed or consumed, just as the stick used for stirring the burning funeral pyre gets consumed."[279]

Hence, the first-person singular-subjective (1UL) pronoun, *I*, appears to be the *originary* or *enactive perspective*, the *first among equals* with regard to all the other perspectival pronouns, because none of the others can arise in awareness unless the *I* at the apparent source of conscious action also arises. Therefore, triadic quadratic perspectival reality itself, to whatever extent it is *enacted*, appears to originate with the pronoun *I*, which is *identified* with each and every experience of reality it claims, that is, each and every *form* it *names* (e.g., *I* know *this*; *I* want *that*; *I* like *you*, but not *him*.). The awareness of *I* is (phenomeno)logically prior to the other perspectival pronouns and *I* can remain as the locus of perspectival awareness after the other perspectival pronouns subside. Furthermore, when practicing self-inquiry, *I* am attempting to use the *I* in its capacity as the sole *locus* of perspectival awareness to then make that same *I* the sole *focus* of perspectival awareness—that is, turning the subjective *I* back around as if to make an object of *itself*—thus making it all but impossible for the other perspectival pronouns to arise in relation to that *I*. Then, after sustaining this contemplative inquiry into *who I am*, the *I* that *I* think *I* am as the implied origin of all that *I* think *I* do within the world that *I* think *I* know—the *ahamkara*—tends to subside, leaving nothing but the integral awareness *that I am*. As integral awareness, the self-evident realization that *I* exist, that *I am*, not that *I am this or that* nor that I am *not* this or that, but simply that *I am*, reveals itself *as* the only self-evident realization.

To the seeker who asked "What is this awareness and how can one obtain and cultivate it?" Ramana answered, "You are awareness. Awareness is another name for you. Since you are awareness, there is no need to attain or cultivate it. All that you have to do is to give up being aware of other things, that is of the not-Self. If one gives up being aware of them then pure awareness alone remains, and that is the Self."[280] Of the countless objects of awareness with which Ramana would have *me* cease to identify, none is more significant and challenging than the persistent thought that *I* have not yet realized

the Self—a thought that appears to be endemic to any inquiry into *my* potential for Self-realization. Embracing this paradox, he reminds *me* that "realization is nothing to be gained afresh; it is already there. All that is necessary is to get rid of the thought 'I have not realized.' Stillness or peace is realization. There is no moment when the Self is not. So long as there is doubt or the feeling of non-realization, the attempt should be made to rid oneself of these thoughts. They are due to the identification of the Self with the not-Self. When the not-Self disappears, the Self alone remains. To make room, it is enough that objects be removed. Room is not brought in from elsewhere."[281]

As Wilber elaborates in his foreword to Ramana's *Talks*, "you are *already* aware of the sky, you *already* hear the sounds around you, you *already* witness this world. One hundred percent of the enlightened mind or pure Self is present right now…. As Ramana constantly pointed out, if the Self (or knowledge of the Self) is something that comes into existence—if your realization has a beginning in time—then that is merely another object, another passing, finite, temporal state. There is no reaching the Self—it is reading this page. There is no looking for the Self—it is looking out of your eyes right now. There is no attaining the Self—it is reading these words. You simply, absolutely cannot attain that which you have never lost. And if you do attain something, Ramana would say, that's very nice, but it's not the Self."[282,283] Indeed, as Ramana consistently taught during the course of his entire adult life, "Self-Inquiry directly leads to Realization by removing the obstacles which make you think that the Self is not already realized."[284]

Nevertheless, there is effort required for self-inquiry and therefore at least an implied attainment in mind, whether we call it self-realization, enlightenment, liberation, or something else. To this, Ramana might say, "*I am* is the goal and the final reality. To hold to it with effort is *vichara*. When spontaneous and natural it is realisation."[285] In other words, "the effort is directed to extinguishing the *I*-thought and not for ushering in the true *I*. For the latter is eternal and requires no effort on your part."[286] But if the real *I*, the eternal Self *I* really am, is ever-present and requires no effort on *my* part, then why must *I* make the effort of self-inquiry? Why can't *I* just be *my* real Self? In one sense, *I* can, by simply realizing that *I* already

am. After all, Ramana reminds *me*, "nothing else is so self-evident as *I am*."[287] But in another sense, *I* cannot. Because as long as *I* identify *myself* as the *I*-thought at the center of all that *I* do, *acting as if I am just this actor*, it seems *I* cannot escape from the compulsive effort to attain one result after another. No matter how significant it may be, *action* is all *I* can *do*.

It therefore occurs to *me* that perhaps the self-evident reality that *I act* secretly obscures the self-evident reality that *I am*. But upon closer inspection, it appears as if the *me* perspective in which *I* regard the *I that I was when I acted as I did* as well as the *I that I will be when I act as I might* habitually distracts and obscures the present awareness that *I* really am. Beyond the tenuous focus of *my* situational awareness-in-action, *I* tend to lose *myself* in the *me* that is, through *my* reflections of past actions and projections of future actions, *acting as if it is the I* when, in fact, the *me* is like a movie of the actor *I* was and will be, with the *me's* endless monologue on the past and future *I* being thus confused with the present awareness that *I* am even as *I* act. Amidst this reflexive (con)fusion, *I* ignore the present as if to invest *myself* in the *me* that will be, in the very next moment, the *I* that *I* was just a moment ago, as if *my* future could somehow be secured by deferring *my* present until it becomes *my* past, as if *my* identity is somehow more real when it becomes a temporal object to be seen by the present subject who sees. But the distractions do not end with *me*, for this movie of who *I* was and who *I* will be would not be so believable if it did not appear to implicate who *you* were and who *you* will be as well as who *she* is and who *she* will be, with who *we* were and who *we* will be in all the various permutations rounding out the endless dialogue of who *I* think *I* am as this integral/différantial self. And if *each* of *you* and *each* of *them* are anything like *me*, then *we all* share this tendency to lose *our*-present-*selves* in shadowy reflections of past actions and shadowy projections of future actions, acting as if *our* storied images of who *we* were and who *we* will be can possibly illuminate who *we* really are when *we* really act. Realizing this, *I* see that *I* am far more active than *I* am typically aware, and far more aware than *I* typically act.

So if *I* care to explore or dare to awaken, the best *I* can do is to

inquire deeply into the *I* that *I* think *I* am as the implied origin of all that *I* think *I* do—right here, right now—and interrupt this différantial confusion with the integral awareness that *I am* even as *I act*. More to the point, Ramana assures *me* that "to do self-enquiry and be that *I am* is the only thing to do. *I am* is reality. I am this or that is unreal."[288] But if this is the only thing worth doing, does this mean *I* have to give up doing everything else? On the contrary, Ramana says "the life of action need not be renounced.... If you meditate in the right manner then the current of mind induced will continue to flow even in the midst of your work.... Your actions will tend to follow your meditations of their own accord.... There is no conflict between work and wisdom."[289] In his view, "self-enquiry is the one infallible means, the only direct one, to realise the unconditioned, absolute being that you really are."[290,291]

Therefore, the best *I* can say is that *I* am this integral awareness that is, in and of itself, whether the proximate *I* that *I* think *I* am (focused on the distal *me* that *I* think *I* was and will be) realizes it or not, uninterrupted by changing states of awareness-in-action—such as waking, dreaming, and sleeping—in the course of an ordinary day and changing structures of awareness-in-action—from preformal to formal to postformal—in the course of an extraordinary life. More to the point, *I* am this ever-present, all-inclusive integral awareness in which the *realizer*, the perspectival *I* with which *I* habitually identify, and the *realized* co-arise in the *relative realization* of never-present, always-exclusive triadic quadratic perspectival action, *such as it is*. Furthermore, by logical extension, so too are *each* of *you* and *each* of *them* this very same ever-present, all-inclusive integral awareness in which the realizer, the perspectival *I* with which *each* of *you* and *each* of *them* habitually identify, and the realized co-arise in the relative realization of never-present, always-exclusive triadic quadratic perspectival action. If so, then all *my* apparent choices could be traced back to the *one primordial choice* to enact this particular triadic quadratic perspectival self-imaging/world-viewing in *choiceless* awareness, the actual realization of which would imply the *primordial transparency* of, and *primordial accountability* for, that self-imaging/world-viewing. Moreover, the particular self-imaging/world-viewing enacted by *each* of *you* and

each of *them* could also be traced back to the primordial transparen-cy, choice, and accountability from which these originated.

That being said, integral awareness is not the *thought* that *I* am this ever-present, all-inclusive integral awareness in which the perspectives and practices of différantial action arise. On the contra-ry, integral awareness is *that which is aware of the thought* that *I* am this integral/différantial awareness-in-action—indeed, that which is aware of *all* the *subjects* and *objects* co-arising in *my* awareness-in-action, regardless of what these subjects and objects of awareness might say about that awareness. So if *I* can resist the temptation to think *my* way to an ultimate conclusion, no matter how simple or sophisticated that conclusion might be, while sustaining the inquiry into who *I* am—which is always right here, right now—then *I* might just realize who *I* really am as *I* really act. Likewise, if *each* of *you* and *each* of *them* can sustain the very same self-inquiry, then perhaps *we* can *all* realize, once and for all, who *we* really are as *we* really act. But, of course, the real question is whether *I*, *any* of *you*, or *any* of *them* will *do* anything *different* in the wake of this declarative impera-tive, or if *we* will choose instead to *defer* indefinitely *our* integral realizations of this so-called awareness-in-action, at least until *we* are convinced of its différantial reality. Regardless, even if the *différantial realization* of awareness-in-action (A^N) is never really done (A^∞), the *integral realization* of awareness-in-action (A^0) is always already.

Awareness-in-Action may therefore be understood as the ever-present realization of the integral awareness that *we*—*I*, *each* of *you*, and *each* of *them*—*are* amidst the never-ending realization of the différantial action that *we*—*I*, *each* of *you*, and *each* of *them*—*do*.

— 6 —

CRITICAL INTEGRALISM

As I have attempted to convey with the preceding synopsis, Awareness-in-Action has the potential to serve as a *critical integral* meta-paradigm of extraordinary scope and depth. As such, it clarifies the presupposed perspectives and practices of human awareness-in-action in all its myriad *forms*—from writing, speaking, and conversing to giving, taking, and trading, to working, playing, and creating to learning, developing, and evolving—inclusive of anything and everything people *do*, regardless of how purposeful or spontaneous, mental or physical, independent or interdependent these actions might seem. To whatever extent these universal presuppositions might be regarded as provisionally valid, these would, logically, serve as necessary premises for all subsequent inquiries into, and hypotheses about, the many *fields* of human awareness-in-action, from economics and business to politics and governance to sociology and social work to journalism and activism. I am therefore proposing that this meta-paradigm of *realization* in three modes—*authentication*, *legitimation*, and *confirmation*—constitutes a significant portion of that intuitive knowledge without which people could not act as they really do and, correspondingly, a significant portion of those essential premises without which we cannot know what human action really is.

Post-metaphysical Proceduralism

Awareness-in-Action not only *describes* how people really *do* reason, act, and learn in all these forms and fields, but also *prescribes* how people really *should* reason, act, and learn if they are interested in creating actionable knowledge of freedom, justice, and truth that supports knowledgeable action that is more free, just, and true. In bridging the *empirical actualization* and *normative idealization* of human realization, this formulation also signals a decisive shift from the metaphysics of *unconditional declaratives*, or *substantive* statements of *what* we know to be real, independent of *how* we know it, to the post-metaphysics of *conditional imperatives*, or *procedural* statements of *how* we should act *if* we want to know *what* is real. Thus, in the form of a conditional imperative, *if* we want more freedom, justice, and truth in our lives and in the lives of those around us, *then* we should engage in the requisite practice of transparency, choice, and accountability with respect to the triadic quadratic perspectivism of challenging action situations.

This formulation is therefore consistent with Habermas's emphasis on *procedural* rather than *substantive* conceptions of reason, wherein the standards of what is or is not *reasonable* are grounded in the *conduct* of dialogue rather than the *content* of that dialogue—in *how* we validate knowledge rather than *what* we currently regard as valid knowledge.[292] So instead of attributing degrees of reasonableness to *specific claims to reality*, such as *my* truth claim versus *your* truth claim, any such attributions should be directed at the *specific practices of realizing* by which *you* and *I* attempt to justify *our* respective claims and determine what really is true. Furthermore, as already demonstrated, this formulation incorporates wholesale the other major themes in Habermas's post-metaphysical philosophy, including the shift from *foundationalist* to *fallibilist* premises in validation and the expansion of exclusively *impersonal-representative* conceptions of realization to include *interpersonal-participative* and *intrapersonal-personified* conceptions based on the pragmatic perspectives and historic contexts of communicative reason.[293]

Although he does not specifically position his work as such, Argyris's action science is an impressive exemplar of post-metaphysical

proceduralism at work in real-world communities of practice. As explored in Part II, the action science method is centered on a form of critical-reflective dialogue guided by the procedural norms of *valid information*, *free and informed choice*, *internal commitment to the choice*, and *vigilant monitoring of its implementation in order to detect and correct error*. Consistent with these intentional values, specific behavioral strategies include "sharing control with those who have competence and who participate in designing or implementing the action," replacing "unilateral advocacy… or inquiry that conceals the agent's own views" with a forthright combination of advocacy and inquiry, illustrating "attributions and evaluations with relatively directly observable data," and encouraging "the surfacing of conflicting views… in order to facilitate public testing" of these views.[294]

The primary purpose of such dialogue is, according to Argyris and his colleagues, to help each community of practice create actionable knowledge of its own patterns of reason, action, and learning consistent with the most rigorous standards of critical social science, including: "(1) empirically disconfirmable propositions that are organized into a theory; (2) knowledge that human beings can implement in an action context; and (3) alternatives to the status quo that both illuminate what exists and inform fundamental change, in light of values freely chosen by social actors."[295] Argyris justifies this bridging of the empirical and the normative by ensuring that both the substantive content and procedural conduct of the ensuing dialogue are open to potential critique by all participants as an essential feature of that dialogue.[296]

Yet another form of post-metaphysical proceduralism features prominently in Wilber's procedural model of valid knowledge, which calls for the grounding of any substantive theory with a *practical injunction* to take a specific action, followed by an *experiential apprehension* of the empirical evidence resulting from that action, and culminating in a *communal (dis)confirmation* of whatever theoretical knowledge was claimed.[297] Wilber's proceduralism is modeled, not on the norms of *dialogue* as with Habermas and Argyris, but on the *scientific method*, the systematic rigor of which he would like to see extended from the *natural* sciences in which it originated to the established *social* and emerging *spiritual* sciences essential to a more

integral understanding of reality, without confusing or conflating any of these domains with the others.

Accordingly, Wilber's notion of experiential apprehension establishes an extraordinarily broad scope for valid knowledge—all quadrants, levels, lines, states, and types—that he intends to be limited only by the requirement that any claim to valid knowledge be justified by recourse to a practical injunction through which others can apprehend in their own direct awareness the empirical evidence that purportedly justifies that claim.[298] As he emphasizes, such a practical injunction will generally take the form of what I have described as a conditional imperative: *If you want to know that, then do this*. "This injunction, exemplar, or paradigm is, as Thomas Kuhn pointed out, an actual *practice*, not a mere concept." Once properly engaged, "the injunction or exemplar *brings forth a particular data domain*—a particular experience, apprehension, or evidence…. This apprehension, data, or evidence is then tested in the circle of those who have completed the first two strands; bad data or bad evidence is rebuffed, and this potential *falsifiability* is the third component of most genuine validity claims; it is *not* restricted to… sensory claims alone: there is sensory experience, mental experience, and spiritual experience and any specific claim in each of those domains can potentially be falsified by further data in those domains."[299]

Wilber's insistence that each and every form of valid knowledge is enacted by a practical injunction consistent with Thomas Kuhn's widely misunderstood notion of a *paradigm* may be one of his most significant challenges to the contemporary discourses about everything from *the new science* to *new age spirituality* to *conscious evolution*, which tend to equate their purportedly *new paradigms* with *theories worth adopting* rather than *practices worth engaging*.[300] For his part, Kuhn gradually distanced himself from the misappropriated term *paradigm*, even going so far as to propose instead, in the second edition of *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions*, the theft-deterring term "*disciplinary matrix*: *disciplinary* because it refers to the common possession of the practitioners of a particular discipline; *matrix* because it is composed of ordered elements of various sorts each requiring further specification."[301] He further clarified that "all or

most of the objects of group commitment that my original text makes paradigms, parts of paradigms, or paradigmatic are constituents of the disciplinary matrix and as such they form a whole and function together."[302]

As for the shared understandings comprising the disciplinary matrix that defines a scientific community, Kuhn identifies: i) *symbolic generalizations* that are logical, formal, or readily formalizable; ii) *models* and *heuristics* that supply metaphors and analogies; iii) *values* concerning the evaluation of evidence and the relative merits of competing theories (e.g., accuracy, consistency, simplicity, plausibility); and iv) *exemplars*, or shared examples, of concrete problem-solutions that show scientists how their normal puzzle-solving work is to be done.[303] With regard to this fourth element, *exemplars*, Kuhn specifically notes that "for it, the term *paradigm* would be entirely appropriate, both philologically and autobiographically; this is the component of a group's shared commitments which first led me to the choice of that word."[304] In Kuhn's view, this disciplinary matrix, or paradigm in the broad sense, not only defines the membership of a specific scientific community in terms of who actually understands and implements the paradigm, but also explains the source of the socio-technical community structure by which most scientific knowledge progresses. As he discovered, scientific fields progress through an alternating rhythm of what we might call *evolution*, characterized by relatively stable periods of highly productive knowledge accumulation consistent with the established paradigm of the community, and *revolution*, characterized by relatively turbulent intervals during which the community, in whole or in part, adopts a new paradigm that better accounts for an expanded body of empirical evidence, thereby initiating a new period of scientific evolution.

Wilber's further emphasis on the necessity of communal (dis)confirmation that adheres to an empirically non-reductionist version of Karl Popper's rather strict standard of *falsifiability* presents yet another challenge to those inclined toward metaphysical theorizing.[305] Building on the premise of *fallibilism* advocated by Habermas, wherein theories are only ever recognized as provisionally valid and therefore subject to revision, *falsifiability* requires that theories be

formulated in a way that facilitates systematic revision and potential refutation in light of a preponderance of falsifying evidence. In Popper's view, "the criterion of the scientific status of a theory is its falsifiability, or refutability, or testability."[306] While advocating for the standard of falsifiability in all domains of knowledge identified in his AQAL integral theory, Wilber condemns the reductionist forms of empiricism with which it is typically paired in communities of practice within, or overly influenced by, the physical sciences:

> As it is now, the Popperian falsifiability principle has one wide-spread and altogether perverted use: it is implicitly restricted *only to sensory data*, which, in an incredibly hidden and sneaky fashion, *automatically bars all mental and spiritual experience from the status of genuine knowledge*. This unwarranted restriction of the falsifiability principle claims to separate genuine knowledge from the dogmatic, but all it actually accomplishes, in this shrunken form, is a silent but vicious reductionism. On the other hand, when we free the falsifiability principle from its restriction to sensory data, and set it free to police the domains of mental and spiritual data as well, it becomes an important aspect of the knowledge quest in all domains, sensory to mental to spiritual. And in each of those domains, it does indeed help us to separate the true from the false, the demonstrable from the dogmatic.[307]

Be that as it may, it is equally important to preclude any reductionist forms of falsifiability itself that may creep into our disciplined pursuits of genuine knowledge within and across the various domains of a fully resurrected empiricism honoring whatever we can apprehend in our own direct awareness. Note, for example, that in the passage quoted two pages prior, Wilber claims that "this apprehension, data, or evidence is then tested in the circle of those who have completed the first two strands; bad data or bad evidence is rebuffed, and this potential *falsifiability* is the third component of most genuine validity claims."[308] At first glance, this may appear to be a simple misstatement, because of course it is not empirical evidence that should be rejected if it fails to conform to the accepted theory, but rather the accepted theory that should be challenged by any preponderance of falsifying evidence. However, he vigorously asserts the same claim in a subsequent book, twice, just prior to the passage quoted above, arguing that "the validity of these data is

demonstrated by the fact that *bad data can indeed be rebuffed*, which is where Popper enters the picture," and "whereas bad data in those domains *are indeed falsifiable*, but only by further data *in those domains*, not by data from lower domains!"[309]

   While it may be appropriate, on occasion, for scientists to marginalize some empirical evidence in favor of better evidence resulting from more effective and consistent applications of a practical injunction, this has nothing to do with the practice of falsification. The standard of falsifiability is not supposed to police the domains of sensory, mental, and spiritual *data* in service to accepted *theories* in those domains, because doing so will likely be in service to the confirmation biases of theorists who favor the accepted theories. As Popper himself warned, "if we are uncritical we shall always find what we want: we shall look for, and find, confirmations, and we shall look away from, and not see, whatever might be dangerous to our pet theories. In this way it is only too easy to obtain what appears to be overwhelming evidence in favor of a theory which, if approached critically, would have been refuted."[310] Wilber is not unaware of this, as he does note, amidst his contradictory misinterpretations of falsifiability, that "genuine knowledge must be open to disproof, or else it is simply dogma in disguise."[311] But it is *theories*—not empirical evidence—that must be open to disproof, because it is *theories*—not empirical evidence—that can become dogma in disguise. Thus, if one is to apply the strict standard of falsifiability in whatever domain of reality, it is the *accepted theory* that should be *falsifiable* in light of a preponderance of *acceptable evidence*, and certainly not the inverse.

   This is important because any such misunderstanding of falsifiability within a community of practice purporting to be practicing falsification would exacerbate whatever tendencies that community might already have toward the social mode of instrumental rationality known as *strategic action*. In strategic action, as we have already seen, the predominant standard of validity is not *falsifiable* or even *verifiable truth*—let alone *justice* and *freedom*—but rather *rationalizable success*, indeed *unilateral* success, of one theory over another, one theorist over another, or one community over another, based on a systematically biased filtering of the empirical evidence. If Argyris's

action science is any indication, the professional communities of practice in which knowledge is created and disseminated may already be governed by the dialogue-stifling, debate-promoting norms of strategic action—*define and achieve goals*, *maximize winning*, *minimize losing*, *minimize negative feelings*, and *be rational*—which tend to preclude, through tacit habits of deception, coercion, and defensiveness, the sort of dialogue in which established orthodoxy can be reasonably (dis)confirmed in light of a growing body of empirical evidence.[312] When proceeding under the guise of a distorted notion of falsifiability that targets acceptable evidence in service to accepted theory, this instrumental preclusion of transparency, choice, and accountability institutionalizes the confirmation, legitimation, and authentication biases by which individuals and communities tend to regard their own established theories as inherently more valid than emerging alternatives and thereby impair their ability to create, through (re/de)constructive dialogue, actionable knowledge of truth, justice, and freedom.[313]

In my view, falsifiability implies, as another conditional imperative, that *if* we are serious about the progressive quest for increasingly valid theories enacted by exemplary forms of practice, *then* we should actively seek empirical evidence that can *falsify*, in addition to that which can *verify*, our theories and thereby challenge ourselves to develop better theories that take into account an increasingly comprehensive body of evidence. By this interpretation, *falsifiability* actually supports a proactive approach to theoretical innovation intended to balance a potentially biased standard of *verifiability* that, for all of its grounding in empirical evidence of apparent *justifiability*, ignores the prototypically postmodern recognition of the theory-laden nature of empirical evidence and, therefore, the empirical bias toward verifying the currently accepted theory.[314] Furthermore, a sophisticated application of falsifiability, similar to that advocated by Imre Lakatos, would require that any proposed falsification of the *accepted theory* be justified, not simply by the empirical falsification of one or more of its constituent propositions or predictions, but by recourse to a *more acceptable theory* offering a more comprehensive explanation and interpretation of all the relevant empirical evidence.[315] In this way, the standard of falsifiability can support,

though certainly not guarantee, *progressive* theoretical *reconstruction* rather than potentially *regressive* theoretical *deconstruction*.[316]

Interestingly enough, Kuhn's research reveals that "once it has achieved the status of a paradigm, a scientific theory is declared invalid only if an alternate candidate is available to take its place. No process yet disclosed by the historical study of scientific development at all resembles the methodological stereotype of falsification by direct comparison with nature. That remark does not mean that scientists do not reject scientific theories, or that experience and experiment are not essential to the process in which they do so. But it does mean… that the act of judgment that leads scientists to reject a previously accepted theory is always based upon more than a comparison of that theory with the world. The decision to reject one paradigm is always simultaneously the decision to accept another, and the judgment leading to that decision involves the comparison of both paradigms with nature *and* with each other."[317] Hence, it would seem that the key to successful application of any standards of falsification and verification is to legitimate these standards in the Kuhnian paradigm of the scientific community—specifically the *values* and *social practices* that supply the standards and procedures for critically evaluating the merits and demerits of competing theories as well as the exemplary practices that tend to (re)create these theories.

From a *meta-theoretical* perspective, the enduring challenge in such a disciplined proceduralism is to preclude any form of *perspectival confusion* whereby the empirical evidence apprehended in one perspective (e.g., objective quantitative evidence) is used—either mistakenly or unfairly—to invalidate a theory that is based on empirical evidence apprehended in another perspective (e.g., subjective qualitative evidence). Such perspectival confusion may be one source of the occasional *paradigm clashes* that arise between established and/or emergent communities of practice, whose paradigms are, as Kuhn observed, at least somewhat *incommensurable* because the exemplars of one community cannot disclose the evidence so readily disclosed by exemplars of another, and even to the extent that some evidence overlaps, each paradigm will tend to inform different theoretical interpretations of that shared evidence. This is

certainly part of the inspiration for my inquiry into meta-theory—as I'm sure it was for Habermas and Wilber before me—and I believe that *triadic quadratic perspectivism* may constitute an integral theory necessary—though not necessarily sufficient—to preclude the paradigm clashes that undermine our quest for realization.

From a *meta-practical* perspective, the enduring challenge in such a disciplined proceduralism is to preclude any form of *practical coercion* whereby the provisional validity of one theory/practice (e.g., the orthodox paradigm) is presumed—either overtly or covertly—to invalidate alternative theories/practices (e.g., heterodox paradigms) simply because the orthodoxy wants to preclude a *paradigm change* within their field. Unfortunately Popper's falsifiability, even in its most inclusionary (e.g., Wilber) and sophisticated (e.g., Lakatos) reinterpretations, can do little more than support the disciplined justification of impersonal truth within communities of practice that have, by other means, managed to transform their deceptive, coercive, and defensive habits of reason and communication. The communal (dis)confirmation of truth, even when secured from confirmation bias in principle or in practice, cannot *in itself* secure the (de)legitimation of interpersonal justice (i.e., respect, morality) and the (in)authentication of intrapersonal freedom (i.e., sincerity, honesty) that necessarily co-arise in parallel with every justification of impersonal truth, particularly during revolutionary intervals of paradigm change.[318] This is certainly part of the inspiration for my inquiry into meta-practice—as I'm sure it was for Habermas and Argyris before me—and I believe that *transparency*, *choice*, and *accountability* may constitute an integral practice necessary—though not necessarily sufficient—to preclude the deception, coercion, and defensiveness that undermines our quest for realization.

In his most recent book, Wilber distills his procedural model of valid knowledge—injunction, apprehension, confirmation—down to a memorable post-metaphysical maxim: *The meaning of a statement is the means of its enactment*.[319] In other words, *substantive* meaning is to be validated only through *procedural* means. While placing a primary emphasis on the practical injunction from his original model, Wilber's maxim might be generously interpreted to imply the experiential apprehension of *the meaning so enacted* as well as the communal

confirmation without which the verbal equation established by the word *is* between *the meaning of a statement* and *the means of its enactment* would be severed. Hence, to the extent that all three procedural elements may be justifiably interpreted within this one maxim, it appears to be a useful alternative. However, it is not without some precedent.[320]

A central premise in Habermas's pragmatic theory of meaning and validity is his contention that "*we understand a speech act when we know what makes it acceptable*." In other words, "a hearer understands the meaning of an utterance when… he knows those *essential conditions* under which he could be motivated by a speaker to take an affirmative position."[321] Restating Habermas's premise in Wilberian form suggests that *the meaning of a statement is knowledge of the conditions that would make it valid*. As we have already seen, the essential conditions under which one person will affirm the validity of another's statement are, for Habermas, the situation-specific satisfaction of the context-transcendent norms of discourse, which he has articulated in terms of the *ideal speech situation*. Thus, more concisely, *the meaning of a statement is the discourse of its validation*. Given the apparent contrast between Wilber's *means of enactment* and Habermas's *discourse of validation*, we might want to remind ourselves of the practical injunctions of Habermasian discourse, which I have already explored in terms of the Argyrisian exemplar of critical-reflective discourse, the intentional values and behavioral strategies of which were recapitulated near the beginning of this section. Better yet, we could look for sufficiently *dialogical* versions of practical injunction, experiential apprehension, and communal confirmation consistent with a procedural approach to the discourse-centered validation of substantive theory.

Hence, consider again the paradigmatic features of critical-reflective action science as articulated by Argyris and his colleagues. The standard of "empirically disconfirmable propositions that are organized into a theory" is clearly recognizable as the *falsifiable substance* of any scientific approach to impersonal truth, although it stops short of differentiating a more inclusive empirical falsifiability/verifiability applicable to the dialogues of interpersonal justice and intrapersonal freedom, which are always at least implicated in

any dialogue of truth. Furthermore, the standard of "knowledge that human beings can implement in an action context" is just as clearly recognizable as the *injunctive procedure* that should accompany any substantive theory, and especially those in the social and spiritual sciences in which the objects of theory include human subjects themselves. Finally, the standard of "alternatives to the status quo that both illuminate what exists and inform fundamental change, in light of values freely chosen by social actors" may be interpreted as the actors' *apprehended experience* of *what is* in relation to *what might be*,[322] with this creative tension between the *empirical real* and the *normative ideal* being the special province of distinctively critical-reflective paradigms, which, as Wilber himself once recognized, have applicability across the spectrum of natural, social, and spiritual sciences.[323] Thus, in light of my proposed integral reconstruction of both Argyrisian and Habermasian theories of critical-reflective discourse—including essential insights from Wilber, Kuhn, and Popper, as well as Bühler, Mead, and Derrida—the genuinely post-metaphysical geneology of Awareness-in-Action should now be reasonably clear.

More significantly, this exploration suggests that the themes of post-metaphysical philosophy are more-or-less consciously recognized in every action situation in which even explicit claims to freedom, justice, and truth convey meaning only to the extent that they are actively justified—hence verified or falsified—in direct experiential awareness, while the potential for such active justification is always presupposed in every action situation. Indeed, the *presupposed ideality* of awareness-in-action, denoted $A^{\infty} = TCA^{\infty} \times TQP^{\infty} = ALC^{\infty}$, appears to be *implicitly post-metaphysical*, even when the *postulated actuality* of awareness-in-action, denoted $A^N = TCA^N \times TQP^N = ALC^N$, appears to be *explicitly metaphysical*. Thus, even when human action in real-world situations displays, as it so very often does, a preponderance of *assertions* without *injunctions*, *assumptions* before *apprehensions*, and *satisfaction* in lieu of *realization*, all such human actors presuppose the counter-factual potential for post-metaphysical actions that do justice to the inherently fallible, yet irreducibly necessary practices of transparency, choice, and accountability with respect to the triadic quadratic perspectivism in that

situation. The requisite practice of Awareness-in-Action, then, is intended to establish these post-metaphysical ideals ($TCA^\infty \times TQP^\infty$) in the context of all relatively (post-)metaphysical real action situations ($TCA^N \times TQP^N$), by justifying controversial assertions with actionable injunctions, illuminating familiar assumptions with novel apprehensions, and finding satisfaction in the progressive (in)authentication, (de)legitimation, and (dis)confirmation of *both* substantive theories *and* procedural practices.

Awareness-in-Action is therefore formulated with the intent to differentiate and integrate *substantive* and *procedural* conceptions of *realization*, wherein the standards of what is or is not *real* are grounded in the *perspectival content of reality* as well as the *practical conduct* of *realizing*, in *what* we regard as real as well as *how* we realize what is real. Hence, the substantive meta-theory of *reality*—meaning intrapersonal freedom, interpersonal justice, and impersonal truth—mutually implicates the corresponding procedural meta-practice of *realizing*—meaning transparency, choice, and accountability with respect to freedom, justice, and truth. Likewise, bracketing the (phenomeno)logical extremes of *relative realization* (R^N), substantive theories of *absolute reality* (R^0) and *ultimate reality* (R^∞) mutually implicate corresponding procedural practices of *absolute realizing* (R^0) and *ultimate realizing* (R^∞). Finally, as conveyed in the deliberately redundant notation for *realization* (R), a term with both substantive and procedural connotations, the triadic quadratic perspectivism of *substantive reality* mutually implicates the transparency, choice, and accountability of *procedural realizing*. With this in mind, I offer a new post-metaphysical maxim: *The (integral/différantial) reality of a declarative is the imperative to (integrally/différantially) realize it*.

Awareness-in-Action may therefore be understood as a *substantive/procedural* meta-*paradigm* of realization centered on the *procedural* meta-*practice* of transparency, choice, and accountability with respect to the *substantive* meta-*theory* of triadic quadratic perspectivism, which can be integrally/différantially realized in each and every action situation, thus facilitating the empirically and normatively justifiable (in)authentication, (de)legitimation, and (dis)confirmation of each and every action claiming knowledge of reality.

Praxiological Integralism/Différantialism

If indeed Awareness-in-Action is applicable to each and every form and field of human awareness-in-action, then this meta-paradigm provides the means by which we can proactively create actionable knowledge within, across, and beyond established disciplinary and institutional boundaries in service of greater freedom, justice, and truth. More specifically, this relatively content-free, yet context-rich meta-paradigm clarifies what appear to be some of the essential premises for an *action-oriented integral philosophy* concerned with helping people realize their full potential in the full variety of real-world situations.

Awareness-in-Action embraces the general idea—though not the specific formulation—of Wilber's post-metaphysical *integral methodological pluralism*, which aims at a meta-paradigmatic integration of paradigmatic pluralism consistent with his AQAL formulation of integral theory.[324] With regard to the *meta-paradigmatic* aspect of integral methodological pluralism, Wilber proposes three integrative principles—*nonexclusion*, *enfoldment*, *enactment*—in order to create the conceptual space necessary to incorporate a great variety of paradigmatic practices already in use by disciplined scholar-practitioners seeking valid knowledge in their respective fields:

> **Nonexclusion** means that "Everybody is right"—or more technically, that the experiences brought forth by one paradigm cannot legitimately be used to criticize, negate, or exclude the experiences brought forth by other paradigms. The reason that "everybody is right" is called **enactment**, which means that no experience is innocent and pregiven, but rather is brought forth or enacted in part by the activity of the subject doing the experiencing. Thus, one activity (or paradigm) will bring forth a particular set of experiences—experiences that are not themselves innocent reflections of the one, true, real, and pregiven world, but rather are co-created and co-enacted by the paradigm or activity itself, and, accordingly, one paradigm does not give "the correct view" of the world and therefore it cannot be used (as if it did) in order to negate, criticize, or exclude other experiences brought forth by other paradigms. However, if one practice or paradigm includes the essentials of another and then adds further practices—such that it "enfolds" or includes the other—then that paradigm can legitimately be claimed to be

more integral, which is the **enfoldment** principle. Together, these guiding principles give us an Integral Methodological Pluralism that is the warrant for AQAL metatheory.[325]

Wilber contends that, "these three regulative principles—nonexclusion, enfoldment, enactment—are principles that were reverse engineered, if you will, from the fact that numerous different and seemingly 'conflicting' paradigms are already being competent-ly practiced all over the world; and thus the question is not, and never has been, which is right and which is wrong, but how can all of them already be arising in a Kosmos? These three principles are some of the items that need to be already operating in the universe in order for so many paradigms to already be arising, and the only really interesting question is how can all of those extraordinary practices already be arising in any universe?"[326]

With regard to the *paradigmatic* aspect of integral methodological pluralism, Wilber proposes a set of eight complementary methods, or families of paradigms, framed by the four quadrants of his AQAL integral theory: *phenomenology* and *structuralism* as the inside and outside of his intentional UL, *hermeneutics* and *ethnomethodology* as the inside and outside of his cultural LL, *autopoiesis* and *empiricism* as the inside and outside of his behavioral UR, and *social autopoiesis* and *systems theory* as the inside and outside of his social LR.[327] As he describes it, integral methodological pluralism "involves, among other things, at least 8 fundamental and apparently irreducible methodologies, injunctions, or paradigms for gaining reproducible knowledge (or verifiably repeatable experiences). The fundamental claim of AQAL Integral Theory is that any approach that leaves out any of these 8 paradigms is a less-than-adequate approach according to available and reliable human knowledge at this time."[328] He says that the easiest way to understand this dyadic quadratic model:

> …is to start with what are known as the quadrants, which suggest that any occasion possesses an inside and an outside, as well as an individual and a collective, dimension. Taken together, this gives us the inside and the outside of the individual and the collective. These are often represented as I, you/we, it, and its (a variation on 1st, 2nd, and 3rd-person pronouns; another variation is the Good, the True, and the Beautiful; or art, morals, and science, and so on—namely, the objective truth of exterior science, or it/its; the subjec-

tive truth of aesthetics, or I; and the collective truth of ethics, or thou/we)…. If you imagine any of the phenomena (or holons) in the various quadrants, you can look at them from their own inside or outside. This gives you 8 primordial perspectives—the inside and the outside view of a holon in any of the 4 quadrants.[329]

Thus, as the above passage clearly states, this revised version of AQAL asserts the existence of perspectives for the *inside* and the *outside* of the *inside* and the *outside* of the *individual* and the *collective*, and, by virtue of the tri/quad conflation just invoked, it simultaneously asserts the existence of perspectives for the *inside* and the *outside* of the *first-*, *second-*, and *third-person*, which are, respectively, the *inside* of the *individual*, the *inside* of the *collective*, and the combined *outsides* of the *individual* and the *collective*.

While accepting the validity of Wilber's formulation of integral methodological pluralism, Sean Esbjörn-Hargens offers a refinement that explicates the *epistemological* and *ontological* pluralism implied by Wilber's *methodological* pluralism. His more encompassing notion of *integral pluralism* clarifies the mutually implicated *epistemological* pluralism of *who* enacts, the *methodological* pluralism of *how* they enact, and the *ontological* pluralism of *what* is enacted—in short, who × how × what.[330] Using climate change as an example, Esbjörn-Hargens contends that, "we do not have a simple case of many perspectives looking differently at a single object (e.g., a circle of people looking at a red ball in the middle) but rather have multiple perspectives using a variety of techniques, practices, and injunctions to enact multiple objects that overlap with and diverge from each other in numerous ways to generate an object that goes under the signifier of [climate change]."[331] His key point is that, in addition to the multiple methods of any methodological pluralism, we must also recognize the *multiple subjects* and the *multiple objects* that, as he puts it, *en-ter-act* to create all the *multiple realities*, which are, in his view, already articulated in AQAL.[332,333]

Unfortunately, Wilber's tri/quad conflated, dyadic quadratic formulation of primordial perspectives, which serves as the conceptual framework for his integral methodological pluralism—that is, the integral theory on which his integral practice is based—is completely inconsistent with the actual primordial perspectives of human awareness-in-action, thus rendering incoherent his particular

formulations of integral theory and practice. While the *methods* themselves are relatively valid as they are employed by various scholar-practitioners in their respective fields, the multi-perspectival *methodology* that Wilber designed to differentiate and integrate these methods is inconsistent with the primordial perspectives that are always already active in the work of all these scholar-practitioners—inconsistent, that is, with the *essential* or *integral* perspectivism they implicitly enact in every situation. Furthermore, as demonstrated in my critique of this formulation in Appendix A, because the tri/quad conflated, dyadic quadratic perspectives of AQAL are conceptual products of a deceptively simple confusion between *equation/conflation* and *differentiation/integration* with respect to the purely triadic (123) and purely quadratic (X_{AQ}) primordial perspectives—$1 = X_{UL}$; $2 = X_{LL}$; $3 = X_{UR+LR}$—these AQAL perspectives simply *do not exist* anywhere in human awareness-in-action other than as illogical, irredeemable claims *that they exist*.

Hence, it is not just that AQAL is not quite primordial enough, as would be the concern with any multi-perspectival meta-theory purporting to be primordial enough to serve integral methodological, epistemological, and ontological purposes, but rather that AQAL completely distorts the triadic (123) and quadratic (X_{AQ}) perspectives purportedly differentiated and integrated within AQAL, rendering incoherent each and every perspective in AQAL and, thus, any methodology, epistemology, or ontology based on AQAL. After all, if the tri/quad conflated AQAL is not the correct way to articulate the primordial perspectives of human awareness-in-action and triadic quadratic perspectivism is correct, then each and every attempt to apply AQAL in some field of theory or practice is actually preventing people from realizing in their own active awareness the primordial perspectival meta-theory of TQP that is, nevertheless, always already implicitly active in those action situations. Nevertheless, Wilber's general idea of an integral methodological pluralism, consistent with the principles of nonexclusion, enfoldment, and enactment, remains quite promising to the extent that it invites alternative formulations of paradigmatic pluralism and meta-paradigmatic integralism consistent with these premises. Likewise, many of the important insights offered by AQAL scholar-practi-

tioners, including Esbjörn-Hargens's emphasis on epistemological, methodological, and ontological pluralisms, can nevertheless be retained within alternative formulations that are free from the contradictory constraints of AQAL.

Figure 21. Awareness-in-Action as a Praxiological Integralism/Différantialism

As an alternative to AQAL, Awareness-in-Action offers what appears to be a more coherent and justifiable formulation of paradigmatic pluralism and meta-paradigmatic integralism that is consistent with the principles of nonexclusion, enfoldment, and enactment, but grounded instead in the primordial perspectives and practices of our situational awareness-in-action. Awareness-in-Action encompasses both the ever-present realization of the integral awareness *that I am* and the never-ending realization of the différantial action *that I do*, which are indeterminately realized in each and every situational action-in-awareness through the procedural meta-practice of transparency, choice, and accountability with respect to

the substantive meta-theory of triadic quadratic perspectivism. More specifically, Awareness-in-Action is a meta-paradigm of realization that entails the requisite practice of transparency, choice, and accountability with respect to *my* pragmatic significations of reality, *each* of *your* pragmatic significations of reality, and *each* of *their* pragmatic significations of reality, each comprised of its corresponding intentional signifieds, behavioral signifiers, cultural semantics, and social syntax of reality, all of which appear to co-arise in the integral awareness that *each* of *us* brings to *our* différantial action situation. It therefore includes the (a)perspectival/(a)practical realizations of each and every *realizer-realized* that can possibly be regarded as relatively real within *my* circle of integral awareness—that is, the potentially infinite, yet always indeterminate *epistemological-ontological* multiplicities of *my methodological* awareness-in-action.

Awareness-in-Action constitutes a substantive/procedural form of meta-paradigmatic integralism—a *praxiological integralism*—from which a substantive/procedural form of paradigmatic pluralism—a *praxiological différantialism*—is derived based on its primordial perspectival structure. As already presented, the *triadic* paradigms of authentication, legitimation, and confirmation constitute the most important differentiation of integral/différantial realization without which people tend to confuse and conflate *intra*personal, *inter*personal, and *im*personal modes of realization: (Fig. 21)

- Authentication is the *intra*personal mode of realization that entails the requisite practice of transparency, choice, and accountability with respect to *my* personified symptoms of freedom (1_{AQ}), *each* of *your* personified symptoms of freedom (2.1_{AQ}), and *each* of *their* personified symptoms of freedom (3.1_{AQ}), each comprised of its corresponding intentional signifieds (123.1_{UL}), behavioral signifiers (123.1_{UR}), cultural semantics (123.1_{LL}), and social syntax (123.1_{LR}) of freedom, all of which appear to co-arise in the integral awareness (0) that *each* of *us* brings to *our* différantial action situation ($A > TCA \times 123.1_{AQ} = AF < R$). It is the paradigm by which each of us (in)validates each of our relatively knowledgeable actions in terms of its *honesty* and *authenticity*, more-or-less consistent

with each of our previously established structures of action-able knowledge of *freedom*.

- Legitimation is the *inter*personal mode of realization that en-tails the requisite practice of transparency, choice, and ac-countability with respect to *my* participative signals of jus-tice (2AQ), *each* of *your* participative signals of justice (2.2AQ), and *each* of *their* participative signals of justice (3.2AQ), each comprised of its corresponding intentional signifieds (123.2UL), behavioral signifiers (123.2UR), cultural semantics (123.2LL), and social syntax (123.2LR) of justice, all of which appear to co-arise in the integral awareness (0) that *each* of *us* brings to *our* différantial action situation ($A > TCA \times 123.2_{AQ} = LJ < R$). It is the paradigm by which each of us (in)validates each of our relatively knowledgeable actions in terms of its *morality* and *legitimacy*, more-or-less consistent with each of our previously established structures of actionable know-ledge of *justice*.

- Confirmation is the *im*personal mode of realization that en-tails the requisite practice of transparency, choice, and ac-countability with respect to *my* representative symbols of truth (3AQ), *each* of *your* representative symbols of truth (2.3AQ), and *each* of *their* representative symbols of truth (3.3AQ), each comprised of its corresponding intentional sig-nifieds (123.3UL), behavioral signifiers (123.3UR), cultural se-mantics (123.3LL), and social syntax (123.3LR) of truth, all of which appear to co-arise in the integral awareness (0) that *each* of *us* brings to *our* différantial action situation ($A > TCA \times 123.3_{AQ} = CT < R$). It is the paradigm by which each of us (in)validates each of our relatively knowledgeable actions in terms of its *accuracy* and *cogency*, more-or-less consistent with each of our previously established structures of action-able knowledge of *truth*.

Within each of these triadic paradigms, we can further differen-tiate a *quadratic* pluralism oriented toward the integral/différantial realization of each of our claims to the *intentional*, *behavioral*, *meaning-ful*, and *functional* aspects of freedom, justice, and truth: (Fig. 21)

- Praxiological *intentionalism* entails the requisite practice of transparency, choice, and accountability with respect to *our* individual-subjective *intentions*, which includes *my* claims to *intentional* freedom, justice, and truth (123_{UL}), *your* claims to *intentional* freedom, justice, and truth (2.123_{UL}), and *his* or *her* claims to *intentional* freedom, justice, and truth (3.123_{UL}), all of which appear to co-arise in the integral awareness (0) that *each* of *us* brings to *our* différantial action situation ($A_{UL} = TCA \times 123.123_{UL} = ALC_{UL} = R_{UL}$). It is the paradigm by which each of us (in)validates the intrapersonal, interpersonal, and impersonal *intentions* or, more broadly, the personified, participative, and representative *signifieds* that each of us brings to the action situation, more-or-less consistent with our previously established structures of actionable knowledge.

- Praxiological *behavioralism* entails the requisite practice of transparency, choice, and accountability with respect to *our* individual-objective *behaviors*, which includes *my* claims to *behavioral* freedom, justice, and truth (123_{UR}), *your* claims to *behavioral* freedom, justice, and truth (2.123_{UR}), and *his* or *her* claims to *behavioral* freedom, justice, and truth (3.123_{UR}), all of which appear to co-arise in the integral awareness (0) that *each* of *us* brings to *our* différantial action situation ($A_{UR} = TCA \times 123.123_{UR} = ALC_{UR} = R_{UR}$). It is the paradigm by which each of us (in)validates the intrapersonal, interpersonal, and impersonal *behaviors* or, more broadly, the personified, participative, and representative *signifiers* that each of us brings to the action situation, more-or-less consistent with our previously established structures of actionable knowledge.

- Praxiological *interpretivism* entails the requisite practice of transparency, choice, and accountability with respect to *our* collective-subjective *meanings*, which includes *my* claims to *meaningful* freedom, justice, and truth (123_{LL}), *your* claims to *meaningful* freedom, justice, and truth (2.123_{LL}), and *his* or *her* claims to *meaningful* freedom, justice, and truth (3.123_{LL}), all of which appear to co-arise in the integral awareness (0) that *each* of *us* brings to *our* différantial action situation ($A_{LL} = TCA \times 123.123_{LL} = ALC_{LL} = R_{LL}$). It is the paradigm by which

each of us (in)validates the intrapersonal, interpersonal, and impersonal *meanings* or, more broadly, the personified, participative, and representative *semantics* that each of us brings to the action situation, more-or-less consistent with our previously established structures of actionable knowledge.

- Praxiological *functionalism* entails the requisite practice of transparency, choice, and accountability with respect to *our* collective-objective *functions*, which includes *my* claims to *functional* freedom, justice, and truth (123_{LR}), *your* claims to *functional* freedom, justice, and truth (2.123_{LR}), and *his* or *her* claims to *functional* freedom, justice, and truth (3.123_{LR}), all of which appear to co-arise in the integral awareness (0) that *each* of *us* brings to *our* différantial action situation ($A_{LR} = TCA \times 123.123_{LR} = ALC_{LR} = R_{LR}$). It is the paradigm by which each of us (in)validates the intrapersonal, interpersonal, and impersonal *functions* or, more broadly, the personified, participative, and representative *syntax* that each of us brings to the action situation, more-or-less consistent with our previously established structures of actionable knowledge.

Likewise, within each of these triadic paradigms, we can also differentiate a secondary quadratic—or perhaps, more accurately, a quadratic dyadic—pluralism oriented toward the integral/différantial realization of each of our claims to the *individual*, *collective*, *subjective*, and *objective* aspects of freedom, justice, and truth: (Fig. 21)

- Praxiological *individualism* entails the requisite practice of transparency, choice, and accountability with respect to *our* *individual* intentions-behaviors, which includes *my* claims to *intentional-behavioral* freedom, justice, and truth (123_{UL+UR}), *your* claims to *intentional-behavioral* freedom, justice, and truth (2.123_{UL+UR}), and *his* or *her* claims to *intentional-behavioral* freedom, justice, and truth (3.123_{UL+UR}), all of which appear to co-arise in the integral awareness (0) that *each* of *us* brings to *our* différantial action situation ($A_{UL+UR} = TCA \times 123.123_{UL+UR} = ALC_{UL+UR} = R_{UL+UR}$).
- Praxiological *collectivism* entails the requisite practice of transparency, choice, and accountability with respect to *our* *collective* meanings-functions, which includes *my* claims to

meaningful-functional freedom, justice, and truth (123$_{LL+LR}$), *your* claims to *meaningful-functional* freedom, justice, and truth (2.123$_{LL+LR}$), and *his* or *her* claims to *meaningful-functional* freedom, justice, and truth (3.123$_{LL+LR}$), all of which appear to co-arise in the integral awareness (0) that *each* of *us* brings to *our* différantial action situation (A$_{LL+LR}$ = TCA × 123.123$_{LL+LR}$ = ALC$_{LL+LR}$ = R$_{LL+LR}$).

- Praxiological *subjectivism* entails the requisite practice of transparency, choice, and accountability with respect to *our subjective* intentions-meanings, which includes *my* claims to *intentional-meaningful* freedom, justice, and truth (123$_{UL+LL}$), *your* claims to *intentional-meaningful* freedom, justice, and truth (2.123$_{UL+LL}$), and *his* or *her* claims to *intentional-meaningful* freedom, justice, and truth (3.123$_{UL+LL}$), all of which appear to co-arise in the integral awareness (0) that *each* of *us* brings to *our* différantial action situation (A$_{UL+LL}$ = TCA × 123.123$_{UL+LL}$ = ALC$_{UL+LL}$ = R$_{UL+LL}$).

- Praxiological *objectivism* entails the requisite practice of transparency, choice, and accountability with respect to *our objective* behaviors-functions, which includes *my* claims to *behavioral-functional* freedom, justice, and truth (123$_{UR+LR}$), *your* claims to *behavioral-functional* freedom, justice, and truth (2.123$_{UR+LR}$), and *his* or *her* claims to *behavioral-functional* freedom, justice, and truth (3.123$_{UR+LR}$), all of which appear to co-arise in the integral awareness (0) that *each* of *us* brings to *our* différantial action situation (A$_{UR+LR}$ = TCA × 123.123$_{UR+LR}$ = ALC$_{UR+LR}$ = R$_{UR+LR}$).

Therefore, within both of these alternative overlapping triadic quadratic formulations, we find twelve distinct complementary *primordial paradigms*, each of which might be further described as a diverse cluster of even more specific paradigms that share a single primordial perspective while enacting different empirical features of that perspective.[334] Nevertheless, regardless of where we place the differential emphasis on the primordial paradigms of this praxiological différantialism, TCA × TQP are the substantive/procedural features of the praxiological integralism by which this différantialism is derived and therefore enactive of each and every différantial

paradigm. Simply put, the meta-paradigmatic integralism of Awareness-in-Action always already infuses a constitutive paradigmatic différantialism that includes all the paradigms of Awareness-in-Action.

However, the ever-present, never-ending potential for *novelty* in human action, which applies to the *conduct* as well as the *content* of that action, means that each and every one of us will conduct each and every one of our respective paradigms in a different way simply due to the différantial integralism of the awareness-in-action we all nevertheless share. Even if all three of us agree, for example, to the definition of a paradigm designed to (dis)confirm the objective truth claims of our shared social context (123.3_{LR}) through a specific form of impersonal praxiological functionalism (CT^2_{LR}), each of us will enact that paradigm differently and in so doing create an actual paradigm that is, as we all might agree, at least marginally unique. The implications of this are interesting because it means that each and every one of us enacts a unique version of each and every pluralistic paradigm—and of the integral meta-paradigm itself—even when we all agree in theory on what that paradigm is and how to do it well. When we actually do it, each of our versions will be somewhat unique and therefore the realities enacted by *you*, *me*, and *her* will be somewhat unique as well—not necessarily enough to cause a conflict between *each* of *us*, but if not between *us*, then more likely between *us* and *them*. Hence, this praxiological différantialism only *begins* with the differentiation of the two sets of twelve primordial paradigms common to *all* of us. It then differentiates further to include the différantialism within, between, and beyond disciplinary and institutional boundaries common to *some* of us and ultimately differentiates enough to embrace *every* conceivable paradigm that might originate from *any* one of us—from any unique enactive *I* in the potentially infinite, yet always indeterminate derivatives of integral aperspectival/apractical awareness-in-action.

Therefore, due to the origin of praxiological integralism/différantialism in the unique enactive *I* whose purview, by virtue of TCA^∞ × TQP^∞, potentially includes each and every other unique enactive *I*—each of whom is the direct or indirect realizer of all the other perspectives that are realized within each and every action situa-

tion—it appears that *each* paradigm presupposes *every* paradigm with *any* number of derivative paradigms in the radically open-ended, yet reliably closed-minded meta-paradigm of Awareness-in-Action. Hence, *each* direct realization presupposes *every* direct realization with *any* number of indirect realizations in the potentially infinite, yet always indeterminate epistemological-ontological multiplicities of methodological Awareness-in-Action. Nevertheless, regardless of who is enacting these integral/différantial paradigms in all their potentially infinite diversity, $TCA^{\infty} \times TQP^{\infty}$ are the normative ideals apparently presupposed in every empirically real action situation, and therefore the essential premises by which each of our unique versions of integral/différantial praxiology should be guided. Simply put, the *empirical diversity* of praxiological integralism/différantialism in *real* action situations mutually implicates the *normative unity* of praxiological integralism/différantialism in the *ideal* action situation.

Awareness-in-Action may therefore be understood as a semiotic, pragmatic, and praxiological integralism/différantialism centered on a realization paradigm of paradigms that encompasses both the ever-present realization of the *integral awareness that we are* and the never-ending realization of the *différantial action that we do*—an *essentialist formulation* that facilitates a *comprehensivist application* honoring the full potential and variety of the human experience, including our experiences of the worlds beyond humanity.

(R)Evolutionary Criticalism

Finally, as a distinctively *critical* integral philosophy, Awareness-in-Action offers actionable insights into the subtle sources of deception, distortion, coercion, corruption, dysfunction, and disruption that can manifest at all degrees of depth and scale in all the forms and fields of human action. It does so by virtue of the empirical/normative complementarity between the *context-immanent actualization* of any particular action-in-awareness and the *context-transcendent idealization* of all universal action-in-awareness. More precisely, human action is always already *critical* as well as *integral*, due

to the creative tension between *what is* and *what could*, *should*, and *would be*, if only *real* actions in all their empirical diversity (A^N = TCA^N × TQP^N = ALC^N = R^N) conformed to the normative unity of *ideal* action (A^∞ = TCA^∞ × TQP^∞ = ALC^∞ = R^∞). Awareness-in-Action can therefore be described as a *critical integralism*, which captures the idea of an inherently *critical* meta-paradigm infusing an otherwise *integral* meta-paradigm, thus grounding its essentialist/comprehensivist aspirations in the unavoidably (r)evolutionary challenge of human action in real-world contexts.[335]

The term *critical*, as used in contemporary critical theory, generally refers to a class of social scientific theories and practices that share a similar commitment to the interdisciplinary critique of *what is* from the perspective of *what might be*. More specifically, in the wake of Habermas's early formulation,[336] critical social science can be usefully described as a normative method of *critical-reflective intervention* that transcends, yet includes the traditional social science methods of *empirical-analytic explanation*, which is oriented toward the *functional* understanding of society in its *objective* forms, and *historical-hermeneutic interpretation*, which is oriented toward the *meaningful* understanding of society in its *subjective* forms.

Within the society-wide object-domain of critical theory, common issues of concern to critical theorists have included:

- ideology, false consciousness, projection, and coercion in social relations;[337]
- distorted and dysfunctional communication in groups and organizations,[338] and in socio-cultural evolution;[339]
- crisis tendencies in advanced capitalist democracies, particularly those rooted in lifeworld/system conflicts;[340]
- dysfunction in structural-hierarchical human development, including translational distortions within each level and transformational demands between lower and higher levels;[341]
- critical evaluation of critical theory itself as a necessary part of its application;[342]
- critical reflexivity and community-based practice of the social science practitioner;[343] and

- methodological, epistemological, and ontological presuppositions of social and other sciences.[344]

While there is no single, definitive formulation of critical theory, Geuss's concise synopsis based on the early work of Habermas and his predecessors at the Frankfurt School[345] offers a meta-theoretical articulation sufficient for our present purposes. "A critical theory is a very complicated conceptual object; it is addressed to a particular group of agents in a particular society and aims at being their 'self-consciousness' in a process of successful emancipation and enlightenment. A process of emancipation and enlightenment is a transition from an initial state of bondage, delusion, and frustration to a final state of freedom, knowledge, and satisfaction."[346] Although Habermas seems to use *emancipation* more prominently than *enlightenment*,[347] Geuss contends that both terms have an interdependent meaning across the multiple sources of critical theory. As he clarifies, "various texts inform us that 'emancipation and enlightenment' refer to a social transition from an initial state to a final state which has the following properties:

a. The initial state is one *both* of false consciousness and error, *and* 'unfree existence.'
b. In the initial state false consciousness and unfree existence are inherently connected so that agents can be liberated from one only if they are also at the same time freed from the other.
c. The 'unfree existence' from which the agents in the initial state suffer is a form of *self-imposed* coercion; their false consciousness is a kind of *self-delusion*.
d. The coercion from which the agents suffer in the initial state is one whose 'power' or 'objectivity' derives *only* from the fact that the agents do not realize that it is self-imposed.
e. The final state is one in which the agents are free of false consciousness—they have been enlightened—and free of self-imposed coercion—they have been emancipated."[348,349]

The emphasis on *self-imposed* deception and coercion that we find in critical theory does not, in my interpretation, preclude the simultaneous existence of deception and coercion from others with

whom one is living and working. As I see it, the *intra*personal forms of deception and coercion are *internalized*, likely via the socialized *me* that is habitually (con)fused with the enactive *I*, from the *externalized* forms of deception and coercion—both conscious and deliberate as well as subconscious and inadvertent—that one encounters in his or her *inter*personal and *im*personal relationships. Nevertheless, once internalized through decades of far-less-than-ideal socialization, a particular rationalized habit of self-imaging/world-viewing that is mistakenly considered to be valid and defended as such against all reasonable challenges is indeed a form of self-imposed deception and coercion that is best revealed and revised through a practice of well-informed, well-facilitated mutual, reflexive, différantial, yet integral *realization*, which is the distinctively *critical* aim of Awareness-in-Action.

Continuing his meta-theoretical synopsis, Geuss contends that "a typical critical theory… will be composed of three main constituent parts:

a. A part which shows that a transition from the present state of society… to some proposed final state is '*objectively*' or 'theoretically' *possible*, i.e. which shows:

  i. that the proposed final state is inherently possible i.e. that given the present level of development of the forces of production it is possible for society to function and reproduce itself in this proposed state;

  ii. that it is possible to transform the present state into the proposed final state (by means of specified institutional or other changes).

b. A part which shows that the transition from the present state to the proposed final state is '*practically necessary*,' i.e. that:

  i. the present state is one of reflectively unacceptable frustration, bondage, and illusion: (a) the present social arrangements cause pain, suffering, and frustration; (b) the agents in the society only accept the present arrangements and the suffering they entail because they hold a particular world-picture; (c) that world-picture is not reflectively acceptable to the agents, i.e. it is one they ac-

quired only because they were in conditions of coercion;

ii. the proposed final state will be one which will lack the illusions and unnecessary coercion and frustration of the present state; the proposed final state will be one in which it will be easier for the agents to realize their true interests.

c. A part which asserts that the transition from the present state to the proposed final state can come about only if the agents adopt the critical theory as their 'self-consciousness' and act on it."[350]

As this description makes perfectly clear, the special province of critical theory is that creative tension between the *empirical actuality of what is*—such as a present state of bondage, delusion, and frustration—and the *normative ideality of what might be*—such as a final state of freedom, knowledge, and satisfaction—within any specific context of human action. However, a careful reading also reveals a decidedly *substantive* and potentially metaphysical bias toward the *content* of real/ideal human action that stops short of differentiating the corresponding *procedural conduct* of real/ideal human action that can account for the inherently active transition from *what is* to *what might be*. Without such a post-metaphysical differentiation, the critical theory is hampered by an over-emphasis on the substantive critique that has already been conducted by the theorist and an under-emphasis on the procedural critique that will have to be conducted by those practitioners charged with making this critical transition in real-world situations. Perhaps with some irony due to the all-too-common tendencies toward instrumental rationality so well documented by later critical theorists, a critical theory that is heavy on communicated substance and light on communicative procedure is more likely to be *rationalized* in counter-productive monological action than *justified* in adaptive dialogical action. As Argyris has discovered in real-world communities of practice, the widely-enforced, yet self-imposed forms of deception and coercion characteristic of instrumental rationalization are bolstered by pernicious defensive routines that make it normatively inappropriate for members to even discuss the possibility that the critique in question might be valid for their community.[351] Hence, in my view, the ab-

sence of potential enlightenment and emancipation are due to institutionalized rationalizations of deception, coercion, and defensiveness that require for their resolution the (re)institutionalization of requisite procedures of transparency, choice, and accountability.

In contrast to a purely *substantive* form of criticalism focused on the *content* of real/ideal action, in which critique is limited to a *declarative imperative* to adopt a contextualized critical theory of reality, Awareness-in-Action is also a *procedural* form of criticalism focused on the *conduct* of real/ideal action, in which critique is led by an *emergent imperative* to engage a contextualized critical paradigm of realization ($A = TCA \times TQP = ALC = R$). Additionally, this particular formulation of substantive/procedural criticalism is thoroughly integral/différantial, as it encompasses both the absolute realization of the integral awareness that we are—hence, the *integral enlightenment* and *emancipation* that is nowhere yet now-here—and the relative realization of the différantial action that we do—hence, the *différantial enlightenment* and *emancipation* that is our ultimate destiny. Because the *absolute* realization of the integral awareness that we are is often only *relatively realized* in the différantial action that we do, it is often only *relatively idealized* in the form of an *ultimate* realization (R^∞) that can only ever signify in spacial-temporal form the absolute realization (R^0) always already beyond the relativity of dimensional-durational awareness-in-action. This appears to give rise to the distinctively *critical* tension between, on the one hand, the *empirical* realization of a particular, content-rich, context-immanent, perspectival/practical awareness-in-action—the action situation that is *already realized*—and, on the other hand, the *normative* realization of a universal, content-free, context-transcendent, aperspectival/apractical awareness-in-action—the action situation that is *always idealized*—both of which are *always already* aspects of our *requisite* realization.

With these formulations in mind, we can carefully reconstruct Geuss's outline of a critical theory by redefining the *present state* as the empirically justifiable realization of human action in some specific real-world context ($A^N = TCA^N \times TQP^N = ALC^N = R^N$) and the *proposed final state* as a credible approximation to the normatively justifiable realization of human action in that same real-world con-

text ($A^{\infty} = TCA^{\infty} \times TQP^{\infty} = ALC^{\infty} = R^{\infty}$). Once again, in my view, human awareness-in-action is always already *critical* due to the creative tension between *what is* and *what could*, *should*, and *would be*, if only *real* actions (A^N) conformed to the presuppositions of *ideal* action (A^{∞}). Hence, we can see in the three parts of a critical theory outlined above a general account of the creative tension between the present state of *what is* and the proposed final state of *what could be* in part a, *what should be* in part b, and *what would be* in part c. Alternatively, we might like to re-phrase this more personally in terms of the creative tension between the present state of *who we are* and the proposed final state of *who we could be* in part a, *who we should be* in part b, and *who we would be* in part c. Furthermore, we can see at least a substantive suggestion of the corresponding critical paradigms of impersonal *(dis)confirmation* in part a, interpersonal *(de)legitimation* in part b, and intrapersonal *(in)authentication* in part c by which we could, should, and would transform, through mutual, reflexive, différantial, yet integral critique, our conduct and, thus, also the content of that conduct. In doing so, we would be mindfully practicing Awareness-in-Action as our self-consciousness in a process of *integral/différantial* emancipation and enlightenment—a(n) (r)evolutionary meta-paradigm of integral/différantial *realization*—not as a metaphysical meta-theory to be discussed and deferred indefinitely, but as a post-metaphysical meta-paradigm to be enacted and evaluated immediately in real-world action situations.

Consistent with this reconstruction, deliberate applications of Awareness-in-Action may be described as critical integral *interventions* fallibilistically oriented toward the requisite realization of situational awareness-in-action, within and beyond the context of the semiotic, pragmatic, and praxiological capacity constraints previously established in the course of that awareness-in-action. As I use the term, *intervention* is quite simply the mindful practice of Awareness-in-Action through which we cannot help but act in ways that may present challenges to those with whom we are interacting, particularly if our actions are designed to rectify what we regard as insufficient degrees of transparency, choice, and accountability in established institutions or disciplines whose members may prefer to maintain the status quo. Even the most conscientious efforts to create

actionable knowledge of freedom, justice, and truth—*enlightenment*—that, in turn, supports knowledgeable action that is more free, just, and true—*emancipation*—are typically resisted, often vehemently, by those who benefit most in terms of power and wealth from whatever lack of freedom, justice, and truth others are forced, or allowed, to endure. However, without denying its (r)evolutionary implications and applications, it is important to remember that Awareness-in-Action is primarily about bringing more awareness to our own actions and creating conditions in which others may do the same so that we may all realize more of the ideal potential we presuppose with every action we take.

Bearing in mind the mutual, reflexive, and différantial nature of these critical integral interventions, we mindful practitioners of Awareness-in-Action will recognize our own substantive and procedural fallibility and, hence, the need for (in)authentication, (de)legitimation, and (dis)confirmation of any such intervention—and of the realization paradigm itself—as essential features of that intervention and the very means to our own situational realization. Therefore, *if* the underlying cause of the interdependent crises afflicting human civilization—whether specifically construed as political, economic, social, or ecological in nature—can be more generally construed as the conspicuous disregard for requisite degrees of transparency, choice, and accountability with respect to the triadic quadratic perspectivism in challenging action situations, *then* the most effective (r)evolutionary responses to these crises would be critical integral interventions to facilitate our requisite realization of the relatively unfree, unjust, untrue, and, therefore, unreal conditions in which we have, unwittingly, been living and working.[352]

Awareness-in-Action may therefore be understood as a *critical integralism* attuned to the interdependent political, economic, social, and ecological challenges of our time. Thus, *if* we want to realize more freedom, justice, and truth in our lives and in the lives of those around us, *then* we should engage in the requisite practice of transparency, choice, and accountability with respect to the triadic quadratic perspectivism of challenging action situations.

CONCLUSION

In lieu of a more traditional conclusion in which I would summarize what I have already presented in the preceding chapters, I think it preferable to make an object of all that has been presented and invite some attention to the justification considerations at least implied in the formulation and presentation of Awareness-in-Action. If, as I have proposed, *the reality of a declarative is the imperative to realize it*, then the reality of my proposed realization meta-paradigm, Awareness-in-Action, should be justifiable by recourse to some exemplary procedure by which you, the reader, might realize for yourself the substantive reality of the whole hypothesis, including the claims to truth, justice, and freedom either expressed or implied in this book. Beyond the justification of *integral reconstruction* that I painstakingly demonstrated in the course of writing this book and that you necessarily engaged in the course of reading this book, there remains much potential for wider dialogues of *confirmation*, *legitimation*, and *authentication* within the pluralistic communities of scholar-practitioners committed to the continuing evolution of integral theory, critical theory, and action science. Therefore, the very formulation of Awareness-in-Action provides the normative procedures for its own situational verification or falsification and, hence, its own ultimate realization—$A^\infty = TCA^\infty \times TQP^\infty = ALC^\infty = R^\infty$—as any formulation of action science, critical theory, or integral theory very well should.

Furthermore, given that I have intentionally formulated Awareness-in-Action as a realization paradigm of paradigms, *the imperative to realize these purported realities* can also include mindful engagement

in a paradigmatic application of Awareness-in-Action—that is, the meta-practice of transparency, choice, and accountability with respect to the meta-theory of triadic quadratic perspectivism—in any form or field of human awareness-in-action. Any such critical integral intervention within, between, or beyond established disciplinary and institutional paradigms can proceed with the secondary aim of either verifying or falsifying the propositions of Awareness-in-Action while engaged in the primary task of paradigmatic reconstruction guided by these provisionally validated propositions. After all, if my hypothesis is something less than correct, or perhaps deeply flawed in some way that awaits discovery in the midst of application, then you will be able to make a significant contribution to what I think we can both agree is a worthwhile, yet unfinished project.

Finally, given that the essential premises of Awareness-in-Action are based on what I hypothesize to be the essential presuppositions of the awareness-in-action already being practiced by each and every one of us, *the imperative to realize these purported realities* requires nothing so much as bringing a more contemplative awareness to your own situational action, just as I brought to mine prior to making these discoveries. You simply pay close attention to *who you are* and *how you act* in various situations—pay attention, that is, to the perspectives and practices emerging in every situational action-in-awareness—and see if you can discover for yourself some of the fundamental presuppositions in your own awareness-in-action. After all, if my hypothesis is correct, then you too will realize in your own active awareness the latent potential for integral aperspectival/apractical awareness-in-action generally consistent with my particular formulation for Awareness-in-Action.

If nothing else, bringing more awareness to your own actions and creating conditions in which others may do the same should help us all to realize more of the ideal potential we presuppose with every action we take.

He who fails to keep turning
the wheel thus set in motion
has damaged the working of the world
and has wasted his life, Arjuna.

But the man who delights in the Self,
who feels pure contentment and finds
perfect peace in the Self—
for him, there is no need to act.

Without concern for results,
perform the necessary action;
surrendering all attachments,
accomplish life's highest good.

~ Bhagavad Gita

APPENDICES

— APPENDIX A —

THE TRI/QUAD FALLACY

As presented in Part I, a central feature of Ken Wilber's *all-quadrant*, *all-level*, or AQAL, formulation of integral theory is the particular way he equates and conflates the *quadratic perspectives—intentional*, *behavioral*, *cultural*, *social*—for which his meta-theory is best known with the *triadic perspectives—first-person*, *second-person*, *third-person*—exemplified by the meta-theory of Jürgen Habermas. In the series of books and articles published from 1995 through 2007, including the earliest and latest presentations of AQAL, Wilber makes it perfectly clear that he considers the quadratic perspectives and the triadic perspectives to be identical and interchangeable, with:

- the *first-person* perspective (1) being identical to his *intentional* perspective, the conflated form of which he labels with the pronoun *I* in his upper-left (UL) quadrant;
- the *second-person* perspective (2) being identical to his *cultural* perspective, the conflated form of which he labels with the pronoun *We* in his lower-left (LL) quadrant, noting that this first-person plural pronoun is intended to represent the relationship between first-person *I* and second-person *You*; and
- the *third-person* perspective (3) being identical to his combined *behavioral* and *social* perspectives, the conflated forms of which he labels with the pronoun *It* in his upper-right (UR) quadrant and *Its* in his lower-right (LR) quadrant.[354]

I refer to this essential feature of the AQAL formulation as the *tri/quad conflation* and offer Figure A1 as an illustration.

Figure A1. Wilber's Tri/Quad Conflation

In a complete departure from Wilber's tri/quad conflation, I recognize Habermas's *triadic perspectives* and Wilber's *quadratic perspectives* as two entirely differentiated, yet nevertheless tightly integrated, multi-perspectival frames of reference for human action, development, and evolution. As I see it, *each* of the first-, second-, and third-person perspectives has within it *all four* intentional, behavioral, cultural, and social perspectives, which are identified and experienced by each one of us from within each of the three personal perspectives we use to frame our actions in our worlds. I therefore reconstructed in Part I a *triadic quadratic perspectivism* (123.123$_{AQ}$) based on 12 primordial perspectives: (Fig. A2)

- a *first-person, all-quadrant* perspective of *freedom* (i.e., *beauty*), denoted 1$_{AQ}$, signified by the singular-subjective pronoun *I* in the *intentional* quadrant, or 1$_{UL}$, the singular-objective pronoun *me* in the *behavioral* quadrant, or 1$_{UR}$, the plural-

subjective pronoun *we* in the *cultural* quadrant, or 1LL, and the plural-objective pronoun *us* in the *social* quadrant, or 1LR;

- a *second-person, all-quadrant* perspective of *justice* (i.e., *goodness*), denoted 2AQ, signified by the singular-subjective pronoun *you* in the *intentional* quadrant, or 2UL, the singular-objective pronoun *you* in the *behavioral* quadrant, or 2UR, the plural-subjective pronoun *you* (or occasionally *we*) in the *cultural* quadrant, or 2LL, and the plural-objective pronoun *you* (or occasionally *us*) in the *social* quadrant, or 2LR; and

- a *third-person, all-quadrant* perspective of *truth*, denoted 3AQ, signified by the singular-subjective pronouns *he*, *she*, or *it* in the *intentional* quadrant, or 3UL, the singular-objective pronouns *him*, *her*, or *it* in the *behavioral* quadrant, or 3UR, the plural-subjective pronouns *they* or *these* (or occasionally *you* or *we*) in the *cultural* quadrant, or 3LL, and the plural-objective pronouns *them* or *those* (or occasionally *you* or *us*) in the *social* quadrant, or 3LR.

As I demonstrated in Part I, triadic quadratic perspectivism differentiates and integrates these complementary meta-theories toward a more integral/différantial semiotics, pragmatics, and praxiology consistent with the primordial perspectives of our situational awareness-in-action.

However, as an unintended consequence of my discovery, the presence of triadic quadratic perspectivism reveals what appears to be a fundamental problem with Wilber's formulation, thereby raising the disconcerting prospect of a *tri/quad fallacy* at the heart of AQAL. The reason the tri/quad fallacy is a worthwhile critique is because the tri/quad conflation is an essential feature of AQAL and one of the most significant contributions Wilber has made to the wider field of integral theory. It is the conceptual lynchpin that purportedly integrates in a very particular way two enormous bodies of philosophical thought, one *triadic* and primarily Habermasian and the other *quadratic* (and therefore also *dyadic*) and primarily Wilberian, into what may be justifiably described as the most comprehensive and popular version of integral theory yet created. The ontological, epistemological, and methodological location, so to speak, of the triadic perspectives in relation to the quadratic perspec-

tives should be one of the more significant lines of inquiry within the Wilberian integral community, if not also the wider field of integral theory.[355,356] If Wilber's tri/quad conflated AQAL is not the correct way to integrate these two distinct meta-theories and triadic quad-ratic perspectivism is correct, then all of Wilber's teachings that hinge on this tri/quad conflation—such as his triadic or quadratic reinterpretations of significant ideas from other fields—will need to be reconstructed to conform to triadic quadratic perspectivism. Much to everyone's benefit, such integral reconstructions would acknowledge the major difference between the triadic and quadratic meta-theories and use that difference to enhance them both in ways that the tri/quad conflated AQAL has always precluded.

Figure A2. Triadic Quadratic Perspectivism – N$^{\text{th}}$ Derivative

At the risk of digressing at the outset, I feel it is important to note that I do not typically engage in significant critique of the source material that I simultaneously incorporate into my own reconstructive proposals. It seems unnecessarily argumentative to

critique, for just one example, Habermas's triadic perspectives due to the fact that they fail to differentiate the quadratic perspectives later identified by Wilber and subsequently integrated by me into triadic quadratic perspectivism. Likewise, I would find no need to critique the absence of the triadic perspectives if Wilber's AQAL had been presented as a purely quadratic meta-theory with no tri/quad conflation. It is only because Wilber's formulation attempts to integrate the triadic and the quadratic perspectives in a manner contrary to mine that I would even consider clarifying the differences by way of critique. Furthermore, it is only because Wilber's tri/quad conflation is so essential to his AQAL formulation and all its purportedly integral, or post-postmodern, applications to other fields of theory and practice that I would invest the effort in such a rigorous critique. After all, if the tri/quad conflated AQAL is not the correct way to articulate the primordial perspectives of human awareness-in-action and triadic quadratic perspectivism is correct, then each and every attempt to apply AQAL in some field of theory or practice is actually preventing people from realizing in their own active awareness the primordial perspectival meta-theory of TQP that is, nevertheless, always already implicitly active in those action situations. Hence, I offer this initial statement on the tri/quad fallacy with the caveat that it can only be understood in the context of, and therefore should only be read after reading, at the very least, Part I of the present work. In what follows, I repeat *none* of what I presented in the work to which this critique is appended.

Formulation & Interpretation

Reviewing Wilber's tri/quad conflated perspectivism of Figure A1 in light of the alternative offered by the triadic quadratic perspectivism of Figure A2, one central problem becomes immediately apparent. The tri/quad conflation is inconsistent with the actual system of interlocking personal pronouns at the preconscious root of pragmatic human action, a system of personal identifiers that in all likelihood evolved in conjunction with the corresponding personal perspectives that human beings developed the capacity to take as a

necessary pre-condition for conscious interaction. In TQP, these personal pronouns are recognized as the *primordial signs* we use to identify the various facets of reality, or *primordial referents*, we experience through the *primordial perspectives* of our situational awareness-in-action. The trouble with Wilber's tri/quad conflation begins with his explicit equation and conflation of first-, second-, and third-person perspectives with, respectively, his UL, LL, and UR+LR quadrants, with little justification for this allocation beyond repeated assertions of its validity. The trouble mounts when it becomes clear that the tri/quad conflation distorts each of the three personal perspectives to such a degree that they are practically unrecognizable, constraining what TQP reveals to be fully quadratic personal perspectives—1_{AQ}, 2_{AQ}, 3_{AQ}—with which each one of us identifies as an essential pre-condition for everyday action in real-world situations to just one or two quadrants each—UL, LL, UR+LR—with no recognition of the inherent contradiction. Apart from the obvious confusion arising from such a formulation, it begs the question of *whose* perspectives are these intentional (UL), behavioral (UR), cultural (LL), and social (LR) perspectives if not specifically *mine* (1_{AQ}), *yours* (2_{AQ}), or *his* (3_{AQ})? *Who*, in Wilber's view, is enacting these four domains of reality and raising and redeeming the corresponding reality claims? Is this *originary* or *enactive* perspective represented somewhere in these *enacted* perspectives, or is it hovering above the lighted page, looking at the multi-perspectival map from some presumed meta-perspective that is inescapably uni-perspectival?

If we reverse the tri/quad conflation and re-consider AQAL as if Wilber had never attempted to incorporate this dimension of Habermas's triadic meta-theory, we can still appreciate its great strength. For even after such a deconstruction, a pure quadratic form of AQAL, relieved of the distortions of the tri/quad conflation, offers impressive explanatory and interpretive power in the multi-disciplinary realm of human development and evolution. After all, Wilber's inductive synthesis of scores of distinct multi-level theories of development and evolution is not necessarily diminished by the reversal of the tri/quad conflation.[357] For the essence of AQAL, what really distinguishes it from so many of its constituent dyadic and monadic theories, is the mutual-causal correspondence among *all* the

quadrants at *each* level of existence, indeed at each *moment* of exist-ence, such that every occasion manifests as, and can be understood in terms of, its interdependent intentional-behavioral-cultural-social aspects. This is why, in Part I, I presented AQAL in two steps, be-ginning with a purely quadratic formulation that might be appreci-ated on its own merits, followed by the tri/quad conflation that, for Wilber, is always presented as an essential feature of the quadratic formulation. After reversing the tri/quad conflation, it is quite ap-parent that this pure quadratic form of AQAL would be a meta-theory of *anyone* and *everyone*, *anything* and *everything*, consistent with the *indefinite quadratic perspectivism* (X_{AQ}) of Figure A3. This X_{AQ} perspectivism can only be understood in terms of triadic quadratic perspectivism (123_{AQ}), because it is, by definition, *not triadic* in that it reduces the fully triadic intentional (123_{UL}), behavioral (123_{UR}), cultural (123_{LL}), and social (123_{LR}) perspectives and, therefore, *speci-fied identities*, to indefinite perspectives and, therefore, *generalized identities*. Instead of 123_{AQ}, it is X_{AQ}.

Figure A3. Indefinite Quadratic Perspectivism

Unfortunately, Wilber has never presented AQAL as a purely quadratic meta-theory relieved of the distortions caused by the tri/quad conflation. All of Wilber's presentations of AQAL, from his first in 1995 to his latest in 2007,[358] include the tri/quad conflation and thereby expressly, pre-emptively contradict any *indefinite* (X) interpretation or application of the quadrants (AQ) or levels (AL). For Wilber, the tri/quad conflation *is* the AQ in AQAL and therefore precludes any X_{AQAL} formulation, interpretation, or application. Nevertheless, Wilber's standard visual illustrations of AQAL, like Figures 3 and 4, are actually X_{AQAL} maps of intentional-behavioral-cultural-social levels of existence. Look again at Figure A4 below, which has become *the* iconic image of AQAL, and really think about it. This model actually signifies nothing other than Wilber's hypoth-esized levels of existence attributable to *anyone* and *everyone*, *any-thing* and *everything*. All *specified* identities for individuals and collec-tives that can be signified by first-, second-, and third-person (123) pronouns such as *I*, *you*, and *he*, and *we*, *you*, and *they*, have been reduced to *generalized* identities that can only be signified by indefi-nite (X) pronouns such as *anyone* and *everyone*, *each* and *all*, despite Wilber's claim that *I* am in the UL, *we* are in the LL, *it* is in the UR, and all the other *its* are in the LR. In Figure A4, all *personal specifics* that would be signified by 123_{AQ} pronouns in TQP have been re-duced to *indefinite generics* that can only be signified by X_{AQ} pro-nouns.

It appears that Wilber does not realize this because he consist-ently asserts in the text surrounding these illustrations that the tri/quad conflation simultaneously renders this X_{AQ} model as genu-inely 123 based on what I regard as the mistaken interpretation that:

- X_{UL}, which is *anyone's* individual-subjectivity, equates with an undifferentiated 1, which is the entire *first-person* or *in-trapersonal* perspective;
- X_{LL}, which is *everyone's* collective-subjectivity (or even just *anyone's* collective-subjectivity), equates with an undifferen-tiated 2, which is the entire *second-person* or *interpersonal* per-spective; and
- X_{UR+LR}, which is *anyone's* individual-objectivity and *everyone's* collective-objectivity (or *anyone's* collective-objectivity),

equates with an undifferentiated 3, which is the entire *third-person* or *impersonal* perspective.

Figure A4. Wilber's All-Quadrants All-Levels Integral Theory

If these equations were valid, then this purely quadratic illustration, Figure A4, would be capable of framing, without confusion or contradiction, the simplest of triadic action situations, such as that in which *I* am having a conversation with *you* about *his* level of consciousness. According to the tri/quad conflation, the first-person *I* should be framed in the intentional UL quadrant, the second-person *you* should be framed in the cultural LL quadrant, and the third-person *he* should be framed in the combined behavioral UR and social LR quadrants, while *all three* of *us* tetra-arise through *these four* quadrants at some level of existence. Now, is that what Figure A4 appears to be illustrating? I think not. Clearly, the tri/quad conflation renders incoherent even the simplest of perspectival interpretations

of normal, everyday action situations. Neither *I*, nor *you*, nor *he* can be found anywhere in this model, particularly if *we* are *all* supposed to occupy it simultaneously yet within the specific quadrants to which *each* of *us* has been restricted by the tri/quad conflation essential to AQAL.

Notwithstanding Wilber's inadvertent visual illustration of what can be reinterpreted as a purely quadratic and useful version of AQAL, it is important to recognize that this indefinite formulation of a deconstructed AQAL, X_{AQAL}, has *never* been presented by Wilber because AQAL has *always* included the tri/quad conflation as an essential feature of its formulation. One of the more tedious implications of this fact is that the specific quadratic perspectives rendered triadic within triadic quadratic perspectivism (123_{AQ}) are not the same as the quadrants in AQAL, because Wilber's definitions of these quadrants have always been conflated with the definitions of the corresponding first-, second-, or third-person perspectives according to the tri/quad conflation. For example, the cultural perspectives in my TQP and X formulations (123_{LL} and X_{LL}) are not the same as the cultural LL quadrant in AQAL, because the cultural LL quadrant in AQAL conflates the entire second-person perspective, which in TQP is a fully quadratic 2_{AQ}, into the definition of what would otherwise be a pure X_{LL} in the absence of the tri/quad conflation. While TQP differentiates and integrates the intrapersonal (1_{LL}), interpersonal (2_{LL}), and impersonal (3_{LL}) perspectives on the collective-subjective cultural perspective, and while the X formulation then reduces these 123_{LL} perspectives to an indefinite X_{LL}, AQAL conflates the unacknowledged X_{LL} with the unacknowledged fully quadratic interpersonal perspective, 2_{AQ}, and only this interpersonal perspective, in a manner that distorts the meaning of both and renders the conflated perspectives, $X_{LL} = 2_{AQ}$, inconsistent with the cultural perspective in either its 123_{LL} or its X_{LL} formulations. Therefore, it is inaccurate to infer that TQP is simply a 123_{AQ} elaboration of some pre-existing X_{AQ} formulation of AQAL, because no such X_{AQ} formulation of AQAL has ever existed prior to the formulation of TQP. The reason for any confusion, however, is none other than the tri/quad conflation.

From AQAL v1 to AQAL v2

In what appears to be an effort to address the unacknowledged X$_{AQ}$ reductionism secretly lurking in the original AQAL formulation, notwithstanding the contradictory claims of the tri/quad conflation that impair what could have been a useful, though monological, X$_{AQAL}$ formulation without delivering a genuinely dialogical 123$_{AQAL}$ synthesis, Wilber has in recent years augmented AQAL by differentiating what he terms the *insides* and *outsides* of the four individual quadrants, as illustrated in Figure 5.[359] He says that, the easiest way to understand this:

> …is to start with what are known as the quadrants, which suggest that any occasion possesses an inside and an outside, as well as an individual and a collective, dimension. Taken together, this gives us the inside and the outside of the individual and the collective. These are often represented as I, you/we, it, and its (a variation on 1st, 2nd, and 3rd-person pronouns; another variation is the Good, the True, and the Beautiful; or art, morals, and science, and so on— namely, the objective truth of exterior science, or it/its; the subjective truth of aesthetics, or I; and the collective truth of ethics, or thou/we)…. If you imagine any of the phenomena (or holons) in the various quadrants, you can look at them from their own inside or outside. This gives you 8 primordial perspectives—the inside and the outside view of a holon in any of the 4 quadrants.… We inhabit these 8 spaces, these zones, these lifeworlds, as practical realities.[360]

Thus, as the above passage clearly states, this dyadic quadratic version of AQAL asserts the existence of perspectives for the *inside* and the *outside* of the *inside* and the *outside* of the *individual* and the *collective*, and, by virtue of the tri/quad conflation just invoked, it simultaneously asserts the existence of perspectives for the *inside* and the *outside* of the *first-*, *second-*, and *third-person*, which are, respectively, the *inside* of the *individual*, the *inside* of the *collective*, and the *outsides* of the *individual* and the *collective*.

If *we* really do, as Wilber claims, inhabit the eight perspectives of Figure A5 as practical realities, then where am *I*, where are *you*, and where is *he*? *Whose* perspectives are these dual intentional, behavioral, cultural, and social perspectives if not specifically *mine*, *yours*, or

his? *Who* is enacting these eight domains of reality and raising and
redeeming the corresponding reality claims? Is this *originary* or
enactive perspective represented somewhere in these *enacted* perspec-
tives, or is it hovering above the lighted page, looking at the multi-
perspectival map from some presumed meta-perspective that is
inescapably uni-perspectival? If *the meaning of an assertion is the
means of its enactment*, as Wilber asserts in his proposal for *integral
post-metaphysics*,[361] then what is the means of enactment, the action
we can take, that will disclose the meaning, indeed the existence, of
these tri/quad conflated, dyadic quadratic perspectives of AQAL?
Despite Wilber's illustrations of these proposed tri/quad conflated,
dyadic quadratic perspectives throughout much of his latest book, I
have found no coherent answers to any of these questions.[362]

Figure A5. Wilber's AQAL Zones

These dyadic quadratic perspectives might be reasonably inter-
preted as Wilber's attempt to differentiate a more genuinely *partici-
pative* perspective as the *inside* view of the quadrants from the origi-

nal *observational* perspective as the *outside* view of the quadrants, notwithstanding his prior claim that the original AQAL already framed the observational perspective with the *exterior right-hand* (RH) quadrants and the participative perspective with the *interior left-hand* (LH) quadrants. This interpretation would entail the fabrication of a dyadic quadratic version of the indefinite pronoun such as the one depicted in Figure A6, in which *anyone* and *everyone* who *participates* in quadratic development and evolution is also *observable* as *anything* and *everything* that develops and evolves.

Figure A6. Wilber's AQAL Zones
Indefinite Participant / Observer Interpretation

In a less logical variation of the indefinite participant / observer interpretation, these dyadic quadratic perspectives might be interpreted as Wilber's inadvertent incorporation of a fully quadratic *first-person* perspective—*I-me-we-us*—as the *inside* view of the quadrants and a fully quadratic *third-person* perspective—*he-him-they-them*, *she-her-they-them*, or *it-it-these-those*—as the *outside* view of the

quadrants, which would obviously beg the question of where we can find a genuine *second-person* quadratic perspective. Given that Wilber has never published such a *quadratic pronoun* in any first-, second-, or third-person form, this interpretation, depicted in Figure A7, would seem to be less likely than the indefinite participant / observer interpretation. That said, Wilber does make repeated reference throughout his latest book to the *insides* and *outsides* of each of the quadrants using generic *first-person* and *third-person* notation,[363] respectively, thereby providing just enough support for this interpretation to guarantee confusion when considered in the context of the contradictory tri/quad conflation he invokes while introducing this model in the passage just quoted.[364]

Figure A7. Wilber's AQAL Zones
First-Person Inside / Third-Person Outside Interpretation

In a still less likely, but nevertheless plausible, interpretation, these dyadic quadratic perspectives might be interpreted as Wilber's inadvertent incorporation of a fully quadratic *first-person* perspec-

tive—*I-me-we-us*—as the *interior* (LH) quadrants and a fully quadrat-ic *third-person* perspective—*he-him-they-them*, *she-her-they-them*, or *it-it-these-those*—as the *exterior* (RH) quadrants, which would obviously beg the question, once again, of where we can find a genuine *second-person* quadratic perspective. This interpretation, depicted in Figure A8, if it has any validity, would seem to be not only inadvertent on Wilber's part, but rather well disguised throughout his text, with no shortage of perspectival notation to contradict it in favor of the previous interpretation. Still, it might help to explain his selection and allocation of various zone-specific methods in his *integral meth-odological pluralism*, such as the thoroughly *impersonal*, *third-person* methods of *autopoiesis* and *social autopoiesis* for the *insides* of the *right-hand* quadrants and *empiricism* and *systems theory* for the *outsides* of the *right-hand* quadrants.[365]

Figure A8. Wilber's AQAL Zones
First-Person Left-Hand / Third-Person Right-Hand Interpretation

However, these three alternative interpretations could only be the case if Wilber is also acknowledging that the original formulation of AQAL was *never* more than a quadratic indefinite perspective (X_{AQ}), a quadratic third-person perspective (3_{AQ}), or a hybrid first-person / third-person perspective (1_{UL+LL} / 3_{UR+LR}). Such an acknowledgement would necessarily entail the simultaneous admission that the tri/quad conflation was *always* an error, for the simple reason that an exclusively *indefinite* (X_{AQ}), an exclusively *impersonal* (3_{AQ}), or a hybrid *intrapersonal / impersonal* (1_{UL+LL} / 3_{UR+LR}) formulation of the original AQAL would *negate* the tri/quad conflation by which the third-person (3) is equated only with the combined behavioral UR and social LR quadrants, the second-person (2) is equated only with the cultural LL quadrant, and the first-person (1) is equated only with the intentional UL quadrant. But Wilber's most recent book re-iterates the tri/quad conflation verbatim in three separate passages, one of which, as we have seen, is part of the introduction of the new dyadic quadratic formulation.[366] Furthermore, an even more recent article by Sean Esbjörn-Hargens, presenting the authoritative over-view of AQAL on behalf of Wilber's Integral Institute, describes and illustrates the tri/quad conflation and the dyadic quadratic perspectives as parts of a single, seamless presentation.[367] Thus, my depictions of Wilber's new AQAL formulation in Figure A5 and in the various interpretations I offered in Figures A6-A8 include appropriate references to the first-person, second-person, and third-person perspectives allocated to their corresponding quadrants consistent with Wilber's many presentations of the tri/quad conflation.[368]

The aforementioned article by Esbjörn-Hargens is particularly relevant because he is arguably the most knowledgeable, sympathetic, articulate, and prolific scholar working in the tradition of Wilber's AQAL formulation of integral theory. In his presentation of Wilber's dyadic quadratic formulation of AQAL, Esbjörn-Hargens differentiates the inside quadratic perspectives *that every individual possesses as his or her own embodied awareness* from the outside quadratic perspectives *from which any phenomenon can be viewed*.[369] He follows Wilber's recent change in terminology by referring to the former as the *quadrants* of an individual and the latter as the *quadrivia* of any phenomenon. In a footnote from his latest book, Wilber

distinguishes the inside and outside views of each quadrant in terms of the *view through* and the *view from*, emphasizing that "all individual (or sentient) holons HAVE or POSSESS 4 perspectives through which or with which they view or touch the world, and those are the quadrants (the view through). But anything can be *looked at* FROM those 4 perspectives—or there is a view of anything from those perspectives—and that is technically called a quadrivium."[370] As Esbjörn-Hargens summarizes it, "the quadrants represent the native ways in which we experience reality in each moment and quadrivia represent the most common ways we can and often do look at reality to understand it."[371] More helpfully, Esbjörn-Hargens illustrates each of these distinct quadratic formulations in a manner consistent with Figures A9 and A10.[372]

Figure A9. Wilber's AQAL – Quadrants

As useful as these quadratic models might first appear, we nevertheless must ask ourselves exactly *what* perspectives, and *whose* perspectives, they actually illustrate. As I suggested above, these

complementary quadratic formulations appear to illustrate either: a) a differentiated *participative/observational* version of the indefinite quadratic perspectives in which *anyone* and *everyone* who participates in quadratic development and evolution is also observable as *anything* and *everything* that develops and evolves; or b) an inadvertent and incomplete attempt to differentiate a fully quadratic *first-person* perspective—*I-me-we-us*—and a fully quadratic *third-person* perspective—*he-him-they-them*, *she-her-they-them*, or *it-it-these-those*—without making any provision for a fully quadratic *second-person* perspective—*you-you-you-you*. But once again, these alternative interpretations could only be the case if Esbjörn-Hargens and Wilber are simultaneously acknowledging that the tri/quad conflation was an error from the start and is now recognized as completely inconsistent with whichever of these interpretations they actually intend.

Figure A10. Wilber's AQAL – Quadrivia

Instead, Esbjörn-Hargens not only embraces the tri/quad conflation in its entirety, presenting a visual illustration nearly identical to

Figure A1, but he also attempts to describe his quadratic illustrations through its invocation.[373] For example, regarding the inside quadratic perspectives, or *quadrants*, that every individual possesses, he invites the reader to "notice right now how you are engaged in all three perspectives: first-person (e.g., noticing your own thoughts as you read this), second-person (e.g., reading my words and interpreting what I am trying to convey), and third-person (e.g., sitting there aware of the light, sounds, and air temperature around you). Do you see how you are always experiencing the world from all four quadrants—right here, right now? It is that simple."[374] But is it really as simple as AQ = 123 = AQ, or, even more simply stated, 4 = 3 = 4?

Later in the same article, Esbjörn-Hargens introduces Wilber's AQAL-based eight-fold methodology by way of a recapitulation of the dyadic quadratic formulation depicted in Figure A5. As he tellingly summarizes it, "each of the perspectives associated with the four quadrants can be studied through two major methodological families, namely from either the inside (i.e., a first-person perspective) or the outside (i.e., a third-person perspective). This results in eight distinct *zones* of human inquiry and research. These eight zones comprise what integral theory calls *integral methodological pluralism* (IMP), which includes such approaches as phenomenology (an exploration of first-person subjective realities), ethnomethodology (an exploration of second-person intersubjective realities), and empiricism (an exploration of third-person empirical realities)."[375] Thus, it would appear that $4 \times 2 = 8 = 3$, or, more charitably, $4 \times 2 = 8 \div 2 = 3$. With this we have returned to Wilber's original outline of these perspectives for the *inside* and the *outside* of the *inside* and the *outside* of the *individual* and the *collective*, and, by virtue of the tri/quad conflation seamlessly invoked, the conflated perspectives for the *inside* and the *outside* of the *first-*, *second-*, and *third-person*, which are, respectively, the *inside* of the *individual*, the *inside* of the *collective*, and the *outsides* of the *individual* and the *collective*.[376]

Clearly, the result of the persistent tri/quad conflation together with this dyadic quadratic formulation is an even more confused assemblage of perspectives that cannot possibly exist simultaneously without serious contradictions. AQAL asserts a complete first-person (1) perspective confined entirely to the intentional UL quad-

rant (as per the tri/quad conflation) that is experienced intrapersonally (1) from the inside and observed impersonally (3) from the outside (as per the dual perspectives on this quadrant), while allowing for the co-existence of a first-person (1) plural perspective in the cultural LL quadrant even though that quadrant is serving double duty as the entire second-person (2) perspective (as per the tri/quad conflation) and potentially additional first-person (1) perspectives as the inside views of the behavioral UR and social LR (which would have to be the case if the four inside views together represent a quadratic first-person (1) perspective or even a quadratic indefinite (X) participant perspective), despite the simultaneous assertion that these two right-hand (UR+LR) quadrants, and therefore the inside (1) and outside (3) views of these quadrants, represent only the entire third-person (3) perspective, exclusive of any first-person (1) or second-person (2) perspectives (as per the tri/quad conflation).

Evaluation & Implication

In my evaluation, the original formulation and the more recent reformulation of AQAL are both riddled with contradictory definitions—whether expressed or implied—of the first-person (1), second-person (2), and third-person (3) perspectives in relation to the intentional (UL), behavioral (UR), cultural (LL), and social (LR) perspectives, all of which appear to be rooted in the erroneous tri/quad conflation. This leads to the hypothesis that AQAL has been burdened from the start with an illogical formulation appropriately termed the *tri/quad fallacy*. More precisely, a triadic quadratic perspectival interpretation of AQAL reveals the inherent tri/quad fallacy whereby the following *illogical perspectival equations* are nevertheless asserted—*explicitly* and *implicitly*—in the tri/quad conflation:

- $X_{UL} = 1 = 1_{AQ}$, meaning the indefinite individual-subjective intentional UL perspective (e.g., *anyone*) equals, and is thus interchangeable with, an undifferentiated first-person perspective (for which there is no single pronoun, but Wilber uses *I*), and therefore, via TQP, equals, and is thus inter-

changeable with, the first-person intentional-behavioral-cultural-social perspectives (e.g., *I-me-we-us*).

- $X_{LL} = 2 = 2_{AQ}$, meaning the indefinite collective-subjective cultural LL perspective (e.g., *everyone*) equals, and is thus interchangeable with, an undifferentiated second-person perspective (for which there is no single pronoun, but Wilber uses *we*), and therefore, via TQP, equals, and is thus interchangeable with, the second-person intentional-behavioral-cultural-social perspectives (e.g., *you-you-you-you*).

- $X_{UR+LR} = 3 = 3_{AQ}$, meaning the indefinite individual-objective behavioral UR and collective-objective social LR combined perspective (e.g., *anything* and *everything*) equals, and is thus interchangeable with, an undifferentiated third-person perspective (for which there is no single pronoun, but Wilber uses *it*), and therefore, via TQP, equals, and is thus interchangeable with, the third-person intentional-behavioral-cultural-social perspectives (e.g., *he-him-they-them*).

Figure A11. The Tri/Quad Fallacy

As Figure A11 illustrates, each of these illogical perspectival equations actually contains *three constituent equations* of its own and can therefore be read in three parts. The first part of each equation (e.g., $X_{UL} = 1$) denotes an *explicit* assertion contained in Wilber's tri/quad conflation. The second part of each equation (e.g., $1 = 1_{AQ}$) denotes an *explicit* assertion contained in my triadic quadratic perspectivism. The third part of each equation is revealed when we remove the middle variable (e.g., 1) and collapse the remaining two variables into a single equation (e.g., $X_{UL} = 1_{AQ}$) that denotes the *implicit* assertion contained in Wilber's tri/quad conflation as revealed through triadic quadratic perspectivism. While the explicit equations in the tri/quad conflation are the source of the problem and erroneous in and of themselves, the implicit equations revealed through TQP clarify the precise nature and extent of the tri/quad fallacy.

Bearing in mind the distinctions between the *explicit* assertions of the tri/quad conflation and the *explicit* assertions of triadic quadratic perspectivism, which together reveal *the implicit assertions that form the object of my critique*, we can express the tri/quad fallacy even more concisely in terms of the following illogical perspectival equations: (Fig. A11)

- $X_{UL} = 1_{AQ}$
- $X_{LL} = 2_{AQ}$
- $X_{UR+LR} = 3_{AQ}$

Furthermore, we can recognize the tri/quad fallacy not just as a meta-theoretical *product*, but also as a meta-theoretical *process*. *If* triadic quadratic perspectivism accurately represents the perspectival nature of human awareness-in-action, *then* the tri/quad fallacy could be interpreted as the *enaction* of these illogical equations. Thus, by turning these formulas around and attempting to signify with "=>" the idea of an *enacted equation*, I offer this representation of what Wilber and everyone else who accepts his formulation of AQAL are attempting to *do*:

- $1_{AQ} => X_{UL}$
- $2_{AQ} => X_{LL}$
- $3_{AQ} => X_{UR+LR}$

The implications of these *illogically enacted equations*, embedded as they are in the conceptual architecture of AQAL, which Wilber intends to represent the primordial perspectives of integral episte-mological, methodological, and ontological pluralism, appear to be rather significant.[377]

Despite Wilber's assurances that all the AQAL perspectives are immediately available in one's own direct awareness and consistent with the personal pronouns contained in every major language,[378] there are in fact *no pronouns* that actually refer to *any perspectives* that meet the definitions supplied by AQAL.

- There is no pronoun that can accurately refer to the mistak-enly equated and conflated X_{UL}, which can only be signified by a singular subjective indefinite pronoun (e.g., *one* or *any-one*), and 1_{AQ}, which can only be signified by the first-person quadratic pronoun (i.e., *I-me-we-us*). Furthermore, even in the explicit form of the tri/quad conflation, there is no pro-noun that can accurately refer to the mistakenly equated and conflated X_{UL} and an undifferentiated 1, which cannot be signified by any single pronoun, but even if loosely signified by Wilber's *I*, is still inconsistent with X_{UL}.

- There is no pronoun that can accurately refer to the mistak-enly equated and conflated X_{LL}, which can only be signified by a plural subjective indefinite pronoun (e.g., *many* or *eve-ryone*), and 2_{AQ}, which can only be signified by a second-person quadratic pronoun (e.g., *you-you-you-you*). Further-more, even in the explicit form of the tri/quad conflation, there is no pronoun that can accurately refer to the mistak-enly equated and conflated X_{LL} and an undifferentiated 2, which cannot be signified by any single pronoun, but even if loosely signified by Wilber's *we/you*, is still inconsistent with X_{LL}.

- There is no pronoun or pair of pronouns that can accurately refer to the mistakenly equated and conflated X_{UR+LR}, which can only be signified by a pair of singular and plural objec-tive indefinite pronouns (e.g., *anyone* and *everyone*), and 3_{AQ}, which can only be signified by a third-person quadratic pro-noun (e.g., *he-him-they-them*). Furthermore, even in the ex-

plicit form of the tri/quad conflation, there is no pronoun that can accurately refer to the mistakenly equated and conflated $X_{UR\text{-}LR}$ and an undifferentiated 3, which cannot be signified by any single pronoun, but even if loosely signified by Wilber's *its* and/or *it*, is still inconsistent with X_{UR+LR}.

Triadic quadratic perspectivism reveals the tri/quad conflated perspectives of AQAL to be completely inconsistent with the actual system of interlocking personal pronouns at the pre-conscious root of pragmatic human action—the *primordial signs* we use to identify the various facets of reality, or *primordial referents*, we experience through the *primordial perspectives* of our situational awareness-in-action. The absence of these primordial signs in AQAL implies the absence of their corresponding primordial referents among the mistakenly equated and conflated perspectives of AQAL. Furthermore, Wilber's claim that the study of AQAL is *psycho-active*, that its primary *signifiers* (i.e., $X_{UL} = 1 = I$, $X_{LL} = 2 = we$, and $X_{UR+LR} = 3 = it/its$) automatically activate in the minds of readers the first-, second-, and third-person *signifieds*,[379] is undermined by the fact that these AQAL signifiers clearly do not accurately signify the primordial signifieds of human awareness-in-action. If it is even appropriate to attribute psycho-activation to a meta-theory, then only the accurately depicted first-, second-, and third-person signs of TQP would be capable of automatically activating in the minds of readers the first-, second-, and third-person referents. Therefore, the tri/quad fallacy appears to imply that the AQAL perspectives resulting from these illogically enacted equations simply *do not exist* anywhere in human awareness-in-action other than as illogical, irredeemable claims *that they exist*.

If so, then what exactly are people doing when they purport to be using AQAL in some deliberate application, such as a multi-perspectival analysis of an important issue or a multi-perspectival reconstruction of an academic theory? While the answers to this question may vary, depending upon each person's understanding of AQAL, one thing seems certain: any claim that one is accurately applying AQAL or that, more generically, AQAL works, should be justified by clearly identifying the tri/quad conflated perspectives of AQAL (i.e., $X_{UL} = 1 = I$, $X_{LL} = 2 = we$, and $X_{UR+LR} = 3 = it/its$) as they

appear in specific, real-world applications, both pre- and post-conflation. That being said, one of the most surprising practical implications of the tri/quad fallacy, defined as it is by three illogical perspectival equations that render their constituent perspectives all-but-meaningless upon conflation, is that there does not appear to be any way to apply AQAL without contradicting the actual definitions of AQAL. If this is the case, then even the most conscientious schol-ar-practitioner of AQAL must engage in some form of more-or-less intentional work-around in order to bypass both the explicit and the implicit equations of the tri/quad conflation. The most sensible work-around is to apply either:

- a simplified X_{AQ} framework that ignores any conflated triadic perspectives, and therefore ignores the distinctions between the personal claims to freedom (1), justice (2), and truth (3) (i.e., beauty, goodness, and truth) in favor of the non-triadic indefinite claims to intentional (X_{UL}), behavioral (X_{UR}), meaningful (X_{LL}), and functional (X_{LR}) validity; or
- a simplified 123 framework that ignores any conflated quadratic perspectives, and therefore ignores the distinctions between the indefinite claims to intentional (UL), behavioral (UR), meaningful (LL), and functional (LR) validity in favor of the personal claims to non-quadratic freedom (1), justice (2), and truth (3) (i.e., beauty, goodness, and truth).

However, due to the particular formulation of the tri/quad con-flation, wherein otherwise valid perspectives originating in either a purely quadratic (X_{AQ}) or a purely triadic (123) set of perspectives are erroneously equated and conflated with one another, there is no valid X_{AQ} or 123 meta-theory remaining within AQAL. Once the X_{UL} is conflated with the 1, the X_{LL} is conflated with the 2, and the X_{UR+LR} is conflated with the 3, there is no way to accurately discern the original X_{AQ} or 123 within the conflated confines of AQAL, because each quadratic or triadic perspective now implicates its conflated associate in a newly created, mutually distorted meaning. It appears, therefore, that the purely quadratic and the purely triadic meta-theories mistakenly equated and conflated within the formulation of AQAL actually *ceased to exist* upon conflation within AQAL.

Both of these simplified applications, therefore, are *contradictory* to AQAL because of the tri/quad conflation they may seek to bypass and yet, ironically, both may be popularly, if inaccurately, regarded as *consistent* with AQAL because of the tri/quad conflation. How can this be possible? I suspect it is in part because most people, following Wilber's lead, more-or-less-consciously confuse the *both/and necessity* of the tri/quad conflation, which *requires* them to recognize the perspective equations that comprise its formulation, with an *either/or option* that *allows* them to choose either a pure non-conflated 123 framework or a pure non-conflated X_{AQ} framework in each application while still claiming to be applying AQAL. But according to AQAL, AQAL cannot be reduced to either X_{AQ} or 123 without contradicting AQAL, because according to the tri/quad conflation, X_{AQ} always already equals 123, thus making it impossible to apply either a pure X_{AQ} framework or a pure 123 framework without negating the claimed equation between the two. Notwithstanding these understandable tendencies toward the unavoidably inaccurate application of the inherently contradictory perspectives of AQAL, when one uses either an X_{AQ} framework or a 123 framework in some deliberate integral application, one is not actually applying AQAL because these simplified frameworks are inconsistent with the perspective equations of the tri/quad conflation essential to AQAL.

If these logical implications of the tri/quad fallacy are valid, then the challenge they present to the meta-theoretical and meta-practical premises of AQAL date all the way back to its origin. Beginning with his first presentation of AQAL in 1995, through the meta-narrative that many regard as his *magnum opus*, *Sex, Ecology, Spirituality*,[380] Wilber has been quite articulate, even passionate, and occasionally polemical, about the need to preclude the all-too-common philosophical and scientific *reductionism* by which individual-subjective (UL) and collective-subjective (LL) *interiors* of existence are collapsed into the individual-objective (UR) and collective-objective (LR) *exteriors* of existence. But while rescuing these left-hand *depths* from their right-hand *surfaces*, reclaiming the *intentional* from the merely *behavioral* and the *meaningful* from the merely *functional*, he inadvertently enacts his own new form of pseudo-integral reductionism whereby a genuinely triadic (123) formulation of these otherwise

merely quadratic (X_{AQ}) perspectives is at once *claimed*, yet *prevented* by way of the illogically enacted equations of the tri/quad fallacy. This infects AQAL with a more subtle and confusing form of the modern *myth of the given* by secretly reducing the 123_{AQ} kosmos to an indefinite quadratic holonarchy (X_{AQAL}) with which *I* cannot help but to engage monologically as a relatively isolated subject hovering above the lighted page, unable to locate *myself* in *my* own adopted map of the kosmos except to the extent that *I* am willing to reduce *myself* to just *anyone* (X_{UL}) in this purportedly integral theory of *everything*. This is the myth of the *integral* given at once *denied*, yet nevertheless *enacted* by way of the tri/quad fallacy.

Furthermore, because of the way this AQAL reductionism is conceptually engineered, there is no valid way to salvage either a simple quadratic (X_{AQ}) or a simple triadic (123) meta-theory from the AQAL corpus without explicitly acknowledging the original error and rescinding the tri/quad conflation. Doing so, however, would undermine the perennial claim, since *Sex, Ecology, Spirituality*, that AQAL is a visionary-logical synthesis of triadic and quadratic meta-theories and corresponding meta-narratives of human development and evolution. Once the conceptual lynchpin of the tri/quad conflation is removed, these two enormous bodies of philosophical thought—one *triadic* and primarily Habermasian and the other *quadratic* and primarily Wilberian—would appear to go their separate ways with all their constitutive theories and stories, practices and protagonists, until a more coherent meta-theoretical integration can be enacted. The significance of these implications is in direct proportion to the significance attributed to this particular feature— the tri/quad conflation—of Wilber's AQAL, which will naturally be assessed differently from one reader to the next. It is, however, central to all his teachings since 1995 and the primary frame of reference for his ever-popular *integral vision*.[381]

Therefore, it appears that in his sincere attempt to create an integrated meta-theory that is *both* 123 *and* X_{AQ}, thus a fully triadic quadratic 123_{AQ}, Wilber has created one that is *neither* 123 *nor* X_{AQ}, and therefore tends to disintegrate upon application into one that is *either* 123 *or* X_{AQ}, but in either case *not* really AQAL. The resolution to this tri/quad fallacy presents itself as soon as we recognize its

origin in a deceptively simple confusion between *equation/conflation* and *differentiation/integration* with respect to the purely triadic and purely quadratic meta-theories. By accurately differentiating and integrating the triadic (123) and quadratic (X_{AQ}) meta-theories within triadic quadratic perspectivism, the latent potential (123$_{AQ}$) of both Habermas's and Wilber's multi-perspectival meta-theories can be more fully realized in the integral aperspectival / différantial perspectival meta-paradigm of Awareness-in-Action.

Invitation

Throughout this presentation I have tried to make a careful distinction between what I regard as the *incontrovertible facts* of the tri/quad conflation, which can be verified by reviewing the many specific references offered, and the *controversial claims* of the tri/quad fallacy, which constitute my evaluative critique of the tri/quad conflation in light of my hypothesized triadic quadratic perspectivism. Between these incontrovertible facts and controversial claims lies the realm of *logical interpretation*, wherein I have attempted to present a concise, rigorous re-interpretation of the conflation, while being sincere from the beginning that I have already hypothesized an implicated fallacy. Clearly, if the claims of the tri/quad fallacy are ever to be validated to widespread satisfaction, it will require additional reflection and discourse among those who understand both the tri/quad conflation and triadic quadratic perspectivism.

Given the tenuous nature of the discourse within the Wilberian integral community, wherein the *ideas* of AQAL are often conflated with the *person* of Wilber in the minds of both detractors and defenders alike, I feel it might be worthwhile to disavow any affinity for either political faction and affirm my sincere intent to contribute to a more integral discourse about integralism itself. If you, the reader, cannot see that this critique is offered in the context of a much larger, deeper appreciation for Wilber's good intentions and inspiring contributions to the field of integralism, as well as the context of a reconstructive contribution of my own to which this deconstructive critique is but a reluctant afterthought, then I suspect

the potential for discourse between us shall remain unrealized. If, however, seeing the contexts in which I have offered this critique, you would like to engage in discourse about these ideas, then consider this an invitation.

SUMMARY PROPOSITIONS

- 1 -

Awareness-in-Action may be understood in terms of three interde-pendent, irreducible perspectives—*first-person*, *second-person*, *third-person*—each of which includes four constituent interdependent, irreducible perspectives—*intentional*, *behavioral*, *cultural*, *social*—all four of which are experienced *intrapersonally*, *interpersonally*, and *impersonally* from within each of the actor's three distinct *personal* perspectives, thus forming a set of *triadic quadratic perspectives* (TQP) that co-arise in every actor's awareness and find immediate expression in the system of *triadic quadratic pronouns* at the pre-conscious root of semiotic, pragmatic, and praxiological action-in-awareness.

- 2 -

Awareness-in-Action may be understood as the mutual, reflexive, différantial integration of *my* pragmatic significations of reality (123$_{AQ}$), *each* of *your* pragmatic significations of reality (2.123$_{AQ}$), and *each* of *their* pragmatic significations of reality (3.123$_{AQ}$), not just as *I* can identify *each* of *our* distinct realities, but as *each* of *us* can identify *each* of *ours* as an essential dimension of *our* situational awareness-in-action.

- 3 -

Awareness-in-Action may be understood as the *integral aperspectival*, yet *différantial perspectival* self-imaging/world-viewing by which *we—I*, *each* of *you*, and *each* of *them*—disclose, yet obscure, and ultimately realize *each* of *our* unique, yet interpenetrating visions of reality.

- 4 -

Awareness-in-Action may be understood as the active differentiation of triadic quadratic perspectivism from the *integral awareness* that is *nowhere* to be found as long as one is actively searching, yet *now-here* as long as one inquires deeply into the identity of the actor.

- 5 -

Awareness-in-Action may be understood in terms of the deeply meaningful, broadly functional, partially presumed stock of TQP^N *actionable knowledge* that serves as the situationally relevant ground for the consensus-based, goal-oriented, error-prone flow of TQP^N *knowledgeable action* by which this actionable knowledge is surprisingly, inevitably, indeterminately deconstructed and reconstructed.

- 6 -

Awareness-in-Action may be understood as the meta-practice of *transparency*, *choice*, and *accountability* (TCA^N) with respect to the meta-theory of *triadic quadratic perspectivism* (TQP^N), both of which are always already active in our situational awareness-in-action.

- 7 -

Awareness-in-Action may be understood as the *substantive/procedural*, the *integral/différantial*, and the *empirical/normative* meta-paradigm of *realization* in three modes—*authentication*, *legitimation*, and *confirmation*—by which *we—I*, *each* of *you*, and *each* of *them*—(re/de)construct *our* actionable knowledge of reality in three forms—freedom,

justice, and truth—to guide knowledgeable action that is progressively more real—or free, just, and true.

- 8 -

Awareness-in-Action may be understood as the one *ideal action situation* (A^∞) in which each and every one of us can *ultimately realize* (R^∞) each and every one of us as unique members of a universal civilization grounded in the *ultimate realization* (R^∞) of integral aperspectival freedom (AF^∞), justice (LJ^∞), and truth (CT^∞), and, thus, *ultimate reality* (R^∞).

- 9 -

Awareness-in-Action may be understood as the many *real action situations* (A^N) in which each and every one of us is indeterminately constrained in our capacities to ultimately realize each and every one of us as unique members of a universal civilization committed to the authentication of freedom (AF^N), legitimation of justice (LJ^N), and confirmation of truth (CT^N), and, thus, *indeterminate realization* (R^N).

- 10 -

Awareness-in-Action may be understood as the *absolutely relative*, yet *relatively absolute* metalogue in which *our—mine*, *each* of *yours*, and *each* of *theirs—relative* realizations (R^N) presuppose the never-ending potential for *ultimate* realization (R^∞) based on the ever-present intuition of *absolute* realization (R^0).

- 11 -

Awareness-in-Action may be understood as the (a)perspectival/ (a)practical realization *of*, and *about*, human development and evolution, *enfolding* within its visual-logical meta-structure all multi-structural patterns of human development and evolution that might actually *unfold* in the course of our ever-present, never-ending (re/de)constructive realization.

- 12 -

Awareness-in-Action may be understood as the ever-present realiza-
tion of the integral awareness that *we—I, each* of *you*, and *each* of
them—are amidst the never-ending realization of the différantial
action that *we—I, each* of *you*, and *each* of *them—do*.

- 13 -

Awareness-in-Action may be understood as the tendency toward
rationalized *realization bias* in three primary modes—*authentication*,
legitimation, and *confirmation biases*—in which *we—I, each* of *you*, and
each of *them*—regard *our* own capacity for realization as inherently
superior to that of the others and thereby impair *our* ability to create
actionable knowledge of reality—or freedom, justice, and truth.

- 14 -

Awareness-in-Action may be understood as the potential for *realiza-
tion crisis* in three primary modes—*authentication*, *legitimation*, and
confirmation crises—in which *we—I, each* of *you*, and *each* of *them*—
eventually realize the extent to which *our* organizational, institution-
al, and civilizational realization has been systematically rationalized
by increasingly conspicuous disregard for requisite degrees of
transparency, choice, and accountability with respect to the triadic
quadratic perspectivism of our awareness-in-action.

- 15 -

Awareness-in-Action may be understood as a *substantive/procedural*
meta-*paradigm* of realization centered on the *procedural* meta-*practice*
of transparency, choice, and accountability with respect to the *sub-
stantive* meta-*theory* of triadic quadratic perspectivism, which can be
integrally/différantially realized in each and every action situation,
thus facilitating the empirically and normatively justifiable
(in)authentication, (de)legitimation, and (dis)confirmation of each
and every action claiming knowledge of reality.

- 16 -

Awareness-in-Action may be understood as a semiotic, pragmatic, and praxiological integralism/différantialism centered on a realization paradigm of paradigms that encompasses both the ever-present realization of the *integral awareness that we are* and the never-ending realization of the *différantial action that we do*—an *essentialist formulation* that facilitates a *comprehensivist application* honoring the full potential and variety of the human experience, including our experiences of the worlds beyond humanity.

- 17 -

Awareness-in-Action may be understood as a *critical integralism* attuned to the interdependent political, economic, social, and ecological challenges of our time. Thus, *if* we want to realize more freedom, justice, and truth in our lives and in the lives of those around us, *then* we should engage in the requisite practice of transparency, choice, and accountability with respect to the triadic quadratic perspectivism of challenging action situations.

- 18 -

Awareness-in-Action may be understood as the *realization paradigm* of paradigms that provides the normative procedures for its own situational verification or falsification and, hence, its own ultimate realization—$A^{\infty} = TCA^{\infty} \times TQP^{\infty} = ALC^{\infty} = R^{\infty}$—as any formulation of action science, critical theory, or integral theory very well should.

NOTES

[1] Stephen Mitchell (2000, 75).

[2] I mention in this introduction some of the more obvious fields of human action, including economics, business, politics, governance, sociology, social work, journalism, and activism. I might just as well include philosophy, psychology, education, law, and medicine. Furthermore, once we come to terms with the universal nature of human awareness-in-action in all its myriad forms, it appears as if *every* field of inquiry—including physics, biology, ecology, engineering, religion, spirituality, literature, entertainment, and art—might be defined as a field of human action without detracting from its particular distinctiveness. Finally, beyond the academy, the fields of human action certainly include marriage, domestic partnership, parenting, friendship, and the practice of community. The question, therefore, is *what isn't a field of human action?*

[3] The adjective *integral* is defined in two complementary ways: (Source: http://www.answers.com/topic/integral)

    1. Essential or necessary for completeness; constituent.
    2. Possessing everything essential; entire.

[4] Habermas (1979; 1984; 1987).

[5] Habermas (1979, 1).

[6] Habermas (1984, 275, emphasis added).

[7] Habermas (1984, 275, emphasis added).

[8] Habermas (1992b, 57).

[9] Habermas (1992b, 58).

[10] Habermas (1979).

[11] Habermas (2003, 30).

[12] Habermas (1979, 66-67).

[13] Habermas (1979, 67).

[14] Habermas (1979, 67).

[15] Habermas (1979, 65-6).

[16] Habermas (1979, 68).

[17] In his discussions of formal pragmatics, Habermas (1979) typically refers to *speech acts* together with the related terms of *speaker* and *hearer*, likely due to the speech act theory from which he draws some of his ideas. However, given that formal pragmatics is the basis for his theory of communicative action, it seems entirely appropriate to use the term *communicative act*, in part due to its more inclusive connotations of both *speaking* and *writing*, and therefore *speaker/writer* and *hearer/reader*. By coincidence, in his preface to Bühler's (2011, xx) recently republished *Theory of Language*, Werner Abraham emphasizes that Bühler's model of language functions is a model of the *communicative act*, notwithstanding Bühler's own emphasis on speech act theory and the sound of the linguistic sign. This more inclusive terminology of the communicative act between speaker/writer and hearer/reader does not, however, ignore the distinctions between spoken and written acts of communication, as well as their constituent spoken and written signs—*phoneme* and *grapheme*—that, while not highlighted by Habermas, are likely appreciated by him, and certainly by me, in the wake of Jacques Derrida's deconstruction (Derrida, 2002; Culler, 1982; Habermas, 1990c).

Furthermore, by illustrating the *communicative act* in the peculiar geometry of Bühler's (2011, 34-5) overlapping *circle/triangle*, my intent is to highlight, in terms of pragmatics, his insightful semiotic distinction between the *concrete sound* of the linguistic sign, represented by the *circle*, and its *abstract meaning*, represented by the *triangle*. In short, where the circle (concrete sound) extends beyond the triangle (abstract meaning), the concrete sound includes information ignored in the abstract meaning. Where the triangle (abstract meaning) extends beyond the circle (concrete sound), the abstract meaning includes information ignored in the concrete sound. As we will see, this distinction between what may be more generally termed the *objective* and *subjective* aspects of a linguistic sign, which Ferdinand de Saussure (Chandler, 1994) referred to as the *signifier* and *signified*, is essential to Derrida's (2002) deconstruction and an important feature of the more integral/différantial semiotics I present in this book.

Finally, Habermas (1979, 66-67) typically refers to the third-person communicative mode using either the adjective *objective* or the noun *observer* and the second-person mode as either the adjective *conformative* or the noun

participant, while referring to the first-person mode using only the adjective *expressive*. For purposes of symmetry and clarity, I have added the noun *personality* to this first-person communicative mode, consistent with Habermas's intended meaning and consistent with his use of this same term for the first-person structures of the lifeworld as described in subsequent works (1987, 119-152; 1998b). Regarding validity claims, I have chosen to lead with the term *sincerity* rather than *truthfulness* to denote the first-person validity claim in order to preclude confusion with the third-person claim to *truth*. Habermas uses the terms *truthfulness* and *sincerity* interchangeably, but, unfortunately, many people mistakenly use the terms *truthfulness* and *truth* interchangeably.

[18] Habermas (1979, 29).

[19] McCarthy (1994, 281-2).

[20] Habermas (1979, 29).

[21] Habermas (1979, 69-94).

[22] Habermas (1979, 97).

[23] Habermas (1979, 95-177).

[24] In the preface to the first volume of *The Theory of Communicative Action*, Habermas (1984, xli) appears to contradict my meta-theoretical interpretation of his critical theory when he states, with undue modesty, "the theory of communicative action is not a metatheory but the beginning of a social theory concerned to validate its own critical standards." Granted, but in his effort to validate these standards of critique, Habermas has, perhaps inadvertently, articulated a very powerful meta-theory, the object domain of which includes a breathtaking variety of theories from such fields as sociology, psychology, post/modern philosophy, linguistics, communication, and systems theory. On the following page, he (Habermas, 1984, xlii) elaborates by acknowledging that "*every* sociology that claims to be [a] theory of society encounters the problem of employing a concept of rationality—which always has a normative content—at three levels: It can avoid neither the metatheoretical question concerning the rationality implications of its guiding concepts of action nor the methodological question concerning the rationality implications of gaining access to its object domain through an understanding of meaning; nor, finally, can it avoid the empirical-theoretical question concerning the sense, if any, in which the modernization of societies can be described as rationalization."

[25] Wilber (2000a; 2000d; 2007).

[26] Habermas (1979; 1984; 1987).

[27] Habermas (1987, 199-299).

[28] Jantsch (1980).

[29] Gebser (1985).

[30] Sorokin (1970).

[31] Aurobindo (1990; 1999).

[32] I mention these particular authors—Habermas (1979; 1984; 1987), Parsons (Habermas, 1987, 199-299), Jantsch (1980), Gebser (1985), Sorokin (1970), and Sri Aurobindo (1990; 1999)—because their meta-theorizing appears to have informed and inspired Wilber's and because the substance of their respective contributions appears to be under-appreciated by those who nevertheless appreciate Wilber's AQAL. Having studied some of these authors prior to encountering their ideas within Wilber's work, I suspect I may have a different appreciation for their ideas just for having encountered them earlier. Careful study of these works by anyone seriously interested in Wilber's version of integral philosophy would likely be rewarding and by no means entirely historical in nature.

[33] Wilber (2000c, 373).

[34] Wilber (2000c, 374).

[35] Wilber (2000d; 2003c; 2007).

[36] Wilber (2000d, 701-4).

[37] Wilber (2007, 287).

[38] Wilber (2000d, 701-4; 2007, 287).

[39] Unbeknownst to Wilber, a very similar quadratic semiotic model was published by Louis Hjelmslev in 1961 and elaborated upon by several linguists in the following decades. As Daniel Chandler (1994, 2) outlines it, Hjelmslev's model began with Saussure's *signifier* and *signified* and then distinguished between the *form* and *substance* of each, with the form of the signifier being *syntax*, the form of the signified being *semantics*, the substance of the signifier being the *printed or spoken words* and the substance of the signified being the *subject matter or human content*. This quadratic semiotics, as far as it goes, is identical to Wilber's.

[40] Wilber (2000d, 702).

[41] Wilber (2007, 22, 50-70).

[42] Wilber (1999e, 627-47).

[43] Wilber (1999c, 439).

[44] Wilber (1999c; 2007).

[45] Habermas (1979; 1984; 1987).

[46] Habermas (1987, 199-299).

[47] Jantsch (1980).

[48] Aurobindo (1990; 1996; 1999).

[49] Wilber (1999e, 493-505; 2000a, 149-153; 2000b, 298-302; 2000c, 377-381; 2000d, 430-437; 2000e, 146-8; 2003a, part i; 2007, 18-23).

[50] Interestingly, *functional fit* is a special type of validity claim that Habermas (1987) uses in his bi-dimensional *lifeworld/system* theory of society, wherein the consequences of action are deemed valid to the extent that they are a functional fit within the actor-agnostic, media-steered society-as-system. The three primary validity claims included in his formal pragmatics and his theory of communicative action—*truthfulness*, *rightness*, and *truth*—are associated with the alternative vision of society-as-lifeworld. As Habermas uses them, the three validity claims of the lifeworld, which Wilber associates with his intentional-UL, cultural-LL, and behavioral-UR, represent a categorically different type of analysis than the one functional claim of the system, which Wilber associates with the social-LR as a co-equal complement to the other three validity claims. In Part II, I propose a triadic quadratic perspectival reconstruction of the lifeworld/system theory of society that honors Habermas's distinctions while still preserving what I regard as Wilber's correct insight into the equal validity of all four quadrants at each moment of existence, notwithstanding what I regard as his incorrect conflation of triadic and quadratic perspectives in AQAL. See Appendix A for a critique of Wilber's tri/quad conflation.

[51] Wilber (2000d, 436-7).

[52] Wilber (2007, 20).

[53] Wilber (2000a).

[54] Wilber (1979; 1984; 1987).

[55] O'Connor (2008a; 2008b; 2010).

[56] I present throughout this book a new system of perspectival/practical notation that may facilitate, in subsequent publications by me and others, more efficient and effective communication about the major features of Awareness-in-Action. This notation emerged in the course of my articulation of these ideas and can be interpreted as an alternative to Wilber's (2003c; 2007) AQAL-based *integral mathematics of primordial perspectives*.

As should be clear from the presentation in Part I, my *perspectival signs* are entirely consistent with the visual-logical geometry of the integral/

differential meta-theory of triadic quadratic perspectivism, which is based on accurate definitions of the first-, second-, and third-person perspectives, as well as the individual-subjective, individual-objective, collective-subjective, and collective-objective perspectives within each of these personal perspectives. Furthermore, the *practical signs* I introduce in reference to my proposed meta-practice build on these perspectival signs to yield at least the beginning of an internally consistent system of signs that unfolds from, and enfolds into one single sign of non-dual Awareness-in-Action. While it is necessary to study this text in order to learn this corresponding notation, it is *not* necessary to learn the notation in order to understand this particular text. So if the notation is more of a distraction, then simply ignore it and concentrate on the surrounding text to which it refers.

With regard to the most elementary perspectival notation, Wilber typically uses 1p for the first-person, 2p for the second-person, 3p for the third-person, and 123p when referring to all three personal perspectives. Furthermore, he equates and conflates his 1p with his UL quadrant, his 2p with his LL quadrant, his 3p with his combined UR and LR quadrants, and therefore his 123p with all four of his quadrants, or AQ. In contrast, I have omitted the "p" in my triadic perspectival notation, 123, as it is an unnecessary term that obstructs the use of subscript notation for the quadratic perspectives, such as 1_{AQ}, which designates the *first-person*, *all-quadrant* perspective found only in triadic quadratic perspectivism.

[57] See Appendix A for a critique of the tri/quad conflation that is central to Wilber's AQAL formulation of integral theory.

[58] Wilber (2000d, 701-4; 2007, 287).

[59] Habermas (1984, 275, emphasis added).

[60] Habermas (1979, 68).

[61] Wilber (2000d, 701-4).

[62] Habermas (2003, 30).

[63] Habermas (2003, 36).

[64] Wilber (2000e, 186).

[65] Wilber (2000e, 192-3).

[66] Wilber (2003d, part i).

[67] To put a finer point on this, note that I am using the interrogative pronoun *whomever* rather than *whatever*. To the extent that a third-person perspective is referencing a *sentient whom* rather than an *insentient what*, the sentient whom is regarded as presupposing his or her own triadic quadratic perspectives. Debates concerning whether and where to draw the line between

sentience and insentience, as well as whether and where to draw the line between TQP sentience and pre-TQP sentience can await future discourse. For now, we should note that all such discourse about the forms and fields of human action, not to mention the merits and demerits of various formulations of integralism, happens within the frame of TQP and includes sentient "*whoms*" as the most important referents in the third-person perspective. In other words, I don't much care what that chair across the room thinks, but I do care what the person sitting in that chair thinks. *She* or *he*, as the case may be, tends to be more significant to most of *my* action situations than *it* can ever be, which does not diminish the more fundamental role *it* plays in supporting or impeding these action situations. In contrast, naïve realists seem to be particularly obsessed with the philosophical status of chairs. And rocks. But they don't much care about people.

[68] When illustrating the third-person perspectival pronouns, I will typically use either the feminine (*she-her*, *her-hers*) or masculine (*he-him*, *his-his*) variety, rather than both, in order to streamline what will, I'm sorry to say, be some rather complex illustrations.

[69] Habermas (1990a, 296-7).

[70] Habermas (1992d; 1987, 58).

[71] Mead (1967, 173-4).

[72] Mead (1967, 174-5).

[73] Brook (2008).

[74] Mead (1967, 175).

[75] Mead (1967, 178).

[76] Mead (1967, 199-200).

[77] Habermas (1987, 58-9).

[78] Mead (1967, 173-200).

[79] Brook (2008).

[80] To my knowledge, Ramana Maharshi (1974, 1992, 1997, 2001) *never* taught *any* theory of multi-stage psychological development consistent with Wilber's (1999c, 465-6) attribution in this passage, wherein "the 'I' of one stage becomes a 'me' at the next" and "the subject of one stage becomes an object of the next." Ramana's (1997, 41) actual teaching as it pertains to the subjective I-thought, which I quote verbatim in this book, is categorically different from Kegan's multi-stage developmental logic and should not be conflated in this manner.

[81] Wilber (1999c, 465-6).

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[82] Ramana (2001).

[83] Wilber (2000d, 628-9).

[84] Mead (1967, 174-5).

[85] Kegan (1994, 314-5).

[86] In a subsequent work, Wilber (2007, 131) further clarifies that "healthy development converts 1st-person subjective to 1st-person objective or possessive (I to me or mine) within the I-stream, whereas unhealthy development converts 1st-person subjective to 2nd- or 3rd-person (I to yours, his, theirs, it) within the I-stream. The former is healthy dis-identification, the latter is pathological dissociation." Although Wilber's (2007, 119-41) triadic account of developmental logic in terms of the first-, second-, and third-person perspectives is basically correct and does a nice job of integrating Freudian shadow with Keganesque light, it still retains the confusions of his (2007, 18-23, 224-5) tri/quad conflation, wherein the first-, second-, and third-person perspectives are mistakenly equated and conflated with, respectively, what would otherwise be indefinite intentional (X_{UL}), cultural (X_{LL}), and combined behavioral (X_{UR}) and social (X_{LR}) perspectives, thus rendering the proposed developmental logic completely incoherent. Nevertheless, by reconstructing Wilber's triadic account of healthy/unhealthy development within the triadic quadratic perspectivism of the integral/différantial self, we can clearly identify the light and the shadow of personal development, wherein, for example, healthy development (re/de)constructs the deep-structural capacities of yesterday's *I-me* within the deeper-structural capacities of today's *I-me*, while unhealthy development represses and projects both negative and positive aspects of *I-me* (1_{UL+UR}) to either *you-you* (2_{UL+UR}) or *she-her* (3_{UL+UR}). Furthermore, TQP frames the very important dialogical distinctions between, in the first derivative (TQP^1), *my* disowned projections onto what *I* regard as *your* intentions-behaviors (2_{UL+UR}) or *her* intentions-behaviors (3_{UL+UR}), and, in the second derivative (TQP^2), what *I* regard as *your* own first-hand experience of *your* intentions-behaviors (2.123_{UL+UR}) or *her* own first-hand experience of *her* intentions-behaviors (3.123_{UL+UR}) that necessarily challenge *my* projections in the course of *our* mutual, reflexive development. Without these TQP^2 dialogical distinctions, there is no way to perspectively account for the development in which *I* might eventually re-integrate *my* projections onto *you* and *her*, while *we* come to realize who *we* really are in relation to one another (123.123_{AQ}).

[87] Habermas (1984, 275; 1992b, 57).

[88] Wilber (2000d, 703).

[89] Habermas (1992c, 91).

[90] This is in contrast to Wilber's AQAL formulation, in which he equates and conflates an unacknowledged indefinite collective-subjective perspective (X_{LL}) with an undifferentiated interpersonal perspective (2), resulting in the distortion of both original perspectives in his LL quadrant, which he then alternately refers to as an *intersubjective* perspective, a *second-person* perspective, a *first-person* plural perspective, a *cultural worldview* perspective, and a *lifeworld* perspective. See Appendix A for a critique of the tri/quad conflation.

[91] Habermas (1992c, 110).

[92] Habermas (1992c, 110).

[93] Habermas (1992c, 110). I should note that this particular passage by Habermas is unusually articulate in its differentiations of the pragmatic-semiotic perspectives essential to any such analysis, which comes fairly close to identifying the first-, second-, and third-person perspectives in both their individual and collective dimensions, merely implying the corresponding subjective-objective differentiation already contained in Peirce's model, and more than merely implying the beginning of a second-derivative differentiation. This is a great deal more articulated than nearly everything else he has written on the topic, which is typically limited to a simple triadic differentiation that, at best, alludes to the mutual nature of this triadic differentiation.

[94] Wilber (2000d, 701-4; 2007, 287).

[95] Defenders of Wilber's semiotic model might attempt to counter this critique by claiming that his indefinite quadratic semiotics of intentional *signified* (X_{UL}), behavioral *signifier* (X_{UR}), cultural *semantics* (X_{LL}), and social *syntax* (X_{LR}) is a deliberately simplified version of my triadic quadratic semiotics and that the differentiation/integration of the first-person *symptoms* of freedom (123.1_{AQ}), second-person *signals* of justice (123.2_{AQ}), and third-person *symbols* of truth (123.3_{AQ}) are therefore implied in his indefinite quadratic semiotics. Apart from the fact that Wilber has never mentioned or referenced Bühler's triadic semiotics, or any other semiotics based on the first-, second-, and third-person perspectives, the more salient counterpoint to such an evidence-free claim would be that Wilber's tri/quad conflation makes it perfectly clear that he equates and conflates the first-person (1) with the intentional (UL), the second-person (2) with the cultural (LL), and the third-person (3) with the combined behavioral (UR) and social (LR), without ever acknowledging the existence of the indefinite quadratic perspectives (X_{AQ}), let alone the triadic quadratic perspectives (123_{AQ}). There-

fore, even if Wilber were to have discovered Bühler's triadic semiotics through a more careful reading of Habermas, he would have mistakenly equated and conflated the first-person expressive *symptoms* (1) with the intentional *signifieds* in his UL quadrant, the second-person appellative *signals* (2) with the cultural *semantics* in his LL quadrant, and the third-person representative *symbols* (3) with the combined behavioral *signifiers* and social *syntax* of his UR and LR quadrants.

Such a tri/quad conflated semiotics would have been completely incoherent. Ironically, the best we can say of Wilber's indefinite quadratic semiotics is that it stops short of the tri/quad conflation that would be necessary to render it consistent with his own flawed formulation of AQAL. It is this very *inconsistency* with AQAL that renders Wilber's indefinite quadratic semiotics immediately useful in triadic quadratic semiotics, as there is no need for a deconstructive effort to salvage a pure quadratic semiotics from the tri/quad conflation of AQAL before properly integrating it with a triadic semiotics to yield a genuinely triadic quadratic semiotics. Unfortunately, if Wilber mistakenly believes that his indefinite quadratic semiotics is an "AQAL semiotics," and thus congruent with the tri/quad conflation essential to AQAL, which seems very likely, then he may also mistakenly believe that this indefinite quadratic semiotics already differentiates and integrates a genuine triadic semiotics of first-, second-, and third-person perspectives. Clearly it does not, as illustrated in Figures 7 and 11.

See Appendix A for a critique of the tri/quad conflation.

[96] Habermas (1992c, 110-1).

[97] Derrida (2002).

[98] Culler (1982, 97).

[99] Derrida (2002).

[100] Derrida (2002, 559).

[101] Derrida (2002, 559).

[102] Culler (1982, 99).

[103] Derrida (2002, 561).

[104] Habermas (1990a).

[105] Habermas (1990e, 55).

[106] Habermas (1990e, 55-6).

[107] Culler (1982, 215, emphasis added).

[108] Habermas (1990d, 193) quoting Culler (1982, 181) on Derrida's deconstruction: "'If serious language is a special case of nonserious, if truths are

fictions whose fictionality has been forgotten, then literature is not a deviant, parasitical instance of language. On the contrary, other discourses can be seen as cases of a generalized literature, or archi-literature.'" Habermas (1990d, 205): "For Derrida, linguistically mediated processes within the world are embedded in a *world-constituting* context that prejudices everything; they are fatalistically delivered up to the unmanageable happening of text production, overwhelmed by the poetic-creative transformation of a background designed by archewriting, and condemned to be provincial. An aesthetic contextualism blinds him to the fact that everyday communicative practice makes learning processes possible (thanks to built-in idealizations) in relation to which the world-disclosive force of interpreting language has in turn to prove its worth. These learning processes unfold an independent logic that transcends all local constraints, because experiences and judgments are formed only in the light of criticizable validity claims."

[109] Habermas (1990d, 198).

[110] Habermas (1990c; 1990d).

[111] Wilber (2000e, 198).

[112] Deleuze and Guattari (1987, 23).

[113] TQP^1 has 12 primordial perspectives, all of which are *mine*. TQP^2 derives a new set of 12 primordial perspectives for each of the second and third persons referenced in TQP^1—*yours* and *his/hers*—which adds an additional $(2 \times 12 =)$ 24 perspectives. TQP^3 derives a new set of 12 primordial perspectives for each of the new second and third persons referenced in TQP^2, which adds an additional $(4 \times 12 =)$ 48 perspectives. TQP^4 derives a new set of 12 primordial perspectives for each of the new second and third persons referenced in TQP^3, which adds an additional $(8 \times 12 =)$ 96 perspectives. TQP^5 derives a new set of 12 primordial perspectives for each of the new second and third persons referenced in TQP^4, which adds an additional $(16 \times 12 =)$ 96 perspectives. In summary, the total number of primordial perspectives identified in TQP^5 is $12 + (2 \times 12) + (4 \times 12) + (8 \times 12) + (16 \times 12) = 12 + 24 + 48 + 96 + 192 = 372$. The total number of unique, enactive *I*s identified in TQP^5, each of whom enacts his or her own complete set of 12 primordial perspectives, is 31 ($= 372 \div 12$).

Regarding the graphical design of Figure 13 in relation to Figure 12, note that the increasing derivatives of TQP, from the 4th to the Infinite, are all framed as deeper/wider permutations within the 3rd Derivative perspectives of $2.2.2_{AQ}$, $2.2.3_{AQ}$, $2.3.2_{AQ}$, $2.3.3_{AQ}$, $3.2.2_{AQ}$, $3.2.3_{AQ}$, $3.3.2_{AQ}$, and $3.3.3_{AQ}$. This is the fractal pattern of differentiation from which TQP^2 and TQP^3 were derived. Beginning with Figure 12, if you can imagine delineating each of

these additional derivatives using the same light gray lines used to delineate TQP[3], you will see that the white space within these 3rd Derivative perspectives fills up with gray ink at the 5th Derivative, leaving just a sliver of white in each from the 4th Derivative first-person perspectives that were not further differentiated: 2.2.2.1AQ, 2.2.3.1AQ, 2.3.2.1AQ, 2.3.3.1AQ, 3.2.2.1AQ, 3.2.3.1AQ, 3.3.2.1AQ, and 3.3.3.1AQ. Thus, when depicting the Infinite Derivative TQP[∞] on such a small scale, I can only use this 5th Derivative.

[114] Gebser (1985, 117).

[115] Gebser (1985, 529).

[116] The term *integral-aperspectival* was coined by Jean Gebser (1985) in the mid-20th century in reference to the emerging structure of consciousness he so brilliantly clarified through painstaking documentation and interpretation of art, literature, social science, and natural science, yet never modeled in any visual-logical way. While TQP presents one particular version of an integral aperspectival meta-theory—the only one of which I am aware—it should not be misconstrued as an attempt to represent Gebser's theory of consciousness any more than his theory of consciousness should be necessarily attributed to TQP. Simply put, Gebser's integral-aperspectival consciousness is neither *triadic* nor *quadratic* and therefore *not* TQP. That being said, there appears to be enough commonality to warrant these preliminary observations in advance of a more systematic inquiry and reconstruction.

[117] Wilber (2007, 248-61).

[118] Cook (1989, 214).

[119] TQP[∞] also reminds me of certain features of the ancient process philosophy of Taoism. In his reconstruction of the key concepts in Taoist cosmology, Roger Ames (1989, 113-44) explores the deeper meaning of *tao*, the *holistic field* from which Taoism gets its name, and *te*, the *particular focus*, which is an equally significant concept emphasized in Lao-Tzu's seminal text, *Tao-te-ching*. In short, Ames (1989, 136) suggests that "*tao* be understood as an emerging pattern of relatedness perceived from the perspective of an irreducibly participatory *te*." He (1989, 132) further clarifies that "*tao* in its broadest meaning is the 'spontaneous'… 'self-evidencing' process of all that is as it presences for a given particular. It would be a contradiction to suggest that the all-embracing *tao* is entertained from some objective perspective beyond it; rather it is always engaged from some particular perspective within it. This, then, is the basis of the polar relationship of *tao* as field and *te* as a particular focus."

In my interpretation, the particular *focus*, *te*, is suggestive of the unique enactive *I* with which the triadic quadratic perspectival *field*, *tao*, of infinitely

particularized and interrelated *I*s appears to co-arise in a continuous practice of mutual, reflexive, différantial, yet integral presencing. This further suggests that *tao* might be interpreted as the spontaneously self-evidencing complementarity between a postulated *ever-present context-immanent actuality* that nevertheless presupposes a *never-present context-transcendent ideality*, both of which are necessarily construed from the variegated perspectives of those particular *I*s, *te*, who constitute these contexts. That being said, in this philosophy as in life, while the field, *tao*, attracts most of the attention, it is the focus, *te*, that deserves a closer look. Ames (1989, 125-6) contends that:

> *te*, at a fundamental cosmological level, denotes the arising of the particular in a process vision of existence. The particular is the unfolding of a *sui generis* focus of potency that embraces and determines conditions within the range and parameters of its particularity.… The range of its particularity is variable, and is contingent upon the way in which it interprets itself and is interpreted. It is a focus because its context, in whatever direction and degree, can alternatively be construed as 'self' or 'other.' The presencing of particulars… is characterized by an inherent dynamism which, through its own disposition and self-direction, interprets the world. It has the possibility of making a direction appropriate by expressing itself in compromise between its own disposition and the context which it makes its own.… There is an openness of the particular such that it can through harmonization and patterns of deference diffuse to become coextensive with other particulars, and absorb an increasingly broader field of 'arising' within the sphere of its own particularity. As a particular extends itself to encompass a wider range of 'presencing' or 'rising,' the possibilities of its conditions and its potency for self-construal are proportionately increased.

Therefore, each and every particular focus, or unique enactive *I*, has the potential to deepen and broaden the TQP^N field of its own harmonious presencing and, in so doing, contribute to the harmonious presencing of all the other particular focused *I*s in that field. The question, then, is *how do we do this?* In Taoism, the type of action characteristic of this harmonious presencing is called *wu-wei*, which is commonly misinterpreted by Western scholars as some sort of *acquiescent non-action* that contrasts with conventional instrumental notions of *antagonistic proaction/reaction*. Ames (1989, 137), however, reinterprets *wu-wei* as "a negation of that kind of 'making' or 'doing' which requires that a particular sacrifice its own integrity in acting on behalf of something 'other,' a negation of one particular serving as a

'means' for something else's 'end.' *Wu-wei* is the negation of that kind of engagement that makes something false to itself… and that kind of related-ness between two particulars that will compromise their opportunity for 'self-evidencing.'" He (Ames, 1989, 138) further argues that "*wu-wei*… is bidirectionally deferential in that it entails both the *integrity* of the particular and its *integration* in context.… *Wu-wei*… is the particular authoring itself, on the one hand, deferring to the integrity of its environment, and at the same time demanding that the environing conditions defer to its integrity."

In my interpretation, *wu-wei* is consistent with the requisite practices of transparency, choice, and accountability by which each and every particular focus, *I*, realizes its potential to deepen and broaden the triadic quadratic perspectival field of its own harmonious presencing and, in so doing, contribute to the harmonious presencing of all the other particular focused *I*s in its field. Hence, the emerging integrity of *my* particular self-imaging/world-viewing should not require *you* to sacrifice *your* own emerg-ing integrity nor *her* to sacrifice *her* own emerging integrity in order that *each* of *us* may actively integrate *each* of *our* emergent selves/worlds in our requisite realization. On the contrary, it appears that *my* emerging integrity may actually depend upon *yours* and *hers*, just as *ours* may depend upon *theirs*, as we are all presently implicated and eventually explicated in this integral aperspectival/apractical field of potentially harmonious presencing. Despite the evidence that each and every one of us has indeed pursued our own marginally satisfying notions of truth, justice, and freedom in ways that apparently require others to curtail their pursuits of the same, there also appears to be no way to ignore forever our semiotic, pragmatic, and praxio-logical interdependence in ultimate realization ($A^\infty = TCA^\infty \times TQP^\infty = R^\infty$).

[120] There is an unfortunate similarity between the terms I must use to denote the *indeterminate*, N, number of derivatives of TQP, that are always *specific* personal perspectives, and the *indefinite*, X, personal perspectives that are always *generic* personal perspectives. Indeterminate, N, is a quantitative variable that can be any integer from 0 to infinity. Indefinite, X, is not a quantitative variable, but rather a qualitative status of a pronoun and corresponding perspective regarded as generic, rather than specific, as universal, rather than particular (e.g., *each*, *all*, *one*, *many*, *anyone*, *everyone*, *anything*, *everything*). The presupposition of a dynamic indeterminate deriva-tive of TQP reality, denoted R^N, is therefore *radically different* from the presupposition of a static indefinite reality, whether monadic, dyadic, or quadratic, all of which might be denoted R^X. By placing the non-quantitative X in the power position reserved for a quantitative variable, this sign is intended to signify, if not also induce, the cognitive dissonance that post-

postmodern philosophers should, in my opinion, experience when present-ed with a *monological* meta-theory or meta-narrative of *anyone* and *everyone*, *anything* and *everything*, erroneously purported to be *dialogical*, if not also *integral*.

[121] According to Merriam-Webster (http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/indeterminate) and Wikipedia (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Indeterminate_form) the term *indeterminate* has two mathematical defini-tions. It can characterize both a system of equations with an infinite number of potential solutions and any of seven undefined mathematical expressions: $0/0$, 0^0, $0 \times \infty$, ∞^0, ∞/∞, $\infty-\infty$, 1^∞. While I am certainly no mathematician and do not want to read too much into these indeterminate expressions, I find it interesting that the three variables used in these seven expressions—0, 1, and ∞—appear to be the only *determinate* derivatives of the otherwise *indeterminate*—N—derivatives of triadic quadratic perspectivism. In other words, the 1st derivative of Awareness-in-Action, TQP^1, in which the 12 primordial perspectives co-arise within the implied 0 derivative of Aware-ness-in-Action, TQP^0, is always already open, of necessity due precisely to its personal perspectival structure, to the implied infinite derivative of Awareness-in-Action, TQP^∞, all three of which—0, 1, and ∞—are necessary to frame the field of possibilities for the otherwise indeterminate derivatives of any particular, context-specific action-in-awareness, TQP^N.

[122] The perspectival notation for TQP^N is rendered as 123.123$_{AQ}$, which is the same as that denoting the 2nd derivative TQP^2. The 2nd derivative is the most basic TQP derivative in which the fractal pattern of differentiation is estab-lished and the inherent mutuality, reflexivity, and différance of human action can be recognized. Why limit the Nth derivative perspectival notation to the 2nd derivative? Because it gets very cumbersome to add additional 123s for a variable, N, that can theoretically climb to infinity. Thus, it is necessary to recognize that additional derivatives are *always implied* as potential. That is the meaning of the indeterminate derivative. I have con-sidered the possibility of adding three ellipsis points after the 2nd derivative, such as 123.123…$_{AQ}$, but this pushes the subscript quadratic notation away from the triadic notation, thus reducing the clarity of the combined notation. Therefore, 123.123$_{AQ}$ denotes *at least* the 2nd derivative TQP, which is how I typically present TQP^N.

[123] Habermas (1998c, 336-8).

[124] Ramana (1997, 41).

[125] Waite (2007, 258-63).

[126] Ananda Wood (n.d.), for example, translates and explains the insights of

the 5th century linguistic philosopher, Bhartrihari, whose phenomenological analysis of language tracks the cartography of multi-state consciousness profiled in the *Mandukya Upanishad*, one of the most significant source texts in Advaita Vedanta.

As Dennis Waite (2007, 4) introduces it, *Advaita*, meaning *not-two*, is a nondual philosophy of Self-realization rooted in the *Vedanta*, meaning the *final sections* and *culminating wisdom* of the *Vedas*, the sacred texts of ancient India purportedly written 2,000 to 3,000 years ago after being passed down orally for thousands of years prior to that. Known also as the *Upanishads*, which means *sitting near the teacher*, the Vedanta teachings are grounded in direct experience of Self-realization by *rishis*, or *seers*, who are the forebears of contemporary seers like Ramana Maharshi. The *Mandukya Upanishad*, described by Waite (2007, 586) as possibly the single most important Upanishad and by the 8th century sage Adi Shankara (Nikhilananda, 2006, 2) as the quintessence of all the Upanishads, focuses exclusively on the sacred sound, sign, and word *Aum*, which is widely recognized in Devanagari script as ॐ.

Swami Nikhilananda's (2006, 9-11) masterful translation of the *Mandukya Upanishad* begins by equating *Aum* with the Real Self, *Atman*, and the Absolute Reality, *Brahman*, inclusive of "all this…," "all that is past, present and future…," and "that which is beyond the triple conception of time." After declaring (Nikhilananda, 2006, 11) that "this Atman has four quarters," it then outlines through a series of verses a cartography of multi-state consciousness correlated with the phonetic spelling of *A-U-M*, direct translations of which include the following:

- "The first quarter… is *Vaiśvānara* whose sphere (of activity) is the waking state, who is conscious of external objects,… and whose experience consists of gross (material) objects." (Nikhilananda, 2006, 13) Furthermore, "he who is *Vaiśvānara*, having for its sphere of activity the waking state, is *A*, the first letter (of *Aum*) on account of its all-pervasiveness or on account of its being the first (these being the common features of both). One who knows this attains to the fulfillment of all desires and becomes the first (of all)." (Nikhilananda, 2006, 71)

- "The second quarter… is the *Taijasa* whose sphere (of activity) is the dream, who is conscious of internal objects,… and who experiences the subtle objects." (Nikhilananda, 2006, 18) Furthermore, "*Taijasa*, whose sphere of activity is the dream state, is *U*, the second letter (of *Aum*) on account of superiority or on account of being in between the two. He who knows this attains to a superior knowledge, is treated equally by all alike and finds no one in his

line who is not a knower of Brahman." (Nikhilananda, 2006, 72)

- "The third quarter… is *Prājña* whose sphere is deep sleep, in whom all (experiences) become unified or undifferentiated, who is verily, a mass of consciousness entire, who is full of bliss and experiences bliss, and who is the path leading to the knowledge (of the two other states)." (Nikhilananda, 2006, 21) Furthermore, "*Prājña* whose sphere is deep sleep is *M* the third... (letter) of *Aum*, because it is both the measure and that wherein all become one. One who knows this (identity of *Prājña* and *M*) is able to measure all (realise the real nature of the world) and also comprehends all within himself." (Nikhilananda, 2006, 73)
- "*Turīya* [the *fourth*] is not that which is conscious of the internal (subjective) world, nor that which is conscious of the external (objective) world, nor that which is conscious of both, nor that which is a mass of all sentiency, nor that which is simple consciousness, nor that which is insentient. (It is) unseen (by any sense organ), not related to anything, incomprehensible (by the mind), uninferable, unthinkable, indescribable, essentially of the nature of Consciousness constituting the Self alone, negation of all phenomena, the Peaceful, all Bliss and the Non-dual. This is the *Ātman* and it has to be realised." (Nikhilananda, 2006, 47-8)
- "The same *Ātman*… is, again, *Aum*, from the point of view of the syllables. The *Aum* with parts is viewed from the standpoint of sounds. The quarters are the letters… and the letters are the quarters. The letters here are *A, U* and *M*." (Nikhilananda, 2006, 70) "That which has no parts (soundless), incomprehensible (with the aid of the senses), the cessation of all phenomena, all bliss and non-dual *Aum*, is the fourth and verily the same as the *Ātman*. He who knows this merges his self in the Self." (Nikhilananda, 2006, 78)

As these rather esoteric verses nevertheless reveal, the phonemes of *Aum* designate more than the three primary *states* of consciousness that unfold within the fourth non-state source of all. They actually designate the three *centers* of consciousness who *experience* those *states*, or the *identities* who *identify with* the experiences of those states. This is a subtle but essential distinction that is lost in many translations and popularizations of this teaching. It is all too easy to imagine that the deeper states of consciousness described in spiritual philosophy are just extraordinary experiences given to the same experiencer, the same *I*, who ordinarily experiences the apparent world of the waking state—that is, the *I* that *I* think *I* am as the implied origin of all that *I* think *I* do within the world that *I* think *I* know.

But as Waite (2007, 299) clarifies, "the three states are unarguably separate states from the standpoint of the phenomenal world, with each having its own characteristics and apparent 'ego.' The waking state is called *jAgrat*, with its waking ego of *vishva* (literally meaning 'whole, entire,' because the individual person seems to be 'complete'), also referred to as *vaishvAnara* (literally 'relating to or belonging to all men'). The dreaming state is *svapna*, with the dreaming-ego *taijasa*, literally 'consisting of light.' *svapna* also means sleeping but it is only the body that sleeps in this state—the mind is very active, constructing its own world out of itself, complete with its own space, time and causality. The true sleeping state—deep sleep—is called *suShupti* and the sleeper is *Praj~na*. In this state, both body and mind are inactive and time apparently stands still. It is the mind that, upon waking, claims that the deep-sleep experience was a blank since it was not present at the time. But clearly the Self must have been there—indeed it is never absent." Therefore, to summarize, *Vaiśvānara*, *A*, is the *gross self* whose sphere of experience is the waking state, *jagrat*; *Taijasa*, *U*, is the *subtle self* whose sphere of experience is the dreaming state, *svapna*; and *Prājña*, *M*, is the *causal self* whose sphere of experience is the sleeping state, *suṣupti*.

Furthermore, Nikhilananda (2006, 32) notes that, "the three apparent cognisers, *Viśvā*, *Taijasa*, and *Prājña* are really one, because a plurality of perceivers in the same state, namely, the waking, and in the same body is an absurdity, as that would preclude the possibility of the continuity of perception as revealed through memory. Therefore the apparently three different perceivers are identical and their apparent distinction is due to their identification with the three states…. The difference is only imaginary and empirical and due to the identification with different bodies [i.e., experiential worlds]. Really speaking, one *Ātman* alone manifests itself in different forms…." Ramana Maharshi (1974, 16-7) adds an additional distinction to the articulation of *Ātman* as *Turīya*, or the *fourth*. "The experiencers (*jivas*) of the three states of waking, dreaming and deep sleep, known as *vishva*, *taijasa* and *prajna*, who wander successively in these three states, are not the Self. It is with the object of making this clear, namely that the Self is that which is different from them and which is the witness of these states, that it is called the fourth (*turiya*). When this is known, the three experiencers disappear and the idea that the Self is a witness, that it is the fourth, also disappears. That is why the Self is described as beyond the fourth (*turiyatita*)."

Therefore, we might say that the real Self, *Atman*, at one with absolute Reality, *Brahman*, when not properly Self-identified, contracts to the mistaken identity of the causal self, *Prājña*, whose sphere of experience is typically limited to the sleeping state, *suṣupti*, who when not properly identified

contracts further to the mistaken identity of the subtle self, *Taijasa*, whose sphere of experience is typically limited to the dreaming state, *svapna*, who when not properly identified contracts further still to the mistaken identity of the gross self, *Viśvā*, whose sphere of experience is typically limited to the waking state, *jagrat*, from whose perspective the ordinary experiences of waking, dreaming, and sleeping follow an involuntary daily cycle of multiphasic self-consciousness that disguises the depths of the Self ever-present.

One common way to experientially access the depths of the Self ever-present during the waking state is the meditative incantation of *Aum* in its capacity as the primordial *mantra*. Mantras are meaningful syllables, words, or short phrases that are recited aloud or silently as a form of meditation that concentrates, calms, and clears the mind. The word *mantra* is composed of the verb *man*, which means *to think*, and the word *tra*, which means *instrumentality* and, via the related verb *trai*, *to protect* or *free*. Therefore, this practice may be understood as the instrumental repetition of a particular thought, the mantra, in order to free the mind of other thoughts and initiate deeper awareness of the Self. As the primordial mantra, *Aum* encompasses all other mantras, as well as all sounds and all letters of the alphabet, given that *A* is the first sound the voice can make and *M* is the last, while *U* bridges the middle range between the two. When coupled with a series of *yogic* preliminaries, including steady posture, *asana*, controlled breathing, *pranayama*, withdrawn senses, *pratyahara*, and mental concentration, *dharana*, the meditative, *dhyana*, incantation, *japa*, of the mantra *A-U-M*, inclusive of the lingering silence after the *M*, is said to guide the locus of awareness, the *subject* rather than the *object* of awareness, from *Viśvā* to *Taijasa* to *Prājña* to *Atman*, culminating in the wakeful awareness of the Self, *samadhi*. (Vishnu-Devananda, 2003, 47, 55-6, 78) As Waite (2007, 596, 606, 589, 595) further clarifies, this "state of total peace and stillness achieved during meditation," known as *samadhi*, has four distinct stages of emergence, from Self-realization with "doubt, uncertainty, or indecision," *vikalpa samadhi*, to Self-realization "'with' [lingering] doubts about one's identity with the one Self," *savikalpa samadhi*, to Self-realization "'without' doubts about one's identity with the one Self," *nirvikalpa samadhi*, to Self-realization that is "full and lasting knowledge of the Self," *sahaja sthiti samadhi*.

In one sense, *Aum* can be interpreted as a sound, sign, and word that designates, step-by-step, the meditative path back to the silent awareness within which, as which, all else arises and falls, as if those *rishis* who first discovered this path subsequently conceived a word that would adequately signify it in their spoken and written teachings. But in another, complementary sense, *Aum* can be interpreted as a discovery in itself, a revelation to

those *rishis* who first developed the capacity to remain fully aware through all their passing states of consciousness—gross/waking, subtle/dreaming, and causal/sleeping—to rest in the silent awareness that they, and we, really are, and to witness the manner in which this subtle sound permeates, indeed vibrates as, all manifest creation.

It is in light of this view that Bhartrihari (Waite, 2007, 258-63) apparently formulated his thesis that language is the means by which the silent awareness of the real Self manifests through speech into the differentiated names and forms of our worldly experience, tracking the A-U-M cartography of consciousness as it unfolds in each moment of more-or-less aware, but nevertheless wakeful, communication. In my reconstruction, weaving the essential terminology of the *Mandukya Upanishad* together with Ananda Wood's (n.d., 29) account of Bhartrihari's linguistics yields a general outline of what we might refer to as *primordial semiotics* and *pragmatics*:

- *A* designates the real Self in its constrained capacity as the *gross self*, *Vaiśvānara*, whose sphere of experience is that of the *waking state*, *jagrat*, and corresponds with the gross state of linguistic expression called *elaborating*, *vaikhari*, that is characterized by the "personal articulation of words and symbols" and the "changing world of perceived objects." This is the state of differentiated names and forms, *nama-rupa*, elaborated through the use of spoken/written language, and corresponds with the specific content, and particularly the objective content, of the triadic quadratic perspectives. Simply put, this state has the potential to illuminate all the signs and referents of spoken/written language.

- *U* designates the real Self in its constrained capacity as the *subtle self*, *Taijasa*, whose sphere of experience is more commonly that of the *dreaming state*, *svapna*, and corresponds with (the wakeful experience of) the subtle state of linguistic expression called *mediating*, *madhyama*, that is characterized by the "succession of mental states through which symbols are formed and meanings are interpreted" and the "flow of happenings through which objects take shape and convey meaning." This is the state in which all differentiated names and forms of the gross realm are enfolded as potential expressions of language, and corresponds with the differentiation of the triadic quadratic perspectives in the linguistic medium itself. Simply put, this state has the potential to illuminate the use of all language as well as all that is spoken/written with language.

- *M* designates the real Self in its constrained capacity as the *causal self*, *Prājña*, whose sphere of experience is most commonly that of

the sleeping state, *suṣupti*, and corresponds with (the wakeful experience of) the causal state of linguistic expression called *seeing*, *pashyanti*, that is characterized by a "quiet insight and latent potentiality continuing at the depth of mind" and a "subtly intelligible order and causation of nature's functioning." This is the state in which all differentiated perspectives and distinct languages are enfolded as latent potential, and corresponds with the causal *I* that enfolds/unfolds the triadic quadratic perspectives of the subtle state. Simply put, this state has the potential to illuminate the causal source of all languages prior to their use, as well as the use of all language and all that is spoken/written with language. (Incidentally, the dissolution/resolution of the causal *I* within the background of integral awareness is depicted, as a transitional moment out of perspectival space-time, in Figure 15.)

- *Silence* designates the non-dual awareness that is the real Self, *Atman*, at one with absolute Reality, *Brahman*, and corresponds with (the wakeful experience of) the self-illuminating origin of linguistic expression called *beyond*, *para*, that is characterized as a "pure and unconditioned seeing, quite unmixed with any passing states or differentiated objects" and the "ultimate identity of knowing and being." This is the realization of who we really are beyond the constrained capacities of the gross, subtle, and causal selves, and corresponds with the circle of integral awareness illuminating all différantial action manifesting through the apparent agencies of the causal, subtle, and gross selves in our situational awareness-in-action. Simply put, this illuminates the Silence of the Self, *mouna*, that is beyond all communicative language but nevertheless powerfully transmissive. Ramana Maharshi (2001, 151), whose preferred method of teaching was indeed Silence, declared that "*mouna* is not closing the mouth. It is eternal speech…. That state which transcends speech and thought is *mouna*." He (2001, 162-3) also mentioned that "what one fails to know by conversation extending to several years can be known in a moment in Silence, or in front of Silence…. That is the highest and most effective language."

Therefore, as the inverse of the multi-state *meditation* that guides us back to the silent illumination behind our worldly experience, there is a multi-state *signification* by which this silent illumination manifests through the use of language as the differentiated names and forms of our self-imaging/world-viewing. In both interpretations, the states of our situational awareness-in-action are none other than the *illumination*/*manifestation* of the integral/

différantial Self both discovered and designated as *Aum*—the primordial *Sound of Silence*.

Thus, as Wood (n.d., 39) notes, *Aum* is often described as *bijakshara*, the unique, unchanging *seed syllable* that enfolds as latent potential all the other syllables, words, sentences, stories, and languages with which we construct, deconstruct, and reconstruct our relative realities, the very sound of which draws the contemplative mind back to the deep silence of the Self. This implies that *Aum* literally is *the* sound within *all* sounds, *the* sign of *all* signs, and *the* word behind *all* words—that *primordial semiosis* from which all triadic quadratic perspectival *signs* and *referents*, *names* and *forms*, are derived in the integral awareness we secretly, silently are. In this view, *Aum* would be the *Self-referencing sign* and *Self-signifying referent* of a new multi-state depth dimension in integral/différantial semiotics, pragmatics, and praxiology. This is all the more suggestive of triadic quadratic perspectivism as the *mandala* of Awareness-in-Action—the *sacred circle* of integrally aperspectival, yet différantially perspectival self-imaging/world-viewing by which *we*—*I*, *each* of *you*, and *each* of *them*—alternately manifest and illuminate *each* of *our* unique, yet interpenetrating visions of reality.

This hypothesis of primordial semiosis through which integral awareness manifests as différantial action clarifies the depth perspective in my reconstruction of Derrida's (1996; 2002) deconstructive critique of the phonocentric (con)fusion of subjective, intentional signifieds (123UL) with objective, behavioral signifiers (123UR), which, in his view, leads to the philosophical metaphysics of a presence forever presumed, yet never realized. Primordial semiosis traces this (con)fusion state-by-state back from its acute manifestation in the fully differentiated Self-as-*gross*-self, *Viśvā*, in its sphere of *elaborating* semiosis, *vaikhari*, to its deeper, intuited origins in the Self-as-*subtle*-self, *Taijasa*, in its sphere of *mediating* semiosis, *madhyama*, the Self-as-*causal*-self, *Prājña*, in its sphere of *seeing* semiosis, *pashyanti*, and the *integral* Self, *Atman*, as the illuminating origin *beyond* semiosis, *para*, yet paradoxically *of* semiosis itself. In view of this primordial semiosis, all différantial signs that are so understandably susceptible to a more fully elaborated deconstruction nevertheless contain a *primordial trace* of the *Self-referencing sign* and *Self-signifying referent Aum*, which is but the vocal manifestation of the real Self, *Atman*, at one with absolute Reality, *Brahman*, that is therefore the secret, silent integral source of all these différantial signs.

As to the predictable Derridean challenge that this hypothesis of primordial semiosis might be just another metaphysical doctrine of presence, the definitive post-metaphysical response—following my integral post-metaphysical maxim that *the reality of a declarative is the imperative to realize*

it—is to offer an exemplary practice by which the appropriately skeptical practitioner might realize in his or her own direct awareness the real nature of this purportedly primordial semiosis. Thus, given the persuasive critique of the metaphysics of presence offered by an integrally reconstructed deconstruction, as proposed in my formulations of integral/différantial semiotics and pragmatics, what is the potential for a *post-metaphysics of presence* that is consistent with this integral/différantial semiotics and pragmatics? The answer begins with the recognition that, if all différantial actions contain a primordial trace of the integral awareness that is their secret, silent source, then integral/différantial semiotics and pragmatics cannot be limited to action conditioned by the relative *I* that *I* think *I* am.

Therefore, if *I* am serious about the deconstructive revelation of primordial perspectival differentiations amidst the reconstructive integrations of *my* situational awareness-in-action, then *I* must follow this purportedly primordial trace back to the source and see for *myself* whatever there is to see. Because the most immediate semiotic source of *Aum*, *Atman*, and *Brahman* to which *I* can direct *my* attention is the *I* that *I* think *I* am as *I* say what *I* think *I* say, it is to this *I* that *I* must direct *my* inquiry. This brings *me* back to the practice of self-inquiry, as taught by Ramana Maharshi. The practice of self-inquiry, the Sanskrit name for which is *atma vichara*, is a subtle, silent inquiry, *vichara*, into *who I am* at the apparent source of all perspectives, thoughts, feelings, and actions, the sustained practice of which transcends the mental flow and purportedly reveals the integral awareness *that I am*, the real self, *Atman*, at one with absolute reality, *Brahman*, illuminating all manifest perspectives, thoughts, feelings, and actions. In his (Ramana, 1992, 51) view, "self-enquiry is the one infallible means, the only direct one, to realise the unconditioned, absolute being that you really are."

[127] Wilber (2007, 258).

[128] Ramana (1992, 51).

[129] Argyris, et. al. (1978; 1985; 1990; 1993).

[130] Argyris, Putnam, & McLain Smith (1985, 4).

[131] Argyris (1993, 1-4).

[132] Lewin (1999).

[133] Schön (1983).

[134] McGregor (1985).

[135] Torbert (2004).

[136] Marquardt (1999).

[137] Schein (1987; 1988).

[138] Kolb (1984).

[139] Knowles, Holton, & Swanson (1998).

[140] Isaac (1999).

[141] Kegan and Leahy (2001, 2009).

[142] Cooperrider, Sorensen, Whitney, & Yaeger (2000).

[143] Scharmer (2007).

[144] Argyris (1986).

[145] Argyris (1993, 1).

[146] Habermas (1975, 15).

[147] Habermas (1975; 1979; 1984; 1987; 1990b).

[148] Habermas (1975, 15, emphasis added).

[149] Argyris, Putnam, and McLain Smith (1985, 69-79).

[150] Habermas (1971).

[151] Geuss's (1981).

[152] Habermas (1979; 1984; 1987).

[153] Habermas (1984; 1987).

[154] Habermas (1979; 1984; 1987).

[155] Argyris et al. (1985, 80-1).

[156] I have taken the liberty of revising one of the terms in the theory of action—changing the term *governing values* to *action values*—in order to facilitate a better understanding of the model as well as better integration with related models in this work.

[157] Argyris et al. (1985, 80-8); Argyris (1990, 94); Argyris (1993, 50).

[158] Argyris et al. (1985, 80-8).

[159] Habermas (1987, 96).

[160] Habermas (1979, 41, 117-9).

[161] Habermas (1979, 117).

[162] Habermas (1979, 118; 1975, 15).

[163] Mises (1998).

[164] Kotarbiński (2002).

[165] Habermas (1998a, 203).

[166] Habermas (1987, 126-7).

[167] Habermas (1979, 97-8).

168 Habermas (1979, 98, 122).

169 Habermas (1979, 173).

170 Argyris (1986).

171 Argyris et al. (1985, 99).

172 Habermas (1979, 173).

173 Habermas (1975, 8).

174 McCarthy (1994, 246).

175 McCarthy (1994, 246).

176 McCarthy (1994, 246).

177 Wilber (1999d, 292).

178 Habermas (1987, 117).

179 Habermas (1987, 150-1).

180 Habermas (1971, 308).

181 Habermas (1987, 151).

182 Habermas (1987, 117).

183 While I am not aware of any particular positioning by Habermas of his critical theory as distinctively *post-postmodern* either in form or intent, I think it is a justifiable interpretation in light of his evidently post-postmodern embrace of post-metaphysical philosophy, as explicitly described in *Postmetaphysical Thinking* (1992), as well as his critical engagement with both *modern* (e.g., *philosophy of the subject*) and *postmodern* (e.g., *deconstruction*) philosophy that nevertheless retains reconstructed forms of their enduring strengths (e.g., modern *reason* and postmodern *language*), an exemplary demonstration of which can be found in *The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity* (1990). Still, it is possible that I am reading too much of my own formulation into Habermas's engagement with (post)modernism, as Awareness-in-Action is, in part, a modest attempt to continue the postmodern *linguistic turn*, not simply away from modernism, but all the way back around to reconstruct at least some of the essential insights of (post)modernism within a more integral, or post-postmodern, semiotics, pragmatics, and praxiology.

184 Habermas (1987, 313-4).

185 Wilber (2000a, 115-57).

186 Wilber (2003a, part ii; part iii).

187 Wilber (2000d, 436-7).

188 See Appendix A for a critique of the tri/quad conflation central to AQAL.

[189] Habermas (1987, 313-4).

[190] Wilber (2000a, 115-57).

[191] Wilber (2003a, part iii).

[192] Habermas (1987, 119-52; 1998b, 236-46).

[193] Habermas (1987, 135).

[194] Habermas (1998b, 247-8).

[195] Habermas (1998b, 236-46),

[196] Habermas (1998b, 245).

[197] Habermas (1990b, 345-6).

[198] Habermas (1987, 140-4).

[199] Habermas (1987, 141-2).

[200] Habermas (1987, 142-3).

[201] Habermas (1979, 98).

[202] Habermas (1987, 137-8).

[203] Habermas (1998b, 247).

[204] Habermas (1987, 138).

[205] Habermas (1987, 131).

[206] Wilber (2000a, 115-57).

[207] Habermas (1987, 131).

[208] Argyris, et. al. (1985, 36).

[209] Argyris, et. al. (1985, 34-5).

[210] Morrow and Brown (1994, 57; 146-9).

[211] Habermas (1971, 308).

[212] Argyris, et. al. (1985, 5).

[213] Argyris, et. al. (1985, 6).

[214] Argyris et al. (1985, 81-3).

[215] Argyris et al. (1985, 90-1).

[216] Argyris et al. (1985, 89-91).

[217] Habermas (1979, 41, 117-9).

[218] Habermas (1979; 1990).

[219] Argyris et al. (1985, 89).

[220] Argyris et al. (1985, 91-2).

[221] Argyris (1990, 13).

[222] Argyris and Schön (1978).

[223] Argyris et al. (1985, 93).

[224] Argyris (1990, 27)

[225] Habermas (1979; 1984; 1987).

[226] Argyris et al. (1985, 51).

[227] Argyris et al. (1985, 85).

[228] Kahneman & Tversky (2000).

[229] Argyris et al. (1985, 99).

[230] Argyris et al. (1985, 98-102).

[231] Argyris et al. (1985, 102).

[232] Argyris et al. (1985, 99).

[233] Kegan (1994, 307-34, 320).

[234] Kegan (1994, 321).

[235] Braaten (1991, 9-11).

[236] Braaten (1991, 9).

[237] Habermas (1979, 69-94).

[238] Wilber (1999c, 627-47; 2007).

[239] Cook-Greuter (2002).

[240] Torbert (2004, 177-208).

[241] Wade (1996, 175-202).

[242] Kegan (1994, 307-52).

[243] The use of the term *formal* in Habermas's *formal pragmatics* should not be misinterpreted as being in any way related to the common use of the term *formal* to describe various *formal-operational* and *postformal* levels in developmental psychology. Thus, *formal* pragmatics is not a *formal-operational* pragmatics. Indeed, it is more accurately described as *postformal*-operational in that it is concerned with universal presuppositions of possible understanding well beyond the language use of formal-operational actors.

[244] Habermas (1979, 78).

[245] Habermas (1979, 90).

[246] Habermas (1984, 42).

[247] Habermas will also, in some essays and books, such as (1990f, 88), refer to *discourse* as *argumentation*. Because this term has unfortunate connotations in

American English, exacerbated by the disgraceful anti-discourse *arguing* of so many cable television news pundits and internet commenters, I prefer to use the term *discourse* exclusively.

[248] McCarthy (1994, 292).

[249] Habermas (1990f, 88).

[250] Geuss (1981, 65).

[251] McCarthy (1994, 308).

[252] Geuss (1981, 66).

[253] Habermas (1975, xvii-xviii).

[254] Geuss (1981, 66).

[255] McCarthy (1994, 310).

[256] Alexy (1990, 151-190).

[257] Habermas (1990f, 89).

[258] Habermas (1987, 149).

[259] Habermas (1987, 149).

[260] Habermas (1987, 149).

[261] Habermas (1987, 150).

[262] As suggested above, Habermas points to an apparent connection between these context-transcendent norms of discourse and the post-formal levels of ego, moral, and cognitive development subsequently documented by several researchers. By positioning Argyris's Model II as a partial answer to Habermas's search for context-transcendent norms of discourse and thereby implying that it may also be a paradigmatic exemplar of the universal ethics of speech among all people as members of a fictive world society, I draw attention to the question of how the various action science models relate to the as-yet-merely-implicit levels of Awareness-in-Action.

While Argyris does not acknowledge levels of psycho-social development as even a background for action science, I think it is reasonable to interpret Argyris's articulation of Model I, Opposite Model I, and Model II as indicative of three sequential levels of consciousness in Wilber's (1999c, 627-47; 2007) spectrum: *Orange*, *Green*, and *Teal*. Similarly, I interpret his articulation as being generally indicative of: Torbert's (2004, 104-17) *Achiever*, *Individualist*, and *Strategist* action-logics, Cook-Greuter's (2002) *Conscientious*, *Individualist*, and *Autonomous* levels of identity, Jenny Wade's (1996, 131-74) *Achievement*, *Affiliative*, and *Authentic* levels of consciousness, and Kegan's (1994, 307-52) *4th Order*, an intermediate *late-4th / early-5th Order*, and *5th Order* consciousness. In the familiar terms of socio-cultural evolution as

well as philosophy, these three levels correspond with *modernity*, *postmodernity*, and *post-postmodernity*, with the latter also being referred to by Wilberians as *integral*.

Furthermore, provided that the focus of the post-postmodern Model II discourse is not limited to the transformation of modern Model I and postmodern Opposite Model I, as is so often the case in action science interventions and literature, and provided that the Model II practitioners fully engage the multiple derivatives of triadic quadratic perspectival action-learning, the Model II practices are open to higher levels of awareness-in-action beginning with Wilber's (1999c, 627-47; 2007) *Turquoise*, Torbert's (2004, 177-208) *Alchemist*, Cook-Greuter's (2002; 2008) *Construct-Aware*, and Wade's (1996, 175-202) *Transcendent*. In other words, there is little in the action values of Model II that precludes and much that supports the emergence of higher levels of post-postformal, post-postmodern action-learning. For those with a specific interest in the intersection of action science with adult developmental psychology, I know of no better source than the excellent *action inquiry* of Bill Torbert and his associates (2004).

All that being said, in my view, the specific levels of consciousness identified in any particular theory of human development or evolution belong in the realm of *theory*, not *meta-theory*, because these structural levels are not *primordial* perspectives or practices of human awareness-in-action. As important as these various theories of multi-level consciousness may be to a comprehensive understanding of awareness-in-action, the particular sequences of levels they describe do not appear to be universal presuppositions of the awareness-in-action that actually (re)creates the actionable knowledge that is *only ever subsequently described* in various theories of multi-level consciousness, which are themselves *only ever provisionally validated* through awareness-in-action.

[263] O'Connor (2003; 2005; 2008a; 2008b; 2010).

[264] As I use the terms, an *integral paradigm* is a type of *meta-paradigm*, but likely not the only type of meta-paradigm. Based on this distinction, I will in some passages make reference to Awareness-in-Action as a general meta-paradigm that, by definition, integrates multiple constitutive paradigms, while elsewhere describing it as a distinctively integral paradigm that still, by definition, integrates multiple differential paradigms.

[265] O'Connor (2008b).

[266] My choice of the terms *authentication*, *legitimation*, and *confirmation* to refer to the *intra*personal, *inter*personal, and *im*personal modes of Awareness-in-Action is based on a variety of considerations, including the use of identical

or similar terms by Wilber, Habermas, and Argyris to refer to different, but not entirely unrelated, aspects of human action, development, and evolution. In short, different theorists use these terms in different ways, and in this respect I am no different.

Argyris (1985) uses the term *confirmation* in reference to *empirical* validation in the context of his critical social science. My use of the term *empirical* is radically extensive/intensive in that it includes all 12 primordial perspectives for each and every person identified in an action situation. In my parlance, empirical *validation* is used interchangeably with *realization* and includes empirical *confirmation* of truth, empirical *legitimation* of justice, and empirical *authentication* of freedom. While Argyris does address issues of interpersonal rightness and intrapersonal sincerity consistent with Habermas's formal pragmatics, I think his use of the term *empirical* is limited to truth claims and his use of confirmation is therefore linked exclusively to truth claims and, thus, constitutes a simplified, non-quadratic version otherwise consistent with my use of the term.

Wilber (1999b, 128; 1999c, 192; 2000d, 495-7; 2000e, 217-22) uses *confirmation* as the third strand of his procedural model of valid knowledge, which begins with a *practical injunction* to take a specific action, followed by an *experiential apprehension* of the result from the action, and culminating in a *communal (dis)confirmation* of the knowledge claimed by those who followed through on the injunction. Although the scope of Wilber's definition of valid knowledge extends to every perspective in AQAL—all quadrants, levels, lines, states, types—AQAL does not recognize the fully triadic nature of each and every quadratic perspective arising in an action situation. Therefore, although he may intend for his *confirmation* to serve as a comprehensive form of dialogical *validation* that can, via his tri/quad conflation, address claims to interpersonal justice/goodness and intrapersonal freedom/beauty just as readily as it addresses claims to impersonal truth in all four quadrants, in reality it cannot do so within the confines of the tri/quad conflated AQAL. His actual use of the term *confirmation* is therefore similar to my actual use of the term: impersonal quadratic, at best, or a more reductionist indefinite quadratic validation.

In his early work on the developmental sociology of religion, Wilber (1999a, 13) used the term *legitimacy* to describe "how well a given religion provides meaning, integration, and value on a particular level" of development and the term *authenticity* to describe "how well a given religion promotes transformation to higher levels altogether." With regard to methodology, he (1999b, 119-25) proposed *structural-hermeneutical* analysis to determine the degree of authenticity and *functional-empirical* analysis to

determine the degree of legitimacy of a particular religious expression. Approximately 20 years later, Wilber (2003a, part iii) defined legitimacy as "adequacy in horizontal translation" and authenticity as "adequacy in vertical transformation…. Thus, authenticity is a measure of the degree of depth or height of a belief system (so that a turquoise worldview is more authentic than a blue worldview), and legitimacy is a measure of how well that worldview functions at its own level. A particular worldview can be very legitimate (or happily accepted by most members of the culture) but not very authentic (e.g., it might be a purple or red belief structure). On the other hand, some worldviews might be very authentic (representing, say, turquoise or vision-logic cognitions) and yet not very legitimate (or not accepted by the ruling or ruled classes)." At first glance, there appears to be very little common ground between Wilber's use of these terms and my use of the similar terms *authentication* and *legitimation*. However, I would suggest that Awareness-in-Action reconstructs orthodox theories of the developmental/evolutionary spectrum of all human actions, including religious insights and expressions, and thereby clarifies the issues addressed by Wilber (1999b), notably allowing for the intrapersonal (in)authentication, interpersonal (de)legitimation, and impersonal (dis)confirmation of each and every religious insight and expression, which is something AQAL has never been able to frame.

As for Habermas, his use of this terminology is limited to *legitimation* and *legitimacy*, which for him (1979, 178) "means that there are good arguments for a political order's claim to be recognized as right and just; a legitimate order deserves recognition. *Legitimacy means a political order's worthiness to be recognized*." Setting aside his narrow focus on political orders, my use of legitimacy as the degree to which a particular action—including institutionalized actions—is considered just, right, and moral is similar, yet more inclusive and therefore more widely applicable to every form and field of human action.

[267] The term Awareness-in-Action is intended to signify both the absolute realization of the *integral awareness that I am* and the relative realization of the *différantial action that I do*, while precluding any latently hierarchical conceptual opposition within the complementarity of *awareness/action*. It is challenging to find the right terms to articulate nondual ideas without inadvertently denoting dualism, as is the case with the term *nondual* itself, which includes the term *dual*, and is therefore suggestive of precisely that which it is intended to not-suggest. Once understood as a deliberately dualistic term for nondualism, the linguistic tension in Awareness-in-Action might be appreciated for the meaning it carries and the inquiry it inspires. It

may also be permissible to use either of the terms *awareness* or *action* separately, often for purposes of brevity, without conveying any dualistic intentions. Thus, in my parlance, *awareness* and *action* are always *awareness-in-action* (or *action-in-awareness*), all three of which, careful readers will have noticed, are deliberately denoted with the same sign: A. Thus, A^0 signifies Awareness, the Zero Derivative (i.e., Integral) of Action, as well as the Zero Derivative of Awareness-in-Action, as all three are the same. Likewise, A^N signifies the Indeterminate Derivatives of Action, Awareness-in-Action, and, with a little extra interpretation, Awareness, which is integral to différantial action.

[268] Wilber (2007, 22, 50-70), as we have seen, typically defines both individual development and collective evolution in terms of an emergent hierarchy of progressively more *transcendent*, yet *inclusive* structures of consciousness—a colorful spectrum of consciousness with intentional, behavioral, meaningful, and functional facets—extending from prerational/premodern to rational/modern to postrational/postmodern levels and beyond. (Fig. 4) This multi-faceted, multi-leveled integral theory—termed AQAL for *all-quadrant, all-level*—informs one of the predominant discourses about human development and evolution, which emphasizes the as-yet-unrealized potential for (post-)postrational psycho-spiritual development of individuals and corresponding (post-)postmodern conscious evolution of small collectives assessed, or at least professed, to be acting from the highest echelons of that spectrum. This particular meta-theory has also become a popular tool for many students of Wilber's work, who use it to inform their all-too-instrumental explanations, interpretations, and evaluations of various people, theories, and practices as part of that same discourse about what they see as the necessary progress to higher levels of development and evolution.

In my view, those who study theories of human development and evolution are not necessarily any less prone to the ALC biases whereby an overestimation of one's own claims to truth, justice, and freedom, juxtaposed with an underestimation of everyone else's claims to the same, mutually reinforces the all-too-common deceptive, coercive, and defensive habits of reason and communication characteristic of (pre/post)modern consciousness. Informing such consciousness with developmental-evolutionary theories, whether AQAL or any of the alternatives, does little, in and of itself, to enhance the awareness-in-action of those whose tacit structures of consciousness cannot help but to process this new knowledge in purely instrumental, strategic modes of rationality. That these theories tend to be *monological* in formulation, rather than *dialogical*, and *descriptive*

theories of *applicable* knowledge rather than *prescriptive* theories of *actionable* knowledge, further compounds the instrumental tendencies by giving readers the impression that application of the theory in real-world situations should require no new forms of practice from them beyond accurate recital of the theoretical content and unreflexive, unilateral explanation, interpretation, and evaluation of other people's actions. And when some of these theories or their theorists make the claim that it is only from the highest levels of consciousness that one is able to recognize and understand all the lower levels of consciousness for their important, though subordinate, contributions—however true such a claim may be within the context of a particular theory—while then providing clear, concise descriptions of those lower levels, it tends to exacerbate the instrumental tendencies of many students of the theory, who, being so well-informed, subsequently imagine themselves capable of accurately recognizing and adequately understanding these many lower levels as they appear in the words and deeds of other people—but not so much themselves—which then implies to them that they must be operating from a superior level of consciousness, as per the theory. Needless to say, these are far less than ideal conditions for the integral/différantial discourses of authentication, legitimation, and confirmation that this controversial topic deserves.

[269] For one example, a careful review of Kegan's (1994, 314-5) theory reveals that he differentiates and integrates *three* distinct lines of consciousness—*intrapersonal*, *interpersonal*, and *impersonal*—that are *all* involved in this developmental logic by which the capacities experienced as *subject in one's knowing* within one structure of consciousness gradually transition over many years to become *object in one's knowing* from the more encompassing perspective of the higher-order subject. This suggests that the subjective-objective perspectives in developmental play are not limited to the first-person *I-me*, but would also include the second-person *you-you* and third-person *she-her*, thus 123_{UL+UR}, that are, according to the implicit rules of TQP, all perspectives of *my* integral/différantial self. Furthermore, although Kegan's (1994, 307-34) basic developmental logic does not go so far as to outline the mutual reflexive *différance* within and between the individuated perspectives of *my* integral/différantial self (123_{UL+UR}), *your* integral/différantial self (2.123_{UL+UR}), and *her* integral/différantial self (3.123_{UL+UR}), his descriptions of the (post-)postformal, (post-)postmodern 5th Order of consciousness—e.g., *interindividual self* (123.1_{UL+UR}), *interpenetration of self and other* (123.2_{UL+UR}), and *dialectical cognition* (123.3_{UL+UR})—together with his (1994, 320-1) alignment of this 5th Order with Argyris's Model II praxis—*valid information*, *free and informed choice*, and *internal commitment and vigilant*

monitoring—can be interpreted in terms of $TCA^N \times TQP^N = ALC^N$. In fact, without any deliberate attempt to do so, Kegan nevertheless comes rather close to outlining a research-based $TCA^N \times TQP^N$ theory of personal development, with five major structures of consciousness within the 123_{UL} and 123_{UR} perspectives, together with an evident sensitivity to the evolving socio-cultural contexts (X_{LL+LR}) that establish the challenges to, and opportunities for, this personal development.

For another example of a theory of personal development generally congruent with Awareness-in-Action, Susanne Cook-Greuter (2002) describes how self-awareness appears to develop through a sequence of increasingly complex perspectives on oneself and others that offer progressively more sophisticated ways of making sense of reality. These levels of awareness alternate in sequence between differentiating structures marked by a tendency toward individual agency and integrating structures marked by a tendency toward collective communion. Additionally, in a manner similar to Kegan's developmental logic, the perspective-taking capacity evident at each level in Cook-Greuter's spiral becomes, in a sense, the pragmatic object of the more encompassing perspective-taking capacity of the subsequent subjects. For example, the capacity to see oneself in relation to others both backward and forward in time in a relatively objective way, which is characteristic of the formal Conscientious structure (roughly Kegan's 3rd Order), deepens and widens across two subsequent structures into the capacity to see, from the perspective of the (post-)postformal Autonomous seer (roughly Kegan's 5th Order), the previously unrecognized relativism of the Conscientious seer embedded in cultural and social contexts across multi-generational time spans. Two structures beyond that, the psychologically mature Autonomous seer is newly recognized as an ego-centered, linguistically-constructed, high-functioning identity arising within the aperspectival ego-awareness of the Unitive seer. In short, Cook-Greuter (2002) appears to be positioning the variable capacity for perspective-taking as a qualitative indicator of that most central feature of personal development: *identity*. While she does not delineate the triadic or the quadratic perspectives within each structure of development, her research-based theory does resemble a simplified version of the multiple derivatives of triadic quadratic perspectivism, wherein the capacity to act through first-, second-, and third-person perspectives is gradually deepened through progressively more encompassing perspectives on the perspectives on the perspectives, with no apparent limits other than the quality of awareness we bring to each action situation.

[270] For more on self-deception, see:

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Self-deception

[271] For more on logical fallacies, see:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Logical_fallacy

[272] For more on cognitive biases, see:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_cognitive_biases
See also Kahneman & Tversky (2000) for the definitive research findings on decision science, with an emphasis on well-documented cognitive biases and decision heuristics. See also Mercier & Sperber (2011) for an interesting discussion concerning the possible *argumentative purpose of reason*, which would seem to support the idea that ALC^N Biases are the *normal* form of reason, rather than a *biased* form of reason. Each implies the other, as far as I am concerned.

[273] For more on psychological projection, see:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Psychological_projection

[274] For more on personality types, see:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Personality_type

[275] For more on developmental psychology, see: Kegan (1994), Cook-Greuter (2002), and Torbert, et al. (2004).

[276] My reference to an *infinite cornucopia* of information is inspired by the Law of the Infinite Cornucopia. According to Wikipedia—http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Law_of_the_infinite_cornucopia—the "Law of the Infinite Cornucopia, put forth by Polish philosopher Leszek Kołakowski suggests that for any given doctrine one wants to believe, there is never a shortage of arguments by which one can support it. A historian's application of this law might be that a plausible cause can be found for any given historical development. A biblical theologian's application of this law might be that for any doctrine one wants to believe, there is never a shortage of biblical evidence to support it." To this we might add political, economic, and sociological doctrines as well, in support of which no shortage of apparent evidence and opinion can typically be gathered by those actively seeking to verify, but not falsify, whatever it is they already believe to be true, just, and free.

[277] According to Wikipedia—https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cultural_dissonance—*cultural dissonance* "is an uncomfortable sense of discord, disharmony, confusion, or conflict experienced by people in the midst of change in their cultural environment. The changes are often unexpected, unexplained or not understandable due to various types of cultural dynamics. Studies into cultural dissonance take on a wide socio-cultural scope of analysis that inquire into economics, politics, values, learning styles, cultural factors, such

as language, tradition, ethnicity, cultural heritage, cultural history, educational formats, classroom design, and even socio-cultural issues such as ethnocentricism, racism and their respective historical legacies in the cultures."

[278] For an expanded treatment of these themes as they appear to be manifesting in the debased political economic discourse of the United States, readers might be interested in my (O'Connor, 2006) article entitled "The Political Economics of Stephen Colbert," wherein I explore (and lament) the current situation by juxtaposing the ideas of the satirical pundit, Colbert, and the serious philosopher, Jürgen Habermas.

[279] Ramana (1997, 41).

[280] Ramana (1992, 10-11).

[281] Waite (2007, 284).

[282] Ramana (2001, xi-xii).

[283] I highly recommend Wilber's (2000d, 672-90) superb essay, Always Already: The Brilliant Clarity of Ever-Present Awareness, which is the final chapter in *The Eye of Spirit*.

[284] Ramana (2001, v).

[285] Ramana (1992, 51).

[286] Ramana (2001, 149).

[287] Ramana (1992, 43).

[288] Ramana (1992, 43).

[289] Ramana (1992, 57).

[290] Ramana (1992, 51).

[291] The deepest/highest exemplars of what I call authentication, legitimation, and confirmation include the three principal *yogas* from the tradition of Vedanta: *jnana* yoga, *bhakti* yoga, and *karma* yoga. In my interpretation, the three yogas can be described as integral disciplines oriented toward absolute realization by way of the three primary modes of integral/différantial realization:

- *my* authentication of the Self-that-*I*-am through *my* self-inquiry is *jnana* yoga, the integral discipline of intrapersonal *knowledge* or *wisdom*, the dedicated practice of which may ultimately reveal the divine in *me* ($TCA^N \times 1_{UL} = AF^N_{UL} =/= R^0$);

- *my* legitimation of the Self-that-*each*-of-*you*-are through *my* selfless devotion to *each* of *you* is *bhakti* yoga, the integral discipline of interpersonal *devotion* or *compassion*, the dedicated practice of which

may ultimately reveal to *me* the divine in *each* of *you* ($TCA^N \times 2_{UL} = LJ^N_{UL} =/= R^0$); and

- *my* confirmation of the Self-that-*each*-of-*they*-are through *my* selfless service to *each* of *them* is *karma* yoga, the integral discipline of impersonal *action* or *service*, the dedicated practice of which may ultimately reveal to *me* the divine in *each* of *them* ($TCA^N \times 3_{UL} = CT^N_{UL} =/= R^0$).

Likewise, *your* authentication of the Self through *your* self-inquiry, or *jnana* yoga, may ultimately reveal to *you* the divine in *you* ($TCA^N \times 2.1_{UL} = AF^N_{UL} =/= R^0$); *your* legitimation of the Self through *your* selfless compassion toward *each* of *us*, or *bhakti* yoga, may ultimately reveal to *you* the divine in *each* of *us* ($TCA^N \times 2.2_{UL} = LJ^N_{UL} =/= R^0$); and *your* confirmation of the Self through *your* selfless service to *each* of *them*, or *karma* yoga, may ultimately reveal to *you* the divine in *each* of *them* ($TCA^N \times 2.3_{UL} = CT^N_{UL} =/= R^0$).

Finally, *her* authentication of the Self through *her* self-inquiry, or *jnana* yoga, may ultimately reveal to *her* the divine in *her* ($TCA^N \times 3.1_{UL} = AF^N_{UL} =/= R^0$); *her* legitimation of the Self through *her* selfless compassion toward *each* of *you* and *them*, or *bhakti* yoga, may ultimately reveal to *her* the divine in *each* of *you* and *them* ($TCA^N \times 3.2_{UL} = LJ^N_{UL} =/= R^0$); and *her* confirmation of the Self through *her* selfless service to *each* of *them*, or *karma* yoga, may ultimately reveal to *her* the divine in *each* of *them* ($TCA^N \times 3.3_{UL} = CT^N_{UL} =/= R^0$).

Consistent with the teachings of contemporary Vedantin sages, such as Swami Vivekananda (1996) and Sri Aurobindo (1995; 1996), all three yogas, particularly if practiced by *all* of *us* as a genuinely integral yoga, may ultimately support Self-realization for *all* of *us* ($TCA^N \times 123.123_{UL} = ALC^N_{UL} = R^N_{UL} =/= R^0$).

[292] Habermas (1992a, 34-9).

[293] Habermas (1992a).

[294] Argyris et. al. (1985, 98-102).

[295] Argyris et. al. (1985, 5).

[296] Argyris (1985, 79).

[297] Wilber (1999b, 128; 1999c, 192; 2000c, 379-80; 2000d, 495-7; 2000e, 217-22).

[298] Wilber (2000a, 705-7; 2000e, 215-22).

[299] Wilber (2000c, 379-80).

[300] Wilber (2000e, 108-19).

[301] Kuhn (1970, 182).

302 Kuhn (1970, 182).

303 Kuhn (1970, 182-7).

304 Kuhn (1970, 186-7).

305 Wilber (2000e, 217-22).

306 Popper (2002a, 48).

307 Wilber (2000e, 221).

308 Wilber (2000c, 379-80).

309 Wilber (2000e, 220-1).

310 Popper (2002b, 124).

311 Wilber (2000e, 220).

312 Argyris, et.al. (1985, 90-1).

313 If indeed "science advances one funeral at a time," as physicist Max Planck purportedly remarked, then it would seem that many of our most capable intellectuals would rather die than fundamentally change their minds about what they think is genuinely real, perhaps because their preferred reality is so intertwined with who they think they are as professionals. Kuhn (1970, 150-1) addressed this all-too-common resistance to paradigmatic revolution when he noted that:

> Copernicanism made few converts for almost a century after Copernicus' death. Newton's work was not generally accepted, particularly on the Continent, for more than half a century after the *Principia* appeared. Priestly never accepted the oxygen theory, nor Lord Kelvin the electromagnetic theory, and so on. The difficulties of conversion have often been noted by scientists themselves. Darwin, in a particularly perceptive passage at the end of his *Origin of Species*, wrote: "Although I am fully convinced of the truth of the views given in this volume…, I by no means expect to convince experienced naturalists whose minds are stocked with a multitude of facts all viewed, during a long course of years, from a point of view opposite to mine. … [B]ut I look with confidence to the future,--to young and rising naturalists, who will be able to view both sides of the question with impartiality." And Max Planck, surveying his own career in his *Scientific Autobiography*, sadly remarked that, "a new scientific truth does not triumph by convincing its opponents and making them see the light, but rather because its opponents eventually die, and a new generation grows up that is familiar with it."

> These facts and others like them are too commonly known to need further emphasis. But they do need re-evaluation. In the past they have most often been taken to indicate that scientists, being only human, cannot always admit their errors, even when confronted with strict proof. I would argue, rather, that in these matters neither proof nor error is at issue. The transfer of allegiance f[r]om paradigm to paradigm is a conversion experience that cannot be forced. Lifelong resistance, particularly from those whose productive careers have committed them to an older tradition of normal science, is not a violation of scientific standards but an index to the nature of scientific research itself. The source of resistance is the assurance that the older paradigm will ultimately solve all its problems, that nature can be shoved into the box the paradigm provides. Inevitably, at times of revolution, that assurance seems stubborn and pigheaded as indeed it sometimes becomes. But it is also something more. That same assurance is what makes normal or puzzle-solving science possible. And it is only through normal science that the professional community of scientists succeeds, first, in exploiting the potential scope and precision of the older paradigm and, then, in isolating the difficulty through the study of which a new paradigm may emerge.

[314] Morrow & Brown (1994, 70-2).

[315] Lakatos (1974).

[316] The discourse between Kuhn, Popper, and Lakatos on such issues as paradigms, falsifiability, and the growth of scientific knowledge is fascinating, as much for the misunderstandings between these philosophers as for their positive contributions. See for example the articles by Kuhn (1974a; 1974b), Popper (1974), and Lakatos (1974), all contained in the single volume *Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge*.

[317] Kuhn (1970, 77).

[318] Notwithstanding Wilber's sincere intentions and assertions to the contrary, there are no domains of interpersonal justice/morality or intrapersonal freedom/honesty—by whatever names—anywhere to be found within the perspectives of AQAL, and therefore no practices of legitimation or authentication—by whatever names—to be found within his definitions of practical injunction, experiential apprehension, and communal confirmation. The primary source of any confusion about this is addressed in Appendix A: The Tri/Quad Fallacy.

[319] Wilber (2007, 258).

[320] Another philosophical maxim of interest is the *pragmatic maxim* articulated by Charles Sanders Peirce (1997, 56), on which his philosophy of pragmatism was based. "The maxim is intended to furnish a method for the analysis of concepts…. The method prescribed in the maxim is to trace out in the imagination the conceivable practical consequences—that is the consequences for deliberate self-controlled conduct—of the affirmation or denial of the concept; and the assertion of the maxim is that herein lies the *whole* of the purport of the word, the *entire* concept." In other words, the meaning of an idea can be wholly assessed in terms of the *expected difference its acceptance or rejection would make in human conduct.*

While recognizing the deep connection between theory and practice, Peirce is less concerned with the particulars of any *practical injunction* that might recreate the theoretical concept than he is with the *practical application* of the theoretical concept, the imagined consequences of which constitute the empirical experience to be apprehended and, presumably, evaluated by some unstated criteria. He is therefore focused not on the *practical means* by which knowledge can be validated in *theoretical* form, but on the *theoretical ends* by which knowledge can be validated in *practical* form. Thus, we might articulate this pragmatic maxim as *the meaning of a statement is the ends of its enactment.*

Unfortunately, due to the absence of any dialogical practice or perspective within its thoroughly monological formulation, the pragmatic maxim appears to be particularly susceptible to co-optation by an instrumental rationality that can do no better than assess the validity of a theory in terms of the *success* of its practical results as can be envisioned in monological thought (i.e., win/lose expectations). Unless that theory has already been provisionally validated on the basis of the more significant standards of truth, justice, and freedom, which are inherently dialogical, then the empirical results of its practical application, whether actual or imagined, once apprehended in direct experience, will have to be validated in full discourse—that is, if something more than instrumental success is desired.

[321] Habermas (1984, 297-8).

[322] Argyris, et.al. (1985, 5)

[323] Wilber (1999b, 112-8).

[324] Wilber (2003b; 2003d; 2007).

[325] Wilber (2003b, part ii; 2003d, part i)

[326] Wilber (2003b, part ii).

[327] Wilber (2003d, part I; 2007, 37).

328 Wilber (2007, 33).

329 Wilber (2007, 33-4).

330 Esbjörn-Hargens (2010, 146).

331 Esbjörn-Hargens (2010, 144).

332 Esbjörn-Hargens (2010, 157-8).

333 In a footnote from this article, Esbjörn-Hargens (2010, 168) mentions a conversation between Mark Edwards and himself in which they discuss the potential for an *integral theoretical pluralism*, centered on Wilber's AQAL formulation of integral theory, with three levels of scale: "1) micro (e.g., how Integral Theory includes a pluralism of unit-level theories in its meta-framework); 2) meso (e.g., how within Integral Theory there can be a plural-ism of approaches to the AQAL model); and 3) meta (e.g., a diversity of metatheories of which Integral Theory is but one)." The problem with this conceptual scheme is that it is premised on the equation of *AQAL*, which is Wilber's particular formulation of integral theory, with the whole field of *integral theory*—a premise enacted by using the two terms interchangeably. The only conceptual space acknowledged between AQAL and integral theory is that which allows for multiple approaches to AQAL—that is, one authoritative formulation of AQAL, being Wilber's and his alone, and multiple interpretations of that formulation which can only ever be AQAL. The very same equation—AQAL = Integral (Theory, Model, Approach)—has been proactively asserted for over a decade by Wilber and his colleagues from Integral Institute and, more recently, Integral Life. For just one exam-ple, consider the recent article by Esbjörn-Hargens (2009) that presents the authoritative overview of AQAL on behalf of Wilber's Integral Institute, the title of which is "An overview of integral theory: An all-inclusive framework for the 21st century." Even less subtle are these two definitions of *integral* from the Integral Institute's AQAL Glossary, which establishes the termi-nology for articles to be submitted to their Journal of Integral Theory and Practice: "1. Complete, balanced, whole, lacking nothing essential. In this general usage, 'integral' is typically lowercase. 2. When capitalized, 'Inte-gral' is synonymous with AQAL. In this usage, 'Integral Art,' 'Integral Ecology,' or 'Integral Business' mean 'AQAL Art,' 'AQAL Ecology,' 'AQAL Business,' etc."

The implications of this terminological equation certainly present some challenges for those of us working within the field of integral theory, whether capitalized or not, yet beyond the limits of AQAL. First, it implies that all valid critiques of AQAL are critiques of integral theory itself, which may also imply that these critiques constitute something other than integral

theory. Thus, critiques of AQAL are regarded as critiques of the one and only Integral (Theory, Model, Approach) and, therefore, perhaps with some exceptions, *not integral*. Second, it excludes by authoritative definition all alternative formulations of integral theory from consideration as legitimate formulations of integral theory simply because they are not AQAL. Thus, alternatives to AQAL would have to be regarded as alternatives to the one and only Integral (Theory, Model, Approach) and, therefore, without exception, *not integral*. These implications may, in turn, assist advocates of AQAL in marginalizing as "non-integral" any major integral critiques of, or alternatives to, AQAL, while accepting only those minor critiques and alternatives that can be plausibly positioned as nothing more than alternative interpretations of, or ongoing refinements to, the ever-integral AQAL, thus still AQAL and, therefore, under the authoritative control of Wilber and his colleagues.

But it is the third implication that should be of greatest concern to those working comfortably within the limits of AQAL while advocating for its equation with Integral (Theory, Model, Approach), because this equation requires that integral theory itself, which is in the early stages of being established as a legitimate field of scholarship and practice, must live and die on the basis of Wilber's AQAL formulation. Thus, any definitive refutation of AQAL would have to be regarded as a definitive refutation of the one and only Integral (Theory, Model, Approach) and, therefore, the death of integral theory as it is so narrowly and rigidly defined. Given the inevitability of one or more definitive refutations of AQAL, whether of the deconstructive or reconstructive variety, we should expect some of its more passionate advocates to become rather dogmatic in their efforts to undermine the necessary discourse within the integral community of scholar-practitioners, while the fate of "integral theory" itself, as a field of scholarship and practice, hangs in the balance. After all, if AQAL = Integral (Theory, Model, Approach), then the potential refutation of AQAL might be threatening to those who are personally and professionally invested in what they regard as the one and only integral theory, model, approach, vision, community, movement, etc.

It seems to me that generic terms that refer to whole fields of scholarly inquiry, like *social* theory, *critical* theory, or *market* theory, belong in the public intellectual domain, regardless of who might have first coined the term. Specific terms that refer to one theoretical formulation or another within a general field, like specific *social*, *critical*, or *market* theories, can certainly be capitalized and otherwise differentiated as a distinct, perhaps even predominant, school of thought or research program, but not to the

exclusion of others working in the same general field. I recognize that Wilber and his colleagues have chosen to define "AQAL = Integral (Theory, Model, Approach)" as that specific formulation or school of thought within some larger and more general field of *meta-theory* or, as Esbjörn-Hargens (2009) has also proposed, *integral studies*. I do not take issue with the positioning of either AQAL or integral theory, whether capitalized or not, as specific fields within these more generic fields. What concerns me is the immediate reduction of the potentially wider field of integral theory to AQAL through this enacted equation. If there can be no legitimate integral theory that is not already AQAL, then what exactly is the future of this AQAL-delimited field of integral theory beyond marginal refinements in the AQAL formulation and its extensive application to other domains of theory and practice? How can a field of scholarship and practice that was, by the definition of its sole founder and his colleagues, created in 1995 and formally named in 2000—which is essentially yesterday in academic terms—be expected to evolve if it is deliberately defined in a way that marginalizes or excludes the possibility of theoretical innovation right from the start? How can a field of scholarship and practice that is deliberately defined in a way that marginalizes or excludes the possibility of theoretical innovation avoid the inevitable descent into dogma disguised as discourse? Therefore, if Wilber, Esbjörn-Hargens, and their colleagues want "integral theory" to continue evolving into a field even more worthy of its name, I hope they will reconsider their short-sighted strategy to the benefit of the much wider, deeper, and more diverse field of integral theoretical pluralism that already, in fact, exists.

[334] Nearly every term introduced in this praxiological pluralism—from *intentionalism*, *behavioralism*, *interpretivism*, and *functionalism* to *individualism*, *collectivism*, *subjectivism*, and *objectivism*—is burdened with problematic connotations that appear to be unavoidable. My intent is simply to offer relatively neutral descriptive terms closely aligned with the terms I use for the primary and secondary quadratic perspectives in TQP. It would be a mistake to assume that my use of any one of these terms is the same as its use in any particular philosophical school of thought. Furthermore, it is important to recognize that each and every one of these quadratic primordial praxes is fully triadic in multiple derivatives, thereby embracing the integral discourses of authentication, legitimation, and confirmation with respect to its limited domain. This alone renders each and every one of these primordial praxes distinct from *any* methods currently operating under *any* names. Therefore, instead of trying to interpret the meaning of my use of each term by analogy to its use by others, it would be far more effective to

deduce the meaning from the whole context of Awareness-in-Action.

335 I coined the term *critical integralism* to capture the idea of an inherently *critical* meta-paradigm infusing an otherwise *integral* meta-paradigm, thus grounding its essentialist/comprehensivist aspirations in the unavoidably (r)evolutionary challenge of human action in real-world contexts. As I hold it, I think there may be room within this concept to embrace a number of alternative formulations/articulations of the nexus between integral theory and critical theory.

Wilber (2000d, 408) has loosely positioned his AQAL as an *integral critical theory*, following Jack Crittenden's 1996 observation in the foreword to Wilber's *The Eye of Spirit*, wherein he describes the manner in which Wilber uses AQAL, a meta-theory that purportedly incorporates as many partial truths as possible from a wide variety of constituent theories, to critique the relative partiality of its constituent theories from the perspective of its more holistic integrations. This appears to be the same meta-theoretical technique used by Habermas (1984, 1987), for example in the two volumes of *The Theory of Communicative Action*. There is certainly some value in using a meta-theory to critique the partiality of various theories, and all the more value in using that meta-theory to systematically reconstruct those theories so that they are less partial, more integral. However, the critical integralism I am formulating and articulating is more ambitious.

Interestingly, Wilber's earliest foray into a form of integral critical theory—about 15 years before he adopted the term *integral theory* to define his work—was also more ambitious. In *A Sociable God*, in which he outlines a proposal for a developmental sociology of religion, Wilber (1999b, 112-8) incorporates and extends Habermas's (1971) formulation of critical-reflective social theory by making an interesting distinction between what he terms *horizontal* and *vertical* types of emancipatory interest. As he (Wilber, 1999b, 60-1) envisioned it, "a comprehensive, unified, critical sociological theory might best be constructed around a detailed, multidisciplinary analysis of the developmental-logic and hierarchic levels of relational (psychosocial) exchanges that constitute the human compound individual. The theory would be *critical* in two important ways: (1) adjudicative of each *higher* level of structural organization and critical of the comparative partiality of each lower level, and (2) critical of the *distortions* in exchange when and if they occur on any particular level. The latter is a criticism *within* a level and demands as its corrective a self-reflection on the historical formations that led to the distortions in the particular realm, economic, emotional, communicative, or spiritual. The former is a criticism *between* levels and demands as its corrective a *growth* to higher levels. The one is a horizontal emancipation,

the other, a vertical emancipation. Neither can be dispensed with—growth to a higher level does not ensure the healthy normalization of a lower level, and healing a lower level does not in and of itself produce a higher level."

With reference to a proposed five-level developmental-structural model of cognitive interests, Wilber (1999b, 112-8) mentions Marx, Freud, and Habermas as exemplars of, respectively, *material-economic*, *emotional-sexual*, and *communicative* levels of critique, while positing the need for analogous critical engagement with potential distortions that can arise in pursuit of two additional levels of cognitive interest: the *soteriological* interest in *salvation* and the *gnostic* interest in *radical liberation*. "Where soteriological interest wishes to present to the self a higher knowledge, liberational interest aims at dissolving the self into higher knowledge *as* that knowledge, that is, as spirit's knowledge of and as spirit. The former wishes, as self, to be saved by spirit; the latter wishes, as spirit, to transcend self."

Awareness-in-Action ($TCA^N \times TQP^N = ALC^N = R^N = A^N$) embraces all of these cognitive interests and this more complete notion of emancipation, while relaxing the strict distinctions between horizontal/vertical emancipation that are necessarily based on a developmental-structural theory of human action that, in practice, does not appear to be as primordial as the triadic quadratic perspectives through which any and all such development/evolution unfolds. Incidentally, the passages in the present work that address the perspectives and practices of Self-realization may be interpreted as soteriological articulations of both the soteriological and gnostic interests and aspects of Awareness-in-Action, with Ramana Maharshi being respectfully positioned as the exemplary *critical integral gnostic interventionist*.

Two additional contributions to the discourse of integral/critical theory came to my attention while writing this book. Daniel Gustav Andersen (2006; 2008; 2010) has published a series of three articles that outline what he calls a *critical integral theory*, the impressive erudition of which I find all the more fascinating because of the entirely different approach he takes to what may appear to be, at first glance, a similar line of inquiry. Martin Beck Matuštík (2007) takes yet another approach to what he calls *integral critical theory*, based on a "three-pronged model of material, socio-political, and spiritual critique of the present age." If nothing else, the diversity of our different approaches to what I call *critical integralism* (and shall we include *integral criticalism*?) is suggestive of a great potential for future development of this appropriately différantial discourse, to which I look forward.

[336] Habermas (1971).

[337] For example, Habermas (1971), Argyris, et.al. (1985), and Wilber (1999b).

[338] For example, Argyris, et.al. (1985).

[339] For example, Habermas (1979; 1987).

[340] For example, Habermas (1975; 1979; 1987).

[341] For example, Wilber (1999b, 60-1).

[342] For example, Argyris, et.al. (1985).

[343] For example, Argyris, et.al. (1985).

[344] For example, Argyris, et.al. (1985), Habermas (1971; 1979; 1984; 1987), and Wilber (1999b; 2000d; 2003; 2007).

[345] Habermas (1971).

[346] Geuss (1981, 76).

[347] Habermas (1971).

[348] Geuss (1981, 58).

[349] There is an interesting similarity between this critical theory of *social* enlightenment and emancipation and the Four Noble Truths of Buddhism, which might be described as a critical theory of *spiritual* enlightenment and emancipation. As described in this article (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ Four_Noble_Truths), "the four noble truths are: i) the truth of *dukkha* (suffering, anxiety, unsatisfactoriness); ii) the truth of the origin of *dukkha*; iii) the truth of the cessation of *dukkha*; and iv) the truth of the path leading to the cessation of *dukkha*." My use of the terms *enlightenment*, *emancipation*, and *realization* embrace both the social and spiritual aspects, which I tend to designate in terms of the *différantial action that we do* and the *integral awareness that we are*, without confusing or conflating the two.

[350] Geuss (1981, 76).

[351] Argyris et al. (1985, 93).

[352] One of the best examples of a large-scale, multi-sector realization (R^N) crisis-in-progress is the current *monetary crisis*, which has had, and will continue to have, significant negative consequences for truth, justice, and freedom in specifically economic, political, social, and ecological contexts, at least until unprecedented monetary, banking, and financial reforms take place in the United States, Europe, China, and the other great powers to eliminate the root causes of the crisis. I (O'Connor, 2011) addressed this crisis in an article, Debt Trapped: Exploring Monetary Futures, which was written as a *critical integral intervention* into the decidedly indefinite func-tionalist (X_{LR}) (post)modern political economic discourse about the US economy circa 2010. A consistent *emancipatory/enlightenment* interest is expressed throughout the article, in three seemingly different, yet deeply similar ways.

The primary intervention is an appropriately praxiological functionalist (3.123LR) critique of monetary policy and the system of money, banking, and finance that it sustains, which includes four complementary scenarios for the potential consequences of monetary policy choices given the current system design—hence, path-dependent potentials originating in the design of the monetary system and shaped by subsequent policy choices about how best to sustain that system—the plausible truths (3.123LR) of which dramatically illustrate the relative absence of economic truth (3.3LR), justice (3.2LR), and freedom (3.1LR) that the vast majority of us are unknowingly forced to accept as mandated conditions of our participation in the economy. In other words, the possibility that the very design of the monetary system and the very conduct of monetary policy, characterized as they are by insufficient degrees of transparency, choice, and accountability, hence institutionalized deception, coercion, and defensiveness, would render plausible all four of these scenarios raises serious questions about the extent to which the vast majority of the population are living, working, borrowing, investing, and nevertheless failing amidst economic conditions far less true, just, and free than they believe.

The secondary intervention is a more subtle engagement with the reader (2.123AQ) that is intended to facilitate a shift in perspective *from* an outward-focused cognition of an objectified world as an overwhelming given (XLR) that tends to reduce one's equally objectified sense of self to a solitary figure, *me* (1UR) or, worse yet, *anyone* (XUR), in antagonistic resistance to that unattractive world—the standard modern myth of the functionalist given— *to* an inward-focused re-cognition of the reader's own unique, active identification, *I* (1UL), with the integral awareness, *I-I* (0), that is always already holding the entirety of this nevertheless challenging political economic discourse (123.123AQ), including that which was, just a moment ago while reading those scenarios (3.123LR), likely felt as a contracted objectified identification, at best *me* (1UR), in tense opposition with an overwhelming outward de-identification, *everyone* and *everything* else (XLR).

Given the premises of Awareness-in-Action, which are based on the apparent presuppositions of human awareness-in-action, these two critical integral interventions are complementary ways of engaging with the reader regarding what appears, to me at least, to be a realization crisis-in-progress, which points to the self-reflexive third intervention by which I (1UL) simultaneously acknowledge the obvious fact that I am the author of this admittedly biased explanatory, interpretive, and evaluative narrative by gently inviting the reader, in my second-person perspective (2.1UL), to re-cognize his or her own causal role as accountable author of his or her own alterna-

tive narrative of *what is* (123.123AQ) from the perspectives of *what could be* (123.3AQ), *what should be* (123.2AQ), and *what would be* (123.1AQ) amidst the integral awareness (0) that he or she really is.

The Debt Trapped article is therefore indicative of one way that I use Awareness-in-Action as a critical integral praxis with a thoroughly emancipatory/enlightenment interest in the *presence of the past/future*, in this case offered to a very large potential audience of (post)modern participants in the US political economic discourse for whom the causal role of monetary policy and system in the economic, political, social, and ecological problems they recognize nevertheless remains a mystery.

As another example of a critical integral intervention in the contentious (post)modern political economic discourse, in 2002 I wrote A Crisis of Vision: Toward a More Integral Economics. I originally intended this to be the opening chapter of a long-since-trans/cluded book (O'Connor, 2003), but subsequently published it as an article (O'Connor, 2005). In this article, I introduce for the first time the critical integral practices of *transparency*, *choice*, and *accountability*, both as the major implicit themes of the contentious political economic discourse of the time—illustrated in terms of three complementary political-economic sub-cultures: *libertarians, egalitarians,* and *authoritarians*—and as a critical integral theory of the market that might serve to better inform this discourse by clarifying *how the market is supposed to work, why it doesn't generally work as promised*, and *what we can do to make it work for us*. Awareness-in-Action is the present status of the critical integral (meta-)paradigm I introduced in A Crisis of Vision.

[353] Stephen Mitchell (2000, 64-5).

[354] Wilber (1999e, 493-505; 2000a, 149-153; 2000b, 298-302; 2000c, 377-381; 2000d, 430-437; 2000e, 146-8; 2003a, part i; 2007, 18-23).

[355] Mark Edwards (2003) appears to have been the first to publish a proposed reconstruction of Wilber's AQAL that is, in part, an effort to address some of the problematic symptoms of what I refer to as Wilber's tri/quad conflation. "While there are," as Edwards (2003, n.p.) introduced it, "many innovative aspects to Wilber's current work on social perspectives, I believe that his I-We-It-Its model has deep-seated flaws that can be traced back to some fundamental inconsistencies in conceptualisations of the holon construct. One implication is that there is no real phenomenological space for "you" singular or "you" plural in Wilber's model. This, combined with his reduction of the third person "he/she/it" to simply "it" and "them to "its", results in a model of perspectives that is inadequate for the representation and analysis of complex social dynamics and interactions." While Edwards's critique of AQAL was unknown to me prior to my (2008a, 2008b) publication of

triadic quadratic perspectivism, and does not inform my argument in the tri/quad fallacy, I would be remiss if I did not draw attention to, and express appreciation for, his pioneering critique of AQAL. Having mentioned this, I should offer some brief remarks about what I see as a fundamental difference between our two views of integral perspectives.

Approaching his critical reconstruction of AQAL with a focus on the perspectives and dynamics of *holons*, rather than my approach focused on the perspectives and practices of *human action*, Edwards (2003, n.p.) reconstructs what he terms the Integral Holon with four quadrants that frame any holon's UL *experiential life and identity*, UR *behavioral life and identity*, LL *cultural life and identity*, and LR *social life and identity*. He further claims that there are in fact two different types of holons, *individual* and *collective*, each of which is a *fully quadratic* Integral Holon with its own subjectivity and objectivity, as well as a newly differentiated form of *agency* and *communion* characterizing, respectively, the new upper and lower quadrants of both individual and collective holons. Thus, instead of individual and collective dimensions characterizing the upper and lower quadrants of a quadratic holon, Edwards separates individual and collective holons and posits analogous dimensions of agency and communion for both. He then proposes that each pair of individual and collective quadratic holons can be framed in terms of the first-, second-, and third-person perspectives of language. This results in *six distinct quadratic holons* encompassing a total of 24 primordial, or indigenous, perspectives. However, due to the fact that there are only 12 primordial perspectival pronouns—the singular-subjective, singular-objective, plural-subjective, and plural-objective of the first-, second-, and third-person—he is compelled to re-use each set of individual subjective-objective pronouns (i.e., *I-me*, *you-you*, *he-him / she-her*) for both the upper and lower quadrants of the individual holons and re-use each set of collective subjective-objective pronouns (i.e., *we-us*, *you-you*, *they-them*) for both the upper and lower quadrants of the collective holons. For example, he separates what I understand to be a quadratic first-person perspective of human action, with UL-UR-LL-LR perspectives signified by the quadratic pronoun *I-me-we-us*, into a quadratic *individual* first-person holon, signified by the UL-UR-LL-LR pronouns *I-me-I-me*, and a quadratic *collective* first-person holon, signified by the UL-UR-LL-LR pronouns *we-us-we-us*.

When I interpret this in terms of triadic quadratic perspectivism, it appears that Edwards's formulation accentuates the *differentiation* of perspectives at the expense of *integration*, resulting in a set of proposed primordial perspectives inconsistent with what I, at least, see as the perspectival presuppositions of human awareness-in-action. In fact, *none* of the 24 primordi-

al perspectives identified by Edwards match *any* of the 12 primordial perspectives identified by me in TQP, despite what appears to be our shared desire to differentiate, at least, the triadic and the quadratic perspectives mistakenly equated and conflated in AQAL. The source of the surprisingly large rift between our two formulations is to be found in what I understand to be his claim that reality is composed of *holons* and, specifically, *individual* holons and *collective* holons, each of which possesses its own four quadrants based on its own inherent drives or dimensions of agency and communion, subjectivity and objectivity. In my view, which I still hold as a hypothesis, the *individual* and *collective* are inseparable aspects, not of *holons*, but of human awareness-in-action. As I proposed in Part I:

> Individual pronouns in the intentional (123UL) and behavioral (123UR) are always paired with appropriate collective pronouns in the cultural (123LL) and social (123LR), because each implicates the other in every action. There is no such thing as an individual perspective without its contextual collective or a collective perspective without its constituent individuals. Likewise, subjective pronouns in the intentional (123UL) and cultural (123LL) are always paired with appropriate objective pronouns in the behavioral (123UR) and social (123LR), because each implicates the other in every action. There is no such thing as a subjective perspective without its complementary objective or an objective perspective without its complementary subjective. Finally, first-person (1AQ), second-person (2AQ), and third-person (3AQ) perspectives and their corresponding pronouns mutually implicate one another in every action. There is no such thing as a first-, second-, or third-person perspective in isolation without the other two corresponding perspectives.

Therefore, despite Edwards's attempt to use personal pronouns to signify all 24 of his primordial perspectives, because his formulation requires him to *use each pronoun twice*, he may in fact be *misusing each and every pronoun* to signify perspectives that are not actually consistent with these pronouns—perspectives that, in my view, are *not actually primordial*. His version of integral perspectivism may suffer from the same general problem as Wilber's, though much less so, namely that it is inconsistent with the actual system of interlocking personal pronouns at the preconscious root of semiotic and pragmatic human awareness-in-action—the *primordial signs* we use to identify the various facets of reality, or *primordial referents*, we experience through the *primordial perspectives* of our awareness-in-action. Edwards's formulation is commendably freed from the major distortions of Wilber's tri/quad conflation, but stops short, in my opinion, of a more

compelling re-integration rooted in the self-evident reality of awareness-in-action, which is the only reality we know in which any such thing as a *holon* can be said to exist.

356 Lexi Neale (2009) appears to have been the third to publish a proposed reconstruction of Wilber's AQAL that is, in part, an effort to address some of the problematic symptoms of what I refer to as Wilber's tri/quad conflation. Although he was apparently unaware of my (2008a, 2008b) triadic quadratic perspectivism at the time of his publication, Neale's AQAL Cube identifies the same primordial perspectives—a *first-person, all-quadrant* perspective, a *second-person, all-quadrant* perspective, and a *third-person, all-quadrant* perspective—in both *personal* and *possessive* forms, consistent with the 1st Derivative of TQP. Beyond the identification of these three quadratic pronouns, Neale has yet to discover the multiple derivatives of TQP that reveal the inherently mutual, reflexive, différantial, and, ultimately, integral aperspectival nature of our situational awareness-in-action. Also of note is Chris Dierkes's (2009) insightful review of Neale's AQAL Cube—through which I discovered Neale's article—including references to Edwards's (2003) and mine (2008a).

357 Wilber (2000c, 373).

358 Wilber (2000a; 2007).

359 Wilber (2003c; 2007).

360 Wilber (2007, 33-4).

361 Wilber (2007, 231-74).

362 Wilber (2007).

363 Wilber (2007, 40-2, 50, 64, 85-7, 125, 154, 163-4, 170-1, 284-5, 291).

364 Wilber (2007, 33-4).

365 Wilber 2007, 37).

366 Wilber (2007, 18-23, 33-7, 224-5).

367 Esbjörn-Hargens (2009, 2-7).

368 Wilber (1999c, 493-505; 2000a, 149-153; 2000b, 298-302; 2000c, 377-381; 2000d, 430-437; 2000e, 146-8; 2007, 18-23, 33-7, 224-5).

369 Esbjörn-Hargens (2009, 5-7).

370 Wilber (2007, 34).

371 Esbjörn-Hargens (2009, 7).

372 Esbjörn-Hargens (2009, 5-6).

373 Esbjörn-Hargens (2009, 4).

[374] Esbjörn-Hargens (2009, 6).

[375] Esbjörn-Hargens (2009, 16).

[376] Wilber (2007, 33-4).

[377] Wilber (2007, 42).

[378] Wilber (2007, 2, 18, 34).

[379] Wilber (2003a, part v; 2007, 299-300).

[380] Wilber (2000a).

[381] Wilber (2000d, 419-50).

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Pitirim Sorokin

Pitirim Alexandrovich Sorokin (/səˈroʊkɪn, sɔː-/;[1] Russian: Питири́м Алекса́ндрович Соро́кин, 21 January [O.S.] 1889 – 10 February 1968) was a Russian-American sociologist and political activist, who contributed to the social cycle theory.

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Background

Pitirim Alexandrovich Sorokin was born on 21 January [O.S.] 1889, in Turya, a small village in Yarensky Uyezd, Vologda Governorate, Russian Empire (now Knyazhpogostsky District, Komi Republic, Russia), the second son to a Russian father and Komi mother. Sorokin's father, Alexander Prokopievich Sorokin, was from Veliky Ustyug and a traveling craftsman specializing in gold and silver. At the same time, while his mother, Pelageya Vasilievna, was a native of Zheshart and belonged to a peasant family. Vasily, his elder brother, was born in 1885, and his younger brother, Prokopy, was born in 1893. Sorokin's mother died on March 7, 1894, in the village of Kokvitsa. After her death Sorokin and his elder brother Vasily stayed with their father, traveling with him through the towns searching for work. At the same time, Prokopy was taken in by his aunt, Anisya Vasilievna Rimsky. The

	Pitirim Alexandrovich Sorokin
	Питирим Александрович Сорокин

Sorokin in 1917

Born	21 January [O.S.] 1889 Turya, Yarensky Uyezd, Vologda Governorate, Russian Empire (now Komi Republic, Russia)
Died	10 February 1968 (aged 79) Winchester, Massachusetts
Nationality	Russian
Citizenship	• Russian Empire (1889–1917) • Stateless (1922–1930) • United States (1930–1968)
Alma mater	Saint Petersburg Imperial University

latter lived with her husband, Vasily Ivanovich, in the village of Rimia. Sorokin's childhood, spent among the Komi, was complicated, but enriched by a religious and moral education. The moral qualities (such as piety, a firm belief in good and love) cultivated in him at that time would yield their fruits in his subsequent work (his amitology and call to overcome the crisis of modernity).

Pitirim and his older brother's father developed alcoholism. Because of this, their father had severe anxiety and panic attacks to the point where he was physically abusive to his sons. After a brutal beating that left a scar on Pitirim's upper lip, Pitirim, at the age of eleven, along with his older brother, decided that he wanted to be independent and no longer under their father's care.[2][3]

In the early 1900s, supporting himself as an artisan and clerk, Sorokin attended the Saint Petersburg Imperial University in Saint Petersburg, where he earned his graduate degree in criminology and became a professor.[4]

Sorokin was an anti-communist. During the Russian Revolution was a member of the Socialist Revolutionary Party, a supporter of the White Movement, and a secretary to Prime Minister Alexander Kerensky. After the October Revolution, Sorokin continued to fight communist leaders and was arrested by the new regime several times before he was eventually condemned to death. After six weeks in prison, Sorokin was released and went back to teaching at the University of St. Petersburg, becoming the founder of the sociology department at the university.[4] As he had been a leader among the Democrats leading up to the Russian Revolution, he was sought by Lenin's forces after Lenin consolidated his power.[5]

Accounts of Sorokin's activities in 1922 differ; he may have been arrested and exiled by the Soviet government,[4] or he may have spent months in hiding before escaping the country.[5] After leaving Russia, he emigrated to the United States,[4] where he became a naturalized citizen in 1930.[5] Sorokin was personally requested to accept a Harvard University position, founding the Department of Sociology and becoming a vocal critic of his colleague, Talcott Parsons.[6][7] Sorokin was an ardent opponent of communism, which he regarded as a "pest of man," and was a deputy of the Russian Constituent Assembly.

Sorokin was a sociology professor at the University of Minnesota from 1924 to 1940 when he accepted an offer of a position by the president of Harvard University, where he continued to work until 1959. One of his students was writer Myra Page.[8]

Spouse(s)	Elena Petrovna Sorokina (née Baratynskaya) (1894–1975)
Scientific career	
Fields	Sociology
Institutions	Saint Petersburg Imperial University
	Harvard University
	University of Minnesota
Doctoral students	Robert K. Merton

Inspiration

In 1910 young Sorokin was shaken to the core by the death of the great Russian writer LN Tolstoy. In the article 'LN Tolstoy as a philosopher' (1912) he carried out a reconstruction of the religious and moral teaching of Tolstoy, which he regarded as the philosophical representation of a harmonious and logical system (Sorokin, 1912: 80–97). Tolstoy's teaching exceeded the habitual bounds of traditional philosophy and flowered into a certain kind of moral philosophy, which attracted Sorokin immensely. He marked out the structure of Tolstoy's teaching by grounding it in 'the tradition of four great philosophical problems: the essence of the world; the nature of ego; the problem of cognition and the issue of values' (Johnston et al., 1994: 31). According to Tolstoy, God is the basis of our existence and love is the way to God. Sorokin formulated the main principles forming the foundation of Tolstoy's Christian ethics: the principle of love, the principle of non-violent resistance to evil and the principle of not doing evil. He adhered to these principles for the whole of his life, which is demonstrated in the course of this article.

Works and interests

Before his achievements as a professor in the United States, he published his 1924 *Leaves of a Russian Diary* by (E.P. Dutton & Co.), giving a daily, and sometimes hourly account of the Russian Revolution. He first started in February 1917 where he was in the forefront of creating a provisionary government, only to see it unravel and lose power to the Bolsheviks in October 1917. In 1950, Sorokin published an addendum to the book called *The Thirty Years After.* It is a personal and brutally honest account of the revolution and his exile.

Sorokin's academic writings are extensive; he wrote 37 books and more than 400 articles.[4] His controversial theories of social process and the historical typology of cultures are expounded in *Social and Cultural Dynamics* (4 vol., 1937–41; rev. and abridged ed. 1957) and many other works. Sorokin was also interested in social stratification, the history of sociological theory, and altruistic behavior.

Social Differentiation, Social Stratification and Social Conflict

Sorokin's work addressed three significant theories: social differentiation, social stratification, and social conflict. The idea of social differentiation describes three types of societal relationships. The first is familistic, which is the type that we would generally strive for. It is the relationship that has the most solidarity, the values of everyone involved are considered, and there is a great deal of interaction.

Social stratification refers to the fact that all societies are hierarchically divided, with upper and lower strata and unequal distribution of wealth, power, and influence across strata. There is always some mobility between these strata. People or groups may move up or down the hierarchy, acquiring or losing their power and influence.

Social conflict refers to Sorokin's theory of war. Whether internal to a nation or international, peace is based on the similarity of values among a country or between different nations. War has a destructive phase when values are destroyed and a declining phase, when some of the values are restored. Sorokin thought that the number of wars would decrease with increased solidarity and decreased antagonism. If a society's values stressed altruism instead of egoism, the incidence of war would diminish.

Three Principal Types of Culture Integration

In his *Social and Cultural Dynamics*, his magnum opus, Sorokin classified societies according to their 'cultural mentality', which can be "ideational" (reality is spiritual), "sensate" (truth is material), or "idealistic" (a synthesis of the two).

He suggested that significant civilizations evolve from a conceptual to an idealistic, and eventually to a sensate mentality. Each of these phases of cultural development not only seeks to describe the nature of reality, but also stipulates the nature of human needs and goals to be satisfied, the extent to which they should be satisfied, and the methods of satisfaction. Sorokin has interpreted the contemporary Western civilization as a sensate civilization, dedicated to technological progress and prophesied its fall into decadence and the emergence of a new ideational or idealistic era. In *Fads and Foibles,* he criticizes Lewis Terman's *Genetic Studies of Genius* research, showing that his selected group of children with high IQs did about as well as a random group of children selected from similar family backgrounds would have done.[4][9]

Politics

Sorokin was heavily involved in politics; his interests being on the issues with the legitimacy of power, Russia's representative democracy, and how it connected to the country's national question regarding its democratic structure. He believed that after the fall of communism, a new form of Russia would arise. He also believed that pushing Russia out of its crisis would encourage the world to utilize altruistic love, a vital part of his research.[2]

Sorokin also created the Center for the Study of Creative Altruism in Harvard, and there he developed and proposed his ideas about the ethics of love and social solidarity. With this program, he was able to express how we can save humanity through altruistic actions made out of love.[2]

Involvement with other sociologists

With the financial assistance of Eli Lilly, a friend of Sorokin who was a pharmaceutical heir, he was able to do further research in creative altruism. From this research, he gained much popularity and was well respected by other sociologists and sociology. He was referred to as the "founder of the sociology of altruism". Thus, he was allowed to create "The Harvard Research Center in Creative Altruism" in 1949 and had two instructors under him, Alfredo Gotsky and Talcott Parsons.[10]

Although Sorokin and Parsons worked together as colleagues, Sorokin heavily criticized Parsons' works due to having opposing views. Sorokin disapproved of America's ways of civilization and felt as if it was in decline, creating tension between Sorokin and Parsons (Parsons being an American sociologist while Sorokin was Russian). The rift between them was put to the test when Harvard University and the American sociology community favored Parsons views, and Sorokin's administrative position in Harvard was seized.[10][11]

Sorokin's research also focused on rural society, making him more approachable and referable by other moral conservatives. This initiated his collaboration with Carle Zimmerman, and together they expanded on the perspective of rural-urban sociology. They believed that the rural way of life was established from the following characteristics: a conservative and traditional family, an economy based on manual labor or from a family and home business and their connection to it, whether it be sociologically, demographically, or economically.[10]

Major impacts on influential figures

Sorokin impacted the historian Allan Carlson. He agreed with Sorokin and his disapproval of communism. Carlson also considered himself pro-family and agreed with Sorokin's views on how a family's most ideal environment is living in intimate, small village-like towns.[10]

Sorokin also impacted the forty-eighth vice president, Michael Pence, who quoted him while defending his failed House Resolution, the Marriage Protection Amendment in 2006, when there were same-sex marriage debates. Pence stated, "Marriage matters according to the researchers. Harvard sociologist Pitirim Sorokin found that throughout history, the societal collapse was always brought about following the advent of the deterioration of marriage and family".[10]

Personal life and death

Sorokin married Dr. Helen Baratynskaya, with whom he had two sons, Peter and Sergey. His son, Peter P. Sorokin, co-invented the dye laser.

Sorokin suffered from a severe illness, and after struggling for two years, he died on 10 February 1968, aged 79, in Winchester, Massachusetts.[12] A Russian Orthodox service was held at home for the family, followed by an eclectic service at the Memorial Church of Harvard University.[13]

The University of Saskatchewan currently holds Sorokin's papers in Saskatoon, Canada, where they are available to the public. In March 2009, the Sorokin Research Center was established at Syktyvkar State University facilities in Syktyvkar, Republic of Komi, for the purpose of research and publication of archive materials, mainly from the collection at the University of Saskatchewan. The first research project, "Selected Correspondence of Pitirim Sorokin: Scientist from Komi on The Service of Humanity" (in Russian), has been drafted and will be in print in the Fall of 2009 in Russia.[9][14]

Image of Pitirim Sorokin and his wife along with his two sons in 1934.

Major works

In English or English translation

- *Contemporary Sociological Theories* (1928), New York: Harper.online free (https://web.archive.org/web/20170312195237/http://www.dli.ernet.in/handle/2015/49994)
- *Principles of Rural-Urban Sociology* (1929, with Carle C. Zimmerman) New York : H. Holt. Preface: "a summary of Source book in rural sociology," in three volumes, prepared under the auspices of the U.S. Dept. of Agriculture and the University of Minnesota, to be published in 1930 or 1931"[15]
- *The Sociology of Revolution* (1935) OCLC 84193425. FReprint, H. Fertig, 1967.[16]
- *Social and Cultural Dynamics* (1937–1941), Cincinnati: American Book Company, 1937–1941. 4 vols.
- *The Crisis of Our Age* (1941), New York : Dutton, 1941 "Based upon four volumes of the author's Social and cultural dynamics."[17]
- *Man and Society in Calamity: The Effects of War, Revolution, Famine, Pestilence upon the Human Mind, Behavior, Social Organization and Cultural Life*, E.P. Dutton and Company, Inc., 1942
- *Society, Culture, and Personality: Their Structure and Dynamics, A System of General Sociology* (1947), Harper & Brothers Publishers:, New York & London. (723 double columned pages plus an 11 triple coumned page Index and a 7 triple columned page Index of Names)
- *Leaves From a Russian diary, and Thirty Years After* (1950), Boston: Beacon Press. OCLC 1476438
- *The Ways and Power of Love: Types, Factors, and Techniques of Moral Transformation*. Philadelphia: Templeton Foundation Press (Original work published 1954). 2002. ISBN 978-1-890151-86-7. (with introduction by Stephen G. Post in 2002 edition) (552 pages)
- *Fads and Foibles in Modern Sociology and Related Sciences* (1956), Chicago:, H. Regnery Co. OCoLC 609427839. Reprinted by Greenwood Publishing Group, 1976, ISBN 978-0-8371-8733-4.
- *The American Sex Revolution* (1956), Boston : Porter Sargent Publishers
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- *Social And Cultural Mobility* (1959 ed.). Boston: Free Press. 1959. ISBN 9780029302804.
- *Social Philosophies of an Age of Crisis (1950)*

- *Altruistic Love: A Study of American "good Neighbors" and Christian Saints*(1950)
- *Russia and the United States* (1944)

See also

- Integral movement
- Komi Republic
- Sorokin Research Center
- Social cycle theory
- War cycles
- Sociology of revolution
- *Perversion for Profit*

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External links

- The Pitirim A. Sorokin Foundation (USA) (http://sorokinfoundation.org/)
- The Pitirim A. Sorokin Foundation (http://www.pitirimsorokin.org) (in Russian)
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[Anatoly] Antonov and [John] Carlson shared admiration for one scholar and intellectual, now considered a key thinker of the Christian Right: Pitirim Sorokin (1889–1968). Sorokin was a Russian emigre Harvard sociology professor, whose works on rural society, family, and civilisational decline from the 1930s to the 1950s had greatly influenced American conservative intellectuals. Carlson was also intellectually influenced by Carle Zimmermann, who had written books together with Sorokin in 1929. Sorokin's ideas were largely unknown in the Soviet Union, but Antonov recalls clandestinely reading his works during Soviet times. Sorokin was "rediscovered" in Russia in the 1990s and became a point of reference for Russian conservatives.

Kristina Stoeckl, "The rise of the Russian Christian Right: the case of the World Congress of Families." *Religion, State & Society*. Volume 48, number 4, 2020. Pages 223-238.