ON THE LOGICAL STRUCTURE OF REALITY AND CONCEPTUAL RELATIVISM

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Part 1. The Relativity of Objects

1. Conceptual Schemes and Analyticity

Conceptual schemes have had a variety of notions. An early and prototypical proposal being the transcendental idealism of Kant wherein fixed rules for mental activity synthesize a manifold of empirical data into intelligible experience. Another being the paradigms of Kuhn. Another being the simple intuition involving differing points of view. Wang (2009) explains that while widespread confusion lingers over the notion of a conceptual scheme, a particular version dominates the discourse, namely the Quinean linguistic model which was ironically popularized by Davidson's critique (1973). We will take this *linguistic model* (or the Quinean model) for our conceptual schemes so that languages and schemes are approximately correspondent. As such, our starting position is the same which Davidson attacks in his critique of conceptual relativism, which associates having a language to a conceptual scheme, and that, if conceptual schemes differ, so do languages.

Start then with a linguistically equipped observer recording into language the world as it appears to them. Assume this observer to be reliable and a conceptually matured. As facts appear, our observer documents each as a proposition. The Sultans of Mughal India would commission historians to chronicle the proceedings of court life and all factual details of administering the empire. One of the most thorough and detailed of these chronicles is the three volume Akbarnama (the official chronicle of the reign of Emperor Akbar) written by the courtier Abul Fazl. So detailed, in fact, as to include minutia of the Sultan's daily diet. I imagine an observer like Abul Fazl. A trusted and reliable historian documenting every fact using the resources of his language.

Assume further that Abul Fazl is permitted a certain omniscience, granted the ability of bringing his chronicle everywhere and into every corner of the Indian subcontinent, such that all the facts comprising a state of his world fills a volume. This volume includes all facts expressible or reachable through language, as "Akbar is mortal," "Bodies are extended," "The cat is on the mat," and so on.

Suppose further that this language is formalizable into a first-order logic (even if that mathematical machinery is unknown to Abul Fazl), such that concepts like "cat" or "mortal" correspond to a unary predicate symbols, on-ness to a binary relation (we also permit of relations and functions of arbitrary order as well as constants), so that all the elements of the scheme are collected into a signature $\mathcal{L}$.[1]

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[1]It is not here implied that the entirety of Abul Fazl's natural language is reducible to a first-order system. There are several dimensions of language (giving orders, telling jokes, religious

The state of India, all objects and their arrangements as facts, is thereby an $\mathcal{L}$-structure. For Quine (1951) the conceptual scheme itself ought to be subject to revision according to the demands of empirical observation. Concepts might be introduced to service novel patterns within experience, and others discarded, as well their meanings rearranged. However, we will suppose the scheme immutable (if only to hold it still and explore its consequences). Whichever novelties, and however the "flux of experience" refluxes, the subsequent state of things decomposes into propositions with respect to this fixed scheme. Today's facts will be an $\mathcal{L}$-structure. Tomorrow – whichever tomorrow – will be an $\mathcal{L}$-structure. Had a past contingency been otherwise, the alternative now and its objects are an $\mathcal{L}$-structure.

Suppose we list these worlds as $\mathcal{L}$-structures $\mathcal{U}_1, \mathcal{U}_2, \mathcal{U}_3, \ldots$ each with their respective domain of existing objects. Were all these viewable at once, a cross-examination would disclose propositions true of all worlds. Propositions always confirmed from wherever the linguistically equipped observer chooses to observe from. This set of necessary propositions would be non-empty, since they would at least include what Kant describes as *containments* such as "bodies are extended," in symbols $\forall x\, (b\,(x) \to e\,(x))$.

Propositions of this form are true by a relation of meanings (are *analytic*) and are law-like from within the scheme. Whatever possible world becomes actual "bodies are extended," since this is true by the conventions of the language and derived from meanings alone.

As philosophy stands there is a great number of contentions and conflations among the categories of analytic/synthetic, necessary/contingent and a priori/a posteriori, and to progress it will take some effort to untangle these.

Quine (1951) undermines the distinction between *analytic* and *synthetic* by exposing the entirety of an empirical theory (as well its innermost logical structure and arrangements of meanings) to revision. Any statement can be "held true come what may" should the system be adjusted to ensure its necessity. Even the laws of logic (like that of excluded middle) are revisable as the evidence requires. Here Quine is correct. Both descriptively, in that, were the meaning of a *line* to change, their intersections are no longer known come what may; and prescriptively, since our models should be adaptable, and our lines ought curve with the shape of experience so to speak.

However we have assumed the scheme immutable (if only to fix its consequences), and thereby the category of analytic truths is valid, since the positions of meanings cannot change. The example provided "bodies are extended" is serviceable. If the meaning "body" and the meaning "extended" are constant, the containment "bodies are extended" comes what may. Or it might be said that the *analyticity* of a proposition is respective to the choice of scheme itself, any scheme *possesses* analytic propositions, and swapping schemes also changes-out the analytic propositions.

Any analytic proposition is represented formally as a sentence (ie, a formula where every variable is bounded). Simplest among these are single variable Kantian containments, as "all bodies are extended" symbolized by $\forall x\, (b\,(x) \to e\,(x))$. But more complicated propositions involving functions, higher-order relations, etc. would also be found. Perhaps the proposition "if a is heavier than b and b is heavier

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experience, etc.) which could not be represented in that reduction. Rather I propose that terms used for description can be so reduced. Those elements used in the recording of fact. In terms of later Wittgenstein: The special langauge game of factual reporting.

than c, then a is heavier than c" or in symbols,

$$\forall xyz \, (H\,(x,y) \wedge H\,(y,z) \rightarrow H\,(x,z))$$

which is so by the meaning of the heavier than relation.

Collect all analytic propositions into a set of sentences $\mathcal{A}$ (alternatively, collect a set of sentences $\mathcal{A}$ serving as axioms for analyticity: If s is analytic, then $\mathcal{A} \vdash s$). Since these are necessary, any world models $\mathcal{A}$. Similarly necessary propositions must also be sentences. Collect these propositions into a set of sentences $\mathcal{Q}$. Will analytic and necessary propositions coincide? Imagine Abul Fazl working with unlimited time and writing unlimited chronicles. At the end of his modal travels he finally visits the last possible world, and after committing every fact therein to a volume, verifies at last that s was indeed necessary. Does it follow that s might have been derived *a priori* from the start? That it might have been deduced by simply unpacking the definitions of the terms and this modal journey was wasteful?

An example from Quine (1951) might be useful: The terms "creature with a heart" and "creature with a kidney" likely overlap in extension but differ in meaning. Perhaps (because all creatures with hearts need kidneys to clean the same blood the heart pumps) $s = \forall x\,(k\,(x) \leftrightarrow h\,(x))$ is true in all worlds. But might we *deduce so* by meanings alone? Or following Kant, and making analytic depend upon the principle of contradiction: Does $\neg s$ contradict $\mathcal{A}$? Would the existence of a creature with a heart but not with kidneys violate the conventions of the language? Intuitively not, and to know s with absolute certainty would require a modal journey to the last possible world. Such a proposition is an *a posteriori necessary* truth. The existence of such propositions was elaborated by Kripke (1980). He provides the example "the morning star is the evening star." Both morning star and the evening star identify the same object Venus, but this equivalence cannot be deduced a priori through and appeal to the meanings of "morning star" and "evening star." The proposition required observation; yet venus is venus, and in all worlds the morning star is the evening star; therefore the proposition is necessary.

Supposing Abul Fazl were permitted to observe every possible world forming a large family of $\mathcal{L}$-structures $\{\mathcal{U}_\alpha : \alpha \in I\}$. Each would be a model $\mathcal{U}_\alpha \models \mathcal{A}$. By completeness, if every model of $\mathcal{A}$ models s then $\mathcal{A} \vdash s$, which builds an intuitive connection between necessary truths (true in every model) and a priori/analytic truths (deductively true by the conventions of the language). Of course we cannot assume that possible worlds exhaust models of $\mathcal{A}$. By the upper Skolem theore: If $\mathcal{A}$ has an infinite model then $\mathcal{A}$ has a model at every cardinality (much too large for possible worlds). Not to mention the models of $\mathcal{A}$ that are semantically incommensurate to human experiences (modeling the conventions of the language, but with alien objects). Even so, this gives some mathematical intuition that analytic/a priori propositions and necessary propositions are connected. It cannot be assumed that every model of $\mathcal{A}$ is a possible world, for the moment I will assume so to exploit completeness (this is a technical error, but one that will be rectified later).

There are two cases. The simplest occurs when necessary truths are analytic truths. In this case,

- A sentence s is analytic when $\mathcal{A} \vdash s$.
- Then s is a priori as it has a deduction from $\mathcal{A}$.
- If $\mathcal{A} \vdash s$ then for all models $\mathcal{U} \models A$ we have $\mathcal{U} \models s$, therefore s is necessary.

- Analytic propositions are by definition necessary (are a subset of necessary propositions).
- A synthetic proposition s is by definition one which does not follow from $\mathcal{A}$. Or alternatively $\mathcal{A}$ and $\neg s$ are consistent. So there exists models of $\mathcal{A} \cup \{\neg s\}$. Therefore synthetic propositions are contingent.
- Synthetic propositions are a posteriori (are true of particular worlds $\mathcal{U} \models s$). A posteriori propositions are synthetic, since if an a posteriori proposition is not synthetic it is analytic, then $\mathcal{A} \vdash s$ and s is a priori.

The more complicated case occurs when there exists a necessary proposition s that is not a deductive consequence of $\mathcal{A}$. In this case there exists an $s \in \mathcal{Q}$ so that $\mathcal{A} \nvdash s$. Because $\mathcal{Q}$ are all necessary truths, for any possible world $\mathcal{U}$ it it must be that $\mathcal{U} \models \mathcal{Q}$.

- The *modal scope* of $\mathcal{A}$ is larger than physical possibility. Since there exist models of $\mathcal{A}$ that are not models of $\mathcal{Q}$. If s is a posteriori and necessary then $\mathcal{A} \nvdash s$. Since $\neg s$ is consistent with $\mathcal{A}$ and there is a model $\mathcal{U} \models \mathcal{A}$ where $\mathcal{U} \models \neg s$. But this could not be a possible world.
- Models of $\mathcal{Q}$ are models of $\mathcal{A}$. Therefore analytic propositions (s where $\mathcal{A} \vdash s$) are still necessary.
- Since the a posteriori necessary propositions are *discoveries* that could not be arrived at a priori, the a priori category remains the conclusions of $\mathcal{A}$.
- Further, synthetic propositions (s that is not an consequence of $\mathcal{A}$) are still a posteriori (since s is not deducible by $\mathcal{A}$, and must be discovered through observation). As before, synthetic propositions are a posteriori and a posteriori propositions are synthetic.

Thus there is only one distinction between these cases: The existence of synthetic (equivalently, a posteriori) necessary propositions. In the simpler case: A proposition is either a contingent empirical truth or is a logical consequence of the language. In the complexified case, a proposition is classified into one of the following: Analytic truths (which are a priori truths, and form a subset of necessary truths), synthetic truths (a posteriori and contingent, the three are equivalent), and finally necessary but a posteriori (equivalently, necessary but synthetic).

2. Conceptual Schemes and Objects

The purpose of classifying analyticity and the above complications is to ground an ontology. There exists an intuitive connection between objects and properties. Common-sensically, a property describes some attribute or quality inhering in the object. A given property P is "true of" the object a and is written $P(a)$. But the object might equally be attributed to the property: The form $P(a)$ might be rethought as $a(P)$. After all, listing the properties of an object is also to know it, and an exhaustive list is to know it exhaustively. In other words, a might be reconstructed by $a(P)$ across P.

Our chronicler Abul Fazl searches out every fact that can be found and records each. These labors produce an $\mathcal{L}$-structure $\mathcal{U}$ such that each fact has been represented as an $\mathcal{L}$-formula $\psi(a_1, \ldots, a_n)$ where $\mathcal{U} \models \psi(a_1, \ldots, a_n)$. So if the "cat is on the mat" then $\mathcal{U} \models \operatorname{on}(\operatorname{cat}, \operatorname{mat})$, and if not then $\mathcal{U} \nmodels \operatorname{on}(\operatorname{cat}, \operatorname{mat})$. All this documentation must therefore posit the objects $a_1, \ldots, a_n$ that arrange within those same formulas. Formally, this is the domain of interpretation which, in our context, is an ontology of existing things. When tomorrows facts are recorded,

those formulas will arrange from tomorrows existents. And the day after. So that each $\mathcal{U}_1, \mathcal{U}_2, \mathcal{U}_3, \ldots$ comes with an ontology of existing objects. While an overlap between these domains is expected (the same cat is alive tomorrow), it is not evident from here that there would be a global inter-relation, and each domain could be something of an ontological island.

We will construct a more global ontology. As before let $\mathcal{A}$ be analytic sentences capturing the conventions of the language. These propositions verified everywhere in observation provided observation is conducted through the scheme. In the language of model theory the $\mathcal{L}$-structures $\mathcal{U}_\alpha$ are *models* of the theory $\mathcal{A}$, or $\mathcal{A} \models \mathcal{U}_\alpha$ for $\alpha \in I$.

Construct the 1-*types* of the theory $\mathcal{A}$ according to the following procedure:

(1) Define an equivalence relation on unary formulas $\psi(x) \sim \varphi(x)$ when $\mathcal{A} \vdash \forall x \left(\psi(x) \leftrightarrow \varphi(x) \right)$.

(2) Order the equivalence classes by setting $[\psi] \leq [\varphi]$ when $\mathcal{A} \vdash \forall x \left(\psi(x) \rightarrow \varphi(x) \right)$. This partial order defines a Boolean algebra (the Lindenbaum-Tarski algebra). Denote this algebra as $B(\mathcal{A})$.

(3) Construct the Stone space $S(\mathcal{A}) = \mathrm{St}(B(\mathcal{A}))$. This is the space of 1-types.

Let $\mathcal{U}$ be a model of $\mathcal{A}$. Given $u \in \mathcal{U}$, the type of that object $\mathrm{tp}(u)$ is the function defined on equivalence classes of unary formulas by,

$$\mathrm{tp}(u)([\psi]) = \begin{cases} T & \text{when } \mathcal{U} \models \psi(u) \\ F & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}$$

This is a homomorphism of $B(\mathcal{A})$ into $\{T, F\}$. Notice that if $\mathcal{A} \vdash \forall x \left(\psi(x) \leftrightarrow \varphi(x) \right)$ then $\mathcal{U} \models \psi(u)$ if and only if $\mathcal{U} \models \varphi(u)$, so the function is well defined on equivalence classes. While if $[\psi] \leq [\varphi]$, then $\mathcal{A} \vdash \forall x \left(\psi(x) \rightarrow \varphi(x) \right)$, and because $\mathcal{U} \models \mathcal{A}$ we know $\mathcal{U} \models \forall x \left(\psi(x) \rightarrow \varphi(x) \right)$ and therefore $\mathrm{tp}(u)([\psi]) \leq \mathrm{tp}(u)([\varphi])$. Thus $\mathrm{tp}(u)$ is an order-preserving map from $B(\mathcal{A})$ to the two element Boolean algebra. Which is to say that any object $u \in \mathcal{U}$ specifies a type $\mathrm{tp}(u)$. Or the map $u \rightarrow \mathrm{tp}(u)$ sends objects to respective types.

Suppose the model $\mathcal{U}$ satisfies a second-order logical property corresponding to Leibniz's law (that is, the identity of indiscernibles), formulated as: If for all ψ, $\mathcal{U} \models \varphi(u)$ if and only if $\mathcal{U} \models \varphi(v)$, then $u = v$. In other words, given $u, v \in \mathcal{U}$ where $u \neq v$, there exists a single-variable formula distinguishing them. Under this law $\mathrm{tp}(u) = \mathrm{tp}(v)$ implies $u = v$. Such that the map $\mathcal{U} \rightarrow S(\mathcal{A})$ given by $u \rightarrow \mathrm{tp}(u)$ is injective. In other words, every domain $\mathcal{U}$ satisfying Liebnez's law identifies a *subspace* of $S(\mathcal{A})$. If Leibniz's law fails then $u \rightarrow \mathrm{tp}(u)$ is no longer injective and maps together indiscernible objects (with respect to unary formulas).

This will need some exploration and cleaning up. For now the intuition is: An object $u \in \mathcal{U}$ *is* (or is *up to classification*) its truth-values when paired with unary formulas ψ. Consider that all simple concepts (as "animate," "inanimate," "organic," "synthetic," "hard," "triangular," ...) have been represented as predicate symbols $p(x)$, then knowing $\mathrm{tp}(u) : B(\mathcal{A}) \rightarrow \{T, F\}$ is to know all inhering properties of the object. If Abul Fazl were allowed to study the object for an indefinite length of time, to inspect it from every possible angle, noting all its tinniest flaws and intimate details – observations conducted from *within* the scheme – everything that could be recorded is given by $\mathrm{tp}(u) : B(\mathcal{A}) \rightarrow \{T, F\}$. Two objects of the same type $\mathrm{tp}(u) = \mathrm{tp}(v)$ are the same from every angle, share the tinniest flaws and most infinitesimal details, and are indiscernible or equivalent under classification.

Assuming an identity of indiscernibles. Given a possible world as a model $\mathcal{U}$ of $\mathcal{A}$, the domain of $\mathcal{U}$ becomes a subspace of $S(\mathcal{A})$ under $\text{tp}(\cdot) : u \to \text{tp}(u)$. Another documented world determines another subspace. In other words the points of $S(\mathcal{A})$ are related to *possible object*s. Given a point $\mathfrak{p} \in S(\mathcal{A})$ its definition as $\mathfrak{p} : B(\mathcal{A}) \to \{T, F\}$ tells us every property an object of type $\mathfrak{a}$ will have should it become actual. Any property ψ of $\mathfrak{p}$ is answered by the value $\mathfrak{p}([\psi])$. Thus $\mathfrak{p} : B(\mathcal{A}) \to \{T, F\}$ places a possible object as an intersection of properties. With a point of $S(\mathcal{A})$ given, a possible object is fully disclosed through an exhaustive list of properties, all the smallest details that the scheme is capable of expressing.

3. Semantics

We should remark that because the signature $\mathcal{L}$ and the theory $\mathcal{A}$ are syntactic, the construction of $S(\mathcal{A})$ – which proceeded from $\mathcal{L}$ and $\mathcal{A}$ as mathematical objects – is also syntactic. We can see this by imagining another *type* of world classified by the logical structure of our conceptual scheme following a semantic substitution. Where our "organic" is sent to their property-O, our "synthetic" is sent to their property-S, and so on, while preserving the all logical relations. One might recall what Hilbert said of geometry: That the axioms may hold as well for tables, chairs and beer-mugs as they do of points, lines and planes. Likewise, the same conceptual scheme that would organize the contents of my experience, and would identify all the objects within a lounge and their mutual relations, might, with like suitability and economy, organize the contents of a geometrical world of pure mathematical objects. Imagining both the lounge $\mathcal{U}$ and the geometric world $\mathcal{V}$ as $\mathcal{L}$-structures modeling $\mathcal{A}$, their respective existing objects embed as subspaces (assuming Leibniz's law) of $S(\mathcal{A})$. Where it becomes possible that the same point $\mathfrak{p} \in S(\mathcal{A})$ be identified both as by a geometric object and as lounge paraphernalia, and it is impossible to preference either interpretation syntactically.

But intuitively a conceptual scheme would classify consistent experiences. Or a constant *type* of world. Organizing human experience from a particular perspective, a perspective which does not jump to geometric worlds and back again. In Davidson's language, conceptual schemes are "ways of organizing experience; they are systems of categories that give form to the data of sensation; they are points of view from which individuals, cultures, or periods survey the passing scene" (Davidson, 1973, p. 1). We can imagine these *scenes* of Davidson passing into and out of existence, while the mode of surveying, the point of view, is a constant. Each scene is surveyed and its contents organized by fixed meanings within the scheme. The concept "apple" selects-out all apples within that scene, the relation "heavier than" finds all pairs of objects standing in that relation, and so on. *When the next scene is surveyed* those concepts perform the same work.

Davidson relates that, "Strawson invites us to imagine possible non-actual worlds, worlds that might be described, using our present language, by redistributing truth values over sentences in various systematic ways. The clarity of the contrasts between worlds in this case depends on supposing our scheme of concepts, our descriptive resources, to remain fixed" and that this "requires a distinction within language of concept and content: using a fixed system of concepts (words with fixed meanings) we describe alternative universes. Some sentences will be true simply because of the concepts or meanings involved, others because of the way of the world. In

describing possible worlds, we play with sentences of the second kind only" (Davidson, 1973, p. 9). We accept Strawson's invitation (Strawson, 1998). The *contents* of experience flux and are passing, concepts have fixed meanings which perform a classificatory work on whatever comes.

Even if the causal freeplay of the Universe voids the extension of a concept, even if all apples were to vanish, the concept's place within the scheme is secure. Of course, the absurdity of maintaining apples even when apples are gone, perhaps gone forever, is an argument for the revisability of the conceptual scheme. But to restate our purpose: A scheme is held constant long enough to understand its full consequences. That is not to say these concepts are *innate*, as some wondering through experience or a certain process of socialization is needed to acquire them, but once they are framed-so in the mind (and assuming the scheme is fixed) they obtain a transcendence to experience as an organizer of experience. Such might be described in terms of the above mentioned scheme-content dualism. Conceptual meanings obtain a certain transcendence (not completely unlike Kant's use of transcendental) above the flux of experience.

With fixed meanings, $S(\mathcal{A})$ become the possible object-types of a consistent *type* of world. Where above the $\mathcal{L}$ theory $\mathcal{A}$ could model a geometrical plane or a lounge, and therefore a point $\mathfrak{p} \in S(\mathcal{A})$ has two interpretations, by fixing the meanings of a scheme we mean *only* geometrical planes or *only* lounges (but not one then the other), so that each point has one coherent interpretation.

A point $\mathfrak{p} \in S(\mathcal{A})$ is interpreted as the possible object-type given by the values $\mathfrak{p}([\psi])$ where ψ is given a meaning respective to the fixed meanings of the scheme. With meanings attached to every element of the conceptual scheme, each point of $S(\mathcal{A})$ is given an interpretation, call $S(\mathcal{A})$ so interpreted $\mathbb{U}$.

4. Possible Objects

With meanings assigned to formulas, an element $\mathfrak{p} \in \mathbb{U}$ represents a certain logically formal object-type described by a family of properties $\mathfrak{p} : B(\mathcal{A}) \to \{T, F\}$. The ontology $\mathbb{U}$ contains the types of possible objects, since a possible world $\mathcal{U}$ models $\mathcal{A}$ and as above $u \to \mathrm{tp}(u)$ is a well-defined map $\mathcal{U} \to \mathbb{U}$ (mapping together indiscernibles). Any object Abul Fazl gathers in a passing scene is classified somewhere in $\mathbb{U}$. Thus $\mathbb{U}$ is ontologically exhaustive as the space which contains the object-types of every $\mathcal{U}$.

Even so, we should pause to ask whether an abstract object of $\mathbb{U}$ should be given the dignity of being thought about, or whether the better part of $\mathbb{U}$ is what Quine (1948) would call an "overpopulated universe" and a "disorderly slum of possibles" (p. 2). Mathematically, $\mathbb{U}$ exists by virtue of sound construction, much as the distributions of Schwartz exist or the algebraic closure of a field exists (whether these formal constructions are real or mathematical fiction is another question). Further, the objects of $\mathbb{U}$ meet Quine's minimal standard as elements of a set which can be quantified over.

Still, our universe seems something of a Plato's beard, which for Quine is "frequently dulling the edge of Occam's razor" (ibid, p. 1). But given that our possibles have proceeded from exact mathematical construction, rather than whatever phantasmogoria the imagination can conjure, we can reply to many of Quine's objections:

> Take, for instance, the possible fat man in that doorway; and, again,
> the possible bald man in that doorway. Are they the same possible

> man, or two possible men? How do we decide? How many possible
> men are there in that doorway? Are there more possible thin ones
> than fat ones? How many of them are alike? Or would their being
> alike make them one? Are no two possible things alike? Is this alike
> to saying it is impossible for two things to be alike? Or, finally, is the
> concept of identity simply inapplicable to unactualized possibilities?
> (ibid, p. 2)

Our definition of a possible object-type is $\mathfrak{p} : B(\mathcal{A}) \to \{T, F\}$. This definition allocates properties automatically and keeps these properties from self-contradiction. Responding to "unless the round square cupola on Berkeley College were, it would be nonsense to say that it is not" (ibid, p. 3). There are no round-square-cupolas, as such a possible object would satisfy $\mathfrak{p}(\text{round}) = T = F$. There are no round-square-cupolas or squared-circles to be found in $\mathbb{U}$.

Indeed, an object-type $\mathfrak{p} : B(\mathcal{A}) \to \{T, F\}$ must respect the relations of meanings native to the scheme. If properties have meanings which exclude one another (or p and q are such that $\exists x (p(x) \wedge q(x))$ is inconsistent with $\mathcal{A}$) then there is not an object in $\mathbb{U}$ satisfying those properties. This is so because $\exists x (p(x) \wedge q(x))$ is equated to 0 in $B(\mathcal{A})$ and therefore is empty in the Stone space. Above a possible object-type is described as a listing of all possible properties that would inhere in the object – but arbitrary lists will not specify possible objects, only those lists respecting the logical relations of meanings internal to the scheme.

Similarly, if we denote baldness by a predicate $b(x)$, and a possible bald man by u and a possible fat man by v, then (presuming the fat-man is not also bald) both are distinct possible objects, since $b(u) \neq b(v)$. Can two possible things be alike? Two possible objects can agree on a set of properties, but if they agree on all predicates then they are indiscernible and identify the same type in $\mathbb{U}$. This answers Quine's objection "Is the concept of identity simply inapplicable to unactualized possibles? But what sense can be found in talking of entities which cannot meaningfully be said to be identical with themselves and distinct from one another?" (ibid, p. 2).

Are there more possible bald-men than fat-men? At first glance the question is nonsense (the sort of question that would circulate within ontological slums), but even this nonsense might be resolved. Remember $\mathbb{U}$ is a topological space and has a natural Borel algebra Σ. For a unary formula $\psi(x)$ let $\text{tp}(\psi)$ be the representation of ψ in the Stone space in $\mathbb{U}$ (ie, the set of object-types satisfying ψ). With a measure μ on Σ, it is possible to compare $\mu(\text{tp}b)$ to $\mu(\text{tp}f)$ and determine which is larger. Such measurements are speculative in the extreme, I only wish to convey that because $\mathbb{U}$ is a mathematically consistent construction, it is sound and perfectly amenable to other mathematical tools (as the measure μ).

Consider Pegasus. Is Pegasus somewhere in $\mathbb{U}$? It depends on the conventions of the language. If w symbolizes "winged" and h symbolizes "horse," Pegasus is an object a such that $w(a) \wedge h(a)$. If $\exists x (w(x) \wedge h(x))$ is consistent with $\mathcal{A}$ then the formula $\exists x (w(x) \wedge h(x)) \not\sim 0$ in $B(\mathcal{A})$ and is represented by a non-empty subset of the Stone space $\mathbb{U}$. Conversely, if the meanings of "winged" and "horse" exclude one another a priori, so that $\exists x (w(x) \wedge h(x))$ is an analytic contradiction, then the formula is extensionless in the Stone space.

A question arises: Are all these possible objects *physically possible*? This depends on the existence of a posteriori necessary propositions. Using Kripke's example: The morning star is the evening star, but their identity is not knowable a priori. Since

our universal ontology contains all objects that are consistent with the schemes conventions, there would exist distinct objects *Hesperus* and *Phosphorus* in $\mathbb{U}$. Similarly, Pegasus is in $\mathbb{U}$ provided the meanings of "winged" and "horse" are not exclusionary; however, a prolonged trans-modal investigation by Abul Fazl may verify that Pegasus does not exist in any possible world. Such would occur when the meanings of "winged" and "horse" are not analytically exclusionary – yet some physical law or principle of biological evolution prohibits the existence of a winged horse. The non-existence of Pegasus is then an *empirical discovery* (which is a posteriori necessary).

For this reason certain possible objects of $\mathbb{U}$ are physically impossible. To clarify the distinction call the objects of $\mathbb{U}$ *logically possible objects* (or just possible, unless the prefix of logical is needed for clarity) and the objects that appear in some possible world *physically possible objects* (all physically possible objects are logically possible, but not all logically possible objects are physically possible).

The distinction can be given a mathematical explanation. Recall that $\mathcal{Q}$ are all necessary propositions. There exist models of $\mathcal{A}$ that are not models of $\mathcal{Q}$ (logically possible worlds that are not physically possible). For $\mathcal{L}$-formulas ψ and φ, notice that $\mathcal{A} \vdash \forall x\,(\psi\,(x) \to \varphi\,(x))$ implies $\mathcal{Q} \vdash \forall x\,(\psi\,(x) \to \varphi\,(x))$ (but not the converse). Therefore there is a surjective homomorphism of Boolean algebras $h : B\,(\mathcal{A}) \to B\,(\mathcal{Q})$. Because the Stone functor sends surjections to injections,

$$\mathrm{St}\,(h) : S\,(\mathcal{Q}) \to S\,(\mathcal{A})$$

is a topological embedding. Physically possible objects embed as a subspace of logically possible objects.

It might be protested that $S\,(\mathcal{Q})$ is the better choice for a universal ontology. It is true that, as to what could exist, physically possible objects are the better-fitting choice. Yet the advantage of logically possible objects is their *a priori* existence. Once the meanings of the scheme are framed, all possible object-types are populated through the form $\mathfrak{p} : S\,(\mathcal{A}) \to \{T, F\}$. They are a priori consequences of the structure of the scheme. Conversely, a physically possible object cannot be reckoned a priori. It is only through empirical investigation that $\mathcal{Q}$ might be known and consequently the scope of $S\,(\mathcal{Q})$. It might be required that Abul Fazl travel to the last possible world to verify the necessary non-existence of Pegasus. As we progress it will become clear that an ontology of logically possible objects – those objects that belong to the scheme – is the better choice of universe.

Curiously, a deductive gap between $\mathcal{Q}$ and $\mathcal{A}$ (the existence of a posteriori necessary truths) is equivalent to an ontological gap $S\,(\mathcal{A}) - S\,(\mathcal{Q})$. Since if $S\,(\mathcal{A}) = S\,(\mathcal{Q})$ then the continuous map $\mathrm{St}\,(h) : S\,(\mathcal{Q}) \to S\,(\mathcal{A})$ is both injective and surjective. But a continuous injection between compact Hausdorff spaces is a homeomorphism from between domain and image. Therefore $\mathrm{St}\,(h)$ is a homeomorphism between $S\,(\mathcal{Q})$ and $S\,(\mathcal{A})$. Applying the Stone functor h is an isomorphism between $B\,(\mathcal{A})$ and $B\,(\mathcal{Q})$ as Boolean algebras (from which it follows that $\mathcal{A}$ and $\mathcal{Q}$ coincide). Conversely, when $\mathcal{A}$ and $\mathcal{Q}$ coincide, then $B\,(\mathcal{A}) = B\,(\mathcal{Q})$ and $S\,(\mathcal{A}) = S\,(\mathcal{Q})$.

5. A Copernican Revolution

Objects (more exactly object-types) and conceptual schemes are *mathematically dual* in exactly the same way that a Stone space and a Boolean algebra are dual. Once a scheme has been framed and its meanings set, the full space of $\mathbb{U}$ is implicit.

The form $a : B(\mathcal{Q}) \to \{T, F\}$ gives an object-type as a unique positions within the classifications of the scheme. Positioned as an intersection of properties. But to say an object is classified and an object *is* an intersection of properties has become exactly the same. Classified objects and intersections of properties have been placed in a bijective correspondence. In a sense there can be no surprises: As the scheme classifies the content of experience, what it uncovers are not exotic relics, but *the productions of its own inner logical machinery.*

No matter how much Fazl observes his records may only combine objects into observed facts $\psi(a_1, \ldots, a_n)$ where $\mathrm{tp}(a_1), \ldots, \mathrm{tp}(a_n) \in \mathbb{U}$. Were he permitted to chronicle indefinitely, and explore every empirical corner, the scope of his observations can only excavate a subspace of $\mathbb{U}$. Yet this $\mathbb{U}$ was fashioned a priori before his work began. Everywhere he travels is a charted course through constructions, never exceeding certain Kantian boundaries laid by the schematic structure.

Following Quine's advice, the scheme itself ought to be revisable through experience. In that case the ontological universe $\mathbb{U}$ is also subject to revision, but that this new frontier of ontological possibilities is now *dual* to the revised scheme. This $\mathbb{U}'$ is mathematically dual to $\mathcal{A}'$. Modifying the scheme modifies objects, but the co-relativity of objects and schemes cannot be modified.

I propose this duality as a reconstruction of Kant's Copernican revolution:

> Thus far it has been assumed that all our cognition must conform to objects. On that presupposition, however, all our attempts to establish something about them a priori, by means of concepts through which our cognition would be expanded, have come to nothing. Let us, therefore, try to find out by experiment whether we shall not make better progress in the problems of metaphysics if we assume that objects must conform to our cognition.—This assumption already agrees better with the demanded possibility of an a priori cognition of objects–i.e., a cognition that is to ascertain something about them before they are given to us. The situation here is the same as was that of *Copernicus* when he first thought of explaining the motions of celestial bodies. Having found it difficult to make progress there when he assumed that the entire host of stars revolved around the spectator, he tried to find out by experiment whether he might not be more successful if he had the spectator revolve and the stars remain at rest. Now, we can try a similar experiment in metaphysics. (Kant, 1996, p.21)

With the important distinction that our revolution has a linguistic basis. Where Kant's objects *revolved* about the subject in orbits determined by cognitive faculty, ours are settled into linguistic paths. While we have not reconstructed Kant's revolution in all its details, the "primary hypothesis" is in tact: Objects revolve about schemes and not the reverse. Concepts are not abstracted from patterns within an ontology that is prior and given; the object descends from a production-line of classifications and appears in consciousness as shaped by the mode of classification.

But there remains an important counter-revolutionary objection: The possibility that *constructions* correspond (are isomorphic with) objects at their most objective and observer-independent state. The realist might concede that experiences are representational while adding that those representations are structurally isomorphic to the things in-themselves. We see in perspective, and of course the tree on the

hill is not many scale-factors smaller than the tree an arms length away, but the tree in perspective can be claimed to be isomorphic with the tree itself. Even with the above mathematical duality, it might yet be that a distinguished scheme is isomorphic with reality, such that its constructions and natural objects happen to be in correspondence.

Notice that this objection is logically related to the possibility of translating between schemes. Were there only one conceptual scheme (equivalently, if all schemes are inter-translatable), then the possible objects of all schemes are common. In that case, there is but *one* duality, and to assert that concepts conform to objects or that objects conform to concepts are both consistent. Further, concepts conforming to objects would be the better interpretation, since there is one $\mathbb{U}$ that all conceptual schemes conform to. Thus our Copernican revolution will depend upon the existence of an alternate and non-translatable conceptual scheme.

Part 2. **The Structure of Reality**

6. Possible Worlds and Indiscernibles

Abul Fazl documents each "passing scene" as an $\mathcal{L}$-structure $\mathcal{U}_\alpha$, where $\mathcal{U}_\alpha \models \mathcal{A}$ for all $\alpha \in I$ (since observation is conducted *through* the scheme). Thus we might heuristically intuit possible worlds as possible models of $\mathcal{A}$. This intuition has technical problems that have already been discussed: First, a model of $\mathcal{A}$ might interpret the structure with an alien semantics (the possible *lounge-world* is interpreted as a *geometrical-world*). Our modal-scope should not include such inversions and departures of meaning. Secondly, as a consequence of the upward Skolem theorem: Any theory with an infinite model has a model at any cardinal, and these are intuitively too large to be a possible world.

The first problem is solved by *fixing a meaning* to each element of the scheme so that its formulas are articulations respective to a consistent *type* of world. A relation $R(a, b)$ between beer mugs, is always between beer mugs, and never transitions its meaning to Platonic solids. The second problem may be solved by bounding the size of the models. A hint derives from model theory, where it is known that it is only necessary to verify a sentence s is true in all finite and countably infinite models of a theory T to conclude that $T \vdash s$. In our case: To test whether s is *a priori* and a deductive consequence of a scheme, it would be enough to verify s in all finite and countably infinite worlds. Fortunately, *countably infinite* is fitting for the size of a possible world.[2]

With these qualifications possible worlds should include finite and countably infinite models of $\mathcal{A}$ whose object-types are a subset of $\mathbb{U}$. In this view, any such scattering of $\mathbb{U}$-object-types observing the analytic conventions of the scheme is a logically possible world.

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[2]At most countably infinite is a good fit for schemes which correspond to natural languages . There may be cause to think of larger worlds (for example, where points in space are all objects). But for our purposes, objects are to be the objects of Abul Fazl's representations, such as tables, chairs, cats, mats, etc. These objects would be at most countably infinite. Bounding the size of worlds in this way also ensures that the number of indiscernibles to any object are at most countably infinite, and this facilitates a tidy mathematical presentation of an object as a_n where a is the type of the object and n indexes which indiscernible. In other words, a world is contained in $\mathbb{U} \times \mathbb{N}$, which greatly simplifies the topic. Admittedly, there are reasons to allow more general sizes, but the resulting complexity only hinders the present discussion.

Definition. A *possible world* $\mathcal{U}$ is a model $\mathcal{U} \models \mathcal{A}$ which is at most countably infinite and whose object-types are a subset of $\mathbb{U}$ (up to indiscernibility).

A physically possible world $\mathcal{V}$ is a possible world such that $\mathcal{V} \models \mathcal{Q}$ where $\mathcal{Q}$ is the category of necessary truths (both analytic or a priori necessary and a posteriori necessary). Similar to the discussion of *possible objects* vs *physically possible objects*, a physically possible world is only knowable through empirical observation, while *logically possible worlds* are implicit once the structure of the scheme known and are enumerable *a priori*. The definition of a possible world allows for indiscernible objects. The reason for allowing a violation of Leibniz's law is to have sufficiently many models for the following theorem:

Proposition. *All truths necessary to logically possible worlds are a priori.*

Proof. It is enough to test whether $\mathcal{U} \models s$ for all finite and countably infinite models $\mathcal{U}$. Given an at most countably infinite model $\mathcal{U}$, order formulas $\psi(x)$ and $\varphi(x)$ by $\mathcal{U} \models \forall x (\psi(x) \rightarrow \varphi(x))$, this produces a Boolean algebra $B(\mathcal{U})$, and since consequences of $\mathcal{A}$ are modeled by $\mathcal{U}$ there is a surjection $B(\mathcal{A}) \rightarrow B(\mathcal{U})$. The Stone functor sends surjections to injections, thus there is an injective continuous map:

$$f : \mathrm{St}(B(\mathcal{U})) \rightarrow S(\mathcal{A})$$

Given $a \in \mathcal{U}$ representing a type $\mathrm{tp}(a) \in S(\mathcal{A})$, there are at most countably many b where $\mathrm{tp}(b) = \mathrm{tp}(a)$. By choosing an enumeration of indiscernibles $a^0, a^1, a^2, \ldots$ we can produce the injections:

$$\mathcal{U} \rightarrow S(\mathcal{A}) \times \mathbb{N}$$

by sending $a^k \rightarrow (a, k)$.

Further each point of $S(\mathcal{A})$ has an interpretation as a potential object, and so there is a bijection $S(\mathcal{A}) \times \mathbb{N} \rightarrow \mathbb{U} \times \mathbb{N}$. Composing with this last map produces an injection $h : \mathcal{U} \rightarrow \mathbb{U} \times \mathbb{N}$. Now use the domain $\mathcal{W} = h(\mathcal{U})$, and interpret each function f into $\mathcal{W}$ through $f^{\mathcal{W}}(h(a_1), \ldots, h(a_n)) = h(f^{\mathcal{U}}(a_1, \ldots, a_n))$, each relation R as $R^{\mathcal{W}} = (h, \ldots, h)(R^{\mathcal{U}})$, and each constant c as $c^{\mathcal{W}} = h(c^{\mathcal{N}})$. Then $\mathcal{W}$ is a model of $\mathcal{A}$ which is a possible world and is isomorphic to $\mathcal{U}$.

A sentence s is true in $\mathcal{U}$, if and only if, s is true in the corresponding possible world $\mathcal{W}$. Therefore $\mathcal{A} \vdash s$, if and only if, s is true for all possible worlds. $\square$

Curiously, for the proof to work, the modal scope must include possible worlds with indiscernible objects. Possible worlds with Leibniz's law are too few to make an appeal to the above variation of completeness. Thus, the possibility of indiscernibles has, at least, this purely formal logical evidence.

Notice the proof employed the domain $\mathbb{U} \times \mathbb{N}$. When a world $\mathcal{W}$ satisfies Leibniz's law we can view $\mathcal{W}$ as a subset of $\mathbb{U}$ and so, for these worlds, $\mathbb{U}$ is sufficient as a universal domain. When $\mathcal{W}$ has indiscernible objects an ontological embedding into $\mathbb{U}$ is impossible since indiscernibles must identify the same potential object type in $\mathbb{U}$. But for a class $[a^0]$ of indiscernible objects, enumerating $[a^0]$ as $\{a^0, a^1, a^2, \ldots\}$ views the class as $[a^0] \times \mathbb{N}$ contained in $\mathbb{U} \times \mathbb{N}$. Of course the choice of enumeration is not unique, and there are several embeddings of $\mathcal{W}$ into $\mathbb{U} \times \mathbb{N}$. But this non-uniqueness does not implicate the integrity of the semantics (exactly because the another choice of embedding only exchanges indiscernibles). The ontology of any

possible world is contained in $\mathbb{U} \times \mathbb{N}$. In modal logic this is also called a *constant domain* semantics.

The goal is to define a constant and universal ontology as a mathematically imminent consequence of the conceptual scheme, which becomes ontological at the moment the meanings are arranged; thus all *facts* will combine objects that existed prior to the fact, like hands of cards drawn from a deck . That perspective will be developed bellow, but before doing so it is necessary to address the issue of indiscernibility in more detail. Our theorizing would have gone much easier assuming Leibniz's Law and your author was tempted to simply assume it. For example, assuming Leibniz's Law any domain of objects $\mathcal{U}$ becomes a straight-forward subspace of $\mathbb{U}$ and no further discussion is needed. The primary reasons for not assuming Leibniz's law was the theorem above and the simple observation that in other first-order systems (for models of other theories) indiscernibles are just a "fact of life" and eliminating them is mathematically misguided. Moreover, it is easy to conceive of indiscernibles respective to our linguistic conceptual schemes. Supposing a scheme had little expressive power (if ninety-nine percent of concepts in English were removed) then, simply because there are so few properties to distinguish objects and opportunities for discernment, indiscernibles become likely.

A possible world $\mathcal{U}$ has an embedding $h : \mathcal{U} \to S(\mathcal{A}) \times \mathbb{N}$ sending $a \to (\text{tp}(a), k)$, supposing that objects were relabeled so that $a \to (\text{tp}(a), n)$ $(n \neq k)$ it should not to matter since this amounts to exchanging indiscernibles. That is intuitive for *intrinsic* indiscernibility but what about *extrinsic* indiscernibility? Two objects sharing all the same properties need not stand in the same relations. For example, imagine two indiscernible motor vehicles a and b (they are the same dimensions, weight, model, etc. down to the smallest detail), if a is parked next to vehicle c does that imply that b is parked next to c?—No, b might be anywhere else in the world. The question becomes: Are free choices of labels consistent with these higher relations? Luckily, this is not an issue. The embedding sends objects to $\mathbb{U} \times \mathbb{N}$ and so tuples are taken from $(\mathbb{U} \times \mathbb{N})^n$. As in the proof above the embedding is built in a way to produce an isomorphism of models h where $h : \mathcal{U} \to \mathbb{U} \times \mathbb{N}$ and $h(\mathcal{U}) = \mathcal{W}$,

$$\mathcal{W} \models \psi(h(a_1), \ldots, h(a_n)) \text{ if and only if } \mathcal{U} \models \psi(a_1, \ldots, a_n)$$

Therefore whether vehicle b is parked next to c is resolved in the original model and there is no inconsistency. Moreover any choice of embedding can be made consistent (in that case the isomorphism is adapted to this alternative labeling).

The idea of a possible world being *a topological subspace* can also be rescued. Define the function $g : \mathbb{U} \times \mathbb{N} \to \mathbb{U}$ by mapping together indiscernible objects. The topology induced on $\mathbb{U} \times \mathbb{N}$ by g is generated by $g^{-1}(\text{tp}\psi)$ where ψ is a unary formula and $\text{tp}\psi$ is the representation of ψ as a clopen subset of the space of 1-types. This makes $\mathbb{U} \times \mathbb{N}$ a genuine topological space, but with indistinguishable points (the indiscernible objects). In other words, the space violates the separation axiom T_0, or is non-Kolmogorov. Any topological space has a Kolmogorov quotient identifying indistinguishable points, in our case the quotient map is g. The topological perspective is salvageable by allowing topologically indistinguishable points, then a possible world $\mathcal{W}$ embeds into $\mathbb{U} \times \mathbb{N}$ and can be viewed as a topological space under its subspace topology.

Having developed this perspective, the full mathematical power of model theory can be leveraged with surprising results. Proposition 4.1.3 from Marker (2002) states:

> Let $\mathcal{M}$ be an $\mathcal{L}$-structure, $A \subset \mathcal{M}$, and p an n-type over A. There is $\mathcal{N}$ an elementary extension of $\mathcal{M}$ such that p is realized in $\mathcal{N}$.

Here the n-types are constructed respective to the model $\mathcal{M}$ (By adding constants A and using $\mathcal{M} \models \forall x_1, \ldots, x_n \left(\psi \left(x_1, \ldots, x_n \right) \to \varphi \left(x_1, \ldots, x_n \right) \right)$ to order formulas into a Boolean algebra). In our case, if $\mathcal{U}$ is a world and $\mathrm{Th}\left(\mathcal{U}\right)$ are all its true sentences (which includes analytic truths, a posteriori necessary truths, and contingent truths), and p is a possible type of object consistent with $\mathrm{Th}\left(\mathcal{U}\right)$ and missing from $\mathcal{U}$, then there exists a strictly *larger world* $\mathcal{W}$ (ie, having all the objects of $\mathcal{U}$), so that: For all $(a_1, \ldots, a_n) \in \mathcal{U}^n$ and $\mathcal{L}$-formulas ψ:

$$\mathcal{U} \models \psi\left(a_1, \ldots, a_n\right), \text{ if and only if, } \mathcal{W} \models \psi\left(a_1, \ldots, a_n\right)$$

In other words, the extended world $\mathcal{N}$ keeps all objects in their present arrangements (if the "cat is on the mat" in $\mathcal{U}$ then that *same cat* is on the *same mat* in $\mathcal{W}$), while simultaneously realizing an object of the specified missing type.

Possible worlds have a resemblance to field extensions. If a solution to a polynomial is missing from the base field ($x^2 + 2 = 0$ is missing from the rational field) there exists an extended field that includes a solution (a $\sqrt{2}$), but which also agrees on all arithmetical facts of the base field ($1/2 + 1/2 = 1$ is still the case in the extension). Analogously: There exists a world agreeing with all the facts of this world (the populations of cities are the same, wars concluded on the same dates, etc.) but somewhere within exists your near twin (only one foot taller, with different colored eyes, or as close as can be approached respective to $\mathrm{Th}\left(\mathcal{U}\right)$). Even stranger, the near-twin is not quarantined to a realm of mathematical abstraction (as exotic mathematical objects often are), since $\mathrm{Th}\left(\mathcal{U}\right)$ *includes* every scientific, historic, sociological, and psychological law. The twin is more worldly than Pegasus or Plato's beard. Fitting well into the world's common senses.

It is also possible to omit types. Theorem 4.2.4 from Marker's text states:

> Let $\mathcal{L}$ be a countable language, and let T be an $\mathcal{L}$-theory. Let X be a countable collection of non-isolated types over $\emptyset$. There is a countable $\mathcal{M} \models T$ that omits all the types $p \in X$.

Here types are respective to the theory T (dual to formulas ordered by T). We can choose T to be the conventions of the language $\mathcal{A}$ or include necessary a posteriori truths $\mathcal{Q}$. In either case for a countable set X of non-isolated types there is a world $\mathcal{U}$ (modeling the theory) which omits them. For instance: The planet Earth and all objects within. Or the Milky Way Galaxy. Either might be *deleted*.

My intention is not to write a detailed mathematical investigation, but to illustrate how the mathematical tools allow a rigorous exploration of old speculations.

7. The Facts in Logical Space are the World

Let us finally define a conceptual scheme formally,

Definition. A *conceptual scheme* $\mathscr{U}$ is a signature $\mathcal{L}$, a set of sentences $\mathcal{A}$ representing linguistic conventions, and a universal domain of object-types $\mathbb{U}$ (characterizing meanings fixed to the scheme's concepts). That is, a triple $\mathscr{U} = (\mathcal{L}, \mathcal{A}, \mathbb{U})$.

Given a conceptual scheme $\mathscr{U} = (\mathcal{L}, \mathcal{A}, \mathbb{U})$, since $\mathbb{U} \times \mathbb{N}$ is a constant domain, it is possible to list all formulas in permutations of potential objects: For an $\mathcal{L}$-formula $\psi(x_1, \ldots x_n)$, all $\psi(a_1, \ldots, a_n)$ across $(a_1, \ldots, a_n) \in (\mathbb{U} \times \mathbb{N})^n$. For example, where $R(x, y)$ is the relation "is an acquaintance of," and x and y ranges over individual people, it becomes possible to enumerate, $R(a, b)$ across *potential* pairs of people $(a, b) \in (\mathbb{U} \times \mathbb{N})^2$. A possible world $\mathcal{U} \models R(a, b)$ describes a world where person a and person b are acquaintances. We might do the same with "is to the east of" or "is taller than."

Interpreting a free-standing formula $\psi(a_1, \ldots, a_n)$ as a *state-of-affairs* and a formula which obtains $\mathcal{U} \models \psi(a_1, \ldots, a_n)$ as a *fact*, the resulting combinatorics recalls the Tractatus (Wittgenstein, 1999), since all possible states-of-affairs (as combinations of objects) stand in logical space, and facts (true-states-of-affairs) are a sub-set of these affairs which happen to hold in the world, and which in an important sense *are* the world.

From our position there is an immediate interpretation of:

> (1.1) The world is the totality of facts, not of things.
> (1.11) The world is determined by the facts, and by these being *all* the facts.

Since after the domain $\mathbb{U}$ is given, all combinations of objects within formulas is mathematically imminent. All possible states of affairs gather as a set,

$$\mathrm{SA}(\mathscr{U}) = \{\psi(a_1, \ldots, a_n) : \psi \text{ is an } n\text{-ary } \mathcal{L}\text{-formula for some } n \text{ and } (a_1, \ldots a_n) \in (\mathbb{U} \times \mathbb{N})^n\}$$

while facts $\mathrm{F}_{\mathscr{U}}(\mathcal{U})$ (respective to $\mathcal{U}$) is the subset of $\mathrm{SA}(\mathscr{U})$ where $\mathcal{U} \models \psi(a_1, \ldots, a_n)$. There is a closely related construction from model theory. If $\mathcal{M}$ is an $\mathcal{L}$-structure, and $\mathcal{L}_{\mathcal{M}}$ is the language obtained by adding $\mathcal{M}$ as constant symbols. The *elementary diagram Diag*$(\mathcal{M})$ of $\mathcal{M}$ is,

$$\{\psi(a_1, \ldots, a_n) : \mathcal{M} \models \psi(a_1, \ldots, a_n), \psi \text{ is an } \mathcal{L}\text{-formula}\}$$

The reason for the added constants is to make $\psi(a_1, \ldots, a_n)$ into sentences which can be modeled as a theory, otherwise the construction amounts to the same as $\mathrm{F}_{\mathscr{U}}(\mathcal{U})$. By Lemma 2.3.3 from Marker (2002), if $\mathcal{N}$ is an $\mathcal{L}_{\mathcal{M}}$-structure and $\mathcal{N} \models \mathrm{Diag}(\mathcal{M})$; then, viewing $\mathcal{N}$ as an $\mathcal{L}$-structure, there is an elementary embedding of $\mathcal{M}$ into $\mathcal{N}$. In the case where diagrams overlap (worlds that agree on all facts) then $\mathcal{M}$ is a substructure of $\mathcal{N}$ and $\mathcal{N}$ is a substructure of $\mathcal{M}$ and models are isomorphic. Therefore *all the facts* determine the world up to isomorphism. Up to isomorphism, since applying a model theoretic automorphism to the world preserves the elementary diagram while permuting he objects.

Though it should be noted that, in the Tractatus, a state-of-affair is not identical with a logical formula "as it stands printed on paper" (4.011). For Wittgenstein reality has a logical structure, this structure is conserved in thought, and subsequently from thought to printed propositions. So there are three movements, but when we speak of $\psi(a_1, \ldots, a_n)$ as a state-of-affairs we are already at the printed proposition and are silent on the logical structure of reality (indeed, since our thesis is that propositions involve construction). A helpful idea here is that of *isomorphism*. Wittgenstein does not use the word isomorphism in the Tractatus, but the notion is apparent in the text through statements such as:

> (2.12) The picture is a model of reality.

(2.15) That the elements of the picture are combined with one another in a definite way, represents that the things are so combined with one another.

Recall that Wittgenstein's was inspired to write the Tractatus after hearing of traffic courts where accidents are reenacted with scale-models. For the reenactment to be faithful, it should preserve the structure of the true event. The elements are arranged so that velocities of the toys correspond to velocities as they happened, "to the east of" in the model corresponds to "to the east of" in the event, and so on. The event and the reenactment are logically isomorphic.

The primary movements of the Tractatus can expressed diagrammatically through the isomorphisms:

$$(\text{reality}) \to (\text{picture}) \to (\text{proposition})$$

in category theory isomorphisms are composible and invertible, and that should be the case here, therefore (reality) $\to$ (proposition) and (proposition) $\to$ (reality).

We can use $\psi(a_1, \ldots, a_n)$ as states-of-affairs (without commenting on the structure of reality) and reproduce propositions from the Tractatus *because* for Wittgenstein there is an isomorphic correspondence between reality and the proposition. States-of-affairs in logical space *are* propositions in logical space. If "facts in logical space are the world" (1.13), then committing those facts to propositions and arranging them in logical space reproduces the world (as an isomorphic copy). A significant amount of the Tractatus is interpretable in this way. I am not a Wittgenstein scholar, and my project is not to reconstruct the Tractatus, but I will present some results in this direction. Going forward it should be noted that Wittgenstein's logical atomism cannot be justified within our system and the "atomic" of the "atomic fact" will have to be dropped from the declarations. Wittgenstein uses atomic fact to denote facts which cannot be analyzed further into sub-facts. The fact "it is snowing outside and the roads are slippery" might be analyzed into "it is snowing outside" and "the roads are slippery," and these have an analysis into still smaller facts, at some point the analysis concludes and the remaining logical particles are the atomic-facts. These atoms do not exist in our system. The states-of-affairs generated by the conceptual scheme are *interconnected*; and, if there is reduction, then everything reduces into everything else.

I will give a mathematical argument for the non-existence of logical atoms. To start, it is not clear how Wittgenstein understands the logical atom, a best guess is a *subset* of $F_{\mathcal{U}}(\mathcal{A})$ which generates all facts through logical combinations (under connectives). I will show there exist no such atoms in the one dimensional case (the higher dimensional case is analogous)

Proposition. *There does not exist a unique set of atoms.*

Proof. Let $A \subset F_{\mathscr{U}}(\mathcal{U})$ be a set of unary atoms determining unary facts. Knowing A must determine $F_{\mathscr{U}}(\mathcal{U})$ which in the one-dimensional case means that for an object $u \in \mathcal{U}$, knowing $a(u)$ across atoms determines $\psi(u)$ for general formulas. To know an object it is enough to know its *type* since, if b is indiscernible to a, then both agree on all unary formulas. For any unary formula ψ the topological position tells us if $\text{tp}(a) \in \text{tp}(\psi)$ for all formulas ψ. Thus a logical determination of a is fully given by the position of $\text{tp}(a)$ in $S_1^{\mathcal{U}}(\emptyset)$ (here we use the types of $\mathcal{U}$). The existence of logical atoms can be restated: There are formulas A so that $\text{tp}(A) = \{\text{tp}(a) : a \in A\}$ generates the topology $S_1^{\mathcal{U}}(\emptyset)$. Note that the types

represented by $\mathcal{U}$ in $S_1^{\mathcal{U}}(\emptyset)$ give a dense subspace, therefore atoms with respect to the domain $\mathcal{U}$ must become generators of the full space $S_1^{\mathcal{U}}(\emptyset)$. Now apply a homeomorphism h to $S_1^{\mathcal{U}}(\emptyset)$ where $h(A) \neq A$. If $\mathrm{tp}(\alpha)$ are atoms, then the pre-images $h^{-1}(\mathrm{tp}(\alpha))$ are as atomic. The original atom α therefore has a logical decomposition to with respect to this transformed set of atoms. This is not unlike applying an invertible linear transformation to a vector space, one basis is exchanged for another, and it is impossible to privilege either.

Where $u \to \mathrm{tp}(u)$ maps $\mathcal{U}$ into $S_1^{\mathcal{U}}(\emptyset)$ (not surjectively), if $A \subset F_U(\mathcal{A})$ are atoms, then knowing when $\mathrm{tp}(u) \in \mathrm{tp}(a)$ across $a \in A$ determines the topological position of $\mathrm{tp}(u)$. But that must also hold with the same map $u \to \mathrm{tp}(u)$ after replacing A with $h(A)$. $\qquad\square$

A possible exception occurs when every homeomorphism h is such that $h(\mathrm{tp}A) = \mathrm{tp}A$. But this will be unlikely given the character of logical topologies. For example, supposing the Tarski algebra of $\mathcal{U}$ is countable and atomless (a likelihood for conceptual schemes corresponding with natural languages), then the space of types $S_1^{\mathcal{U}}(\emptyset)$ is the Cantor set. In that case: For *any* two non-empty clopen subsets $K, N \subset S_1^{\mathcal{U}}(\emptyset)$ there exists a homeomorphism $h : K \to N$ so that $h(K) = N$. The space is so self-symmetrical that you cannot even detect when a formula is more basic.

Moving on,

(2.01) A fact is a combination of objects.

This combinatorial understanding of the fact is confirmed by our approach. A combination of objects $(a_1, \ldots, a_n)$ obtains in the fact. Handfuls of objects are pulled from a constant and universal ontology and, in the fact, settle into mutual coherence. States-of-affairs are like all possible hands drawn from this deck.

(2.012) In logic nothing is accidental: if a thing can occur in a fact, the possibility of that fact must already be prejudged in the thing.
(2.1123) If I know an object, then I also know the possibilities of its occurrence in facts.

Such is especially true for unary-properties. Objects (types of objects) are identical with order-theoretic homomorphisms from the algebra of logical formulas into $\{T, F\}$. An object *just is* its point-like position amid overlapping properties. To state an object-type as $\mathfrak{p} : B(\mathcal{A}) \to \{T, F\}$ is to know all of its intrinsic properties; conversely, to put one's finger *somewhere* at the intersection of properties defines an object-type.

Higher-dimensional facts are more complex. Analogous to the unary case: Ordering n-ary formulas under logical equivalence gives a Boolean algebra, its corresponding Stone space is the space of n-types $S_n(\mathcal{A})$ (it should be noted that $S_n(\mathcal{A})$ is *not* $S_1(\mathcal{A})^n$). If we treat the tuples $(a_1, \ldots a_n)$ as the object, then knowing its type, as in the one-dimensional case, completely determines its occurrence in n-ary facts. However, if $(a_1, \ldots, a_n)$ and $(b_1, \ldots, b_n)$ are indiscernible at each component, that is insufficient to show $\mathrm{tp}(a_1, \ldots, a_n) = \mathrm{tp}(b_1, \ldots, b_n)$. For this reason, there is a way in which an object a, perfectly known, is indeterminate with respect to higher facts.

(2.0122) The thing is independent, in so far as it can occur in all *possible circumstances*.

In the sense that given a tuple of objects $(a_1, \ldots, a_n)$ and a formula ψ the pairing $\psi(a_1, \ldots, a_n)$ is well-formed. That is to say that a tuple applies to all circumstances.

(2.02) Objects are simple.

Objects in $\mathbb{U}$ are *not* composite. The object has already been narrowed to a *point* in the logical topology; and, following Euclid, a point is "that without parts." Sub-objects in the extensional sense (fingers on the hand) are, in the logical topology, points unto themselves (at a certain geometric distance from the super-object).

(2.022) It is clear however different form the real one an imagined world may be, it must have something common - a form - in common with the real world.
(2.023) This fixed form consists of objects.

Indeed, an imagined world *draws* from the same reservoir of objects (from the universal ontology of $\mathbb{U}$); and, viewed from our world, rearranges them. Our world and a possible world are separated by a combinatorial permutation. But I only add that possible worlds must must first model the conventions of the language (also a common form). Objects are mathematically dual to these conventions.

(2.03) In the fact objects hang one in another, like links in a chain.
(2.032) The way in which objects hang together in the fact is the structure of the fact.

The formula ψ is the way in which the objects $(a_1, \ldots, a_n)$ hang together as $\psi(a_1, \ldots, a_n)$. This notion of structure will become very important in what follows, since it is the structure to be preserved under isomorphism. Supposing we agree with Wittgenstein that there is an isomorphism between reality and thought (the picture) where "The picture is a model of reality" (2.12) and "To the objects correspond in the picture the elements of the picture" (2.13). Objects $a_1, \ldots, a_n$ must map to elements $a_1', \ldots, a_n'$ such that the structure of ψ is preserved.

In model theory, a map $j : \mathcal{M} \to \mathcal{N}$ between $\mathcal{L}$-structures is an isomorphism when for all formulas ψ,

$$\mathcal{M} \models \psi(a_1, \ldots, a_n), \text{ if and only if, } \mathcal{N} \models \psi(j(a_1), \ldots, j(a_n))$$

and this appears to be the correct mathematical formalism of the Wittgensteinian intuition. The structural feature of reality ψ and the objects $a_1, \ldots, a_n$ must map onto the pictorial feature ψ and its elements $j(a_1), \ldots, j(a_n)$. Our most important questions will come to depend on the existence or non-existence of such isomorphisms.

We have confirmed much of the *metaphysical side* of the Tractatus: Facts in logical space are the world, alternative worlds are alike to a reshuffling of objects, objects hang together in logical structure, etc. This metaphysics, however, is *printed on the page*. On the proposition side of Wittgenstein's (reality) $\to$ (picture) $\to$ (proposition). We have yet to eclipse the chronological project of Abul Fazl – being led by the hand across recordings and discovering this metaphysics at the horizon of record. With everything observed, between the bindings of his text: *Facts in logical space are the world*. Still unanswered is whether this space of facts, of true states-of-affairs, corresponds with the in-itself as it looks upon its own affairs. Does logical space correspond with the inner-space of reality?

8. The Existence of Untranslatable Schemes

A conceptual scheme is a *means of representation.* This is seen in the chronicles of Abul Fazl, in which propositions linguistically image a world-state:

"The Sultan reclines."

"The court musician, Tansen, begins to sing and play..."

"The instrument is made of..."

"A breeze has begun to blow and ruffles a curtain directly north-east of Tansen."

"The curtain is made of..."

The finished chronicle is a Wittgenstein-like picture of a world-state wherein "the proposition is a picture of reality" which "models reality as we think it is" (4.01). The question becomes: Is this representation unique (more properly, unique up to isomorphism)? For Wittgenstein reality has a logical structure which propositions *display.* There is an isomorphism from the logical structure of reality to the logical structure of propositions, where "We must not say, the complex sign $R(a, b)$ says 'a stands in a certain relation R to b'; but we must say, that a stands in a certain relation to b says that $R(a, b)$" (3.1432). The R is written into the real and the proposition can only display this.

Such a structural isomorphism is plausible, but should not be assumed. That is to say, we should not presume that all our analytic taxonomizing and grid-making activities are mirrored in the Universe as it follows its own courses. That the great Hericlitian tide washes ashore in these little symbols R for the sake of treasure hunting analytic philosophers to discover afterwards. That takes much for granted.

By assumption, any world models the conventions of the scheme, and for this reason the conventions of the scheme satisfy the common idea of *objectivity* since its anticipations and the patterns of nature (recorded through the scheme) reciprocally confirm. But do these conventions valorize as objective because they are intrinsic to reality, or because observations are conducted *through* the scheme in observance of its conventions? To use a Kantian example: Proclus' lemma holds of all experience and its negation is unobservable *because* Euclidean geometry is rule-like of representation. Observations always confirm any theorem of Euclid because Euclidean geometry is the framework through which experiences appear.

With reference to Wittgenstein, consider a traffic accident observed from two sides. Or it is better to say: Consider *an event*, which a western observer represents as a traffic-accident, approached by a second observer from their angle of observation. I believe it is possible to think of this *scene* – approached from two sides – as a *world* in the Wittgensteinian sense. Everything that was said of our observer Abul Fazl, who, recall, carried his recording tools into every corner of the Indian subcontinent, holds equally when he carries those same tools everywhere within the scene of the event. Here is a microcosm which also splits apart into facts in logical space. The scene models the conventions of the language – but, so it does from two sides, as it also models the conventions of the second observer.

Hence we have two "worlds" $\mathcal{U} \models \mathcal{A}_1$ and $\mathcal{V} \models \mathcal{A}_2$ and the fundamental question can be stated: Is there an isomorphism $f : \mathcal{U} \to \mathcal{V}$?

Intuitively no. Since the observing of a fact $\mathcal{U} \models \psi(a_1, \ldots, a_n)$ depends upon requisite linguistic resources being present. There must exist some combination of known concepts which produces ψ. Thus if we ask Abul Fazl to approach from his angle, and yet with all the power of his linguistic resources and given all possible linguistic combinations of his concepts, he simply cannot interpret industrialized

urban landscapes, since red-lights, traffic-signs, and motor-vehicles, then he cannot reproduce the meaning of ψ.

Before we assume all meanings are discoverable through finite linguistic combinations, there exist clear counter-examples: Produce the meaning "good" using only descriptive terms. Goodness is transcendental to description – separated by a Humean gap. Hence transcendental or unreachable meanings are possible. It seems to me that Abul Fazl, dropped by time-machine into this alien landscape where metal beasts that we call vehicles roam and towers we call skyscrapers loom, will have a great many gaps before him. Of course, with exposure to experience, his conceptual scheme should adapt to tame the empirical chaos. But that is not our question. The question is: Given his scheme *as it stands*, does there exist a translation? Surely not. What we observe as a traffic-accident is to Abul Fazl a confusion as blooming and buzzing as that of James. *As it stands*, he simply does not have the tools to resolve the manifold of experience as we do.

There is still a way out for the conceptual chauvinist, since it is possible to argue that, although a concept is presently unreachable, objects stand and wait on the observer to integrate them into the appropriate concepts. Davidson (1973) admits that an alternate conceptual scheme could contain predicates whose extensions have no match, but the insists that the detection of this matchlessness depends on a mutual ontology. How do we know an extension is incongruent if not through common ontology of objects to signal where the incongruence occurs?

To this Wittgenstein provides a hint, "Objects form the substance of the world" (2.021). All of the tuples $(a_1, \ldots, a_n)$ which could be configured $\psi(a_1, \ldots, a_n)$ are mathematically dual to the scheme. If objects are the substance of facts, and the totality of facts is the world, then an alternative ontology is the substance of an alternative world (in representation). As the many things that might be molded from Descartes' wax would be *other things* when that wax is substituted for another substance. Davidson (1973) claims "Different points of view make sense, but only if there is a common coordinate system on which to plot them; yet the existence of a common system belies the claim of dramatic incomparability" (p. 6). But to press this geometric analogy: The coordinates are tuples of objects $(a_1, \ldots, a_n)$ hanging together in the fact $\psi(a_1, \ldots, a_n)$. To be certain: The affine n-space of the complex numbers, the real numbers, and a finite field, cannot be plotted in a common coordinate system.

Because ontologies and schemes are mathematically dual, when schemes diverge sufficiently, their respective ontologies decohere and the substance which fills extensions becomes incompatible. If we imagine the passing scene of Davidson, like a traffic-accident, the parts of the scenery that catch and become objects are contingent upon the scheme. A street sign catching and rending itself from the manifold is a production of the scheme. Another observer, without the concept of signage, might not recognize the sign as distinct from what is materially contiguous to it. There is no impetus to separate the sign from the concrete at its base or a nearby parking meter. The same passing scene may induce, in two observers, distinct parades of passing objects. If the alternate scheme is sufficiently departed from our own, then the corresponding ontology lacks the objects needed to replicate an extension. In other words, street-signs are not roaming or wondering objects that wait on us to notice the signage they have in common and to integrate them into

their concept. To the other observer, scheme street signs are not objects at all and there is nothing there to be integrated.

Locke (1847) explains concept creation as a process of abstraction where the mind extracts patterns found in existing objects. The particular white observed in chalk, snow, milk, etc. is abstracted into the general "white." This is necessary, since if the mind were responsible for tracking each object with a distinct name it would quickly become overburdened. Such a sequence of mental operations is plausible but depends upon a hidden assumption: Objects are given, and the task of the mind is to discover patterns within. Chalk, snow, and milk are given, and among these the mind notices the same whiteness. However, a given ontology presumes, secretly, that a particular organization of the manifold of experience is so given (since again, objects and schemes are mathematically dual). Davidson's common ontology is logically equivalent to a common conceptual scheme (granted in a way that is mathematically obscure) and so his argument is circular.

A straightforward way to witness ontologies diverging is to position two schemes, one as base and the other as extension. This can be said to occur when $\mathscr{U}_1 = (\mathcal{L}_1, \mathcal{A}_1, \mathbb{U}_1)$ and $\mathscr{U}_2 = (\mathcal{L}_2, \mathcal{A}_2, \mathbb{U}_2)$ where $\mathcal{L}_1 \subset \mathcal{L}_2$ and for unary $\mathcal{L}_1$-formulas $\psi(x), \varphi(x)$, $\mathcal{A}_2 \vdash \forall x (\psi(x) \rightarrow \varphi(x))$, if and only if, $\mathcal{A}_1 \vdash \forall x (\psi(x) \rightarrow \varphi(x))$. In other words: $\mathscr{U}_2$ introduces new concepts to $\mathscr{U}_1$ while preserving the original conceptual relations. The expansion of a dictionary so to speak. When this occurs, there is an injection $i : B(\mathcal{A}_1) \rightarrow B(\mathcal{A}_2)$, and since the Stone functor sends injections to surjections, there is a surjective map $\mathrm{St}(i) : \mathbb{U}_2 \rightarrow \mathbb{U}_1$ which is explicitly the restriction map that sends $a : B(\mathcal{A}_2) \rightarrow \{T, F\}$ to $a|_{B(\mathcal{A}_1)}$. It is simple to show that when the extension is proper (ie, $B(\mathcal{A}_1)$ is a proper sub-algebra of $B(\mathcal{A}_2)$) that $\mathrm{St}(i)$ is not injective. This is consistent with the intuition that fewer boundaries made within the data of sensation implies fewer opportunities for objects to distinguish as object. Here we see that the granularity of a scheme conditions the ontology. A very fine scheme and a very coarse scheme must have incommensurate ontologies (and thus an incommensurate "substance").

There need not exist a isomorphic reconstruction of the fact $\mathcal{U} \models \psi(a_1, \ldots, a_n)$ in another mode of representation. Firstly, because the logical form of ψ is contingent upon the formation of meanings; secondly, because ontologies are incommensurate such that no sensible correspondence between objects exists. This answers Davidson.

9. The "Fittedness" of Schemes and Pragmatism

Let us distinguish between two categories of schemes: Scientific models and natural languages. The former tends towards mathematical exactness, uses a deeper layer of data mined through scientific instruments, and has a stronger claim to grasping the structure of reality. The later are the types of schemes that have been considered so far where ordinary language is used to make descriptions. Call a scheme corresponding to a natural language a *natural scheme* (also a natural representation) and call schemes corresponding to scientific models *formal schemes* (also formal representations).

In this section I wish to consider two natural schemes which resolve the same event (say a traffic-accident) into *untranslatable* facts, and whether preferencing either as better fitted to reality is justified.

Subjectivity is inseparable from natural schemes. This is shown by observing the universal tendency for linguistic communities (who intersubjectively agree on a scheme) to use those conceptual tools optimally *adapted* to the challenges effacing that community. Every natural representation is adapted to a short-band of challenges native to a specific somewhere.

The traffic accident provides an illustrative case. Where is the hint from nature that we *ought* to separate out the panel of the traffic sign as the object? Why not the panel and its pole? Or the panel, the pole and a small island of surrounding concrete? When we expand too far, where are the cries of nature against this abuse? A scheme should be efficient in prediction – what then is worth predicting? Arriving at the scene of an accident, the first philosophical question is not "Who is at fault?" but why these peculiar configurations metal are worth noticing at all. Surely adjudicating traffic accidents is adaptation to post-industrial life where all perpetually commute an urban labyrinth.

The conceptual chauvinist might yet argue that, while all schemes have signs of being adapted, certain evolutionary forces have pressurized his own linguistic community into a uniquely intimate correspondence with reality. The blooming and buzzing confusion which effaced Abul Fazl was, in fact, the glare of reality. As the initial shock diminishes, Abul Fazl becomes adapted to the chauvinist's reality (which is also *the* reality).

But the idea that reality changes in correspondence with the human striving of a particular historic epoch feels too convenient. How kind of nature to change its inner-self with our attempts to master it. Quine states that:

> Hence it is meaningless, I suggest, to inquire into the absolute correctness of a conceptual scheme as a mirror of reality. Our standard for appraising basic changes of conceptual scheme must be, not a realistic standard of correspondence to reality, but a pragmatic standard. Concepts are language, and the purpose of concepts and of language is efficacy in communication and prediction. Such is the ultimate duty of language, science, and philosophy, and it is in relation to that duty that a conceptual scheme has finally to be appraised.
>
> Elegance, conceptual economy, also enters as an objective. (Quine, 1950, p. 632)

Before Abul Fazl is dismissed as merely confused, we should acknowledge how our own parochial concerns influence what to us is economical and elegant. That, as the manifold is tamed and collapsed into form and resolves into the traffic accident, the style of construction is motivated by our pragmatic concern. We *need* to see these objects. Is the structure of reality changing or is language adapting to meet historically evolving challenges? In the later case, whatever is the sub-straight of the real (the in-itself, quantum-fields, or whichever) is simply of-itself-so and quite indifferent to the races we run upon it.

Between two human observers untranslatability must increase with divergent social and historic pressures. Note that this divergence occurs *with respect to* common faculties. Diverging *despite* evolution endowing all human subjects with a common perceptual apparatus. The divorce becomes all the more radical imagining subjectivities shaped by different evolutionary pressures. After all, human representation is optimized to solve the trouble of being human. Evolutionary, human faculties

are all wired and adapted to measure a small island of earthbound experiences and exploit bands of information falling within the not-too-large, the-not-too-small, the-not-too-fast, and so on.

Thus when we imagine what it is like to be a bat:

> Now we know that most bats (the microchiroptera, to be precise) perceive the external world primarily by sonar, or echolocation, detecting the reflections, from objects within range, of their own rapid, subtly modulated, high-frequency shrieks. Their brains are designed to correlate the outgoing impulses with the subsequent echoes, and the information thus acquired enables bats to make precise discriminations of distance, size, shape, motion, and texture comparable to those we make by vision. But bat sonar, though clearly a form of perception, is not similar in its operation to any sense that we possess, and there is no reason to suppose that it is subjectively like anything we can experience or imagine. This appears to create difficulties for the notion of what it is like to be a bat. We must consider whether any method will permit us to extrapolate to the inner life of the bat from our own case, and if not, what alternative methods there may be for understanding the notion...
>
> If anyone is inclined to deny that we can believe in the existence of facts like this whose exact nature we cannot possibly conceive, he should reflect that in contemplating the bats we are in much the same position that intelligent bats or Martians would occupy if they tried to form a conception of what it was like to be us. The structure of their own minds might make it impossible for them to succeed, but we know they would be wrong to conclude that there is not anything precise that it is like to be us: that only certain general types of mental state could be, ascribed to us (perhaps perception and appetite would be concepts common to us both; perhaps not). We know they would be wrong to draw such a skeptical conclusion because we know what it is like to be us. And we know that while it includes an enormous amount of variation and complexity, and while we do not possess the vocabulary to describe it adequately, its subjective charater is highly specific, and in some respects describable in terms that can be understood only by creatures like us. The fact that we cannot expect ever to accommodate in our language a detailed description of Martian or bat phenomenology should not lead us to dismiss as meaningless the claim that bats and Martians have experiences fully comparable in richness of detail to our own...
>
> This brings us to the edge of a topic that requires much more discussion than I can give it here: namely, the relation between facts on the one hand and conceptual schemes or systems of representation on the other. My realism about the subjective domain in all its forms implies a belief in the existence of facts beyond the reach of human concepts. Certainly it is possible for a human being to believe that there are facts which humans never will possess the requisite concepts to represent or comprehend. Indeed, it would

be foolish to doubt this, given the finiteness of humanity's expectations. After all, there would have been transfinite numbers even if everyone had been wiped out by the Black Death before Cantor discovered them. But one might also believe that there are facts which could not ever be represented or comprehended by human beings, even if the species lasted forever-simply because our structure does not permit us to operate with concepts of the requisite type. This impossibility might even be observed by other beings, but it is not clear that the existence of such beings, or the possibility of their existence, is a precondition of the significance of the hypothesis that there are humanly inaccessible facts. (After all, the nature of beings with access to humanly inaccessible facts is presumably itself a humanly inaccessible fact.) Reflection on what it is like to be a bat seems to lead us, therefore, to the conclusion that there are facts that do not consist in the truth of propositions expressible in a human language. We can be compelled to recognize the existence of such facts without being able to state or comprehend them. (Negel, What it is like to be a Bat, pp. 438-441)

Applying Nagel's "what is it like to be?" to organisms other than ourselves evokes radically untranslatable representations. The quickest way to recognize these breakdowns is to remember that objects and schemes are correlative. The objects which "hang together" in the fact are themselves dependent on the structure of representation. The objects assembling and dissembling in bat-phenomenology are not an adoptable alternative to human objects, but rather *incoherent* to human representation. Mobius strips and Klein bottles and other weavings of unreason. The Martian, whose faculties of perception evolved to exploit information that is extra-spectral or cleanly beyond human detection, conceives in shapes of the beyond, and in "things" unreckonable. Their Wittgenstinian pictures are a gallery of Lovecraftian twistings and what is simply and only beyondness.

At issue are the pragmatic interests exerting a pressure upon the structure of the scheme. Its architecture becomes tailored to the challenges which beset the subject, and the in-itself resolves into representation, not disinterestedly or in shapes of ultimate-reality, but into those shapes serviceable to problem solving. Wherever the observer is found so is a representation optimized to those puzzles and problems local to the site of observation; to bring another observer into our way of seeing is to bring them into our struggle, and that explains a diminishing bloom of confusion as much as anything.

Anywhere on earth (and perhaps beyond it) the subject is equipped with conceptions that problem solve and manage a struggle for existence. This is not unlike Marx's conception of history: Ideology is always super-structural to the economic struggle of a historically given context. It would a coincidence on the order of overlapping lightning strikes for Feudal-ideology to map onto the structure of the cosmos and apply to solar systems lightyears from the economic pressures which generated the ideas.

Granted, mastering nature is advantageous to the meeting of needs – so there is an incentive to figure nature at its more elemental. This cannot change that the scheme was not designed to understand nature disinterestedly, but to solve it respective to an interest. The problem must first stand apart as problematic before

the scheme has a chance to analyze it. Within our linguistic pictures of nature linger artifacts of *what we wanted* from nature.

Above the idea of a scheme-extension was introduced (where an extension adds concepts while preserving the conceptual relations of the base scheme). A scheme-extension (increasing analyticness) has an intuitive epistemological legitimacy. There is a feeling that we are in correspondence with reality presently and that correspondence is preserved by adding new details. But if every refinement is epistemologically legitimate, so should be the reverse: A forgetting of details. Since how can we tell that this current correspondence is not the refinement of an earlier correspondence, and that earlier correspondence also has a prequel, and so on. At the limit of coarseness is a conceptual scheme with two concepts *everything* and *nothing*, and a single object, something like the Parmenidian sphere. A sequence of conceptual extensions connects this Parmenidean scheme with our language. How can we tell whether the path of refinements should have concluded with the panel as the sign or the panel and its pole? Or the panel, its pole, and some surrounding concrete? It cannot be coincidence that our current refinement *picks-out* exactly those objects which currently have the most utility.

As far as natural schemes corresponding with reality: The problem are the many subjective inputs which influence the position of meanings. It would be too convenient for the pursuit of our needs to guide up the path of ultimate reality so that subjective desire and absolute truth meet in the center.

The evidence is already here, and additional reports are rolling in from physical sciences, that human perception and more fundamental representations of reality are divorced. Paradoxes of the very small, the very fast, and the very energetic. It cannot be a coincidence that these paradoxes arise just beyond the horizon of events which impacted human evolution. Paradoxes like those from special relativity (traveling near the speed of light and then turning your headlights on) are not paradoxes respective to the math – they are the contradictions that follow bringing all your natural intuitions with you outside the band of information which they were designed to model. Human representation breaking down outside its own limits (a very Kantian notion).

10. The Logical Structure of Reality

The above arguments given, there remains a final way to salvage conceptual chauvinism: Reality has a logical structure to which a privileged conceptual scheme corresponds isomorphically. In that case, there might exist a plurality of representations where all but one are at some divergence with reality. Moreover, the pragmatic and subjective inputs into a scheme's structure are no issue, since these very forces (the drive for predictive power and explanatory elegance) press the observer deeper into a correspondence with reality. Davidson (1973) describes this as the *fitting* metaphor of scheme-content dualism, where the conceptual scheme conforms to sensory promptings after facing the tribunal of experience. If reality has an intrinsic logical structure, it is possible that a privileged scheme is fitted to it.

In the view of the Tractatus there is an isomorphism between the structure of reality and the structure of representation, and for this reason "we must not say $R(a, b)$ means a stands in relation R to b, but rather $R(a, b)$ therefore a relates to b." Reality has an intrinsic $R(a, b)$ to which the proposition stands in isomorphism.

In the same way that the cyclic group with $(p-1)$-elements (where p is a prime) is the group of $(p-1)$-roots of unity, or the group of multiplicative units of $\mathbb{Z}/p\mathbb{Z}$, each is the same structure under the guises of new symbols. There is then some $R(a,b)$ written into the real, perhaps not in those English letters or any names we know, but such that our labels and notations track the elements of the real in isomorphic correspondence. This is also called a *structural correspondence* which is distinguished from the weaker *correlative correspondence*. A *correlative correspondence* tells us that "snow is white" corresponds to the true state-of-affairs of snow being white, but not necessarily in terms of structural isomorphism. A *structural correspondence* tells us both that "snow is white" and that "snow" and "white" are natural kinds.

Because a scheme and its objects are mathematically dual, an intrinsic logical structure corresponds to an ontology of natural objects. Such would evade the "different substances of facticity" argument for conceptual relativism.

By positing a privileged correspondence with reality, the rival observer – the cultural other, the bat, the Martian – can be seen as misled by a false light of reason to the summit of an erroneous path, where they find their Mobius strips and Klein bottles and arrange these into logical pictures. But any arrangement of mistakes must be mistaken. Their pictures, even if logically formed, contain unnatural elements. Since it is possible to construct representations that function (that are *correlative*) but which miss completely the features of nature's true face.

Assuming reality has an intrinsic logical structure which can be "reached up to," then any two structurally correspondent schemes must be translatable. Since mathematical isomorphisms preserve structure up to a change of symbols, assuming an agreement with reality, Plutonian will translate (while preserving structure) into the symbols of Saturnian. This can be expressed in basic category theory:

$$(\text{Saturnian}) \to (\text{Reality}) \to (\text{Plutonian})$$

The invertibility of the arrows (isomorphism) implies,

$$(\text{Saturnian}) \approx (\text{Plutonian})$$

The task is to discover whether these morphisms are justified. It must be stressed that *correspondence* (verifying "snow is white" through an observation) is insufficient to prove a structural isomorphism. Moreover, it is seemingly impossible to determine from within the linguistic structure whether correspondence is structural or merely correlative. We showed this through thought experiments involving the Mughal court historian Abul Fazl. By employing the linguistic resources of his conceptual scheme, Abul Fazl can construct representations as logical as any other. A formula $\forall x\,(p\,(x) \to \exists y\,(q\,(x,y)))$ is as logically pure as it will ever become. Moreover, any of his chronicles, as a totality of facts, determines a world. By agreeing that the facts are "all that is the case" it is impossible for Abul Fazl to be more factually oriented or to accommodate facticity further. We found that his linguistic conventions are analytic and will be verified in all possible experiences (and so are as "objective" as any proposition could be). We also noted a category of a posteriori necessary truths. Discoverable scientific truths which hold necessarily of experience. Discoveries that are as much discoveries as any other. Supposing the formula $\forall x\,(p\,(x) \to \exists y\,(q\,(x,y)))$ is a posteriori necessary (a scientific discovery), one cannot tell, or see the angle, from which it might be dismissed as less scientific

than our own cherished discoveries. By assumption, this *law* will be repeatedly corroborated and replicated, will never be falsified, and presents itself with perfect logical exactness.

Wittgenstein and Abul Fazl approach the same motor vehicle accident from "points of view from which individuals, cultures, or periods survey they passing scene." Each choosing a vantage from which to survey. In both representations "the world divides into facts." From within both languages, it cannot be determined which of these reports is more reality-oriented. None of the scientific merits (factuality, logical clarity, reproducibility, ...) preferences either representation.

A scientific merit (say reproducibility) does not require structural correspondence but arises through precision in language and conceptual construction. Both Abul Fazl and Wittgenstein, or Saturnian and Plutonian, might make predictions that are latter confirmed everywhere. The categories of analytic and a posteriori necessary truths are everywhere confirmed, but both of these categories are relative to a scheme and its arrangement of meanings.

For all schemes (used precisely) correlative correspondence is assured. A scheme's native propositions and the reality *represented through the scheme* as facts arrayed in logical space are *automatically* in correspondence. We cannot help but see the proposition mirrored *out there* within a conceptually processed experience.

Now we see the issue: A finely engineered conceptual scheme deployed without error will always confirm its own expectations and is at least *correlatively correspondent*; additionally, it is impossible to decide, from within the language, when a correspondence is correlative and when it is structural. Supposing the correspondence is denoted as a mathematical function $f : A \to B$, no signal is given when $a \in A$ corresponds correlatively or structurally. Consider how the sensation that force fields are structural and that goodness is structural overlap phenomenologically, and it is perhaps this overlapping confidence that motivates some philosophers to pursue the promise of a scientific ethics as if uncovering a field theory.

Of course, one could cite some darling of science that is verified everywhere and calculated down the thousandth decimal place; but as we have already seen, precision does not depend upon a *structural isomorphism* but upon a precise application of language. *Any* conceptual scheme could be verified everywhere and calculated to the thousandth decimal place.

Davidson's final attack against conceptual relativism relies on an over-extension of Tarski's semantic conception of truth (Beillard, 2008). Davidson claims that the meta-language, where object-language propositions are assigned truth-values, is a "language we know." That is not necessary. Indeed, we have already specified a theory of representational truth that satisfies Tarski's schema: p is true in $\mathcal{U}$ when $\mathcal{U} \models p$. There is some debate as to whether Tarski's conception of truth reduces to, or was a precursor to, truth in a model (Raatikainen, 2007). Regardless, the inductive building-up of model theoretic truth satisfies the T-schema ($\mathcal{U} \models p$ and $\mathcal{U} \models q$ implies $\mathcal{U} \models p \land q$ and so on) where the meta-language is set theory. In Model Theory, the fully theory of $\mathcal{U}$, the diagram of $\mathcal{U}$, the elementary diagram of $\mathcal{U}$, are all meta-linguistic constructions.

If we are willing to use set theory as our meta-language: Both Plutonian and Saturnian enumerate their respective facts $F_{\mathscr{P}}(\mathcal{P})$ and $F_{\mathscr{S}}(\mathcal{S})$. In a way, this is translation into "a language we know" – since we know set theory. Using set theory

we can interrogate the diagram of an alien scheme. We could calculate the cardinality of their diagram. We could define a sigma-algebra onto their diagram and look at the Borel hierarchy. Or decompose it into group-orbits. Any number of mathematical tricks. But no amount of analysis will give the meanings of the alien language. We can only organize encrypted names of sentences in the meta-language. Though we see a proposition in their diagram, and recognize it as a signification, we will never know anything internal about it. Any conceptual scheme produces a correspondence amenable to a Tarskian theory of truth. Showing a structural isomorphism would require a type of evidence that is not rooted in correspondence (verification, repeatability, etc.) We cannot use the correspondence between "snow is white" and the snow being white as evidence that "snow" and "white" are structural.

Here is an example of what might qualify as structural evidence. Consider Euclidean geometry. Why might Euclidean geometry be structural? Euclidean geometry might be thought to result from a particular way of assigning distances between points through the Pythagorean theorem. Between two points (a_1, a_2, a_3) and (b_1, b_2, b_3) is assigned the distance $\left((a_1 - b_1)^2 + (a_2 - b_2)^2 + (a_3 - b_3)^2 \right)^{1/2}$. Someone with enough mathematical imagination might ask: Why does 2 appear there? Why not another number? Why not 3? Or 1? Or why not a number so close to 2 that it should not make a difference? It turns out that any of those choices are valid ways of assigning distance. In fact substituting any $1 \le p \le \infty$ for 2 produces mathematically consistent distances. So we might ask: Why would the universe use two and not any of the infinitely many choices between one and infinity?

There are a couple of mathematically convincing reasons. For any metric $d(a, b)$ which assigns the distance between points a and b within a space S, a natural question of interest are distance preserving transformations (isometries) of the space. That is $f : S \to S$ such that $d(a, b) = d(f(a), f(b))$. It is easy to verify that if f and g are isometries so is g followed by f, or $f \circ g$. If f is an isometry, then its inverse f^{-1} (reversing the transformation) is an isometry. Finally, the identity map $\mathrm{id}_S(x) = x$ is clearly an isometry. Thus the set of all isometries form a mathematical group. But, with respect to the above, it is not clear that any choice of p would have the same symmetry group. The first piece of mathematical evidence that the universe ought to use 2 is that the group of isometries respective to that choice is quite a bit more lovely and important than the rest (for example, in its relation to the special orthogonal group).

Second to my mind is that this choice of $p = 2$ lines up distances with the nicest way of measuring volumes of space. Generally for a measure μ on a space S and a measure λ on a space T there is product measure $\mu \times \lambda$ on the cartesian product $S \times T$ defined by:

$$(\mu \times \lambda)(a \times b) = \mu(a)\lambda(b)$$

As there would be a product measure on $S \times T \times R$ and so on (this is an abstraction of the grade-school mantra "length times width times height"). Once more, there exist infinitely many ways of assigning measurements to (measurable) subsets of three-dimensional space. But only *one* (the nicest) starts by assigning as lengths of segments $l(a, b) = |a - b|$, and then builds up through "length times width..." to measuring squares and cubes, and then to more complex shapes which have

something like a decomposition into little cubes, and so on. But we should like all of this to play nicely with distances within the space. If I apply a rotation to a cube, without changing its dimensions, the rotated cube ought to have the same volume, but now we have new edges to and potentially new distances. The nicest volumes (built up from absolute values between points) are preserved under rigid transformations at the choice of $p = 2$.

Something else rather special occurs at the choice of $p = 2$. At $p = 2$ alone, and not any other choice, not even for a choice of p so close to 2 as to differ on the trillionth decimal place, the space becomes a Hilbert space with an inner-product, which might be considered intuitively as a way of calculating angles between points. All choices of p have produce nice spaces in terms of distance, but only at the choice of $p = 2$ is there a way to think about angles.

This is what I picture as *structural evidence*. Evidence as to why the concepts *should be*. Such mathematical evidence does not depend on verification, consistency, predictiveness – as these are possible for any scheme – but is evidence that the *structure itself* is exceptional. Still, this feeling of exceptionalism resolves into purely subjective appraisals of beauty, elementariness, "conceptual economy," etc. Even pre-Einstein, the above would not constitute a *proof* of structural isomorphism. At most it is a clue that Euclidean geometry (and generalizations therefrom) could be more than just representation.

Pursuing this idea: There could be structural isomorphism between the most fundamental physical constituents of the Universe and our physical models of them. At the level of gravity, photons, fields etc. – these constituents might qualify as natural kinds. The reason being that Quantum mechanics has more than just correspondence to support it, since it involves rich mathematical structures. There is some cause to believe that the structures themselves are uniquely exceptional. Though the same retorts against the structurality of Euclidean geometry apply equally here. The impression of exceptionalism resolves into subjective feelings of beauty, elegance, etc. Additionally, the same constituent can have a plurality of mathematical perspectives. Is the most basic building block a particle or a wave? Perhaps the building block is a particle through the lens of mathematical tools that particularize, and a wave likewise. Further, it seems to me that both particles and waves are metaphors borrowed from ordinary human experience. The mathematical particle began as the phenomenological "tiny object" where it was isolated and pursued formally. There was a lead in everyday experience. The same can be said of waves. The little billiard ball applied to a sub-atomic particle is only metaphor. Or a "it must be like" prompted by experience and developed into a formal edifice. Are such developments not possible elsewhere? Would the sentient bat discover a "it must be like" within their phenomenology? Or the martian? Do they develop metaphors into edifices?

Secondly, while there might be a structural isomorphism at the most fundamental building blocks, the correspondence would be structural *only* at that level. Since we do not "survey the passing scene" in particle physics, any structural correspondence of particles cannot be lifted onto the outlook of our daily experiences. All levels above that base – ethics, aesthetics, politics, religion, etc. – then become constructed. It could prove that ultimate reality is like a giant encyclopedia of atomic events, where every item within is like a code for an elementary particle interaction – and all subjects that come to ultimate understanding agree on this

text. Still, subjective utility and pragmatic considerations will decide how this text becomes *interpreted* under natural representation. A structural isomorphism, if existent, cannot be *extended* or *lifted* to that natural representation.

Of course fundamental constituents would determine the facts of a natural representation. Constructed facts such as "if someone has undermined the foundation of his house, we say that he could have known a priori that the house would cave in." (Kant, 1996, p. 45), are determined by all near-to particles. If all the atomic events were to recur, they would reproduce the same macroscopic objects and the representation would reappear. Both are connected. In earlier drafts I conceived of fundamental physical models as *substructural* to higher representations. So that the linguistically equipped subject might fill a blackboard with mathematical equations describing a quantum field, and on another blackboard write down a news headline, and the later would stand *over* the former. I came to recognize this as an error. There is a *connection* which will be explained shortly, but it is not one of sub-structure and super-structure.

Perhaps there are parallels to the Buddhist tradition. Certain schools admit that dharmas (elementary facts, particle events, irreducible phenomenological experience, etc.) have ultimate reality while facts involving aggregates (like a chariot or the self) are constructed. While a thinker like Nagarjuna rejects even dharmas as ultimately real and says all is construction (Nagarjuna's Middle Way, Siderits pp 13-17). In our case, that "particle at (x, y, z, t)" is ultimately real (structurally correspondent) is not enough to lift that *ultimate reality* onto natural representations involving chariots or selves or traffic signs.

We must ask: Where is the mathematical support for Wittgenstein's representation of the motor vehicle accident? When so much mathematical distinction is not proof that "line" and "plane" are structural – how much less justification is there for "steering wheel" and "traffic light"? If there were a structural correspondence at the level of fundamental constituents – at the level of the dharmas so to speak – that would not excuse appropriating the bearing of "ultimate reality" onto natural representations. Appropriating confidences and certainties from the mathematical world. Where we *pretend* that our everyday concepts came about as the solutions to a system of differential equations. I imagine a stereotypical subscriber to what is pejoratively called "scientism." The type who pictures themselves as stridently accepting of reality with a mind pruned and trimmed of all fantasy. Of possessing a psychic-hotline to ultimate empirical reality. We can overhear this type proclaiming "Particle-physics advances towards the final structure of reality through reason, I cheer-on these advances, further I tell myself I'm rational constantly and wear labcoats in my self-image, therefore my outlooks are advancing – or have advanced – to the final structure of reality." Clearly an over-extension. Appropriating a certain flattering feeling that comes from viewing the Universe all settled and analyzed into mathematical equations for a personal worldview.

Natural schemes have tell-tale signs of construction. Every element of natural language admits of a repositioning, an expansion, a retraction, a bifurcation, etc. This is plain by phenomenological inspection. Whenever I ask, "What if there were no distinction made between light-bulb and candle-flame?" Or "What would happen if I invented a hundred categories of door-handle?" The answer is always that my efforts would generate another list of facts, neatly arranged and verifiable, logically perfect and no less factual. Much like the boarders of nations are shaped by chance

historical events – so for the concept, chance events in the history of ideas have pushed and pulled them into their current shape. I can imagine an alternative unfolding of collective thought, where the constellation of concepts have settled into new positions, while maintaining the integrity of the subject to the object. The in-itself is as before – much as the Earth would be the Earth had the Spanish reconquest failed to take Granada.

Saussure in his course on linguistics (2011) examines the evolution of languages as transformations of a system of values (related to *meanings* as I use it but not identical) diachronically (that is, across time). He shows that meanings (values) are never fixed in their positions. The constellation of ideas is forever re-equilibrating disturbances in the placements of its meanings "It is as if one of the planets that revolve around the sun changed its dimensions and weight: This isolated event would entail general consequences and throw the whole system out of equilibrium" (ibid, pp. 84-85). A further analogy is made between the state state of a language and the state of a chess board where the value of a term corresponds to a position on the board. The moving of a single piece does not induce a general corruption of the system, yet has repercussions on the whole, and it is impossible for the player to predict the end of those consequences. In a game of chess, the present state of the board is independent of the previous state in the sense that an alternative sequence of moves might have produced that same conclusion and one could come across the game in its present state and know it as well as those playing from the beginning. With a variety of natural languages as case studies, Saussure carefully documents the diachronic moves of specific values, using abundant empirical evidence to demonstrate they do indeed move across the board. What is important from his research is that it answers the problem of an evolving conceptual scheme by demonstrating these changes have already happened: We are here after the change. It is just an empirical fact, shown in historical data, that languages evolve. Considering a fixed conceptual scheme (that is, considered synchronically) as a state of the chess board, we have already shown that each such state has a correlative ontology: What are the chances that one of those states (and one of those ontologies) is the correct one? Accepting that a scheme is capable of organizing the contents of experience across evolutionary time, and at any syncronic moment the integrity of the subject-object relation is maintained (regardless of whether the knight is on B4 or D5), we are in post-(Copernican) revolutionary state (at least for natural schemes).

Take the concept of *justice*. The concept has certainly held taken up a variety positions in the plane of thought. We observe a gulf between the preliminary definition forwarded in the Republic ("helping your friends and harming your enemies") and the definition offered in the Sermon on the Mount ("love your enemies"). Different positions on the board. Independent of these positions the in-itself stays itself (what else could it be?).

There are two spheres of linguistic activity:

(1) Formal representations of fundamental constituents. Of particles, forces, fields, and so on (and possibly higher scientific subjects).
(2) Natural representations. The linguistic activity of daily social life under ordinary conditions. Of sidewalks, traffic signals, justice, beauty, and so on.

A structural isomorphism of at the level of fundamental constituents need not lift to a structural isomorphism between daily linguistic activity and reality. Correlation is not evidence of structural correspondence. Facticity, verifiability, repeatability, etc. are not evidence of structural correspondence. A type of meta-linguistic or meta-representational evidence – the nature of which I cannot exactly state – is required for the suggestion (though not proof) of structural correspondence. It can be suggested that Quantum theory is structural; on the other hand, there is a total absence of structural evidence for the traffic signal.

Two cases: Formal representations are correlative or structurally correspondent. If formal representations are correlative, then natural representations are certainly correlative. If formal representations are structurally isomorphic, then, regardless, natural representations are still correlative.

11. The In-Itself

A problem was introduced: How do formal representations implicate natural representations? The relation should be one of *determination*: Since were all the particle-states to *re*-state themselves, the recurrence would induce the previously seen macroscopic objects and link them together in the same chain. Yet the determination is not reciprocal, since the natural representation is not sufficient to reconstruct the formal representation.

Let us evoke Laplace's demon: Knowing the positions and momentums of all particles is to know, with sufficient computing power, the positions and momentums of those same particles at any future time. Let $\mathscr{P}$ denote this Laplacian scheme, so that a particle world $\mathcal{P}_t$ at time t models its conventions. Further, let $\mathscr{U}$ denote a natural scheme so that $\mathcal{U}_t$ is the world at time t modeling its conventions. The facts $F_{\mathscr{P}}(\mathcal{P}_t)$ (the factual positions and momentums of of the objects – ie, the particles) determines $F_{\mathscr{U}}(\mathcal{U}_t)$. Which is so whether $\mathcal{U}_t$ was constructed under the conceptualizations of Mughal India, or early 20th century Vienna, or by any natural language. But we also know that the granularity of a conceptual scheme has a subjective arbitraity: The particle-world continues to determine natural representations even the natural scheme looses all its resolution and begins to represent the world in the most pixelated way. Clearly a reciprocity of determination is lacking. As resolution decreases, and information is lost, it becomes increasingly impossible to reconstruct particle-facts through natural-facts.

Particles *determine* the facts of natural representation (but not the converse). Further, time-evolving the mechanical system will determine a time-evolution of natural representations. Laplace's demon makes this intuitive: $\mathcal{P}_t$ determines $\mathcal{U}_t$, so that evolving $\mathcal{P}_t$ to $\mathcal{P}_\tau$ determines the evolution of $\mathcal{U}_t$ into $\mathcal{U}_\tau$.

Write an arrow $e : \mathcal{P}_t \to \mathcal{P}_\tau$ when $t \leq \tau$ and $\mathcal{P}_t$ time evolves into $\mathcal{P}_\tau$. This forms a category (a categorical representation of causality). What has been discovered is that morphisms $\mathcal{P}_t \to \mathcal{P}_\tau$ determine morphisms $\mathcal{U}_t \to \mathcal{U}_\tau$. The determination $R : \mathcal{P}_t \to \mathcal{U}_t$ gives a *functor* from the Laplacian-scheme to the scheme of a natural language.

$$
\begin{array}{ccc}
\mathcal{P}_t & \xrightarrow{\ e\ } & \mathcal{P}_\tau \\
\downarrow & & \downarrow \\
\mathcal{U}_t & \xrightarrow[R(e)]{} & \mathcal{U}_\tau
\end{array}
$$

A yet more fundamental structure may lie beneath the Laplacian-scheme which determines the sequence of Laplacian representations. It may be that particles are structural, or it could be that particles are constructed abbreviations which round-off the still more fundamental. In the later case: There is a functor from the fundamental representation $\mathcal{F}_t$ to particles $\mathcal{P}_t$ and from particles to natural representations, thus a composition of functors:

$$
\begin{array}{ccc}
\mathcal{F}_t & \xrightarrow{\ e\ } & \mathcal{F}_\tau \\
\downarrow & & \downarrow \\
\mathcal{P}_t & \xrightarrow{R_1(e)} & \mathcal{P}_\tau \\
\downarrow & & \downarrow \\
\mathcal{U}_t & \xrightarrow[R_1 \circ R_2(e)]{} & \mathcal{U}_\tau
\end{array}
$$

What brings this together is causality. The use of "causality" here may be contentious; since, at least in the Kantian approach to conceptual schemes (following Hume), causality is *representational*. Above, causality is meta-representational (it orders representations and brings $\mathcal{P}_t$ into correspondence with $\mathcal{U}_t$), and this is a large metaphysical ask depending on the choice of philosophical authority. If nothing else, causes and effects need not *inhere* in events, causality might only be "this follows that" (the Humean idea of causality); or more primitively still, just a category of formal arrows whose greater physicality is unknown.

The critical thing is this: A causal functor $R : \mathcal{P} \to \mathcal{U}$ need not preserve the structure of $\mathcal{P}$. Such is clear when $\mathscr{P}$ is the Laplacian-scheme and $\mathscr{U}$ are natural representations (as perceiving a traffic accident). The particle-facts determine the facts of the accident, but the structure of particles is not to be found in the higher representation. A pointed analogy for any reader with an understanding of mathematics: The fundamental group *measures* or *records* something about a topological space at a point, but is not itself spatial.

The notion of the in-itself is notoriously problematic, since it is posits itself as inscrutable while simultaneously asserting its own existence and connection to phenomena. It is both here and not here. Much of German philosophy following Kant is a struggle to reconcile that tension. We might attempt a definition as: The content organized by the conceptual scheme and that which appears through the model theoretic structure. This does not make the in-itself unstateable. A noumenal-state is I so that a causal functor sends I to a representation $R(I)$. A noumenal-state can be stated, but its *structure* is not found in the representation $R(I)$. It is measured by representation, but not isomorphically. Such does not evoke a contradiction of existing while non-existing. The in-itself exists and is para-linguistic.

Were Wittgenstein correct that propositions *display* the logical structure of reality, then any two conceptual schemes which agree with reality "reach up" to that structure and are mutually translatable:

$$R_1\left(I\right) \approx I \approx R_2\left(I\right)$$

When correspondence is only correlative, it is possible for the noumenal-state to appear as $R_1\left(I\right)$ and $R_2\left(I\right)$, but where $R_1\left(I\right) \not\approx R_2\left(I\right)$. Still, the noumenal-state is a coherent *something*, because observations conducted through a shared conceptual scheme always *agree* on matters of fact. "Snow is white," for all observers who look out their window with a shared conceptual apparatus. The in-itself resolves as facts in logical space identically for all such observers. Indeed, were the Universe classical, classical particles might qualify as the in-itself, in which case the Laplacian scheme successfully accesses the in-itself, and the functor $R : \mathcal{P} \to \mathcal{U}$ is an example of a noumenal-state $\mathcal{P}_t$ appearing as $R\left(\mathcal{P}_t\right) = \mathcal{U}_t$. Similarly, our current state-of-the-art quantum models might access the in-itself; then again, present results may only be the in-itself *appearing through* state-of-the-art structures; and, moreover, there is no way to detect whether the correspondence is structural or correlative. This does not regulate representational truths to uncertainty or imprecise subjectivity. Phenomena can be as Newtonian clockwork machined down to the thousandth decimal place. This is because a time-evolution between noumenal-states,

$$e : I_1 \to I_2$$

implies,

$$R_1\left(e\right) : R_1\left(I_1\right) \to R_1\left(I_2\right)$$

so that the prevailing of R_1-facts is as nonnegotiable as the sternest word of any God. Recalling Kant's example, "A house with an undermined foundation will fall," it is pulled down by $R_1\left(e\right) : R_1\left(I_1\right) \to R_1\left(I_2\right)$ with an arrow like an iron hand. Yet an alien observer might represent the same time-evolution as $R_2\left(e\right) : R_2\left(I_1\right) \to R_2\left(I_2\right)$, with their own iron-handed arrows, none of which recognize *houses*. All the clock-like regularity of the representational world is thus possible without the in-itself possessing the parts of a clock. The logos which feels so present at every joint in the relay of causality and whose fingerprints are so apparent throughout the order of the cosmos simply need not be there. A noumenal-state is the *it* which resolves as facts in logical space. A central something which portrays itself across representations. A subject-independent judicial body passing verdicts over representational dilemmas. "A house with an undermined foundation will fall," it is this sovereignty which rules so. The two appearances – the house with an undermined foundation, and the collapsed house – are deterministically bridged by the passage of noumenal-states. The "point of view," the angle of observation, which decomposes the noumenal-state state to include the undermined house among its facts, will afterwards – looked at again with the same angle – include the collapsed house. With unerring regularity. Yet "house" and "foundation of a house" are certainly not natural kinds. There is some inner turning of the in-itself that necessitates a representational series; but internally, the in-itself does not know the parts we make, nor which lies up and which down.

The linguistic version of conceptual schemes has the advantage of including representations that transcend the psychic. Kant ascribes Newtonian Mechanics to the constructive activity of the mind which feels intuitively absurd. Given the elegant

dance of celestial bodies in their trillions, how could my mind make such sophisticated and encompassing clockwork? A linguistic scheme can be a mathematical model which has extended the reach of observation with scientific instruments. So it is possible that Newtonian mechanics is not structural, and the in-itself, *represented through* the mathematical structure, takes the appearance of inconceivably complex clockwork. These linguistic representations are also compatible with precise and immutable scientific law. Constructions have the potential to work the same each time and to travel scientifically delineated paths eternally. There is no tension with this and the common sense notion of *objectivity*.

For a conceptual scheme $\mathscr{U} = (\mathcal{L}, \mathcal{A}, \mathbb{U})$ define a *mode of representation* to be a category (also denoted $\mathscr{U}$) whose objects are possible worlds and morphisms are arrows $\mathcal{U}_1 \to \mathcal{U}_2$ when $\mathcal{U}_1$ causally evolves into $\mathcal{U}_2$. Above these were parameterized by a real variable representing time, but it may be efficacious to think of these in the unparameterized abstract. A *causal functor* (also determination) is a functor between modes of representation $\mathscr{U}$ and $\mathscr{V}$. Meaning that a $\mathscr{U}$-evolution $e : \mathcal{U}_1 \to \mathcal{U}_2$ is sent to a $\mathscr{V}$-evolution $R(e) : R(\mathcal{U}_1) \to R(\mathcal{U}_2)$. Intuitively these morphisms would be unique. There is at most one causal evolution $e : \mathcal{U}_1 \to \mathcal{U}_2$ between worlds $\mathcal{U}_1$ and $\mathcal{U}_2$. Likewise, if $\mathscr{U}$ determines $\mathscr{V}$ there is at most one determination $R : \mathscr{U} \to \mathscr{V}$ (there is only one way for a particle world to determine a natural representation). However, since math bellow does not require the assumption of uniqueness, the constructions will be left at their more general.

Two modes of representation $\mathcal{U}$ and $\mathcal{V}$ are isomorphic when there exists an invertible casual functor $R : \mathscr{U} \to \mathscr{V}$, in which case they are co-determinant. I am unsure whether co-determinancy implies translatability (through a model-theoretic isomorphism) or whether the modes of representation may be untranslatable but of equal predictive power. Form a category of representations Γ (a category of categories) whose objects are modes of representations and morphisms are causal functors.

We now have a mathematical order, something like a tree, of representational modes. At one position is the Laplacian-scheme $\mathscr{P}$, and beneath it, two natural representations connected by functors: $R_1 : \mathscr{P} \to \mathscr{U}$ and $R_2 : \mathscr{P} \to \mathscr{V}$. A particle-world $\mathcal{P}$ comes to be represented as $R_1(\mathcal{P}) = \mathcal{U}$ and $R_2(\mathcal{P}) = \mathcal{V}$, but where $\mathcal{U}$ is not translatable to $\mathcal{V}$ nor are both co-determinant. But then *above* $\mathscr{P}$ is a still more fundamental $\mathscr{Q}$ and a causal functor $R_0 : \mathscr{Q} \to \mathscr{P}$. So that a $\mathscr{Q}$-representation $\mathcal{Q} \in \mathscr{Q}$ is constructed as $(R_1 \circ R_0)(\mathcal{Q}) = \mathcal{U}$ and $(R_2 \circ R_0)(\mathcal{Q}) = \mathcal{V}$. Yet also, observers who deploy the natural representation $\mathcal{V}$ may be ignorant of particle physics, where, from their position, it is more proper to claim they construct $\mathscr{V}$ directly from $\mathscr{Q}$. The entire state of things looks something like:

Perhaps a physical model, a promised theory of everything, will someday "reach up" and know reality as it knows itself. This representation will capture the Universe at its most fundamental and will be called $\mathscr{F}$. Then for for any other mode of representation $\mathscr{U}$ there will exists a casual functor $\mathscr{F} \to \mathscr{U}$ and the theory of everything will have the top position of the above tree. Assuming that causal functors are unique, $\mathscr{F}$ satisfies a universal property in Γ as an initial object. If such an $\mathscr{F}$ does not exist, then the in-itself is truly unknowable (structurally) and this is the much more interesting case. Since while the in-itself (denoted $\mathscr{I}$) is structurally unknowable, its *action* on representations (the appearance generated by $\mathscr{I}$) is knowable, and this can be described using Category Theory.

Let us review Yoneda's lemma and the Yoneda embedding. Start with $\mathcal{C}$ a locally small category, and to any object $A \in \mathcal{C}$ associate the covariant functor into the category of sets defined by,

$$h_A = \mathrm{Hom}\,(A, -)$$

Given a $\mathcal{C}$-morphism $f : X \to Y$, we obtain $h_A(f) : \mathrm{Hom}\,(A, X) \to \mathrm{Hom}\,(A, Y)$ by sending $g \in \mathrm{Hom}\,(A, X)$ to $f \circ g \in \mathrm{Hom}\,(A, Y)$. Yoneda's lemma states that for any covariant functor F from $\mathcal{C}$ to (Set), that the natural transformations from h_A to F are in one-to-one correspondence with the elements of $F(A)$. Recalling that bijections are isomorphisms in the category of sets,

$$\mathrm{Nat}\,(h_A, F) \approx F(A)$$

Supposing that F is representable, there exists an object $B \in \mathcal{C}$ so that $F \approx h_B$, and the lemma takes the form:

$$\mathrm{Nat}\,(h_A, h_B) \approx \mathrm{Hom}\,(A, B)$$

Let $[\mathcal{C}, (\mathrm{Set})]$ denote the category of functors from $\mathcal{C}$ to (Set). Associate to a morphism $f : X \to Y$ the natural transformation $f^* : h_Y \to h_X$, so that given $g : A \to B$:

$$
\begin{array}{ccc}
\mathrm{Hom}(Y, A) & \xrightarrow{h_Y(g)} & \mathrm{Hom}(Y, B) \\
\downarrow & & \downarrow \\
\mathrm{Hom}(X, A) & \xrightarrow{h_X(g)} & \mathrm{Hom}(X, B)
\end{array}
$$

where the components are defined by pre-composition along f.

Defining $Y : \mathcal{C} \to [\mathcal{C}, (\mathrm{Set})]$ via $Y(A) = h_A$ and $Y(f) = f^*$ gives a contravariant functor which is fully faithful by the Yoneda lemma.

For example, in the category of topological spaces, $h_{S^1}(X) = \mathrm{Hom}\,\left(S^1, X\right)$ is all loops in X, and S^1 can be identified as corresponding to the functor which sends topological spaces to spaces of loops. While the topological space p consisting of a single point can be identified with the functor $h_p(X) = \mathrm{Hom}\,(p, X)$ which gives all points in X. Such is possible for any space. This allows for a generalization where a functor $F : (\mathrm{Top}) \to (\mathrm{Set})$ sends topological spaces to "shapes of type F" but where that type might not be representable. For a more thorough discussion on the Yoneda Lemma and the Yoneda Embedding refer to Mac Lane (2010).

In our case, beginning with the category Γ of representations, any mode of representation $\mathscr{U}$ can be thought of in terms of its action on other modes of representation $\mathscr{V} \to h_{\mathscr{U}}(\mathscr{V})$. For example, the Laplacian-scheme can be thought of as (partly) determined by its way of appearing through natural representations.

Embedding Γ into $[\Gamma, (\mathrm{Set})]$ conserves the order of determination contra-variantly (ie, the Laplacian-mode still determines a natural-mode), but there can exist objects in $[\Gamma, (\mathrm{Set})]$ *which are not representable* by objects in Γ. In other words, there can exist an object $\mathscr{I} \in [\Gamma, (\mathrm{Set})]$ which causally determines while not being fully captured by any mode of representation (ie, there does not exist a mode-of-representation $\mathscr{F} \in \Gamma$ so that $\mathscr{I} \approx h_{\mathscr{F}}$).

The behavior of $\mathscr{I}$ should act like $\mathscr{V} \to \mathrm{Hom}\,(\mathscr{I}, \mathscr{V})$ but where $\mathscr{I}$ is not actually in Γ. We know how this should look by observing the action of a given representation. A mode of representation is a category consisting of causal evolutions $e : \mathcal{U}_1 \to \mathcal{U}_2$, and this representation acts on another representation $\mathscr{V}$ via determinations $R\,(e) : R\,(\mathcal{U}_1) \to R\,(\mathcal{U}_2)$ which collectively give $\mathscr{V} \to \mathrm{Hom}\,(\mathscr{U}, \mathscr{V})$, and this is an element of $[\Gamma, (\mathrm{Set})]$. The in-itself $\mathscr{I}$ is a category consisting of noumenal-states, where an arrow $e : \mathcal{I}_1 \to \mathcal{I}_2$ is an evolution of the noumenal-state $\mathcal{I}_1$ into $\mathcal{I}_2$. But we know that the in-itself exhibits through representations, as we have immediate experience with appearances. Given a mode of representation $\mathscr{U}$ and an evolution $e : \mathcal{I}_1 \to \mathcal{I}_2$ there must occur a $\mathscr{U}$-evolution $R\,(e) : R\,(\mathcal{I}_1) \to R\,(\mathcal{I}_2)$. Therefore define $\mathrm{Hom}\,(\mathscr{I}, \mathscr{U})$ as such functors between $\mathscr{I}$ and $\mathscr{U}$. With this it is possible to send $\mathscr{U} \to \mathrm{Hom}\,(\mathscr{I}, \mathscr{U})$ and this is a functor from Γ to (Set), since given a determination $H : \mathscr{U} \to \mathscr{V}$ we obtain:

$$I_H : \mathrm{Hom}\,(\mathscr{I}, \mathscr{U}) \to \mathrm{Hom}\,(\mathscr{I}, \mathscr{V})$$

via $g \in \mathrm{Hom}\,(\mathscr{I}, \mathscr{U})$ being sent to $H \circ g$. Which works because an evolution of noumenal-states $e : \mathcal{I}_1 \to \mathcal{I}_2$ commutes through representations:

$$
\begin{array}{ccc}
\mathcal{I}_1 & \xrightarrow{\,e\,} & \mathcal{I}_2 \\
\downarrow & & \downarrow \\
\mathcal{U}_1 & \xrightarrow{\,g(e)\,} & \mathcal{U}_2 \\
\downarrow & & \downarrow \\
\mathcal{V}_1 & \xrightarrow{(H \circ g)(e)} & \mathcal{V}_2
\end{array}
$$

Next consider Γ^* as the sub-category of $[\Gamma, (\mathrm{Set})]$ generated by $Y\,(\Gamma)$ and $\mathscr{I}$ (which amounts to adding the in-itself as a limit to Γ). In natural science (and physical description more generally) there is a staircase of fundamentality: Particles are more fundamental than natural representations, but sub-particles are more fundamental than particles, and so on. Either this quest terminates with a theory of everything in which case Γ possesses this limit, or the in-itself is truly inaccessible, in which case noumena occupies the position of a limit in Γ^*. If morphisms from $\mathscr{I}$ are unique, then $\mathscr{I}$ is a terminal object (since the embedding was contra-variant) in Γ^*.

Phenomenologists in the tradition of Husserl practice an elimination of things-in-themselves by unraveling the object into its series of appearances. In the opening of *Being and Nothingness* Sartre describes this position nicely:

> By reducing the existent to the series of appearances that manifest it, modern thought has made considerable progress. The aim was to eliminate a number of troublesome dualisms from philosophy and to replace them with the monism of the phenomenon. Has it succeeded?

> In the first place, we have certainly got rid of the dualism that opposes the existent's inside to its outside. The existent no longer has an "outside," if by that we mean some skin at its surface that conceals the object's true nature from view. And if this "true nature" is, in turn, to be the thing's secret reality—something that we can anticipate or assume but that we can never reach, because it is "inside" the object in question—that does not exist either. The appearances that manifest the existent are neither internal nor external: they are all of equal worth, each of them refers to other appearances, and none of them has priority. Force, for example, is not a metaphysical *conatus* of some unknown kind, concealed behind its effects (accelerations, deviations, etc.); it is the sum of these effects. Similarly, an electric current has no secret other side: it is nothing but the collection of physiochemical actions (electrolytic processes, the incandescence of a carbon filament, the movement of the galvanometer's needle, etc.) that manifest it. None of these actions is sufficient to reveal it. But it does not point to anything *behind* it; each action points to itself and to the total series. (Sartre, 1943, pp. 1-2)

The above Yoneda perspective confirms that the object is not concealed by a skin. The secret reality of the thing *is* simply all its external sides as appearances (a nuemenal state was equated to an action across modes of representation). No inside remains after the object has been observed from all sides. Yet, every observation leaves a "secret other side." The representation *measures* the nuemenal-state (as the fundemental group measures a topological space). The neumenal-state is objectified through representation, and how the objects combine into facts discloses a side of the in-itself. A measurement, a certain temperature, is recorded using the tools of the language. Yet there must be something unmeasured or a remaining interior. After all, Sartre's total series of appearances – after committing the phenomenological picture to proposition – is just the mathematical definition of the object's type as a order-theoretic homomorphism $B(\mathcal{A}) \to \{T, F\}$. But schemes and objects are correlative; therefore, absent a structural isomorphism (which we assume not to exist here), the total series points to a construction which is not the inside of anything. The in-itself is all its exterior presentations – yet some of these are known only to Negel's Martian or Bat. A "total series" underdetermines when serialized by a single conceptual scheme.

Suppose one hopes to know a traffic-light through an exhaustive series of observations and writes a series for as long as language allows. But this leaves a remainder. Another conceptual scheme must be adopted and the observer must look again. But objects and schemes are correlative – new lens is put-on and the traffic-light *vanishes*. So what was there from the start?

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
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THE CLASSIFICATION
OF
CRIMINAL BEHAVIOR

Selected Papers from a Seminar Series
Sponsored by the
National Institute of Law Enforcement
and Criminal Justice
Law Enforcement Assistance Administration
April-May, 1972

The points of view or opinions stated in this document are those of the persons who addressed the seminar and do not necessarily represent the official opinion or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.

June 1973

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FOREWORD

The papers included in this monograph have been selected from
presentations in a seminar series on "The Classification of
Criminal Behavior: Uses and State of Research" sponsored by the
National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice in the
Spring of 1972.

The four authors presented discuss the responsibilities and
the problems facing the criminal justice field in the establishment
of a valid classification system. In the first article, Professor
Don Gibbons reviews some prominent examples of typlogical analysis
found in the criminological literature. He establishes the major
criteria for taxonomic systems as well as the requirement that
they be congruent with reality. Dr. Marguerite Warren views
classification systems as essential in planning intervention
strategies. Her paper focuses on the classification system called
Interpersonal Maturity Level (I-level) based upon seven successive
stages of psychological development. In the third presentation,
Dr. Lawrence Bennett's approach emphasizes changing the criminal
justice system through its decision-making processes, rather than
attempting to change the behavior of the individual criminal
offender. The focus of Dr. Jerome Miller's paper is upon the latent
social control functions of diagnosis and classification of criminal
offenders.

Although each of the contributors discusses the classification
of criminal offenders from his own perspective and orientation,
they are all responsive to the need for further research in this
area. In disseminating this monograph, the Institute hopes to
stimulate further interest and study of this important concern.
These seminar papers will be of special interest to the criminal
justice research community, operating agencies and administrators
at every level of the criminal justice system.

Martin B. Danziger
Assistant Administrator
National Institute of Law Enforcement
and Criminal Justice

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OBSERVATIONS ON TYPOLOGIES OF CRIME AND CRIMINALS
Don C. Gibbons
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Introduction

My task in this paper is to discuss the general issue of criminal
classification and criminal typologies, particularly as these taxo-
nomic systems bear upon the correctional task of offender rehabilitat-
ion. However, a good deal of what I have to say in the remarks to
follow centers around my own typological work and my own intellectual
history. This concentration upon my own endeavors is due to: (1)
the fact that my writings have had some fair influence upon the broader
historical trend in the direction of typologies, and (2) the shifts in
my personal views on this subject are illustrative of alterations in
viewpoints within the field of criminology.

My introduction to offender classification came in the 1950's,
when I first encountered the work of Clarence Schrag, dealing with inmate
types in the prison community.[1] According to Schrag, prisoners exhibit
patterns of social role behavior which the inmate argot designates by
the labels, "square John," "right guy," "ding," "outlaw," and "politician."

Somewhat later, Donald Garrity and I wrote an essay on offender
typologies in which we identified some criteria for adequate taxonomies,
reviewed a number of efforts which had been made to develop typologies,
and discussed some uses for these classificatory systems.[2] That paper
was followed by a companion article, in which Garrity and I tentatively
identified a number of patterns of criminality.[3]

The thrust of my work with Garrity centered around the development
of offender typologies for causal or etiological purposes, with secondary
attention to the correctional applications of these systems. I later
wrote several essays on diagnostic typologies in correctional practice,
the most important being the book, Changing the Lawbreaker.[4] Indeed,
it is fair to say that this text, which outlined nine types of delinquents
and fifteen adult offenders, along with a categorization of forms of
correctional intervention linked to the types, is the most detailed
attempt that has yet been made to articulate the form which an applied
science of correctional treatment might take.

During the past half-dozen years, my own perspectives on etiological
and diagnostic typologies have undergone considerable change. Addition-
ally, I have become less sanguine about the prospects for a behavioral
science-oriented field of correctional practice.[5] On this point, several

pieces of research in which I have been involved suggest that although typologies do have heuristic value, they also tend to distort the nature of criminal behavior as it actually exists.[6] That is, researchers have found considerable difficulty in placing many real-life offenders within the categories of typologies. In my opinion, much of the difficulty in fitting actual lawbreakers within typologies comes from the fact that a large number of them are individuals who engage in tentative flirtations with criminality, drifting into and out of trouble, and who show no clear-cut pattern of criminal conduct.[7]

In the sections to follow, I shall indicate some basic considerations which need to be addressed in typological endeavors, followed by a review of some of the more prominent examples of typological analysis in the criminological literature. The paper will then discuss the typological system which I have been developing, along with some cases in which attempts have been made to employ this scheme in correctional treatment.

Kinds of Typologies[8]

Causal and Diagnostic Typologies

There are two basic kinds of typologies which can be developed, in terms of the purposes they are to serve. Causal or etiological typologies are those that identify patterns of crime or criminality that are hypothesized to develop from specific etiological backgrounds. Thus some observers have singled out types such as "naive check forgers," on the assumption that persons who engage in certain forgery activities are also the product of an identifiable causal process such as "isolation and closure."[9] In a similar fashion, patterns of crime have been identified for etiological purposes, with the end in mind of discovering social-structural correlates that produce the different kinds of lawbreaking.

A second kind of typology is the diagnostic one, designed to provide the basis for treatment intervention. Some of the classificatory schemes advanced in the literature have been offered as useful both for diagnostic and causal purposes. In my own writings, I have argued that the role-career types which I have identified are etiologically-significant and have some utility in correctional treatment. Other taxonomic devices which have been put forth have been characterized either as diagnostic or etiological schemes, but not as both.

The I-Levels formulation currently being employed in delinquency treatment in California is a prominent example of a typology which has been offered as a diagnostic tool.[10] However, it should be noted that the I-Levels theory also contains a relatively explicit and controversial

formulation of delinquency causation within it. The I-Levels argument strongly implies that delinquents are to be found predominately at low levels of interpersonal maturity and that they are involved in misbehavior as a consequence of these socialization deficiencies. Non-offenders, on the other hand, are assumed to be more interpersonally mature on the average, and thereby insulated from juvenile lawbreaking. It should be noted that these hypotheses about delinquents and non-offenders have not been subjected to research scrutiny. There is a good bit of evidence from other research studies, in fact, which points in a direction different from the I-Levels argument;[11] a large quantity of data appears to show that delinquents are not markedly less well-adjusted, emotionally healthy, or interpersonally mature than non-offenders.

There are several points to be noted concerning causal and diagnostic typologies. First, it may well be that valid classificatory schemes that provide the basis for significant etiological discoveries may be exceedingly difficult, if not impossible, to construct. Second, it may be possible to devise diagnostic instruments having treatment utility which are independent of the causal typologies.[12] Third, development of the former may be less difficult than is articulation of the latter.

Typologies of Crime, Criminals, and Personalities

Those various typologies which can be found in the criminological and correctional literature can be classified in another way, namely, in terms of their content or behavioral dimensions. Stated differently, the literature contains a sizeable number of classificatory schemes which have identified patterns of crime. A second group of typologies have dealt with types or patterns of offenders, in which the emphasis is upon describing the characteristics of individuals. Thirdly, some schemes found in the literature are categorizations of personality types or patterns, rather than typologies of offenders. The I-Levels system falls into this third category, in that there presumably are many non-delinquent youths who would be found in one or another low-maturity level in that scheme. Typologies of personality patterns differ from taxonomies of offenders, for the latter sort lawbreakers into categories in which lawabiding citizens are not represented.

Relatively little attention has been paid in criminology to the development of typologies of crime, with most of the attention centering instead upon explication of classifications of offenders. It seems likely that efforts to develop taxonomies of patterns of criminality may be more profitable or easier to accomplish than endeavors to evolve offender typologies. Classification of forms of crime involves the identification of commonalities to be found in single criminal incidents,

while the development of offender classifications requires that we pay attention to the patterning of multiple instances of conduct of individuals over time. Researchers have reported that behavioral stability in lawbreaking is relatively uncommon among offenders, that is, that "careers" in crime are the exception rather than the rule.

Some Criteria for Adequate Typologies

There are a number of criteria for typologies which could be listed, depending upon the purposes which the schemes are designed to serve. However, the major requirements of taxonomic systems are easily stated.

First, a typology which is to have some utility in etiological analysis or correctional treatment must possess clarity and objectivity. The characteristics or dimensions which are employed in the typology for purposes of identifying types must be clearly specified. Different observers must be able to apply the scheme to real-life offenders and must be able to make reliable assignments of specific persons to the categories of the typology.

A second requirement of a good typology is that the types or categories in the scheme be mutually exclusive. Actual offenders must fit into one and only one category within the typology.

A third requirement, whether it is to be used in etiological analysis or for correctional treatment, is that the typology be comprehensive. In other words, all or most of the population of actual offenders ought to be placeable within one or another type within the scheme. Finally, we might identify parsimony as a requirement of a good typology. Diagnostic or etiological schemes should have relatively few categories within them, although it is difficult to identify a priori the numerical limits of a useful, parsimonious typology. Nonetheless, a typological system with several hundred types within it would clearly be too unwieldy to be of much value.

These criteria for typologies appear obvious enough. The point to be noted about these requirements is that they are often violated in practice. In the review of typologies to follow, we shall see that many of them are defective in terms of one or another criterion above.

Processes of Typology Development

There are some typological schemes in the criminological literature which are largely the product of theoretical speculation, evolving out of the explication of logically derived relationships based upon some conceptual scheme. On the other extreme, some investigators have gone

about the discovery of types through a theoretical, inductive fact-gathering, hoping to uncover patterns through the manipulation of variables found in the backgrounds of offenders. However, the majority of existing typologies have been the joint product of theoretical speculation and inductive discovery through research. In my own work, I have drawn upon a number of studies of specific offender types which have been defined ad hoc, as well as upon other bits and pieces of research. These factual materials have been assembled in typologies, but the taxonomic categories also contain a large number of hunches or hypotheses about characteristics of offenders. For example, statements are made about attitudinal and self-concept patterns to be found on the part of persons who engage in certain kinds of criminality. In a number of cases, hard evidence is lacking to show that the hypothesized attitudinal correlates do accompany the lawbreaking behavior. What is called for in these typologies is research which would investigate some of these hypothesized patterns. In turn, those empirical investigations which turn up negative findings concerning claims in the typologies would compel us to make revisions in the typological scheme. In sum, typology development ought to be a specific case of the more general process of scientific discovery, in which a continuous interplay of theory and research is involved.

Some Existing Typologies

Typologies of Delinquents

The main focus of this paper is upon typologies of crime and criminals, rather than upon taxonomies of delinquents and delinquency. However, it should be noted that typologies of delinquents have been put forth in great number, such that there are considerably more of these in the criminological literature than there are classifications of adult offenders.[13] Then too, it is the case that the most widely-used and well-known diagnostic typology currently in use in correctional practice is the I-Levels scheme in California.[14]

Typologies of delinquents are not without flaws, many of them being defective in terms of the criteria we have noted previously, particularly with regard to clarity and objectivity. A good many delinquent typologies which have been advanced in the literature are relatively anecdotal or vague in character, so that considerable difficulty is encountered in reliably placing actual offenders within the categories of the scheme. It might be noted that the I-Levels system is not entirely satisfactory in this regard, for difficulties have been reported in the actual utilization of this system in correctional practice.[15]

One might well argue that the prospects for development of an

etiologically or diagnostically adequate delinquency typology are greater than for the articulation of an adequate criminal typology. Although there is a good deal of variability of delinquent behavior, it is exceeded by the wide range of lawbreaking patterns encountered among adult offenders.

Typologies of Criminals

There are a fairly sizeable number of typologies of criminals which have been offered in the criminological literature, as well as an even larger number of descriptions of specific, single forms of criminal conduct such as "naive check forgers."[16] Let us examine a sample of these categorizations.

One fairly old and well-known venture into typology construction is represented by the research of Roebuck, dealing with 1,155 inmates in the District of Columbia Reformatory.[17] Roebuck's typology was based on legal categories of offender behavior studied within the framework of criminal careers. Prison inmates were sorted into classes on the basis of their total crime record as indicated in official records. Types such as "Negro armed robbers" and "Negro jack-of-all-trades offenders" were identified, with thirteen types being specified in all. This inductively-derived scheme was based on prison inmates and probably fails with regard to the comprehensiveness criterion.

A different approach to typology development is represented by the recent essay by Daniel Glaser, in which he identifies ten patterns of criminal behavior.[18] His list includes such types as "adolescent reca-pitulators," "subcultural assaulters," "vocational predators," "crisis-vacillation predators," and "addicted performers." Although Glaser draws upon research findings, his typological scheme is relatively speculative in character. More important, while it is of some heuristic value in providing some structure to thinking about differential social policies for various offenders, Glaser's typology does not specify the characteristics of offenders in sufficient detail to be reliably applied to actual lawbreakers with much precision.

One common occurrence when persons begin to examine some specific "type" of offender in detail is the proliferation of sub-types in order to capture the variability of behavior within the type. For example, consider McCaghy's research on child molesters--a kind of criminal career which might be hypothesized to be relatively homogeneous.[19] McCaghy reports that he found six separate types of child molesters, including the "high interaction molester," the "incestuous molester," the "career molester," and the "spontaneous-aggressive molester."

This proliferation of sub-types of criminals can also be seen in the essays on murder by Guttmacher[20] and Neustatter.[21] Both of these writers have argued that murderers come in a variety of types; Guttmacher asserts that there are nine kinds of murderers while Neustatter lists ten types. Both of these persons advance anecdotal schemes lacking in clarity and objectivity. Another and more recent listing of sub-types of offenders, which is also impressionistic and relatively crude in definition, is Conklin's four types of robbery offenders (professional, opportunist, addict, and alcoholic robbers).[22]

The material discussed to this point indicates that general and abstract typologies can be developed which identify a relatively small number of criminal types thought to include most actual offenders. These classificatory devices are of some heuristic value, in that they aid us by providing some structure to our thinking about criminal etiology or differential treatment of offenders. But, at the same time, these abstract typologies are not very useful in actual research or correctional practice. When we begin to try to evolve typologies that are sufficiently explicit and detailed as to be consistent with the facts of criminal behavior, we soon discover that a markedly increased number of categories is required in order to capture the variability among actual offenders.

On this point, I am reminded of the efforts of the pioneering taxonomist, the 19th century scholar, Henry Mayhew. He produced a table of the different types of criminals, with five major headings, twenty minor headings, and over one hundred different categories.[23] Mayhew's typology included such types as "Thimble-screwers," "Snoozers," "Snow Gatherers," and "Sawney Hunters." A contemporary parallel to Mayhew's long list of types can be seen in the inductively-developed scheme used in the San Francisco Project. In that study, the present offenses of probationers, along with their ages, prior record of offenses, and their scores on the California Personality Inventory So (Socialization) Scale were trichotomized, yielding fifty-four possible types of probationers.[24]

The point which I would make here is that in the search for a typology which does justice to the richness and variability of offender behavior, we may run the danger of developing a scheme of such elegance, with so many specific types in it, that the typology frustrates efforts at differential treatment, rather than serving as an aid.

Typologies of Crime

Before leaving this review, let us examine some of the typologies of crime which have been advanced. One of these, by Clinard and Quinney, lists eight categories of crime, defined in terms of the dimensions of criminal career of the offender, group support of criminal behavior, correspondence between criminal behavior and legitimate behavior patterns,

and societal reaction.[25] These authors identify such types as occasional property crime, conventional crime, and political crime. Several points should be noted regarding their taxonomy. First, the categories within it are very broad ones, including forms of criminality within them which do not seem very similar, as for example, political crime which includes everything from protest behavior to espionage. Second, the Clinard and Quinney classification is somewhat ambiguous, for it is not entirely clear as to whether they have in mind a taxonomy of crime or of criminal persons. Schemes such as the Clinard and Quinney one seem most useful for textbook purposes and have little or no applicability to correctional endeavors.

Other examples of crime typologies would include the mathematically-complex scheme by Shoham, Guttman, and Rahav.[26] A more well-known taxonomy is contained in the Kinsey research on sex offenders, in which sexual offenses were classified in terms of the age of the victim or co-participant, and also in terms of whether the acts were forced or consensual in nature, as well as whether the victims or co-participants were children, minors, or adults.[27] Combinations of these dimensions yielded twelve possible types of behavior. This is not a taxonomy of criminal offenders since individual lawbreakers often later engage in two or more of these patterns of activity and in other forms of criminality as well.

Gibbons' Role-Career Typologies

Developmental Background

My interest in offender typologies came early in my criminological training, when as a graduate student in sociology, I encountered the prison social types identified by Schrag. The initial notions which Donald Garrity and I evolved regarding offender "types" were quite crude and ambiguous ones. Over the past decade, I have devoted a considerable amount of time to the formal explication of criminal and delinquent typologies. My efforts have been devoted to the articulation of typological systems which are sufficiently explicit and detailed so as to lend themselves to empirical testing.

The key feature of the typological work with which I am identified is the stress on role-careers. I have attempted to specify criminal behavior patterns which describe the lawbreaking life career of individual persons. This interest grows out of the common sense observation that individuals who steal a car today, for example, may be implicated in quite a different kind of misbehavior tomorrow. Accordingly, typologies of criminals which center about specific forms of illegal activity are not adequate. At the same time, although it may not make sense to speak of "receivers of stolen property," "2nd degree burglars," or

"larceny by bailee offenders" as offender types, it may be possible to identify "semi-professional property offenders" as a distinct type, made up of individuals who specialize in a variety of identifiable predatory acts.

The basic model involved in role-career analysis is one of sequential stages through which deviants are presumed to proceed. Probably the clearest prototype of a stable career in deviance is the chronic alcoholic career identified by Jellenik and others,[28] in which individuals get caught up in a sequence of increasingly more deviant drinking activities, one stage following the other. At any one point in time, it is possible to identify specific individuals who are involved in the chronic alcoholic career but who are at different points in the career.

Some of the existing research material in the criminological literature does suggest that some criminal careers are made up of related episodes of behavior which unfold over time. I have already taken note of research on "naive check forgers."[29] Some other studies which lend at least some general support to the view that there are careers or stabilities in criminal deviance are those by Peterson, Pittman, and O'Neal,[30] and by Frum.[31]

The search for criminal careers has been conducted for two reasons. First, investigators, including myself, have been interested in identifying a parsimonious set of types of offender role behavior for which underlying causal or etiological processes might be discovered. Criminologists are interested in accounting for the lawbreaking behavior of individuals over time, rather than in the explanation of single episodes of criminality.

Criminal career analysis is also of interest in applied, correctional settings. The ideal diagnostic typology would be one which could be generalized across correctional structures and organizations, such that "naive check forgers," "incest offenders," or other types might be identified wherever they happen to turn up in the correctional machinery. Such a system of types would allow us to measure the differential effects upon offenders of different treatment strategies in different settings.

Definitional Variables

The structure of the typologies of delinquents and of criminals which I have developed revolves around five "defining dimensions" or definitional variables. Types are identified in terms of various combinations of characteristics exhibited by offenders within the categories of offense behavior, interactional setting, self-concept, attitudes, and role-career. The last category is one in which the career pattern of lawbreaking activity is described. The typologies which have been developed around these dimensions offer descriptions of such types as

"naive check forger," in which the forgery behavior of the individual is described, along with the social circumstances (interactional setting) in which it occurs. The naive check forger is also identified in terms of a self-concept pattern centering about notions of dependency and a non-criminal self-image, along with attitudes of the sort: "You can't kill anyone with a fountain pen." In short, the typological description asserts that the real world includes individuals who exhibit certain specified kinds of criminal behavior, self-images, and attitudes in common and it provides a guide to the observations which must be made so that the observer can "see" naive check forgers or some other "type."

Background Dimensions

The typologies which I have been developing also include statements about the social backgrounds of the various types which have previously been identified in terms of the definitional dimensions. Thus the typologies assert that offenders of some particular type exhibit common background characteristics. These background characteristics are enumerated within the rubrics, social class, family background, peer group relations, and contact with defining agencies. The latter category identifies some of the hypothesized effects upon offenders of various correctional experiences which they undergo. In this view of things, the involvement of the offender with agencies of social control may operate as a career contingency which influences the subsequent course of his deviant career. Although the observations which are made about the social backgrounds of different role-career types are not specific enough to constitute explicit causal generalizations, the statements are designed to hint at the etiological processes which produce the various types. As a consequence, these typologies might be described as prototheories or "explanation sketches," that is, as immature theories regarding the causation of criminal behavior.

Offender Typologies

In the work on typologies which I have accomplished so far, nine role-careers in delinquency have been identified:[32]

1. Predatory Gang Delinquent
2. Conflict-Gang Delinquent
3. Casual Gang Delinquent
4. Casual Delinquent, Nongang Member
5. Automobile Thief - "Joyrider"
6. Drug User - Heroin
7. Overly Aggressive Delinquent
8. Female Delinquent
9. Behavior Problem Delinquent

The typology of criminals includes twenty-one types, as follows:[33]

1. Professional Thief
2. Professional "Heavy" Criminal
3. Semiprofessional Property Offender
4. Amateur Shoplifter
5. Naive Check Forger
6. Automobile Thief - "Joyrider"
7. Property Offender, "One-Time Loser"
8. White Collar Criminal
9. Embezzler
10. Professional "Fringe" Violator
11. Personal Offender, "One-Time Loser"
12. "Psychopathic" Assaultist
13. Statutory Rapist
14. Aggressive Rapist
15. Violent Sex Offender
16. Nonviolent Sex Offender
17. Incest Offender
18. Male Homosexual
19. Organized Crime Offender
20. Opiate Addict
21. "Skid Road" Alcoholic

Typologies in Use

Most of the typological schemes which have been advanced in the criminological and correctional literature have failed to find their way into correctional practice. Doubtless this is in part because of the deficiencies with which many of these taxonomies have been plagued.

The Gibbons' classifications have been employed in a limited way in three experimental projects within corrections. One of these was conducted at the Stonewall Jackson Training School in Concord, North Carolina, and dealt with delinquent offenders.[34] A second project involved a community-based probation treatment program for semi-professional property offenders, carried on in Utah under the joint auspices of Thiokol Chemical Corporation and the state correctional agency.[35] In both of these projects, the procedures employed to pick out offenders as members of the types identified in the typologies were quite crude. Also, these two projects made no attempt to sort a large, diversified group of offenders into a number of the categories of the typologies. Therefore these two projects cannot be offered as convincing evidence of the utility of the Gibbons' typological schemes.

A third correctional project utilizing the typologies I have been developing took place in the San Mateo County Probation Department in

California.[36] That study was a much more comprehensive one and is of more significance for the general issue of the validity of typologies. We shall consider that investigation in the next section.

Isomorphism with Reality?

I have suggested the caveat at several junctures in this essay that while typological schemes may be highly useful as an organizing principle around which some of the facts of criminality can be assessed, we need to be wary of assuming that typologies provide accurate and comprehensive descriptions of the offender population in the real world. In other words, we need to ask whether a given typological scheme is congruent with the facts. To what extent are the types in a classificatory device isomorphic with reality? Do typologies provide accurate characterizations of actual offenders?

One indication of the relationship between typological descriptions and the real world can be found in the work of Schrag, to which I alluded earlier.[37] He reported that inmates in prison can be identified as "right guys," "square Johns," and so on. Presumably the convicts employ these typological labels in their dealings with one another as well. But, are all inmates classifiable?

In an attempt ot replicate the observations of Schrag, Peter Garabedian studied a sample of prisoners in the same prison from which Schrag's report emanated.[38] Garabedian identified incumbents of prisoner social roles through responses to a series of attitude items on a questionnaire. On the one hand, about three-fourths of the inmate subjects did fall into the Schrag types, but on the other, about one-fourth were unclassifiable. Moreover, although the social correlates such as prior offense records, participation in prison programs, and attitudes toward the penitentiary that are said to accompany the role types were observed, many of the associations were less striking than implied in some of the writings on prisoner types. The conclusions of this study were two-fold; it demonstrates that social types exist at the same time that it indicates that the typological scheme implies more regularity of inmate behavior than is actually observed.

The only direct examination of the typological schemes with which I am associated is found in the San Mateo County Probation Department study.[39] In that project, a small group of probation officers attempted to classify probationers, according to the types of adult criminals and juvenile offenders identified in Changing the Lawbreaker. The officers added two "types" of their own, "alcoholic delinquents" and "marijuana hippies," which they claimed were fairly commonly encountered in probation caseloads.

The methodological procedures employed by the probation officers included the development of abridged profiles or typological descriptions of offenders from Changing the Lawbreaker, with both background and definitional dimensions being included. Then, groups of three probation officers acting as "judges" read case records of actual probationers, comparing the data in case files against the typological profiles. Each "judge" evaluated cases independently, without consultation with the other researchers. A probationer was designated as an incumbent of a type if two of the three "judges" assigned him to that type.

Approximately 650 probation cases were examined by the probation officers working in research teams of "judges." The study was not officially sponsored by the agency and this project was conducted by the workers in their free time. Accordingly, the large investment of time which the officers made in the study was quite remarkable. These remarks should condition any observation about the crudeness of the classificatory procedures employed in the project. Also, while the classification methods were relatively simple, the tactic of employing "judges" and profile descriptions is not an uncommon one being particularly appropriate for the task in this instance.

In brief, the results of the diagnostic effort by the probation officers were that 312 of the 655 probationers were categorized as falling within a type in the typologies. Of these persons, the largest share of them (60.8 percent) were classified as alcoholic delinquents; nonviolent sex offender, "rapos"; marijuana offender, "hippies"; or naive check forgers. It also should be noted that of the 343 persons not assigned to a type, 312 of these were judged by the probation officers as not falling into any type within the typology. Stated differently, there was a relatively high degree of rater-agreement in the research; officer-"judges" either agreed that a person was a particular type within the typologies or that he was not any of the types under study.

What about the remaining half of the probationers who were not initially classified? Are there perhaps some types within which they fall, but which have not yet been identified in any existing typology? Using a parallel technique of independent judges, Clayton Hartjen attempted to sift through the probationers who had not been assigned to the typology, in order to see whether there were some similarities among them that had escaped the attention of the typology developers. Using offense records, he placed most of these individuals (330 of the 343) into seven "types," with 26.5 percent of them classified as "nonsupport offenders" and 22.1 percent typed as property offenders.[40]

My own evaluation of these findings is a mixed one. On the one hand, the study does offer some encouragement for those who would endeavor to develop differential treatment programs centered about diagnostic types, in that a fairly large number of offenders were classified into types. On the other hand, the research was lacking in the precision that one would hope to achieve in taxonomic endeavors. In particular, the judges were restricted in their taxonomic endeavors to data contained in probation reports. As a consequence, offenders were classified largely in terms of offense behavior and social background characteristics. The classificatory activities did not involve self-concept and attitudinal items, at least not in a systematic way. I suspect that if the probationers had been subjected to a battery of personality tests such as the California Personality Inventory So Scale, and had their test scores been included in their files, the officer-judges would have encountered considerably more difficulty in assigning persons to typology categories.

Regarding the approximately half of the probationers who were not initially placed in the Gibbons typologies but who were eventually assigned to some other "types," Hartjen and I concluded that most of these offenders were involved in "folk crime." "Folk crime" is H. Laurence Ross' term for forms of lawbreaking arising out of laws introduced to solve problems related to the increased complexity of modern society.[41] These offenses usually draw little public attention, they involve little social stigma, they include persons of relatively high status, and they are frequently dealt with in a variety of administrative ways. Probation caseloads apparently include a number of novices in criminality who do not move on into more complex forms of lawbreaking and who do not become committed to careers in deviance.

Career Typologies: An Assessment

Although it is perhaps too early for unequivocal assertions about the long-term prospects for career-oriented typologies of the kind I have been describing above, the evidence to date does not seem encouraging. To begin with, the research I have surveyed indicates that no fully comprehensive offender typology which subsumes most criminality within it yet exists. Then too, there are some criminologists who suggest that new forms of lawbreaking are emerging in addition to traditional ones.[42] If so, these emergent types of criminal behavior will have to be accommodated in typologies.

Additionally, it is by no means clear that existing typologies of criminals, including the one I have advanced, are empirically precise. It has yet to be shown that the degree of patterning or regularity of offense behavior which typologies assume truly does exist in most cases

of criminality. On this same point, there has been almost no research dealing with hypothesized social-psychological correlates of offense behavior, so that it remains to be demonstrated that check forgers are dependent personalities, that semiprofessional property criminals exhibit common attitudinal patterns, and so on.

These remarks come down to one central conclusion: the notion of identifiable careers in criminality may be a hypothesis about behavior which is entirely too clinical. The language of "types," "syndromes," "behavioral roles," and the like may be inappropriate for many criminals. Instead, we may find that many lawbreakers are individuals who exhibit relatively unique combinations of criminal conduct and attitudinal patterns, or at least that we can only group them with some difficulty into some very general categories or types.

My attention in recent years has been drawn to the contemporary theorizing in the sociological field of deviance study, particularly to the writings of so-called "labeling" theorists. Sociologists such as Lemert have argued that many deviants, including criminals and delinquents, "drift" into misbehavior or that their conduct is a risk-taking response to value-conflicts in society. The conventional image of the deviant whose conduct is the consequence of internalized motives which differentiate him from nonlawbreakers is relatively absent in the writing of labeling theorists. Deviance theorists assert the importance of "societal reactions," "turning points," "career contingencies," and the like, arguing that individual careers in deviance do not usually follow some kind of straight line progression of behavioral deviation. Instead, variability rather than regularity is most characteristic of offenders; lawbreakers engage in flirtations with criminality; individuals get drawn into misconduct for a variety of reasons and many of them manage to withdraw from deviance. In all of this, labeling theorists suggest that deviant careers do not unfold from "within the skin" of the actor, so to speak, so much as they develop in response to various contingent events that occur to him along the way, including experiences with correctional organizations.

If we were to follow deviance arguments very far, we might be led to turn away entirely from the search for types of criminal persons, investing our energy instead in the development of descriptions of interactional processes or patterns. That is, we might search for generalizations which would describe the ways in which norm-violators, social audiences, and agents of organizations such as prisons or probation agencies are all bound together in interactional patterns which result in various outcomes on the part of the deviant. John Irwin's account of the career of the felon is a case-in-point of analysis of this kind.[44]

I would not embrace deviance theories to the point of arguing that we should give up entirely the search for stabilities among deviants. For one thing, the deviance theory which I have described currently exists as a collection of plausible but empirically un-verified hypotheses about behavior. My guess is that this body of argument sometimes distorts the facts of actual criminality in a manner opposite to that of typological formulations. The latter are overly-clinical, while the former place too much emphasis upon career con-tingencies and kindred factors external to the actor. In their extreme form, labeling theories put forth a kind of "billiard ball" image of the deviant, in which he is buffeted about by social forces over which he has no control.

Even so, I would again emphasize that I have become increasingly skeptical about the prospects for uncovering a relatively parsimonious set of criminal role-careers. Let me also note in passing that the typological assumption that clear-cut causal processes can be identified for role-careers, involving some specific set of earlier life experi-ences out of which criminal motivation developed, is also open to serious question. I do not have space in this paper to elaborate upon this point, but I have commented on criminal etiology in detail in another essay.[45] That paper draws attention to "risk-taking" processes in criminality, involving persons who are not specifically motivated to engage in lawbreaking. The essay places much heavier emphasis upon situational pressures and factors in criminal etiology than has been customary in criminological theorizing in the past. If those obser-vations are on the mark, they would serve to deemphasize the importance of typologies in causal analysis.

My guess is that insofar as the search for typologies turns out to be profitable in corrections, it will be as a consequence of the further development of statistical classifications such as the base expectancy system of analysis[46] or predictive attribute analysis.[47] These techniques of inductive analysis involve relatively modest goals, centering about the development of classificatory devices based on specific groups of offenders within certain limited correctional settings. They in no way involve the grand ambitions of theoretically-derived typologies such as the ones I have been manufacturing. Again, I suspect that the search for a single offender typology which can be used everywhere represents an illusory goal.

Some Concluding Comments

I would like to end my remarks in this paper with a few terse comments about typologies and the state of the correctional art. To begin with, it appears to me that a full-blown applied science of cor-

rectional rehabilitation is still a good distance in the future. Cor-rectional agents continue to be employed from a myriad of educational backgrounds, such that little progress has been made toward the standardization of training and knowledge on the part of treatment workers.

Then too, great gaps exist in our knowkedge regarding the nature of the basic correctional task. We are a long way away from proven scientific generalizations concerning the etiology of lawbreaking. Because we often do not know precisely what is "wrong" with the offender, we cannot be sure of what we should do to him in the name of treatment. Thus to give someone the mandate to rehabilitate an offender is to assign him the task of "tinkering" with that person.[48] The correctional agent often has no clear idea of the therapeutic program that is in order for the lawbreaker, and even if he did, there is no assurance that the worker is equipped with sufficient knowledge to be able to do anything in the way of correctional intervention.

It is against this background that the current popularity of the I-Levels typological system in California should be evaluated. On the one hand, there is no convincing evidence that the underlying theory in that diagnostic system is correct.[49] Furthermore, the sponsors of that scheme have yet to demonstrate conclusively that it can be reliably applied to offenders, assuming that its central tenets are valid.[50] Finally, it is not yet clear that use of the diagnostic system actually improves the effectiveness of correctional intervent-ion.[51]

The I-Levels typology does have a very important latent function, even if it is invalid and ineffective. Those who acquire the special diagnostic language of the system, including such terms as "Se, situational emotional reaction," "Nix, neurotic anxious," along with the psychogenic theory that is at the heart of this formulation, there-by become "inside dopesters" who are able to dazzle their correctional colleagues who have not acquired this material. Even more important, the acquisition by the worker of the I-Levels theory and prescriptions for differential treatment operates to reduce his confusion and uncertainty about the degree to which he really is the "professional" person which he has proclaimed himself to be.

I do not mean to discourage the search for improved knowledge in the field of corrections, including the attempt to evolve diagnostic typologies. However, I would argue that typological systems ought to be studied and evaluated very closely, so that we do not seize pre-maturely upon some scheme which will ultimately turn out to be in-adequate to the tasks which are set for these instruments.

NOTES

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2. Don C. Gibbons and Donald L. Garrity, "Some Suggestions for the Development of Etiological and Treatment Theory in Criminology," Social Forces, XXXVIII (October 1959), 51-58.

3. Gibbons and Garrity, "Definition and Analysis of Certain Criminal Types," Journal of Criminal Law, Criminology and Police Science, LIII (March 1962), 27-35.

4. Gibbons, Changing the Lawbreaker (Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1965); Gibbons, "Some Notes on Treatment Theory in Corrections," Social Service Review, XXXVI (September 1962), 295-305.

5. Gibbons, "Punishment, Treatment, and Rehabilitation: Problems and Prospects," in Abraham S. Blumberg, ed., Introduction to Criminology (New York: Random House, Inc., forthcoming).

6. See Clayton A. Hartjen and Gibbons, "An Empirical Investigation of a Criminal Typology," Sociology and Social Research, LIV (October 1969), 56-62, Robin Moore and Gibbons, "Offender Patterns in a Federal Probation Caseload," unpublished report, Center for Sociological Research, Portland State University, 1970; Gibbons, "Crime in the Hinterland," Criminology, August 1972.

7. Gibbons, "Observations on the Study of Crime Causation," American Journal of Sociology, LXXVII (September 1971), 262-78.

8. An excellent brief discussion of different kinds of typologies and criteria for good typologies can be found in Roger Hood and Richard Sparks, Key Issues in Criminology (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., Inc., 1970), pp. 114-40.

9. Naive check forgers are discussed in Edwin M. Lemert, "An Isolation and Closure Theory of Naive Check Forgery," Journal of Criminal Law, Criminology and Police Science, XLIV (September-October 1953), 296-307.

10. The Interpersonal Maturity Levels typology has been examined in detail in Don C. Gibbons, "Differential Treatment of Delinquents and Interpersonal Maturity Levels Theory: A Critique," Social Service Review, XLIV (March 1970), 22-33. [The typology is explained in Warren's paper. See pp. 23-35 below. Editor]

11. That evidence is reviewed in Gibbons, Delinquent Behavior (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1970), pp. 76-89.

12. This point is discussed in Hood and Sparks, op. cit., pp. 124-25.

13. Listings of delinquent typologies and discussions of the variations among these schemes can be found in Gibbons, Society, Crime, and Criminal Careers (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1968), pp. 221-23; Gibbons, Changing the Lawbreaker, pp. 33-39; Theodore N. Ferdinand, Typologies of Delinquency (New York: Random House, Inc., 1966); National Clearinghouse for Mental Health Information, Typoligical Approaches and Delinquency Control: A Status Report (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, 1967).

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15. Ibid.; Hood and Sparks, op. cit., pp. 193-214.

16. For a review of criminal typologies, see Gibbons, Society, Crime, and Criminal Careets, pp. 218-221.

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31. Harold S. Frum, "Adult Criminal Offense Trends Following Juvenile Delinquency," Journal of Criminal Law, Criminology and Police Science, XLIX (May-June 1958), 29-49.

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35. Utah State Division of Corrections, Quarterly Narrative Report: Utah Community Based Treatment Program (Salt Lake City: Utah State Division of Corrections, March 1971).

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38. Peter G. Garabedian, "Social Roles in a Correctional Community," Journal of Criminal Law, Criminology and Police Science, LV (September 1964), 338-47.

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47. Leslie T. Wilkins and P. MacNaughton Smith, "Predictive Attribute Analysis," in Johnson, Savitz, and Wolfgang, op. cit., pp 814-27.

48. The conception of correctional work as "tinkering" draws upon Erving Goffman, Asylums (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday and Co., Inc., 1961), pp. 321-86.

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CLASSIFICATION FOR TREATMENT

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Rationale

Many reasons can be given for current interest in classi-
fication systems and typologies of criminals and delinquents.
Only the rationale for classification in terms of its importance
in the area of making decisions about intervention programs will
be presented here. One can speak about this subject from the
perspective of rational argument or from the perspective of
research evidence. To start with the rational argument - one of
the few facts agreed upon in the field of corrections is that
offenders are not all alike. That is, they differ from each
other not only in the form of their offense, but also in the
reasons for and the meaning of their crime. Some individuals violate
the law because the peer group, upon which they depend for approval,
prescribes criminal behavior as the price of acceptance, or because
the values, which they have internalized, are those of a deviant
subculture. Other individuals break laws because of insufficient
socialization, which leaves them at the mercy of all but the most
protected environments. Still others delinquently act out inter-
nal conflicts, identity struggles or family crises. This list
is not meant to be exhaustive but to point out two features of
such types of categorization. The first feature has to do with
the characteristics or the state of the individual offender -
for example, quoting from the above list:

"peer group upon which they depend for approval,"
"values which they have internalized,"
"insufficient socialization,"
"internal conflicts, identity struggles."

The second feature has to do with identifying those conditions of
the environment which will, in interaction with the characteristics
of the individual, lead to offense behavior. To continue quoting
from the list of "meanings":

"the peer group...prescribes criminal behavior as the price
of acceptance,"
"values (internalized) are those of a deviant subculture,"
"(insufficient socialization) which leaves them at the
mercy of all but the most protected environments,"
"family crises."

The point being emphasized here is that a categorization of crime
meanings may reflect, not simply inner states of individuals nor
simply external conditions, but may reflect the interaction be-
tween the two.

Now to return to the main theme: the rational argument for
classification. On the assumption that these differences in
meaning of the offense will be relevant to understanding the
offender, predicting his future behavior, and intervening in his
life in a useful way, one can argue that a classification scheme
will be important to a correctional system as a management and
treatment tool.

To proceed with the rational argument for classification in
a somewhat different direction, let us focus for a moment
on treatment programs. The switch in correctional programs
from the emphasis on custody to the emphasis on treatment in
handling offenders has brought numerous disappointments regarding
the total effectiveness of attempted treatment programs. Like
the humanitarian reform movement itself, trade training, in-
creased facilities for socially acceptable outlets of aggression,
individual and group counseling as well as better defined treat-
ment programs (such as behavior modification and guided group
interaction), have each been thought of as the answer to the
crime problem. While movements in behalf of these causes have
undoubtedly made important contributions to the field of correc-
tions, they have tended to be viewed as cure-alls; i.e., appro-
priate across-the-board for all kinds of offenders.

Studies of the impact of treatment of client populations have
been generally discouraging, most studies showing "no change"
with treatment or producing contradictory evidence about improve-
ment. One explanation of these findings is that a masking effect
has occurred when all offenders have been lumped together. The
beneficial effects of a treatment program on some individuals,
together with the detrimental effects of the same treatment program
on other individuals, may each mask and cancel out the other. A
number of recent studies of correctional treatment have demonstrated

the point that it is only when the classification of individuals
in a treatment-relevant way is introduced into the study that
productive relationships with program success or failure are
found. Proceeding with the notion that there is an interaction
between kind of offender and kind of treatment, one can say that
ideally the goals of treatment will relate in some direct manner to
the meaning of the offense, and the treatment strategies will
relate specifically to the goals for the various offender sub-
groups.

Now, to the area of research evidence for classification -
evidence which comes primarily from treatment studies. Research
efforts in correctional treatment have produced a further force
for classification in two ways: (1) research has needed a
systematic framework for designing relevant investigations, and
(2) research findings themselves have contributed additional
arguments for classification of study populations. It has been
found that the interpretation of research findings can achieve
greater specificity and accuracy through use of a classification
system. The evidence on the importance of using a classification
scheme in both designing treatment studies and in analyzing
findings is very impressive. This point needs emphasizing
because, although most would agree that offenders have arrived in
correctional agencies by different paths and that these differ-
ences must be taken into account when planning treatment, many
program planners, research designers, and data interpreters still
seem to be searching for the answer to the crime problem. To
make the case, a series of questions are posed: Is treatment in
the community preferable to treatment in an institutional setting?
Is behavior modification an effective treatment for offenders?
Do people do better if they enter parole through a short stay
in a half-way house? Is psychotherapy passe? If the point
has been made, the response to these questions will be that each
of them must be rephrased to allow for the fact that any program
element may have a positive impact on some kinds of offenders, a
negative impact on other kinds of offenders, and be irrelevant
to others. Psychotherapy, while not appropriate across-the-board,
may well be the most appropriate treatment for a certain proportion
of offenders, say 10-15%. Which of the offenders will do better
if they enter parole through a stay in a half-way house? For
which offenders is guided group interaction the treatment of choice?
Who will be treatable in a community program and who will do
better following incarceration?

If a study of any treatment program or aspect of a treatment program has been approved without providing for a classification of the study population, it can almost be guaranteed that more information will be concealed than will be discovered. As a result, the research report will end with that sad last paragraph, saying: "It is very likely that these inconclusive findings result from the program's positive impact on some individuals and its negative or irrelevant impact on others. Unfortunately, since a classification of subjects was not used, it is not clear which is who."

This position can be given strong support with examples of differential findings. Most of these examples are from work in the California Youth Authority. However, the list begins with a few examples from other programs:

(1) A study of Project Outward Bound in Massachusetts showed that program to be effective with those delinquents who were "reacting to an adolescent growth crisis" and not to be effective with the more immature, emotionally disturbed or characterologically deficient boys.[1]

(2) A number of studies (SIPU, Phase IV[2] and a study by Berntsen and Christiansen of Denmark[3]) have showed individual counseling programs to be effective with cases in the mid-range of difficulty (as measured by Base Expectancy, for example) but not to be effective for either the "easier" or the "more difficult" cases.

(3) Several studies have shown the differential impact of a treatment program on various offense categories; for example, a study at the Medical Facility in the California Department of Corrections showed that a program of group psychotherapy had the greatest positive impact on robbers and on check writers. The same program conducted with offenders against persons appeared to diminish the offender's ability to make a community adjustment.[4]

(4) In a large sample of delinquent youths participating in California Youth Authority institution programs, the recidivism rate at a 15-month community exposure point was 50%. If this population is subdivided into eight categories on the basis of a typology, one finds concealed in that 50% failure rate, one subgroup whose recidivism rate at 15 months was 14%, another whose recidivism rate at that point was 68%, other subgroups falling somewhere in between.[5]

(5) Looking at the same subgroups of the delinquent population in a sample of 258 experimental cases of the Community Treatment Project, one finds violation rates for subgroups ranging from 13% to 43% - again these data reported for a 15-month follow-up.[6]

(6) In Phases I and II of the Community Treatment Project, data over a number of years showed the benefits of treatment in a community setting to be greatest for those offenders identified as Acting-out Neurotics, Cultural Conformists and Manipulators. Also consistent over the years has been the finding that the Cultural Identifier subtype may be more effectively handled in a program involving incarceration.[7]

(7) In a study conducted by Dr. Carl Jesness at the Preston School in California, it was found that homogeneity (by delinquent subtype) in the living units consistently decreased unit management problems, primarily for certain subtypes. Significantly fewer rule infractions and peer problems, as well as transfers out of the living units for closer confinement, were found primarily for three of six subgroups, those identified as Manipulator, Cultural Conformist and Acting-out Neurotics.[8]

(8) In a recently-concluded study by Dr. Jesness at two Youth Authority institutions - O. H. Close School and Karl Holton School - evidence is accumulating concerning the differential impact of Behavior Modification and Transactional Analysis programs on different subtypes of offenders. Data which includes such attitudinal assessments as taking responsibility for delinquency, alienation from adults, attitudes towards staff and towards self; academic progress while incarcerated; and recidivism rate - all of these data are rather consistently presenting evidence that the Behavior Modification program is particularly appropriate for delinquents identified as very low social maturity, Asocial individuals (I_2), and for delinquents identified as middle social maturity, Cultural Conformists. On the other hand, Transactional Analysis programming appears to be particularly appropriate for those delinquents identified as middle social maturity, Manipulators. For delinquents identified as high social maturity, recidivism data do not indicate at this point evidence in favor of either program; however, attitudinal data from the offenders themselves indicates a clear preference for the Transactional Analysis program.[9]

(9)   A number of Guided Group Interaction studies within the California Youth Authority have indicated a more positive impact of the program on those offenders who were comfortable with confrontive interactions[10] (for example, Acting-out Neurotic rather than Anxious Neurotics).   Data collected in the Guided Group Interaction study conducted within the Community Treatment Project also showed the recidivism rate for Anxious Neurotics to be somewhat higher than that for Acting-out Neurotics following a GGI program.[11]

(10)   This example is a little ahead of program description; however, within the Community Treatment Project, treatment being conducted by workers whose style and stance were well-matched to the needs of the individuals assigned to them was a crucial factor in the success in some subgroups and irrelevant or nearly irrelevant in others.   Matching was especially crucial for Acting-our Neurotics and somewhat less so for Manipulators.[12]

(11)   In Phase III of the Community Treatment Project a question being asked is whether the likelihood of achieving specified treatment objectives with certain offenders would be considerably increased if treatment were to begin, not within the community proper, but within a differential treatment-oriented residential setting.[13]   Current data from the study suggest that the residential program offers considerable payoff for some subtypes, may represent a damaging effect for others, with evidence still unclear for other subtypes at this time. The residential program appears to have its most positive impact on individuals identified as Anxious Neurotics, and its most negative impact on individuals identified as Immature Conformists and Cultural Conformists.[14]

The preceding bits of evidence have been presented to make the point that looking at intervention programs without a system of classifying offender subgroups is a most wasteful procedure.   Once having decided that a typology of offenders is important, the question remains - what kind of classification system should be used?   Some systems are more useful than others when the goal is the planning of intervention strategies. In a paper entitled "Classification of Offenders as an Aid to Efficient Management and Effective Treatment,"[15] an attempt was made to outline a wide variety of classification schemes and to indicate their relevance for management and treatment strategies.   That ground will not be re-covered here.   Rather, the presentation will focus on a classification system called

Interpersonal Maturity Level, I-level for short, a classification system underlying a general programmatic thrust which includes a series of Differential Treatment projects.   In focusing on this classification scheme, it is not intended to suggest that others have less treatment-relevance.   The Herbert Quay behavior classification system, for example, is being utilized in an attempt to describe differential treatment strategies in the Robert F. Kennedy Center at Morgantown.[16]   The focus on I-level and the Differential Treatment programs which follow from it is a simple matter of knowing the California Youth Authority data best.

The discussion so far has focused on classification systems which characterize the offenders.   Other elements or components of intervention strategies may also be classified.   Settings in which intervention is to occur may be classified; workers who play an important interpersonal role in the intervention strategies may be classified; and treatment methods may be classified as well.   Having these various classifications schemata available, one can then proceed to "match" environments, treaters, and methods with types of offenders in a manner calculated to bring about maximum positive impact.   Using such a classification approach, one can begin to sort out the various intervention elements and their contribution to outcome, rather than looking at the intervention package as a whole.   This sorting out will help investigate some of the complexities which interact in the correctional treatment process.

This process can be illustrated with a chart which shows the development of a number of research studies around the Differential Treatment theme.   A number of these studies have already been mentioned in connection with giving evidence for differential impact.   Here, the studies will be utilized to describe the successive pinning-down of these four major, co-existing interactions - interactions between type of client, type of treatment environment, type of worker and type of method.

First a word about the underlying theory and classification system.   I-level theory had its first application in a study of treatment of a military offender population, beginning in the early 1950's.[17]   The first major elaboration of the theory occurred in 1960-1961 with the beginnings of the Community Treatment Project.   Subsequent elaborations have occurred through the projects shown in the chart.

DEVELOPMENT OF RESEARCH STUDIES ON DIFFERENTIAL TREATMENT: HOW ONE QUESTION LED TO ANOTHER

A UNIFYING THEORETICAL FRAME OF REFERENCE

COMMUNITY TREATMENT PROJECT PHASE III

COMMUNITY TREATMENT PROJECT PHASE II

COMMUNITY TREATMENT PROJECT PHASE I

PRESTON TYPOLOGY STUDY

DIFFERENTIAL TREATMENT ENVIRONMENTS FOR DELINQUENTS

NORTHERN CALIFORNIA YOUTH CENTER PROJECT

CENTER FOR TRAINING IN DIFFERENTIAL TREATMENT PHASE I

CENTER FOR TRAINING IN DIFFERENTIAL TREATMENT PHASE II

PASO ROBLES DIFFERENTIAL EDUCATION PROJECT

1961 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74

——— PLANNING PHASES

The original theoretical formulation described a sequence of personality (or character) integrations in normal childhood development.[18] This classification system focuses upon the ways in which the individual is able to see himself and the world; that is, his ability to understand what is happening between himself and others as well as among others. According to the theory, seven successive stages of interpersonal maturity characterize psychological development. They range from the least mature, which resemble the interpersonal reactions of a newborn infant, to an ideal of social maturity which is seldom or never reached in our present culture. Each of the seven stages, or levels, is defined by a crucial interpersonal problem which must be solved before further progress toward maturity can occur. All persons do not necessarily work their way through each stage, but may become fixed at a particular level. The range of maturity levels found in an adolescent delinquent population is from Maturity Level 2 (Integration Level 2 or I_2 to Maturity Level 5 [I_5]). Level 5 is infrequent enough that, for all practical purposes, use of Levels 2 through 4 describes the juvenile delinquent population. Level 5 individuals are found more often in adult offender populations. It should be stressed that interpersonal development is viewed as a continuum. The successive steps, or levels, which are described in the theory, are seen as definable points along the continuum.

The elaboration that came with the development of the Community Treatment Project was based on the assumption that although a diagnosis of Integration Level (I-level) identified a group of individuals who held in common a certain level of perceptual differentiation, not all individuals in this group responded to this perceptual level in the same way. An attempt was made to classify within each I-level according to response set. There appeared to be two major ways in which the Integration Level 2 (I_2) individual responded to his perceptual frame of reference. Similarly, there appeared to be three typical response sets among delinquent I_3's, and four typical response sets among delinquent I_4's. In this manner, the nine delinquent subtypes were identified. These nine subtypes were originally described in 1961 - as part of the proposal for CTP, Phase I - by lists of item definitions which characterize the manner in which the members of each group perceive the world, respond to the world, and are perceived by others. The description of the nine delinquent subtypes, with predicted most effective intervention or treatment plans, combined to make up the original statement of the Differential Treatment Model. A more recent edition was published in 1966 as one product of CTP I and II.[19]

Brief descriptions of the three maturity levels (Integration Levels or I-levels), as well as the nine empirical subtypes, found in the juvenile delinquent population are given below:

Maturity Level 2 (I_2): The individual whose interpersonal understanding and behavior are integrated at this level is primarily involved with demands that the world take care of him. He sees other primarily as "givers" or "withholders" and has no conception of interpersonal refinement beyond this. He has poor capacity to explain, understand, or predict the behavior or reactions of others. He is not interested in things outside himself except as a source of supply. He behaves impulsively, unaware of anything except the grossest effects of his behavior on others.

Subtypes: (1) Asocial, Aggressive (Aa) responds with active demands and open hostility when frustrated. (2) Asocial, Passive (Ap) responds with whining, complaining, and withdrawal when frustrated.

Maturity Level 3 (I_3): The individual who is functioning at this level, although somewhat more differentiated than the I_2, still has social-perceptual deficiencies which lead to an underestimation of the differences among others and between himself and others. More than the I_2, he does understand that his own behavior has something to do with whether or not he gets what he wants. He makes an effort to manipulate his environment to bring about "giving" rather than "denying" response. He does not operate from an internalized value system but rather seeks external structure in terms of rules and formulas for operation. His understanding of formulas is indiscriminate and oversimplified. He perceives the world and his part in it on a power dimension. Although he can learn to play a few stereo-typed roles, he cannot understand the needs, feelings, and motives of another person who is different from himself. He is unmotivated to achieve in a long-range sense, or to plan for the future. Many of these features contribute to his inability to predict accurately the response of others to him.

Subtypes: (3) Immature Conformist (Cfm) responds with immediate compliance to whoever seems to have the power at the moment. (4) Cultural Conformist (Cfc) responds with conformity to specific reference group, delinquent peers. (5) Manipulator (Mp) operates by attempting to undermine the power of authority figures and/or usurp the power role for himself.

Maturity Level 4 (I_4): An individual whose understanding and behavior are integrated at this level has internalized a set of standards by which he judges his and others' behavior. He can perceive a level of interpersonal interaction in which individuals have expectations of each other and can influence each other. He shows some ability to understand reasons for behavior, some ability to relate to people emotionally and on a long-term basis. He is concerned about status and respect and is strongly influenced by people he admires. Identification at this stage is with an over-simplified model - a model which is based on dichotomous definitions of the "good" and the "bad". Neither ambiguities nor "shades of gray" are allowed for. Because of the rigidity of these standards, the person at this stage often feels self-critical and guilty.

Subtypes: (6) Neurotic, Acting-out (Na) responds to under-lying guilt with attempts to "outrun" or avoid conscious anxiety and condemnation of self. (7) Neurotic, Anxious (Nx) responds with symptoms of emotional disturbance to conflict produced by feelings of inadequacy and guilt. (8) Situational Emotional Reaction (Se) responds to immediate family or personal crisis by acting-out. (9) Cultural Identifier (Ci) responds to identification with a deviant value system by living out his delinquent beliefs.

Maturity Level 5 (I_5): The individual at this stage is able to perceive and handle more ambiguities in people and situations. He is increasingly aware of complexity in himself and others, aware of continuity in lives, more able to play roles appropriately. Empathy with a variety of kinds of persons becomes possible.

It is with respect to the nine delinquent subtypes in Maturity Levels 2 through 4 that the various projects have sought differentially to define treatment goals as well as the various elements - environments, methods, worker styles - of the treatment strategies.

Now, looking at the experimental programs shown in the chart:

(1) Community Treatment Project, Phase I - a study of the differential impact of intensive community treatment vs. incarceration on the various subtypes of the delinquent population - was primarily a study of setting.[20] Within each classification category, random assignment was made to (1) an intensive treatment program located in the community or (2) the regular Youth Authority pro-gram (primarily institutionalization). The community alternative appeared to be preferable for about 50% of

the population; however, it was not clear whether success could be attributed to avoidance of the institution, super.or staff, receptivity of particular communities, or treatment methods (Differential Treatment Model) being used.

(2) Community Treatment Project, Phase II - study of the differential impact of the Differential Treatment Model program a la CTP I vs. a Guided Group Interaction program on various subtypes of delinquents - was a study of treatment methods.[21] Within classification categories, a three-way random assignment was made to (1) a community program using the Differential Treatment Model, (2) a community program using a Guided Group Interaction model, or (3) the regular Youth Authority program. The effects of several factors were sorted out. Success in community programs did not appear to be the result of simply avoiding the institution, superior staff nor specific community receptivity. Differences between the success rates of the two community programs appeared to result from the treatment models used.

(3) Preston Typology Study - a study of the differential impact of homogeneous living units (that is, only boys of one subtype in a unit) vs. heterogenous living units on various subtypes of the delinquent population - was a study of setting or treatment environment.[22] Within each of seven classification categories, random assignment was made to homogeneous or heterogeneous units. Although clear management advantages were shown for homogeneous assignment, no long-term treatment effects were shown.

(4) Differential Treatment Environments for Delinquents - a study of five types of group homes, each home representing a treatment environment specifically related to the growth and development needs of particular types of delinquent youths - was a study of treatment environments,[23] but it was also a study of types of workers.[24] All of the differential Treatment studies include an attempt to "match" worker style with appropriate subtype of offender. In the group home study, this involved matching group home parents' style with type of offender. Data from the Community Treatment Project show a large recidivism rate difference for youth well-matched with their workers- a difference which holds up two years beyond discharge from the agency.

(5) Northern California Youth Center Project - a study of the differential impact of Behavior Modification and Transactional analysis on various subtypes of delinquents - was a study of treatment methods in an institutional setting.[25] Both the application of the theoretical models to specific kinds of offenders and the differential impact of the two programs on kinds of offenders were studied.

(6) The Paso Robles and Ventura Differential Education Project - a study of the differential impact of homogeneous classrooms with matched teachers vs. the regular school program - is a study of settings and workers.[26] For each of five subtypes of offenders, characteristics of preferred teaching plans (atmospheres, methods, motivation procedures, control strategies, curriculum) are being defined. Comparisons between experimental and regular classrooms are being made using achievement and attitudes measures.

(7) Community Treatment Project, Phase III - a study of Differential Treatment begun in a residential setting vs. a community setting on various types of offenders - is a study of treatment setting.[27] An attempt is being made to increase the chances of success for types of offenders previously unsuccessful either in the community or institution programs. Within the study, a comparison of matched (or specialist) workers with generalist workers is being made.

(8) Center for Training in Differential Treatment, Phases I and II, has had as its purpose the development of a training model for teaching Differential Treatment concepts to staff of a broad range of correctional agencies.[28] The focus has been on how to implement Differential Treatment programs in operating agencies.

This series of studies in Differential Treatment has been rather successful in teasing out some of the many complexities which interact in the correctional intervention process. A beginning has been made in identifying the differential contributions to success, or lack of it, made by offender characteristics, worker characteristics, treatment atmospheres, and treatment methods. Much remains to be done in areas which can be described as the "who" and the "what" of correctional programs. The "who" question

involves a greater concern with the characteristics of the offender
which, in interaction with his environment, brought him into a
correctional system, as well as the relationship between those
characteristics and what will be required to get him out of the
correctional system permanently. The increasing specification of
the "who" calls for further developments in theoretical under-pinnings
as well. In the past, many causal theories, purporting to explain
"delinquency," have described only one segment of the total offender
population. Differential association theories, social disorganization
theories, role theories, psychogenic theories - all appear to have
validity when applied to some segment of the offender population,
but none of these theories alone is sufficiently complex to account
for the total range of causal factors. Theory, which should guide
program development, is often missing, leaving the rationale for
intervention procedures unclear. Pressure for further theoretical
work builds as empirical findings indicate the heterogeneity of
the correctional population and thus the complexity of the inter-
vention task.

The "what" question involves a concern with studying vari-
ous intervention elements and their contribution to outcome, rather
than looking at the treatment package as a whole. Although this
paper has tried to list some of the bright spots, much more is
needed in an effort to pin down more precisely the ways in which
specific program elements are aimed at intervening in specific
aspects of offense behavior.

Illustrations in this paper have all focused on the cor-
rectional process. Similar classification and intervention
issues arise all along the criminal justice continuum when thinking
about diversion strategies at the law enforcement level or de-
cision alternatives at the court level. Who can be diverted and
to which resources? Who should go to court and who to informal
probation? Who shall the court return to the community and who
send on to prison systems?

In all of these developments, two major research strategies
are called for: (1) a tied-down experimental design whenever
possible so that hard data are available; and (2) process-
oriented exploratory research, which permits the detailed
viewing of complexities and interactions among the intervention
elements, and which is guided in the direction of systematic
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CLASSIFICATION REQUIREMENTS IN THE PROCESS
OF SOCIAL CHANGE
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In order to make a discussion of this topic of value in planning action, it would appear appropriate to limit the scope of the effort to dealing with change in the criminal justice system. It is a popular cliche to view the problems and even the social institutions of the criminal justice system as symptoms of a malfunctioning society. Cries are then raised to treat the "sick" society. It is readily acknowledged that there are many aspects of our social organization that are contributory to crime and delinquency and that could well be modified or improved. But for the purposes of this paper, that task will be left for other agencies, other social reformers. The thrust of this presentation will be upon the criminal justice system and how to change the way it functions. Emphasis will be upon "treating" the system rather than the people who are caught up in the process of that system. Many of the views presented have been derived from an earlier paper[1] which stressed the examination of decision points and the possible modification of system behaviors, while suggesting a lower priority for efforts at changing offenders.

A quick review of the findings of treatment efforts would seem to be in order. Stuart Adams[2] in studying the Pilot Intensive Counseling Organization (PICO) project in the California Department of Corrections found that a cost/benefit analysis suggested that the expenditure for special counseling could be just about offset by the savings resulting from reduced costs for reconfinement of the treated group. Such findings fail to be very impressive. In a study of group psychotherapy with prison inmates[3], it was found that the return-to-prison rate was lower for those treated by this modality than for a comparison group. The difficulty of determining what constitutes a comparison group tends to cloud the issue somewhat. But even if the difference in outcome did turn out to be a reliable one, would the differences be sufficient to balance the cost? It must be remembered that psychotherapy is usually conducted by professionally trained staff, a commodity both expensive and difficult to locate. How about group counseling? Wouldn't that be less expensive? Indeed it is. But what is the level of effectiveness? Earlier group counseling was evaluated on a department-wide basis[4] and positive "treatment effects" were found even when differences in comparison groups were controlled by base expectancy.[5] However, when a more rigorous research design was applied involving

randomization of assignment of treatment and control groups by Kassebaum, Ward and Wilner[6], findings failed to support the hypothesis that group counseling had an effect on subsequent parole adjustment or even an adjustment to prison confinement.

Rita Warren has contended[7] that many such findings are inconclusive because the beneficial effects of the treatment program on some individuals, together with the detrimental effects on others may mask or cancel each other. Perhaps a review would help. In the case of the PICO project, the crude classification in "amenable" and "nonamenable" categories did indeed make a difference.[8] The study of group psychotherapy revealed that some offender groups seemed to be able to respond in a more profitable way[9] in terms of parole outcome. The application of group counseling seems to be uniformly ineffective; in the correlational study, conflicting suggestive evidence was developed in which no trends at all were noted in the more systematic study.

Other kinds of institutional programs such as camp placement and vocational training have been investigated.[10] Again the results are equivocal. A summary of findings suggest the following conclusion - correctional programs can train inmates, some people who are trained get jobs in their trade, but neither being trained or getting a job is related to recidivism.

The matter of the use of institutionalization as an intervention strategy has been raised by Rosett[11] with some implication that if not too severe, it may have some deterrent effect. A series of studies in California[12] have found positive parole outcomes associated with lesser periods of incarceration or no differences in outcome associated with length of time. Here again some suggestive evidence is forthcoming that different offender groups seem to react differently to longer or shorter periods of incarceration.[13]

Treatment strategies have been based upon the assumption that the problem is related to some maladjustment within the individual and that programs have to be developed to "correct" the individual. The evidence for this assumption has been seriously questioned.[14] Studies conducted have usually been designed to find evidence to support the position that offenders are different and have seldom examined the alternate phenomenon that many people who are as seriously maladjusted as the offender population do not become embroiled in the criminal justice system. While not supporting this position wholeheartedly, it seems safe to ascribe some validity to this position. Such a view suggests that if the criminal justice system is to change, the thrust of research will be relatively more profitable if it is directed toward something other than the usual treatment intervention programs.

Having now determined in what direction not to go, what direction might be profitable? The thesis to be presented is that changing agency and societal decisions about offenders will result in more positive outcomes than attempting to change the client. Further, an attempt will be made to relate changes in decision-making to research functions and activities; namely, the providing of feedback information to decision makers about the outcome or results of their decisions.

A basic assumption that is necessary if such an approach is to be viable is that decision-making is a rational process. Decision-making is clearly not always, in every instance, responsive to factual information. There are economic considerations, political influences, personal biases, and sometimes the capriciousness of chance. But on the whole and over time, the system is moving toward an approach involving planning, evaluation and measurement. Given this hopeful sign, it seems safe to proceed toward trying to influence the system through rational feedback systems.

Is there any evidence that such a strange approach has any chance of really working? It would appear that some starts have been made, at least in California. The story of Probation Subsidy is presented as a case study, drawing on the work of Wilkins and Gottfredson.[15]

Starting with an assumption that not all people incarcerated in institutions needed to be there, research was conducted[16] to evaluate a sample of intake into the state-level correctional institutional program. From the findings, it was estimated that 25-30 percent of the intake did not require the controls provided by prison placement. Findings were recognized as significant in terms of taking the strain off an overburdened correctional system as well as avoiding the negative influences of incarceration both in terms of the experience, in and of itself, as well as the imposition of a prison record. Having determined that acting on the information obtained was of positive social and economic value, the feasibility of changes in the system was examined. It soon became clear that many judges were quite willing to consider alternative sentencing practices but felt that more people could not be referred to understaffed and inadequately trained probation departments. Top correctional administrators clearly saw a solution to this problem--give the counties the money necessary to bring probation departments up to standards already established. However, when this concept was presented to legislators, it met with little enthusiasm. All kinds of problems were raised having to do with taxation, distribution of funds, local autonomy, etc.--all concerns of a governmental nature and more understandable to a political scientist. This did not stop the correctional administrators. A new plan was devised. In the new approach, counties would be paid on the basis of not sending people to state-level correctional

facilities. The measurement would be based on the number that would have been expected to have been sent had the commitment rate remained at past levels. To insure that resulting payments were not simply used to support existing service, proposed legislation included requirements that any monies received must be spent on special supervision programs. The amount of reimbursement ($4,000) was based on "career costs" derived from a systems study of corrections by the aerospace industry.[17] This new plan was introduced in the Legislature only to drift into limbo when it failed to gain sufficient support to be moved out of committee.[18]

How can a story be told if the hero is killed in the first chapter? Needless to say, this temporary set-back was not seen as the death-knell of the program and eventually legislation was passed and the program placed into operation. What have been the results? No one is really sure, but one thing is clear--the population of adult male felons in California's prisons is considerably less than it was in 1966 (16,952 vs. 22,666). This reduction occurred during a period of increased police activity and a strong public sentiment for "law and order". Is all this reduction due to Probation Subsidy? Not at all. The contention is that there has been a confluence of effects to bring about a changed attitude on the part of decision makers at the local level. Part of the push has been increased capability of probation departments in addition to the special strengths provided to the counties by the Subsidy Program. Judges have come to view the rehabilitative aspects of community programs as potentially more beneficial than incarceration. The thrust toward community-based programming can be seen not only in the brochures distributed by LEAA but also in a general lowering of prison populations in various states across the nation in the last few years. In California, two additional factors contribute. First, there now has been a long series of judges sentencing conferences with top correctional administrators interacting with judges and supplying information as to what the prison system can and cannot provide in the way of corrective services. The second program that plays a part in the changing picture is the presentence observation and diagnostic service provided by the Department of Corrections. If a judge feels that more information is needed before he decides whether a man should be placed in prison or again tried in the community, he may send the man to one of the reception-guidance centers for special study. Within 90 days, the individual is returned to court with a complete diagnostic evaluation along with a recommendations as to disposition. Remember, these are recommendations and as such are not binding on the court. However, the agreement between these recommendations and court disposition in terms of state-level commitment or not is quite high, running between 70 and 85 percent over the last few years. As can be seen, this program also provides

the court with increased understanding of what kinds of services the correctional system can provide.

If the original observation--25-30 percent entering prison could be handled suitably by local-level corrections--could be restated in terms of goals and objectives, it might appear something like this:

Goal: To place in state-level incarceration only those for whom local alternatives cannot be developed.

Objective: Within five years to decrease the intake from courts of new commitments by 25 percent.

Has this objective been met? A significant approach has been made to it. The commitment rate has not increased as it has in the past. There was a slowdown in the increase of actual numbers of commitments. And the action at this point in the system had effects throughout, exercising some influence, making some contribution to an overall reduction in California's prison population (adult male felon) from 22,666 at the end of 1966 to 16,952 at the end of 1971.

Are there other areas of study that might provide evidence that the approach under consideration has impact? Two programs come to mind, both in the area of parole supervision.

The first of these again grew out of a study of available data. It was observed that a very high percentage of people on parole who completed the first two years under supervision managed the third year quite well with most gaining a satisfactory discharge from parole. The question then becomes, why keep them under parole supervision? In dealing with this question, the matter found its way into legislative action and a mandatory review after two years of satisfactory parole became a part of the Penal Code (2943 P.C.). A study of the results of actions taken under this provision revealed that those discharged at this point got into somewhat less difficulty than those retained under supervision. Those continued on parole, however, became entangled in technical parole violations for activities for which dischargees would be only mildly punished by society.[19]

Growing out of this experience a researcher raised the question, why two years? Again turning to an examination of the data, it was seen that 35 to 40 percent of any release cohort managed to get through the first year on parole "clean"; that is, free from arrest for anything more serious than traffic violations. Following these people through the system, it was found that nearly 90 percent made it through the next year on parole without major difficulty. Why not

review these people at the end of one year, discharge those seen as appropriate for such action and redeploy the parole resources thus freed, to more intensive work with parolees in that threatening transition period of re-entry into the community? Here administration moved with alacrity. Relying on internal policy rather than legislation, the Adult Authority (the paroling authority in California) adopted a resolution (A.A. Resolution 284) and moved into action. The amount of parole supervision time saved in this manner resulting from Adult Authority actions during just the last half of 1971 amounted to resources for redeployment worth over one and one-half million dollars. This gives some clue as to the extent of impact resulting from alterations in decision making patterns.

The concerns just addressed could be phrased in another way, "How long must one adjust before he can be viewed as having 'adjusted'?" This seems like a simple question but there are many jurisdictions where people remain under parole or probation supervision for three, five and ten years. In other areas, of course, the length of supervision is greatly curtailed with periods of three years being reserved for unusual cases. But in those situations where longer periods of supervision are involved, it would appear that great savings of limited available resources could be gained by terminating those individuals who demonstrate their ability during the first year or two under supervision.

In pulling all these bits of evidence together, the main theme would be that changing decision-making patterns at key decision points by feedback of results of past actions can have a greater therapeutic effect than attempting to change the individuals who are the clients of the system.

An example might help clarify the matter in terms of comparison. If a correctional treatment program could be found that had a ten percent differential positive effect over no such treatment (and no such program is presently in sight), it would appear to be sufficiently powerful to put it into operation. However, most such programs require either highly trained professional personnel or expensive equipment. For the sake of argument, the assumption might be made that this will be an all-out program. It seems likely that no more than ten percent of those going through any correctional system would become involved in such a program, because of the many limitations inherent in the situation--limited budget, limited availability of qualified staff, and general operational restraints. The result is, then, that ten percent of a population is affected by a ten percent shift in outcome-- a net change in overall outcome of one percent!

In changing the way decision makers view a situation, a change in outcome of five, ten or even thirty percent is not inconceivable.

Relationship to Classification and Other Matters

As can be seen only the most rudimentary classification approach is required to apply the principles being suggested. The basic criterion is often known behavioral information--did this individual suffer an arrest during the last year? Under the Probation Subsidy program the decision is somewhat more difficult, but no elaborate classification system has been required. The key factor seems to be feedback of results of decisions which allows for the development of an implicit classification and selection process. The provision of knowledge about the effects of decisions was not discussed by Professor Rosett[20] in his discussion of discretion. He presents the term "discretion" in a somewhat unusual sense to imply deviation from announced norms or, stated another way, "substantive normlessness"[21] leading to ineffectiveness and injustice. The dictionary,[22] however, lists as one definition of the term, "... individual choice or judgment .. and power of free decision or latitude of choice within certain legal bounds" (emphasis added). The very manner in which the concern is presented suggests a part of the solution. The lack of norms could be corrected by the development and acceptance of a coherent general policy to guide decisions at every step of the process. As these policies are implemented through the delineation of specific objectives, the need for a more clearly articulated classification system will emerge. The goals seen by some as appropriate for correctional processes need only slight modification to encompass control of the use of custodial restrictions at any step in the criminal justice process. These guiding principles might be formulated along the following lines:

- Permit entry into any confinement phase of the system only those for whom no suitable alternative can be developed.

- Retain people in the confinement stage for the shortest possible time consistent with the safety of the community.

- Following a period of institutional stay, return to confinement only those for whom no suitable community-based alternative can be developed.

- Remove from the criminal justice system all those who have demonstrated a reasonable potential for adjustment and as soon as this potential can be identified.

Perhaps an attempt to apply these policies to a likely situation will serve to illustrate the utility of the procedure. Suppose a judge is considering pretrial release of an individual. He has the alternatives of detention, high bail, low bail or O.R. release. Rather than considering whether the particular offense is distasteful to him, or whether detention will serve to deter others or whether the individual can afford a high bail, he faces only two questions-- what is the known threat to society if the individual is released and what is the probability of the individual returning to court to stand trial? Rosett[23] has provided a social reinforcement model to enhance the chances of the decision being toward the less restrictive; that is, establishment of a review procedure whereby the decision maker is granted broad powers not to invoke the sanctions of the system but given strong assurances that if he decides to impose custody he must be prepared to formally defend the reasons for his action.

Another aspect of the environment that must be modified if decisions are going to be away from the imposition of the controls of custody is that of information. If adequate records are kept the probability of certain kinds of outcomes can be ascertained. Knowing that 85 percent of those released on O.R. will return for trial, the judge is likely to be more willing to entertain this alternative than if the chances are 50/50. In too many areas, the information is non-existent, leading to intuitive and often erroneous decisions or to overcautious approaches. In cases where information is available but does not provide an obvious preference of one alternative over another, the development of a classification system may be indicated. It may be that within the undifferentiated group there are those who could be released with a high probability of conforming behavior.

If a policy such as the one suggested comes into general practice, and information systems are developed to support the implementation, the result should be that those segments of the system in which isolation from society is involved will contain only those individuals for whom some alternative of lesser severity could not be developed. It is at this point that the maximum effort must be made to develop calssification schemes that can assist in the management and treatment of this residual population.

Marguerite Warren[24] argues for a strong theoretic base in the development of a classification approach. Solomon[25] discussed two types of factor analysis--assignment procedures and cluster analysis. In the first instance the attempt is made to assign cases to pre-determined classes. This might be likened to hypothesis testing growing out of theoretical formulations. The second approach, cluster analysis, is a procedure which evaluates natural groupings and attempts to determine common characteristics. This approach is in contrast to

the theoretical attack and might be described as more inductive than the deductive approach of theory building. Which is the better road to take?

To determine whether to place heavy emphasis on theory or take a more inductive approach it might be well to examine what it is that is being demanded of the classification system. If the aim is broad understanding, then the testing of the tenets of various theories will probably provide the best results. If, however, the goal is to provide a framework for action or treatment, then more inductive studies seem more appropriate. At this stage of development it may be less important how the arm has been broken than to know the fact that it is broken and something about what to do about broken arms. At some later stage of development of the system it may be possible to examine causative factors and work toward prevention. In the case of the broken arm, safety precautions around dangerous machinery may be necessary. In taking this stance, support comes from Gibbons who states the following:

> ...insofar as the search for typologies turns
> out to be profitable in corrections, it will
> be as a consequence of the further development
> of statistical classifications such as the base
> expectancy system of analysis or predictive
> attribute analysis. These techniques of inductive
> analysis involve relatively modest goals, cen-
> tering around the development of classificatory
> devices based on specific groups of offenders
> within certain limited correctional settings.[26]

Hood and Sparks also make the point that classification systems can be developed having treatment utility independent of causal components.[27]

Thus it is argued that the first obligation of research is to develop and test classification systems related to differential treatment while continuing a secondary effort in the direction of etiological processes that society may wish to modify. While the highest priority goes to that activity where the potential for early success is most likely, the effort to learn about causal factors cannot be neglected for at some point the criminal justice system should be more concerned with arranging conditions in such a way as to minimize criminal behavior rather than "correcting" those who have already committed an illegal act.

Some Recommendations

Every research effort should lead to recommendations for action. Otherwise it falls into the "very interesting" classification wherein can be found innumerable dusty research reports.

The first recommendation is but a reaffirmation of the basic policy upon which this symposium is based--continuation is urged for the social support for diversion from the system.

In order to maximize the probability of occurrence, information systems must be improved at all levels of the system to insure that decision makers learn the consequences of their actions.

As the implementation of the diversion efforts gains momentum, classification systems should be developed to further refine decision making.

The fourth recommendation is to develop classification schemes related to differential treatment for those for whom diversion from the system is not presently possible.

Next, it would be desirable to work toward the development of classification approaches that examine etiological aspects with the long range goal of developing preventive measures.

Overriding all of these recommendations are two considerations. First all efforts made should be structured within the framework of a systems approach. The work of Blumstein[28] and Klein, Kobrin, McEachern and Sigurdson,[29] provides a good background for safeguards in this area.

The other consideration has to do with a strategy for research. The present state of knowledge concerning classification is in some state of coherence but knowledge in the field in general is almost totally unorganized. Before much more federal money is disbursed for research there must be an attempt made to comprehensively survey the field to determine what is known, what needs to be known (where the gaps are), and what needs to be discovered first. Such an effort would involve segmenting the criminal justice field into categories into which existing knowledge could be fitted. A small group of highly skilled researchers would be called together to pool their understanding about what studies have been completed and the value of these studies to an understanding of the subject under consideration. By systematically arraying known research contributions in a cross-classified manner, missing elements could be readily identified. The areas of need could then be evaluated in terms of necessity vs. desirability;

short term impact vs. long range planning; and ready feasibility vs. massive effort.

With a set of research priorities the determination could be made as to which kinds of projects should be encouraged by federal funding and which kinds should be dealt with on a state and local level. Without this kind of framework within which to plan and work, efforts will be scattered and ineffective. In many situations no research at all will be accomplished, for those allocating funds are already inclined to favor action over research; this tendency can be expected to be increased when there is no coherent plan for research expenditures.

NOTES

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3. Charles C. Jew, T.L. Clanon and Arthur L. Mattocks "The Effectiveness of Group Psychotherapy in a Correctional Setting." California Department of Corrections, Research Division. Sacramento, California, 1972.

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6. Kassebaum, Gene G., David A. Ward and Donald M. Wilner. Prison Treatment and Parole Survival (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1971).

7. Marguerite Q. Warren "Classification for Treatment", paper presented at the National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice seminar on "The Classification of Criminal Behavior: Uses and State of Research", Washington, D.C. May 4, 1972.

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22. _____ Webster's Seventh New International Dictionary (Springfield, Mass., Merriam: 1969).

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SOCIAL CONTROL FUNCTIONS OF DIAGNOSIS

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It has been a characteristically difficult task for members of
the helping professions[1] to assess the social control aspects of
their practice. Although concerns are expressed from time to time,
the general feeling appears to have been that social control is
an important issue, but hardly a crucial one. It is probable,
however, that as the present ferment in society is exacerbated,
the helping professions will be forced to reassess their roles and
the norms underlying professional role expectations. The social
control aspects of "helping" will become more obvious as the larger
society begins to seek "help" from these professions in defining,
identifying, and controlling deviance within the framework of a
scientific rationale. The helping professions of every era and
society have been traditionally involved in direct social control
functions as carriers and indirect enforcers of culturally defined
values or socially defined norms and roles.

Looking at situations surrounding cases such as those of Ezra
Pound or General Edwin Walker, one could reasonably assume that
prevailing ideologies influence otherwise professional decision-
making and practice. This is not to dispute the validity of the
diagnoses given. It is, however, to question the events surrounding
the application of the diagnosis and the relevancy of the diagnosis
in light of those events. More importantly, this concern invites
focus upon the latent functions of otherwise "objective" professional
practice.

The concept of latent function is essential to an understanding
of social control in the helping professions. It is to this type
of question that Szasz indirectly addresses himself when he asks
whose "agent" a psychiatrist must be.[2] This is a legitimate concern.
Unfortunately, the "either-or" phrasing of the question tends to lead
to deceptively simple conclusions. Social control factors are present
in the helping professions by the very existence of these groups.
"Help" in psychiatry, social work, or psychology is, for the most part,
culturally influenced and socially determined. At least half of the
equation of what constitute help in these areas is a social definition.
The clinician, in being called upon by either a "patient" or "client"
or by representatives of social groups or systems surrounding that person,

is immediately involved in issues relevant to the transmission of prevailing norms, and is, in a sense, partially involved in social control. It will not be the task of this paper to pursue issues relative to such concepts as "self-determination" in psychoanalytic and non-directive therapies versus "influence" in directive or behavior-oriented treatment approaches, though these issues remain of vital importance. Rather, the focus will be upon the latent social control functions of psychiatric, psychological and social work practice specifically as these relate to the diagnostic process.

Sociologists have been justly criticized for engaging in the fallacy of rationality in the development of theories of crime, delinquency and mental illness. The helping professions have engaged in a similar fallacy through the focus upon medical or psychological diagnostic systems. Often these systems are used and applied as though they were, in fact, removed from the social processes which, to a great degree, determine not only the types of diagnostic categories, but also the prognostic assessment and treatment approaches. Diagnosis must ultimately affect the stability of the social systems from which the patient or client arises. It is this latter issue which must be explicated if the diagnostic process is to be understood.

The concept of latent function, more familiar to anthropologists than the sociologists or clinicians, provides a useful construct within which to analyze the diagnostic process as it occurs within the helping professions. Merton defines it as follows:

> a standardized practice designed to achieve an objective which one knows from accredited physical science cannot be thus achieved. This would plainly be the case, for example, with Pueblo rituals dealing with rain or fertility.[3]

In using this definition, it should not be assumed that psychiatric and psychological diagnostic precedures are presented here as similar to rain dance rituals in their validity. However, even valid procedures are tied to social structures and processes and, thereby, have latent functions in addition to manifest functions. One of the latent functions of psychiatric or psychological diagnosis is social control. This is becoming a more manifest function as the professions enter into community programs and move away from classic medical or behaviorist models. The traditional models allow for selective inattention of social processes while "disease entities" or "habits" are identified and categorized. It is of the essence of pan-medical or pan-psychological approaches that social control functions remain latent. One can anticipate, however, that as the helping professions in general move into the public arena (as they

have begun to do in their focus on family therapy and community approaches) that social control functions will become more manifest and less latent. This situation is likely to force ethical confrontations which will be both painful and necessary if the helping professions are to remain viable in any traditional sense.

One need not focus only upon inappropriate overextension of a medical or psychological model to see how latent functions contribute to social processes in professional practice. In corrections, for example, prisons have long fulfilled latent functions which are characteristically at odds with the manifest function of rehabilitation. The screening process (diagnosis) and handling (treatment) of prisoners has been a classic example of latent function at odds with manifest function. Such practices invite social or psychological theories which will lend congruence to the actual practice.

In order that the latent functions remain latent, it is necessary that social or psychological theories be developed which lend credence to the manifest functions. Diagnosis becomes an integral part of this process. D.L. Howard, the British criminologist, clearly describes how English prison practice of the late 19th Century found a felicitous ally in Lombrosian theory regarding the diagnosis of the "criminal". He makes note, thereby, of the latent functions of punitive bureaucracy in prison management introduced by Lt. Colonel Edmund Du Cane as director of the prison commission.

> The Du Cane regime, far from following public opinion, was successful in directing it to some extent. Men and women went into prison as people. They came out as Lombrosian animals, shorn and cropped, hollow-cheeked, and frequently, as a result of dietary deficiencies and lack of sunlight, seriously ill with tuberculosis. They came out mentally numbed and some of them insane; they became the creatures, ugly, and brutish in appearance, stupid and resentful in behavior, unemployable and emotionally unstable, which the Victorian middle classes came to visualize whenever they thought of prisoners. Much of the prejudice against prisoners which remains today may be due to this conception of them not as the commonplace, rather weak people the majority of them really are, but as a composit caricature of the distorted personalities produced by Du Cane's machine.[4]

Chapman sees the same process existing today, though adjusted to contemporary social conditions.

> The Theories of Lombroso and others on criminal types, and the Victorian stereotype of the criminal was identical. Prison produced the criminal type, scientific theory identified him even to the pallor of his skin, and the public recognized him: The whole system was logical, water-tight, and socially functional.[5]

He goes on to add that the present system is more complex in that a large number of the public would wish to modify or abolish the prison systems, while a larger number of the public and of legislators believe in punishment and social isolation. Chapman then identifies a similar process as it involves the role of con-temporary helping professions. Although they are engaged in diagnosis of the prisoner, criminal, or delinquent, they are again involved in fulfilling latent functions of social control.

> In such a system, the change of prison conditions proceeds at a rate rapid enough to satisfy the pressures of reformers, while continuing to produce the stereotyped 'old lag', the 'abnormal' the 'psychologically motivated', the 'inner-directed' delinquent whose maladjustment is 'deepseated' and often 'intransigent to treatment' and who, in his turn, becomes the scapegoat needed by society and the data for the latter-day Lombrosos whose social function is to provide the 'scientific' explanations required by the culture.[6]

This assessment of latent function as found in closed prison settings may have more than passing relevance to similar functional relationships existing between the helping professions and other "rehabilitative" or "treatment" settings. All such settings, from the most closed to the most open, reflect larger social systems and are related to them at least partially in terms of social control functions.

One must question how the helping professions come to assume latent functions of social control. It is also important to know something of the rationale for assigning certain aspects of social control to help-giving agencies rather than frankly punitive agencies.

Chapman draws upon the thesis of W. I. Thomas which states that when people define things as real, they are real in their conse-quences. This is seen as reflecting a need for "systematic study of the symbolic systems by which persons represent themselves to themselves".[7] He sees the problem as existing at two levels.

> The first is that of comprehending the symbolic system, the second that of tracing the social processes which have been selected out of the infinite range of alter-natives, which occur by chance and are maintained because they 'fit' the belief system.[8]

It might be added here that many of the practice settings, roles, skills, etc. of the various helping professions are part of such social processes. In this sense, they represent a response of belief systems (families, communities, societies) to definitions made by those systems. This is the very reason for the existence of the helping professions. It is this phenomenon that must be of concern to these professions as they examine social control features in their practice.

Social control becomes an acute issue at the point of diagnosis since diagnoses often serve direct social control functions. Social control functions can be readily seen in the use of such terms as "psychopath", "impulsive personality", "sociopath", "asocial personality", etc. The terms themselves invite social control measures. More frequently, however, diagnosis is used with reference to an "objective condition" which is somehow viewed as able to be so labeled apart from the social function of the labeling process. It is in these cases that latent social control functions become a major consideration.

Psychiatrists, social worders and others have characteristically been interested in the social functioning of the individual in his environment. The matter of how to draw the connection between the personality system and the social system, however, has been hazy in clinical practice. Usually, there has been primary focus upon the person "with a problem". This is an appropriate, though narrow perspective. It has been in the tradition of clinical diagnostic work that if the individual person is understood in depth, his behavior will be understandable and meaningful by his subjective lights. The implication of this, however, with reference to

"disturbed" persons, is that the patient has misperceived parts of reality, or has been unable to meet social demands with mature responses. However, with clinical interest in such matters as family diagnosis, "double-bind" theories of schizophrenia, and community psychiatry, there has been an authentic concern with social systems as being not only formative of "pathological" personality patterns but as maintaining norms and roles which though "irrational" may be functional for a given system. It is at this point that the clinician begins to consider social control as related to diagnosis, but as a phenomenon which may or may not be consonant with classical diagnostic categories. Certain "pathological" patterns of behavior may provide social control functions for the system whereas other "mature" or "normal" patterns may be at times dysfunctional to social control in particular systems. This is often a hard truth for helping persons to absorb, since clinicians themselves are tied to system definitions at most basic levels of their own professional and personal identities. Unfortunately, it is usually an easier task to isolate out a patient's "pathology" or even the "pathology" of patients' family, than it is to attempt to understand the reasonableness of the "pathology" as seen within larger systems, or perhaps more to the point, to assess the "pathology" or "irrationality" of the larger systems, the community, or the society.

It is this phenomenon that must be of concern to the professions as they examine social control features of their practice. The helping professions represent one of a host of alternatives which are responsive to the belief systems of a particular society at a particular time and place. An essential feature of professional practice rests upon these belief systems, be they "scientific" or "mythological". The selection of factors for consideration in diagnosis ("criminal" vs. "non-criminal", "psychotic" vs. "non-psychotic") itself reveals a symbolic stance related to social control in a given society.

Social control becomes an acute issue at the inception of the diagnostic process since diagnoses so often serve direct and manifest social control functions which force functional though inappropriate diagnoses of deviant sub-systems. In this sense, psychiatric diagnosis may serve aspects of social control unrelated to the merit of the diagnosis itself.

As the helping professions move into the public arena, the issues surrounding social control functions become more apparent. Although the deviant is a fit subject for diagnosis, it is a dicey game for the clinician to look at wider social contexts as fit matter for diagnostic assessment. One then finds a situation, in

a sense, forced upon the clinician, which is inauthentic, if not itself irrational. One need only recall the recent court-martial for "mutiny" of U.S. Army military prisoners involved in a sit-down, singing anti-war songs as a protest against Vietnam, stockade conditions, and the killing of a fellow-prisoner by a guard. No less than fourteen psychiatrists were presented by the defense to testify as to the existence of mental illness and emotional disturbance in the defendants. One is not surprised as to the extent of emotional disturbance present, but one must be concerned with the way in which the helping person is placed in an inauthentic role, allowing very real issues of wider societal import to be obscured and, in effect, invalidating those whose condition or behavior would call attention to wider issues.

The diagnosis relieves strain on the system by allowing focus upon the deviant who is in large part a product of the inconsistencies existent in the system. The humane clinician may very likely be the most vulnerable, in this situation, in that to play the game with other rules (e.g., to demonstrate the "reasonableness" of the client in response to an "unreasonable" social system) would likely insure the punitive handling of his client. In this sense, it would be difficult to identify who is more the true agent or advocate of the patient or client.

Ronald Laing notes that the diagnostic process which denies social intelligibility to behavior

> sanctions a massive ignorance of the social context within which the person was interacting. It also renders any genuine reciprocity between the process of labeling (the practice of psychiatry) and of being labeled (the role of patient) as impossible to conceive as it is to observe. Someone whose mind is imprisoned in the metaphor cannot see it as a metaphor. It is just obvious.[9]

Laing summarizes this process and relates it to social control.

> The unintelligibility of the experience and behavior of the diagnosed person is created by the person diagnosing him, as well as by the person diagnosed. This stratagem seems to serve specific functions within the structure of the system in which it occurs.[10]

If this is so, it presents some very real dilemmas for the helping person. It says that an essential part of the diagnostic process is a social stratagem fulfilling latent social control functions for the larger society. This is not to say that such should not be the case. Indeed, such will always be the case in clinical practice. It is important, however, that these functions be clearly identified and explicated so that helping professionals know well in what processes they are involved in clinical diagnostic work. It follows from this that they must then assume more responsibility for the social effects of the diagnostic process. Speaking of diagnosis, in another place Laing has commented:

> the label is a social fact and the social fact a political event. This political event, occurring in the civic order of society, imposes definitions and consequences on the labeled person. It is a social prescription that rationalizes a set of social actions.[11]

If one views the diagnostic process within the context of a political event with predictable consequences in the civic order, the person who makes the diagnosis is immediately related to that civic order as a social control agent whether or not he wishes to be. The diagnostic act, thereby, carries responsibilities far beyond those of identifying an "objective" medical or psychological condition. The diagnosis is, in part, a social control mechanism which provides the larger system with the means and "scientific" sanction to disregard the products of its own internal value, normative, or role contradictions.

Within the context of the binding characteristics of social systems, the question of whose agent the helping person is, can be misleading. It may be that in performing entirely as the agent and advocate of the patient or client (manifest function), the clinician is, in fact, performing other latent functions for the society which are ultimately destructive of the patient's own best interest. By the same token, it may be that in assuming a role as agent of a social system, a court, an institution, a university, etc., the helping person inadvertently hastens the restructuring or demise of that system due to latent functions concomitant with, but in opposition to the more manifest functions.

For example, the psychiatrist who in court acts as "agent" for his patient in demonstrating the subjective reasonableness of the patient's "criminal act" may, by that process, insure the severity of the court's sentence. The psychiatrist who invalidates the patient's action by labelling it "psychotic" may, by the same token, influence the court decision in the direction of mercy. If psychosis were an easily definable and scientifically demonstrable condition in all cases, it is still probable that the dilemmas surrounding diagnosis and criminal responsibility in court settings would continue to plague the helping professions. This is because the source of the dilemma has to do with the latent functions of the diagnosis. Most psychiatrists perceive that certain social and political processes will predictably follow from the fact of diagnosis. The dilemma is, therefore, moral rather than scientific. It is a question of human responsibility, not only of the patient, but more importantly of the diagnostician.

If the position of the helping person who acts as an agent for his patient or client is ambiguous, a similar dilemma confronts the helping person who views himself as totally the agent of a particular system or of specific institutions (court, school, agency) within the society. The clinician who assumes this role eventually restricts his own professional identity and helping role to such a degree as to diminish his usefulness outside the narrow definitions and confines of the agency. In so doing, he hastens petrification of the system he would serve, insofar as agencies evolve through authentic listening to the fluid feedback of clients. Such a process presumes some ability of the agent of the system to detach himself and assume some agent functions for the individual. This alters professional role models and agency structures and ultimately diagnostic categories and treatment modalities. Society is such that the professional cannot isolate a small segment and deal with it to the exclusion of other concerns. His role as a professional involves him in functions for a variety of systems from the micro-systems of the individual personality on through other systems and meta-systems, ranging from the family through the political order. Because of the pervasive characteristics of social control functions as they relate to professional practice, the helping person may feel immobilized in a series of double-binds. He must then begin to address himself to ways to extricate himself from such situations.

Regardless of the particular orientations of the various helping professions to social control, it is crucial that they begin out-lining theories and approaches relevant to this important area. It may be that the professions will have to move away from social control functions by assuming roles which enhance what Etzioni has called the process of authentic societal guidance.

We refer to the combined sources of social regulation and change, the downward and the upward flows, as social guidance, while we reserve the term social control for downward flows and consensus formation for upward ones.[12]

The diagnostic process as fulfilling latent functions of social control will be more consonant with democratic systems to the degree that it is open to alteration and change not only in its application, but in its redefinition. Central to the idea of societal guidance is that of "authenticity". Etzioni has noted that:

> A relationship, institution, or society is inauthentic if it provides the appearance of responsiveness while the underlying condition is alienating. ...Authenticity exists where responsiveness exists and is experienced as such. The world responds to the actor's efforts, and its dynamics are comprehensible. ...Authenticity requires not only that the actor be conscious, committed, and hold a share of the societal power, but also that the three components of the active orientation be balanced and connected. It is the fate of the inauthentic man that what he knows does not fit what he feels, and what he affects is not what he knows or is committed to do. His world has come apart. The alienated man, in comparison, is likely to be excluded to a greater extent from all three societal sources of activation, laboring in someone else's vineyard, laboratory, or army.[13]

The helping professional is basically concerned with those who are defined as "deviant", or as having "problems", or who so define themselves. Perhaps the diagnostic role of the clinician should concern itself with serving as a touchpoint between the deviant and the defining systems, allowing for inter-communication. The helping person assumes the role of negotiating a "dynamic social contract"[14] between social systems and outsiders, between definers and defined. This implies that there will be "authentic" listening by the clinician engaged in diagnosis. This is much different than the common practice in which the listener often hears only with reference to what fits pre-defined diagnostic categories. The authentic listener will have to widen or change the focus of these categories, thereby, altering the latent functions served in the labeling processes. He may thus bring the life-space and "rationality" of the deviant to the defining

social systems, and in that process contribute to the evolution and alteration of those systems in ways authentically responsive to the condition of those being diagnosed.

If the diagnostic process is to be socially authentic, it must reflect responsiveness to the person diagnosed, not only insofar as those categories are open to change and reinterpretation on the basis of the life experiences and perceptions the patient, or client, or groups of clients bring to the diagnostic situation. In this sense, the "mentally ill", the "criminal", the "disturbed", the "deviant" in our society will be less likely to be made alienated victims of social control as a latent function of professional practice. The authentic professional provides an essential role in society of mediating and relaying new information between the person "in need of help" and his relevant social systems, contributing both to the adjustment of the individual and the evolution of the society.

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NOTES

1. In this context, the term "helping professions" is meant to refer to those characteristically offering planned interpersonal help, e.g., psychiatry, psychology, social work, counseling.

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10. Ibid., p. 18.

11. R. D. Laing, The Politics of Experience, Penguin Books, Middlesex, England, 1968, p. 100.

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13. Ibid. pp. 619-620

14. Ibid., p. 14.

END

The New Generation Self-Directed Teaching Materials of Natural Science in Elementary Schools Validity Tests

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 The new generation of natural science teaching material in elementary school is the teaching material that utilizes inquiry-based learning in most parts of the tutorial and the provided material. The updating of teaching materials is an activity that must be carried out by the Universitas Terbuka to assure that the quality is following the development of science and knowledge. The study aims to test content, construct, and face validation along with the reliability by the experts upon the new generation self-directed natural science teaching materials in elementary schools following the scientific process. The validation process was conducted through Focus Group Discussion (FGD) in June 2019, which involved the interaction with the experts on teaching material, device, and media development. The instruments of teaching material validity are reviewed based on the content, construct, and face validity by employing Aiken's formula analysis for Content Validity Coefficient (CVC). Moreover, the instrument reliability is by using a One-way ANOVA analysis and Cronbach Alpha formula for Intraclass Correlation Coefficients (ICC). The results of validity assessment in average are CVC ≥ 0.8 categorized as high validity and $0.4 < CVC < 0.8$ classified as medium validity. The level of agreement reliability between experts generates the significance of p-value > 0.05. Hence there are no significant differences in the assessment of the experts. The level of the experts' reliability is on average of ICC ≥ 0.8, which is categorized as good.

Keywords: teaching materials, content validity, construct validity, face validity, self-directed learning skills

INTRODUCTION

Teaching material have various types and qualities. Teaching materials is one of the material devices in tutorial activity, systematically composed and displays completely of the competence mastered by the students (McLaren & Kenny, 2015). The function of teaching materials is critical when helping the tutor to do the tutorial activity. Teaching material development direction is designed for the students to be able to find the concepts, procedures, and be able to apply them in solving the given situation (Roy, Guay, & Valois, 2013; Forsyth, 2014). The contextual presented material is intended to make the study of material adapted to the learning environment and easily understood by students. The results of the study show that teaching materials that can improve thinking skills are also teaching materials that are independent in nature (Hung, Chen, & Huang, 2017). It means that the teaching material can be independently studied because it is systematic and complete, so it is beneficial in the learning process.

Universitas Terbuka organizes remote education in which the students are separated from the tutors, and their learning uses various learning resources. Nevertheless, printed materials are the main learning resources for the students of Universitas Terbuka (Sadjati, Yuliana, & Suparti, 2017). In these circumstances, teaching materials are a substantially crucial learning resource to provide educational services to the groups of people who cannot attend face-to-face education. It is held in various forms, modes, and coverage supported by learning facilities and services as well as assessment systems that guarantee the quality of the graduates are following national education standards (Caswell, Henson, Jensen, & Wiley, 2008). According to Butcher (2015), teaching materials should have the following characteristics:

(1) self-instructional, students are able to teach themselves, so some goals clearly formulated the final goal. Besides, it eases the students to study thoroughly by providing teaching material that is manifested into more specific units or activities;

(2) self-contained, all competency material that is thoroughly studied to make it easier for students to understand it;

(3) stand-alone, dependent not on other teaching materials so that they can be used independently;

(4) adaptive, which contains material that can increase students' knowledge regarding the development of the times and science and technology;

(5) user-friendly, which makes it easier for students to get information as clearly as possible.

The remote education system requires students to be able to learn self-directed learning by utilizing various teaching materials and learning assistance services (Richter & McPherson, 2012). To learn self-directed skills in the context of the system affects the utilization of information and communication technology, which means various media are available as teaching material (Sediyaningsih, 2018). The results of the study show that self-directed learning skills require a great responsibility for students so they can try to do various activities to achieve goals (Rolfe, 2012; Wiley, Bliss, & McEwen, 2014).

Learning ability depends on the speed of reading and the ability to understand the content. In practical self-directed learning skills, students must have self-discipline, initiative, and strong learning motivation. Students must also have the capability to efficiently manage their time, hence able to study regularly based on the self-regulated schedule (Pucciarelli & Kaplan, 2016).

It is a need to develop teaching materials that synch with the tutorial activities and characteristics of students as well as directed to the changes of student behavior following the learning outcomes (Broto & Irianto, 2017). In the context of developing teaching materials, product design requires a validation process. Validation is a process to collect the shreds of evidence, which may support then inference from the utilization of measurement specifically (Baldus, Voorhees, & Calantone, 2015). Validity means to what extent the accuracy of measuring or accuracy of measuring instruments in measuring the attributes that are the objective of measurement. The purpose of the implementation of validation is that all objects testing of teaching materials will always achieve the desired results continuously (Steyerberg & Harrell, 2016). The product design validation process is carried out by experts in the related field. Based on the results of the expert validation, there is a possibility that the product design still needs to be improved according to the validator's suggestions.

The analysis results of the use of Universitas Terbuka printed and online teaching materials were taken from a set of 20 questions questionnaire. Utilization of teaching materials is the best known and used facility by students including 11.4% strongly disagree; 18.4% disagree; 31.3% doubt; 31.7% agree, and 7.2% of respondents who strongly agree to access Universitas Terbuka printed and online teaching materials. The data show the lack of students in utilizing teaching materials. In general, they only know but have not been able to use them. Based on the 2016 final semester examination results data, for elementary education study students who took natural science learning courses in elementary schools, students got difficulties in understanding the material as evidenced by the low score obtained when the assessment was conducted. The teaching materials have not inspired the principles of natural science that can be applied in the students' daily lives. Based on the results of observations and analysis from September to November of 2018 on the students who have taken the course, the students were less directed to be able to design, implement, evaluate, and analyze the process and results of natural science learning using approaches, methods, tools, and learning media that are relevant with the material and indicators that must be achieved (Budiastra, Erlina, & Wicaksono, 2019).

The development of teaching materials is carried out based on a systematic process so that the validity and reliability of teaching materials can be guaranteed (Kaye & Rumble, 2018). One of the stages of the development process is the validation utilized to obtain the appropriate data from the variables studied, namely self-directed learning skills. The type of validity that is present in the development process is the content, construct, and face validity (Krippendorff, 2018). Content validity is a representation and relevance of a set of items used to measure a concept carried out through rational analysis of needs based on the state of the art of science. Construct validity is an instrument that shows the

extent to which the instrument can reveal the theoretical constructs to be measured in terms of consistency of design and logic of all supporting components of teaching materials. Face validity is items that are used to measure concepts in teaching materials and provide assessments that can uncover the concepts to be measured and their appearance. Additionally, the design of teaching material writing must be adjusted to the learning rules because it will be used by tutors to help and support the tutorial process (Daniel, 2017).

In Universitas Terbuka context, there is a problem where the previous development process of teaching materials of natural science in elementary schools was not in compliance with the materials development theories, as mentioned above. Thus, the study aims to test content, construct, and face validation along with the reliability by the experts upon the new generation self-directed natural science teaching materials in elementary schools following the scientific process. The new generation of teaching materials of natural science learning courses at elementary school is designed to foster student self-directed learning skills. The self-directed skill indicators embodied in the teaching materials of the new generation include (1) initiative and persistence in learning; (2) responsibility; (3) discipline and curiosity; (4) confidence and strong desire; and (5) organizing time and speed of learning (Broad, 2006). With the growth of self-directed learning in students, they are expected to be able to know when they need help from others and be able to identify sources of information (Pandiangan, Sanjaya, & Jatmiko, 2017). The process of identifying this information source is needed to facilitate the learning process.

METHOD

The study used the Research and Development (R&D) method in the form of teaching materials for natural science learning subjects in elementary schools. The new generation teaching materials will be used in the tutorial by implementing inquiry-based learning in most of the material presented. The process of product development results required planning design of teaching materials products. The R&D of the study is a combination of major steps in the cycle with the steps of the system approach model of educational R&D from Gall & Borg (1979), and Gall & Borg (2007) as follows:

(1) research and information collection;

(2) identify instructional goals;

(3) conduct instructional analysis;

(4) analyze learners and contexts;

(5) write performance objectives;

(6) develop an assessment instrument;

(7) develop instructional strategy;

(8) develop and select instructional materials;

(9) preliminary field testing;

(10) preliminary product revision;

(11) main testing field;

(12) operational product revision;

(13) operational field testing;

(14) final product revision;

(15) dissemination and implementation.

The results of the validity of the teaching materials of the natural science learning course at the elementary school are a series of the 9th stages of developing and selecting instructional materials. Validation activities used the Focus Group Discussion (FGD) technique in June 2019. Data sources were obtained from the results of the validation of three (3) validators, which were considered experts in science learning in elementary schools. The learning expert validator reviewed the new generation of teaching material that will be used in tutorial activities. The validator of the material discussed the contents of the new generation of science teaching materials in elementary schools by instructional objectives. The practitioner validator reviewed the implementation of the new generation of teaching materials in the tutorial activities. Data collection or information validity were taken from interaction with experts in developing instructional materials, devices, and learning media.

The instrument used to test the validity of the new generation teaching materials of natural science learning in elementary schools is the validation sheet (Setiani, Sanjaya, & Jatmiko, 2019; Suprapto, 2019). The validity of teaching materials is reviewed based on the validation of content, construct, and face using Aiken's V formula analysis for Content Validity Coefficient (CVC) based on the results of expert judgment (Aravamudhan & Krishnaveni, 2015). Besides, the reliability of the instrument uses a One-way ANOVA analysis to calculate the level of agreement between experts and the Alpha Cronbach formula to calculate the reliability of expert self-assessment (Gliem & Gliem, 2003). Components of content validation instruments are rational analysis of needs based on the state of the art of science. The instrument component of construct validity is the consistency of the design and logic of all supporting components of teaching materials. The instrument component of face validity measures concepts in teaching materials and their appearance. The elements of teaching materials towards indicators of self-directed learning skills include (1) initiative and persistence in learning; (2) responsibility; (3) discipline and curiosity; (4) confidence and strong desire; and (5) organizing time and speed of learning (Broad, 2006).

The data analysis technique for the validity of the new generation teaching materials in elementary school learning used the Aiken's V formula, which is CVC = $\sum$ S / [n(C-1)] with S is R – Lo. Lo is the lowest value, C is the highest rating, and R is the number given by experts (Aravamudhan & Krishnaveni, 2015). The CVC value category $\leq$ 0.4 has low validity, 0.4 < CVC < 0.8 has moderate validity, and CVC $\geq$ 0.8 has high

validity. The data analysis technique on the level of agreement reliability among the experts uses a One-way ANOVA on SPSS 24. If the results of the significance p-value are > 0.05, then there is no significant difference in the assessment between experts. Besides, expert judgment reliability analysis techniques used Alpha Cronbach based on the results of Intraclass Correlation Coefficients (ICC) on SPSS 24. ICC value category ≤ 0.4 has a low agreement, 0.4 < ICC < 0.75 has a good agreement, and ICC ≥ 0.8 has a perfect agreement.

FINDINGS

The new generation teaching materials on natural science learning in elementary schools have been validated by three experts consisting of experts developing teaching materials, devices, and learning media. The results of the validity of the teaching material are reviewed based on the content, construct, and face validation. The validation of the content of the new generation teaching materials on natural science learning in elementary school needs analysis and state of the art components resulted in an average value of 0.4 < CVC < 0.8, which was 0.75 and 0.76 in the category of moderate validity. The level of agreement reliability among experts in the needs analysis and state of the art components resulted in a significance of p-value > 0.05 which was equal to 0.78 and 0.86 so that there was no significant difference in the assessment among the experts. The reliability level of the expert needs analysis component produces an average value of ICC ≥ 0.8 which is equal to 0.81 categorized as having a perfect agreement, and state of the art produces an average value of 0.4 < ICC < 0.75 which is 0.78 categorized as having a good agreement with expert evaluation. The results of the validation of the content of teaching materials for science learning in elementary schools can be shown in Table 1.

Table 1
Content Validation Results

No	Validation Components	CVC	Category	p-value	ICC	Category
A.	Needs Analysis					
1	The nature of natural science learning in elementary school	0.67	Moderate		0.74	Good
2	Based on inquiry for self-directed learning skills	0.88	High		0.87	Excellent
3	Compatibility with course profiles	0.78	Moderate	0.78	0.84	Excellent
4	Compatibility with remote open learning systems	0.88	High		0.87	Excellent
5	Teaching material improvement	0.56	Moderate		0.71	Good
Average		0.75	Moderate		0.81	Excellent
B.	State of the art					
1	Main source is from the latest journal	0.78	Moderate		0.77	Good
2	The latest empirical result	0.88	High		0.8	Excellent
3	Refers to the latest theory	0.56	Moderate		0.69	Good
4	Planning and Implementation	0.88	High	0.86	0.8	Excellent
5	Learning environment	0.67	Moderate		0.73	Good
6	Encourage further research	0.78	Moderate		0.77	Excellent
Average		0.76	Moderate		0.78	Good

The results of the construct validation assessment of the new generation teaching materials of science learning in elementary component implementation and planning and evaluation resulted in an average CVC value of ≥ 0.8, which was 0.82 and 0.83 in the category of high validity. Besides, the rational component, theoretical and empirical support, learning environment produces an average value of $0.4 < CVC < 0.8$, which is 0.78, 0.62, and 0.67 in the category of moderate validity. The level of agreement reliability among rational component experts, theoretical and empirical support, implementation and planning, learning environment, and evaluation implementation resulted in the significance of p-value > 0.05, which amounted to 0.85, 0.77, 0.83, 0.79 and 0.88 so that there were no significant differences in assessment among the experts. The level of reliability of rational component experts, implementation and planning, and evaluation implementation resulted in an average value of ICC ≥ 0.8, which was equal to 0.81 categorized as having a perfect agreement. In addition, theoretical and empirical support and learning environment produce an average value of $0.4 < ICC < 0.75$, which is equal to 0.78 categorized as having a good agreement with experts' evaluation. The results of construct validation of natural science learning teaching materials in elementary schools can be shown in Table 2.

Table 2
Construct Validity Result

No	Validation Components	CVC	Category	p-value	ICC	Category
A.	Rationale					
1	Development purpose	0.88	High		0.92	Excellent
2	Instructional purpose	0.67	Moderate	0.63	0.79	Excellent
3	Meaning and component symbol	0.78	Moderate		0.85	Excellent
Average		0.78	Moderate		0.85	Excellent
B.	Theoretical and empirical support					
1	Consistency of theoretical support	0.67	Moderate		0.81	Excellent
2	Consistency of empirical support	0.56	Moderate	0.54	0.73	Good
Average		0.62	Moderate		0.77	Good
C.	Implementation and Planning					
1	Material is realized logically, systematically and consistently	0.88	High		0.86	Excellent
2	Material coherence	0.78	Moderate		0.81	Excellent
3	Student and tutor interactions presence	0.67	Moderate		0.77	Excellent
4	Appreciating and responding to the students	0.88	High	0.74	0.86	Excellent
5	Supporting the remote learning system	0.78	Moderate		0.81	Excellent
6	The creation of a positive tutorial atmosphere	0.88	High		0.86	Excellent
Average		0.82	High		0.83	Excellent
D.	Learning environment					
1	Achieving of the goals of remote learning system	0.56	Moderate		0.74	Good
2	Self-directed learning skills and freedom.	0.78	Moderate	0.31	0.84	Excellent
	Average	0.67	Moderate		0.79	Good
E.	Evaluation implementation					
1	Consistency with purpose	0.88	High		0.93	Excellent
2	Consistency with a remote learning system	0.78	Moderate	0.59	0.82	Excellent
Average		0.83	High		0.88	Excellent

The assessment of face validation on the new generation teaching materials of natural science learning in elementary schools, components of the truth, concepts and languages resulted in an average CVC value of ≥ 0.8 which was equal to 0.88, and it is in the category of high validity. Additionally, the rules component in measurement and instrument format resulted in an average value of $0.4 < CVC < 0.8$, which was 0.67 and 0.78 in the category of moderate validity. The level of reliability of agreement among experts on the concept of truth components, rules in measurement, instrument format, and language produced an average value of significance p-value > 0.05 which was 0.82 so that there was no significant difference in the assessment between experts. The level of reliability of the expert component of agreement between experts in the concept of truth components, rules in measurement, instrument format, and language produces an average value of ≥ 0.8, which is equal to 0.82 categorized as having a perfect agreement with expert judgment. The results of face validation of natural science learning teaching materials in elementary schools can be shown in Table 3.

Table 3
Face Validity Result

No	Validation Components	CVC	Category	p-value	ICC	Category
1	Conceptual truth	0.88	High		0.85	Excellent
2	Measurement standard	0.67	Moderate		0.76	Excellent
3	Instrument Format	0.78	Moderate	0.51	0.81	Excellent
4	Language	0.88	High		0.85	Excellent
Average		0.81	High		0.82	Excellent

The validation assessment of the new generation teaching materials of natural science learning in elementary schools self-directed learning skills of students in the components of competition and persistence, self-confidence, and a strong determination to learn has an average value of $CVC \geq 0.8$. Means 0.88 is categorized as high validity. In addition, the components of responsibility, discipline and curiosity, and managing the time and speed of learning results an average value of $0.4 < CVC < 0.8$, which was 0.78, 0.67, and 0.78 in the category of moderate validity. The level of agreement reliability among the experts, the component of initiative and persistence, responsibility, discipline and curiosity, confidence and strong determination to learn, and organizing time and learning speed results in an average value of significance p-value > 0.05 so that only 0.48 significant difference in the assessment among the experts. The experts level of reliability on the components of initiative and persistence, responsibility, responsibility, discipline and curiosity, confidence and a strong determination to learn, and organizing the time and speed of learning results an average value of 8 0.8, which means 0.82 categorized as having the perfect agreement to the evaluation of the experts. The results of the validation of teaching the new generation materials of natural science learning in elementary schools for students of independent learning can be studied in Table 4.

Table 4
Results of Validation of New Generation Teaching Materials on Self-directed Learning Skills

No	Validation Components	CVC	Category	p-value	ICC	Category
1	Initiative and persistence	0.88	High		0.84	Excellent
2	Responsibility	0.78	Moderate		0.82	Excellent
3	Discipline and curiosity	0.67	Moderate		0.78	Excellent
4	Confidence and strong determination to learn	0.88	High	0.48	0.84	Excellent
5	Organizing time and learning speed	0.78	Moderate		0.82	Excellent
Average		0.8	High		0.82	Excellent

DISCUSSION

Content Validation

Based on the data from content validation and reliability by experts in Table 1, the components of needs analysis and state of the art indicate that the new generation teaching materials of natural science learning in elementary schools are worthy of being tested in tutorial activities to foster the student self-directed learning skills. In the needs analysis component, the nature of natural science learning in elementary school has three dimensions through product, process and attitude (Stuckey, Hofstein, Mamlok-Naaman, & Eilks, 2013). The inquiry learning model encourages students who have self-directed learning skills that emphasize experiences that are appropriate to the challenges in the environment. The results of the study show that the compilation of inquiry activities, students provide opportunities to ask questions, ideas, build curiosity about everything in their environment, build skills and develop awareness in science learning to be very needed to be studied (Abd-El-Khalick, 2013).

The objective of the development of new generation teaching materials of natural science learning courses in elementary schools is that the students are expected to be able to design, implement and evaluate, and analyze the process and results of natural science learning using approaches, methods and tools and learning media in accordance with the material and indicators that must be achieved as stated in the applicable curriculum by considering the development and characteristics of students. The results of the study show that the quality of teaching materials is very dependent on the accuracy in calculating these factors in the development of teaching materials (Atenas & Havemann, 2013).

Validation of content about components of conformity with open remote learning systems emphasizes the importance of system flexibility to minimize the constraints of place, time, and aspects caused by student characteristics. Teaching materials are developed for the remote education system as an alternative institution for the community to take part in educational programs due to scarcity of resources and high costs for participating in regular education programs (Yuan & Powell, 2013). The stages of improvement in teaching materials on one component must be followed by

improvements and adjustments on the other teaching material components, so that the whole and integrated teaching materials are obtained. The results of experts input on the teaching materials developed are input to improve the teaching materials and make the teaching materials qualified better (Downes, 2007).

In the state-of-the-art component, there is the need for references that describe information about related sources. The new generation teaching materials on natural science learning in elementary schools are compiled using the latest reference material and are used as a reference for more advanced. The results of the study show that scientific works use complete references, so scientific work quality is getting better and better (Kholodov, 2015). In addition to reference sources, teaching materials are composed based on empirical reviews which are the results of previous studies that present several concepts that are relevant and related to natural science learning in elementary schools. The results of the study indicate that teaching materials must be based on concepts, theories, and empirical facts that can be accounted for (Blumer, 2017).

The component of the application of teaching materials must consider planning and implementation, the role of a speaker in designing or compiling teaching materials is crucial to the success of the learning and learning process. With the teaching materials of a new generation of natural science learning in elementary schools, teachers will be more coherent in teaching material to students and achieving all predetermined competencies (Klopp & Stark, 2018). The environment of the teaching and learning process is an influential learning resource in the learning process and student's development. The environment always surrounds students from time to time, so that between students and the environment there is a reciprocal relationship which the environment affects students and vice versa (Van der Kleij, Feskens, & Eggen. 2015). The new generation teaching materials of natural science learning in elementary schools create an environment that includes all material and stimuli inside and outside the individual, both physiological, psychological and socio-cultural. The results of the study show that the learning environment that surrounds students both in the social and non-social environments influences the learning process of students (Kangas et al., 2017).

Construct Validation

Based on data from construct validation and reliability data from the experts in Table 2, the rational component, theoretical and empirical support, implementation and planning, learning environment, and evaluation show that the new generation teaching materials of natural science learning in elementary schools are worthy of testing in tutorial activities to develop student's self-directed learning skills. In the rational component, it is a description of the things that cause the need to do research on specific problem or problem that appears and is written in the form of description by containing information, such as the development, instructional, meaning and symbol components. Teaching materials developed must refer to the applicable curriculum, especially those related to the objectives and material in the Indonesian National Qualifications Framework (Jatmiko, Widodo, Martini, Wicaksono, & Pandiangan, 2016). Theoretical support of the new generation teaching materials on natural science learning in elementary schools

is based on thoughts or mindsets that base everything from existing theories as to the basis of their actions (Kent, Laslo, & Rafaeli, 2016). Moreover, the teaching materials are also based on empirical support, namely observation of the reality of common sense and the results are not speculative.

The components of implementation and planning, the new generation teaching materials on natural science learning in elementary schools, tutors are required to be able to present teaching materials that encourage student activity. Presentation of teaching materials or subject matter is directed at the approaches to how to find out and how to do, to provide direct experience to students to develop their concepts that will give meaning to the knowledge gained (Howard, Gagné, Morin, & Van den Broeck, 2016). The new generation teaching material is related to the achievement of general and specific instructional objectives so that the tutor understands the material to be taught as material facts, concepts, principles, and procedures. With the presence of new generation teaching materials, the process of interaction between students and tutors must show the existence of educational relationships. Interaction must be directed to a specific educational purpose, namely the change in student behavior to have self-directed learning skills (Pandiangan et al., 2017). In the tutorial activities, the activities must be centered on students planning their teaching materials to be learned and implementing the tutorial process in learning the material. The role of the tutor is more permissive, namely allowing each activity carried out by students in learning whatever they want. It is relevant to the competencies that will be mastered by students after learning the teaching material.

The learning environment of the new generation teaching materials of natural science learning in elementary schools was created so that students have self-directed learning skills and they decide their own goals in learning and try to use methods that support their activities. The results of the study show that students who have self-directed learning skills are able to transfer learning, both knowledge and expertise from one situation to another (Broad, 2006). Every student can take the initiative, with or without the help of others, in diagnosing learning needs, formulating learning goals, identifying learning resources, choosing and implementing learning strategies that are appropriate for him, and evaluating his learning outcomes (Caswell et al., 2008).

Evaluation is important in the tutorial activities with teaching materials for a new generation of natural science learning in elementary schools so that students can understand the extent of students' understanding of the material presented and to also know the effectiveness of the teaching materials used. In addition, the evaluation also functions as a measuring tool, whether the objectives of the tutorial that have been formulated previously have been achieved or not (Wicaksono, Madlazim, & Wasis, 2017). Evaluation of new generation teaching materials is not the result, but rather a process that takes place as long as the learning program takes place. The evaluation depends on the type of evaluation that is used. The type of evaluation used will influence an evaluator in determining procedures, methods, instruments, the timing of implementation, and data sources (Erlina, Susantini, Wasis, Wicaksono, & Pandiangan, 2018).

Face Validation

Based on data from construct validation and reliability data by experts in Table 3, conceptual truth, rules of measurement, instrument format, language show that teaching materials for a new generation of natural science learning in elementary schools are worthy of testing in tutorial activities to foster students' self-directed learning skills. Component of conceptual truth, the collected data becomes valid through ways of collecting data in the validation process. The data obtained can be a supporter of the truth of a particular concept. An instrument is a tool used in tracing the symptoms that exist in the validation process to prove the truth or refute certain hypotheses (Gliem & Gliem, 2003). Data collection in the validation process, researchers can use the available instruments and can also use self-made instruments. The use of available instruments is an instrument that has been set or standardized to collect predetermined variable validation process data. However, if the standard instrument is not yet available for certain variables in the study, the researcher can arrange the instrument itself which will be used by the researcher in conducting the validation process (Blumer, 2017).

The rule in measuring the validation instrument is a systematic process in assessing and distinguishing something that is measured. These measurements are arranged according to certain rules. Different rules require different scales and measurements. Data processing and analysis must consider the nature of the measurement scale used (Aravamudhan & Krishnaveni, 2015). Mathematical operations and the choice of statistical equipment used in data processing, basically have certain requirements in terms of the scale of data measurement. The mismatch between the measurement scale and the statistical operation used will produce biased and inappropriate conclusions. The important principles in measurement are; numbers, determination, and rules (Krippendorff, 2018). Good measurement must have isomorphism with reality. In the principle of isomorphism, there is a close similarity between the social reality under study and the value obtained from the measurement (Boxenbaum & Jonsson, 2017). Therefore, a measuring instrument is seen to be good if the results can reflect the reality of the phenomenon to be measured precisely.

Instruments are tools that are selected and used by researchers in their activities to collect data so that these activities become systematic. The instrument format component plays a very important role in determining the quality of a validation process because the validity of the data obtained will be largely determined by the quality of the instruments that are used, in addition to the data collection procedures that are performed (Kaye & Rumble, 2018). This can be interpreted because the instrument functions are to reveal facts into data, so that if the instrument used has adequate quality in the sense of valid and reliable, the data obtained will be in accordance with the facts or the actual situation. If the quality of the instrument used is not good in the sense of having low validity and reliability, then the obtained data is also invalid or not in accordance with the facts. Hence it can produce false conclusions (Steyerberg & Harrell, 2016).

The variety of standard written languages in the instrument validation can be viewed from standard terms, which are used with the correct meaning. One term or word is said

to be standard if its formation and method of writing are following the rules for forming Indonesian terms (Solihati & Hikmat, 2018). The written language in the validation instrument can be understood well if the sentences that have been written are in accordance with the rules that apply in that language. Furthermore, punctuation plays an important role because if it is incomplete, it can cause the contents of the writing difficult to understand. Components of language based on spelling are rules that must be adhered to by written language users. Regularity in the form will have implications for the accuracy and clarity of meaning. The results of the study indicate that the use of language in a validation instrument means that it is focusing on a language as a communication tool in the form of writing (Sulfasyah, Bahri, & Saleh, 2018).

Teaching Materials Validation to Grow Self-directed Learning Skills

Based on the data from the validation of teaching materials to foster self-directed learning skills and reliability by experts in Table 4, the components of initiative and persistence, responsibility, discipline and curiosity, confidence and a strong desire to learn, organize time and speed of learning show that the new generation teaching material of natural science learning in elementary schools is worthy of being tested in tutorial activities to foster student self-directed learning skills. The material in the development of new generation teaching materials for natural science learning in elementary schools is the material that is able to make students having self-directed learning skills, which includes (1) providing interesting examples and illustrations in order to support the material presentation; (2) provide the possibility for students to provide feedback or measure their mastery on the material provided by providing practice questions, and independent assignments; and (3) contextual through the material presented related to the atmosphere or task context and student environment. The language that is used is quite simple because students only deal with teaching materials when studying independently (Yuan & Powell, 2013).

The component of initiative and persistence in the new generation teaching materials encourages students to have their initiatives and habits. The ability to recognize problems or opportunities and be able to take action to solve problems. When students have an initiative, they can immediately see the problems that arise and find solutions so that problems can be solved (Blumer, 2017). Self-persistence and learning habits of each student need to be improved to support the process of successful natural science learning in elementary school. This is where the potential role of new generation teaching materials to increase self-persistence or the determination and learning habits of students in addition to external factors are also needed. In addition, persistence for students is a continuation of voluntary actions taken to achieve a goal despite obstacles, difficulties or despair (Rolfe, 2012; Wiley et al., 2014).

The component of learning responsibility has a very important role in efforts to improve student learning autonomy. Responsibility is a student's awareness of intentional or unintentional behavior or actions. Responsibility also means acting as an embodiment of awareness of its obligations (Richter & McPherson, 2012). New generation teaching materials encourage students to be more mature and become better individuals so that in solving problems, students will be more confident. Indicators that may support the

responsibility of learning new generation teaching materials are carrying out and completing tasks seriously, keeping promises, and accepting the consequences of their actions (Pandiangan et al., 2017).

In studying the teaching materials of the new generation, confidence is needed in solving problems. Confidence shows the quality needed to make students self-assured and responsible. However, self-confidence is not something that can be taught to individuals from day to day but must be embedded in the learning process (Hung et al., 2017). Based on this description, it appears that the orientation of natural science learning in elementary school fosters the students' strong determination for learning. The tutorial successfully uses this teaching material through the interaction of tutors in the tutorial to student behavior as a reciprocal of the process. Student behavior when studying new generation teaching materials, can indicate interest and a sign of student interest in the material (Klopp & Stark, 2018).

Organizing the time and pace of learning in realizing a learning environment through regulating how long students will need time to practice a task and how high students in new generation teaching materials do the intensity of the task on natural science learning in elementary schools. Time is an important aspect of the structure of the implementation of the tutorial and can be used by tutors to create a more productive learning environment (Rolfe, 2012). The results of the study show that how long it takes students to practice completing a task before moving on to the next task (Wiley et al., 2014). In the use of new generation teaching materials, the tutor must first decide on aspects related to time. Decisions about when to transfer student activities to other assignments or change assignments performed by students are usually based solely on what the tutor sees from student progress when the process takes place when learning new generation teaching materials.

In the process of learning science in elementary schools, students are not only given knowledge or various memorized facts, but students are required to use the mind to study natural phenomena actively. The new generation teaching materials of natural science learning does not only discuss mastery of facts, concepts, and principles about nature but also about methods of problem-solving; practice the ability to think critically and draw conclusions; practice to be objective, teamwork and appreciate the opinions of others. Content validation, construct, and advance validation activities provide the feasibility of new generation teaching materials that are suitable for natural science learning in elementary schools so that they are expected to foster students' independent learning skills. The process of identifying sources of information in this new generation of teaching materials is needed to expedite the learning process of new students. The Universitas Terbuka students enter the world of distance education, which has unique learning characteristics that are in some ways different from the face-to-face teaching that they have been undergoing to become independent students who excel, not a dream.

CONCLUSION

Based on the results of the validation process and discussion above about the validity of the content, constructs, faces, and validation of teaching materials to foster self-directed

learning skills and reliability of new generation teaching materials in valid categories to promote student self-directed learning skills. Evaluation of the validity of new generation teaching materials of natural science learning in elementary school was obtained by the average CVC value of 0.8 in the category of high validity and $0.4 < CVC < 0.8$ in the category of moderate validity. The level of agreement reliability among experts produced a significance of p-value > 0.05, so there was no significant difference towards the assessment among experts, the level of reliability of experts on the average ICC value ≥ 0.8 categorized as having a perfect agreement and $0.4 < ICC < 0.75$ categorized as having a good agreement. The first recommendation of the study to UT and its tutors are that the new generation self-directed teaching materials of natural science learning in elementary schools are worthy of being piloted in tutorial activities. The study also recommends that self-directed teaching materials developers, especially in distance education, conduct a validation and reliability test of the teaching materials that are being developed so that they comply with scientific process.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

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TEXTUAL PRACTICE

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This edition published in the Taylor & Francis e-Library, 2005.

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Contents

ISOBEL ARMSTRONG

Thatcher's Shakespeare?

The new wave of radical Shakespeare criticism in Britain has emerged during the long spell of Tory power which began in 1979. Alan Sinfield and Jonathan Dollimore edited *Political Shakespeare,* identified as among the foremost of these studies, in 1985, a year after Dollimore's *Radical Tragedy: Religion, Ideology and Power in the Drama of Shakespeare and his Contemporaries* (1984). Then followed *Alternative Shakespeares,* edited by John Drakakis (1985), Terence Hawkes's *That Shakespeherian Rag: Essays on a Critical Process* (1986), and Terry Eagleton's *William Shakespeare* (1986), to name a few of the most influential books. The flow of radical readings continues with *The Shakespeare Myth,* edited by Graham Holderness (1988). The coincidence of radical discussion with Tory rule may *be* a coincidence, of course. But arguably, the institution of academic criticism has done what seems to be politically satisfying, if profoundly surprising, given the usual quietism of British academic critical discourse. It has made a radical attack on conservative positions at a time when the right has commandeered debate almost unchallenged (as in the discussion of education) in many areas. At the same time, it seems that in spite of the government's orgy of compulsive cuts in subsidy for theatre, radical productions of Shakespeare, or productions advertised as radical, do occur in both publicly subsidized theatre such as the National Theatre and in companies where a considerable proportion of funds comes from private finance. The new English Shakespeare Company, for instance, was funded by the Allied Irish Bank over 1986–7, and continues to be so, in addition to its Arts Council subsidy. (If banks were not such international bodies, there might be an irony here recognized by Terry Eagleton in the first issue of *Textual Practice* in which the colonial repressed returns from the margins to support British culture.)

Is this one of the rare occasions in which radical academic critique and the performing arts are dancing ideologically cheek to cheek? One surely needs to be sceptical here. Alan Sinfield has pointed out in *Political Shakespeare* that the convergence, when it happens at all, has generally been in mutually conservative practices over the last thirty years. And so it is instructive to ask whether the correlation between Shakespeare in criticism and in the theatre is as neat and satisfying as it may seem. This entails a further set of questions. In what sense is the demythologizing and politicizing of Shakespeare going on in English studies relevant beyond them? It is generally assumed that it is, but is it? Second, particularly in view of the predominantly middle-class composition of theatre audiences, in what way is it possible to direct Shakespeare in a radical form in the theatre today? If there is a reciprocity between theory and practice one would expect this to be revealed in recent productions of Shakespeare. Some productions in the summer of 1987 purported to be radical readings of Shakespeare: the National Theatre's *King Lear* and the new English Shakespeare Company's *Henry IV* and *Henry V,* which are to continue in repertory until the spring of 1989. Were they? How easy is it, anyway, to produce radical

Shakespeare, privately or publicly subsidized, when theatre is subject to ever-increasing economic constraints? The Chancellor of the Exchequer announced a 3.2 per cent cut for the arts and libraries in his autumn budget for 1987. Though Richard Luce subsequently announced an increase in grant to the Arts Council, new legislation under the Insolvency Act of 1986 will mean that companies in deficit will no longer be allowed the customary twelve-month breathing space to prevent closure. Since the report of the Cork Committee, Arts Council practice is changing: an annual payment-by-results policy is being introduced into subsidy. So it's becoming harder to take risks with controversial productions.

How radical, first of all, is radical Shakespeare criticism? Alan Sinfield's analysis of the Royal Shakespeare Company's cultural role and its confusions over the post-war period in 'Royal Shakespeare: theatre and the making of ideology' (*Political Shakespeare,* pp. 158–81) is both prophetic and, even three years after the book was published, in 1988, a little out of date. He considers the formation of what he calls 'culturism' in relation to Shakespeare in the theatre in the post-war years and its breakdown in the late 1970s.

> The ruling concept I shall call *culturism:* the belief that a wider distribution of high culture through society is desirable and that it is to be secured through public expenditure. Culturism is an aspect of the theory of welfare capitalism, within which the market is accepted as the necessary agency for the production of wealth, and its tendency to produce unacceptable inequality is to be tempered by State intervention. (*Political Shakespeare,* p. 164)

Culturism is deeply suspect for Sinfield because it actually funded middle-class opportunism in the arts, just as it enabled similar exploitation of other state-subsidized services, health and education (he elides arts policy with the social policy enunciated in Anthony Crosland's *The Future of Socialism,* 1956). He believes that culturism fostered a factitious account of relevance, and a spurious radicalism based on an appeal to the 'real' Shakespeare as cultural totem in RSC productions. These were essentially individualist, nihilistic and ahistorical. They appealed indiscriminately to an uneasy mix of new technocratic intellectuals and a middle-class youth culture caught in a typically bourgeois false consciousness which luxuriated in alienation while believing in its autonomy. He predicted that the Thatcher government's hostility to state subsidy as contributing to the sump of post-war dependency culture would mean the collapse of the consensus of culturism and a return to a more overtly conservative theatre with the necessity to seek private funding.

Sinfield's analysis makes depressing reading because his predictions are to an extent undoubtedly correct. The Royal Shakespeare Company's union with the Royal Insurance Company and the defensive marketing of musicals to tourists both at the RSC and the National Theatre confirm his analysis. On the other hand, his diagnosis now looks misplaced. The ground has changed as a result of the increasing virulence of the government's offensive against the arts and education, which are either treated as commodities or seen as exactly analogous to the drain on the economy produced by unemployment—all state support is a kind of dole. Yet once the inner contradictions of

predominantly middle-class culturism and, if you like, its misuse of funds, are exposed, does that necessarily invalidate the possibility of state contributions of another kind, structured according to different principles? This is a question Sinfield puts outside his brief, together with the problem of how a different range of choices would affect working-class culture. But it is an important question in the late 1980s, for the ground has changed so rapidly that to bracket off a consideration of the status of public funding puts one in dangerous collusion with the right, whether one wants to be or not. Historians of the right have recently occupied the ground Sinfield sketches out in 'Royal Shakespeare' to persuade us that middle-class exploitation of state capitalism, with its concomitant conditioning of the working classes to passivity, is an argument for disallowing state intervention altogether.

This is not to argue for a wholesale reinstatement of subsidy for what have largely been middle-class categories since the nineteenth century: literature and the 'arts'. Nor does it mean a return to cultural imperialism. What is required is another kind of debate, a more radical exploration and redefinition of these categories, and—Shakespeare is a test case here—a redefinition of the function and politics of public finance for 'cultural' activity. A vapid consensual culturism has created the possibility for a Thatcherite attack through its own élitism and exclusiveness. But need public subsidy always be misappropriated?

The same bracketing off of crucial questions occurs in the writing which demonstrates an overwhelming need to deconstruct the way in which Shakespeare has been used as a powerful ideological weapon of conservatism. In 'Swisser-Swatter: making a man of English letters' (*Alternative Shakespeares,* pp. 26–46) Terence Hawkes argues that Shakespeare has been used remorselessly to support a reactionary system.

> Shakespeare is a powerful ideological weapon, always available in periods of crisis, and used according to the exigencies of the time to resolve crucial areas of indeterminacy. As a central feature of the discipline we call 'English', his plays form part of that discipline's commitment—since 1870 in a national system of education—to the preservation and reinforcement of what is seen as the 'natural' order of things. (p. 43)

The 'natural' order to which Shakespeare gives credibility here is, of course, what G.Wilson Knight describes as 'our country's historic contribution, seeing the British Empire as a precursor, or prototype, of world order' (*Alternative Shakespeares,* p. 43). Hawkes connects this with the well-meaning propositions of the Scarman Report in 1981 after the Brixton riots, on the necessity of creating racial unity through recourse to the teaching of English. A 'command'—note the authoritarian word—of the English language, and presumably of the great British classics such as Shakespeare is, Scarman believes, a way of homogenizing ethnic groups and taming working-class violence. Hawkes is right to pour scorn on the coercive naïvety of this view, but he is far less clear about the alternatives to it and seems to accept the Scarman view—far from being the *only* view—of what 'English' is. In fact, he implies, like Terry Eagleton writing on 'The end of English' in the first issue of *Textual Practice* and describing 'English' as a nineteenth-century bourgeois construct by and for the middle classes (not wholly correct, this), that Shakespearean texts have been so disabled by reactionary readings that the

project of mediating them in any other way is doomed to failure.[1] Yet to assert that there *can* be no other way than a conservative way of reading texts because of their history is surely to pre-empt matters. Quite apart from belying Eagleton's and his own practice in reading Shakespeare, this is nonsense, as both he and Eagleton ought to know. Such left-wing pessimism assumes that the category of literature cannot be defined or used in a radical way. True, if that radical reading were to happen, a great deal, quite properly, would have to change. But it is important to work on this. Otherwise, it is to concede too much to the right, and to leave a dangerous emptiness at the heart of the cultural theory we bring to literature which can only invite further appropriation of it by reactionary writers. By tacit agreement, literature as a 'bourgeois' construct is left intact.

Hawkes begins his essay with a brilliant discussion of the way in which *The Tempest* problematizes the definition of 'man' through the shifting status of Caliban who is both monster and 'man of Ind', challenging a 'settled European notion of "manhood"' (p. 28). In his view the Scarman Report reduplicates the oppressive discourse of the Prospero/Caliban conflict: 'the language of British society has never been, and is not now, simply English'. He means the varieties of English coexisting today, but he also means Welsh (which has legal parity with English throughout Wales), so often ignored in government reports, including the Kingman Report (1988). On the whole his argument that government reports are repressive is confirmed.[2] But such deconstructive zeal can assume pessimistically that to impose a 'classic' text such as *The Tempest* on the culture of the rioters, inevitably constructed as the men of Ind (but were they?) will simply reinforce the authoritarian manipulation of Shakespeare. the colonialist view of language as entry into privileged discourse expressed by Miranda: 'I…took pains to make thee speak… I endow'd thy purposes/With words that made them known' (*The Tempest,* I.ii.353–8). Miranda and Scarman and Hawkes forget that there is an answer to this: 'You taught me language: and my profit on't/Is, I know how to curse' (*The Tempest,* I.ii. 363–4). This is a complex moment, for one reading of this speech is that Caliban is so brutalized that he is disabled as a language user and permanently disenfranchised from discourse (the Miranda/Scarman view). On the other hand, the text allows that to curse is at least to begin to articulate oppression. Language makes 'known' our purposes, not simply by an act of communication but because it enables a reflexive act of definition. This is the beginning of critique. Caliban already knows that language is a site of conflict, power, and exploitation, or 'profit'. Hawkes and Francis Barker among others have shown that *The Tempest* is one of the classic texts of colonialism and riven with contradictions.[3] A way of getting at these contradictions, the answer to Scarman, lies in Hawkes's analysis of Caliban and in a reading of Caliban's own language.

Not to argue powerfully that this is the kind of reading which can be made available to the men—and women—of Ind (or to the white working class of Brixton?) is to concede to conservative accounts of race as well as to conservative readings of Shakespeare. It is to perpetuate the 'thing of darkness' which Prospero's repressed violence has made of the colonial or ethnic other. Though Shakespeare always has been exploited as an ideological weapon of the right, there have always been competing readings of the texts—witness the struggle for interpretation of *Coriolanus* among radicals and reactionaries in the early nineteenth century, a theme to which the radical *Monthly Repository* repeatedly returned in the 1830s.[4] It is possible to mount a radical reading without necessarily reinstating

Shakespeare the Bard. The new contemporary readings of Shakespeare and the cultural history of the ideological construction of the texts has required some uncompromising and necessary intellectual work to overturn a hundred years of systematic misprision. But the exhilaration of abandoning Shakespeare's special status and the obsolete category of literature which accompanies the challenge to conservative reading forgets that the work of radical reading has only just begun—the work of displacing traditional humanist reading by defining what a historically specific text means, by evolving ways of thinking about the cultural contradictions which cross the plays, by finding an entry for feminist work. Such trashing in fact plays into conservative hands. For while it has been going on a more ruthless conservatism by far than that of patrician liberals like Scarman is *assuming* the redundancy of literary studies and the arts as institutions and practices. It has no patience with literature, criticism, or textual practice. It couldn't care less about Shakespeare, on or off the stage.

So the curious convergence of left and right, for different reasons, which has been noticed in other spheres, comes together in Shakespeare criticism now. For the left the high bourgeois construction of art and aesthetics is absolute and thus untenable. The right has simply taken the post-Kantian 'aesthetic' at its own word: it is to be marked off from market forces and wealth production and falls into the realm of private experience, a privacy which can make no institutional claims for financial recognition and support. Terry Eagleton recognized this privatizing of the aesthetic when he took Roger Scruton to task recently in the *Times Literary Supplement*.[5] But if it is at all important to sustain institutions and practices which take literary and cultural studies as their project, this can only be done by redefining those practices and areas of study and opening up texts for democratic reading.

Another kind of offensive altogether is required now. Are the principles underlying the new Shakespeare work (for as I have said, Shakespeare becomes a test case) resilient enough to produce a new textual practice? Sinfield moves towards what is now the rationale of an alternative textual practice in the last page of his essay when he suggests how Shakespeare can be directed in the theatre: 'it amounts to treating Shakespeare as a historical phenomenon, implicated in values which are not ours but which can in producton be made to reveal themselves, can become contestable' (p. 179). It is the historical and cultural materialism which in Peter Widdowson's *Re-Reading English* (1982) is claimed as the 'growing point in literary comment and analysis' ('Historicist criticism', David Craig and Michael Egan, p. 221). But it is arguable that 'real' history can simply displace the 'real' Shakespeare as a hypostasized entity, even if we could be really sure of getting at it. The new theory has itself made the possibility of 'real' history problematical. It is difficult to see in any case how any self-respecting director would produce the texts as a 'historical phenomenon' without reference to the present. The strategy Sinfield proposes, however, goes some ways towards unfreezing the texts for critique because the important term is 'contestable'. But contestable by whom and for whom? Contestable for a radical reading? Contestable for the *present*? The plays must surely 'reveal themselves' for the present. The Shakespeare play as a matrix of 'contestable values' does open up texts to democratic reading to some extent. But the democratizing and enabling possibilities here surely are limited unless they can be explored with some more confident propositions.

One of the reasons why the new critique lacks such confidence is that, with rare exceptions, it lacks a genuine textual practice; it lacks a powerful democratic account of language, of reading practice and analysis, which can be brought to the Shakespeare text and made to live there. Feminist linguistics points to a new textual practice which suggests how a vital engagement with language is possible. 'If, as feminists', Deborah Cameron has written, using Adrienne Riche as a precursor,

> we believe that we and others are made powerless partly because there are resources language denies us, or others it gives to our detractors, then it must be our aim 'to release the oppressed into language' and as part of that, to reveal how language can work for or against them. Awareness of the working and possibilities of language is far from being irrelevant or trivial. It should not be confined to the postgraduate seminar room. (Unpublished MS contributed to *Teaching Women,* ed. Helen Wilcox and Ann Thompson)

As Caliban's curses show, language works for or against the oppressed at crucial moments *in* Shakespeare's texts, not only in the critical construction of them. A release into language, imaginatively and intellectually, is something that the complexities of the texts can achieve in a powerful way. This is not the deadening initiation into the 'English' of cultural elitism. It enables a democratic dialogue with the texts in which language is conceived as something mobile, something which can be challenged and changed in and outside the process of reading.

So it would seem that one can't have 'contestable values' in production without a democratic dialogue with the language of a text, without a production which is aware of the way language works for and against the powerless. Such a release of significance into the present would produce a radical subtext which would not simply be a superficially 'modern' and anachronistic reading (these can be just as dead and coercive as historical readings) any more than it would mean keeping artificially alive something we posit as 'Shakespeare's language'. But it would mean a renewed attention to language through the correlation of the spoken word with sharp, arresting theatrical images.

Did so-called 'radical' Shakespeare productions achieve 'contestable values' by releasing 'the oppressed' into language or making power relations visible through it? David Hare's unfortunate production of *King Lear* at the National Theatre simply confirmed Sinfield's grim analysis. Masquerading as radical, it was culturism at its very worst. There were no 'contestable' values in an incoherent reading: 'Family, religion, politics, madness, sex… Take your pick' (programme notes). The logical end of culturism is consumerist Shakespeare. But if a production is to disclose 'contestable' ideology, taking your pick is just what you cannot do. And quite aside from the hurried, baying National Theatre Shakespeare dialect which obliterates clarity, the play fell apart linguistically by adopting a number of totally contradictory speaking styles.

The play was fascinating as a late manifestation of culturism. The director seems to have been superficially influenced by recent radical criticism, by Jonathan Dollimore's *Radical Tragedy* for instance, which centralizes the idea of property and the social basis of Lear's suffering. A large wooden map of England, like a child's picture puzzle, was conspicuously displayed when Lear divides his kingdom. The introduction of the map at

this stage is always a difficulty because it seems to make Lear's appearance the 'real' beginning of the play and suggests that the initial scene between Gloucester, Kent, and Edmund is an awkwardly redundant preliminary. This is exactly how the first scene was played. But it is essential to make the complexities of language work at this point to prepare for the following violence, the rhetorical competition between Lear's daughters. As the three characters stood stiffly to attention, talking politely to one another like Tory wets, the production failed to establish that the division of the kingdom (or kingdoms) is already disruptive. Gloucester's defensively libidinal smut, played down in this production, is a response to uneasiness, as the puns on sex and money proclaim that he is dividing his own finances between a legitimate and an illegitimate son: 'His breeding, sir, hath been at my *charge*' (I.i.9). That is, he has been accused of being Edmund's father *and* he has paid for his upbringing. Gloucester's obsessive puns are as much aggression *against* the inconvenient Edmund—and women—as they are self-congratulatory statements about fairness. A historicist reading of the play would be aware that *King Lear* is a Jacobean play, troubled by the laws of primogeniture, the volatile movement of property and the unstable definition of legitimate territorial boundary and centre. But all this is abstract unless one sees how the language works *for* people with property and *against* those without it. Because the production refused to take risks with this sleazy male colloquy, nothing like this can emerge.

This production missed, or fudged, the opportunity to explore an increasingly devastating critique in the least conservative of Shakespeare's plays. Lear's world is one in which you can ask for your own 'need' not to be subject to the calculus of reason and fail to see that to compare yourself to the 'basest beggar' in the same breath is to leave invidious social arrangements as they are. When Edgar becomes 'nothing' as a beggar, Poor Tom, he shuffles backwards into a little dole queue of rustic derelicts who appear from nowhere. But the point of Edgar's transformation is to deny him solidarity of any kind and to put him in total isolation. His utter dereliction is harshly recalled when Lear names the beggar as 'superfluous' in the merest thing, reminding us that superfluous court luxury is actually predicated on lonely poverty. Later, the Fool comments remorselessly that beggars are at least superfluous in one thing, fleas (III.ii.27–34): but since this production sentimentalized the Fool as a solicitous and comforting figure the power of this analysis was obliterated. The language caved in again.

Hare did get some things across: the torture of Gloucester as a political atrocity (he has let the key figure, Lear, escape); the final confusion, when nobody is clear whether the men or the women are in charge. But mostly the production displayed the sheer intellectual and political incoherence of culturism. It was characteristic of its incoherence that it used the conflated Quarto and Folio text. This was of a piece with inconsistency of every kind. It was split between being a fringe experimental play one moment and an official National Theatre pageant the next, as the characters sprinted across the chilly Olivier stage to get to their places in time to speak. It veered between inconsequential Brechtian alienation techniques, heavy expressive naturalism at variance with these, and Wildean elegance, all producing incompatible dictions. The mad scene was acted to roars of laughter from the audience (at least on the day I saw the play), the tense verbal competition between Goneril and Regan was turned into repartee. There was never any meaningful correlation between the style of direction and diction chosen and the events

of the play. Designer dressing-gowns and Laura Ashley riding habits against a panorama of moving clouds all indicated that this production was up in the air and came from nowhere.

K*ing Lear,* as Stephen Greenblatt has said, is a play in which subversion is near the surface, so the fudging was all the more surprising. But how does a radical production address the more complex ideology of the two-part *Henry IV* and *Henry V*? If one accepts Greenblatt's account of the 'poetics of power' in these plays, subversion is contained, not despite its presence, but because it is made 'the very condition of power' ('Invisible bullets: Renaissance authority and its subversion, *Henry IV* and *Henry V*', *Political Shakespeare,* p. 45). So there is no uncertainty about the authority of monarchy and its importance. Subversion ultimately endorses power and the need for it rather than contradicting it. Power, inevitably creating resistance, *deserves* subversion: subversion *deserves* power. This is a sophisticated argument about a conservative dialectic. But it is hard to see how its ambivalences could be expressed in a production or precisely how that Elizabethan account of history could seek out contestable values for the present, even supposing we assume Greenblatt to be right. The English Shakespeare Company's reading of the plays, productions with a sense of theatre, clarity of diction and intellectual control which made the National Theatre *King Lear* look like a school play, actually makes Greenblatt's thesis look questionable, even when there was an uncanny convergence of interpretation. Michael Bogdanov, the director, handled Prince Hal's despicable, manipulative baiting of Francis (*Henry IV, Part I,* II.iv.34–79) with scrupulous clarity as a form of oppression in which Francis is deprived of language at the same time as he is being accused of having none. It's a moment Greenblatt reads in the same way. Hal's appropriation of 'low life' speech—he boasts his 'mastery' of the ideolects of the poor—is used as a way of paralysing and silencing the dispossessed. Instrumental power over language works for Hal here, and against Francis. This came over with sinister clarity in the image of the abjectly dithering servant. It became an image of the Prince's compulsive need to exploit power relations, whether over seditious peers or the potentially subversive masterless servant class which continually threatens to disrupt in these plays.

Otherwise, theory and practice diverge. The English Shakespeare Company worked systematically against the customary patriotic readings of the texts in a way which had to be bolder than Greenblatt's new historicist provisos in order to achieve a radical production in the theatre. But the energy and cohesion of the production did not arise from this simple solution alone. Of course, it was a jubilantly challenging 'contestable reading': a 'Fuck the Frogs' banner sends off the English to the French wars, in splendid reminiscence of the Falklands war, to suggest that foreign wars distract attention from trouble at home. Union Jacks were waved by thugs. Black leather and Mohican haircuts suggested the National Front.

But something more interesting than superficial topicality was being addressed. The Greenblatt hypothesis was shifted into a sharper profile by making the plays not so much a display of ideological containment as a study of the way a monarchy under strain maintains power and legitimizes itself. That the conservative reading can be so palpably up-ended made one doubtful about Greenblatt's case. As I suggest in a moment, there was some cost to this, but the strategy worked initially by reversing the way in which

court and tavern scenes are usually related to one another. The play's opening design, a cavernous hall filled with stained red and black colour, could have been a grandiose, slightly run-down pub out of hours or a slightly decaying stateroom. In fact, the set doubled, with adaptations, for both. So an uneasy relationship between court and tavern, reciprocally dependent and exploitative, was established immediately. This reading was endorsed by Falstaff, played as an upper-class con man hovering between both worlds, consciously 'performing' for Hal, magnificently in collusion with Hal's contempt for him but exploiting a privileged access whenever possible. When the plays are staged as an exercise in the increasingly efficient use of unscrupulous power, the so-called 'low life' elements have to constitute a subversive critique of this, not because they are outside the court's provenance but because they are playing the same game. They are not the jolly, powerless, mindless subjects of Hal's 'japes', the infantilized popular element of some factitious Merry England they are often set up to be. They are implicated in power.

Staged in this way, the Gadshill robbery in *Henry IV, Part I*, is a vicious mugging where double-crossing is simply more successful than the court's inexpert fumbling over the dispute about the prisoners, a parallel piece of double-crossing which leads to the rebellion against Henry IV. And the point about this 'low life' violence is that it is factitiously energizing just as, with the increasing inevitability of the coming battle, both the king's side and the rebels regard combat as an exhilarating opportunity for the display of masculine camaraderie and power. The effect of this is to turn around the usual reading of the low-life sequences as a subversive parody of the court, by making the court seem instead an inflated parody of the tavern element. Thus the tavern element has a curious authority. So Falstaff's deconstruction of 'Honour' becomes supremely relevant when Hotspur, the naïve victim of a rhetoric of personal heroism, meets Hal in single combat. This, the first and last single combat in the three plays, becomes a virtual anachronism as personal honour is forced to carry a quite different and more ruthless politics of war which has superseded it. Accordingly, chain mail displaces the combat jackets and the two males fight out a struggle in Oedipal rivalry which is almost erotic in its intensity. It is at once a spurious gesture and a heroic but useless spectacle. It is a moment of political critique and a historical analysis which is registered in a fully theatrical way. After this war becomes progressively a matter of guns and missiles.

The logic of reading these plays in terms of the development of an ever more efficient machine for maintaining state power gives *Henry V* particular prominence. *Henry IV* opens out as a country run by old men in search of the human 'food for powder' necessary to prop up a monarchy. Henry V, learning from Gadshill, is simply better at it. The reactionary argument that order is threatened with breakdown (*Henry V,* I.ii.183–220) is exploited by Henry as a means of social control and this conservative speech is played as the pure rhetoric of power. His own dubious right to kingship is repressed by the tactic of challenging the legitimacy of the French line and embarking on a war which aims for a spurious unifying function. So aggressive British power breaks in upon an elegant, vulnerable French court, here costumed in white with Manet-like delicacy. (The old-fashioned costume is historically out of synchronization with the British to make the point about different cultures.)

But there are problems inherent in Shakespeare's text which cause some strain here. In the English Shakespeare Company production the rejection of Falstaff is a political

necessity for Hal's credibility as king (and personal revenge for the deceit over Hotspur's killer). It marks the point in the text at which the low-life scenes cease to be ideological critique of the monarchy and become instead extensions of its brutalizing strategies. Interestingly, this is a difficulty both for Greenblatt and this production. Greenblatt handles this ingeniously, arguing that subversion is a particular mode of Elizabethan culture which is the condition of power even while it exposes the tensions of authority. Michael Bogdanov handles this much more uncompromisingly by showing the low-life elements to be progressively degraded, brutalized and exploited as they become disposable 'food for powder'. The incipient viciousness of the football crowd already present in the early tavern scenes becomes steadily more dominant, so that the tavern scene of *Henry IV, Part II* which exactly parallels that of *Henry IV, Part I,* is a violent duplication of it. The football crowd modulates into the National Front at the rejection of Falstaff, and in the French wars Pistol can be seen as an obscenity to be eliminated with a nod.

There is a rigorous consistency here, but the difficulty, both in text and production, is that the brutalization which is the result of oppression can actually appear to justify the ruthless power exercised to control it. There are some risks here. This was a widely popular production and carried along large audiences despite some timid notices, such as Michael Billington's in the *Guardian,* describing the production as 'Marxist'. But how many members of the audience were able to endorse comfortable prejudices by seeing National Front thuggery as the inevitable result of degeneration instead of the product of a violence done to 'popular' life? This way of doing things is open to interpretation as conservative *or* radical critique. This is a particularly pressing question when one remembers that these—theatre-goers being what they are—are middle-class prejudices. The problems derive from the text as well as the production. It is never clear whether the tavern scenes constitute a matrix of 'popular' energy or a violent criminal element, or whether one is predicated on the other. The director's decision neither to infantilize the tavern element nor to play it as straightforwardly subversive parody of the court, but to present it, rather on the model of Gay's *Beggar's Opera,* as a beggars' or robbers' pastoral, created some ideological difficulties. The tavern element, doing what its masters do, but with more brio and less hypocrisy, constitutes a critique of the court and deconstructs power. On the other hand, it could be read more comfortably as the inveterate criminal element which infests the court and requires repression—dawn raids on the football thugs.

Michael Bogdanov pushes the plays towards radical critique by foregrounding their deconstructive moments. He deconstructs the sexiness of power and the prince's interest (born of the king's need to control representation) in *making people powerless* as an end in itself. This becomes an addictive need in this production as much as a practical necessity. The Gadshill robbery is a double double-crossing as the prince deliberately divides the robbers against themselves. The absurd play with the glove at the end of *Henry V,* borrowed from the techniques of the comedies, becomes a regressive, not so comic game of manipulation to show who is in power, a replication of the Francis incident.

What the popularity of the English Shakespeare Company's productions demonstrated conclusively is that it *is* possible to produce Shakespeare in the theatre as a radical

experiment, and to succeed. Some of that popularity may have rested on misprision, as I've suggested. This production made me wonder how far it is ever possible to control the way you are interpreted. But in spite of the difficulties I have mentioned, a radical critique is there all the same. No one could fail to see the challenge to conservative readings however this was taken up. It is ironic that a production outside the safety net of institutionalized public subsidy should take more risks than the dead weight of the National Theatre's moribund *King Lear*.

There is some symbiosis, then, between theory and performance. And academic criticism and live theatre do have something to tell each other—though this is perhaps unexpected. Sinfield's analysis of culturism under stress is a rebuke to the National Theatre *King Lear,* the true incoherence of culturism and consumerism. On the other hand, there is much more reciprocity between the English Shakespeare Company and radical academic criticism. If the demands of live theatre question the theses of historicist criticism, they question fruitfully. The Company's success makes it clear that it is possible to make a coherent critique through Shakespearean production. Michael Bogdanov sees himself as 'somebody who works out my politics through theatre.'[6] The Bogdanov productions, however, do point up some of the self-absorbed aspects of the new Shakespeare criticism. Obsessed with the deconstruction of Shakespeare as the bard of liberal humanism; equally obsessed with undermining and abolishing the élitist category of literature and particularly 'English' literature (of which Shakespeare is, of course, the glaring example), some academic criticism has begun to lose sight of what the radical task now is, both in Shakespeare criticism and elsewhere. It is to redefine the category of literature for a radical reading and to consider how a democratic account of language—a democratic textual practice—can empower the dispossessed.

To see literature as a construct of 'the Victorian middle class', as Terry Eagleton has it ('The end of English', p. 2), does not necessarily entail relinquishing it as Eagleton sometimes, but not always, implies. The abandonment of the concept of literature and of the category of the 'aesthetic', the philosophical terrain which should support it, is possibly one of the greatest mistakes the left has made this decade. It is not only that to talk about the 'end' of English is to play into the hands of a government not in the least interested in deconstructing liberal humanism but only too interested in getting rid of non-wealth-producing activities, professional intellectuals in the humanities in particular: mere self-protection is not what is at stake. Eagleton says, using the trite media slogan which is unworthy of him, that 'English' as it is at present constituted is irrelevant to 'inner city school kids' (the expression is a smear, a cultural construction just as élitist as 'literature', implying as it does a pedagogical no-go group). But 'English', 'literature', 'Shakespeare', need *not* be constituted as they are at present. The left needs to work on a radical new textual practice which is enabling. There is no reason why, on this new reading, literature and cultural studies, so often seen as a substitute for it, should be inimical. It is not really necessary to ditch the category of literature and abandon Shakespeare just because they are fetishized by liberal humanists and manipulated by an élitist ideology. It is a question of redefinition and reconstruction.

The category of aesthetics, so long despised by the left, requires a radical rethinking, along with the idea of literature. It has been left too long to right-wing aestheticians such as Roger Scruton who appropriate it in the name of a mystified, quasi-religious account

of the beautiful. Eagleton has recently made a magnificent analysis of this reactionary aesthetics in the *Times Literary Supplement* article already mentioned (see note *5*). But the project of the left is now surely to produce an alternative of its own. Not to do so is to mimic the systematic deprivation of the dispossessed which goes on under cover of accounts of the beautiful.

As Eagleton points out, aesthetics have been dominated by Kantian concepts which are conservative in impulse. But an alternative tradition exists to be retrieved—or re-read— for radical thought in Hegel, who was not concerned with a disinterested response to the beautiful. He was interested in the cognitive and cultural problems circulating around pleasure, pain, representation, and language. These questions—pleasure, pain, language—are all of political importance in a new aesthetics. It is in the interests of late capitalism, for instance, to commodify pleasure by limiting it to sexuality and thus actually policing its subversive power by restricting its provenance. It is also in its interests (look at any of the media at work) to blunt the response to language and homogenize idiosyncrasy, dulling the retentive aural sense which stores up the linguistic potential for thought and argument—for critique, in fact. The capacity of literary texts (and not simply the ones we canonize) to explore the transgressive pleasure of critique— witness Blake, witness even 'reactionary' Shakespeare—is bound up with the libidinal pleasure and power in language. Literary production, always posited since the Renaissance on its own absolute redundancy (because it can't *do* anything instrumental which an alternative form of writing can do just as well), has as its only justification a kind of logophiliac energy of analysis, which is where the question of democratic reading begins. The left badly needs to re-theorize the cultural importance of pleasure, through language and representation, and to think through the nature of literature again in terms of knowledge and critique. We cannot afford not to engage with aesthetics and redefine it for the left.

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The English Shakespeare Company is performing at the Old Vic in London from January 26 to March 11, 1989.

NOTES

1 Terry Eagleton, 'The end of English', *Textual Practice,* 1, 1 (Spring 1987), pp. 1–9.

2 The Kingman Report is far more sensitive to the problem of 'English' than that of Scarman: it does make careful efforts to recognize the many kinds of English spoken in Britain today, and understands the unreal way in which 'Standard English' is constituted. But it partly confirms Terence Hawkes's case by stating that it is necessary for speakers to 'learn the standard language' in order to 'communicate with others in the wider world' (para. 34).

3 Francis Barker and Peter Hulme, 'Nymphs and reapers heavily vanish: the discursive contexts of *The Tempest*', *Alternative Shakespeares,* ed. John Drakakis (London: Methuen, 1985), pp. 191–205.

4 See William Bridges Adams, 'Coriolanus no aristocrat', *Monthly Repository,* VIII (1834), pp. 41–54, 129–39, 190–202, 292–9; Charles Reece Pemberton,

'Macready's Coriolanus', *Monthly Repository,* VIII (1834), pp. 76–81. *Coriolanus* is the subject of a (conservative) reading in Charlotte Brontë's *Shirley* (1849). This was a highly politicized and contested text in the nineteenth century.

5 Terry Eagleton, 'The politics of aesthetics', *Times Literary Supplement,* 22 January 1988, pp. 84, 94.

6 Michael Bogdanov interviewed by Christopher J.McCullough, in Graham Holderness (ed.), *The Shakespeare Myth* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1988), p. 90.

R.A.STRADLING

The propaganda of the deed: history, Hemingway, and Spain

Who says that fictions onely and false hair
Become a verse?
May no lines pass, except they do their dutie
Not to a true, but painted chair?
Must all be vail'd, while he that reads, divines,

Catching the sense at two removes?

(from *Jordan,* by George Herbert)

I

Does the title of Herbert's poem assert the impossibility of communicating a secure meaning—the unattainable river Jordan of the exiled chosen people—and thereby entrap us in the ultimate epistemological conundrum? Or does it refer, at the more mundane end of the hermeneutic spectrum, to seventeenth-century slang in which 'a Jordan' equalled a chamber-pot? The hero of Hemingway's *For Whom the Bell Tolls,* Robert Jordan, is a professor of Spanish, holder of a 'true, but painted chair', with a speciality in the seventeenth century, the celebrated 'Golden Age' of Iberian literature. The character is based upon several American intellectual warriors who fought and died in the Lincoln and Washington Brigades during the Spanish Civil War.[1] His university, somewhere in the mid-west, is (surprisingly) enlightened enough, not only to employ him in teaching Spanish literature, but also to allow him indefinite leave from it to fight in Spain.

Hemingway's chosen title is a deliberate reference to the fate of the Spanish people, representing, in the words of another so-called 'meta-physical' poet, a common destiny. In effect it is a call to arms as opposed to a farewell, a propaganda slogan exhorting men to go and fight for the life of the Spanish Republic against the death (Fascism) by which it was allegedly threatened. Hemingway's campaign is a revival of Byron's, aimed at mobilizing support in the Anglo-Saxon world for a geographically distant but emotionally intimate ideal. Yet the discourse of this crusade thoroughly betrays its hegemonic culture. The very words *For Whom the Bell Tolls* encode a privileged message—and are also inscribed with a contradiction which impedes, or at least constrains, effective transmission of the message. The 1930s equivalent of Byron's public-school philhellenes might be alerted; but people in general tend to remain islands

intire unto themselves when this is the élite language used to persuade them otherwise. Two other points about Hemingway's title are perhaps more germane to the central concern of my essay. First, it encapsulates a powerful myth of the Spanish Civil War as a defence of the intellect against nihilism. Second, both the title and the plot of the novel seek to demonstrate that the heroic leadership of the intelligentsia is central to politics and war.

As a prelude to his account of the murderous assault of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, under Stalin's leadership and inspiration, against the Russian intelligentsia—a campaign exactly contemporaneous with the war in Spain—the composer Shostakovich suggests that the last source it is safe to believe over the actuality and detail of an historical event is the record of an eyewitness. G.B.Shaw (in *The Devil's Disciple,* also set in a revolutionary context) asserts that the events described in his play, precisely because not recorded in the textbooks of historians, can be comfortably believed to be true. Shostakovich's memoirs are widely discredited as a forgery. Shaw visited the USSR during the Stalinist purges—described by 'Shostakovich'—in which millions died, and reported no word of them in any of his writings, not even a mention of victims like the theatre director Meyerhold, the novelist Babel, the composer Zhilayev *et al.*[2] Only a few years before Hemingway's birth, Oscar Wilde, perhaps in his capacity as Jokanaan, had prophesied his veracity. Gwendoline Fairfax, living 'in an age of ideals', asserts her personal ideal to love an Ernest, 'a name which inspires absolute confidence'. The union of Ernest and Fairfax would indeed be a powerful instrument of persuasion. Whom do we believe? Or, to put the question more exactly: How do we believe?

This essay asks this question through an investigation of the meaning of mass violence as represented in various modern texts. Its main purpose is to illustrate, in the context of its most emotive and ethically controversial issues, and with central reference to its most famous work of 'fiction', that much writing about the Spanish Civil War is concerned to defend what might be called the 'mutual hegemony' of two opposed myths. This is evident right across the spectrum of reportage and available information, source material, and secondary writing (professional historiography if you like).

Several modern authorities in the fields of historiography, philosophy and science have argued that history—defined at this point as writings about the past which are in the public domain—itself produces myths; and even that it *represents* myth.[3] The point is by no means entirely without force. Since history expresses itself linguistically it is metaphorical in mode as much as any other category of writing. But because of the relative lack of self-authenticating specificity in its vocabulary, at least when compared to other disciplines (even amongst the social sciences), the cultural sympathy with the past that today is encouraged in its practitioners, and its complete indifference to formal limits of reference and language barriers, it may still be regarded as a more reliable (or sensitive) vehicle of mediation than many. The history-as-myth argument has been expounded mainly by the disguised use of analogy, and in my view the analogy has been pushed too far. Though I have no space here to elaborate my full objections, it will be clear for my present purposes that if all history is myth, then the capacity of historians and other critics to identify areas or cases in which myth, mystification, and downright propaganda have hijacked treatment of a past event would be severely handicapped, if not abrogated altogether. This would represent a serious net loss to intellectual life.

The Muse of history is, of course, herself a myth: but this is the case for all the so-called 'arts'. Clio is often portrayed as carrying a book in one hand and a trumpet in the other—hence the definition given above. Yet perhaps a better classical patroness would be Penelope, not only because her weaving, which she mystifyingly unpicked at night, seems a subtler metaphor for the making and unmaking of history, but also because, whereas in Homer's version of the *Iliad* she is the steadfast and constant spouse to Ulysses, in other sources she becomes the whore of her many suitors. History is both weaving and unweaving, purity and prostitution. It can never be absolutely faithful and is never definitive.[4]

But it must at least strive to be saved. In order to be socially useful, and thus to attract interest and support from the wider community, history should attempt to utilize rhetorics of deconstruction. I mean by this that it should seek to identify and thereby to question the discourses of hegemony, or (to rehearse a lexicon of human sciences) to provide a continuous political critique of cultural centres and norms, myths, taxonomies, academic disciplines, homogeneous schools of interpretation, and so on. History—and here I embrace its oral/aural existence (if you like, teaching and debate) as well as its written form—ought to be an attempt to reconstruct consciousness, which is another way of saying, to deconstruct myth.

Of course I do not wish to argue that the word can unmediate the deed, that history can aspire to disentangle experience from discourse. But at least it can address itself to the task of consistently breaking down binary modes of opposition, the task of decentring for which such a plural and omnivorous discipline should be perfectly equipped. The more that the predetermined, tyrannical alternatives of 'either/or' explanations can be challenged, the less history can be deliberately exploited as a means of implanting ideology.

In the context of my present task, the importance of history seems obvious. The professional historian, by mediating all kinds of realities, ingesting all manner of texts in the search for explanation, makes all artefacts into historical evidence, feeding this data back into the process of text-production. It may be conceded that history itself is a discourse of hegemony to the extent that it generates a privileged meaning. Of course, the distinction between literature and history is in itself a major example of the creation of binary modes by cultural manipulation. Yet even on this rather superficial level, are they so different? Think of the high priests of these two new religions, a century ago. Arnold left instructions that the critic must 'see the object as in itself it really is'; Ranke laid it down that the historian should strive to describe the past 'as it really was'.[5]

II

It is a truism that most acts of mass murder are based on belief. The nature of such belief may be described as cultural, in that it has anthropological, psychological, and narrative characteristics. The rituals of atrocity can also emblematically represent, express, and confirm a belief-system. Nothing more completely expressed the culture of the Aztec empire than the mass human sacrifice to the God Huitzilipochtli. The Aztecs actually avoided killing in battle, basing their military tactics and even weaponry on the need to

capture thousands of potential victims for the Hummingbird. Partly for this reason, they fell easily to the *conquistadores*. The Aztecs' lack of a written language may have impeded any coherent modern reading of their massacre-based culture. Spain, which imported, along with gold and silver, many ravaging versions of 'Montezuma's revenge', is at the other extreme. No war in human history has been so textualized as the Civil War of 1936–9.

Spain in the 1930s, contemporary with Shostakovich and Shaw, plaything of Stalin and Hitler, is in the middle between the horrors of Nazi holocaust and Soviet purges on the one hand, and our own current killing fields—like those of Beirut and Belfast—on the other. During the Spanish Civil War atrocities were committed in every part of Spain. However, a qualitative difference between the ritual political crime and the social deed has been often remarked. In the Republican zone, items of luxury and ostentation taken from political victims were thrown into the flames or impounded for the common good. Looting was rarely seen, even according to reports of hostile witnesses. They fought for political ideals, not for material gain, and against the evil of Fascism. On the Rightist side thousands of killings, during and after the hostilities, were preceded by some kind of tribunal hearing. This created the impression that the whole community, through judicial representatives, solemnly decided upon the penalty. The Right fought for law, order, and the ideals of Catholic society. For forty years thereafter, the Francoist state insisted on the figure of 'a million dead' in the war, as a useful deterrent to any renewed challenge to order, even though it was known to be an exaggeration of some one hundred per cent. What is certain is that a large proportion—perhaps as many as a third—of all fatalities were a result of murder rather than military action.[6]

I think it is fair to say that most non-Spaniards today believe that the conduct of the Republic in respect of killings of defenceless victims *en masse* during the Spanish Civil War was morally superior to that of its Nationalist adversary, and that this arose naturally from its purer political nature and aspirations. Writing about this delicate theme tends to confirm the superior ethical and human character of the Republican side.

At first glance at the Spain of 1936 there appear two internecine sides, and two opposed myth-systems are firmly established in popular explanation of the conflict. Spanish history generally is often seen, especially by Anglo-Saxons, as a struggle between two souls—if you like, as permanent civil war—liberal and traditional, extrovert and introvert, red and black, good and bad.[7] In 1936–9 these tendencies were summed up in the apparent struggle of two sides officially describing each other as 'Communist' and 'Fascist'; and the Civil War also explained variously as Republican versus Nationalist, Loyalist versus Rebel, Government versus Insurgent. These alternative nouns are little more than useful vessels in which to contain the power of opposed ideological groupings. The first pair in particular almost inevitably reflected the political language of the time, a decade in which *any* war would have been (and was) similarly characterized. I will call these sides Left and Right, though they may equally well be regarded as obverse and reverse, or better still—to underline their textual dimension—as *recto* and *verso*.

For when the elite Moorish troops of Varela's army made their crucial thrust against Madrid in November 1936, they were held up by the defenders a couple of kilometres outside the city centre, on the campus of Madrid University *(Ciudad Universitaria)*. The front line actually settled down to run between the Faculty Buildings of Law (held by the

Right) and Philosophy and Literature (defended by the Left). Occupying Philosophy, in the process saving Madrid, and keeping the Republic alive, was the Eleventh International Brigade, studded with the expatriate intellectual luminaries of half Europe. In the Law Building, in considerable contrast, were the utterly untutored Moors of Franco's elite African regiments. Bullets and insults ('Red Pansies', 'Fascist Barbarians') were exchanged over makeshift barricades of books and bookcases. For two and a half years the complete works of Byron and Marx on the one side and the *New Recompilation of the Laws of Castile* on the other were slowly ground into dust. This epic contest of Faculties could hardly have been more appropriate if the battleground had been mutually arranged in advance, like some updated version of the Field of Cloth of Gold, a theatrical tournament of apparently opposed power-groups who were actually celebrating their joint hegemony.[8]

The absence of dialogue between these positions is almost as complete now as it was fifty years ago. As much as ever Spain, for the intellectual interventionist, is still a fertile site of struggle. From its hard and exhausted terrain historians, journalists, politicians extract a perennial harvest of intellectual and emotional satisfaction, success, well-being, justification, power. Spain's recent history is a colony of the European mind as much as its beaches are the colony of the European body. Although contemporary Spaniards intensely desire to forget—if not to forgive—considering that their future may depend on the extent to which they can consign the past to rest, the empire of ideas will never have it so. During 1986, the fiftieth anniversary of the conflict, outside Spain, publishers and writers, media people, ageing veterans, all rehearsed the drama with evident profit and pleasure. Inside Spain, even a Socialist government sitting on a massive majority declared that no official commemorations would be held, a line followed by most other responsible political groups.[9]

Amongst current historians it is increasingly accepted that the Spanish Civil War was not a unitary phenomenon fought between two sides, so much as a complex functional collapse of society, involving multiple allegiances and a tribal and even local logic. It was a simultaneous complex of wars-within-the-war, testament to a society which was plural to a literally suicidal degree. Regional grievances were as important as those over religion or class in its making, whilst any binary nomenclature of 'sides' functionally elides a multitude of competing interest groups.[10] The conflict is a labyrinth surrounded by a morass. It was made possible not so much by tactical voting as tactical shooting. Thus the soldiers of the Right 'executed' Basque Catholic priests, and those of the Left mowed down Catalan Anarchist workers.

Some heroes got through to the Labyrinth where they had to face the Minotaur, half bull, half man, Picasso's monster, profound symbol of Iberian culture. Sacrificing themselves to him, in a moment of sacramental truth, they vanquished him as surely as Theseus, the original matador. Such a one was Federico García Lorca, sublime prototype of the gay anti-sexist anti-racist artist. Another was the Falangist leader, writer and intellectual José Antonio Primo de Rivera. The latter used to be eternally 'presente' in Francoist Spain, and has now been spiritually replaced by the former.[11] But this essay is not concerned with heroic individualism. Most victims died in the morass, faces downwards, asphyxiated in more-or-less anonymous crowds. In murder, as much as anything else, our own century is the age of the masses and the morasses. As the Spanish

writer Ortega y Gasset—Dean of the Faculty captured by the ignorant Moors—had put it: 'ya no hay protagonista, solo hay coro'—today there are no heroes, only the chorus.[12] The chorus is at once the victim, the murderer, and the witness. Cases of mass murder form arguably the most central place in which to examine how we believe in our ideological ancestral gods. But care is needed, for this place is like a terrorist time-bomb which we have to defuse for our own safety.

<div style="text-align:center">III</div>

The time-bomb, full of false circuits and dummy fuses, pregnant with booby-traps, is (of course) the text. I use this metaphor deliberately because the text is a deadly weapon of the terrorist of all periods, places, and beliefs. To generalize from Foucault's particular (if not, perhaps, in the sense that he wishes us to), the author of a text about political mass murder is the author of a crime.[13] My specific object of attention might be called in textual terms *artrocity*. The Castilian imagination identified this function in the earliest European fiction of wide circulation, the chivalric romances of Christian legend, incorporating the slaughter of Moors and Infidels, and which were arrogated some responsibility equally for the fictional misdoings of Quixote and the historical massacre of American Indians.

Hemingway himself observed death at close quarters. He visited Spain several times during the war, often spending expeditionary days with the soldiers of the International Brigades at the fronts near Madrid. The Brigades were a volunteer force organized by the Comintern from all over the world, most of whom were members of the Communist Party, and many of whom were writers.[14] The Party was anxious to recruit intellectuals— literally as well as emotionally—for a number of reasons. For one thing, they were excellent propagandists with access to a wide variety of publishing outlets. In the 1930s, despite the growth of radio and the film industry, the influence of the written word had reached a peak. The fame of the author added lustre to the Left cause, especially when (as Harry Pollitt, general secretary of the British CP, recommended to several) they became martyrs for it. In the context of the non-revolutionary 'Popular Front' policy which Stalin had adopted in 1935 in order to appear a plausible ally for the Democracies against Hitler, intellectuals could help to correct the hostile image of the USSR nurtured amongst their families and peer-groups—that is to say, the ruling class. In 1937 appeared the notorious pamphlet, organized by Auden and Haldane for the Comintern, *Authors Take Sides Over Spain,* in which the vast majority of established writers declared their solidarity with the Republic. In the same year amidst considerable razzmatazz the International Writers' Congress was held in besieged Madrid, 'la tumba de fascismo'.[15]

Hemingway was content to be exploited in some at least of these ways. He appeared in film footage and photograph bestowing on the Leftist cause the prestige of authority. Officially he was acting as a freelance reporter for an American newspaper. In his spare time he bashed out documentary-style short stories for an anti-fascist weekly in Chicago. (In these texts his acceptance of the Communist Party line on the conduct and meaning of the war is relatively uncomplicated.)[16] Ostensibly in the former capacity, arriving at his hotel to hear that a battle had just been fought at Guadalajara, Hemingway jumped into a

car and drove 50 miles to the battlefield in order to observe the dead 'before the burial squads had finished their work'.[17] In the latter capacity, he complained about having to wait for four weeks in order to obtain official permission to attend a political execution in Madrid. He countered other press colleagues' reports of frequent firing-squads, and poured scorn on the stories about the nightly *paseos* in the capital. One of these stories relates the just destruction of a 'sensationalist' reporter, a writer who had betrayed his calling. Yet beyond question both these types of atrocity were happening. Hemingway was an active propagandist for the Left, as surely as if (like Koestler or Cockburn) he was actually operated by the Comintern.[18]

But Hemingway's Spanish texts work in a different way from those of other writers. To start with he was—apart fron André Malraux—the only interventionist writer who knew Spain well, or who spoke and understood its language with reasonable fluency.[19] It is almost as though he wrote the script for the war before the cameras began to roll. In his book about bullfighting, *Death in the Afternoon,* published four years before the war, he gave vent to his hatred of the so-called *monosabios* ('wise apes') who were responsible for the horses in the ring. At least they were the *ostensible* target:

> I have seen several of them, two especially that are father and son, that I would like to shoot. If ever we have a time when for a few days you may shoot anyone you wish, I believe that before starting out to bag various policemen, government functionaries, Massachusetts judges, and a couple of companions of my youth, I would shove in a clip and make sure of that pair.[20]

To say that Hemingway gloried in violent death is putting it mildly. The livid anti-intellectualism of this text aligns him closely with the mindless ferocity of the Rightist warlord Millán Astray, a much-mutilated warrior whose infamous battle-cry of '¡Viva la Muerte! ¡Muere la Intelligencia!' was excoriated, in a celebrated confrontation, by the Basque philosopher Miguel de Unamuno. In October 1936, Unamuno, in his capacity as Rector of the University of Salamanca, was presiding at a ceremony during which Millán made a violent, quasi-nihilist speech; when he answered with a few quiet words of dignified reproof, the general retorted with threats against intellectuals, culminating in his warcry already quoted. Unamuno's final measured condemnation, and his death a few days later, was the last set-piece of liberal academic Spain.[21] But—at least on the evidence of his contemporary texts—Hemingway could only have regarded Unamuno's position as weak and despicable. Exactly like Millán, the pro-Left Hemingway exults in and exalts the killer.

> A great killer must love to kill; unless he feels it is the best thing he can do, unless he is conscious of its dignity and feels that it is its own reward, he will be incapable of the abnegation that is necessary in killing. The truly great killer must have a sense of honour and a sense of glory. Also he must take pleasure in it…he must have a spiritual enjoyment of the moment of killing. Killing cleanly and in a way which gives you aesthetic pleasure and pride has always been one of the great enjoyments of a part of the human race. Because the other part, which does not enjoy killing, has always been the more articulate and has furnished most of the good writers, we have had very few statements of the true

enjoyment of killing.[22]

There was another Spanish writer closely involved in the civil war, born like Hemingway in the 1890s, and very similar to him in many ways. He too loved the *corrida de toros* and spent much of his life hunting and killing wild animals. In a strikingly similar pattern to his American contemporary, he admired the fiercely Catholic, conservative Spaniards of the rural north, and the reactionary Navarrese best of all. He too wrote a novel about the conflict, which (this time resembling Malraux) he later turned into a screenplay, and helped to direct as a feature film. In contrast to Hemingway's, however, this text puts the emphasis and the spiritual glory not on the killer, but on the killed. The treatment is overtly sensual and beautiful as in Hemingway, but these emotional qualities appertain to the helpless and the slaughtered, not to the perpetrators of death. Hemingway, if he ever read this writing, may on these grounds at least have thought of it as representative of 'the other part, which does not enjoy killing'. The text quoted below seems ideologically to be in the broad mainstream of the liberal intellectual tradition. The author's peers certainly so regarded it, and elected him to membership of the Spanish Academy on the strength of this masterpiece.

> In the midst of a vile and noisy throng, they are taken towards the nearby beach.
>
> Without resistance, without any sign of pain or protest, between insults and bayonets, marches the long file of the Order of San Juan. A chant of prayer goes up from the holy procession of martyrs. Night is falling as they arrive at the sea shore; beneath the moon, the wavelets of water break onto the sand. A group of militiamen is waiting with a machine-gun at the ready.
>
> The harsh orders of the executioners halt the heroic procession at the water's edge. Against the horizon, the silhouettes of the brothers stretch up high, suffused by the resplendent rays of the moon.
>
> Serene and with faces upraised they await the sublime sacrifice. With unequalled grandeur, the notes of their sacred canticle vibrate in the air—only to be cut short by the tragic roar of the machine-gun.
>
> Later that night, whilst terror sleeps, as in the heroic time of barbarous persecution, some holy women descend to the beach to bury the sacred remains. They cut from their dresses, to preserve as precious relics, the cloth soaked in the generous blood of the martyrs.

The author of these lines, as distinct from the sentiments of Millán Astray as Hemingway's lines resemble them, was, however (unlike Ernesto) in his professional life a strong supporter of the general. He was indeed Millán's colleague;…to be more precise, his leader. For these moving words are taken from a novel by that well-known intellectual warrior Francisco Franco y Bahamonde.[23]

In *For Whom the Bell Tolls* two incidents of mass atrocity are described in detail, one for each of the two sides. Both are recounted by women. One seems entirely unremarkable in historical terms. It is set in María's village, control of which has been seized by the Right. The deaths of all prominent Left sympathizers, including María's parents, by firing-squad against the wall of the cemetery, and her own head-shaving and rape, contain factual elements which can be corroborated by literally dozens of attested

eyewitness accounts. The central features of the other story seem fantastic and bizarre. They relate the ritual destruction of the so-called 'fascists' by the people of Pilar's town, in a highly organized *corridor/corrida*. In a complex ceremony which presents the massacre as a plebianized bullfight, each victim as a bull with individual strengths and weaknesses, each avenging citizen as a matador, the victims are driven through a double line of assailants who beat them to death and throw them into an abyss. The whole passage of twenty-five pages pullulates with bullfighting references, open and sublimated.[24]

    Hemingway may have been given this story by one of his government contacts. He may have heard it in some bar, already containing its central aspects through the accretion of aggregate tellings by many tongues. In any case, his texts are a meeting-place of all sorts of concepts, promiscuously thrown together. They are like a crowded public forum, perhaps indeed a bar or a *plaza mayor*. Hemingway's noisy polyphony also gains historical verisimilitude by its concrete sense of place and personal voice. For example, several of his short stories about the Spanish War are set in a bar ('Chicote's'), which can still be found in the Gran Via of Madrid. Pilar's story is evidently (though not overtly) set in the Andalusian town of Ronda. The *Plaza Mayor,* which is bounded on one side by a frightening precipice, provides the arena ('arena' is the Spanish word for 'sand', groundbase of the bullfight). Ronda is where modern bullfighting is reputed to have begun, and which claims to have the oldest *Plaza Monumental* (bullring) in Spain. The second-in-command of the revolutionary crowd is Cuatro Dedos ('Four Fingers'), a name taken from the 'historical' Seisdedos ('Six Fingers'), alleged leader of an Anarchist rebellion in the village of Casas Viejas, not far from Ronda, in 1933. For what it's worth, at least the broad historical reality of the Ronda incident is well-attested.[25]

    Yet the question of historical truth in the conventional sense hardly arises, for both these stories, the 'ordinary' and the 'extraordinary', confirm and undermine historical credulity at the same time and to the same degrees. Because so many eyewitness accounts present similar detail, should we therefore credit any specific occurrence, or doubt it? Take the tale of the 'fascists' using church towers to snipe at the people. This apparently happened all over Spain, cropping up over and again in different Spanish accounts and foreign reports. Can one doubt that it was invented and/or generally adopted in order to identify 'fascist' with 'Church', to excuse if not to justify the shootings of priests and the burning of churches? Take the ubiquitous raping of nuns, where exactly the same applies. So many accounts, from the domains both of history and fiction, share other less unlikely but suspiciously uniform tropes. Mass murder often takes place in or near a cemetery, or in an abbatoir, and some reference is often made in the text to the bullfight, and/or to the Spanish addiction to violence and necrophilia. There is frequently a mountain of bodies, sometimes an audience of appreciative onlookers, now and again a tricoteuse.[26]

    Arthur Koestler, who was imprisoned and condemned to death by the Right, tells us that after his release he 'helped Willi Muenzenberg to concoct atrocity stories in Paris', in the press office maintained there by Stalin. 'He [Muenzenberg] would shout at me, "Too weak! Too objective! Hit them! Hit them hard! Tell the world how they [i.e. the Right] run over their prisoners with tanks, how they pour petrol over them and burn them alive. Make the world gasp with horror."'[27] On the other side, Franco's brother-in-law, the intellectual Ramón Serrano Suñer, who was imprisoned and narrowly escaped death at

the hands of the Left, was involved in a similar industry.[28] Helen Nicholson swallowed and obligingly regurgitated the blood-curdling stories of 'Red' atrocities with which she was constantly (and deliberately) regaled by Spanish friends. One of them relates how the Moors, on capturing the village of Almendralejo, stood weeping in its *plaza* at the sight of the local Catholics who had been crucified against the trees and their legs burned away with petrol. (I find it difficult to decide which of these 'facts' strikes me as the more unlikely.) Wyndham Lewis, writing for the same publisher, was attracted to a version of the Ronda atrocity almost as bizarre as, and certainly more ridiculous than that of Hemingway.[29] As Koestler protested to his chief, 'in a war the atrocity stories of both sides cancel each other out'. Or, to quote Nicholas Monsarrat:

> Atrocities bred atrocities, as naturally and inevitably as one swing of the pendulum is countered by another…what use to compete in horrors, between which there was nothing to choose?… One could no more discriminate among its bestialities than one could decide the merits of rival cesspools.[30]

Hemingway uses history as well as geography, presumably to give his texts a desired authenticity. Some details of the incident at Ronda are highly reminiscent of a famous medieval event, immortalized by the seventeenth-century dramatist Lope de Vega. His drama *Fuenteovejuna* deals with the insurrection of the townspeople of a *pueblo* situated slightly to the north of the Andalusian border, in New Castile. Robert Jordan, in his capacity as Professor of Spanish Literature, would have known and probably taught the play. In it, the rebels slaughter their tyrannical overlord and his satraps, incited by a woman, and with a mob of *Amazonas* to the fore. All the citizens then claim to have equal responsibility for the killings, thereby at once establishing the justice of the case in Thomist/Aristotelian terms, and making punishment on grounds of guilt more impracticable. The murders are also meant to be reported abroad and thus to be politically effectual: *'acometamos a un hecho/que de espanto a todo el orbe'* (Let us do something together/which will shock the whole world.)[31]

This desire to make a manifesto out of an act of blood, known in nihilist lore as the propaganda of the deed, is acknowledged in another text which bitterly attacks the principle of the 'utilidad de la matanza' -the usefulness of slaughter.

> I am not a soldier, but a man lost amidst the suffering of others. They talk of the usefulness of slaughter. You seem to be followers of the Hebrew God, who for his own glory trampled men underfoot as the peasant tramples the grapes, spattering his limbs with red. It's all very well making haste to start killing but you must find a way to stop it once the utility or glory have been gained. But I reject it utterly. At the beginning of this century a writer suggested that to improve matters Spain needed 'a metre of blood'. A metre? They will have more. If that writer was correct, Spain will be better.

Thus the moving words of Manuel Azaña, writer on politics, retired scholar, liberal President of the Republic during the Civil War; an intellectual warrior, if not in the sense recognized by Ernesto.[32]

The propaganda of the deed, its political effect on waverers and doubters, its role as a

statement of principle and policy, is present in the reasoning of Pablo, the leader and organizer of the massacre recounted to Jordan by Pilar. But the solemn, ceremonial ritual of Ronda ultimately breaks down. The 'firing-squad' turns into a fanatical mob, breaking into the room where the remaining victims cower and butchering them indiscriminately in a frenzy of blood-lust. The messy martyrdom of the cowardly priest is described in detail. Carlos Baker states that the author did not wish his Communist friends in Madrid to see this section of the novel, fearing he would be accused of risking an unfavourable response towards the Left amongst his readers.[33] Such a response may indeed be felt by some, but in fact Hemingway's text is a faithful presentation of the party line on policy in Spain. The possibilities of disciplined planning and organization advocated by the Communists, and which only their leadership could achieve, are demonstrated. The Anarchists, main rivals of the PCE *(Partido Comunista de España)* for the allegiance of the masses, are shown to be stupid, drunken, vicious, and—yes, anarchic. The evils of uncontrolled revolution, vitiating the ordered and just beauty of proletarian action, seem obvious. The author clearly agreed with the supreme argument of the Communists that successful war had to take priority over revolution. At the same time he represents the force of La Pasionaria's words: 'Murderers are at the gates of Madrid. Let us go out to destroy them and to avenge our dead…. Never forget that our acts are ruled and directed by justice.'[34] Hemingway presents this in a dramatic fusion of politics and art, through one of the most celebrated texts of *artrocity*.

Other sources about atrocity corroborate aspects of Pilar's story, indeed almost everything except the details of the bizarre ritual of the *plaza*. The Austrian journalist Franz Borkenau, for example, reports events in the village of Albucierre in Aragón, taken over by the Left militia and then captured temporarily by the Right army.

> The rebels, after having recaptured it, had, I was told, shot all the most active anarchists and socialists—8 to 10 altogether. It was about the same number as had been executed by the Government forces during their occupation. *[And in Fraga, a nearby town]* One man, with a significant gesture of the fingers across the throat, tells us that they have killed 28 'fascists'…. They had not killed any women or children, only the priest, his most active adherents, the lawyer and his son, the squire, and a number of richer peasants.[35]

These events, a revolution which might have been scripted by Foucault or Hemingway, were, it seems, not spontaneous but organized by the Durruti Column on its march from Barcelona to Zaragoza. Back south in Andalusia, the account of events in the town of Baena, compiled from interviews with several survivors by Ronald Fraser, is perhaps closest of all to Hemingway. Here the organized people, armed mostly with the agrarian implements which are at once symbols of their oppression and instruments of protest, besiege the Civil Guard and other Rightists in the town hall. They are about to triumph when a relieving force arrives and turns the tables. The *campesinos* are rounded up, and hundreds are shot in the main square. Order breaks down amongst survivors on the Left—now surrounded in their turn inside a church—who massacre their hostages, including women and children. In Fraser's book, an eyewitness describes in detail the blinding of a priest who is later shot and burned.[36]

IV

Most authorities who deal with the problem of political murder in the Spanish Civil War are careful to draw an ethical distinction between those of the Right and those of the Left. Briefly encapsulated, it is that the former were officially sanctioned and organized by authority, whilst the latter were spontaneous retribution by the people which authority could do nothing to prevent. It was a point agreed by the English historian Hugh Thomas and his Spanish equivalent Manuel Tuñón de Lara, when in the 1960s they wrote separate pro-Left versions of the war which soon became standard.[37] But the case was made during the first year of the war by Manuel Azaña himself. The Republican President had been traumatized by the murder of an ex-ministerial colleague by Left Militiamen in a Madrid prison. Moreover, in the early days of revolutionary Madrid, his apartment of rooms in the Oriente Palace overlooked the Campo de Moro ('the Moor's field'), used at night as a killing place for 'fascists' rounded up during the day. Azaña slept little. He later gave vent to his feelings in a 'fictionalized' account. Again the Doctor speaks:

> I found a hospital next to an animal stable. After lengthy arguments with the local commanders, I obtained a better place to house the wounded, right over the cemetery. 'It will save on transport', they told me, simultaneously acknowledging the bad joke. The new hospital began immediately. Almost every night in the darkest hours, the sound of gunfire could be heard in the cemetery. The first time I heard it, I asked 'What firing is that?' Three patients were with me. One of them, very taciturn, said nothing. Another, smiling at me with a smile of complicity, answered merely, 'What do you think?' The third said: 'They are firing in the cemetery', as if he had remarked: 'It is raining'. One night, towards the end of August, whilst I was leaning on my elbows at the open window of my room for some fresh air, there came three shots from the cemetery. Afterwards, silence. What was happening to me? I don't know! It seemed to me that I could see something, as if the cemetery, actually surrounded by gloom, was illuminated. I was unable to leave the window. After a while, I heard a groan. I listened. The groan again, stronger, increasing to a shout, intermittent but heartrending… The darkness, the silence… Nobody answered. The almost dead, within the mountain of the already dead, screamed breathlessly, returning for a few moments to a life more horrible than his frustrated death. The screaming seemed to be directed at me personally. I went to bring some of the hospital staff to the window. 'Let's go and look for him, perhaps we can save his life!' They refused obstinately, and prevented me from going. Who meddles in such affairs! To do so is to transmit a message to those in charge. The message is never mistaken. Time passes, then bang! bang!—two shots in the cemetery. You cease to hear the groans.[38]

In his novel, Hemingway agrees with Azaña's rationalization that the people were collectively responsible—which is to say, nobody was responsible—and that the legally constituted authorities of the Republic were helpless. 'I know [says Pilar] we did dreadful

things to them too. But it was because we were uneducated and knew no better. But they did that on purpose and deliberately.'[39]

This distinction seems dubious. Take, for example, the two most publicized atrocities of the war, both of them crimes of the Right. The first was the massacre of nearly 2,000 prisoners in the bullring at Badajóz after General Yagüe had taken the city from the Left Militia. It was a classic act of *artrocity,* partly ritual revenge by the Moors who had been made to pay heavily for their victory (and which perhaps was not unconnected to past ages of tribal/cultural warfare with the Spaniards); partly tactical in order to secure the rear of the army. Though one journalist witnessed them, and another alleged that Yagüe admitted responsibility, the Right authorities did all they could to suppress knowledge of the murders. The bodies were burned with the aid of petrol—which was in critically short supply for the advance towards Madrid and rapid military victory. Francoist sources issued denials for thirty years after the event.[40] The Right was hardly less anxious to cover up the German bombing of a crowded Guernica on market day, an event which soon produced the most famous of all works of *artrocity,* by Picasso, and which generated more text, and more lies, than any other of the war.[41]

On the other hand, General Queipo de Llano regularly claimed in his notorious radio diatribes that he would kill ten Leftists for every Rightist murdered, and once asserted that even if an enemy was already dead he would dig him up and kill him again. He seems often to have carried out at least the former threat.[42]

The Left authorities in Madrid seem to have tried to avoid *artrocity* when they arranged the massacre of nearly 2,000 Rightist prisoners (perhaps in conscious reprisal for the affair of Badajóz) at the nearby villages of Paracuellos and Torrejón. Yet on the other hand little attempt seems to have been made to cover up what was happening. The victims were carried in daylight in double-decker buses of English origin—a dramatically unusual mode of transport outside the capital—to open spaces on the edge of two villages. The slaughtering took place at times of day when the inhabitants were not at work, and a small crowd watched the proceedings. The bodies were buried by forced labour from the local population.[43] It seems established beyond reasonable doubt that the *paseos* which went on until late 1936 in towns like Madrid, Gerona, Barcelona and a dozen others were highly organized and the killings carried out in cold blood.[44] The clandestine atrocities of the Stalinist secret police in Spain *(Servicio de Inteligenda Militar),* which continued unchecked throughout the last twenty months of the war, await scholarly investigation.

The Left was declaredly against ritual, of course. The Second Republic suppressed all public Catholic ceremony, by a law incorporated in the body of its Constitution, within six months of its coming into being. Once the Civil War had begun, its very linguistic idioms proclaimed the abolition of God and the class system His worship had engendered: the greeting 'salud' replaced 'adiós' and use of the comradely second person—'tu' instead of the formal 'usted'—became the norm. The revolutionary discourse of the Left zone ranged from discouraging the wearing of ties, as indicative of bourgeois sympathies, to the social liberation of women to an extent previously unknown in Europe. Moreover, despite the risk of alienating Ernesto, bullfighting was banned. It is true that the art of the *Fiesta Nacional* was associated in the minds of many with traditionalist Spain and all the 'fascist' emotional vices. Neither the ranches nor the

persons of the great *ganaderos* (bull breeders) were to be found in the Left zone. But the ban may also have had something to do with the colour of the cape *(muleta)* used by the matador during the final phase of the *corrida*. In this act, the Red Flag provides an intolerable irritant to the Bull (that is, Spain) and in the process is dragged in the sand and even trampled by the animal.[45]

The Second Spanish Republic was labelled at the time as 'The Republic of the Professors'. (It called itself 'a Republic of Workers of all kinds'.) This was not quite the utopian breakthrough that it may sound at first dash to Anglo-Saxon ears, the true legislators of the universe at last receiving their recognition (or having their cover blown, depending on your angle of vision). Since 1625, holders of Chairs in Spanish universities have been the direct appointees of the government of the day, and work as salaried servants of the state. These circumstances are not unusual, and with variations are the case in most other western European countries. Indeed, for centuries the normal *cursus honorum* of academics in Spain led ultimately into the higher reaches of government itself. The count-duke of Olivares, who initiated this situation in Castile, had himself been Rector of Salamanca long before Unamuno.[46] The fact that in modern times Spain has been ruled by academics for at least as many years as it has been in the hands of generals should give some pause for reflection. In any case, contrary to what our prejudice dictates, the vocations are not mutually exclusive. At least two academics were members of Franco's first post-war government. Helen Nicholson's son-in-law, a strong supporter of the Right, was Professor of English Literature at the University of Granada. Mrs Nicholson herself was convinced that 'the Madrid Government, composed of anarchists, jailbirds and Russians, were determined to exterminate every man of brains and outstanding ability in Spain'.[47]

Such revelations will (I suspect) do little to reduce the seductive appeal of a Republic of Professors to our Republics of Learning. Many ministers of the Republic were academics or educationalists, others were workers, at least in origin. During the Civil War, a representative of each category was in turn leader of the Left government. As Stalin's agents increasingly pulled the strings, a cabinet composed mainly of Pablos gave way to one mainly of Robert Jordans. Meanwhile, its philistine 'fascist' enemies screamed '¡Muere la Inteligencia!'

Thus it is that intellectualism and workers' revolution appears to us to have achieved in Spain a Gramscian partnership which fulfils our most sedulous fantasies—those of the 1960s as well as the 1930s. But, as a recent assessment of the responses of Spanish intellectuals to these dilemmas concludes, 'the Republic ought not to appear as the homophonic exaltation of a myth, but as a lens through which we are able to study the diverse contradictions of the intellectuals' song'.[48] Moreover, when Professor Juan Negrín was appointed Prime Minister, after the overthrow of the horny-handed Union boss Largo Caballero (April 1937), it was not even on the principle that revolution was too important to be left to the workers, but in order to suffocate the revolution altogether, on the instructions of Stalin.

Most academics are susceptible in some degree to the pro-Left myth of the Spanish Civil War. They operate within a culture which tends to suppress the shortcomings of the Republic. It supports itself, *inter alia,* by use of a convenient mode of binary opposition, creating a hideous and homogeneous enemy. The culture of Francoist Spain operated in

exactly the same way. Its essential self-image, crucial to the understanding of its politics, was provided by a version of history centring upon the creating of a unified nation by the 'Catholic Kings', a process by which—involving as it did the ending of Islamic Spain and the expulsion of the Jews—God purified it and prepared it for the European mission of struggle against heresy. The *Caudillo* saw himself as chosen by God to re-enact this role. Perhaps in his secret desires, this novelist who was making history aspired to meet the requirements of another, laid down a little earlier for British schoolchildren.

> A great united Europe…will never be able to continue and remain firm unless it unites around one great chosen figure, some hero who can lead a great war, as well as administer a wide peace…. But the will of the people must concentrate in one figure, who is also supreme over the will of the people. He must be chosen but at the same time responsible to God alone.[49]

At any rate, once imperialist dreams had vanished, Franco's Spain was left with its proud insularity. The 'National Catholicism' of the 1940s and 1950s—with its ubiquitous invocation of the Virgin Mary—pictured a uniquely pure Spain, besieged by the corrupt materialism of an evil, atheistic outside world. For Franco, Hemingway was a typical representative of the mongrel, Machiavellian nation which had humiliated Spain and grabbed the last remnants of her overseas empire in 1898—an event which affected him as profoundly as it had Unamuno, Azaña, Ortega, and Hemingway himself, if in a different way. This was the same nation (of course) with which he was to make a military alliance in 1953, in a move which went a long way towards buttressing and perpetuating his regime. The killing field of Torrejón was obliterated by the runway of a USAF base, but that of Paracuellos was turned into a national shrine of 'The Movement'. Meanwhile, the crucial importance of providing a public answer to Hemingway, and the centrality of *artrocity* in this mission, was emphatically demonstrated in Franco's own unique contribution to world literature.

The two myths of Left and Right thus needed each other for their own definition and security in power. Just as Spaniards for thirty years only had access to the grim propaganda of Franco's 'Crusade', so we outsiders read only our own interventionist version, which constitutes a Left-inspired ideological text. There is no doubt which has been the most generally influential—the latter, which appeared almost invariably in English, received worldwide diffusion, while the former was rarely translated from the Spanish and reached only a few Latin American bookshops. One of the best-known epithets of my trade avers that in any war it is always the victors who write the history. All the more so since the Dictator's death and the reversion of power to the Left, the Spanish Civil War has provided a major exception to this rule.

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NOTES

1 Biographical information about Hemingway throughout is taken from C. Baker, *Ernest Hemingway; a Life Story* (London: 1959). I have used the Granada edition of *For Whom the Bell Tolls* (London: Granada, 1976).

2 S.Volkov (ed.), *Testimony: The Memoirs of Dmitri Shostakovich* (London: 1979), p. 1, where the Russian proverb 'He lies like an eyewitness' is cited; Shaw professed to believe that 'the death of many was no more tragic than the death of one because the measure of suffering is what any one individual endures…. It must explain why he came to talk so casually about Stalin's mass murders', T.de Vere White, 'An Irishman abroad' in M.Holroyd (ed.), *The Genius of Shaw: A Symposium* (New York: 1979), p. 39.

3 See (e.g.) the sources cited in Hayden White's 'The burden of history', repr. in *Tropics of Discourse* (paperback edn, Baltimore and London: 1985), pp. 27–50.

4 This year will see the first issue of a new review for historians to be published in Lisbon with the title *Penelope: Fazer e Desfazer a Historia* (Linha Editorial).

5 Arnold in 'The function of criticism at the present time' (at this point he is in fact quoting from his translation of Homer). He is specifically referring to the tendency of *continental criticism*—in contrast to our own—'in all branches of knowledge, theology, philosophy, history, art, science, to see the object as in itself it really is'. From *Essays in Criticism* (London: 1865), repr. in J.Bryson (ed.), *Arnold: Poetry and Prose* (London: 1967), p. 351. The Rankean rule was laid down in his *Geschichten der romanischen und germanischen Völker* (Leipzig: 1875), quoted in R.Collingwood, *The Idea of History* (London: 1961) p. 130.

6 H.Thomas, *The Spanish Civil War* (2nd edn, Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1977), pp.926–7.

7 The early English hispanists George Borrow and Richard Ford, and their American contemporaries Washington Irvine and Henry Lea, reflected the liberal/romantic writer's love-hate encounter with Spain. The ambivalence can still be detected in the most celebrated of all contemporary versions of the Civil War, Gerald Brenan's *The Spanish Labyrinth* (London: 1943); and even in the first 'scholarly' studies, which appeared in the 1960s (H.Thomas (1961); G.Jackson, *The Spanish Republic and the Civil War* (Princeton, 1965)). All these were broadly pro-Left in sympathy. Around the same time appeared the most authoritative *Spanish* pro-Left account by Manuel Tuñón de Lara *(La Guerra Civil (1936/1939),* vol. 3 of his general history *La España del Siglo XX* (Paris, 1966; I have used the 5th (Spanish) edn, Barcelona, 1981). Although officially banned, these books entered Spain in large numbers—I remember reading Jackson in the University of Valladolid research library in 1967—and the regime tried to counter their influence. A spate of 'documented' official studies came from the pens of such writers as Maximiano García Vernero, Ricardo de la Cierva, Ramón Salas Larrazábal, and Vicente Palacio Atarde, many of them in the series 'Cuadernos Bibliográficos de la Guerra de España', published by Madrid University; see esp. the three last-named historians' collection in *Aproximación Histórica a la Guerra Española (1936–1939)* (1970).

8 G.Regler, *The Owl of Minerva* (London: 1959), pp. 184ff; R.Carr, *The Civil War in Spain* (London: 1986), p. 158; Thomas, op. cit. (1977 edn), pp. 483–7.

9 In the last sentences of his last major work, the vastly influential Catalan historian Jaime Viçens Vives rather crankily asserted that despite the indigenous origins of many of Spain's problems, the Civil War itself had been more a reaction to outside pressures. The suggestion is that Spain had been a sacrificial victim of international

power-politics, a safety-valve of European ideological apprehensions. See his *Approaches to the History of Spain* (Berkeley, Los Angeles and London: 1970), p. 150.

10 See two recent volumes of essays, P.Preston (ed.), *Revolution and War in Spain, 1931–39* (London: 1985) and M.Blinkhorn (ed.), *Spain in Conflict, 1931–39* (London: 1986).

11 I.Gibson, *The Assassination of Federica García Lorca* (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1979); for José Antonio, contrast the same author's *En Busca de José Antonio* (Madrid: 1980) with A.Gibello García, *José Antonio, ese desconocido* (Madrid: 1985). The personality cult of the charismatic *falange* leader, 'executed' by the Left in 1936, was exploited by Franco; one manifestation was the daubing of the slogan 'José Antonio Primo de Rivera—¡Presente!' on virtually every church and public building in the country. These graffiti have now largely disappeared.

12 From José Ortega y Gasset's essay 'La Rebelión de las Masas', in *Obras Completas,* vol. IV (4th edn, Madrid: 1957), pp. 113–285.

13 See M.Foucault's contribution ('Tales of murder') to I, *Pierre Riviere, having Slaughtered my Mother, my Sister, and my Brother...: A Case of Parricide in the 19th Century* (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1978), pp. 199–212.

14 The best account of the International Brigades is André Castells, *Las Brigadas Internacionales* (Madrid: 1971); a not impartial history of the British brigaders is by Bill Alexander, *Volunteers for Liberty* (London: Lawrence & Wishart, 1982). The official Soviet memorial, by various hands, is *International Solidarity with the Spanish Republic* (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1975).

15 See Valentine Cunningham's introduction to *The Penguin Book of Spanish Civil War Verse* (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1980), pp. 27–94.

16 See Hemingway's *The Fifth Column* and several of his stories set in Madrid, printed in *The Fifth Column and Four Stories from the Spanish Civil War* (New York: 1969). Another of the stories, 'Under the Ridge' is, however, critical of the brutal operations of the PCE 'Commissars' in the new 'People's Army' *(Ejército Popular).*

17 Baker, op. cit., pp. 364–5.

18 William White (ed.), *By-Line Ernest Hemingway: Selected Articles and Dispatches of Four Decades* (New York: 1968), esp. pp. 259–62.

19 For 'earwitness' testimony to Hemingway's fluency in Castilian, see J.L. Castillo Puche, 'El español cotidiano de Ernesto', *El Atlántico Dominical* (La Coruña), 13 September 1987. The Spanish Civil War was the first conflict to be filmed by newsreel cameramen *in extenso;* see A.Aldgate, *Cinema and History: British Newsreels and the Spanish Civil War* (London: 1979).

20 E.Hemingway, *Death in the Afternoon* (1932) (London: Panther, 1977), p. 166.

21 See the account by Luis Portilo printed in R.Payne (ed.), *The Civil War in Spain* (London: 1963), pp. 123–9. But it is important to note that Unamuno had originally supported the generals' rising, appalled by the widespread anarchy which the minority Republican government had failed to control, following the Popular Front electoral victory in February 1936.

22 *Death in the Afternoon,* p. 205.

23 'Jaime de Andrade' (=F.Franco), *Raza: Anecdotario para el Guión de una Película* (Madrid: Fundación Nacional Francisco Franco, 1981), pp. 121–2 (my translation). For the *Caudillo's* obsession with hunting, see the memoirs of his personal physician, Vicente Gil, *Cuarenta Años Junto a Franco* (Barcelona: 1981), pp. 119–25.

24 *For Whom the Bell Tolls,* pp. 96–120 and 309–12.

25 Thomas, op. cit. (1965 edn), p. 233. At Casas Viejas twelve apparently innocent prisoners had been shot in the belly, not by the hated *Guardia Civil*—generally regarded as police agents of the landowner—but by the pro-Republican armed police, the *Guardia de Asalto;* see R.Abella, 'Casas Viejas: Cincuenta Aniversario de la tragedia que minó a la II República', *Historia 16,* 82 (1983), pp. 11–18.

26 See the extracts printed in R.Payne, op. cit., pp. 102–5 from 'factional' novels by Arturo Barea, George Bernanos *et al.;* two other novels incorporating lengthy atrocity material are André Malraux, *Days of Hope* (London: 1938), pp. 251–7; and J.Mª Gironella, *Un Millón de Muertos* (Barcelona: 1961), pp. 21–2. Many details, particularly of the conscious relationship between bullfighting and public political murder, are corroborated by Thomas, op. cit. (1977 edn), pp. 272ff.

27 A.Koestler, *The Invisible Writing* (London: 1954), p. 333.

28 R.Serrano Suñer, *Memorias* (Barcelona: 1977), a more candid recollection than his *Entre Hendaya y Gibraltar* (Madrid: 1947). Serrano was appointed Minister of Press and Propaganda in 1937; see M.Gallo, *Spain under Franco* (London: 1973), p. 47.

29 H.Nicholson, *Death in the Morning,* pp. 113–14; in *Count Your Dead—They are Alive,* p. 206, Lewis alleged that 500 corpses were discovered in Ronda, 'most of them with toothpicks stuck in their eyeballs and their tongues sawn out'. (Both these contributions were published by Lovat Dickinson, London, in 1937.)

30 N.Monsarrat, *This is the Schoolroom* (London: 1939), p. 393.

31 See J.Hall, 'Theme and structure in Lope's *Fuenteovejuna*', *Forum for Modern Language Studies,* X, i (1974), pp. 57–66; in *For Whom the Bell Tolls* Jordan looks forward (if in a bitterly ironic context) to 'when I get my job back at the University…and when undergraduates who take Spanish IV come in to smoke pipes in the evening and I have those so valuable informal discussions about Quevedo, Lope de Vega, Galdós and the other always admirable dead…' (p. 150).

32 *M.Azaña, La Velada en Benicarló,* ed. M.Aragon (Madrid: 1980), pp. 72–3 (my translation).

33 Baker, op. cit., p. 413.

34 As reported by 'Frank Pitcairn' (=Claud Cockburn), *Daily Worker,* 2 November 1936, repr. in J.Pettifer (ed.), *Cockburn in Spain: Despatches from the Spanish Civil War* (London: 1986), p. 113.

35 F.Borkenau, *The Spanish Cockpit* (Ann Arbor: 1963), pp. 97–102.

36 R.Fraser, *Blood of Spain: An Oral History of the Spanish Civil War* (London: 1979), pp. 129–32.

37 Thomas, op. cit. (1965 edn), pp. 219–20 (but amended somewhat in 1977 edn, p. 277); Tuñón de Lara, pp. 561–2; Raymond Carr, *doyen* of British hispanists, argues much the same point, op. cit., pp. 93–5. Another authority, the American historian Stanley Payne, has never accepted this distinction; see, e.g., *The Spanish Revolution*

(London: 1977), pp. 224–5.

38 *La Velada en Benicarló,* pp. 78–9; see also C.Fernández, *Paracuellos de Jarama—¿Carrillo culpable?* (Madrid: 1983), pp. 14–18.

39 *For Whom the Bell Tolls,* p. 313.

40 R.Payne, op. cit., pp. 96–101, prints the report by the American journalist Jay Allen.

41 H.Southworth, *Guernica! Guernica! A Study of Journalism, Diplomacy, Propaganda and History* (Berkeley and London: 1977).

42 See Fraser, op. cit., p. 128.

43 I.Gibson, *Paracuellos—Como Fué* (Madrid: 1983), esp. pp. 11–14 (a confessedly painful investigation by a Socialist); see also the right-inclining account by Fernández, op. cit. Treatment of these two major atrocities—Badajóz on one side, Paracuellos/Torrejón on the other—is a touchstone of 'objective historiography'. A survey of twelve general studies of the war immediately to hand has revealed that eight mention Badajóz but omit to mention Paracuellos/Torrejón; four mention both; but none mentions Paracuellos/Torrejón without mentioning Badajóz.

44 Thomas, op. cit. (1965 edn), pp. 233–5.

45 For an anthropological analysis of the bullfight, see G.Marvin's essay in D.Riches (ed.), *The Anthropology of Violence* (Oxford: 1987).

46 R.L.Kagan, *Students and Society in Early Modern Spain* (Baltimore, 1974); J.H.Elliott, *The Count-Duke of Olivares: The Statesman in an Age of Decline* (New Haven and London: 1986), pp. 17–18.

47 Nicholson, op. cit., p. 99. No mention, however, is made in her book of the fact that no fewer than eight other professors at *Granada alone* were shot by the Right!

48 F.J.Laporta, 'Los Intelectuales y la República', *Historia 16,* 60 (1981), pp. 85–93.

49 D.H.Lawrence, *Movements in European History* (Oxford: 1921; new edn 1981), p. 306.

REGENIA GAGNIER

The literary standard, working-class lifewriting, and gender

A decade ago in 'Working/Women/Writing' Lillian S.Robinson asked that criticism, especially feminist criticism, not accept the doctrines of individualist aesthetics uncritically:

> It is a fundamental precept of bourgeois aesthetics that good art…is art that celebrates what is unique and even eccentric in human experience or human personality. Individual achievement and subjective isolation are the norm, whether the achievement and the isolation be that of the artist or the character. It seems to me that this is a far from universal way for people to be or to be perceived, but one that is intimately connected to relationships and values perpetuated by capitalism. For this reason, I would seriously question any aesthetic that not only fails to call that individualism into question, but does so intentionally, in the name of feminism.[1]

Robinson then reads the collection *I Am a Woman Worker* as an act of community indistinguishable from 'self-actualization'.[2]

In a 1985 essay on imperialism in *Jane Eyre* that attempts to wrench feminists from the mesmerizing focus of Jane's subjectivity, Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak follows Elizabeth Fox-Genovese's characterization of feminism in the West as female access to individualism: 'the battle for female individualism plays itself out within the larger theater of the establishment of meritocratic individualism, indexed in the aesthetic field by the ideology of "the creative imagination".'[3]

At a time when 'the creative imagination' has ceased to bear the authority or command the attention it did in bourgeois Victorian culture; when it is found to be as historically embedded and culturally bound as romantic aesthetics and the autonomous individualism of liberal political theory; and when literary critics forecast 'the end of autobiography' and give up generic definitions of lifewriting, it is worth considering the relation of lifewriting to individualist aesthetics. The first half of this essay will show how individualist aesthetics have been used to disqualify women's and workers' lifewriting and propose an alternative rhetorical strategy for considering it—not as historians have, as data of varying degrees of reliability reflecting external conditions but as texts revealing subjective identities embedded in diverse social and material circumstances. The second will turn to the function of gender in working-class writing, with special attention to the ideological effects of the middle-class sex-gender system upon working-class subjects for whom that system was a material impossibility.

I

Since the nineteenth century, professional writers and literary critics have attempted generic definitions of autobiography, encouraging readers to take some lifewriting as proper autobiography and other as life, perhaps, but not Art. Such determinations were concurrent with developments in literary professionalism. Despite the marketing developments of 1840–80 that resulted in the institutionalizing of authorship—for example, specialist readers at publishing houses, literary agents, author's royalties, the Society of Authors, etc.—literary hegemony, or a powerful literary bloc that prevented or limited 'other' discursive blocs, did not operate by way of the institutional infrastructure, rules, and procedures of the ancient professions of law, medicine, and clergy. By, or through developments in, the nineteenth century, those ancient professions effectively exercised monopolies over their professional association, its cognitive base (knowledge and techniques), its institutional training and licensing, its 'service' ethos justifying autonomy from the market and collegial control, and the security and respectability differentiating its practitioners from other members of society.[4]

From the second half of the eighteenth century, when the democratic revolution combined with the effects of printing, writers had attempted to 'commodify' literary talent in the same way. In his *Essay on the Manners and Genius of the Literary Character* (1795), Isaac Disraeli makes the literary character independent of local or historical environment, locating the writer's special commodity in his unique psychology.[5] After Disraeli, the so-called Romantic poets, with their unconsciously commodified image of the poet, as in Wordsworth's Preface to the second edition of the *Lyrical Ballads* in 1802, aimed at privileged professional status without the institutional apparatus of the learned professions. In *The Prelude,* subtitled *The Growth of a Poet's Mind,* Wordsworth tentatively specified the meticulous—and idiosyncratic—training programme of the poetic sensibility, to be legitimated with great bravura by Shelley's poets in *A Defence of Poetry* (1821; pub. 1840)—'the unacknowledged legislators of the world'. Mary Jean Corbett has argued that with the sublimation of the poet the 'literary character' sought self-determined valuation rather than subordination to the market; recognition of literature as a specialized and special service offered by the possessor of poetic knowledge for the edification of others, and a measure of social independence and economic security. Like Disraeli, the Romantics felt the need to distinguish 'true artists' from the more populous tribe of scribbling tradespeople.[6]

With the exception of Keats, who died young enough to truncate his agonistic relations with a 'free market' that granted the poetic 'gift' of the son of a stable-keeper no special privilege, the Romantic poets were of sufficient means to enjoy the homely privileges of the gentry amateur. In 1802, 80 per cent of the English population lived in villages and farms; by 1851 half the population was urban, and by 1901 80 per cent lived in towns. Within Victorian bourgeois ideology specialized knowledge and services came to inhabit the public sphere. The person who 'worked' at 'home', within the private sphere, was either paid very little, as in working-class women's 'sweated' homework, or nothing, as in middle-class women's household management. This contradiction for the literary men who worked at home contributed to their fear of 'effeminization' within a society that

conflated 'public' with masculine for the middle class and differentiated this competitive market-place from the private 'feminine' space of the home.

Dickens's work of what is called autobiographical fiction, *The Personal History and Experience of David Copperfield* (1850), did for the middle-class novelist what Wordsworth had done for the poet, and more: it introduced to an extended market— Dickens was the most popular writer of the nineteenth century—the professional author, and reclaimed and colonized the home as *his* domain. Dickens's competitive product, a 'critical' reflective sensibility ('Nature and accident had made me an author', writes David in Chapter 48, entitled 'Domestic'), was commodified in *David Copperfield* as *the* autobiography of the self-made author: it showed the buying public who the man writing 'really' was. But in contributing to the ideological distinction between mental and manual labour (David vs. the Peggotty family) that oppressed working-class writers in ways that I shall specify below, Dickens also contributed to the division of labour along lines of gender. He showed that behind every David Copperfield writing at home, there was an Agnes Wickfield, a perfect household manager, for whom homemaking was as effortless as writing was for David.[7] David's 'progress' to worldly success follows a sequence of relations with unsuitable women, until childlike and incompetent mother and first wife, vulgar nurse, excessively independent aunt, and flirtatious, class-aspiring Little Emily are supplanted by the 'good angel' Agnes, who even as a child is introduced as 'a little housekeeper' with 'a little basket-trifle hanging at her side, with keys in it'.[8] Agnes Wickfield Copperfield is the prototypical wife who cares for the material needs of the writer and who in later lives would type the manuscripts. Moreover, the writer David was to be distinguished from lesser 'hack' writers like Mr Micawber (whose wife is disorganized and whose imprudently large family is banished to Australia); Mr Dick (the 'blocked' hysteric who lives with the 'divorced' and sterile aunt); and Uriah Heep (the sweaty-palmed charity-school lad who had presumed to compete with David for Agnes).[9]

A vast cultural production relegating women to household management while 'authors' wrote made it difficult for middle-class women to write. Men and professionals, especially professional men, worked in the abstract realm of mental labour and women and workers, especially women workers, worked in the immediate, concrete material. Agnes, as it were, types the manuscripts of David's *œuvre:* women, like workers, mediate for men between conceptual action and its concrete forms: 'lady typewriters' (as late-Victorians called them), Beatrice Webb's 'social investigators', Florence Nightingale's nurses, and working-class cooks and cleaners.

In the canonical literary autobiographies, having a woman at home is necessary to the self-conception of authorial men. In John Stuart Mill's *Autobiography* (1873), the great radical retires to Avignon (to get sufficient distance and perspective upon English society) with his stepdaughter Helen Taylor as secretary. In John Ruskin's *Praeterita* (1885–9), the social critic retires to Brantwood with 'Joanie' Severn and calls his last chapter, before madness silenced him for ever, 'Joanna's Care'. Charles Darwin's attentive wife and considerate family enabled the scientist to withdraw for the last forty years of his life from bothersome social engagements (that made him ill, he says) into secluded work and domesticity at Down (*Autobiography,* 1887).

In her edition of his *Autobiography,* Darwin's granddaughter Nora Barlow includes some notes Darwin scribbled in two columns as he deliberated whether or not to marry.

On the plus side, the advantages of marriage, he listed

> constant companion, (friend in old age), who will feel interested in one, object
> to be beloved and played with—better than a dog anyhow—Home, and
> someone to take care of house…. Imagine living all one's day solitarily in
> smoky dirty London House.—Only picture to yourself a nice soft wife on a sofa
> with good fire, and books and music perhaps.

On the negative, 'Not MARRY' side, he listed, 'Perhaps my wife won't like London;
then the sentence is banishment and degradation with indolent idle fool' and 'I never
should know French,—or see the Continent,—or go to America, or go up in a Balloon.'[10]

In Samuel Butler's fictive autobiography *The Way of All Flesh* (1873–8; pub. 1903),
the only woman the narrator approves of is a rich aunt who offers the protagonist a room
of his own in which to develop his aesthetic and muscular interests and then conveniently
dies leaving him her fortune. Now if we return to Disraeli we find a chapter on 'The
domestic life of genius' in which we are instructed that 'the home of the literary character
should be the abode of repose and of silence' (p. 234), where 'the soothing interruptions
of the voices of those whom he loves [may] recall him from his abstractions into social
existence' (p. 236). And there are additional chapters upon 'the matrimonial state of
literature' and 'a picture of the literary wife' who silently mediates between social and
material distractions while the detached and isolated literary character produces abstract
thought.

Even reading, although it unquestionably empowered men of all classes, was
dangerous for women. In her brilliant autobiographical piece *Cassandra* (1852), Florence
Nightingale writes contemptuously of the autonomy denied women in the practice of
their being 'read aloud to', a practice she compares to forced feeding.[11] In many working
women's autobiographies reading is perceived by employers to interfere with their work
and consequently often jeopardizes women's jobs. Because of the sexual division of
labour, reading and writing threatened rather than advanced women's work.

Feminist scholars have told the story of middle-class women's writing. Yet like the
historical subjects themselves they have rarely questioned the distinctions between
mental and manual labour that had first excluded women, and they have rarely attempted
to demystify the individualist 'creative imagination' that women, as producers of
concrete material life, had historically been denied.[12]

In one of the most revealing cultural confrontations in modern British history, Virginia
Woolf's 1931 Introduction to the lifewriting of the Women's Co-Operative Guild
illustrates the cross-purposes of individualist aesthetics and other uses of literacy.[13]
Having been asked to write a preface, Woolf begins with the problem of prefaces for
autonomous aesthetics—'Books should stand on their own feet' (p. xv)—and solves the
problem of introducing the Co-Operativists' writing by producing not quite a preface but
rather a personal letter to the editor, another upper-class woman, Margaret Llewelyn
Davies. Woolf wants the Co-Operativists to be individualists, to develop the self-
expression and choices for things that are ends in themselves, like 'Mozart and Einstein',
and not things that are means, like 'baths and money' (pp. xxv–xxvi). She wants for
them, in short, rooms of their own, private places for private thoughts, detached, as

Bourdieu would say, from the necessities of the natural and social world.[14] Some working-class women, indeed many upper domestic servants—the most ideologically 'embourgeoised' workers—did want such pleasures; but the Guild women's lifewriting indicates that they wanted something different, communality; and distance from the necessities of the natural and social world ('our minds flying free at the end of a short length of capital' as Woolf puts it (p. xxv)) had not led middle-class women to change society in that direction.

Rather, the Co-Operativists are especially grateful to the Guild for transforming shy nervous women into 'public speakers' (pp. 32, 48–9, 65, 100–1, 141): a woman can write forever in a room of her own without ever learning not to go dry-mouthed and shaking in public. Woolf writes sympathetically about the production of the Co-Operativists' texts, 'a work of labour and difficulty. The writing has been done in kitchens, at odds and ends of leisure, in the midst of distractions and obstacles' (p. xxxix), but confined by her own aesthetics of individualism and detachment, she cannot imagine that 'the self' can be communal, engaged, and dialogical as well as individual, detached, and introspective. If such a world were possible, she cannot imagine herself within it: 'This force of theirs'— the Co-Operativists are tellingly always 'they' to Woolf's editorial 'we'—

> this smouldering heat which broke the crust now and then and licked the surface with a hot and fearless flame, is about to break through and melt us together so that life will be richer and books more complex and society will pool its possessions instead of segregating them—all this is going to happen inevitably—but only when we are dead. (p. xxix)

Social historians (not to speak of socialist feminists) have made this point somewhat differently to middle-class feminists. The issue concerns normative dualism, the belief that the especially valuable thing about human beings is their mental capacity and that this capacity is a property of individuals rather than groups ('Mozart and Einstein'), and liberal rationality, the belief that rational behaviour is commensurate with the maximization of individual utility.[15] Showing the astonishing 'strategies' of married working-class women living along the poverty line in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries—working part- or full-time outside the home, using children's wages, controlling household budgets, using the products of their families' allotments, and borrowing both goods and cash—Elizabeth Roberts writes that she is often asked what women themselves 'got' out of their lives:

> It has been remarked that they gave to their families mucn more than they received in return. These questions and comments would not have been asked nor made by the women themselves. Their own individual concerns were of little importance to them. They appeared to have found their chief satisfaction in running their homes economically and seeing their children grow up. Their major preoccupations were (throughout the period) feeding, clothing and housing their families.[16]

In an article in the same collection, Diana Gittins writes of the three interrelated and often overlapping occupational spheres for working-class women from the mid-nineteenth

century through the second world war—paid work, unpaid domestic work in extended families, and marriage—as 'strategies for survival, but survival for the household generally rather than for the individual women'.[17] My reading of working women's lifewriting confirms that such strategies for the family household were, again, indistinguishable from self-actualization.

But non-individualism comes in many forms and working-class lifewriting suggests that that of women at home with their families in nineteenth-century Britain was the least conducive to the constitution of writing subjects. Contrary to the claims on behalf of a room of one's own, workers' lifewriting suggests that writing women Were those whose work took them out of the home. Although some working people wrote to understand themselves, producing the kinds of texts I discuss in detail below, most wrote for communicative rather than introspective or aesthetic ends: to record lost experiences for future generations, to raise money, to warn others, to teach others, to relieve or amuse themselves. One functionalist, William Tayler, footman to a wealthy London widow in 1837, wrote his autobiographical journal 'to improve my hand-writing'.[18]

Such functionalist uses of literacy contrast markedly with the aesthetic of detached individualism represented by literature (as it is represented in literature departments) in general and the autobiographical canon in particular. The criteria we may deduce from the canon include a meditative and self-reflective sensibility; a faith in writing as a tool of self-exploration; an attempt to make sense of life as a narrative progressing in time, with a pronounced narrative structured upon parent/child relations and familial development; and a belief in personal creativity, autonomy, and freedom for the future. This is autobiography as the term is usually employed by literary critics, and it is also bourgeois subjectivity, the dominant ideology of the nineteenth and at least the first half of the twentieth century. It adds to assumptions of normative dualism and liberal rationality the assumption of abstract individualism, or the belief that essential human characteristics are properties of individuals independent of their material conditions and social environment.

Modern literary critics have made deviation from this model of autobiography into a moral as well as an aesthetic failure. In 1960 Roy Pascal claimed that 'bad' autobiography indicated 'a certain falling short in respect to the whole personality…an inadequacy in the persons writing, a lack of moral responsibility towards their task'.[19] Pascal's stance belongs with that of James Olney in *Metaphors of Self;* both are apologists for the primacy of individualism as represented by a literary tradition. Even more recent and properly deconstructive theorists of autobiography, like Paul Jay, Avrom Fleishman, and Michael Sprinker, privilege what they intend to deconstruct by employing such notions as 'the end of autobiography'.[20]

Therefore, it is probably less useful to approach such 'extra-literary' texts as working people produce with frames as value-laden as 'autobiography' than as strategic articulations in a language-power game.[21] By 'strategic' I do not necessarily mean narrowly intended as a political strategy, although many working-class writers, such as the Guild Co-Operativists, intended to place their writing in the service of a political project. I mean, rather, that discursive production must be understood in terms of the multifarious purposes and projects of specific individuals or groups in specific material circumstances. I have often found it useful, for example, to adapt Roberto Mangabeira Unger's spectrum of personality (from longing to be with others to fear of others) to

discourse, locating a text between the poles of discursive participation and antagonism with others.[22] All autobiographical 'moves' in my sense are such inevitable strategies and all are 'interested'. By articulation I mean a speech act in a discursive field of other such acts: the autobiographical move is a cultural product in circulation with other such cultural products. Some workers, for example some music-hall performers, wrote specifically for their writing's exchange-value. Because articulations occur in a theoretically open discursive field—torture, war, and repressive state apparatuses can of course close it, but these are less relevant to the working class in Britain than elsewhere—they can be perceived as participatory or antagonistic to other articulations. Writers like Annie Kenney in *Memoirs of a Militant* (1924) and William Lovett in *Pursuit of Bread, Knowlege, and Freedom* (1876) are participatory with their respective movements, Suffrage and Chartism, while antagonistic to the hegemonic articulations of sexism and classism—hegemonic again meaning dominant with respect to other discourses, denying other discourses their full development and articulation. By 'language-power game' I mean the inevitable social arena in which individuals present 'themselves' and are received. (Needless to say, 'game' here implies structured interactions rather than triviality.) For some, a simpler way of putting this would be to say that I read lifewriting rhetorically, taking language as realist, not in the sense of metaphysical realism, direct isomorphism with reality (Thomas Nagel's 'the view from nowhere'), but realist in the sense of projecting objectively real articulations of power in particular communities. Like reading itself, writing is a function of specific and distinct communities.[23]

I want to emphasize that when I say 'power game' I intend 'power' more with its feminist than its Foucauldian associations: empowerment, 'power to' rather than 'power over'. Specifically I have in mind empowerment to represent oneself in a discursive cultural field. In the postmodern world we live in, 'autobiography' as bourgeois subjectivity may be dead except in academic or psychoanalytic circles; but as long as there is society, even cyborg society, there will be strategic articulations in its language-power games.[24] It is the responsibility of protectors of speech not to disqualify sub-hegemonic articulations, like women's, like workers', by evaluating them out of the game.

II

There is no 'typical' Victorian working-class life or lifewriting; rather the forms of lifewriting were as multifarious as the British labouring classes themselves. I have provided an anatomy of such writing elsewhere, based largely upon several hundred of the 804 texts indexed in John Burnett, David Vincent, and John Mayall's important bibliography, *The Autobiography of the Working Class* (1984), but several salient points are worth reiterating here before focusing on gender.[25] First, the loose 'generic' groupings that may be made according to the rhetorical approach outlined above indicate some uniformity in how texts are written, read, and historically assessed in terms of the participatory modes of value and consensus and the antagonistic modes of resistance, domination, and appropriation. Thus, in nineteenth-century Britain, when working people

began to include their occupations in titles of their work, as in *Memories of a Working Woman, Confessions of a Strolling Player, Narrative of a Factory Cripple, In Service,* and *Autobiography of a Private Soldier,* 'memories' often came from southern agrarian workers who hoped to preserve local history for members of the community, or domestic workers whose trade declined radically after the First World War, 'narratives' from organized northern industrial workers who sought to empower other workers and compete historically with the bourgeoisie, and 'confessions' from transients like stage performers who hoped to gain cash by giving readers immediately consumable sensation.[26] In other words, socioeconomic status, rhetorical purpose, status of labour, and geography were often heavily significant in the forms the lifewriting took.

The second point that must be reiterated is that whether the writer was a factory operative (38 per cent of the working population in 1861), agricultural labourer (18 per cent), miner (14 per cent), or domestic servant (19 per cent—half of the population of women workers), for working-class autobiographers, subjectivity—being a significant agent worthy of the regard of others, a human subject as well as an individuated 'ego', distinct from others—was not a given.[27] In conditions of long working hours, crowded housing, and inadequate light, it was difficult enough for workers to contemplate themselves, but they had also to justify themselves as writers worthy of the attention of others. Thus I have written of what I call the 'social atom' phenomenon. Most working-class lifewriting begins not with family lineage or a birthdate (coqventional middle-class beginnings), but rather with a statement of its author's ordinariness, encoded in titles like *One of the Multitude* (1911) by the pseudonymous George Acorn, a linguistically-conscious furniture builder who aspired to grow into an oak. The authors were conscious that to many potential readers they were but 'social atoms' making up the undifferentiated 'masses'. As radical journalist William Adams put it in 1903, 'I call myself a Social Atom—a small speck on the surface of society. The term indicates my insignificance…. I am just an ordinary person.'[28] Depending upon the author's purpose in writing, such rhetorical modesty could signify any point within an affective range extending from defensive self-effacement through defiant irony, as in the 'Old Potter' Charles Shaw's splendid, 'We were a part of Malthus's "superfluous population".'[29] I have examined the sources of this rhetorical modesty in the writers' struggle, as *Homo laborans* rather than *Homo cogitans,* to distinguish themselves from 'the masses' in order to present themselves as subjects worthy of the attention of others; to indicate their simultaneous resistance to embourgeoisement and their competition with representations of themselves in middle-class fiction and its implicit, broadly Cartesian, assumptions about the self.

The relevance of gender appears with the structural differences between workers' lifewriting and the classic realist autobiography, in which gender plays a major structuring role. The classic realist autobiography includes such elements as remembered details of childhood, parent/child relations, the subject's formal education, and a progressive developmental narrative of self culminating in material well-being and 'fame' within greater or lesser circles (whether the Old Boy's place among Old School fellows or John Stuart Mill's place in the democratic revolution). Most workers' autobiographies deviate from this narrative pattern for fairly obvious reasons: in *A Cornish Waif's Story* discussed below, Emma Smith was born in the workhouse, raised

by a child molester, and educated in a penitentiary.

First, most of the writers were working outside the home by the time they were 8 years old, so the period of 'childhood' is problematic, the remembered details often truncated to the more common 'first memory'. This first memory is often traumatic; its significant positioning within the first paragraphs of the text operates and resonates differently from the evolutionary narrative of childhood familiar to readers of middle-class autobiography. Second, as will be demonstrated in detail below, parent-child relations among the working class often differed from those in the upper classes. Third, since the subject's formal education competed with the family economy, in most cases it was not limited to a particular period. In many working-class examples, education often continues throughout the book and up to the time of writing. And fourth, most working-class autobiographies do not end with success but rather *in medias res*. In this context it is worth noting that with the exception of political and religious-conversion lifewriting, most working-class texts do not have the crises and recoveries that are common to 'literary' autobiography, just as they do not have climaxes. The bourgeois climax-and-resolution/action-and-interaction model presupposes an active and reactive world not always accessible to working-class writers, who often felt themselves passive victims of economic determinism. Working since the age of 9, Mrs Wrigley writes a life consisting of a series of jobs, mentioning in the one sentence devoted to her marriage its maternal character and her childlike relations with her employers: 'I was sorry to give up such a good home, and they was sorry for me to leave but my young man wanted to get married for he had no mother.'[30]

What is 'missing' then in much working-class lifewriting is the structuring effect, apparent in any middle-class 'plot', of gender dimorphism. In Britain, middle-class boys experienced and wrote of an ordered progress from pre-school at home to childhood and youth at school and university, through the Raj, diplomatic corps, or civil service, or through domestic life with equally genderized wives and daughters.[31] Middle-class women wrote of early life with fathers and later life with husbands. These two patterns— as central to the great nineteenth-century realist novels as to Victorian autobiography— represent middle-class gender construction of masculinity and femininity, power and domesticity. Whereas boys learned 'independence' through extrusion from mothers and nannies, and paternalism through elaborate forms of self-government in public schools, middle-class girls under constant supervision by parents and headmistresses learned to be dependent upon and obedient to husbands. (Many, needless to say, also rebelled against this pattern. See especially Cecily Hamilton's trenchant and witty *Marriage as a Trade* (1909), recommended reading for every Victorian and feminist course.) On the other hand, from the time they were old enough to mind younger siblings, to their minding the children of the upper classes, to their non-companionate (economically oriented) marriages ('because my young man had no mother'), working-class women learned to be self-reliant and nurturing, and their husbands learned to be 'matronized'. 'What I needed was a man who was master in his own house,' writes Emma Smith, 'upon whom I could lean. Instead of this, I always had to take a leading role.'[32]

This difference in the practical sex-gender system leads to the major structural difference of working-class lifewriting, but there are trans-class similarities according to gender as well. Working women refer far more frequently to their husbands or lovers and

children (their personal relationships) and working men to their jobs or occupations (their social status). Traditionally prevented from speaking in public, even women like the Guild Co-Operativists, who write with the explicit purpose of political reform, speak from within a material economic realm. Yet politicized men, even before they gained full male suffrage in 1885, were accustomed to public speaking (for example, in pubs) and argued within the discourse of national politics.[33] Comparatively isolated within their homes or others' as domestics, the Co-Operativists learned to internalize rhetorical values acceptable to the middle class, such as the catechism, criticizing personal injustices and inequalities within marriage and the family. On the other hand, from early experience in public and on the job with others, the men write movingly of specific material deprivations but predominantly of the 'rights' of workers and the class struggle, explicitly attacking class structure.

This different understanding of injustice—one local and immediate, the other systemic—leads to different formulations of political goals. The Co-Operativists see politics as a forum for domestic demands, like baths for miners or peace for one's remaining son. The radical men want what the middle class has. These may not in effect be different goals: what the middle class has is baths and sons comparatively safe from war; but because the women reason from personal example and moral lesson and the men launch discourses articulated within the democratic revolutions of the US and France, even the politically-motivated lifewriting is often informed differently by women and men.

Such differences, however, arise in the relative isolation of women's labour, as the highest-paying and most independent employment was consigned to men as principal breadwinners and women were driven from the factories from the 1840s. They may be dealt with by social historians concerned with the interrelations of gender, 'private' and 'public' spheres. For the literary or cultural critic, gender in working-class lifewriting is most interesting when it shows itself as ideological hegemony—in Antonio Gramsci's sense of popular consent to the political order. Here the game is embourgeoisement.

In such texts one reads the cost of bourgeois—especially familial or gendered—ideology to women and men who were not permitted bourgeois lives. They were often written by people with lives of unmitigated hardship, for whom writing was a form, more or less successful, of therapy. They are not trying to sell their work so much as to analyse and alleviate their pain, yet their narratives are derived from models, often literary models, more suitable to the conditions of middle-class authors. Unlike other working-class writers, they have also extensively adopted middle-class ideology: they have accepted the value of introspection and writing as tools of self-understanding; they seek to write their lives as midde-class narratives, especially with respect to the development of parent/child relations and material progress; and they believe that writing and self-understanding will help them succeed. Yet although they attempt self-analysis, their experience cannot be analysed in the terms of their acculturation. This gap between ideology and experience leads not only to the disintegration of the narrative the writer hopes to construct, but, as the analyses below will show, to the disintegration of personality itself.

Discussion of these texts is inescapably reductive, for their characteristic is the authors' layered revisions of their experience, which contribute to an unusual density of

signification. Literary readers will find them the most 'literary' of working-class writers.[34] Here I shall focus upon the writers' attempts to structure their lives according to middle-class gender ideology.

The struggle between ideology and experience is inscribed both micrologically and macrologically in James Burn's *Autobiography of a Beggar Boy* (1855). At 9 years old, Burn tracks down his biological father in Ireland, where the boy is forced to wear rags, endure lice, and work in isolation. In a fit of humiliation and self-hatred, and a parody of primogeniture, he runs away, calling the dirt he associates with his father his 'patrimony'. 'I had neither staff, nor scrip, nor money in my pocket. I commenced the world with the old turf-bag. In order that I might sever the only remaining link that bound me to my family, I tore two syllables from my name [i.e. from McBurney, his father's name].'[35] This minute detail of the boy's insufficiency to meet a cultural code—his castration of his father's name as sign of his lack of father and patrimony in a patriarchal and propertied culture—prefigures the larger narrative distortion reflecting the insufficiency of his experience to meet his society's master narrative of male progress.

When Burn summarizes the lesson of his life for his son at the end of his book (pp. 199–200), the summary corresponds to his preceding narrative only up to a point: he writes of his thoughtless wandering until he was 12 years old, of parental neglect ('I had been blessed with three fathers and two mothers, and I was then as comfortably situated as if I never had either one or the other' (p. 106)), and of his lack of social connection for long periods. This summary corresponds to the episodic structure of his preceding story and to the fragmented nature of his childhood as itinerant beggar on the Scots Border. Yet then Burn refers to the 'grand turning point' of his life, when he learned a trade as hatter's apprentice. In fact, only a nominal change occurred wth his apprenticeship: since there was no work, he was permitted to call himself a hatter rather than a beggar while on a tramp for 1,400 miles (p. 135). He makes much of a change of status from unemployable to employable, although no material change occurs—he remains unemployed. Similarly, he continues to insist upon the great happiness of his domestic life, despite the necessity of living apart from his family for long periods of tramping and the deaths of his wife and twelve of his sixteen children. The summary concludes with the assertion of his relative success in remaining respectable as a debt collector to the poor, a respectability that was reinforced by the bowdlerized version of 1882, in which he finally obliterated all references to sexual experiences and bodily functions.

This summary male middle-class narrative, beginning with the imaginary 'grand turning point' of his trade, occludes, first, Burn's political activity, for which he was well known, and, second, much of his past. With the threat of the General Strike in 1839, he had turned against the Chartists and begun to conceive of his prior activism as 'madness'. In revising his life this 'madness' is excluded along with earlier madnesses, such as the madness of Scottish and Irish poetry. Due to its link with superstition and supernaturalism—and despite his opinion that English poetry is 'dull and lifeless' in comparison—Burn must reject it as irreconcilable with 'useful knowledge' (pp. 192–8). Similarly, the lively Dickensian style of the first two chapters shows his affection for society on the Borders, its lack of social differentiation and its extreme linguistic diversity. Yet this too disappears from his summary. He is left attempting to reconcile his proprietorship of taverns and spirit cellars with his hysterical temperance, and passing

over the details of his job as debt collector to his former Chartist friends. Everything that must be repudiated in the service of class mobility—social tolerance, epistemological pluralism, the aspect of freedom of life on the Borders as a beggar boy—is expunged from the summary. Yet in dutifully obliterating or rewriting his past, there is no indication that Burn is comfortable with his present or future. As he puts it, 'Amid the universal transformation of things in the moral and physical world, my own condition has been tossed so in the rough blanket of fate, that my identity, if at any time a reality, must have been one which few could venture to swear to' (p. 56); or, 'All our antecedents are made up of so many yesterdays, and the morrow never comes' (p. 185).

Moreover, despite the seasonal difficulties of the hatting trade and high unemployment among artisans in Glasgow in the 1830s and 1840s, and despite an active and successful life as spokesperson for hatters in the Glagow United Committee of Trades Delegates, Burn blames himself for his failure in business. Assuming a liberal and masculine ethic of autonomy and progress, he concludes that he was personally deficient in the struggle to maintain either self or social position, and he therefore believes himself uneducable: 'Although my teachers have been as various as my different positions, and much of their instruction forced upon me by the necessities of my condition, yet I have always been a dull dog' (p. 196). Assuming individual responsibility for conditions beyond his control and de-identifying with other workers, he remains merely isolated, neither materially and socially middle-class nor identifying with his own. The disturbing power of the first half of the text, with the boy's mystical worship of his stepfather, the disintegration of the later sections the emphatic progress and rationality in tension with the obsessive memories of early days and the mystified transition from anger against a negligent father to guilt as an unworthy native son: all contribute to a nightmare of socio-psychic marginality. None the less, the book was received as a gratifying example of self-improvement and respectability among the lower classes.[36] Today we can see it as releasing all the phantoms of an ideology of familialism and progress upon a child who was deprived of a family and a chance. Unlike other working-class writers, Burn attempts to narrate his experience according to upper-class models. The price he pays is narrative and psychological disintegration.

Whereas Burn's story shows the effect of Enlightenment narratives, presumably from his days as a Chartist, and masculine 'success' stories combining with familial narrative, women's narratives of this type are correspondingly dominated by familialism and romance. In his *Annals of Labour,* the social historian John Burnett cites Louise Jermy's *Memories of a Working Woman* as an example of a successful transition from a low-paying millinery position into domestic service and ultimately marriage.[37] Yet Jermy sees her life as a series of episodes failing to conform to her expectactions of family and romance. Born in 1877, she is motherless before her second birthday. Her childhood and health are 'bartered' by her father and stepmother when she is taken from school to do mangling at home in order to enable her parents to buy a house. Her adolescence is isolated, 'not like other girls', between illness and an apprenticeship at 14 to a dressmaker in 'sweated' conditions (long hours in confined and crowded space, few and short breaks, low pay). Her education is continually frustrated as her stepmother destroys her books, and while in service to a married couple at Birmingham University 'anything like deep thinking produced the dreadful headaches' (p. 93).

Jermy's romantic life is also a series of non-correspondences. A fragile betrothal conflicts with the long hours in service and the 9 p.m. curfew of domestic servants, until her fiancé bolts and leaves her in a severe depression that endures two years. Finally she marries a farm labourer in 1911, but, like many husbands described by working-class wives, he is 'delicate', ill every spring, and lives only ten years. Jermy returns to work to raise her two sons.

She suffers from amnesia, ceases in childhood to confide in others, and bears a conviction of her awkwardness and unattractiveness. She leaves the millinery shop not, as Burnett implies, for better wages but in order to leave home; and she wears black—the 'decent black' of domestic servants, as Mayhew put it, 'no ringlets, followers, or scandals'—on and off the job.[38] While each episode fails to correspond to its middle-class analogue, Jermy none the less adopts middle-class standards and conventional narratives as her own. R.H.Mottram introduces *The Memories of a Working Woman* as the first autobiography written by a member of the Women's Institute. Yet Jermy never mentions the Institute: the dominant features of her life, at least prior to the Institute, were perverted familial relations (glorified dead mother, evil stepmother), aborted romance, and pronounced isolation.

In *A Cornish Waif's Story: An Autobiography* the pseudonymous Emma Smith's life is also a sequence of non-correspondences to middle-class norms. Born in 1894, Smith was the 'illegitimate' daughter of one of the twenty-three children of a Cornish tin-miner blinded in a mining accident and retired without pension. As a child she is told that her mother is her sister. As accompanist to a hurdy-gurdy man, she is sexually molested by a man she calls 'Fagin' and his friend Dusty the Sword Swallower. At 11, she runs away and is sent to a convent penitentiary, a home for 'errant' girls: 'I was no more a prostitute than Dickens's Oliver Twist was a thief, if I may draw upon a character of fiction to illustrate what I mean. Yet here I was placed in the category, and indirectly it has affected my whole life' (p. 108).

The convent penitentiary fails to prepare her for her re-entry into society, especially for marriage and a family, while it equally denies her a 'speakable' past. Upon release, 'it was impressed upon me…that I was never to talk about the Home or let anyone know where I had come from …it was something to be very ashamed of' (p. 133). Working as a servant in a vicarage provides dissonances that are borne out by her own marriage— 'Nothing was as I imagined it. The vicar was blessed with an unholy temper. His wife did not get on with her husband and took no pains to hide the fact' (p. 134). Her marriage to a gardener is probably arranged by her employers—'If you have two servants, a man and a woman, the thing to do is to marry them up. Then you have two servants for the price of one' (p. 152)—and she very quickly distances herself as a unique, reflective, psychologically rich self ('a complex piece of machinery') from her husband ('a simple country man'), who, as a transparent product of his class status, fails to fulfil her emotional, intellectual, and romantic aspirations (pp. 152–66).

She obsessively attempts to reconcile with her mother (from an external point of view, always a non-existent dyad), aborts an extramarital romance in Australia, and returns with her husband to Cornwall. Yet rather than a parish girl's progress to financial and domestic stability (she is a successful head laundress with three healthy daughters), Smith's is an 'hysterical' narrative indicating her non-adjustment to married life and

maternity.

If personal identity is a function of a temporal unification of past, present, and future, Smith was as deprived as Foucault's 'Herculine Barbin' (who, raised as a girl in a convent, was legally declared to be male as an adult) of the past she had had to repress, and as unprepared for the future entailed by her gender and family: 'I would dream that I was an inmate of a convent…. I was, or could have been, supremely happy if it were not for the knowledge that somewhere in the background I had a husband and children' (p. 178). After several mental breakdowns, she twice attempts suicide (quietly, like a good servant, with aspirin and sleeping pills), but is finally convinced by her doctor that her responsibility is to live for her family. In her last paragraph Smith once again turns to fictive modes to mediate her experience, this time apparently unconsciously:

> I should end my life story on a very happy note if I could honestly record that I have grown so well-balanced mentally that nothing now upsets or worries me. Such, however, is not the case. I am easily worried and upset over certain things, and for this reason as much as for others, I am anxious to find a little cottage somewhere in Cornwall with a bit of ground upon which we can grow vegetables and flowers. It would be a great thrill to me if my dream cottage had a view of both the sun rising and the sunset, for the sun rising fills me with hope, and the sunset fills me with peace. (p. 188)

Novel-readers will recognize this image of the rose-covered cottage as the standard ending of Dickens's domestic fiction, including the image and final resting place of the adopted orphan Oliver Twist.

What is common to these texts is the conscious desire on the part of the writers to write their lives according to middle-class narratives and the unconscious distance between those narratives—especially of financial success, familialism, and romance—and the facts of their existence, especially economic determinism, non-familialism, aborted romance, and non-companionate marriage. What these narratives of disintegrated personality tell us about gender is that in circumstances of familial deprivation, familial ideology can only be assumed at great psychic cost.

Yet not all working-class lifewriters assumed familial ideology at such a cost. It was a cultural commonplace that many male radicals—for example Thomas Hardy, William Lovett, Thomas Cooper, Robert Blatchford, Robert Lowery, James Watson, and Thomas Dunning—had been raised by women alone ('resourceful widows' was the technical term), and they resisted bourgeois ideology as much as Emma Smith suffered from it. Unlike the writers above, the male radicals were engaged in communities with common purpose and in the process of rearticulating their common experience through the progressive narratives of the Enlightenment—as Lovett put it, through their common pursuits of bread, knowledge, and freedom, or material well-being, education, and political status. Emma Smith, Louise Jermy, and the Chartist renegade James Burn, on the other hand, were as isolated, individualistic, or unaffiliated as the middle-class subjects whose ideology they adopted—as isolated but not as autonomous: Smith maintained the forms of middle-class respectability and swallowed her pain like sleeping pills; Jermy was forced to return to work to support her fatherless sons; and as Burn said,

whether or not there was work, his children were his 'hostage to the State' (p. 132).

Faced with such difficulties, the emotional health, or functional identities, of working-class writers were not dependent upon their politicization in any rigid sense so much as upon their participation in alternative articulations of their common experience. The indomitable Ellen Johnston, known to working people as Scotch Nell the 'Factory Girl', could have been a Jermy or a Smith. Abandoned by her father, a stonemason, 'tormented' by her stepfather, 'deceived' by two lovers, and ostracized as a fallen woman, the powerloom weaver/poet's brief *Autobiography* (1867) is melodramatically modelled on Walter Scott and 'those strange romantic ordeals attributed to the imaginary heroines "of Ingelwood Forest"' and her poems show the effects of literary hegemony, although often gender—and class-inverted, as in 'Lines to a Young Gentleman of Surpassing Beauty'.[39]

Yet Johnston articulated as well a common experience of great value to herself and fellow workers: for every epideictic poem to a romantic young gentleman there are many more in praise of working men (she writes, she says, to relieve them from the toils of factory life), and her *Autobiography* concludes not with melancholy and melodrama but with her taking her foreman to court, indicating that the Factory Girl has learned to imitate the middle class in more than literary hegemony. She publishes proud poems on her 'illegitimate' daughter, 'bonny Mary Auchinvole', composes many—including love poems—on behalf of less literate coworkers, includes in her volume addresses and songs written for her from other workers (to which she often composes personal responses), goes international with 'Welcome, Garibaldi' and 'The Exile of Poland', and writes with irresistible affection for the material life of the factory, as in 'An Address to Napier's Dockyard' and 'Kennedy's Dear Mill'. The Factory Girl's Farewell' concludes:

> Farewell to all the works around,
> The flaxmill, foundry, copperage too;
> The old forge, with its blazing mound,
> And Tennant's stalk, farewell to you.
> Your gen'rous masters were so kind,
> Theirs was the gift that did excel;
> Their name around my heart is twined:
> So Gailbraith's bonnie mill, farewell!
>
> Farewell, my honour'd masters two,
> Your mill no more I may traverse;
> I breathe you both a fond adieu;
> Long may you live lords of commerce.
> Farewell unto my native land,
> Land of the thistle and blue-bell;
> Oh! wish me joy with heart and hand;
> So Gailbraith's bonnie mill, farewell! (p. 95)

Johnston participated fully in public life in factories in England, Scotland, and Ireland. Familial and romantic ideology exacted the highest psychic cost to those who lived in

isolation. It seems inescapable that the emotional health and flourishing self-image of working-class subjects whose lives did not conform to the patterns of the dominant culture were proportionate to the degree of participatory—as opposed to purely antagonistic—discursive engagement with others beyond the family in the home. The narrative and psychological disintegration of working-class writers who attempted to adopt middle-class narratives of self, and the relatively successful identities of those supported by alternative participatory articulations, indicate the significance of discourse—in this case, of gendered, familial discourse—in human identity, as well as discourse's insufficiency entirely to override non-discursive material conditions.

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NOTES

  1 Lillian S.Robinson, 'Working/Women/Writing', in *Sex, Class, and Culture* (New York and London: Methuen, 1986), p. 226.
  2 Adria Taylor Hourwich and Gladys L.Palmer 'Women in America' Series (New York: Arno Press, 1974).
  3 'Three women's texts and a critique of imperialism', in Henry Louis Gates, Jr (ed.), *'Race,' Writing, and Difference* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1986), p. 265.
  4 There are many works on the history of individual professions and the crucial periods of professional consolidation, such as the nineteenth century. The one I have found most useful is Magali Sarfatti Larson, *The Rise of Professionalization: A Sociological Analysis* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1979).
  5 My edition of Disraeli is *The Literary Character of Men of Genius,* ed. B.Disraeli (New York: Crowell, 1881).
  6 'Producing the professional: Wordsworth, Carlyle, and the authorial self' in 'Professional women and the public sphere: subjectivity and work in Victorian women's autobiographies', PhD dissertation in progress, English Department, Stanford University.
  7 Mary Poovey argued this in '"The-Man-of-Letters Hero": Literary Labor and the Representatation of Women', paper presented at the 'Dickens, Women, and Victorian Culture' Conference, University of California, Santa Cruz, 6–9 August 1987.
  8 Charles Dickens, *David Copperfield* (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1986), pp. 279–80.
  9 See also Alexander Welsh, *From Copyright to Copperfield* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1987).
  10 Nora Barlow (ed.), *The Autobiography of Charles Darwin 1809–1882* (New York: Norton, 1969), pp. 232–4.

11 Florence Nightingale, *Cassandra* (New York: Kennikat Press, 1969).

12 See however Martha Vicinus, *The Industrial Muse: A Study of Nineteenth Century British Working-Class Literature* (London: Croom Helm, 1974), and Nan Hackett, *XIX Century British Working-class Autobiographies: An Annotated Bibliography* (New York: AMS, 1985).

13 Margaret Llewelyn Davies (ed.), *Life As We Have Known It: By Co-Operative Working Women* (1931; New York: Norton, 1975). Further page references will be included in the text.

14 Pierre Bourdieu, *Distinction: A Social Critique of the Judgement of Taste* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1984).

15 For full discussion of the philosophical concepts normative dualism, liberal rationality, and abstract individualism, see Alison M.Jaggar, *Feminist Politics and Human Nature* (Brighton: Harvester Press, 1983).

16 'Women's strategies, 1890–1940', in Jane Lewis (ed.), *Labour and Love: Women's Experience of Home and Family, 1850–1940* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1986), pp. 243–4.

17 'Marital status, work and kinship, 1850–1930', in Lewis, op. cit., p. 265.

18 William Tayler in John Burnett (ed.), *Annals of Labour: Autobiographies of British Working-Class People 1820–1920* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1974), p. 175.

19 Roy Pascal, *Design and Truth in Autobiography* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1960), p. 148; James Olney, *Metaphors of Self* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1972). I am grateful to Mary Jean Corbett for drawing these passages to my attention.

20 Paul Jay, *Being in the Text: Self-Representation from Wordsworth to Roland Barthes* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1984); Avrom Fleishman, *Figures of Autobiography: The Language of Self-Writing in Victorian and Modern England* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1983); Michael Sprinker 'Fictions of the self: the end of autobiography', in James Olney (ed.), *Autobiography: Essays Theoretical and Critical* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1980).

21 The phrase is Miranda Joseph's. Our ideas have been influenced by the work of Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe, *Hegemony and Socialist Strategy: Towards a Radical Democratic Politics* (London: Verso, 1985); J-F Lyotard, *The Postmodern Condition* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1984); and Michel Foucault, *The History of Sexuality, vol. 1, An Introduction* (New York: Peregrine Books, 1980).

22 See Roberto Mangabeira Unger, *Knowledge and Politics* (New York: The Free Press, 1975) and *Passion: An Essay on Personality* (New York: The Free Press, 1986).

23 See Chaim Perelman, *The New Rhetoric* (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame, 1969).

24 For cyborg society see Donna Haraway, 'A manifesto for cyborgs: science, technology, and socialist feminism in the 1980s', *Socialist Review,* 80 (March—April, 1985), pp. 65–107. Roughly, Haraway intends 'cyborg' to represent the collapse of the distinction between organic and mechanical.

25 See John Burnett, David Mayall, and David Vincent, *The Autobiography of the Working Class: An Annotated Critical Bibliography. Volume 1, 1790–1900* (Brighton: Harvester Press, 1984); R.Gagnier, 'Social atoms: working-class autobiography, subjectivity and gender', *Victorian Studies* (Spring 1987), pp. 335–63. Also see Hackett, op. cit.

26 Louise Jermy, *The Memories of a Working Woman* (Norwich: Goose & Son, 1934); Peter Paterson (James Glass Bertram), *Behind the Scenes: Being the Confessions of a Strolling Player* (London: Henry Lea, 1859); William Dodd, *Narrative of the Experience and Sufferings of William Dodd, A Factory Cripple, Written by Himself* (1841; repr. London: Frank Cass, 1968); Rose Gibbs, *In Service: Rose Gibbs Remembers* (Cambridge: Archives for Bassingbourn and Comberton Village Colleges, 1981); Anon., *The Autobiography of a Private Soldier, Showing the Danger of Rashly Enlisting* (Sunderland: Williams & Binns, 1838).

27 For statistics see P.Bairoch, *The Working Population and Its Structure* (New York: Gordon &t Breach, 1968), p. 99. For detailed explanation see Burnett's introductory essays to the sections of *Annals of Labour* (n. 18 above): The Labouring Classes, Domestic Servants, and Skilled Workers.

28 William Adams, *Memoirs of a Social Atom* (1903; repr. New York: Augustus M.Kelley, 1968), p. xiii.

29 Charles Shaw, *When I Was A Child* (1893; repr. East Ardsley, Wakefield: SR Publishers, 1969), p. 97.

30 *Life As We Have Known It,* p. 60.

31 For a cultural critique of the narratives of English public school boys see Gagnier, '"From fag to monitor; or, fighting to the Front": art and power in public school memoirs', forthcoming in *Browning Institute Studies,* 15 (1988), special volume on Victorian Learning, ed. Robert Viscusi.

32 Emma Smith (pseud.), *A Cornish Waif's Story: An Autobiography* (London: Odhams, 1954), p. 154.

33 For the two modes see *Life As We Have Known It* and David Vincent (ed.), *Testaments of Radicalism: Memoirs of Working Class Politicians 1790–1885* (London: Europa, 1977). The fact that these primarily political and polemical documents represent a wide historical distance is less significant when it is realized that the gender difference alluded to is borne out by many 'genres' of working-class lifewriting throughout the period, e.g. conversion and gallows narratives as well as commemorative story-telling.

34 In *Victorian Writing and Working Women: The Other Side of Silence* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1985), Julia Swindells also analyses some working women's lifewriting in 'Part 2: Working women's autobiographies' (pp. 115–207) in terms of what she calls 'the literary'. I see such 'literary' effects controlling one kind of working-class writing, produced by men and women; whereas Swindells appears to find it characteristic of working women's writing exclusively and as a whole.

35 James Dawson Burn, *The Autobiography of a Beggar Boy* (1855), ed. David Vincent (London: Europa, 1978), p. 78.

36 See Vincent's Introduction, p. 28.

37 Burnett, op. cit., p. 52; Jermy, op. cit.

38 Mayhew, cited in John R.Gillis, *For Better or Worse: British Marriage, 1600 to the Present* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1985), p. 244.

39 Ellen Johnston, *The Autobiography, Poems, and Songs of 'The Factory Girl'* (Glasgow: William Love, 1867), pp. 5, 62.

RICARDA SCHMIDT

The journey of the subject in Angela Carter's fiction

In her last three novels, Angela Carter has used the device of a journey, the traditional symbol of a quest, to structure her narrative. Desiderio's travels in *The Infernal Desire Machines of Doctor Hoffman*[1] are explicitly referred to as a 'quest' (cf. pp. 76, 94, 141); in *The Passion of New Eve*[2] Evelyn's restless flight over the North American Continent is called the search for 'that most elusive of all chimeras, myself' (p. 38); and Fevvers in *Nights at the Circus*[3] is convinced that she has been 'feathered out for some special fate' (p. 39) that will manifest itself in the course of her travels. The adventures these characters encounter on their journeys in the fantastic realm of the imaginary and the symbolic mediate a discussion of the making of the subject in the light of philosophical, psychoanalytical, and feminist ideas. All three novels are complex and multi-faceted, yet each of them deconstructs essentialist, humanist notions of the subject and, as I will show in this essay, explores the constitution of the subject in relation to one dominant aspect, which is at the same time representative of cultural ideas about the subject in the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s, respectively: desire in *Hoffman,* gender in *Eve,* and free womanhood in *Circus.*

I

In *Hoffman,* Desiderio's quest begins in an unnamed South American country whose capital is in a state of dissolution. For the physicist Dr Hoffman has chosen that city as the place where he transforms desire into visible phenomena so that the borderline between reality and fantasy is dissolved. Dr Hoffman is a manifestation of the principle of 'L'imagination au pouvoir' of the 1968 students' revolt. He is opposed by the government, represented by 'the Minister'.

To begin with, Desiderio, who works for the Minister, is immune to Dr Hoffman's phenomena because he is too proud of his detached rationalism to take desire seriously. Looking back after fifty years he tells the story of how he got involved in the war against Dr Hoffman and how at the end of his adventures he was made a national hero. The war between the Minister and Dr Hoffman is the war between super-ego and id, between reality principle and pleasure principle. In the course of the novel we see the construction of Desiderio's ego in the interaction of id and super-ego. As the object of desire he undergoes continuous transformation, his name and appearance change according to the conditions he finds himself in, that is, according to other people's desire for him. But he is also to become the subject of desire. His name Desiderio is the Italian word for wish, longing, desire; that is, it is the active form, not the passive one which the somnambulist

Mary Anne gives as a translation of his name, calling him 'the desired one' (p. 54). It will be his function in the novel to discover something new about the nature of desire at each stage of his picaresque journey.

His buried desire is first expressed in dreams, in a language of changing signs he cannot yet read. It is given the name Albertina. The first time Desiderio acts upon his desire in his waking life, he re-enacts the fairy-tale of the Sleeping Beauty. In a house which nature has half engulfed—a recurrent image in Carter's fiction symbolizing sexual drives overpowering restrictive, rational social structures—he makes love to a beautiful somnambulist and on the following day finds her drowned at the beach. During his attempt at resuscitation he realizes that his attitude is 'a cruel parody of my own the previous night, my lips pressed to her mouth, and it came to me there was hardly any difference between what I did now and what I had done then, for her sleep had been a death' (p. 61). The emotional if not the factual truth of Desiderio's desire had been necrophily. In showing necrophily at the bottom of this male fantasy about making love to a virgin and the attraction of a sleeping woman, Carter reveals a sordid aspect of desire which is usually hidden under the beautiful roses of Sleeping Beauty.

The next stage of Desiderio's journey is his travelling with the river people, American Indians who have preserved their way of life on barges away from the influences of civilization with its prohibition of instinctual wishes. Desiderio experiences his life with them as a 'home-coming' (p. 76). He feels complete happiness in fitting himself into their limited life, in giving up the quest for his self by merging with the strong communal spirit of this pre-civilized society. This includes his initiation into the tribe by means of a ritual courtship with the 9-year-old Aoi and sex with her grandmother who is called Mama. Thus it is also a home-coming in the Oedipal sense, a gratification of the desire for incest. Yet this primitive acting out of desires is not presented as the garden of Eden. For Desiderio discovers that the family plans his wedding as a cannibalistic feast in order to incorporate his knowledge into the tribe by consuming his flesh. Thus he learns that unprohibited desires in precivilized communities may result in a person's happiness but also in their annihilation. This undermines the happy notion of a 'subhistorical past when the life of the individual was the life of the genus, the image of the immediate unity between the universal and the particular under the rule of the pleasure principle'.[4]

After this phase of regression Desiderio travels with fairground people, and is initiated for the second time, now into a different kind of desire: into cruelty, sadism, rape. Each of the nine Moroccan 'acrobats of desire' (p. 113) buggers him at least twice and he is left a bleeding wreck. Yet these rapists are called 'inexhaustible fountains of desire' (p. 117) and they are supposed to have created so much eroto-energy that they effect a natural catastrophe, a landslide. Dr Hoffman's ideology of liberating desire is thus given another ironic counterpoint. For we see again that such liberation would not simply entail freedom and happiness for everybody. Nor is desublimation synonymous with moral goodness. Unrepressed desire may just as well be destructive, cruel, repressive for others.[5]

Desiderio's next travelling companion, the Count, echoes, in the comprehensive catalogue of the sexual tortures and murders he has committed, the atrocities de Sade imagined in his novels. He says about the philosophical background of his perversion: 'I have devoted my life to the humiliation and exaltation of the flesh. I am an artist; my

material is the flesh, my medium is destruction; and my inspiration is nature' (p. 126). This is de Sade's credo in which, as Michael Foucault has pointed out, man discovers a truth he had forgotten while Rousseau's dictum that nature is good dominated philosophical thinking:

> what desire can be contrary to nature, since it was given to man by nature itself ? And since it was taught by nature in the great lesson of life and death which never stops repeating itself in the world? The madness of desire, the most unreasonable passions—all are wisdom and reason, since they are a part of the order of nature.[6]

In order to secure his position as master, the Sadeian Count dehumanizes the objects of his desire and reduces them to 'sexual appliances' (p. 132). Desiderio learns to understand this psychological mechanism when he encounters the prostitutes in the House of Anonymity, who are the translation of sadistic ideas of femaleness into concrete physical forms:

> Each was circumscribed as a figure in rhetoric and you could not imagine they had names, for they had been reduced by the rigorous discipline of their vocation to the undifferentiated essence of the idea of the female. This ideational femaleness took amazingly different shapes though its nature was not that of Woman…. All, without exception, passed beyond or did not enter the realm of simple humanity. They were sinister, abominable, inverted mutations, part clockwork, part vegetable and part brute. (p. 132)

The Count's desire is motivated by his megalomaniac egocentricity which prevents him from feeling either pain or sympathy. His excesses are really a search for the experience of pain and for punishment. The scale of the atrocities he conjures up is in direct proportion to his lack of freedom, to his barbarous will yet guilty conscience. He only finds his freedom when a black tribe, which is a concretization of the Count's fantasies, makes him experience pain for the first time in his life by boiling him up for a cannibalistic soup. The Count serves as an example to show not only the sheer horror of a life of unrepressed aggressive instincts, but also the fallacy of equating such a position with freedom. Freud wrote that the satisfaction of the instinct of destruction 'is accompanied by an extraordinarily high degree of narcissistic enjoyment, owing to its presenting the ego with a fulfilment of the latter's old wishes for omnipotence'.[7] Yet the Count achieves this narcissistic enjoyment only by acting the tyrant to his passions (cf. p. 168), by never acting spontaneously, never giving in to his feelings.

   After leaving the cannibals behind, Desiderio and his dream-woman Albertina roam in the jungle of 'Nebulous Time', where they meet a society of centaurs. Albertina tells Desiderio 'that, according to her father's theory, all the subjects and objects we had encountered in the loose grammar of Nebulous Time were derived from a similar source—my desires; or hers; or the Count's' (p. 186). Albertina herself, when pondering the centaurs' reality status, 'was convinced that even though every male in the village had obtained carnal knowledge of her, the beasts were still only emanations of her own desires, dredged up and objectively reified from the dark abysses of the unconscious' (p.

186). Interpreted like a dream, in which the latent dream-thoughts are translated by condensation and replacement into the manifest dream-content, the rape scene would stand as an image for Albertina's unconscious sexual desire, which has grown to such enormous proportions, as the hideous size of the centaurs' penises and the great number of her rapists suggest. However, this translation of the dream-thoughts, where a woman's sexual desire is so repressed that it can only find expression as rape, reflects a patriarchal misogynist culture which constructs femininity as passive and masochistic.

The centaurs could also be a manifestation of Desiderio's aggressive desires (cf. pp. 179f). Moreover, the allusion to Swift's 'Country of the Houynhynms' is clearly detectable and Desiderio has used *Gulliver's Travels* as a textbook to teach reading and writing to some of the river people (cf. pp. 75, 82). In the centaurs' castigation of the human part in them, Carter shows the violence which is inherent in puritanical idealism. Furthermore, it becomes clear that this sublimated desire for purity requires the projection of 'dirty' parts of oneself onto the 'Other', that is in this case onto humanity and femininity. The overt repression of femininity in the centaurs' society illuminates not only Swift's latent misogyny but the misogyny of puritanism in general.

In the final episode, Desiderio and Albertina are taken to Dr Hoffman's castle, the source of all the wild phenomena of liberated desire. Desiderio finds to his surprise: 'Here, everything was safe. Everything was ordered. Everything was secure' (p. 197). The Doctor himself is grey, restrained, disciplined, i.e. governed by reason. Desiderio's 'disillusionment was profound. I was not in the domain of the marvellous at all. I had gone far beyond that and at last I had reached the powerhouse of the marvellous, where all its clanking, dull, stage machinery was kept' (p. 201). The more Desiderio gets to know of the Doctor's science the more appalled he feels. Dr Hoffman equates liberation of the unconscious with the liberation of man (cf. p. 208). But he gets the necessary energy for this liberation by 'sucking off' the eroto-energy produced by a hundred lovers who copulate non-stop (fired, if necessary, by injections of hormones) in a huge hall full of three-tiered wire bunks. They are in constant motion, yet static, just like the roundabouts on the fairground which Desiderio used to watch. Desiderio is revolted: 'He penned desire in a cage and said: "Look! I have liberated desire"' (p. 208).

When he discovers that there is one of these cubicles waiting for him and Albertina, Desiderio tries to flee. But he can only escape by killing the Doctor, Albertina, and a few attendants. Having killed the personification of his desire, the rest of Desiderio's life consists of disillusionment, regret—and dreams which will never come true again but remain opposed to reality and uncontrolled: 'I close my eyes. Unbidden, she comes' (p. 221).

Desiderio's adventures exemplify the consequences which a liberation of desire, of the unconscious, would have, and result in his constitution as a subject alive with necessarily unfulfilled desire. He functions as a general subject; gender does not play a primary role in the examination of desire (id), social structures (super-ego) and self (ego), although male desire and society are repeatedly exposed in their dominance over women. However, the focus of the novel is the exploration of the relation of the unconscious to reality. It is the dispassionate portrait of a world where desires come true and prove to be far less pleasant than expected (for both men and women), for they include cannibalism, sadism, the will for power, murder, and violent idealism. Moreover, the effect of Dr

Hoffman's phenomena on the inhabitants of the capital is anxiety and melancholy. Constant transformation of the world around them as in a dream makes them lose their sense of orientation. The absolute rule of desire seems to be just as tyrannical as the Minister's absolute repression of desire. Constant change/motion/transformation can be as static as the attempt to uphold social structures rigidly. When Desiderio himself is to become a love machine—in frantic movement, yet bound to the confines of a bed for ever—he panics. He rejects the absolute rule of desire, of the id, the unconscious, as repressive. In doing so he establishes his ego which, according to Horkheimer and Adorno, 'owes its existence to the sacrifice of the present moment to the future'.[8] In renouncing the immediate satisfaction of his desire, he also unwillingly helps to stabilize the Minister's rule of social order, the super-ego, reason. But he does not identify with that rule. Desiderio, who has been in search of a master (cf. pp. 190, 213), in the end rejects all masters. He pays for his independence, for this strength of his ego, with alienation: 'The shrug is my gesture. The sneer is my expression' (p. 221). He becomes a politician, thus following a traditionally male pattern in the constitution of the subject since Odysseus.[9]

David Punter also locates Carter's exploration of the unconscious in *Hoffman* historically, but reads the novel 'as a series of figures for the defeat of the political aspirations of the 1960s, and in particular of the father-figures of liberation, Reich and Marcuse'.[10] He views the sexual revolution advocated by Reich and Marcuse in rather nostalgic terms, referring to its symbolization in Dr Hoffman's enterprise as 'the uprising of the imagination'.[11] According to Punter, Desiderio kills the Doctor and Albertina because he is formed by the Minister's society and thus unable to recognize the liberating effects of the Doctor's plans. Furthermore he is supposed to have been afraid that pleasure might do damage to him and others.

Yet this reading falls short of the complexity of the text. For Carter does not simply take Dr Hoffman's liberating intentions at face value. She shows that the absolute rule of desire would make life just as repressive, sterile, and static as the absolute rule of reason. She examines the promise of desire completely and always fulfilled and finds that it does not guarantee happiness and freedom. Carter does not write about a revolution that went wrong because at a certain point in time the reactionary forces were still too strong, but about the painful insight that such a revolution would not be liberating. She does not offer any other consolatory possibilities of a happy, fulfilled life either. Alienation and unfulfilled desire are part of living in historical, not mythical, time.

II

While desire and the formation of the ego were not primarily examined in relation to gender in *Hoffman,* Carter makes gender the decisive theme in *The Passion of New Eve,* where she explores the function of symbols:

> Our external symbols must always express the life within us with absolute precision; how could they do otherwise, since that life has generated them? Therefore we must not blame our poor symbols if they take forms that seem

trivial to us, or absurd, for the symbols themselves have no control over their own fleshly manifestations, however paltry they may be; the nature of our life alone has determined their forms.

A critique of these symbols is a critique of our lives. (p. 6)

It is the symbols of femininity that are at issue here. The hero and first-person narrator, Evelyn, encounters patriarchal symbols of femininity on three different levels in the course of his journey.

The first one is the beautiful film idol Tristessa whom Evelyn has admired on London screens since his boyhood. Tristessa symbolizes 'passionate sorrow' (p. 6), 'romantic dissolution, necrophilia incarnate' (p. 7), 'suffering' (p. 8). She embodies a heightened idea of femininity, a modern version of the Mater Dolorosa. The psychosexual potential of this symbol is revealed in de Sade's *Justine* as self-pitying suffering, a masochism that corresponds to male sadistic pleasure. Reacting to this unattainable symbol of femininity on a Sadeian level, Evelyn remembers 'the twitch in my budding groin the spectacle of Tristessa's suffering always aroused in me' (p. 8).

On moving to New York, Evelyn encounters a second symbolization of femininity in the black nightclub dancer, Leilah. She is the incarnation of woman as the temptress. Each night before she goes to work Leilah enacts a ritual transformation in front of the mirror and 'she brought into being a Leilah who lived only in the not-world of the mirror and then became her own reflection' (p. 28). The mirror which shows another Leilah symbolizes the male gaze that gives woman an image of herself which is, to begin with, not related to reality. The woman then tries to transform herself into that symbol of woman that the male gaze shows her. In this mirror episode, Carter transfers the 'mirror stage' which Lacan described in relation to the development of the symbolic 'I' in children, to the symbol woman. The symbol into which Leilah transforms herself defines woman as object, as meat.

Evelyn's response to this symbol illuminates what it teaches men as normal behaviour: after having bound, beaten and impregnated Leilah and then having left her half-dead after an abortion, Evelyn travels westward into the desert in search of his self. In the desert he is kidnapped and taken to a mysterious underground city inhabited by feminists who try to recreate matriarchal symbols of woman within a highly technological world. Their leader is called 'Mother' and has made herself into many-breasted Artemis with the help of plastic surgery: 'Mother has made symbolism a concrete fact' (p. 58), she is 'her own mythological artefact' (p. 60). These Amazons celebrate femininity as motherhood, the architecture of their city is modelled on the womb. Their fight against patriarchy is expressed in the emblem of the broken phallus.

The name of the Amazons' underground city, Beulah, recalls Bunyan's country 'upon the borders of heaven' from which the pilgrims pass on to eternal life,[12] and Blake's 'daughters of Beulah', the 'Muses who inspire the Poet's Song,'[13] who have been created by Divine Vision 'to repose/The Sleepers of Beulah'[14] and 'To feed the Sleepers on their Couches with maternal care.'[15] That is, Blake's daughters of Beulah exist only in relation to the male, for the male, and in man's imagination. Moreover, Beulah is also the imaginary place of the ideal patriarchal marriage, both in Bunyan and in Blake.

It seems a parody that the Amazons' city—where women train with nuclear hand-

weapons for the war of the sexes and aim at parricide and castration—should take its name from this male vision of conciliatory femininity and of sexual union of man and woman. Mother, who within the fictional world of *Eve* most likely chose that name, is obviously making strange use of Blake whom she also quotes when she develops her philosophy of feminine eternity. Blake wrote, 'Time is a Man, Space is a Woman, & her Masculine Portion is Death.'[16] Mother perverts this insoluble symbolic relationship to the false syllogism: 'Proposition one: time is a man, space is a woman. Proposition two: time is a killer. Proposition three: kill time and live forever' (p. 53). Mother's attempt to eliminate time from her alternative model of society is destined to result in failure. Like Dr Hoffman in the former novel, Mother wants to make something imaginary concrete and real; and like him she wants to end historical time. In this attempt both figures are unmasked as tyrannical.

Mother's glorification of the womb, female space, biological essentialism (which stands for one position within the women's movement in the 1970s), is satirized in its involuntarily comic self-pronunciation. Especially the pompous litanies and cleverly planned rituals which accompany Evelyn's ceremonial rape by Mother have a hilariously comic effect, since they are narrated from Evelyn's perspective of a frightened child, and yet convey a consciousness of the operatic manner with which Mother sets her deity in scene in phrases like 'all Mahler in her intonation' (p. 63), 'lulling sonorities' (p. 63), 'Her voice went down a scale of brooding tenderness' (p. 63), 'begins to bay like a bloodhound bitch in heat' (p. 64).

With the help of highly advanced medical science, Evelyn is changed into a woman, Eve. An involuntary transsexual, Eve now follows Tiresias in experiencing life both as a man and a woman. When she becomes a prisoner of the harem-keeper and poet Zero, she enters a scenario that is modelled on de Sade's novels and undergoes a bestial apprenticeship in femininity. This third patriarchal symbol of woman that Zero imposes on Eve pictures woman as sub-human. Zero forbids his wives the use of speech, and of the instruments of civilization like knife and fork; he makes them eat pigs' food, beats them, smears them with excrement. That is, what male philosophers have said about women (Nietzsche is Zero's hero) is transformed into concrete, brutal reality: women are not of the same soul substance as men, they are more primitive, more animal-like. In Zero's school of femininity, Eve, with her female body and Evelyn's male consciousness, experiences a lack of self, a split between mind and body, and a recognition of her/his former self. While being raped by Zero, 'I felt myself to be, not myself but he; and the experience of this crucial lack of self, which always brought with it a shock of introspection, forced me to know myself as a former violator at the moment of my own violation' (pp. 101f).

But Carter subverts the Nietzschean and Sadeian dichotomy of weak and strong by showing Zero as physically handicapped and mentally deranged. True to his name, Zero is a nobody who compensates for his weakness with delusions of grandeur, and the sado-masochistic mechanism of his harem works because these delusions are confirmed by women whose self-confidence has early been destroyed.[17]

This, however, is only the beginning of the narrator's insights into the functioning of the symbols of femininity. It turns out that Tristessa is a man, and Eve realizes: '*That* was why he had been the perfect man's woman! He had made himself the shrine of his own

desires, had made of himself the only woman he could have loved' (p. 128f). Tristessa—and that means the femininity s/he symbolizes—has 'no ontological status, only an iconographic one' (p. 129). The ideal woman is constituted as male desire. The fact that Tristessa embodies a male fantasy of femininity also throws light on her/his only occasionally mentioned surname, de St Ange. For Madame de Saint-Ange is the name of the woman who introduces the young virgin Eugénie into the theory and practice of libertinism in de Sade's *Philosophie dans le boudoir*. Madame de Saint-Ange is the product of male fantasy[18] and she teaches sadism, just as Tristessa's suffering taught sadism to young Evelyn.

Tristessa and Eve finally succeed in fleeing into the desert. They fill the desert's vast emptiness with the mirages of all their conceptions of femininity and masculinity. They project them upon each other and merge them into the imaginary wholeness of a hermaphroditic being in their love-making. They exchange roles as in Schlegel's *Lucinde*. However, these roles equate, also as in *Lucinde,* the male role with active pursuit and the female one with being overwhelmed: 'when you lay below me… I beat down upon you mercilessly, with atavistic relish, but the glass woman I saw beneath me smashed under my passion and the splinters scattered and recomposed themselves into a man who overwhelmed me' (p. 149). Even in the apparent freedom of play-acting they cannot escape the social constructs of femininity and masculinity. And the very questioning of those social constructs is belied by a language that incorporates them, as Eve's use of the terms quality and negation does: 'Masculine and feminine are correlatives which involve one another. I am sure of that—the quality and its negation are locked in necessity' (p. 149).

Any further experiments with feminine and masculine roles are cut short by the civil war, against the background of which this novel has unfolded. Tristessa is shot dead and Eve learns that the symbol of woman as temptress has no ontological status either when she comes across a group of guerrilla fighters in whose competent leader she recognizes Leilah, whose real name is Lilith:

> the slut of Harlem, my girl of bile and ebony! She can never have objectively existed, all the time mostly the projection of the lusts and greed and self-loathing of a young man called Evelyn, who does not exist, either. This lucid stranger, Lilith, also known as Leilah, also, I suspect, sometimes masquerading as Sophia or the Divine Virgin… (p. 175).

The fact that, as a man, Evelyn could perceive Lilith only as Leilah exemplifies how men's view of women is formed by the available symbols. The woman is seen through the distorting grid of male symbolization which degrades and traps her.

After the unmasking of patriarchal symbols of femininity as creations of male desire, as images that correspond to no essence, the denouement of Mother's matriarchal symbols of femininity remains to be completed. In *The Sadeian Woman* Carter writes critically about the glorification of femininity as maternity: 'This theory of maternal superiority is one of the most damaging of all consolatory fictions…. It puts those women who wholeheartedly subscribe to it in voluntary exile from the historic world, this world…,'[19] When Mother realizes that she cannot stop time with archetypal symbols, she

gives up her position of goddess of Beulah and retires into a cave. Eve asks: 'Should we do that with all the symbols, Leilah? Put them away, for a while, until the times have created a fresh iconography?' (p. 174)

It is this very act which, paradoxically, is itself symbolic, that remains to be performed by Eve. She follows Mother's order to crawl into a cave/womb near the Pacific Ocean.[20] In the first cave Eve finds a fractured mirror which does not reflect her, not even a part of her: that is, old images of femininity have been shattered, Eve has to learn to live without them. There is also the austere chair crafted by the Shakers, which had served as Mother's throne in Beulah. It is empty now, symbolizing Mother's abdication as a matriarchal goddess, i.e. the emptiness of that symbol.

In a second cave Eve finds a glass flask with amber, a piece of alchemical gold and a picture of Tristessa. Eve tears up the picture and thus destroys a symbol of femininity which was once important to her. As she continues her cave journey, the cave's symbolism becomes more and more concrete: the walls become red and slimy, they throb and pull her inwards. Yet Eve is not afraid, 'for I know, now, that Mother is a figure of speech and has retired to a cave beyond consciousness' (p. 184).

Eve's cave journey, however, does not only serve the deconstruction of both patriarchal and matriarchal symbols of woman, it is also a visionary journey. The flask with amber that becomes viscous rosin when heated in her hands set off an imaginary backwards journey to the beginning of time. Like a film reel seen from the end to the beginning, Eve sees evolution unfold backwards until she has a vision of the legendary bird archaeopteryx. It is

> bird and lizard both at once, a being composed of the contradictory elements of air and earth. From its angelic aspect spring the whole family tree of feathered, flying things and from its reptilian or satanic side the saurians, creepy crawlers, crocs, the scaled leaper and the lovely little salamander. The archaeopteryx has feathers on its back but bones in its tail, as well; claws on the tips of its wings; and a fine set of teeth….
>
> A miraculous, seminal, intermediate being whose nature I grasped in the desert. (p. 185).

This bird, a combination of contrarieties, symbolizes a wholeness before the separation into two different strands of evolution. Eve now realizes that it is the same kind of wholeness which she and Tristessa had created in their love-making in the desert, when it seemed to them as if they 'had made the great Platonic hermaphrodite together' (p. 148).[21]

The fact that this vision of a model for a future symbol of femininity implies the unification of what had been split into feminine and masculine in the course of evolution, i.e. the creation of symbolic hermaphroditism, documents the novel's origin in ideas of the 1970s. For Carolyn Heilbrun's book *Toward a Recognition of Androgyny*[22] started off a lively discussion in the women's movement about the progressive value for women of the revival of this old Platonic concept. Those in favour of the concept of androgyny looked upon it as a helpful construction to overcome the present sex-role division and thus finally to reach a stage in which the term itself becomes meaningless.[23] Others

criticized it as a perpetuation of patriarchal norms because the term androgyny tended to assume femininity and masculinity as fixed entities that corresponded to the old stereotypes.[24] This weakness of the concept of androgyny is also apparent in *Eve*. For, as I pointed out above, Eve's and Tristessa's playful role-change during their love-making still equates active pursuit with masculinity and docile submission with femininity. Furthermore, hermaphroditism still adheres to the phallogeocentric rule of the One and denies difference. But this post-structuralist perspective upon patriarchal culture, developed by French feminists, did not decisively influence Anglo-American feminism until the 1980s.

In *Eve* the vision of hermaphroditism is not given any concrete shape, but the novel opens out with a promise. For Eve believes that the child she conceived by Tristessa will signify the beginning of a new species, symbolically speaking. After having travelled from London to the other side of the world in search of her self, Eve is now about to complete her journey round the world. She takes an old woman's skiff to sail the Pacific Ocean. Since the ocean is both a symbol of the womb and the grave, and since to complete the circle of life is to die, this could mean that her last journey in the novel is the mythic one over the Styx, for which she pays the woman—a modern version of Charon—with her piece of alchemical gold. Yet if Eve dies in the ocean, when would she have told her story? For in both *Hoffman* and *Eve* we have first-person narration from the point of view of posteriority. The heroes narrate their adventures in the past tense long after they have completed them. Their narratives are full of cryptic hints at events to come, insights still to be gained, and explanations in the light of experiences which take place much later in the chronology of events. These narrators are in full command of their stories, they always know more than their readers. Desiderio's time of writing down his life story is specified exactly as fifty years after having murdered Albertina. Eve's actual writing of her story is never mentioned. At the end of the novel we are left with the paradox that the narrator who very probably died must yet have survived to tell her tale. Perhaps the contradictions and uncertainties of this ending point to the fact that, after the destruction both of the old patriarchal symbols and of the feminist revival of the matriarchal ones, the course of the heroine's future journey cannot yet be foretold, since new symbols (of which Eve has had but a glimpse) have yet to be created on a social level. Thus she cannot be given a concrete point of view from which to tell her story. What becomes of her remains an open question, and her wish 'Ocean, ocean, mother of mysteries, bear me to the place of birth' (p. 191) can be read as referring to the child she is about to give birth to, i.e. the birth of a new symbol of femininity, born of the desire to overcome the traditional division of human beings into the stereotypes of femininity and masculinity. These have been shown to be social constructs of male desire. Thus the novel has deconstructed the conception of the self as an essence and has explored the constitution of the subject in patriarchal society as mediated by the symbols of femininity men have created.

III

Nights at the Circus is a logical sequel to *The Passion of New Eve,* since, in a way, the

heroine Fevvers is Eve's daughter: Fevvers is the new symbol of femininity, the contribution to evolution Eve had expected her child to be. She is the archaeopteryx Eve had envisaged, that mystical being, 'composed of the contradictory elements of air and earth' (*Eve,* p. 185). For Fevvers is a very earthly (and earthy) Cockney Venus—big, vulgar, gluttonous, greedy for money—but at the same time she has a pair of splendid wings. As her nickname, the Cockney Venus, already suggests, Fevvers is, beyond doubt, a woman. The symbolic connection between hermaphroditism and the bird archaeopteryx from *Eve* is not pursued in *Circus*. Here, the concept of androgyny is only represented by a minor figure, the hermaphroditic freak Albert/Albertina in Madame Schreck's museum of female monsters. S/he is 'half and half and neither of either' (p. 59). Thus she is a whim of nature but does not embody a longing for unity, wholeness, identity, which had such a strong lure in *Eve* as a possible way out of the patriarchal confines of femininity. *Circus* is not concerned with the invention of such unity, of one humanity—which would only repeat the rule of the One and deny otherness[25]—but with matching woman and freedom in a new symbol of femininity. Its novelty, however, is historicized: Fevver's story is set in 1899. Her performance as a winged aerialiste is the main attraction in the great variety shows of all European capitals. She keeps her audience enthralled about her reality status (to take up a term from *Hoffman*). Her slogan is: 'Is she fact or is she fiction?' (p. 7).

This question also fascinates the American journalist Jack Walser, who interviews Fevvers for his article series 'Great Humbugs of the World' (p. 11). In a magical night in which time stands still and Big Ben strikes midnight again and again, Fevvers tells him her life story, which is supplemented by remarks from her foster-mother and dresser Lizzie.

Fevvers claims to have been hatched from an egg, to be without parents, and to have been tenderly raised by prostitutes in a brothel. Thus she fantasizes a beginning for herself outside the Oedipal triangle, outside the Law of the Father, 'a wholly female world' (p. 38), 'governed by a sweet and loving reason' (p. 39). Earning her bread as a living statue of Cupid and later of Victory in Ma Nelson's brothel, Fevvers 'existed only as an object in one's eyes' (p. 39). In this role she learns early what Eve finds in the course of her quest; Fevvers here serves her 'apprenticeship for life, since is it not to the mercies of the eyes of others that we commit ourselves on our voyage through the world?' (p. 39).

In her voyage through the world of this novel Fevvers does not simply become men's passive object, for her wings ensure that she herself constitutes a formidable subject which others must react to. But as the eye metaphor indicates, she does nevertheless need the reaction of others to have her own conception of herself confirmed. What this self could be is hinted at when the brothel madam comments upon her new wings: 'Oh, my little one, I think you must be the pure child of the century that just now is waiting in the wings, the New Age in which no women will be bound down to the ground' (p. 25). In the middle of her fantastic story, which is spiced here and there with realistic bits that Walser might check up on, Fevvers thus offers an interpretation of the phenomenon Fevvers on a third level, beyond fact and fiction (or in Lacan's terms, the real and the imaginary), as a symbol. Fevvers functions as a sign, one of 'those creatures of dream and abstraction' (p. 30), a child of the dream of the future. While in authentic history

women's bodies have been the location of their degradation and enslavement, the flying Fevvers can rejoice: 'I only knew my body was the abode of limitless freedom' (p. 41).

But before Fevvers comes to embody the dream of freedom for the audience of shows and circuses, she undergoes a period of imprisonment as a freak which is a parody of the Gothic novel. She shows herself for money in the dark, damp cellars of Madam Schreck's museum of monsters and is nearly killed in the neo-Gothic castle of a mad Rosicrucian. Subsequently she finds that her unique appearance need not be considered a pitiable aberration but can be viewed as an enviable, mysterious figuration of human aspirations. Fevvers discovers her excellent exchange value on the market for wonders, humbugs, sensations. The fact that Fevvers can function as a freak or as a wonder confirms the non-essentialist character of femininity. Femininity is a social construction, its value is not inherent but determined in social exchange, on the market.

With this night-long Scheherezadic narration by the highly articulate, educated Cockney giantess, overflowing with vitality, the theme of the novel is developed beautifully: a fantastic sketch of female freedom, of woman as the miraculous bird archaeopteryx. In the remaining two thirds of the novel this theme is played through without ever reaching the intensity of the exposition again. Part II is set in St Petersburg and portrays the world of the circus. Fevvers, who has signed a contract for a world tour with Colonel Kearney's circus, is its top star. Moved by an irrisistible attraction to Fevvers, the journalist Walser has joined the circus incognito as a clown.

The circus functions, self-consciously, as a symbol of life (cf. p. 107). In its arena the world appears as a farce. The panorama of Colonel Kearney's circus includes, among others: dancing tigers; the cowardly Strong Man Samson; depressed clowns, 'the whores of mirth' (p. 119); a modern version of Goethe's Mignon mediated through Alban Berg's opera *Wozzeck*.[26] The narration of the adventures of these figures often takes on a dynamic of its own and develops into rather lengthy stories which are complete in themselves. While Fevver's narration has dominated Part I, and has made the mediating omniscient narrator (who sometimes moves into Walser's consciousness) almost imperceptible because of her vividness, her voice can only occasionally be heard in Part II. Here the strange and fascinating life of the circus is unfolded by an omniscient narrator or through the consciousness of the circus members. Structure is broken up but not broken down. For all these stories, while surpassing the horizon of the heroine within the fictional world and breaking out of a narrative unity with which Carter has disciplined the picaresque elements of her former novels, are thematically linked with the utopian Fevvers theme as variations or reversals. The clowns, for example, choose their own faces freely, but then they are imprisoned by them and eventually they revert to madness and chaos. The tigers feel free when they dance, but occasionally they seem to have an inkling that they have only exchanged their small cage for a bigger one. The Strong Man Samson recognizes that he is trapped by a weak mind.

Above all, the reversal of the strength and freedom that make up Fevvers's theme is developed at length in the Mignon story. An omniscient narrator intersperses the account of Fevvers's meeting with Mignon with Mignon's complete life story. The juxtaposition of these two strands of narrative emphasizes the fact that Mignon is the very opposite of Fevvers: small, underdeveloped, weak, submissive, the born victim who has an endless story of exploitation behind her. Blotting both past and future out of her mind because

they are too awful to contemplate, 'she was the broken blossom of the present tense' (p. 140). However, Mignon's tragic story is not carried to its logical conclusion but is brought to an unexpected happy ending. She begins to work as a partner for the tiger-tamer, the Princess of Abyssinia, they become lovers and Mignon leaves male exploitation behind once and for all; a woman's love makes her beautiful and happy. Even for a comic novel this is rather too much of a happy ending, which seems to be motivated by Carter's belated recognition of lesbianism in her fiction and the political intention to portray it positively.

In the meantime the infatuated clown Walser ponders the paradox of Fevvers:

> if she were indeed a *lusus naturae,* a prodigy, then—she was no longer a wonder.
>
> She would no longer be an extraordinary woman, no more the Greatest *Aerialiste* in the world but—a freak. Marvellous, indeed, but a marvellous monster, an exemplary being denied the human privilege of flesh and blood, always the object of the observer, never the subject of sympathy, an alien creature forever estranged
>
> She owes it to herself to remain a woman, he thought. It is her human duty. As a symbolic woman, she has a meaning, as an anomaly, none.
>
> As an anomaly, she would become again, as she once had been, an exhibit in a museum of curiosities. But what would she become, if she continued to be a woman? (p. 161)

In Walser's reflections several aspects of a new symbol of woman are named which distinguish it from the symbols in *Eve*. First, the new symbol must show woman as part of humanity, not raise her above it or place her below it. Second, it must ensure that woman does not have the status of an object but of a subject. Third, it must appreciate woman's difference sympathetically instead of making it a reason for estrangement. Fourth, the symbolic meaning of woman remains open. This abstention from a concrete, positive definition of woman, let alone of one androgynous humanity, shows the influence of French post-structuralist feminism on the Anglo-American woman's movement in the 1980s.[27]

Part II depicts the circus's journey through Siberia. When the circus train is blown up by a band of outlaws, Fevvers's and Walser's ways part. They undergo very different experiences and developments in the process of which various social concepts are discussed with regard to their potential for freedom. Fevvers encounters people who embody lack of freedom in various forms. The outlaws naïvely believe in the goodness of the traditional powers of state and come to a fitting end when the clowns invoke chaos with their 'deadly dance of the *past* perfect which fixes everything fast so it can't move again' (p. 243): a great snowstorm carries them off. The Escapee trusts in the perfection of the soul in an ideal future, but this combination of Rousseau and Kropotkin falls prey to Colonel Kearney's capitalist lure. A music teacher is the third person Fevvers encounters in Siberia who has fallen into the trap of false beliefs. The Maestro has been the victim of a corrupt Mayor's rosy picture of discovering musical talent in the taiga. His youthful idealism is belatedly rewarded when the Princess and Mignon decide to give up

the circus and to stay with him as his students.

While Fevvers is confronted with these manifestations of belief in false hopes, she undergoes a crisis of her own. When she lost her sword, 'she had lost some of that sense of her own magnificence which had previously sustained her trajectory. As soon as her feeling of invulnerability was gone, what happened? Why, she broke her wing. Now she was a crippled wonder' (p. 273). Furthermore she loses the bright colours of her wings and her blondness, since Lizzie's handbag with the necessary household magic was lost in the blowing up of the train. And she pines after Walser, who has 'the vague, imaginary face of desire' (p. 204) for her. Lizzie reproaches her for having grown more and more like her own publicity since Walser came on the scene: 'Ever the golden-hearted Cockney who don't stand on ceremony. Huh' (p. 198). To Fevvers's question, who she is supposed to be like if not herself, Lizzie replies: 'That's another question, innit…. You never existed before. There's nobody to say what you should do or how to do it. You are Year One. You haven't any history and there are no expectations of you except the ones you yourself create.' (p. 198)

It seems surprising that Lizzie, whose political analysis is firmly grounded in Marxism, should here exempt Fevvers entirely from historical materialism. The complete autonomy she attributes to Fevvers's model of femininity, is, however, contradicted by Fevvers's development. Not only has her greed for money twice made her a near-victim of men, she is also dependent upon public recognition of her symbolic meaning as a free woman. Acknowledging her own vulnerability, Fevvers thinks: 'Pity the New Woman if she turns out to be as easily demolished as me' (p. 273).

Having lost the glamour with which she had endowed her self-styled persona, in direct proportion to the lack of admiring reflection which used to confirm it, Fevvers decides to look for one pair of eyes which could restore her: Walser's. Lizzie probes her about the possible end of her search:

> And, when you *do* find the young American, what the 'ell will you do, then? Don't you know the customary endings of the old comedies of separated lovers, misfortune overcome, adventures among outlaws and savage tribes? True lovers' reunions always end in a marriage. (p. 280)

Appalled by the prospect of her reintegration into the tradition she set out to defy, Fevvers hits on the idea of a role-reversal:

> Oh, but Liz—think of his malleable look. As if a girl could mould him any way she wanted. Surely he'll have the decency to give himself to me, when we meet again, and not expect the vice versa! Let him hand himself over into my safekeeping, and I will transform him. You said yourself he was unhatched, Lizzie; very well—I'll *sit* on him, I'll hatch him out, I'll make a new man of him. I'll make him into the New Man, fitting mate for the New Woman, and onward we'll march hand in hand into the New Century—(p. 281)

As might be expected after this high-flown rhetoric, things will not turn out like that. For Walser has already been hatched out while living with a primitive tribe of bear-worshippers. His adventures have run parallel to and in alternating chapters with

Fevvers's story. Fevvers has met with the pitfalls of belief, and has above all learnt the vulnerability of her belief in herself. Walser has lost his rationalistic detachment, opened up to the moulding influence of experience and learnt the power of spiritual vision while being apprenticed to the bear-worshippers' Shaman. The Shaman has important things in common with Fevvers. Both their livings depend on the fact that their society accepts them, believes in them, and gives them food/money in return for the spiritual vision they offer (cf. pp. 185, 264). The Shaman *provides* concrete manifestations of the spirit world, for example a mouse leaving a body; Fevvers *is* the concrete manifestation of an idea, the free woman. The Shaman succeeds in his role because of his self-confidence: 'His was the supreme form of the confidence trick—others had confidence in him because of his own utter confidence in his own integrity' (p. 263). It is also confidence which has sustained Fevvers in her role. But she is more vulnerable since, unlike the Shaman, she has no ancestors in this confidence trick. Furthermore, her vision does not confirm an ahistorical present, but projects into a utopian future, when all women will have wings (cf. p. 286), when her singularity will be transformed into a paradigm. Her confidence must therefore be nurtured by the admiration of an audience.

When Fevvers discovers Walser among the bear-worshippers, he has 'got himself an apprenticeship in the higher form of the confidence trick' (p. 294) among a people for whom 'there existed no difference between fact and fiction; instead, a sort of magic realism' (p. 260). Consequently, the amnesiac Walser sees Fevvers not as a real being, but as one of the hallucinations of the spirit world he has got accustomed to, due to the Shaman's drugging him with urine containing fly agaric:

> In Walser's eyes, she saw herself, at last, swimming into definition, like the image on photographic paper; but, instead of Fevvers, she saw two perfect miniatures of a dream.
>
> She felt her outlines waver; she felt herself trapped forever in the reflection of Walser's eyes. For one moment, just one moment, Fevvers suffered the worst crisis of her life: 'Am I fact? Or am I fiction? Am I what I know I am? Or am I what he thinks I am?' (p. 290)

The image we have of ourselves stands in a dialectical relationship with the image others reflect of us. Without the recognition of the others, even Fevvers is 'only a poor freak down on her luck' (p. 290). But when Fevvers flutters her one whole wing, and thus excites astonishment and admiration in the bear-worshippers, she regains her old strength in the enjoyment of their eyes 'that told her who she was' (p. 290) and 'restored her soul' (p. 291). In the end the sceptical Lizzie becomes reconciled to Walser 'for, in the light of his grey eyes, her foster-daughter was transformed back into her old self again, without an application of peroxide, even' (p. 293). The recognition of her being, emphasized in this repetition of the eye metaphor (cf. the eye motif on pp. 15, 23, 32, 39, 273), sets Fevvers free. Fevvers needs to see herself mirrored in the eyes of the others. But in contradistinction to the Lacanian constitution of the symbolic 'I', where the mirror image comes first and the symbolic 'I' follows from it, the miraculous Fevvers is the inventor of her own singularity for which she seeks acclaim. She, however, functions as a mirror image for the readers of the novel, representing an image of a freedom which does

not yet exist in the non-fictional world.

The novel ends with Fevvers's and Walser's love-making on the eve of the twentieth century. Symbolizing a new start in heterosexual relations, Fevvers is on top, since nature has equipped her only for that position. The last pages of the novel echo with Fevvers's laughter at having succeeded in one confidence trick all along: Walser has believed her assurance that she is the only fully-feathered intacta in the world.

Thus we finally have a happy ending to the journeys that examined the constitution of the subject. 'Hubris, imagination, desire' (p. 291), the stuff we ought to be made of (cf. p. 97), find fulfilment in this comic fantasy about a new symbol of femininity which unites being a woman with being free, without bowing to essentialist, concrete definitions of femininity. It is the creation of a new signifier which is still without a corresponding signified in the world outside the novel. But authentic history is not Angela Carter's concern; she explores in this novel 'the freedom that lies behind the mask, within dissimulation, the freedom to juggle with being, and indeed, with the language which is vital to our being, that lies at the heart of burlesque' (p. 103).

Carter uses the mask of the fantastic picaresque story in *Hoffman* and *Eve* to dissect fashionable and commonly held conceptions of the subject. In *Hoffman* the hero's journeys serve to dismantle the alluring progressive ideas of the 1960s that individual and social freedom could be achieved if the social repression of desires were lifted. These ideas are shown as an illusion founded on the mistaken view that human beings are good by nature. The unconscious, in which nothing can be negated or destroyed, contains 'good' and 'evil' desires. The novel vindicates Freud's thesis that civilization cannot do without coercion and renunciation of instinct. It leads to the sober position that a certain amount of alienation, of unfulfilled desire and of sublimation, must constitute part of the formation of the subject in modern civilization, that desire must coexist with rationality.

In *Eve* Carter consciously explores the function of gender in the constitution of the subject. Eve/lyn learns during his/her journey that gender is not a natural category. The symbols of femininity are revealed as reflections of male desire. Yet although femininity does not correspond to any essence, women's subjectivity is shown to be de-formed by the social power of patriarchal stereotypes of femininity. A return to the mythical times of matriarchy is rejected as a dead end in *Eve,* but androgyny flickers up as a vision of a way out of the present gender division—thus grounding the novel in ideas developed by the Anglo-American women's movement in the 1970s.

In *Circus* Carter switches from the analysis of the formation of the subject, i.e. from the deconstruction of the subject as good and natural, to the construction of a fantastic subject, the free woman. The author envisages a fantastic woman's creative conception of free womanhood, and by means of adventures, difficulties and misfortunes on the heroine's journey, Carter explores its interdependence with the 'Other', whose recognition is vital for the constitution of the subject. The comic form of this novel ensures that the utopian enterprise can find a happy ending without being reduced to facile propaganda or deceptive wish fulfilment. It is the increased self-confidence of women in the 1980s and their deeper theoretical understanding of patriarchy and the constitution of the subject that have made this light-heartedness and humour possible.

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NOTES

I would like to thank Liselote Glage, Maggie Humm, and Christopher Lyons for their criticisms of a first draft of this essay.

1 Angela Carter, *The Infernal Desire Machines of Doctor Hoffman* (1972) (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1982). All further references to this work and the subsequent two novels appear in the text.

2 Angela Carter, *The Passion of New Eve* (1977) (London: Virago, 1982).

3 Angela Carter, *Nights at the Circus* (London: Chatto & Windus, 1984).

4 Herbert Marcuse, *Eros and Civilization* (1955) (Boston: Beacon Press, 1966), p. 142.

5 Carter thus contradicts Marcuse's optimistic view that the fundamental historical conditions which shaped the instincts and made their repression necessary tend to become obsolete. Marcuse thought that highly advanced productivity now makes a 'non-repressive civilization' (*Eros,* p. 139) possible. His hypothesis that 'the liberation of Eros' (*Eros,* p. 155) could lead to the correlation 'instinctual liberation—socially useful work—civilization' (Eros, pp. 154f) was highly influential on the students' movement in the 1960s. Carter refutes this position by going back to Freud's insights in 'Civilization and its discontents', in *The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud,* vol. XXI, ed. James Strachey (London: The Hogarth Press, 1961), p. 111: 'men are not gentle creatures who want to be loved, and who at the most can defend themselves if they are attacked; they are, on the contrary, creatures among whose instinctual endowments is to be reckoned a powerful share of aggressiveness'.

6 Michel Foucault, *Madness and Civilization,* trans. Richard Howard (Paris, 1961; London: Tavistock, 1977), p. 282.

7 Freud, 'Civilization and Its Discontents', p. 121.

8 Max Horkheimer and Theodor W.Adorno, *The Dialectic of Enlightenment,* trans. John Cumming (Amsterdam, 1947; London: Allen Lane Penguin Books, 1973), p. 51.

9 Horkheimer and Adorno, op. cit., p. 55.

10 David Punter, *The Hidden Script. Writing and the Unconscious* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1985), p. 31.

11 ibid., p. 32.

12 John Bunyan, *The Pilgrim's Progress* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1960), p. 155.

13 William Blake, 'Milton', in Geoffrey Keynes (ed.), *The Complete Writings of William Blake* (London and New York: Nonesuch Press and Random House, 1958), p. 418.

14 ibid., p. 493.

15 ibid., p. 516.

16 Blake, 'A Vision of the Last Judgment', in *The Complete Writings,* p. 614.

17 Zero is modelled on de Sade's Gernande (from *Justine*) about whom Carter writes in *The Sadeian Woman* (London: Virago, 1979), pp. 52f: 'Like all Sade's libertines, Gernande is a great coward; he is terrified, alone and helpless…. As soon as she

[Justine] asks for punishment, Gernande is reassured. Now he knows who he is; she has told him so, she has told him he is her master.'

18 Cf. Jane Gallop, *Feminism and Psychoanalysis. The Daughter's Seduction* (London: Macmillan, 1982), p. 87: Madame de Saint-Ange 'pays homage to the master, becomes his *man*. Her sexuality is male, that is quantitative.'

19 Carter, *The Sadeian Woman,* p. 106.

20 Carter's description of this cave is obviously influenced by Bruno Bettelheim's account of the layout of prehistoric caves which he interpreted as mimicking the womb. Cf. Bruno Bettelheim, *Symbolic Wounds. Puberty Rites and the Envious Male* (London: Thames & Hudson, 1955), pp. 146–9.

21 David Punter misses the point when he writes of 'the lifeless mating of Eve and Tristessa (op. cit., p. 42) and draws the generalization from this that in Carter's fiction the sexual act 'serves only to confirm the boundary between the genders and the incompatibility of desires' (p. 42). For as this connection between the bird archaeopteryx and the Platonic hermaphrodite shows, Eve and Tristessa's lovemaking depicts a moment of utopian vision. As for the incompatibility of desires, Carter's subsequent novel *Nights at the Circus* shows even more clearly that she does not hold this pessimistic view.

22 Carolyn Heilbrun, *Toward a Recognition of Androgyny* (New York: Knopf, 1973).

23 Cf. Carolyn Heilbrun, 'Further notes toward a recognition of androgyny', *Women's Studies,* 2 (1974), pp. 143–9, and Nancy Topping Bazin and Alma Friedman, 'The androgynous vision', ibid., pp. 185–215; Nancy Topping Bazin, *Virginia Woolf and the Androgynous Vision* (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1973).

24 Cf. Cynthia Secor, 'Androgyny: an early reappraisal', *Women's Studies,* 2 (1974), pp. 161–9, and Daniel A.Harris, 'Androgyny: the sexist myth in disguise', ibid., pp. 171–84.

25 Cf. Luce Irigaray, *Spéculum de l'autre femme* (Paris: Editions de Minuit, 1974). Irigaray argues that all theories of the subject up to now have striven after the establishment of identity by making woman the other, whose difference is only perceived as the negative of the male norm. As a way out of the phallogeocentric rule of the One, Irigaray proposes 'deux (disons) syntaxes. Irréductibles dans leur étrangeté, excentricité l'une à l'autre' (p. 172).

26 Cf. Angela Carter in John Haffenden, *Novelists in Interview* (London and New York: Methuen, 1985), p. 82: 'Our literary heritage is a kind of folklore. In *Nights at the Circus,* for example, the character Mignon is the daughter of Wozzeck—I'm more familiar with the opera by Berg than with the play.'

27 Cf. above all the influential anthology *New French Feminism,* ed. Elaine Marks and Isabelle de Courtivron (Brighton: Harvester Press, 1980) and the discussions of French post-structuralist feminism in *Signs* and *Feminist Studies,* e.g. Carolyn Burke, 'Introduction to Luce Irigaray's "When our lips speak together"', *Signs,* 6, 1 (Autumn 1980), pp. 66–8; Carolyn Burke, 'Irigaray through the looking glass', *Feminist Studies,* 7, 2 (Summer 1981), pp. 288–306. Cf. also Hester Eisenstein and Alice Jardine (eds), *The Future of Difference* (Boston, Mass.: G.K.Hall, 1980).

RICHARD LEVIN

Bashing the bourgeois subject

Anyone who has tried to keep up with the current state of critical discourse does not need to be told that the Bourgeois or Humanist Subject (hereinafter abbreviated as BHS) is in very serious trouble. Something like a major industry has developed, primarily among the cultural materialists, new historicists, and feminist critics associated with them, which is devoted to BHS-bashing. And since no one else has yet risen to the BHS's defence, I have reluctantly agreed to take on this thankless task. I had better confess at the outset, though, that I am a card-carrying BHS myself, as are the members of my nuclear, affective family and most of my friends, because some people might object that this first-hand acquaintance with the subject (in both senses) is empiricist and therefore disqualifies me from discoursing about it. They may be right, for it seems that the principal qualification of those who are doing all the discoursing—i.e. the bashing—is that they have never seen a real live BHS. But I must leave that for the reader to judge.

The attacks on the BHS have been launched on two fronts, the diachronic and the synchronic, and so I will take them up in that order. The basic argument on the first front is that the BHS was created (or 'constructed') in the late seventeenth century, by the bourgeoisie of course, in order to consolidate their hegemony over the oppressed masses, and that before this period people had a radically different sense of selfhood (or 'subjectivity'). Indeed to call it radically different is an understatement. Two of the leading new historicists, Jonathan Goldberg and Stephen Greenblatt, give us brief but startling descriptions of this preBHS: the former reports that inhabitants of the Renaissance had no notion 'of character as self-same, owned, capable of autonomy and change', and the latter that the ideas making up our sense of our identity as an 'inalienable possession' that is 'continuous' and 'permanently anchored' in our 'biological individuality' were not held 'by anyone in the sixteenth century'.[1] The cultural materialists provide much more detailed accounts of the historical process involved, although they disagree on most of the details. In Catherine Belsey's scheme there are two diametrically opposed stages; the individual was seen in the Middle Ages as 'disunited' and 'discontinous', with 'no unifying essence', while 'the unified subject of liberal humanism' (the BHS), with an 'inalienable identity' and a 'continuous and inviolable interiority', is 'a product of the second half of the seventeenth century'. Francis Barker also has two opposing stages, but they are reversed; for him it was the pre-BHS who possessed 'coherence', while the BHS, saddled with a 'deadly subjectivity' (which is none the less 'imaginary'), is disunified because of 'deleterious separations' of mind from body and individual from society. And Jonathan Dollimore works out a three-stage sequence incorporating portions of both these versions: under the medieval ideology of 'Christian essentialism' the self was unified but 'metaphysically derivative'; this gives way in the Renaissance to a 'sense of the self as flexible, problematic, elusive' and 'contradictory'; and the 'unified', 'autonomous' BHS 'only

really emerges with the Enlightenment' under 'essentialist humanism'.[2]

I will not linger over the 'evidence' presented for these historical discoveries because I have discussed it elsewhere,[3] and because there is so little of it. Goldberg offers none at all; and Greenblatt bases his case on a sixteenth-century French trial where a man was accused and convicted of impersonating another, and where, according to him, modern ideas of the self as 'continuous', 'permanently anchored', etc., were not invoked 'explicitly or implicitly' and were 'irrelevant to the point of being unthinkable' (p. 215). But it proves just the opposite: if people then had not assumed those ideas, they would not have held a trial to determine whether the accused really was the man he claimed to be or an imposter, since there would be no such thing as an imposter.[4] Belsey, Barker, and Dollimore draw most of their 'evidence' from the representation of character in the Morality drama, which supposedly reveals the nature of the 'medieval subject', and from Renaissance plays which are supposed to show—chiefly in the 'absence of character "consistency"'—the 'impossibility' of depicting an 'autonomous individual' at this time, because the idea is 'as yet…unspeakable'.[5] But this assumes a direct equation between the way characters were presented and the way members of the audience conceived of themselves, which is simply wrong. People watching a Morality play did not think they were personifications of abstract entities; nor did Elizabethans think that women were boys in farthingales who exposed their secrets to the world in blank verse asides; nor did audiences at the early cinema think that men wore lipstick and communicated by mouthing their words silently and then flashing them on a large screen. There obviously have been changes in the conventions involving the presentation of character in the drama and other media, but we have no reason to believe they corresponded to changes in the basic idea of the self. These critics acknowledge this when it suits their purpose. Belsey says 'the recognition of reality in fiction is primarily a matter of familiarity with the conventions used to depict a recognizable world' (p. 87), yet she deduces the medieval concept of selfhood from the conventions of Morality drama. And Dollimore argues that 'the development in th[e] drama of character representation…is evidence less of Renaissance individualism than of an emergent realism' (pp. 175–6), since he wants individualism to be created later by the bourgeoisie; but elsewhere he uses the mode of representing character to establish the nature of the 'subject'.

We would have to add, moreover, that this idea of the pre-BHS is not only without historical foundation but is also incredible. It is a good example of what E.D.Hirsch calls the 'fallacy of the inscrutable past', which finds in the past 'a state of mind so different from our own that… [it] seems to be populated by beings who might have come from Mars'.[6] In fact his own example, Bruno Snell's claim that Homeric Greeks had no conception of a unified human body, is of the same order as the pre-BHS of these critics. For if they are to be credited, an 'Elizabethan subject' on waking up in the morning would not believe she was the same person who went to sleep the night before, and could not make any plans for the day, since that assumed her 'continuous' identity as well as the 'interiority' that would allow her to think that she could think about 'herself'. People then would not even have been able to use the past or future tense, and certainly could not have written all those histories and 'Lives', which assume that their human 'subjects' had selves that were 'continuous' through time. But there is no need to go on, for it should be obvious that this pre-BHS is an absurd fiction.

I think the same must be said of the concept of the BHS that emerges from this body of criticism, if we turn now from the diachronic to the synchronic phase of the attack, which centres upon the listing of qualities that the BHS allegedly attributes to itself. We have already encountered two of these—'unity' and 'autonomy'—that regularly appear in these descriptions (except for Barker's), and that do not seem either immoral or irrational, if not taken in an absolute sense. But they are always accompanied by things that sound much worse. Dollimore, for instance, refers to 'the autonomous, unified self-generating subject postulated by essentialist humanism' (p. 155), and Montrose to 'the freely self-creating and world-creating subject of bourgeois humanism';[7] and Belsey says that the BHS is supposed to be not only 'unified' and 'autonomous', but also 'the free, unconstrained author of meaning and action, the origin of history' (p. 8). In Antony Easthope's account,

> at the centre of bourgeois ideology is the idealist conception of the self-conscious individual (typically male) as an unconditioned source of decision and action—owing nothing to anyone, depending on nothing but himself, choosing freely and autonomously…as if (in the words of Coriolanus) 'a man were author of himself/And knew no other kin'.[8]

And Toril Moi presents a feminist version:

> This integrated self [of the BHS] is in fact a phallic self, constructed on the model of the self-contained, powerful phallus. Gloriously autonomous, it banishes from itself all conflict, contradiction and ambiguity. In this humanist ideology the self is the *sole author* of history and of the literary text: the humanist creator is potent, phallic and male—God in relation to his world.[9]

It was descriptions of this sort that led me to suggest at the outset that these critics have never seen a real BHS, even though according to their own historical analysis they should be surrounded by innumerable living instantiations of this creature. Have they ever known anyone, outside a mental institution, who believed that she generated herself or the world, or that he was completely free to choose and act without any conditions or constraints, or that she had no internal or external conflicts, and was entirely independent of all other persons and things, or that he could make words mean whatever he wanted, and created history all by himself, and was attached (loosely speaking, of course) to a self-contained phallus? Clearly this conception of the BHS is at least as absurd as their conception of the pre-BHS, so if that exemplified Hirsch's 'fallacy of the inscrutable past', then this must represent the fallacy of the inscrutable present. It would seem, therefore, that the historical claim of these critics that the BHS did not exist during the Renaissance turns out to be true after all, in a sense they certainly did not intend, because the kind of BHS they describe has never existed, except in their imagination. It was not 'produced' by the bourgeois Ideological State Apparatus at the end of the seventeenth century, as they maintain, but by anti-bourgeois intellectuals in our own day.

The explanation is simple enough, for when these critics discourse on the BHS they are not talking about actual individuals they have known or even individuals unknown to them; they are talking about an abstraction—an abstraction that they have (to adopt their

own terminology) reified, personified, mystified, stereotyped, caricatured, scapegoated, hypostatized, fetishized, alterized, ventriloquized, and, above all, demonized. This process of demonization can be seen very clearly in two accounts of how the BHS will precipitate a nuclear apocalypse through its own internal dynamics, if we do not stop it in time. According to Belsey, the BHS longs for suicide, which puts

> an end to the endless desire…to be precisely autonomous, to be not just free, but also the origin and guarantee of its own identity, the source of being, meaning and action. Suicide re-establishes the sovereign subject…[and is] the crowning affirmation of the supremacy of the self.

And nuclear war is 'communal suicide, an absolute act of universal sovereignty', which, since it 'clos[es] off in the moment of its fulfilment the desire to be absolute, is [the BHS's] diamond of unnamable desire' (pp. 124–5). And Barker says that 'the death drive' is the BHS's 'unknown objective':

> A nuclear dénouement…would secure the [conclusion]…which bourgeois discourse is committed to seeking…. The desire…for a finality, a plenitude of arrival—which must shape itself as the most complete absence possible—is [its] secret aspiration…. Its aim [is] to find in a general catastrophe…the end of all desire…[where] the hollowing would finally be filled, the absence supplied…by a last erasure of the doubled architecture of presence and absence that describes…bourgeois subjectivity. (p. 110–11)

We should note that in both these fantasies (for that is surely what they are) the BHS produces the ultimate disaster all by itself with no help from the outside world—no changes in the mode of production or social formation, no conflicts between or within classes, no competition for raw materials or markets, no clash of rival ideologies, no enemy, real or imagined, and no external goal, not even the need 'to busy giddy minds with foreign quarrels'. Belsey and Barker presumably regard themselves as materialists, but here they sound much more like theologians trying to explain how Satan's 'pride' caused him to revolt and bring evil into the universe.

Now that we have seen how these critics describe the pre-BHS and the BHS, we should be in a position to determine why they have made their historical claims about this remarkable change in the conception of the self. And on that question, fortunately, we can learn something from the critics themselves, for a number of them have been telling us that historical statements are never objective or impartial, because every history of the past is actually 'fabricated' or 'fictioned' to serve as a 'history-for' some interest in the present.[10] We should therefore apply their own law by asking whose interests are served by this history of the 'subject' that they have discovered. The obvious answer is that it serves the interests of these critics and their projects, but there seems to be a significant difference here between the new historicists and cultural materialists. The historical discoveries of the former group are made—or at least announced—in the course of refuting other critics, and are meant to be the most telling point of that refutation. Thus Goldberg's assertions about the pre-BHS are directed against what he calls 'the ahistorical tendencies in feminist criticism' of Shakespeare, which 'lacks historical

support' and 'historical specificity' (pp. 117, 137); and Greenblatt's are aimed at previous 'psychoanalytic interpretation' of Renaissance texts, which, he says, 'is causally belated', since the concept of selfhood it assumes did not yet exist, so that it 'can redeem its belatedness only when it historicizes its own procedures' (p. 221).[11] The chief value of the discovery, apparently, is to put down someone else, whose ignorance of it demonstrates her ahistoricality, and therefore to establish the superiority of the discoverer who can supply this crucial historical perspective. It is in their own 'interest', then, to find that the Renaissance subject is very different from the modern one, because that provides them with the weapon to defeat their opponents, and at the same time proves the need for, and the validity of, their kind of 'historicising'; but so far as I can see they have no stake in the specific nature of this pre-BHS.[12]

The cultural materialists also deploy their historical discovery at times to refute the readings of critics they oppose (usually the 'formalist/ humanists'), but they seem much more concerned with the pre-BHS itself, because they want it to be not merely different from the BHS but also better (which the new historicists never claim). For their primary 'interest' is in attacking, not other critics, but the evil bourgeois world of modern capitalism, and since they are operating with the standard Marxist two-term dialectic—or, a less kind observer might say, under the standard Marxist difficulty of counting beyond two—the pre-bourgeois conceptions of the Renaissance must be anti-bourgeois and therefore good. That is why they have discovered (or, to adopt their own term, 'fictioned') a history of the subject wherein the Renaissance pre-BHS contains the very qualities that they approve of and therefore want to find there, which turn out to be the exact opposite of the BHS's individualism, essentialism, autonomy, etc., that they disapprove of. Thus, while they regularly accuse older historical critics like Tillyard of producing a Renaissance that reproduces their own ideology (which is true enough), that is just what they themselves have done here, although the ideology itself is of course very different.

There is also, I would argue, another 'interest' served by the production of this history, which I call Edenism. It is the belief—or perhaps the need to believe—in some idyllic period of the past from which we have fallen away, and, in most versions, to which we should return. The Garden of Eden performs this function for many Jews and Christians, as did the Golden Age for pagan Greeks and Romans. German and Italian fascism relied heavily upon Edenic accounts of ancient national glories. And Americans have several Edens—the days of the Founding Fathers, the frontier, the simple life of the small town— that are now exploited by conservatives. In fact we usually think of this as a right-wing phenomenon and call the wish to return to such an Eden 'reactionary', but it also flourishes at or near the other end of the political spectrum. The early Protestant attacks on the papacy appealed to a second Eden in the practices of the primitive church, and there was an old radical tradition in England that evoked the original Eden, where Adam delved and Eve span and there were no gentlemen. Much more recently, we have seen some black militants Edenising the condition of the race in precolonial Africa; and some feminists believe in a prehistoric era of gender equality—or, more often, matriarchy— that has now been described in several books. One of them, for instance, claims that women were worshipped by men as supernatural beings, and that they invented agriculture, cattle breeding, and architecture, among other things, before the men seized

power.[13] Even feminists who do not invoke such ideas, and may not be consciously thinking of them, will often employ the rhetoric of 'reclaiming' or 'recovering' what 'we lost' or what 'was taken from us', which is a form of Edenism.

The Marxists, of course, possess an Eden of their very own in the myth of 'primitive communism', which was recently revived and 'theorized' in Fredric Jameson's *The Political Unconscious*. And it seems that they have constructed a second Eden in the pre-capitalist world. Indeed, in doing this they are simply following the lead of their founding fathers, who began *The Communist Manifesto* with an indictment of the bourgeoisie for drowning chivalrous sentiment in the icy waters of egotistical calculation, resolving personal worth into exchange value, reducing the family to a mere money relation, pitilessly tearing asunder all earlier human ties and leaving no other nexus between people than naked self-interest, in passages that resemble Carlyle's *Past and Present* and Burke's complaint, in *Reflections on the French Revolution,* that 'the age of chivalry is gone' and 'all the decent drapery of life is to be rudely torn off', even though their attack comes from the political right. A few of the critics we are considering here warn against this tendency to idealize the Middle Ages and Renaissance,[14] but they all indulge in it to some extent. The most indulgent by far is Barker, who yearns for the lost organic 'coherence' of feudalism and berates the BHS for those 'deleterious separations', which he characterizes as 'what was done to us in the seventeenth century' by the bourgeoisie, and which his final words urge us to 'undo' (pp. 68, 116).[15] At times he sounds like T.S.Eliot lamenting the 'dissociation of sensibility' in this same period, which is another example of how Edenism can make strange political bedfellows. And his moving account of the 'wretched pathos for the subject' produced by those separations (p. 66) would lead one to conclude that no one living after the seventeenth century was ever happy, although he might claim that the bourgeoisie tricks them into thinking that they are happy, just as it tricks them into thinking that they are thinking, which is why their 'subjectivity' is 'imaginary' (p. 31).

Dollimore's Edenism is somewhat different since it is limited to the Renaissance, which he views as a kind of breathing space of relative flexibility for the subject that opened up between the 'Christian essentialism' of the Middle Ages and the 'essentialist humanism' of the Enlightenment (p. 155). And we get further variations when the critics attempt to combine Marxism and feminism. Belsey, for instance, argues that the wife in a bourgeois companionate marriage, even though it is 'founded on consent' and allows for divorce, is 'in reality' less free than her feudal predecessor in an arranged and indissoluble marriage, because the 'overt' external control of the ecclesiastical courts has been replaced by 'a new mode of control' that is 'internalized and invisible' and therefore 'more insidious'; and Greene asserts that the effect of capitalism is to 'reduce' women 'to objects of appetite and trade' who must sell themselves.[16] She never explains what they have been reduced *from,* but it can only be from their status under feudalism, when they were sold by their father or the lord of the manor (after first exercising his *ius prima nocte*). Selling oneself might seem a step up from being sold by someone else, but Greene regards it as a descent because she has idealized feudal social relations in order to score a point against capitalism. Thus in both her account and Belsey's, Marxist Edenism has won out over feminist concern for the situation of real women in the real world.

Now Edenism may appear to be nothing more than a harmless exercise in nostalgia and

wishful thinking, but it is often accompanied by other ideas that are far from harmless, or can be if people act upon them. The most dangerous of these is the belief in a villain who is responsible for the loss of Eden and hence for our present fallen state. In the biblical Eden it was Satan, and in most of the other versions it is some group or institution, which is usually hypostatized and endowed with Satanic powers—the papal Anti-Christ for early Protestants, International Jewry for the Nazis, Secular Humanism for American fundamentalists, and so on. The Marxists have two Edens and therefore two villains, since 'primitive communism' was destroyed by private property and the class system, and Renaissance wholeness or flexibility by the BHS and its alleged sponsor, Liberal Humanism. (Not so incidentally, Liberal Humanism bears an eerie resemblance to Secular Humanism; the latter is a non-existent 'religion' recently invented by the far right to serve as the enemy, and the former a non-existent 'philosophy' recently invented by the far left for the same purpose.) And this conception in turn usually leads to a rejection of any reforms as deceptive (witness Belsey and Greene on the elimination of arranged marriages), and an insistence upon a radical 'final solution' that will transform society, extirpate the Satanic villain, and so restore the lost Eden in a utopia of idyllic harmony. We now call this a 'totalizing' view of the world, because it posits a single cause for all our problems and a single cure, and within it the processes of Edenizing and demonizing feed upon and reinforce each other in an ascending spiral of fantasy. The belief in a demonic causation enhances the need to Edenize the world that it destroyed, and the belief in that Edenic world enhances the need to demonize the cause of its destruction, which, I am suggesting, helps to explain the incredible portrayals of the BHS that we looked at earlier.

There is, finally, one more reason why the cultural materialists have produced this history of the change from the pre-BHS to the BHS, which can be found in another 'interest' of theirs that it serves. For they themselves want to change the BHS and therefore, in addition to bashing away at it through those portrayals, they must argue that it was itself the result of a radical change in the recent past and so is susceptible to another radical change in the near future. This history, then, justifies their hopes of 'producing a new kind of human subject altogether', as Terry Eagleton puts it,[17] which brings back memories of the reports we used to get from Moscow about the 'human engineering' that was creating a 'New Soviet Man' (with his female counterpart presumably trailing along behind), who would be sober, chaste, and cultured, strong but gentle, industrious but not competitive, independent but obedient to the Party, free of all internal or external problems, and, above all, selflessly dedicated to the common good— in short, a kind of socialist super-Boy Scout. (We have not heard much about him lately, for pretty obvious reasons.) At the end of her essay on 'Literature, history, politics', Belsey states the idea in more general terms as the purpose of this kind of history, which is 'to demonstrate that since change has occurred in those areas which seem most intimate and most inevitable, change in those areas is possible for us' (p. 26).[18] But this too is a fantasy. I do not think many workers will be induced to mount the barricades upon being informed that the conception of the 'subject' underwent a change in the seventeenth century, especially when they are also informed—for surely these critics will be honest about it—that 'the claim is not that such a history…is more accurate' than other histories which deny this change, 'but only that it is more radical' (p. 26), and that it

has been deliberately 'fictioned' as a 'history-for' in order to induce them to mount the barricades. Besides, since they will be BHSs themselves, by definition, they will believe that *they* are 'the sole authors of history', etc., and will certainly resent all the unkind things these critics have been saying about BHS-dom. After all, in the immortal words of P.T.Barnum, you can't expect to bash them and bamboozle them at the same time.

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NOTES

1 Jonathan Goldberg, 'Shakespearean inscriptions: the voicing of power', in Patricia Parker and Geoffrey Hartman (eds), *Shakespeare and the Question of Theory* (London: Methuen, 1985), p. 118; Stephen Greenblatt, 'Psycho-analysis and Renaissance culture', in Patricia Parker and David Quint (eds), *Literary Theory/Renaissance Texts* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986), pp. 214–15.

2 Catherine Belsey, *The Subject of Tragedy: Identity and Difference in Renaissance Drama* (London: Methuen, 1985), pp. 18, 33, 40; Francis Barker, *The Tremulous Private Body: Essays on Subjection* (London: Methuen, 1984), pp. 24–5, 31, 56; Jonathan Dollimore, *Radical Tragedy: Religion, Ideology and Power in the Drama of Shakespeare and his Contemporaries* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984), pp. 155, 179.

3 See 'Unthinkable thoughts in the new historicizing of English Renaissance drama', *New Literary History* (forthcoming). The alert reader will have noted that I am adopting a major strategy of the anti-BHS forces—refutation by inverted commas, which they deploy to place the terms they disapprove of under erasure (like 'so-called' in recent political rhetoric). In Malcolm Evans's *Signifying Nothing: Truth's True Contents in Shakespeare's Text* (Athens, Ga: University of Georgia Press, 1986), for instance, these stigmata are interpellated to bracket 'aesthetic', 'literary', 'taste', 'humane', 'common sense', 'disinterestedness', 'meaning', 'intention', 'character', 'essential', 'universality', etc.

4 He seeks additional support in Montaigne's doubts about the verdict; however, those doubts were concerned not with the continuity of selfhood but with the certainty of the evidence: 'A tuer les gens, il faut une clarté lumineuse et nette' (*Essais,* ed. Maurice Rat (Paris: Garnier, 1962), vol. 2, pp. 478–9). He also admits that another explanation of why these ideas were not invoked during the trial could have been 'a self-evidence so deep and assured that the postulates quite literally go without saying' (p. 215).

5 Dollimore, op. cit., p. 176; Belsey, op. cit., p. 77; Barker, op. cit., p. 38. Greenblatt also goes to the drama for further evidence, arguing that in Renaissance plays based on impersonation or mistaken identity we see an 'exploration of the issue at stake in the trial' (p. 219). But these plays, like the trial, assume that the self is 'continuous' and 'permanently anchored', for otherwise there could be no impersonation or mistaken identity.

6 E.D.Hirsch, *The Aims of Interpretation* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press,

1976), p. 39. He refers to Snell's *The Discovery of the Mind: The Greek Origins of European Thought,* trans. T.G.Rosenmeyer (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1953).

7 Louis Montrose, 'The Elizabethan subject and the Spenserian text', in Parker and Quint, op. cit., p. 306.

8 Antony Easthope, 'Poetry and the politics of reading', in Peter Widdowson (ed), *Re-Reading English* (London: Methuen, 1982), p. 142.

9 Toril Moi, *Sexual/Textual Politics: Feminist Literary Theory* (London: Methuen, 1985), p. 8. She is summarizing, and endorsing, the views of Luce Irigaray and Hélène Cixous.

10 See Barker, op. cit., pp. 15, 68; Evans, op. cit., pp. 83, 253; Catherine Belsey, 'Literature, history, politics', *Literature and History,* 9 (1983), pp. 22, 26; Graham Holderness, *Shakespeare's History* (New York: St Martin's Press, 1985), pp. 22–3, 38.

11 Goldberg's main target is Linda Bamber's *Comic Women, Tragic Men: A Study of Gender and Genre in Shakespeare* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1982), and his attack includes another historical discovery, that Elizabethans had no 'notion that biological difference is an *a priori* fact' in defining gender—the 'evidence' here (which, he says, 'critics forget') is that 'boys and girls in the Renaissance wear female clothes in their early years' (p. 118). Greenblatt, similarly, criticises Judith Brown's *Immodest Acts: The Life of a Lesbian Nun in Renaissance Italy* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986) for failing to 'historicize' the idea of lesbianism, which he claims, on even less 'evidence', did not then exist because 'sexual pleasure was not conceived as inherently gendered' ('Splenditello', *London Review of Books,* 19 June 1986, p. 6).

12 Peter Erickson makes a similar point about the new historicists' use of the terms 'unhistorical' and 'ahistorical' in controversies, but he suggests that Greenblatt's 'invocation of the name "historicism"' to 'rule sexuality out of bounds' in his criticism of Brown 'covers an unacknowledged political move' ('Rewriting the Renaissance, Rewriting ourselves', *Shakespeare Quarterly,* 38 (1987), p. 331). I cannot imagine what it is, unless antagonizing feminist critics (which Goldberg also does in his article) is political. But there may be another significant difference here between them and the cultural materialists, who usually try to co-opt feminism.

13 June Stephenson, *Women's Roots: Status and Achievements in Western Civilization* (Napa, Calif.: Diemer, Smith, 1986); for a more sophisticated version, see Gerda Lerner, *The Creation of Patriarchy* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986).

14 See Evans, op. cit., p. 252, and Belsey, *Subject of Tragedy,* p. 223, where she rejects 'the construction of lost Utopias' and what she calls 'its counterpart, the Whig interpretation of history' as 'the affirmation of progress'. These two views of history seem to be exact opposites, but she brackets them together as 'characteristic of liberal humanism' since both are non-Marxist, which is another example of the Marxist difficulty in counting past two.

15 Compare Frank Lentricchia's desire for 'a redemptive project' that would 'make us whole again' in *Criticism and Social Change* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1983), p. 151.

16 Belsey, *Subject of Tragedy,* pp. 145–7; Gayle Greene, 'Feminist and Marxist criticism: an argument for alliances', *Women's Studies,* 9 (1981), p. 39.
17 Terry Eagleton, *Literary Theory: An Introduction* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1983), p. 191. This is Bertolt Brecht's view, which he agrees with.
18 In the final chapter of *The Subject of Tragedy,* which is titled 'Changing the present', she says, 'The history of the subject in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries indicates…radical discontinuities. On this reading the past affirms the possibility (the inevitability?) of change' (p. 223).

CATHERINE BELSEY

The subject in danger: a reply to Richard Levin

In 1971 Richard Levin published a good book about Renaissance drama called *The Multiple Plot*.[1] I still recommend it to my students as an illuminating analysis, although I do not share most of the critical values it takes for granted. I have never thought of it as remotely comic, or made any jokes about it. Now, however, Levin sees my book about Renaissance drama, called *The Subject of Tragedy,* as hilariously funny, along with some other books by colleagues whose work I find as illuminating as his own, and variously subtle, scholarly and challenging in addition. Why, I wonder. And why all these jokes, this comedy?

The hero of Levin's essay, a sort of composite protagonist of the books he is so amused by, is called BHS ('the Bourgeois or Humanist Subject'). This figure is in danger, Levin rightly recognizes, and therefore, he claims, in need of defence. Levin quite properly reveals from the beginning his own interest in this project. He is a BHS himself, he disarmingly acknowledges, so we know where we are.

One common theme of the books Levin finds so absurd is the instability of the humanist subject. Laying claim to unity, knowledge, and autonomy, humanist subjectivity is for ever inadvertently representing (representing) its own division, uncertainty and subjection. It is then impelled to reaffirm its imaginary authority in what gradually becomes a miserable spiral of mastery and failure, authoritarianism and panic. One mode of reaffirmation is, of course, the repudiation of alternative accounts of the world, since other ways of interpreting texts, history and, inevitably, subjectivity itself, constitute a threat to the condition of knowingness, the sense of possessing the truth, that holds the subject so precariously in place.

From the seventeenth century onwards the humanist subject has developed two main strategies for dealing with threatening alternative knowledges. The first is to denounce them. The present British government, the Moral Majority in the US and the popular press throughout the Free West display the luxury of righteous indignation against those who perceive the world otherwise. Moral invective banishes the threatening alternative as wicked, so that it is not necessary to engage rationally with its disturbing propositions. But denunciation, particularly because of its populist associations, can come across as a bit naïve, a bit 'heavy'. The more sophisticated second strategy, familiar from Dryden onwards, and perfected by Pope and Swift, is caricature. You present as ludicrous the position you fear, so that once again there is no need to engage with the arguments. Thus the Enlightenment protected itself from the implications of its own commitment to reason.[2]

As an academic, Levin naturally prefers the second, more sophisticated strategy (though British theorists working among the heirs of F.R. Leavis are throughly accustomed to eliciting plenty of moral denunciation as well). Levin is not Dryden or Pope, and certainly not Swift. His essay is more at the knockabout level, and it's

apparently all good clean fun. It is written, like *Gulliver's Travels* and *Tom Jones,* from the point of view of the plain man increasingly astonished at the foibles and fopperies of others, though it lacks the subtle ironies which offer to distance the reader to some degree from the innocence of the eighteenth-century heroes. The plain man, as usual on these occasions, knows a thing or two about the real world and has no time for arcane ideas and esoteric theories. Common sense is quite good enough for him…. (He is, of course, always male, and very much one of the lads, a regular guy.)

Levin does not appear to notice that the books he sends up are about texts. He measures works of literary criticism by their knowledge of real life and 'actual individuals'. Literary texts, too, in his view, are about real life, and if what they seem to say is not consistent with the world according to Levin, then clearly they can't possibly be read as saying that. Audiences also know about real life, so they aren't fooled, any more than Levin is, by plays which appear to say silly things. They recognize that these plays are really saying exactly what they and Levin believe: it's just that they're saying it in silly ways. 'People watching a Morality play did not think they were personifications of abstract entities.' As far as I am aware, no one has ever supposed they did. But what I'd love to know is how Levin knows what went on in the minds of people watching Morality plays. How does he have access to the consciousnesses of early sixteenth-century audiences? If only we *did*….

But on reflection, I think I do know how Levin knows. He knows because he has trans-historical and trans-cultural access to all consciousness precisely on the basis of being a humanist subject, a BHS. It is worth noting that Levin's sixteenth-century audience—men, women, clerics, apprentices, presumably, and vagrants, perhaps—all felt the same way as each other, and they reacted exactly as Levin would. Plain men, it seems, all of them, and certainly uncluttered with arcane theories. The humanist subject finds its own mirror image wherever it looks. The first imperative of bourgeois ideology is to proclaim itself natural and universal.

But this means, of course, that the BHS is desperately vulnerable. Because in practice even the present world is full of individuals and groups who feel differently—women, blacks, gays, vagrants again, people who don't want to live in nuclear families, communists….

There. The word is out. And isn't it here, in the end, that we find the source of all this slightly hysterical hilarity? Moscow, the workers and the barricades finally put in an appearance on the last page. It's all a joke, of course. But where was it that Freud traced the utterances of the unconscious? Dreams, parapraxes, and jokes. Poor Levin seems to think that Marxists think that workers are bourgeois, so perhaps his acquaintance with Marxism isn't first-hand. But he evidently finds Marxist politics very unnerving, and sees reds under most of the critical positions he doesn't agree with. He clearly doesn't like the thought that things could change. He does not, he indicates, go along with the idea that nuclear weapons are not justified by real enemies, real conflicts, real goals. And I think he may even be afraid that we're going to try to turn him into a New Man. (Chance would be a fine thing.)

It is a pity, all this. It causes Levin to panic, to the point where he becomes quite unprofessionally repetitive. A good deal of what he says here also appears in the essay he lists in note 3 as forthcoming in *New Literary History*. Not verbatim, of course: Levin

knows about copyright. But in more than one passage, while individual words and phrases have been changed, the sentence structures are identical. If the compulsion to repeat is always an indication of anxiety, self-plagiarism is exactly the form we might expect it to take in the humanist subject, forever insistently reaffirming its own imaginary possession of the truth.

Panic also inhibits his understanding of the books he alludes to. He doesn't appear to recognize the distinction they make between the subject and the self, or between the subject and 'character'; he confuses meaning and experience; and he mistakes the identification of historical difference for nostalgia. The last of these is a common habit of inattentive reading: the reader cements difference as opposition, and assumes that if one term of the consequent antithesis is called in question, the other must be affirmed. If I (or my colleagues—but I don't venture to speak on their behalf) argue that liberalism is different from feudalism, and that liberalism has its problems, it must follow, according to Levin's logic, that I want to reinstate feudalism. But it *is* Levin's logic, not mine. It is quite common to hear otherwise perfectly sensible people urge that Foucault was nostalgic for the *ancien régime,* when *Discipline and Punish* went to the length of opening with a horrifying depiction of torture to forestall exactly that criticism. I did my best to forestall it too by insisting that there were no golden worlds, long-lost or newly found. But perhaps I took too much for granted when I failed to dwell in detail on the authoritarianism and the brutality of feudal values.

What, though, would be the point of denouncing feudalism? It is not an available option. Liberal humanism is, however, and what I hoped to do was point to the imaginary nature of so much that liberal humanism promises—to us now.

Levin can read better than this. *The Multiple Plot* shows that when he's not panicking, he's a subtle and perceptive reader. But ironically it is the theory of subjectivity he so vehemently repudiates which would give a plausible explanation of what went wrong in between. I wrote *The Subject of Tragedy* partly to demonstrate that the outward complacency of the humanist hero is founded on fear. Levin's essay, it seems to me, is a perfect case in point.

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NOTES

1 Richard Levin, *The Multiple Plot in English Renaissance Drama* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1971).
2 Cf. Antony Easthope, 'The politicisation of English', *PN Review,* 40 (1984), p. 4.

SIMON CRITCHLEY

The chiasmus: Levinas, Derrida and the ethical demand for deconstruction

I

Why bother with deconstruction? This is a question that continually haunts the critical reader who has decided to follow Derrida. Why exactly are we seeking to deconstruct logocentric discourse? What or who calls for deconstruction? What necessity governs Derrida's work? In this essay, I shall attempt to investigate these questions along two lines, each of which will intersect and interlace with the other, forming the χ of the figure of a chiasmus: first, I attempt to understand what takes place in Derridian deconstruction; and second, I point out and exploit certain thematic and strategic resonances that deconstruction shares with the ethics of Emmanuel Levinas. The goal of such a chiasmatic dialogue will be to bring into focus the following theses: (i) that a crucial aspect of the otherness which the logocentric totality has continually sought to reduce or expel is the singular otherness that is manifested in the face of the other; (ii) that the necessity for deconstruction can be understood as an ethical demand, a demand that is placed upon us by the alterity of the other person.

Why bother with deconstruction? Because we cannot do otherwise. The necessity which governs deconstruction derives from the wholly Other, *Anankē,* before whom I can refuse nothing and where my claims for liberty are sacrificed to the need for justice. In saying this I believe that I follow Derrida.

II

Let us broach the first line of inquiry by asking the following question: *what takes place in Derridian deconstruction?*

The first essential point to make, however trivial it may seem, is that deconstruction is always a deconstruction of a *text* (for the moment I understand the text in a limited sense. I shall come to the notion of the general text presently). Derrida's thinking is always thinking *about* a text, whether that text is by Hegel, Husserl, Heidegger or Genêt, Ponge or Mallarmé. From this first point flows the obvious corollary that deconstruction is always engaged in a *reading* of a text. The way of deconstruction is always opened through reading; what Derrida calls in *Memoires for Paul de Man,* 'a first task, the most elementary of tasks' (*M* 41). Any thinking which is primarily concerned with reading will clearly be dependent upon the text that is being read. Derrida's writings are parasitic because they are close readings of texts that draw their sustenance from within the flesh of the host.[1] As such, Derrida's thinking, perhaps to a greater extent than that of any

other philosopher, is dependent upon the texts that he reads. It would not, I believe, be implausible to suggest that the trajectory of Derrida's thinking, has, in no small way, been determined by the texts that he selects for reading.

This takes us to the following question: to what texts does Derrida devote deconstructive readings? A unifying element in Derrida's writings can be found in the fact that, from his 1962 introduction to Husserl's *Origin of Geometry* to his most recent work on Heidegger, *De l'esprit,* Derrida has, for the most part, selected *philosophical* texts for deconstruction. In *La différance,* which functions like a synopsis or *compte rendu* of his early work, Derrida lists those writers whose names function like indices (MP 22) in the development of his thinking: Saussure, Husserl, Hegel, Nietzsche, Freud, Heidegger, and, of course, Levinas. What is significant here is the predominance of philosophical proper names. The fact of Derrida's philosophical parasitism could provide the basis for an argument that would suggest that deconstruction must be understood from within the resources of the philosophical tradition, even when it is engaged in a radical displacement of that tradition. Such an argument would not deny the importance of the impact that deconstruction has had upon contemporary literary criticism and the other human sciences, it would simply add the crucial caveat that Derrida's importance must be judged with reference to the context of the philosophical tradition, particularly in connection with the Kantian and post-Kantian tradition of the critique of metaphysics (although we should, I believe, be cautious of recent attempts to place Derrida's work *within* a philosophical context, when Derrida has been more attentive than most philosophers to the difficulties involved in delimiting the boundaries of contextuality). Indeed, the debate about the relation of deconstruction to philosophy and literature has been at the forefront of recent Derrida scholarship in the work of John Llewelyn, Rodolphe Gasché, Irene Harvey, and Christopher Norris.[2]

The way of Derridian deconstruction, then, lies in the reading of texts, primarily philosophical texts. With this in mind, let us return to our earlier question: what takes place in Derridian deconstruction? Taken at face value, such a question would appear to be one of methodology and Derrida addresses it concisely and lucidly in a section of *De la grammatologie* entitled 'L'exorbitant. Question de méthode'.

When Derrida reads Rousseau, he organizes his reading around the word 'supplément'. This word is the 'blind spot' ('tâche aveugle' (G 234)) in Rousseau's text, a word which he employs but whose 'logic' is veiled to him. Derrida's reading of Rousseau traces the logic of this supplement, a logic which allows Rousseau's text to slip from the grip of his intentions and achieve a textual position that is other than the logocentric conceptuality that Rousseau intended to affirm. Thus Derrida's 'lecture critique' (G 227)[3] of Rousseau occupies the space between the writer's intentions and the text, or between what a writer commands and fails to command in a language. It is into this space between intentions and text that Derrida inserts what he calls the 'structure signifiante' (G 227) of the reading that constitutes 'Part Two' of *De la grammatologie*.

How does one perform a deconstructive reading? In 'L'exorbitant. Question de méthode', Derrida pauses in his analysis of Rousseau in order to justify his methodological principles (G 227). The signifying structure of a deconstructive reading cannot, he claims, simply be produced through a commentary. Although Derrida is acutely aware of the exigencies of the classical instruments of commentary, such a

procedure, 'has only ever *protected,* it has never opened a reading' (G 227). However, if the respectful repetition of the text which commentary produces fails to open a reading, then this in no way entails that one should transgress the text by relating it to some referent outside of textuality. The axial proposition of *De la grammatologie* is 'Il n'y a pas de hors-texte' ('there is no outside-text' (G 227)), or again, 'il n'y a rien hors du texte' ('there is nothing outside of the text' (G 233))—one should be attentive to the nuanced difference in these two sentences: the first claims that there is no 'outside-text', no text outside; whilst the second claims that there is *nothing* outside of the text, there is no outside-text outside of the text, the text outside is nothing), which implies that any reading that refers the text to some signified outside of textuality is illusory. Derrida calls such an illusory reading an *interpretation*. A deconstructive reading must, therefore, remain within the limits of textuality, hatching its eggs within the flesh of the host.

Thus, the problem becomes one of discovering how a deconstructive reading can remain internal to the text and within the limits of textuality without merely repeating the text in the manner of a commentary (*G* 228). To borrow the adverbial phrase with which Derrida describes his reading of Husserl, deconstructive reading must move *à travers* the text, traversing the space between commentary and interpretation, '*Traversing (à travers)* Husserl's text, that is to say, in a reading which cannot simply be either that of commentary nor that of interpretation' (*VP* 98). By opening up this textual space that is other to commentary, interpretation and the author's intentions, a certain distance is created between deconstructive reading and logocentric conceptuality. The signifying structure of deconstructive reading traverses a space that is other to logocentrism and which attempts eccentrically to exceed the orbit of its conceptual totality. In an explicit reference to the goal of deconstruction, Derrida writes,

> We wanted to attain the point of a certain exteriority with respect to the totality of the logocentric epoch. From this point of exeriority a certain deconstruction of this totality could be broached *(entamée).* (*G* 231)

It is from such a point of exteriority that deconstruction could cut into or penetrate the totality, thereby displacing it. The goal of deconstruction, therefore, is to locate an otherness within philosophical or logocentric conceptuality and then to deconstruct this conceptuality from that position of alterity. However, the paradox that haunts Derrida's and all deconstructive discourse is that the only language that is available to deconstruction is that of logocentrism; thus, to take up a position exterior to logocentrism would be to risk starving oneself of the very discursive or linguistic resources with which one must, of necessity, deconstruct the tradition. The deconstructor is like a tight-rope walker who risks 'ceaselessly falling back inside that which he deconstructs' (*G* 25).

Thus one perhaps begins to understand a little better the reasons why Derridian deconstruction is best understood with reference to the conceptual resources of the logocentric or philosophical tradition. These are the only conceptual resources that are available to it. However, to subscribe to the above thesis would not be to reinscribe the radicality of Derrida's thinking within traditional categories and within the context of the philosophical tradition. It would rather be to articulate a necessity that governs discourse: namely, that each discursive attempt at overcoming the logocentric totality is obliged to

employ the resources of that totality and thus can still be said to belong to it. This paradoxical situation of both belonging to a tradition and, at the same time, being other to the tradition is addressed by Derrida in the problem of closure (*ED* 163) and the 'double bind'.[4]

As a response to the question, *what takes place in Derridian deconstruction?,* we have noticed the way in which deconstruction opens a reading by locating a moment of alterity or exteriority within a philosophical text. In Derrida's reading of Rousseau, the concept of the supplement is the lever that is employed to show how Rousseau's discourse is inscribed within the *general text,* a domain of textuality that is other to logocentric conceptuality. In this way, one can see how a moment of blindness in a logocentric text becomes the trace of an alterity that exceeds logocentrism.

What takes place in Derridian deconstructive reading is the discovery and pursuit of alterities within (primarily, although by no means exclusively) philosophical texts. In this way, deconstruction hopes to discover the 'Other' to philosophy, an otherness that has been dissimulated or forgotten by the logocentric tradition. As Levinas points out in 'Transcendance et hauteur',[5] André Lalande, in his highly influential *Vocabulaire technique et critique de la philosophie* (a veritable testament to French neo-Kantianism).[6] defines philosophy as the activity of assimilating the Other to the Same. Such a definition would seem to be accurate in so far as the philosophical tradition has always attempted to *understand* and *think* the plurality and alterity of a manifold of entities through a reduction of plurality to unity and alterity to sameness. This same gesture is repeated throughout the philosophical tradition, whether it be Plato's 'One over the many' where the plurality of instances of an entity are understood in relation to a unifying *eidos;* or whether it be Aristotle's 'many towards the One', where *philosophia proté* is the attempt to understand the Being of a plurality of entities in relation to a unifying *ousia* and, ultimately, a divine *ousia;* or, indeed, whether it be in terms of Kantian epistemology, where the manifold or plurality of intuitions are brought into unity and sameness by being placed under concepts which are regulated by the categories of the understanding. The very activity of *thinking* which lies at the basis of epistemological, ontological and veridical comprehension is the reduction of plurality to unity and alterity to identity. As Aristotle remarks, to philosophize is to think and to think is to think one thing.[7] Thus, the activity of philosophy, the very task of thinking, is the reduction and domestication of otherness. In seeking to think the Other, we reduce its otherness to our understanding, we com-prehend (as in the verbs *comprendre,* to understand, include and comprise, and *comprehendere,* to grasp or seize) and surround the Other, thereby reducing its otherness and failing to acknowledge the otherness of the Other. As Rodolphe Gasché points out, 'Western philosophy is in essence the attempt to domesticate Otherness, since what we understand by thought is nothing but such a project'[8] As the attempt to attain a point of exteriority to logocentrism, Derrida's project may therefore be understood as the desire to keep open a dimension of alterity which can neither be reduced, comprehended nor, strictly speaking, even thought by philosophy. To say that the goal of Derridian deconstruction is not simply the *unthought* of the tradition, but rather 'that-which-cannot-be-thought', is to engage neither in sophistic rhetoric nor in negative or Anselmian theology. It is to point towards that which the philosophical tradition is unable to say.

<div align="center">III</div>

Rodolphe Gasché calls this pursuit of alterity 'heterology',[9] and claims that Derrida's work is an attempt to formulate a series of minimal syntheses or 'infrastructures' which are in a relation of a certain alterity to philosophy. These minimal clusters of infrastructures, which are composed of concepts like supplementarity, trace and *différance,* form a *'general system'*[10] that is heterological, that is to say, other to the logos and logocentrism. For Gasché, deconstructive reading opens up a space of alterity that is beyond the walls of the philosophical *polis*. The crucial point to make about such a heterology is that it does not simply represent an other to philosophy, in the same way as non-philosophy or sophistry are understood to be others to philosophy. Derrida's claim runs much deeper than this; as we saw in the discussion of Rousseau, the logic of the supplement does not simply open up an alterity within Rousseau's discourse, it inscribes his discourse within the textuality of the text, within the radical alterity of general textuality. Philosophical discourse becomes inscribed within a constitutive space of general textuality. Philosophy becomes a moment of inscription *within* textuality. As Gasché remarks, deconstructive heterology opens 'the discourse of philosophy to an Other which is no longer simply *its* Other, an Other in which philosophy becomes inscribed.'[11]

In spite of employing the resources of philosophy and the philosophical tradition, deconstruction inscribes philosophical discourse within a space of radical alterity, a space which as well as being other to philosophy, also *precedes* it. One might well be tempted to 'think' the priority of this space as an *a priori* to the *a posteriori* of philosophy (G 234), as it provides the conditions under which something like philosophy would be possible. For example, it is through the concept of the supplement that Rousseau's discourse becomes inscribed within an infrastructural notion of textuality which is ultimately the condition for the possibility of Rousseau's logocentrism. However, one must tread carefully here, for the language of Kantian transcendentalism, a traditional resource from which Derrida frequently borrows, is also, of necessity, displaced. The infrastructural terms which are the conditions for the possibility of philosophical discourse do not provide fundamental principles or grounds from which thought may flow and cognition derive. To borrow a Kantian metaphor, Derridian infrastructures do not provide the plan or blueprint from which the 'dwelling-house' of pure reason may be built.[12] On the contrary, the infrastructures show the *impossibility* of the objectives of philosophical discourse, they do not provide justifying principles or grounds. As Gasché points out, Derrida's deconstructive architectonic is one that provides *both the conditions for the possibility and impossibility of philosophical discourse.*[13]

The first line of inquiry should have shed a little light on the nature and function of Derridian deconstruction and, in particular, its relation to philosophy. If we now turn to the second line of inquiry, the question that must be asked is the following: if deconstruction is defined as an openness towards the Other, as the attempt to inscribe philosophical discourse within an infrastructural alterity that precedes it, then what does this have in common with the ethics of Emmanuel Levinas?

The conviction that underpins this essay is that the deconstructive project of opening

philosophy to the summons of alterity is best illuminated through a dialogue with Levinasian ethics. Yet one may well be inclined to ask: why should a dialogue with Levinas receive special treatment as a way of illuminating deconstruction? What could deconstruction possibly have in common with ethics, given that the latter is habitually understood to be one of the most derivative and traditional areas of philosophy?

   In the conclusion to his study of Levinas,…*Et combien de dieux nouveaux,* Francis Guibal discusses Derrida's 'Violence and metaphysics', where Derrida *appears* simply to reinscribe the radicality of Levinasian ethics within the phenomenology, fundamental ontology and dialectical logic that Levinas sought to overcome in *Totality and Infinity*. However, despite finding the conclusions of Derrida's problematization of Levinasian ethics irresistible, and in spite of being intellectually convinced of the veracity of the arguments set out in 'Violence and metaphysics', Guibal goes on to make the following remark.

> Broadly speaking, it seems to me that it is possible to find, notably in someone like J.Derrida, a subtler, suppler and perhaps better elaborated theory of deconstructive practice (of the tradition) than in Levinas; but the practice of the latter, traversing a certain rigidity, has the merit of keeping alive the question of the sense (direction and signification) of this very practice. It is neither simply a question of deconstructing nor of knowing how to deconstruct, it is also a question of knowing why and *in view* of what.[14]

Thus, although Derrida provides us with a subtle and elaborate 'theory' of deconstruction, Guibal claims that Levinasian ethics keeps alive the sense, direction and purpose of deconstruction. Although Derrida's reading of Levinas in 'Violence and metaphysics' does raise certain weighty objections to the latter's ethical philosophy, it is through the dialogue with Levinas that the urgency of the *ethical demand* for deconstruction is felt.

IV

A charge often brought against Derrida is that his work is ultimately nihilistic because of its allegedly self-reflective character and non-referential semantic theory. On this view, deconstruction would be a species of hermeticism[15] that practices an endless sign-play and whose only purpose is its own infinite continuation and dissemination. The absence of the referent in deconstruction would therefore imply the renunciation of urgent, worldly concerns and the 'emasculation' of our supposed 'textual power' over the world (one should note the metaphorics of masculine power and intellectual virility that run through such arguments). Although I believe that Derrida can be defended against such claims through a reading of his own works, the way in which I shall respond to these criticisms will be through a *rapprochement* of Derrida and Levinas. Taking a lead from Guibal's remark this *rapprochement* will attempt to face the charges of nihilism and hermeticism head-on, by returning to the question with which I opened this essay, namely: *why bother with deconstruction?* Thus far, I have only asked *how* a deconstructive reading of philosophical texts is performed and have at no point asked

why such a reading is necessary. As Guibal points out, if we only know *how* to deconstruct without knowing *why* and in view of *what,* then the above charges of nihilism and hermeticism may well be justified. The question is: *why* are we seeking to deconstruct philosophical discourse by showing how it is inscribed within a domain of infrastructural alterity? *Why* is deconstructive heterology more worthwhile than the logocentrism it seeks to displace?

By sincerely addressing the 'why bother?' question I am asking what demand is being placed on us, as thinkers (of that-which-cannot-be-thought), in doing deconstruction; I am trying to discover the *necessity* that governs deconstruction. What or who is necessity? In several places, Derrida writes of the necessity for deconstruction: it is this same necessity which, after at least twenty centuries of forgetfulness (*G* 15–16), governs the extension of the concept of writing and makes the grammatological project unavoidable. Thus, the emergence of deconstructive heterology is governed by a certain necessity which cannot, claims Derrida, be reduced to a particular philosopher's (i.e. Derrida's) ingenuity or initiative (*P* 15). But what is this necessity? Is it an historical, logical or conceptual necessity? It is certainly true to say that, for Derrida, the emergence of the grammatological project has the force of an historical or, more precisely, epochal necessity which appears to echo the necessity for the question of the meaning or truth of Being in Heidegger, a question which emerges from an historico-metaphysical oblivion (cf. *G* 11–14). It is also the case that the necessity that governs a deconstructive reading has a logical or conceptual force, when, for example in 'Violence and metaphysics', Derrida seizes upon the logical contradiction that inheres in the difference between an author's intentions and the text ('Levinas is resigned to betraying his own intentions in his philosophical discourse', *ED* 224). Or again, in the necessary contradiction which can be found in a conceptual opposition, for example, the displacement of the nature/culture opposition in *De la grammatologie* (cf. *G* 361–78). However, it is the obligating force possessed by all arguments that claim necessity that interests me in this context. To be faced with necessity is to be under obligation. May one not ask oneself whether necessity has the character of an ethical demand? Might one not speak of the 'who' rather than the 'what' of necessity? One can begin to unravel these questions with reference to Derrida's *La carte postale,* where necessity is given a capital 'N' in order to personify it and grant it the Necessity of 'quelque autre singulier' (*A* 92). In the following 'Envoi' from *La carte postale,* Derrida (or another aspect of the narrative voice, for it is at the very least unclear to what extent one can or *should* ascribe these sentences to Derrida's name. I believe that one must take him at his word when he says 'You could read these *envois* as the preface to a book that I have not written' (*CP* 7)) makes the distinction between Necessity and desire. Parodying the closing proposition of Wittgenstein's *Tractatus* and seemingly contradicting much of his own work, 'Derrida' writes,

> *May 1979.* What we cannot speak of must not above all be passed over in silence, but written. Me, I'm a man of speech, I've never had anything to write down. When I've something to say, I say it or say it to myself, basta. You are the only one who understands why it was so necessary that I write exactly the contrary to what I desire, when it's a question of axiomatics, to what I know to be my desire, in other words, you: living speech, presence itself, proximity, the

proper, the guard, etc. I have necessarily written back to front in order to surrender myself to Necessity *(J'ai nécessairement écrit a l'envers—et pour me rendre a Nécessité)*. (*CP* 209)

If we set aside the intimate, evocative force of this quotation, we can see that Derrida (or the voice in the text) draws a distinction between what it desires, which is equated with speech, presence, and the proper, and what is necessary, which is equated with writing and the personage or singular other of Necessity. Thus, desire is on the level of speech and the pleasure principle, whilst the otherness of Necessity is the writing that calls us beyond desire, beyond the pleasure principle and beyond the various *PP*'s that Derrida catalogues in *La Carte postale*.[16] The voice in the text claims that it has necessarily written the opposite to its desire because of a personified figure of Necessity, a singular other, who governs the writing of deconstruction. In a discussion of the above passage transcribed in *Altérités,* Derrida talks of writing under the law of this Necessity,

> When I say that I write under the law of Necessity, it is that I write—I am thinking, for example, of theoretical texts or of texts in which the theoretical dimension is dominant—I write in order to recall, or in letting myself recall, this Necessity in the reading and in the texts that I read. (*A* 93)

Writing under the law of Necessity means trying to discover the necessity of alterity in a theoretical text. One thinks of the necessity of the supplement in Rousseau, the necessity of *différance* in Husserl, the necessity of the Other which is dissimulated in all logocentric texts. The significance of capitalizing and personifying necessity here is that the alterity into which logocentric discourse becomes inscribed becomes the personified alterity of the singular other, what Levinas would call the *Autrui,* the other person.[17] It is precisely this shift from *Autre* or Gasché's 'general Other'[18] to *Autrui* or the singularity of the other person that is of interest here. For Levinas, it is when I am face-to-face with the *Autrui* that I am called beyond my pleasurable separated existence and obliged, of necessity, to recognize the Other's demand. The claim here is that, first, the necessity of 'infrastructural' alterity which governs the deconstructive readings of philosophical texts has clear echoes in the personified figure of Necessity, the singular other who calls us beyond desire. And secondly, that the primacy that is given to the alterity of the singular other in Derrida is not dissimilar to the priority of the *Autrui* in Levinas. In this connection it can be asked: may not the otherness which the logocentric tradition has always sought to reduce, comprehend, or violate be the singular and discrete alterity that is manifested in the face of the other person? On this reading, the necessity that is being placed on us in doing deconstruction, the reason *why* we are bothering to displace logocentrism with a 'system' of infrastructural alterity, can be regarded as an ethical necessity and an ethical demand.

This shift from *Autre* to *Autrui* is best seen if we turn to Levinas's 'Transcendance et hauteur'. For Levinas, the ontological event which defines and distinguishes the entire philosophical tradition from Parmenides to Heidegger, consists in suppressing all forms of otherness and transmuting alterity into the Same *(le Même)*. Philosophy is the assimilation of the other into the Same, where the other is assimilated and digested like food and drink. The Same *par excellence* is the knowing ego *(le Moi connaissant),* what

Levinas calls the 'melting-pot'[19] of Being. The ego is the site for the transmutation of otherness into sameness. Now, the ego desires liberty and comprehension: the latter is achieved through the full adequation of the ego's representations with external reality— truth; the ego comprehends and englobes all possible reality, nothing is hidden, no otherness refuses to give itself up. Liberty, therefore, is simply the assurance that no otherness will hinder or prevent the Same and that each sortie into alterity will return to self bearing the prize of absolute comprehension. Philosophy is defined by Levinas as that alchemy whereby the Other is transmuted into the Same, an alchemy that is performed with the philosopher's stone of the knowing ego.

Non-philosophy, or, more precisely, the limit of philosophy, would consist in the resistance of the Other to the Same. It is towards this resistance that Levinas strives in his works. He tries to locate an otherness that cannot be reduced to the immanence of the Same, an otherness that is a transcendent point of exteriority to the philosophical logos. One might attempt to describe Levinas's thinking (thereby noticing its resonances with the goals of Derridian deconstruction) as the attempt to awaken the Greek *logos* to an other which is not simply an other to the *logos,* but an other within which philosophy becomes inscribed.[20] Levinas's central claim is that such a point of absolute alterity to the *logos* is found in the *face* of the *Autrui* ('L'absolument Autre, c'est Autrui'),[21] the wholly and singular Other who denies him or herself to me by escaping my field of comprehension and paralysing by impetuous liberty. By no longer being able to exert power over the Other, I am obliged to welcome him or her and let myself be placed in question. For Levinas, such an obligation demands a response, the interrogation of the ego by the *Autrui* calls for a responsibility which I cannot evade. The attempt to secure a point of exteriority or transcendence with respect to philosophical discourse is achieved in the relation to the *Autrui,* the singular other who places a demand on me. For Levinas, such a relation is *ethical* and it is *ethics* that has been dissimulated within the philosophical tradition.

<center>V</center>

But is there not a danger here of betraying the very subject we are trying to elucidate? Isn't all such discussion of ethics or of the ethical demand within deconstruction at the very antipodes of Derrida's work? Shouldn't one recall that it was Derrida himself who, in 'Violence and metaphysics', had shown how Levinas's ethical break with ontology is itself dependent upon the transcendental phenomenology of Husserl, the dialectical logic of Hegel, and Heidegger's thinking of the truth of Being? Indeed one must, but if this were all that Derrida had to say about Levinasian ethics, then there would be little reason for the *rapprochement* that is being attempted here. As Robert Bernasconi points out,[22] to interpret 'Violence and metaphysics' solely as a statement of the derivative and secondary character of ethics, *vis-à-vis* phenomenology, ontology, and dialectical logic, would be to read Derrida's essay simply as a critique of Levinas and not as a deconstructive or double reading. To read Derrida's essay deconstructively (that is to say, with the same care and rigour with which Derrida reads Levinas) is to identify other strands of thought, perhaps at odds with the idea of critique.

In 'Ousia et grammè', Derrida writes that a deconstructive reading must operate with 'Deux textes, deux mains, deux regards, deux écoutes' (*M* 75). A good example of this double-handed and double-stranded treatment with respect to Levinas concerns the question of empiricism. In the concluding pages of 'Violence and metaphysics', Derrida 'accuses' Levinas of empiricism, a doctrine, he claims, whose only philosophical shortcoming is to present itself as a philosophy at all (*ED* 24). This seemingly disparaging remark would lead one to believe that Derrida's own position is opposed to, or at least differs from, that of empiricism. Strangely, this is not at all the case. Three years after the publication of 'Violence and Metaphysics', in *De la grammatologie,* Derrida makes the following remark about the style of deconstruction,

> From the interior of the closure, one can only judge its style in terms of received oppositions. One will say that this style is empiricist and, in a certain way, one would be right. The *exit* is radically empiricist. (*G* 232)

Thus Derrida seems to offer with one hand what he takes away with the other! However, to interpret these two uses of empiricism as a contradiction is to miss the point. In 'Violence and metaphysics', *De la Grammatologie,* and throughout his work, Derrida is trying to explicate certain necessities within discourse which all philosophers, Levinas and Derrida included, are obliged to face. The questions that Derrida addresses to Levinas, then, are questions that address the whole field of philosophical discourse, within whose parameters deconstructive discourse is also inscribed. If there were any way in which deconstruction could circumvent the logic of palaeonymy, where all discourse is obliged to employ the 'vieux signes' (*VP* 115) of metaphysics and logocentrism, then it would attempt to give expression to the 'pensées *nouïes* (ibid.) which glimmer beyond the logocentric closure. However, as the resources of logocentric discourse are the only ones that are available, one must continue to use them even when trying to promote their displacement. A significant difference between Levinas and Derrida is that the former is less reticent about using the language of the tradition than the latter.

So, if the derivative character of Levinasian ethics is only one strand of Derrida's understanding of ethics, then what is the other strand? The latter is lucidly and succinctly explained in *Alterités* (*A* 70–2). In the question period that follows an expose of Derrida's work by Francis Guibal, André Jacob asks Derrida 'the reasons why he rarely speaks of ethics' (*A* 37). Although Derrida does not appear at all anxious to answer this question, he begins by saying that his reticences about the word 'ethics' are similar to those of Heidegger in his *Letter on Humanism*.[23] On a Heideggerian reading, ethics and the whole question of the 'ought'[24] is a latecomer to philosophy and constitutes a regional ontology with a status similar to that of logic and physics.[25] In its determination as a regional ontology, ethics is subordinate to fundamental ontology, or, as Heidegger calls it in the *Letter on Humanism,* the truth of Being. To refer philosophy back to a prior domain of ethics, as Levinas attempts, and to make ethics a first philosophy, is to continue the oblivion of the question of the truth of Being which is presupposed by all ethical discourse. As this oblivion or forgetfulness of Being is what, for Heidegger, has characterized the entire onto-theo-logical tradition of metaphysics, to insist upon the

primacy of ethics over ontology is to repeat the most traditional of metaphysical gestures.

Such are Derrida's reservations about the use of the word 'ethics'. He claims that one cannot 'do' ethics in the traditional sense without engaging in a certain Nietzschean geneaology of morals and focusing on 'l'éthicité de l'éthique' (*A* 70). However, continues Derrida, these Heideggerian objections are themselves displaced by the sense that Levinas gives to the word 'ethics',

> I believe that when Levinas speaks of ethics—I wouldn't say that this has nothing in common with what has been covered over in this word from Greece to the German philosophy of the 19th Century, ethics is wholly other *(tout autre);* and yet it is the same word. (*A* 71)

In Levinas's hands, the word 'ethics' becomes wholly other, thereby loosening itself from its traditional metaphysical determination. It is as if Levinas had found a new condition for the possibility of ethics that was dissimulated by the Greco-German tradition. Given the displacement of sense that Levinas gives to the word 'ethics', Derrida finds its use far less bothersome: 'Starting from that argument, I would find the word "ethics" much less restrictive' (*A* 71).

When one thinks of ethics in its traditional determination, one imagines a collection of laws, principles, and moral rules which habitually have some claim to universality and are thus meant to prescribe human action. If ethics is traditionally determined as the construction of a system or procedure which is bound to law and universality and binding upon human beings, such as the Kantian Categorical Imperative, then it is clear that Levinasian ethics is of a different order. As Levinas reminds us in *Éthique et infini,* (*EeI* 85), he is seeking the *meaning* of ethics and the ethical relation and is not primarily interested in constructing an ethical system of rules and laws. The meaning of the ethical relation is found in the face of the *Autrui,* and, for Derrida, it is in the privilege given to the singular other that Levinasian ethics is able to exceed its traditional determination.

> The respect for the singularity or the call of the other is unable simply to belong to the domain of ethics, to the conventionally and traditionally determined domain of ethics. (*A* 71)

It must remain an open question as to what extent the construction of a Levinasian ethical system (should such a thing be either possible or desirable) would betray the essence of the ethical relation. Indeed, it is questionable to what extent an ethics which focuses on the primacy of the singular other is worthy of the title of 'ethics'. Indeed, Derrida wonders whether the title 'ultra-éthique' (*A* 71) might not be a more fitting description of Levinas's project.[26]

The double-handed and double-stranded treatment of ethics by Derrida will hopefully by now have been established. Although he has clear reticences about the word 'ethics' (as he probably would have about any word that has received its determination in the history of metaphysics), he sees in Levinas a 'deconstructive' attempt to displace and think anew ethics by locating its condition of possibility and impossibility in the *Autrui,* the singular other. If the particular meaning that Levinas gives to the word 'ethics' is borne in mind, one can begin to understand how Levinas can claim, as he does in *Totality*

and Infinity, that 'Morality is not a branch of philosophy, it is first philosophy' (*TeI* 28). Although, in a recent essay, Robert Bernasconi has sought to complicate this claim,[27] the thrust of Levinas's remark is that ethics is not merely some appendage or latecomer to philosophical thinking (as Heidegger would claim), but rather that it precedes philosophy, it is first philosophy. Although Derrida would no doubt be concerned by the kind of foundational enterprise that is implied by the allusion to *philosophia protè* (cf. *VP* 3–4), I believe that the anlaysis offered in this essay has established certain definite similarities between Levinas's and Derrida's projects: both of them strive towards a certain point of exteriority with respect to conventional philosophical conceptuality, and they both seek this point by giving a privilege to an 'infrastructural' matrix of alterity (*Autre* or *Autrui*), which, while still depending upon the resources of philosophical discourse, tries to displace that discourse and change its ground. For both Levinasian ethics and Derridian deconstruction, this 'infrastructural' matrix of alterity would try to show the conditions under which something like logocentrism or ontology is possible, whilst at the same time showing how the philosophical pretension towards logocentric or ontological totality is continually rendered impossible by an alterity that can neither be reduced nor excluded. *Derrida and Levinas seek the conditions for the possibility and impossibility of philosophical conceptuality.*

<div align="center">VI</div>

To conclude, then, this discussion has shown certain thematic and strategic resonances which Derridian deconstruction shares with Levinasian ethics and how it is possible for the necessity that governs deconstruction to be understood as an ethical demand, a demand placed upon us by the singular other person, the *Autrui*. A thoughtful dialogue with Levinas is one way of addressing the question, 'why bother with deconstruction?', although I do not doubt that the same question could be addressed through dialogue with Hegel, Husserl, Heidegger, Freud, Nietzsche, or Blanchot. By focusing my attention on Levinas, I have sought to understand the necessity of deconstruction as an ethical demand which would not ultimately confine itself to the discussion of philosophical texts, but which would see the need for deconstruction as something arising in opposition to a philosophical process which is intimately implicated in the homogeneity of the state and the erosion of transcendence in advanced industrial society. As Derrida makes plain in his thesis defence, recalling the events of 1968,

> The necessity of deconstruction…was not primarily a matter of philosophical contents, themes or theses, philosophemes, poems, theologemes or ideologemes, but especially and inseparably meaningful frames, institutional structures, pedagogical or rhetorical norms, the possibilities of law, of authority, of evaluation, and of representation in terms of its very market. (*TT* 44–5)

Upon the basis of such an understanding of deconstruction, the charges of nihilism and hermeticism evaporate like shadows at nightfall.

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ABBREVIATIONS

A	*Altérités* (Paris: Editions Osiris, 1986).
CP	*La carte postale de Socrate à Freud et au-delà* (Paris: Flammarion, 1980).
ED	*L'écriture et la difference* (Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1967).
EeI	*Ethique et infini* (Paris: Fayard/France Culture, 1982).
G	*De la grammatologie* (Paris: Editions de Minuit, 1967).
M	*Memoires for Paul de Man* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986).
MP	*Marges de la philosophie* (Paris: Editions de Minuit, 1967).
P	*Positions* (Paris: Editions de Minuit, 1972).
TeI	*Totalité et infini* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1961).
TT	'The time of a thesis: punctuations', in A.Montefiore (ed.), *Philosophy in France Today* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982).
VP	*La Voix et le phénomène* (Paris, PUF, 1967).

NOTES

The present essay was originally given as a lecture on 1 February 1988 to the Critical Theory Seminar, University of Wales, Cardiff.

1 Cf. John Llewelyn, *Derrida on the Threshold of Sense* (London: Macmillan, 1986), p. X, and David Wood, 'Introduction to Derrida', *Radical Philosophy,* 21 (Spring, 1979).

2 John Llewelyn, *op. cit.* Rodolphe Gasché, *The Tain of the Mirror. Derrida and the Philosophy of Reflection* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1986). Irene E.Harvey, *Derrida and the Economy of Différance* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1986). Christopher Norris, *Derrida,* 'Fontana Modern Masters' series (London: Fontana, 1987).

3 It is interesting to note that, at this early stage in Derrida's thinking, he refers to his own style of reading as 'critical' rather than 'deconstructive'.

4 See, for example, Derrida's recent introduction to the English translation of Glos; cf. J.P.Leavey Jr, *Glassary* (Lincoln, Neb. and London: University of Nebraska Press, 1987), pp. 19–20. For a discussion of this term, see Stephen Melville's *Philosophy Beside Itself. On Deconstruction and Modernism* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1986), pp. 34–5 and 161.

5 'Transcendance et hauteur', *Bulletin de la Société Française de Philosophie,* January 1962, p. 92. This essay gives an excellent précis of Levinas's philosophical project

in the period immediately following the publication of *Totality and Infinity*.

6 See the article 'Philosophie' (Paris: PUF, 1926).

7 Aristotle, *Metaphysics,* 1006, b10. I follow Gasché's analysis here, cf. *The Tain of the Mirror,* pp. 99–100.

8 *The Tain of the Mirror,* p. 101.

9 Cf. 'Beyond reflection—the interlacings of heterology', in *The Tain of the Mirror,* pp. 79–105; and 'Infrastructures and systematicity', in John Sallis (ed.), *Deconstruction and Philosophy* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987), pp. 3–20.

10 'Infrastructures and systematicity', p. 19.

11 ibid, p. 19.

12 Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason,* trans. Norman Kemp Smith (London: Macmillan, 1929), B.735.

13 *The Tain of the Mirror,* p. 100.

14 *...Et combien de dieux nouveaux* (Paris: Aubier Montaigne, 1980), pp. 135–6.

15 For a recent articulation of this criticism, see Robert Scholes's *Textual Power* (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1985). For Scholes, deconstruction supports an hermetic position by erasing the referentiality of meaning. To erase the referent is, claims Scholes, to deny the possibility of criticizing either a text or the world. Deconstruction, consequently, lacks any textual power to change states of affairs.

16 They are variously and severally: 'Principe Postal', 'Principe de Plaisir' 'Penny Post' (*CP* 151) 'Picture Postcard' (ibid.), 'Palais des Postes' (*CP* 152, (faire) 'le PP' (ibid), 'PréPuce' (*CP* 237), Tenman/Postman' (*CP* 154), 'Poste de Police' (*CP* 157), etc.

17 An indefinite pronoun of indefinite signification, because *Autrui* has both a plural meaning *(les autres)* and a singular meaning *(le prochain)*. Levinas seems to employ the term in order to pick out the singularity and, hence, uniqueness of each other and would therefore appear to be using the term in its latter sense. However, the level of plurality is never far from Levinas's inquiry whether it is the meta-Parmenidean plurality that is established in fecundity, or the plurality established by the third party, where the whole of humanity looks at me in the eyes of the Other (*TeI* 188) or again the plurality of *Illeity* where the trace of the divine appears 'over the shoulder' of the Other. *Autrui* is a word with vast reservoirs of singularity and plurality. For Derrida's discussion of *Autrui* in 'Violence and metaphysics', see *ED* 154–5.

18 *The Tain of the Mirror,* p. 103.

19 *Transcendance et Hauteur, op.cit.,* p. 92.

20 Cf. Catherine Chalier, *Figures du féminin* (Paris: La Nuit surveillée, 1982), p. 10.

21 op. cit., p. 96.

22 'Deconstruction and the possibility of ethics', in Sallis (ed.), *Deconstruction and Philosophy,* p. 124.

23 In *Basic Writings,* ed. D.F.Krell (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1978), pp. 192–242. The question of the possibility of ethics in Heidegger's *Letter on Humanism* and its determining influence upon Derrida's reading of Levinasian ethics in 'Violence and metaphysics' has been thoroughly examined by Robert

Bernasconi in 'Deconstruction and the possibility of ethics', cit.

24 Cf. The relation between Being and the ought is discussed as the fourth limitation of Being in Heidegger's *Introduction to Metaphysics,* trans. Ralph Manheim (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1959), see pp. 196–9 and p. 95.

25 *Letter on Humanism,* p. 195.

26 It should be remembered that Derrida briefly makes a similar point in 'Violence and metaphysics' by calling Levinasian ethics an 'Ethics of Ethics' (*ED* 164).

27 In 'Fundamental ontology, metontology and the ethics of ethics', *Irish Philosophical Journal,* vol. 4, nos 1 and 2 (1987), pp. 76–93, Bernasconi argues that the interlacing and entanglement of fundamental ontology and metontology in Heidegger can be extended to the Levinasian distinction of ethics and ontology, thereby problematizing the claim that ethics is first philosophy.

Letter

HERMENEUTIC HUMILITY

To Richard Levin's charge (vol 2 No.3) that I, with other poststructuralist Shakespeareans, fall into the same 'interpretive realism' of which I accuse Stephen Greenblatt, I must plead 'guilty'. To his more serious charge of 'hermeneutic hybris', however, I plead 'not guilty' and claim my right to defense.

The former crime is one of those misdemeanours of a logocentrism as deeply ingrained in our cultural practices as original sin was once thought to be in our souls, and about as hard to avoid. Short of deploying the sort of periphrasis *en abîme* Professor Levin puckishly urges on me, or at the very least bracketing all my writing in inverted commas, there is, as far as I know, nothing for it. I do, in fact, try to meet the problem by signalling a certain 'writerly' play in my work; but this strategy may well be self-defeating, exposing me not only to further 'readerly' misunderstanding but to the opposite charge of 'interpretive relativism'—which Professor Levin comes close to pinning on me as well.

The more serious charge of 'hermeneutic hybris' properly applies, however, only when an interpreter denies or disguises his/her complicity in these misdemeanours, and wittingly or not, pretends that his/hers is a 'true' account, able to cut 'reality' at the joints and arrive at the heart of the matter. Leaving aside politicians, admen, journalists and others whose livelihood depends on such linguistic bad faith, the worst academic offenders tend to be historians and historicists of various methodological and ideological stripes, who seek to offer 'definitive' accounts of 'what really happened'. The more 'poststructuralist', however, which is to say, the more s/he acknowledges the 'textuality of history' as well as the 'historicity' of the text' (Louis Montrose's terms), the less likely s/he is to be culpable of the 'hermeneutic hybris' with which I charged Greenblatt. But by the same token, the more likely s/he is to be charged with interpretive 'realism' or 'relativism'.

In the last resort, our work will have to speak—haltingly, gnomically, and unreliably— for itself. But far from concealing or ignoring the linguistic and interpretive problems Professor Levin finds in it, my own work foregrounds (as we poststructuralists say) them. Admittedly, I have so far failed to solve them. But so too has Professor Levin.

Howard Felperin
The British Library

Reviews

JOSEPH BRISTOW

• **Gregory Woods, *Articulate Flesh: Male Homoeroticism and Modern Poetry* (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1987), 294pp., £16.95**

Articulate Flesh is a book hardly short of examples. In the course of just one page, Gregory Woods manages to rally citations about the myth of Ganymede from the following authors: Michael Davidson, John Lehmann, Keith Vaughan, Juvenal, Aristophanes, Meleager, Phillip Gillespie Bainbrige, William Brown of Tavistock, and Christopher Marlowe. This catalogue in itself, and of the book as a whole, is *exemplary*. And the examples—page upon page of them, almost all declaring men's desires for the male flesh—proliferate only to prove that centuries of poetry have attempted to forge a comprehensive vocabulary for what is here defined (albeit limitingly and, at times, misguidedly) as 'homo-eroticism'. Moreover, these examples—usually accumulating in thematic, and not historical, order—fill up Woods's text to supply as much articulable space as possible to varieties of male sexuality which have either been misunderstood or simply ignored by the 'straight' (and straightening) hermeneutics of literary criticism. The first part of Woods's study, entitled 'Themes', provides a basic primer for those well-read people who, like the nineteenth-century classicists unable to bear the 'vice' of the Greeks, remain (wilfully or otherwise) blind to the homoerotic representations that turn up regularly in the classroom and the research library—Marlowe, Shakespeare, Whitman, Wilde, and Lawrence are only the obvious ones. Concentrating mostly on twentieth-century poetry, Woods identifies key features of what may be termed the 'gay sensibility'—the register of gestures, code words, and motifs that have had to remain semi-visible (often barely representable) even in the past few decades. These 'themes' range from eroticism and violence figured in the masculinities of sportsmen, sailors, and cowboys to the complex (profoundly Freudian) economy of babies, defecation, and anal intercourse that recurs in much gay poetry.

Examples, then, have their uses—not just to illustrate, but educate. Woods's compendious study, however, is almost entirely without any theoretical understanding of how to deal with what must have been an extensive card-index. It is, none the less, refreshing—and academically responsible—to turn, as Woods has done, a page and a half of footnotes over to listing the *fifty-seven* critics who have remained silent (or barely audible) about Auden's homo-erotic writing. The roll-call of names, of course, draws attention to those reputations built on exclusive interpretations which consider Auden's

homosexuality as either tangential, if not totally irrelevant, to his poetic preoccupations, or an item that causes embarrassment not so much because it cannot be spoken about but more because there seems to be only a crude means of articulating it (critics finding themselves on the look-out for phallic and anal imagery).

Several years ago, the debate about 'Re-reading English' and the entry of critical theory into the degree syllabus focused on issues connected with the place of history and/or the use of post-structuralist thinking. Apart from the striking impact of feminist methodologies in redefining concepts of literary tradition and literary production, little or no effort was made towards considering the theorization of those 'other' texts—the Black, lesbian, gay, and regional ones—which were in the process of being 'reread' (or, more to the point, being read for the first time). Only now, with minimal assistance from publishers, is some of this work gaining notice in Britain. That said, the 'student guides' (which *are* necessary) on Black writings from diverse ethnic contexts and ones on lesbian and gay prose, poetry, and drama are *still* awaited. America—always somewhat in advance of, and much more diversified than, British intellectual culture—has recently witnessed the establishment of a Department of Lesbian and Gay Studies at Yale University. (Yale is, noticeably, Woods's publisher.) Over here, where English literature keeps re-theorizing the Bard at the expense of much else, *Articulate Flesh* will appear both familiar *and* perversely 'other'. Its critical peculiarity is of interest in itself. Woods's book displays hardly any response to recent theoretical work within the scope of homo-eroticism. (Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick's remarkable *Between Men* is conspicuously absent.)[1]

In its attention to 'themes' and canonical authors (ones around whom a critical industry exists—Lawrence, Crane, Auden, Ginsberg, and Gunn), *Articulate Flesh* looks conventional. Yet is is astonishing to see how an almost Caroline Spurgeon-like eye for the repeated image derides the critical tradition Woods works within. The frequency of quotation here, if obscuring theoretical issues, says much about the relationship between Woods's subject-matter and his critical method. Exemplification is taken to extremes in a florid style that modulates between serious observation and a kind of excessive verbal expression that could be construed as 'camp'. But 'camp' is a term, among several others central to this study, that Woods will not dwell on. In fact, the very term (homo-eroticism) upon which the whole enterprise subsists is in itself not investigated. Woods points out that it is perfectly possible for 'homosexual' poetry to be written by 'heterosexual' poets, and he conveniently deploys a loose idea of homo-eroticism to settle those simplifying intentionalist arguments which diagnose textual features as symptoms of an author's sexual preference. No comment is made about the much-vaunted (and often confused) notion that male heterosexuality is based on repressed homosexuality. (The concept of the 'homosocial' which uses homophobia to keep men close together in positions of power would have assisted parts of Woods's discussion.) What is more, there is practically no indication given as to why *poetry,* as distinct from other discourses, should accommodate such a repertoire of homo-erotic 'themes'.

There are, therefore, two related questions arising from *Articulate Flesh*. The first concerns Woods's critical style—at once scholarly *and* effusively wayward—and how this style participates in the forms of homosexual representation that he is analysing. The second involves a consideration of the political and historical contexts that inform

Woods's materials, and which he tends to repress. To begin with the issue of style. What follows is a paragraph describing one of three battles that 'exemplif[ies] the connections which exist between male homo-eroticism and war':

> In 1364, the Florentines beat the Pisans in the battle of Cascina. This was no great strategic victory, but a stroke of luck (for both Florence and the history of art). When the Pisan soldiers were bathing, naked and unarmed, the Florentines made a successful surprise attack, thereby providing Michelangelo with an excuse to depict a crowd of naked male figures in violent action. He executed a cartoon for the Palazzo Vecchio in 1504…. Cascina's strategic significance was nothing, compared with its dramatic resonance. We can forget the Florentine army. It was the Pisans who were naked, who were swimming, and who died as they struggled to arm themselves, half submerged and half dressed. Indeed, Cascina is their victory. Its meaning lies, not in military honours, but in the vulnerability of the male flesh. (p. 60)

Homo-erotic 'meaning' remains as implicit in Michelangelo's picture as it does in Woods's prose. Here, it seems that the homo-erotic interests lies in three interconnected things: the aesthetic beauty of the male body; men dying nakedly together; and, it may well be inferred, men dying because they are in the service of the most revered masculinity—they are warriors. It might be said that the painting exposes one of the contradictions supporting the masculine myth—that men must struggle to arm themselves against weaknesses (beauty, vulnerability, physical closeness) that are all too appropriately theirs. Michelangelo catches the Pisans off guard, like the Florentines. Yet, in the context of Woods's study, his picture demonstates that violence between men serves to prevent eroticism between them. The point is that men are a *danger* to each other since violence and eroticism bear a precarious relation. That is, war keeps men in opposing armies and divisive hierarchies and yet men of war must work together in companies and regiments. Woods views the battle of Cascina as a 'stroke of luck (for both Florence and the history of art)'. His tone is facetious but not at all out of keeping with the curious perversity of the picture. Similarly, he claims that the battle provided Michelangelo with an 'excuse' for a homo-erotic perspective, as if this were an incidental matter. An 'excuse', a 'stroke of luck'—such is Woods's irreverent rhetoric to define the height of the Italian Renaissance.

   Throughout this battle scene and a multiplicity of warring encounters between men (most explicitly in the work of Wilfred Owen), it is unclear as to what precisely constitutes or motivates homo-eroticism. Psycho-analysis—which speaks most fully of sexual difference—is rarely to hand in *Articulate Flesh*. What repressions are returning in these stagings of eroticized violence? Imaging the erotic necessarily involves complex identifications. Within twentieth-century gay culture, homo-eroticism is frequently signalled in apparently non-sexual situations. Simon Watney explains this kind of homosexual representation:

> Gay culture invariably works…on the pregiven *forms* of a heterosexual culture with its objects 're-placed'…and homosexualised. The imagery of cowboys and Indians, inscribed throughout American national culture, is always ready and

waiting, as it were, to 'take up' other meanings, which read the relation between the two groups in quite a different light. Thus the movement of desire involving difference *within* the same sex is able to find ready-made instances of analogy within mainstream culture, and to make identifications with them, putting scenarios from heterosexual culture to new, unauthorised usage. At the same time it is important to remember that sexual identification on the part of gay men is always mobile, able to assume different roles and positions, which are always also power relations.[2]

It needs to be pointed out that Watney's remarks are placed at the centre of a discussion about what he believes to be the dangers of pro-censorship feminism, a feminism whose analysis of pornography is based on a theory of 'contents', rather than on the structures of fantasy that eroticize images. Whether there is a causal relation between pornographic representations of sex and sexism, and particularly whether representations of sexual violence lead to sexual violence among its male purchasers, fuels much current feminist debate.

Against this background, Woods's book prompts the following question: is a homo-erotic interest in violence in itself violent? He claims that the sado-masochists of Gunn's poetry engage in 'false violence'—with all these items:

Or 'toys' as they are often affectionately known—with which the body of the masochist is circumscribed: The manacles which hold his ankles in position, far apart; the leather straps which cradle his torso, and with which he may be hoisted from the ground; the cuffs which hold his wrists together, beyond his head or behind his back; the weighted clip on each nipple; the studded collar and leash; the buckled gag whose leather tab fills his mouth to keep his tongue still; the hood, or mask, over eyes and ears; the rack, or pillory; the dildo, enema, or plug in his anus; the bullwhip, curling around his buttocks; the tight ring around the base of his genitals, imprisoning blood in his penis; the weighted straps which stretch the scrotum and separate his balls; the catheter…. All this, the high technology and high glamour of the bedroom Grand Guignol, although apparently threatening, apparently pain-inducing, actually removes the possibility of violence. (p. 217)

Sado-masochism excites its participants because it questions the power of representation itself. On the sado-masochistic stage, all of the terms in play are inverted. The image of fear becomes the image of desire; similarly, pain transforms into pleasure; and, as a consequence of this, the humiliated masochist controls the situation—as 'victim' he is also the 'beneficiary'. It is sometimes argued, therefore, that sado-masochism is a subversive activity among gay men, making the powerful powerless, and vice versa. However, issues of race, consent, gender, and generation exert pressure on this form of sexual play. (What about the slave scene? The involvement of the dominatrix?) Gunn's work lyricizes a joyous sexual war between (one assumes) *white* men: 'He is not a real soldier/but a soldier/inducted by himself/into an army of fantasy' ('The Menace', *Passages of Joy,* 1982). The question is never asked in Woods about how the representational processes of contemporary poetry relate to this fantasy of power. Poetry

has, since Browning's monologues at least, offered a space for private confession which, in terms of its consumption, thrives on voyeurism. And modern poetry, if marginal to much of contemporary culture, is where psychic disorder and sexual fantasy can still be explored in the name of art. Poetry, with its technical precision serving a dominant Romantic egotism, is well suited to turn the world over into the restricted space of a bedroom. The point is, however, that the overdetermined privacy of poetry does not make sexuality a private matter; its representations, of couse, bear a *social* relation with their consumers. And consumers obviously will, according to their sexual preference and political disposition, read the meaning of these fantasies differently.

It is on this note that libertarian arguments about the need to free all forms of sexual representation must be challenged, for representation, as sado-masochism exemplarily reveals, is about the distribution of power. Depending on its mode of consumption, some representations of sado-masochism will challenge sexual violence (this might be said of Gunn's work), and others endorse it, but neither will achieve this in an entirely unproblematical manner. In one sado-masochist scene, gay men of the same race will be exploring masculinity through a sexual relation not legitimated by dominant culture. In others, the white master and the 'black slave', the man and woman, will 'play' with, only to 'promote', representations of racism and sexism culturally deposited like sediment. It has to be emphasized that most heterosexual erotic images are not censored by our culture; while most homosexual ones are. Any radical pro-censorship campaign has to recognize this distinction lest all representations of sex, regardless of context in which they are consumed, are rendered obscene. Are Michelangelo and Gunn to be protected from the censor? As 'artists' or as homosexuals? Woods's book suggests, and far from resolves, these questions.

To return to an earlier point—in modern poetry homo-eroticism has been almost invisible to literary criticism:

> [Hart Crane's] *The Bridge* was published in 1930. Forty-five years passed, before any critic managed to explicate satisfactorily Hart Crane's observation, in 'The Tunnel', that love had become 'A burnt match skating in a urinal'. Referring to this line, Robert K.Martin wrote, in 1975, 'The Source of the Metaphor…is of course a sexual encounter in a subway men's room. That it took a gay commentator to say so is not ínsignificant. (p. 40)

Woods proceeds to anatomize the repetitious pathologizing of Crane's biography. A host of critics depict the poet's homosexuality as a sickness—along with his alcoholism and suicidal tendencies—and not as a structure of desire informing the poetry itself. Straight readers have failed to understand that a public convenience is not necessarily a place for urinating in. The result, therefore, is censorship. Censorship—which is rarely a rational activity—is usually reliant on the belief that sexual representations have the same meaning for anyone who sees them. To ban 'offensive' ones is, supposedly, to bring an end to them.

Unfortunately for the feminist and moral right-wing pro-censorship lobbies, Woods's multiple citations reveal that prohibited homo-erotic desires have found a voice in an uninviting climate. The twentieth-century homosexual voice defies state control,

bourgeois moralizing about 'good' and 'bad' sex, and, of course, the presumed 'naturalness' of heterosexual relations. Desire, as these poems show, leads men into public toilets just as much as it sets up a sado-masochist scene in a bedroom. At the end of his book, Woods makes several remarks that bear out this point, and which, had they been introduced earlier into his argument, would have provided a clearer rationale for his stream of examples:

> If we *require* homosexual men to behave like lunatics, sinners, and criminals, we must exclude their behaviour from the limits we set to sanity, virtue, and legality. Similarly, if we *require* our homosexual writers to employ the elaborate fabrications of neurosis and guilt, we must censor them or, better still, demand that they censor themselves. (p. 231)

In the light of this, it is strange to think that sex takes place *everywhere* and is supposed not to be seen *anywhere*. Sex is relentlessly banned from view only to re-emerge as a contentious spectacle in practically every aspect of our culture—in pornography, advertising, and, for that matter, poetry. Endlessly represented, sex can never be seen for what it is. Which means that it is subject, time and again, to all sorts of *mis*representations. The current debate on censorship is noticeably polarized. Free it up or ban it altogether. *Articulate Flesh* assembles the labours of gay men to disclose how and why this might be so.

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NOTES

1 Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick, *Between Men: English Literature and Male Homosocial Desire* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1985); see, in particular, the Introduction. Sedgwick's arguments are explored in detail by Craig Owens, '*Outlaws:* gay men in feminism', in Alice Jardine and Paul Smith (eds), *Men in Feminism* (London: Methuen, 1987). Several recent studies have theorized the literary representation of homosexual desire, notably: Jonathan Dollimore, 'Different desires: subjectivity and transgression in Wilde and Gide', *Textual Practice,* 1, 1 (1987), pp. 48–67; Ed Cohen, 'Writing gone Wilde: homoerotic desire in the closet of representation', *PLMA*, 102, 5 (1987), pp. 801–13; Louis Crompton, *Byron and Greek Love: Homophobia in Nineteenth-Century England* (London: Faber & Faber, 1985); D.A.Miller, '*Cage aux folles:* sensation and gender in Wilkie Collins, *The Woman in White*', in Jeremy Hawthorn (ed.), *The Nineteenth-Century Novel,* Stratford-upon-Avon studies, 2nd series (London: Edward Arnold, 1986). See also essays in Simon Shepherd and Mick Wallis (eds), *Coming on Strong: Contemporary Gay Culture and Politics* (London: Unwin Hyman, forthcoming.)
2 Simon Watney, *Policing Desire: Pornography, Aids and the Media* (London: Comedia/Methuen, 1987).

ROD MENGHAM

- **Bruce Andrews and Charles Bernstein (eds),** *The L-A-N-G-U-A-G-E Book* **(Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1984), 295pp., n.p.**
- **Barrett Watten,** *Total Syntax* **(Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1985), 244pp. n.p.**
- **Charles Bernstein,** *Content's Dream, Essays 1975–1984* **(Los Angeles: Sun and Moon Press, 1986), 465pp., $17.95**
- **Steve McCaffery,** *North of Intention: Critical Writings 1973–1986* **(New York: Roof Books/Toronto: Nightwood Editions, 1986), 239pp., $12.95**
- **Clark Coolidge,** *Solution Passage: Poems 1978–1981* **(Los Angeles: Sun and Moon Press, 1986), 389pp., $18.95**

The so-called 'Language' school of American poetry remains almost unheard-of in Britain. A handful of texts has appeared here, published by fugitive little magazines such as *Reality Studios, Spectacular Diseases, Rawz* and *Spanner*. In the USA, however, 'Language' writing has become hard to ignore: more and more participants in the movement are being published by university presses or independent but solvent publishers, while the writing has truly become a profession for the more authoritative exponents who are being given 'residencies' in academic or community arts-based programmes. It is no surprise that a serious-minded and ambitious movement in experimental poetry cannot find an audience in Britain; it is a surprise, though, that this particular body of work is unknown to the growing audience for theory and critique— theory and critique of the kind in which 'Language' writing has so heavily invested. The really curious aspect of the situation is that, even in the USA, the poetry itself has stayed more or less out of sight while the subsidiary texts, the works of theorization, have been published in more durable form and made available. And this is not simply because a new demand for poetics outweighs the demand for poetry; a theoretical saliency is at the heart of the 'Language' project. The first publishing outlet, the original *L-A-N-G-U-A-G-E* magazine, ran from 1978 to 1981 in fourteen issues and two supplements and never included a single poem (I don't think). The major publications since then have been *The L-A N-G-U-A-G-E Book,* an anthology derived from the magazine, and bulky collections of essays by Charles Bernstein, Barrett Watten, and Steve McCaffery. All these books are descriptive, expository and concerned to adapt poetic means to social and political ends. But the motivation for them is of course the poetic writing from which they have been abstracted; so that they are uniquely lop-sided texts which make constant reference, either directly or by implication, to material about which they are simultaneously negligent by virtue of displacement.

Close inspection of the two modes of writing shows how the paradox in their relationship is not just an accident of publishing history and that an awkward congruence, a contamination of one discourse by the other, is at the basis of their intended unity. It is clearly in place to ask how much or how little the poetry needs support from the theory

and vice versa. Here is an extract from a recent poem by Charles Bernstein, one of the two editors of *L-A-N-G-U-A-G-E* the magazine:

> You mean you have a life outside this page? Not
> on my greeting list: creation stares at null scooper. Dulled
> dodge—but good to get hit *some*times. But surely the jumps
> open chasms; yet the danger for the night watchman
> is turning against the dark, or animating it with
> demons and detouring them; and gain no sustenance. More
> toward is there, added to some, is beyond and
> present. Fat-bottom boats. Only fire will erase
> the pain of having done or not done what was
> done or not done. *Sheep sheep don't you know*
> *the road.* Intimate essence hurtled into prepubescence
> and mangled by the lurch. Behind this metaphor
> lies Descartes, pulled by a train of horses. 'It's
> been years and twice as many tears.' Only the world happens
>
> and racing to get near enough. Cornered by. Something
> snapped—'like those nasty people with attitude do.'
> Singing fa la la, fa fa la or doodling with a billy
> club. A dab of adagio—humble and then humped.
> 'A sideshow freak suffers from fits of uncontrollable
> laughter that prove to be fatal.' While according to Jones,
> Freud was fed at the breast, as one would expect. 'Hands
> that have touched ham will never touch mine' (can't
> see the forest for the wheeze).

'Fear of Flipping', *Sulfur 16*

While Bernstein is the most tireless spokesman for the aims of *L-A-N-G-U-A-G-E,* Clark Coolidge is less attracted to commentary than any of his colleagues although he is more respected by them and more often cited than any other practitioner in the field; it may be his own theoretical reticence as well as the regard his work is held in that has earned him the kind of publication of his poetry that the others have found for their criticism. This is the last page from his collection *Solution Passage* which contains in its 389 pages the veritable onrush of compositions from the brief period 1978–81:

A FALSE M

The crumpled-up weed pack stuck in the rug

Margin

I am not here today, am meadowless
A cellophane not to loosen

Tenuous connections brought upon the reef
The numbers of your names valiantly
Vacantly, the mouse and its whole fear
Of minuscule arrows

What is not her is of her
Today in her margin, her debt
The whole visible whatever it is inaudible
As surrounding
The plate on which I heat the words
Worrying that the figure or owl

This leads everywhere and nowhere
Impacted in the back
Is there entrance
Every latch edge of her a kindle
Each word an exit for the dream

Bernstein and Coolidge are exemplars in their ways but without having referred to the work of Bruce Andrews, Steve Benson, Lyn Hejinian and Ron Silliman (to give a short-list) it would be misleading to try to determine the range of this writing. All the same, the poems quoted here share a number of characteristics that can be weighed-off against the theoretical claims. Both are largely obstructive to settled forms of coherence; the first, in particular, seeks refuge in the unsuspected, in a trial of wits with the reader for whom the experience of reading a poem is usually a preparation to solve its difficulties, to formulate its meaning and thus to translate it into other words. Clearly, this poem will not submit to any design except the need to delay that second stage of reading, the reduction to sense, and it derives nearly all its vitality from the need for evasive action. Successive verb-forms relative to hurtling, racing, dodging, jumping, and detouring are more concerted than anything else in the poem apart from the hazards of this activity: getting hit, getting mangled, getting cornered, snapping, all of which help to establish a code of reading practice in which there are penalties for halting, predicting, or looking back. The poem only works by reflex movements, as in a game of Space Invaders where there is no opportunity to make plans or draw conclusions, no object other than to play the game, no alternative but to keep going, while the speed of one's reactions manages to generate the excitement normally attendant upon genuine risks. The poem feeds on its excitement, fills up with a sense of its own cunning and becomes provocative and nonchalant in tone, unlike Coolidge's text which is more decorous. *A False M* is more self-contained, reflective in mood and subtle in texture. It is more conventionally acceptable as a poem because its movement is more cautious, making it apparently more thoughtful. The order given to the material seems to be the outcome of deliberate manipulation and although it

has no statements to make, the poem has an air of demonstration and proof as a result of the skilful distribution of oppositional and parallel structures, of question and answer, vagueness and certainty. The loss of semantic coherence and of reference to a world outside the poem is not as showy as in the Bernstein text but more insidious and ultimately more disturbing. Both writers, whether they assume or propose the need for a break with conventional practice, make a feature of syntactic anarchy, semantic incompleteness and a certain brusqueness of resolve in setting out to disappoint the reader.

Are these poetic examples convertible into a theoretical account in favour of revolutionary socialism, as the interested parties maintain? The social delinquency of the language, its refusal to give information about any state of affairs we might be familiar with or could take our bearings from, is inspired by the conviction that reference in language is linked to commodity fetishism. This means that language is seen to have reached a capitalist stage in its development when its powers to describe and narrate are enough to make realism work to full effect. Under the terms of capitalist thought, language does not construct reality but merely simulates it, and the structures and textures of language are recessed in proportion as an illusion of reality is created. With its language in this condition, a text is read only in order to be exchanged for something else—the knowledge of a reality which is already given and which the text depicts— while a focus on the modalities of knowledge, on the means by which reality is 'produced', could only be restored with a consciousness of the ways in which language is constructed. There is nothing fresh here, except that it is not just a report on the course of events so far but a programme for action. Ever since this view was set out by Ron Silliman in his essay 'Disappearance of the Word, Appearance of the World' in 1977, it has become increasingly identified, through deferential paraphrase, as the rationale for a high degree of self-reflexiveness in poetry. Steve McCaffery, in a typical burst of legislation, singles it out as the 'central analogy' by which an aesthetic formalism is defensible in political terms.

One can see that a text like Bernstein's 'Fear of Flipping' is only putting on display an essential predicament of all language: that it is always moving in the direction of, but never actually uniting with, a separate reality. 'Fear of Flipping' only differs in this from a more familiar kind of poetry by ceasing to hold out the promise that the operation will be completed; its language does not even try to present a reality but energetically pursues a distracted onward movement, making it clear that language only points towards what it will never attain. Although there are grounds for a comparison between language and capital, the 'Language' writers rely too heavily on their confidence in its scope, and problems begin to arise when they try to extrapolate a complex series of observations from what is no more than a simple analogy. Granted that there is a similarity of formative processes, it does not follow that any and every formulation of political economy can be applied in the field of language; so that when Bruce Andrews, for example, calls the referential function an example of 'possessive individualism', this is only a presumption. The 'central' analogy so firmly announced by McCaffery is only general in effect and cannot always be sustained when tested in specific instances.

One of the best instances, as it happens, is of the operation of normative grammar when this is given the credentials of a profit structure. Fragments of a text, words and

phrases, are invested in the sentence which promises to yield a return; meaning is gradually accumulated but only on the clear understanding that any labour expended must be transformed into a surplus value capable of being employed in a more ambitious scheme. The trade-off between systems here seems to be mutually reinforcing rather than neutralizing, but that is not necessarily a good thing. The analogy is in place for a description of broader and broader structures of meaning but, by a curious twist, it is also the quickener of a theoretical greed, as shown in this example of McCaffery's thought:

> Words (with their restricted and precisely determined profit margin) are invested into the sentence, which in turn is invested in further sentences. Hence, the paragraph emerges as a stage in capital accumulation within the political economy of the linguistic sign. The paragraph is the product of investment, its surplus value (meaning) being carried into some larger unit; the chapter, the book, the collected works. *The L-A-N-G-U-A-G-E Book* (p. 160)

Neat as it is, the theory is in fact too neat and too constricting to let the poetry do very much work of its own—it reduces the act of writing to a blind act of sabotage repeated an infinite number of times so that, although the resulting text seems difficult at first, its probable effect is much simpler than the interlocking series of relations it is trying to replace. The 'Language' writers are so fascinated by the conceptual framework it is their task to critique that they find it hard to free their thought from its shadow. McCaffery's solution to the problem of normative grammar and narrative is not so much to restructure the semantic process as to turn the old structures inside out:

> The concern of grammar homologizes the capitalistic concern for accumulation, profit and investment in a future goal. Language Writing, in contrast, emerges more as an expenditure of meanings in the forms of isolated active parts and for the sake of the present moment which the aggregative, accumulative disposition of the grammatical text seeks to shun. *North of Intention* (p. 151)

In this revised essay McCaffery is no longer pressing for the need to swap exchange-value for use-value or for the reader to win control of his/her labour. The shift of emphasis to 'expenditure' and the 'present moment' suggests that he has been reading his Baudrillard; but even if that is so, the subsequent revisions are rather inhibited. They ought to signal the realization that 'the epicentre of the contemporary system is no longer the process of material production' (Baudrillard), but in this case they mark the up-dating of a theory whose object has not changed. 'Language' poetry on its own does not really develop any form of radicalism beyond the evidence that its language is atomized. Even by his own account, McCaffery is in no position to deny that the consciousness of the reader of such texts is only raised to the sense that he or she must respond to conventional pressures of meaning not by diverting their force into new channels but simply by letting them peter out. No attempt is made to explore other possibilities implicit in the scope of the 'central' analogy; no consideration of the prospect that if the linear perspective of political economy is such a devastating model for thinking about language, that does not prevent a review of separate orders of transaction such as the cycle of gifts and counter-gifts.

Mesmerized by the need for a showdown with venture capital, the 'Language' poets go too fast in their acts of repossession, seizing and forcing through the mangle of a reductive parallel a variety of skills which all end up looking the same. But whether or not the analogy holds up, it only dilutes a little the central impulse behind the poetry which is to demonstrate how certainty and control are not the basis of our knowledge of the world, and that to ignore the Kantian dictum that a limitation of knowledge is not a failure of it is to misunderstand the correlation that all knowledge is conventional in formation. This linguistic devolution is perhaps more radical in respect of rationalist conceptions of language than of the empiricist position which in fact draws most of the fire. Bernstein has prepared some of the ground in this area, although Nick Piombino also insists that thought cannot be fully socialized and that the most repressive aspect of grammar is its distortion of subjective thought. The prime objection, that grammar and narrative do not reflect the structure of the mind but only film it over, with the corollary that thinking is only validated when it accords with coherence in the speaking subject, is another attack on linearity. Bernstein tries to recruit the example of Wittgenstein as a guide to the uses of dispersive method. The instance of a philosophical writing practice as little interested in expository principles as poetry not only lends gravity to an enterprise which looks to be travelling very light, it also helps to bind the association between theory and poetry. The opening for the negotiation between the two is surely Wittgenstein's reminder that poetry, even when composed in the language of information, 'is not used in the language-game of giving information'.

What comes out of this that is kept all too latent in most poetic practices is the appraisal of knowledge as relation rather than as something to be possessed; but Charles Bernstein, whose terms I am using here, may be cited as a key example of the kind of writer whose every speculative advance is in some measure a compensation or makeweight. When he contends—valuably in the light of current practice—that 'ideas are always syntactic and prosodic, constituted by the interaction of different kinds of elements…and as such are never reducible to one type of image', this tends to push into the background a realization that his own texts are reductive in other ways. 'Fear of Flipping', for example, is so monotonous in register and has such a limited range of rhythms that the reader is only very faintly instructed in the composition of ideas. The urgent demand for poets not to assume any measure handed down by tradition or habit and to make their project the finding of measure in the process of working the text is admirable in itself, but often leads in practice to the revelation of a constructive base that is defeatingly mechanical.

Because of the tendentiousness of its procedures, 'Language' poetry has come to prize its own distinctness at a level which renders it nearly impenetrable. And it can do this in the knowledge that its twin enterprise of theory will act as an overworked apologist. On the very issue of privacy and inscrutability, the argument runs that an individualism of discourse is an important social fact. Reference is made to Adorno's insight that '"lonely discourse" reveals more about social tendencies than does communicative discourse'. However, 'Language' poetry more often provides samples of 'lonely discourse' than questions about its conditions. When Bernstein meets the usual challenge with a retort that 'that writing that had seemed to distance itself from us by its solitude—opaque, obscure, difficult—now seems by its distance more public', his polemic involves a

metamorphosis of the word 'public' which no lover of paradox should leave unexamined. The point is to set up a forum in which 'private' and 'public' can be properly tested by each other's standards not simply to redefine either realm. It should be stressed, though, how depersonalized the privacy of 'Language' writing is, how far it is from endorsing expressionism, confessional modes, or what Bernstein calls the 'mapping of consciousness'. Its patience is quickly exercised by the idea of a case history so exhaustive that everyone has something to learn from it. In fact 'Language' writing proposes, rather heretically, that poetic introspection dupes the reader into emulation on one level while being categorically estranging on another: 'the experience is of a self bound off from me in its autonomy, enclosed in its self-sufficiency' (Bernstein).

So, although 'thinking' is retained as a main constituent in the endeavours of the 'Language' school, allowing them more freaks of fancy and more feints and blinds than 'speaking' would, this is not 'thinking' as a reflection of the personality but a form of exercising the mind from the outside, as it were, as if the initiative for thought came from the structures of the language. Such an approach to mental phenomena from the outside simply yields up the customary advantage the writer has over the reader, bringing to an end the long history of poetry which privileges the writer's mind, by inflecting the moment of writing with a preconception of how, when and where it will be read. The innovation throws poetry into a different order of action where it engages directly with the sociology of reading. But despite the assurance and bravado of the claim that 'the communality of the reading/writing circuit is composed entirely of readers, not writers' (Jed Rasula), the call for a more writerly stance on the reader's part does little more than establish a territorial right to ground which is not occupied. Bernstein is pleased to announce that 'the text calls upon the reader to be actively involved in the process of constituting its meaning, the reader becoming a neutral observer neither to a described exteriority nor to an enacted interiority', but this is to stalk once more in the shadow of the argument against rationalism and empiricism without attending to the limits of readerly competence. 'Productive' reading is an infant tradition whose growth is hampered on at least two counts; in the first place, the text on its own frees the reader less often than it abandons him/her (there is more to be said about this in a moment) and in the second place, when the text is removed from isolation to a prepared context, as the case is with 'Language' writing, the reader immediately enters the orbit of theory and precept—leaves one gravitational field only to succumb to another. Although it is 'free' to all appearances, the reading actually works by remote control. So the drive for greater productiveness soon recoils, as McCaffery is prepared to admit: 'Hence the emancipatory character of the reading becomes a mandatory liberation.'

But, putting aside all disputes about where the margin of liberty lies, giving the reader an incentive to test the limits of his/her role does at least promote reflection on the implications of different reading practices. The analogy between syntactical conventions and structures of social control, whereby the reader or subject has important decisions made for him/her, at the same time enjoying the illusion of self-determination, is sharp enough; as usual, though, the 'Language' writers claim too great a scope for their activities, this time supposing that the alteration of textual roles leads directly to the alteration of social ones. They give too much attention to the isomorphism of different systems of relations and too little attention to the distance across which the analogy has to

work. It would be more realistic of them to forego their dramatic bid for political credibility in order to keep in view an emphasis on the geography of textual relations that would at least complete one side of the equation, namely by furthering an awareness that readers are the products of discourse as much as they are producers themselves. But this poetry seems doomed to sustain a myth of activism: Charles Bernstein is tempted to declare that 'we can reinterpret Pound's remark that poets are the antennae of the race to mean ideas embodied as poetry construct a new polis in the site of the old: no longer postponed, enacted'. What this comes down to in practice is a textual version of civil disobedience, of non-cooperation and irresponsibility; however, this kind of obstructionism is all too easily decontextualized. Bernstein states that his primary desire in poetry is for 'idleness', a quality glossed as non-instrumental and achieved by improvidence and temporizing: 'Not only don't I know what I'll write in the next poem, I don't know what I'll write in the next line of a poem I'm working on.'

This is a strange outcome: although the writing gets written under the remote influence of a detailed programme, it unfolds as if by dictation from a need to resist schemes and structures. The reader is presented with an almost useless licence to cope as he or she likes with minute particles of text all composed in despite of each other. These disintegrative moments ensure the preservation of what Alan Davies calls the 'enigma', which must *not* be distributed, dispersed or otherwise extended: 'When the integer is serialized, or valued, when it is perceived through horizontal or vertical loci, it achieves a rhetorical or narrative function; it relaxes.' The strict enforcement of the 'enigma' rule— the effect of a theoretical momentum—is perhaps the biggest stumbling block to 'Language' poetry. It does not allow for the use of any matrix from which the individual text has sprung and towards which its irregularities may return us. Nor does it recognize the extension of the work in time, although Barrett Watten provides a rueful reminder of Jakobson's observations on the work of Pushkin, which does not flatly condemn the referential function but preempts it: 'The values of reference towards statues in Pushkin are taken in the context of an entire poetic system over an extent of time. The poet's work becomes the context for this reference as much as any statue.' The refusal of a matrix intrinsic to the poem or the body of work makes way for extraneous theorization. Indeed, it introduces the necessity for framing the texts. The poets concerned should be given credit for the energy of their response to the notion that this framing activity is a vital new inflexion in literary practice. They seem not to have missed any of the 'variety of other occasions to speak' and have set in motion an extraordinarily comprehensive support mechanism of written statements, interviews, workshops, seminars, readings, what have you. This curriculum of events serves several purposes: first of all, it helps to determine how a poem is read almost before the reader has seen it; second, it provides an authentic activism on which poetry can try to draw (indeed, the political colouring of 'Language' writing is derived almost as much from this trade-union activity as from the elaboration of a critique, as we might guess from Bernstein's exhortation to 'agitate, to question authority, not only in the poetry magazines but in the workplace, the academy, the corridors of intellectual debate'); third, it ratifies the importance of group work. The degree of co-ordination, of social organizing, needed to pursue these tactics has the advantage of supplying a massive counterweight to the effective isolationism of the texts.

Interestingly, the nearest parallel to this realignment of roles is not a literary one;

Barrett Watten makes this plain with his incisive introduction to the methods of conceptual art: 'The struggle for power over interpretation is a metaphor for the expansion of scale—from that of a construction in materials on which values are placed to one of a reciprocal discourse between "object" and "states" in the world, and language.' In fact, it is only a substitution of materials that distinguishes 'Language' writing in any important sense from the project of a group like Art & Language, for whom the artist must be directly engaged with art-objects, theory, and what Terry Atkinson calls 'ambiences', in equal measure. Very few co-ordinates are fixed in the literary tradition; the most popular choice, or rather the one established by the fiat of a special issue of *L-A-N-G-U-A-G-E* magazine, is Gertrude Stein. Stein is examplary because she resists the convention whereby 'human memory is valorized over human mind in the act of creation' (Michael Davidson). Rather less amenable is Charles Olson, although he is sized up with approval on account of his preference for non-linear and collagist procedures. Curiously, Don Byrd comes up with a formulation of the Olsonian example which suggests why projective verse might yet provide a more useful starting-point for contemporary poetry than 'Language' writing: 'the field of the poem includes not only the data which can be comprehended by humanistic rationalism but also all that humanistic rationalism excludes as irrational, random, or subjective'. In spite of the promise held out by this doubleness, Olson is finally dismissed on the evidence of his appeals to 'primaries, origins, returns' which betray a fatal allegiance to 'phonetic ideology'.

   Without the buttress of theory, 'Language' poetry achieves a density of surface effects whose potential function is unresolved. It would only be able to keep up some tension of a genuinely political nature if the vestiges and traces of normative language allowed to remain on its surface were made to form an array of concrete proposals about the existing state of society, rather than to leave no deeper impression than that which relies on the technicality by which normative language is assumed to be doing the work of other conventions. As it is, the presenting of verbal difficulties is confused with, and exchanged for, the rather more complex specification of why we should think to predicate the world in other ways. At any rate, it is hard to see the ways of filling up the blanks in the schedule of tasks laid down by Ron Silliman in 'Disappearance of the word, appearance of the world':

> By recognizing itself as the *philosophy of practice in language,* poetry can work to search out the preconditions of post-referential language within the existing social fact. This requires (1) recognition of the historic nature and structure of referentiality, (2) placing the issue of language, the repressed element, at the center of the program, and (3) placing the program into the context of conscious class struggle.

The separation of tasks here is not made for the sake of emphasis alone but actually corresponds to successive operations carried out in practice, the serial nature of which has the final effect of delimiting the sphere of the poetic text. The incidental anachronism of

'class struggle' is a fitting example of the relaxed hold on language that this partitioning has in store.

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IAN SAUNDERS

- **Stephen W.Melville, *Philosophy Beside Itself: On Deconstruction and Modernism,*
  foreword by Donald Marshall (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota
  Press/Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1986), xxix+188pp., £8.95
  (paperback)**

What is modernism? *Philosophical* modernism, according to Stanley Cavell, occurs
where the relation between the present practice of philosophy and its history becomes in
some way problematic. *Painterly* modernism, according to Michael Fried, occurred when
artists could no longer escape the decorative, the fate of being merely looked-at, by
depicting scenes of absorbed attention where no heed is paid to the viewing subject,
finding instead the paradoxical necessity of acknowledging and indeed incorporating the
viewing subject, the fact of the picture's inevitably having an audience, inside the
painting in order that it be construed as something more than just paint. Painterly
modernism wants its product to be other than an audience-commodity, and achieves this,
Fried claims, by internalizing the very theatricality it most wants to avoid. Both senses of
modernism, Cavell's and Fried's, loom large in Melville's narrative.[1]

   That narrative is itself by no means easy to follow; however, what appears 'central' (a
concept predictably suspect to Melville) is a history of ideas which aims to provide 'a
context for Derrida'. The history begins with Kant and Hegel, and goes like this.
Positively as it construes itself, Kant's philosophy brings about a break in the unity of
experience, a break countered by Hegel in his proclamation of the philosophy of the
absolute. On Hegel's view, despite appearances, Kant's work of dissociation, separating
as it does self from world, phenomenon from noumenon, and so on, does *not* in the final
analysis destroy that experiential unity. On the contrary, all articulation, all predication, is
based on a prior, primordial unity. The detail of Hegel's argument doesn't much interest
Melville here in the way it does some other of Derrida's prehistorians;[2] his focus is more
on what he sees as the implications of the position Hegel has adopted. In one sense it is a
position profoundly sympathetic to notions of tradition and historical development: Hegel
does not reject Kant, but sets out to improve on his philosophical progenitor. As Hegel
puts it,

> the different systems which the history of philosophy presents are therefore not
> irreconcilable with unity. We may either say that it is one philosophy at
> different stages of maturity; or that the particular principle which is the ground
> work of each system is but a branch of one and the same universe of thought.[3]

The final stage of that maturity is where the Absolute can be recognized in its totality but,
as Melville observes, 'it is one of the distressingly obvious features of Hegel's view' that,
since this final vision is actually achieved in his own philosophy, 'history in fact ends
with Hegel' (p. 43). While profoundly historical in temper, his position none the less

signals the end of history. Accept this recognition of the Absolute and, according to Melville, it follows that:

> all positions in their possible relations to one another can be fully mapped out. The resultant whole is transparent despite the opacities found at any particular position. We can know this because the whole has been laid out. Metaphysics has ended in Hegel. (p. 45).

Leaving aside for the moment Melville's rather cavalier dispatch of 'the opacities found at any particular position', and accepting his assurance that 'the whole has been laid out', the trouble with Hegel is that 'post-Hegelian philosophy' is nigh on impossible. If it accepts the tradition it has nothing to do (Hegel has done it all: 'the whole has been laid out'), but rejection, since there is but the 'one and the same universe of thought', is accompanied by the risk that whatever it *does,* it will not be recognized *as* philosophy. It can be 'post-Hegelian', *or* 'philosophy', but not easily both at once. Thus battling to define its relationship to its past, 'post-Hegelian' thought is, in Cavell's sense, inevitably modernist, and Melville's book itself can be read as the story of that uncertain epithet's search for an appropriate substantive. If not 'post-Hegelian' *philosophy,* 'post-Hegelian' *what?*

The central sections of this volume, those dealing with Heidegger, Bataille, Lacan, and Derrida, become—at least to this reader—increasingly difficult to piece together. In a sense this is not altogether surprising since, according to Melville, these thinkers both inherit this impossible tradition and are sharply aware of the necessity of working in it. The outcome is deconstruction, 'words necessarily at war with themselves, struggling to exempt themselves from the very grammar in which they are caught up and by which they mean' (p. 3), while the shaping force is a certain understanding and analogical extrapolation of Lacanian psychoanalysis. On Melville's account, the 'central teaching of Hegel' (p. 65) for Lacan is to do with the problematic of self and other. Self-consciousness only recognizes itself as such when it is faced by another self-consciousness and is able to demand of the other that it 'negate its own independence in such a way as to let the given self-consciousness secure itself within itself. (My independence means that I do not need you.)' But, Melville continues, even though I don't need you, it is only by not needing *you,* by having the presence of some other that can be negated, that my independence can be assured. If this is the case, though, my 'pure' independence is always, and simultaneously, 'impure'; the logic of the independent self requires, for that very independence, that it be dependent on some other.

This deconstructive double-bind is, Melville thinks, writ large in the post-Hegelian problematic. Hegel's Absolute, by virtue of its very nature, encompasses and absorbs every contingency. Since it cannot rely on any other (on its terms there is no other) its showing is a 'self-showing', one directed from within. Self-absorbed as it thus ought to be, though, the text in which the Absolute is proposed remains a text. The Preface to the *Phenomenology* tries to dismantle this residual textual presence, to show that it is but 'a ladder to be thrown away after it is climbed', yet for all that the Preface, 'the gesture that would throw it away' (p. 67), is, too, a text, and consequently incomplete without a reader. The project that would eschew theatricality in favour of an absorbed, absolute

self-presence is none the less a text that cannot do without an other. As Melville puts it, there is a tension in the *Phenomenology* between 'its totalizing claim over proper scansion and the concomitant recovery and valorization of the absolute subject, and…the fact of its necessary submission to a reader' (p. 70). This prompts him to nominate Hegel's *reader,* at once necessary for and yet ignored by the text, as the project's 'unconscious'. But, as the readers of Hegel are inevitably post-Hegelian, Melville concludes that post-Hegelian philosophy itself is constituted as the Unconscious proper to, yet unable to be absorbed by, the Hegelian Absolute Consciousness. Knowledge is the fruit of a transparent self-showing, its Unconscious the text of post-Hegelian thought, systematic in operation but non-referential in effect. Deconstruction, the point where this Unconsciousness is most nearly made conscious, has then 'the appearance' of 'a certain psychoanalysis of philosophy' (p. 97).

Melville's narrative thus supplies the 'context' for Derrida promised, along the way tying deconstruction to both Cavell's and Fried's modernisms; it is a practice implicated in, but at war with, its disciplinary past, and one that finds the route to something like self-absorbed philosophical legitimacy through the acknowledgement of its own theatricality. It is a useful conjuncture, allowing *inter alia* Melville to give some narrative sense to the importance of rhetorical display to and in deconstructive writing, and to its frequent recourse to the discourse of psychoanalysis, and he goes on to trace some such characteristic moments in the work of Derrida, de Man, Johnson ('The frame of reference: Poe, Lacan, Derrida'), and Felman ('Turning the screw of interpretation'). In moving to include criticism with philosophy and psychoanalysis in his discussion Melville allows his descriptive narrative a more prescriptive edge. That edge is demonstrated well in what he calls the 'wager of deconstruction'. For criticism, the wager's risk is that Derrida may be taken as 'the latest, best, or most powerful source of grounding principles for criticism', that he may be used 'to re-epistemologize criticism', while the possible gain is that 'the critic may come to some acknowledgement of his ungrounded condition and so make such peace as is to be made with his aspiration to "science"' (p. 118). Melville's thesis, in short, is that 'criticism begins and endures just so long as we can set the question of knowledge aside' (p. 120). What comes out of such endurance are texts, systematic but non-referential, texts that talk about texts.

The pragmatic note that emerges here is not entirely surprising. 'Acknowledgement', one of the load-bearing terms in this book, is borrowed from Stanley Cavell, who in turn derives it from a reworking of Wittgenstein's meditation on the nexus between certainty, convention, and forms of life—the same rich vein that accounts for much in Rorty's pragmatist philosophy. However, if it is a pragmatist position that Melville is championing (and Melville's text by no means gives up its secrets readily), it is, I would have to say, a weak and unengaging variety. To say that there seems no reason to be optimistic about the likelihood of our knowledge extending beyond the parameters and procedures of our social and cognitive make-up to a realm of absolute certitude and objectivity is rather different from saying we ought to 'set the question of knowledge aside' altogether. From an extra-terrestrial vantage the production and maintenance of knowledges may well look like a complicated but inconsequential talk-fest, but to participate in a way that is not *sub specie aeternitatis* (and how could we do otherwise?) inevitably is to find that specific questions of knowledge—negotiation, qualification,

substantiation, implication—are of pressing consequence. Metaphysical atheism might well alter the rubric with which we encase such questioning, but I cannot see why the latter has to be reduced to a series of degutted take-it-or-leave-it binary oppositions, the manoeuvre that regularly punctuates Melville's narrative.

If we track back to Hegel's extermination of history, for example, it is interesting to note that Melville qualifies his claim about the impossibility of the 'post-Hegelian' with the parenthetic note that this would of course not be the case were one to find Hegel 'simply irrelevant—a gorgeous excess of speculation of no philosophic consequence' (p. 45). The phrase 'simply irrelevant' is suggestive here. Either one finds Hegel relevant, and by that Melville means compelling in *precisely* the way he indicates, or one finds his work 'simply irrelevant'. There is no other possibility. To read Hegel 'as wrong, as misguided, as basically right but in need of correction' is, it turns out, not to *read* him, but to 'dismiss' him (p. 73). But must this be the case? The Absolute may have a tautological invincibility, but is that reason enough to gloss over the 'opacities' of particular positions and contestations within it? One can engage with Hegel's work in a wide range of ways, and to separate out one such response as the only one that is genuinely, appropriately, a *response* seems altogether too convenient to be persuasive. The question is not solely a stark choice between a prefabricated relevance and simple irrelevance, but is also a matter of asking (always from within the limits and procedures of our own epistemic horizons) to what extent, and in what ways, Hegel is right. To read a text 'as wrong, as misguided, as basically right but in need of correction' and so on is not, perhaps, to relapse into the kind of pathetic torpor that Melville thinks it is.

The take-it-or-leave-it strategy seems connected to two related assumptions. The first is that it makes sense to ascribe a univocal and self-determining *agency* to abstractions. The Absolute that unfolds itself in a precisely regulated self-showing finds its analogue here in the careers that Art, Modernism, Philosophy, and Metaphysics (amongst others) map out for themselves. The second assumption might be called the paradox of contrastive definition. It goes like this. To understand x we need to understand not-x, but if not-x is is thus necessary to our understanding of x we can say that not-x is part of the *essence* of x. Both assumptions have a Derridean pedigree (the latter, for example, is crucial to his well-known case for the necessary failure in language);[4] neither ought to pass unexamined.

The first works to endorse the sense that one is obliged to accept the picture as Melville depicts it. If 'Art', to take but one instance, is a self-driving agent, one either acknowledges the direction of that agency or is left in the parking-lot. That acknowledgement reads Art as a *natural kind,* deferring the uneasy suspicion that it may instead be a complex and evolving social construct until that worry can be reabsorbed as yet another illustration of the paradox of contrastive definition, thus: 'Art' wants to be itself, pure, but if Art's attempt 'to maintain itself in a logical and aesthetic space', free of impurity, is to make sense, the threat of impurity has to be genuine. Art has to be 'the sort of thing' that can 'mistake itself in a certain way' (p. 7); that is, the impurity it wishes to deny is *essential* to its own production of purity. Art on this logic is a deeply fragmented natural kind, a tragic agent inevitably torn asunder by forces inextricably linked to the well-spring of its very identity.

There is, however, little reason to accept this baroque logic, and a great deal to be said

for continuing to suppose that concepts like 'Art' or 'Modernism' are not natural agents, but are constituted by a variety of practices and readers. In *Philosophy Beside Itself* Melville rarely engages in the task of sorting through the claims-to-know such readers make (indeed such claims are considered a kind of bad faith), preferring instead to produce a work that disguises the shape of its own argument in the intricate weave of the cloth that is brought to it. Melville cheerfully admits to 'being in the position of arguing for the Emperor's clothes' (p. 32), and perhaps the decorative, theatrical impulse is indeed the only road to a philosophic text that is legitimately self-absorbed. But I doubt it. 'Philosophy' is no more a natural kind than 'Art', and the fact that Melville's narrative constructs its tradition and problematic in such a way as to disengage it from considerations of knowledge may well be reason in itself to resist it.

Of course pleading for the importance (albeit a difficult importance) of claims to knowledge risks being judged conservative and untheoretical, and no doubt many such unqualified claims are just that. The alternative, though, is not necessarily as radical or adventurous as it first appears. 'Criticism—radical self-criticism—is a central means through which the difficult facts of human community come to recognition'; it is 'an activity intimately bound to the ways in which we do and do not belong in time and in community' (p. 154). 'Community', a noun usually accompanied by an article, is depicted here as an idea, unconstrained by the specific limitations that reference to any actual community would entail. However, the realm of the referent—by which I mean no more than the complex, pragmatic context against which language operates—tends to creep in the back door if excluded from the front, and in Melville's case this architectural possibility can be seen in the way in which his strange, ungainly narrative ('refusing—to the extent possible—the temptation to speak a truth of literature or of philosophy or of literary criticism' (p. 156)) none the less refers, at a deeper level, to a literary and cultural narrative that is at once familiar and reassuring. Despite a surfeit of tragic figures such as 'Art', the story itself is a comedy where Hegel's harsh paternal law forces young post-Hegel to range through a series of confusing misalliances—philosophy, psychoanalysis, grounded criticism—eventually to immigrate to America and there, the selfish heat of youth no longer painfully fierce, find identity and acknowledgement in the mature Whitmanesque sharing of pleasure with a community of academic partners. Like any good Shakespearean comedy the book ensures that its malcontents, in this case readers that do not find the Hegelian project compelling in the proper manner, are given adequate stage time but excluded well before the final scenes of marriage and social intercourse. Like any such comedy, that is, the concluding widespread merriment is somewhat more selective than it gives itself out to be. Derrida and de Man, Fried and Cavell, Johnson and Felman, Edgar Allen Poe and Henry James; the outcome is a modernism but, for all that scenes of rupture are thematized, it is finally a 'comic modernism' where discussion and players become increasingly identified with a specific and familiar national community.

Alan Sinfield has argued that it is just this, the fake universalization—via the celebration of the non-referential—of a specific ideological position, that is constitutive of the way modernism 'was reinvented in the 1950s in the United States'. By inventing the 'modern condition' with a 'romanticism of extremity', Sinfield writes, 'modernist art, literature and criticism…discourage political analysis: modernism is at the brink, it dares to stare in the abyss.'[5] Melville's book is not, to be sure, just some kind of spineless

ideological puppet of a latter-day super-power, and yet the very sharpness of its epistemological self-consciousness (on its own account, it is a book that would 'have its conclusions be radically self-reflexive, anticlimatic, and without thesis; it would be aware of its own failure and finally justificatory only of its own writing—its grammar and rhythms and style' (p. 156)) allows its own blindness to develop, the blindness to the fact that its *own* 'grammar and rhythms and style' are *not* its 'own', but are those of comic modernism, a literary and cultural archetype that, even as it speaks of 'human community', works to maintain the interest and dominance of but one group within it. As always, to write in order to be 'without thesis' is to run the risk that theses are left unacknowledged rather than abandoned, a conclusion that would bite more cleanly if it was possible to be sure that the converse was true. Of course, it isn't, but the teeth seem serviceable for all that.

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NOTES

1 See Stanley Cavell, *Must We Mean What We Say?* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976), and Michael Fried, *Absorption and Theatricality: Painting and Beholder in the Age of Diderot* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980).
2 Rodolphe Gasché provides just such careful (if exquisitely belaboured) detail in his recent *The Tain of the Mirror: Derrida and the Philosophy of Reflection* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1986).
3 G.W.F.Hegel, *The Encydopedia of the Philosophical Sciences,* vol. I, *The Logic,* para. 13; cited in Melville, p. 43.
4 In, for example, his reply to John Searle, 'Limited Inc. abc…', *Glyph,* 2 (1977), pp. 162–254.
5 Alan Sinfield, 'The migrations of modernism: remaking English studies in the Cold War', *New Formations,* 1, 2 (1987), p. 123, p. 122.

ALAN DURANT

• **C.J.Brumfit and R.A.Carter (eds),** *Literature and Language Teaching* **(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986), 289 pp., £7.00.**

Comprehension exercises, parrot-learning and linguaphone discs, with forebodings of service teaching and Freshman English; that's the image many teachers of literature—traditionalist and post-structuralist alike—have of English Language Teaching and Applied Linguistics. Stung by the slurs of reductionism, pragmatism and positivism which give rise to this image, some Applied Linguists are now in fact busily reading up

relevant work in literary theory, in order not to appear the left-over 'moaning minnies' of the profession. The rest just press on with their work—assured of its position as the only vocational, and therefore marketable, part of contemporary English studies.

What is there to say, then, about books which seek to relate literature not to the best that is known and thought in the world, or even to the Other, but, quite without apology, to 'language teaching'? Chris Brumfit and Ron Carter's collection *Literature and Language Teaching* is exactly such a book. Since English language teaching tends not to feature much in literary study, it is useful—in order to see the significance or interest of this book—to begin by setting it briefly in its intellectual and historical context.

Twenty years ago, the study of English literature and English language were mostly conducted separately. This was the case both for native speakers of the language (who generally did separate courses), and also for second-language speakers, for whom the division was modelled on the approach for native speakers. Studying language meant studying the structures of the language—its vocabulary and grammar—in a putatively ascending order of difficulty (nouns, clauses, subjunctives, etc.). Language study was then linked in with literary work, with the two frequently in a hierarchy as well as in sequence: language leads to literature, as competence leads naturally to discrimination.

But all this began to change in the 1970s. Gradually, for native speakers, grammar figured less; emphasis was placed instead on 'composition', which was concerned less with well-formedness or rhetorical skill than with self-expression and personal relevance. For second-language learners, the advent of notional-functional, then communicative language syllabuses (following work by D.A.Wilkins and others) meant an emphasis on acquiring language in the forms in which it occurs in social transactions and interactions, rather than on grammar as in the earlier, structural syllabuses. The acquisition of structures, in the modern view (a view recently extended and developed by Stephen Krashen), develops in the wake of use and experimentation. In this perspective, literature widely appeared to have little role. Even if you don't dispute its claim to be the best in language, best isn't always most useful: even the most 'touchstone-like' lines in *King Lear* are no use when negotiating a lease or ordering a kebab.

Alongside this threat to the place of literature in language learning from communicativism, however, another—more sympathetic—approach to studying literature developed. This approach is now widely associated with H.G.Widdowson's *Stylistics and the Teaching of Literature* (1975), and is a view which overlaps with much that was argued in pragmatics during the later 1970s. In this view, literature is not seen as a formally separate and unique mode of discourse, but is one form of social discourse among others, sharing formal resources though being read in different ways and for different purposes. Studying literature therefore contributes to, rather than conflicts with, the study of other more practically useful modes of discourse: as Short and Candlin put it in their chapter in this collection, 'there is no *a priori* reason for banishing literature from the language curriculum (although there may well be a need to grade literary texts in terms of difficulty and accessibility' (p. 91). It was this view of literature as one among a range of interesting discourse-types which made possible the partial rehabilitation of literary study in second-language teaching which has recently taken place; and in recent years few people have more consistently canvassed for this approach—alongside Widdowson himself and Michael Short—than Chris Brumfit and Ron Carter.

The collection *Literature and Language Teaching* is directly concerned with literature study for second-language learners, and focuses on three main areas of discussion, each of which merits consideration: stylistics, teaching methods, and cultural issues.

STYLISTICS

The principal concern of early chapters in the book (and the good editorial introduction to them) is with stylistics. Stylistics, it is argued, develops interpretative skills in a principled way, and helps subjective responses to texts to form through intensive and systematic analysis, often of short excerpts. When intuitions are formalized, texts can be explored further, for additional or contrary evidence; the result is often that the original intuitions are then modified or refined. 'Pedagogic stylistics' is the application of such procedures in language teaching. The groupwork and discussion through which students formulate and test interpretative hypotheses develop 'literary competence', which is taken throughout this book as a social, rather than innate capacity: what the editors call 'an interesting combination of linguistic, socio-cultural, historical and semiotic awareness' (p. 18).

But why study the language of 'literature' in particular, if, as Brumfit and Carter insist from the outset, 'there is no such thing as literary language' (p. 6). To accept such a view seems to suggest you should analyse all kinds of discourse equally. Widdowson and others have argued, however (and this collection seems to follow the view), that there *is* a property of literary texts which makes them of special use in the language-teaching classroom, in comparison with other discourse-types. This is that in studying literary texts processes of making sense are foregrounded by the fact that the texts are generally not embedded in any immediate functional situation, and by the complexity of the inferences such texts appear to invite. (Widdowson's own chapter in the collection, for example, is about differences between the 'three-dimensional' way poetry is organized, compared with the dependence on sequence and consequence in other kinds of discourse.) The necessity of deliberate interpretative activity to make sense of literature stands in contrast to the virtually automatic processing of other discourses, and so draws attention directly to interpretative procedures.

In *Literature and Language Teaching,* there is no particularly new work in stylistics. Rather, there are competent outlines of basic, pedagogically useful work of well-established kinds. The direction of debate tends instead towards the issue of whether to teach through intensive, stylistic analysis at all, or whether to encourage general, extensive reading. Many contributors (especially G.D.Pickett, who argues that studying one book closely cannot logically stand as a paradigmatic reading of other books (p. 264)) argue against analysis and in favour of establishing what Brumfit in another chapter calls 'reading communities' (p. 260). In such communities, readers would spend time *having* responses rather than *analysing* them. The last section of the book, misleadingly in this context called 'Fluent reading versus accurate reading', is made up of contributions which lay out something of the case—in my view not a particularly persuasive case—for structuring literary study through extensive reading, and for displacing detailed textual analysis with the priority of responsive, personal engagement by readers (engagements Sandra McKay earlier in the book terms 'aesthetic reading').

TEACHING METHODS

Pedagogy, as opposed to research, requires explicit attention to procedures for organizing syllabus content and for directing learning processes. Accordingly, much of *Literature and Language Teaching* is given over to questions of developing skills rather than simply transmitting knowledge. This is appropriate, given Brumfit's reminder that 'literature is a *skills* subject, not a content subject' (p. 237).

Concrete discussion of curriculum and methodology is welcome after the abstractions from actual social practice of much argument in other areas of literary study. The collection includes discussion by Brumfit himself of criteria for text selection in literature courses (pp. 189–90); analysis, in Guy Cook's chapter, of difficulties of 'false texture' brought about by inappropriate selection of extracts chosen for detailed study. There is also discussion—again by Brumfit but also elsewhere by Carter—of 'thematic' arrangement of texts in courses, and of using comparison and other groupwork activities (predicting, completing, debating, rewriting, etc.). Issues of grading, sequencing of texts, and forms of evaluation are explored, relating syllabus design to learner needs rather than to the classical humanist idea of a pre-given academic field. Undoubtedly the best chapter on these issues is Short and Candlin's outline of courses tried out at Lancaster and Nanjing, which illustrates issues in curriculum development by reference to two specific experiments.

CULTURAL QUESTIONS

The third area of interest in the book concerns the cultural representations literature constructs. Although literature is language, it is not only language; it also involves levels of representation of ideas, cultural references, and the construction of world-views which may be created by the language of a text, but are not usefully reducible to it. (A list of roles for literature in the classroom, by William Littlewood, brings out something of this diversity of levels (pp. 179–80)). As soon as the cultural context for literature is acknowledged, familiar but important questions directly arise: how is any particular corpus chosen? What social values does that selection contain or imply?

If literature is to be useful in developing social experience and perception, relevance to social experience is essential. But since most students involved in learning English as a second language are 'overseas students', relevance for them is likely to involve different views of experience and aspiration from those for British, native-speaker students. Is teaching English literature in a second-language context therefore 'imperialist'? Ngugi wa Thiong'o certainly thinks so, and argues that in existing patterns of teaching English in Kenya an African child's 'route to self-realization must be via European heritages and cultures. The price we pay for for these Eurocentric studies of ourselves is the total distortion and misplacement of values of national liberation, making us continue to be slaves to imperialism' (p. 224). Braj Kachru, on the other hand, suggests that students will find relevance to their social experience in 'contact literatures', or literature written in English by non-native users of the language. Such works differ from those of the established canon not only in the varieties of English they use, but also in their cultural references, and so, by a process Kachru describes as 'transcreation', can serve notice of

the changing position of ex-colonial cultures within world English.

The issue of an ideological dimension to literature teaching in second-language situations—often situations of unequal contact or conflict—pervades all work on the teaching of literature. But in this collection it is only tackled directly by Ngugi and Kachru. While there is an openness about 'corpus' throughout the collection which is unusual among literature teachers, there is still from time to time a slippage from particular national or cultural 'literatures' into the abstraction 'literature' when questions of the cultural repercussions of literature loom. The editors themselves acknowledge in the second part of their introduction ('Literature and education') that literature courses contain ideologies; but they go on to say that this is not harmful if the aim of choosing books initially is merely to be catalytic, equipping students with basic skills and orientation that will enable them to read anywhere in the vast range of current writing in English, given the increasing role of English as a world language. Such reasoning can sound naïve—especially ideas of 'orientation'. Such discussion remains valuable, nevertheless, when argued concretely, not as 'theory' but with a view to specific syllabuses and teaching approaches: views taken on such issues have clearly practical consequences, including ones which are not exported as cultural effects on places beyond the shores of the British Isles.

L*iterature and Language Teaching* is undoubtedly a useful collection of material within the changing field of literary studies. It serves as a convenient—and unique— reference for recent debates (though the lack of historical background and of a list of contributors are unhelpful in this respect, as is the length of time the book has taken to come out—the papers are mostly from the early 1980s). The emergence over the last ten years of the kind of work represented in this collection follows from a number of changing circumstances, ranging from a theory-internal logic within Applied Linguistics, through the expansion of ELT in the context of increasing use of English as an international language, to the increasing subsidization of British higher education by governments of developing countries through tuition-fee revenue. Brumfit and Carter's *Literature and Language Teaching* may seem lacking in rigour, compared with research work in linguistic stylistics; and it may seem pedestrian on the question of travelling theories and cultural practices, compared with the work of Said, Foucault, and others. But the issues it raises are urgent and important. Very many of the large number of overseas students of literature in Britain return to teaching in a second-language environment; and for this they need analytic skills and a grounding in pedagogy and curriculum development which they will not find in traditional courses in literature or in courses of literary theory. Shortcomings in work of the kind in Brumfit and Carter's collection need to be investigated and answered; and study needs to be made of cross-connections between teaching literature to second-language learners and to native speakers. There is no reason, in the meantime, for snobbery or ignorance about literature and language teaching.

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- **Jeremy Hawthorn (ed.),** *The Nineteenth-century British Novel,* **Stratford-upon-Avon Studies (London: Edward Arnold, 1986), 175 pp., £9.95**

A collection of essays by several critics on a single, well-defined topic is potentially just about the most exciting format for a book. There is always the possibility that the essays will reveal a new way of looking at an issue, as happens, for example, in *The Modern English Novel,* edited by Gabriel Josipovici (London: Open Books, 1976), where the contributors focus on the process of reading, paying attention in particular to the role of language in the communication between writer and reader. That might sound fairly unoriginal, but little more than a decade ago such close attention to the language of fiction was breaking new ground in English criticism. An anthology such as Josipovici's is often the result of a group of critics working together in the same place, sharing interests and enthusiasms. Another kind of collection, however, is that in which a more scattered group of critics are asked to address themselves to a single issue: for example, *The Worlds of Victorian Fiction,* edited by Jerome H. Buckley (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1975) focuses on the endlessly discussable concept of the fictional 'world'. The principal reason why many readers will have come across this collection is because it includes J.Hillis Miller's 'Optic and semiotic in *Middlemarch*', which did so much to suggest new possibilities for discussing George Eliot, but it should be recognized, I think, that the essay acquires additional force by appearing alongside other essays which touch on related aspects of the same broad issue. In a good collection, every essay will add to the other essays in this kind of way.

   Such overall coherence does, however, demand some positive editorial steering; the editor has to establish a central issue or problem. The main reservation I have about Jeremy Hawthorn's collection *The Nineteenth-century British Novel* is that it does not seem to have been edited in this kind of confident way. It differs in this respect, for example, from one of the last Bradbury/Palmer-edited Stratford-upon-Avon Studies, *The Contemporary English Novel* (London: Edward Arnold, 1979), where there is a central idea of the relationship between realism and experiment in English fiction. In Hawthorn's anthology no central question is asked, nor does any specific brief seem to have been issued to the contributors other than to produce an essay on some aspect of the nineteenth-century novel. The result, consequently, is something of a mish-mash, with each contributor pursuing an individual line, and a wide variation in the critical sophistication of the essays. The opening essay on *Pride and Prejudice,* for example, by Stein Haugom Olsen, does not do very much more than explain that pride and prejudice were important concepts to Jane Austen, and what she meant by these and other moral keywords in the novel. Things improve a great deal after this, as essays deal with the influence of Wordsworth on novelists, versions of Eden in *Wuthering Heights,* women readers, *Dombey and Son, Henry Esmond, The Woman in White,* George Eliot, Trollope, and *Tess of the D'Urbervilles*. The leading figures do, therefore, all put in an appearance, but, apart from the chronological sequence, it is hard to see any obvious relationship between the essays. A good introduction might, of course, have pulled things together, but Hawthorn's opening remarks are astonishingly disappointing, amounting to no more than half a page. What he does in these few lines is suggest that many feel uneasy with the claim that 'the nineteenth-century novel represents one of the supreme peaks of

artistic achievement', and express the hope that the essays in this volume will make readers feel less uneasy about such a claim. This seems an oddly apologetic and dated note on which to start. Certainly none of the contributors feels any need to make out a case for the 'greatness' of the nineteenth-century novel.

Indeed, if anything, there is, in some of the essays, a retreat from some recent views of the Victorian novel, J.M.Rignall, for example, writing on Thackeray, is unhappy with J.Hillis Miller's view of *Henry Esmond* as a text which 'renders all meanings indeterminable', and Graham Sell, writing on Dickens, argues that post-structuralist claims about an infinite number of meanings now seem a thing of the past. Although there is no stated aim to the collection, the pattern of most of the essays is probably implicit in these two responses above. A version of what most of the contributors are pulling back from is evident in the most striking and enjoyable essay, '*Cage aux Folles:* sensation and gender in Wilkie Collins's *The Woman in White*', by D.A.Miller. Starting with the idea of sensation in the sensation novel, Miller then proceeds to discuss the concepts of nervousness and femininity, and the way in which male security depends upon suppression of the feminine and incarceration of the female. Miller uses the text as a springboard for his tremendously agile, and impressive, play of ideas.

The other essays, however, are more cautious about the free play of ideas, and, almost inevitably, the hand on the tiller to steer a course comes from history. Roger Sell's article 'Dickens and the new historicism: the polyvocal audience and discourse of *Dombey and Son*', is the best illustration of this. Sell rejects the notion of infinite meanings to a text, but is also unhappy with the orthodoxy of twenty years ago that focused so much on Dickens's use of symbols and the unity of his novels. Using Bakhtin's idea of *heteroglossia,* and acknowledging a debt to Roger Fowler, Sell writes of how 'Dickens, within the context of his own culture, meant several things at once, discretely interpretable and self-contradictory'. It is this kind of awareness of a lack of uniformity within the Victorian context, and an interest in the way in which the novel participates in Victorian society, that informs several of the essays. Kate Flint, for example, writing on 'The woman reader and the opiate of fiction: 1855–1870', provides what, initially, seems a fairly pedestrian essay about what women read and attitudes towards what they read, but the essay takes off when she views this in more positive terms, of how popular novels of the period allowed women to imagine themselves in a position of power, 'exacting revenge for the paternalistic authority being exercised so unquestioningly over them'. The notion that has been introduced is that of the nineteenth-century reader, and the ways in which that reader might have read a novel. It is a theme that is continued in David Skilton's essay 'The Trollope reader', where the author in question is 'a middle-class gentleman addressing his equals'. Skilton makes the interesting point that the Trollope novels we tend to prefer, such as *The Way We Live Now,* were ill-received at the time because they did not exude a sense of the adequacy of common sense to cope with any situation.

What connects such essays is careful thought about the relationship between text and audience in order to get a reasonable, but by no means simple, sense of the balance between comforting and subversive meanings to a Victorian novel. It would be forcing the point to argue that all the essays in the volume conform to this pattern; indeed, my original point was the collection's lack of overall coherence. But a certain kind of interest

in a text in its period does come up again and again. The real disappointment is the editor's failure to pull things together. Is there something genuinely new in evidence in these essays? Is it 'historicism' or 'new historicism' that is on display? The collection would have more bite if Hawthorn himself drew our attention to a pattern in the essays. As it is, I am left feeling that there is a new approach evident at times, but one that is difficult to grasp because it is never made central enough and is left undefined.

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CATHERINE BELSEY

• **Martin Orkin,** ***Shakespeare Against Apartheid*** **(Craighall: Ad. Donker, 1987), 198 pp. n.p.**

Anyone who still doubts the hegemonic role of the institution of English should read *Shakespeare Against Apartheid.* Orkin's book cites a number of South African critical avowals of 'awe' and 'wonder' at the way Shakespeare's great individuals learn from their tragic experiences, and these ring more excruciating than merely hollow in the context of the collective tragedy of South Africa itself. Each time Shakespeare is read as affirming the transcendent truths of human nature, as against the merely contingent facts of everyday politics, the institution of English in South Africa turns a blind eye to the systematic exploitation and dispossession of black people. Orkin points to the narcissism involved in the critical construction of heroes whose individuality is independent of their societies, and whose experience sensitive readers 'recognize' across distances of time and space. In its imaginary identification with the universal, the institution discards all responsibility for the actual, and thus acquiesces in the bitter suffering caused by a regime it ignores as no more than local and temporary.

There is a message for British and American critics, too, in Orkin's discussion of the tendency of 'liberal' South African whites, when threatened from the right, to retreat in self-defence into traditional affirmations of order, growth and individuality. These values, the book implies, cannot in the end ensure even the personal integrity they were designed to protect. It is of course, easier to contemplate grand fictional power struggles than to confront the implications of current state policies, but the effect is escapism, not enhanced moral probity.

There are worse things, however, than sins of omission. Orkin provides some revealing instances of racism in much traditional criticism of *Othello,* including twentieth-century British criticism. He shows how a habit of finding the explanation of Othello's susceptibility to Iago in a thinly covered, barely civilized savagery culminated in Laurence Olivier's nasty film, which was so popular in the mid-1960s.

Orkin's position is that what we find in Shakespeare depends to a considerable extent on what we look for. The answers that we produce are an effect of our questions. And these questions are in turn an effect of our own material, cultural and political preoccupations, some of them, of course, profoundly unconscious. Orkin reads Shakespeare's plays historically, and makes clear that by this he means two separate but

related things. He sets the plays in their own period, which he sees as one of radical upheaval and intense conflict, and at the same time he sets the process of interpretation in a present which is one moment—a moment of upheaval and conflict—in a continuing history. Thus reading is no more located outside history than is the text itself.

In consequence, whatever the title of the book may suggest to sceptics (and the shock is presumably part of the project), Orkin's readings of the plays are historically responsible. What he finds in them, however, illuminates the South African present, and demonstrates that there is no need to wrench the text from its historical moorings to see its current political relevance. *Hamlet,* for instance, dramatizes the way a state affirms its own corrupt authority as legitimate, and classifies dissent as treachery or madness. State power is maintained by spying and by the collusion of unquestioning bureaucrats like Polonius—or like the doctors who colluded with the official account of the death of Steve Biko. *Lear* reveals the abuse of power which is vested quite legally in land, and shows how a corrupt social order is held in place by property. And here Orkin draws a parallel with the Land Act of 1913, which divided South Africa in such a way that less than 10 per cent of the territory was allocated to the black inhabitants. The effect was to drive black farmers from their land and create a new class of itinerant unskilled labourers and vagrants.

Obviously, to teach Shakespeare in this way in South Africa would be to raise questions with a clear bearing on current government policies. It would therefore be to accept rather than to evade the responsibilities of citizenship. And in case British readers should incline to complacency about the activities of our own state, it is clear that some of these questions might also be applied fruitfully to official policies in Britain.

I believe, therefore, that everyone ought to read this book. But there is a problem here. The book is published in South Africa, and the author teaches at the University of Witwatersrand. Both the British Association of University Teachers and the National Association of Teachers in Further and Higher Education have a policy of unconditional support for the cultural boycott originally proposed by the black organizations in South Africa. This means that no British academic can honourably visit South Africa; we cannot admit South African students to British institutions of tertiary education; we cannot even sustain a correspondence with any individual South African academic. There are, of course, certain contradictions here: academics indifferent to the obscenity of apartheid continue to do all these things, and to be cited by the South African regime as evidence that official condemnation of its policies is mere hypocrisy, while the rest of us are inhibited from offering South Africans who are opposed to apartheid the support they so badly need. On the other hand, this is no reason for making exceptions in an access of individual conscientiousness. The point of the boycott is to declare our support for the judgement of the black organizations on the matter, and to make clear to *all* South Africans that no one with a commitment to the value of human beings will have anything to do with a nation which deprives black people of citizenship in order to protect white supremacy.

Can we, then, buy and read Martin Orkin's book? Readers of *Textual Practice* will make up their own minds. I believe in the end that we should do so, both to affirm the support of the international academic community for his courageous condemnation of a sick regime, and to increase our understanding of the way such sickness permeates not

only South Africa itself but also other societies which resemble it in too many disturbing ways.

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CAROLYN BROWN

• **Hélène Cixous and Catherine Clément, *The Newly Born Woman,* translated from the French (1975) by Betsy Wing, introduction by Sandra M.Gilbert. 'Theory and History of Literature' series, vol. 24 (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1987), 168 pp., £6.95**

> We know the implied irony in the master/slave dialectic: the *body* of what is strange must not disappear, but its force must be conquered and return to the master.
>
> 'Sorties', *The Newly Born Woman,* p. 70

The temporal, geographic, and linguistic transformation of *La Jeune Née* into *The Newly Born Woman* opens up questions of reading, of framing, of history. And bearing in mind the text itself, the politics of desire. Its existence has been known in the English-speaking world through the publication of extracts, of fragments, and it has already been the subject of much discussion.[1] This creates problems for the reviewer. Trailers of films are frequently more exciting than the film itself. How far is this the case with *The Newly Born Woman,* now some 12 years old, dubbed into English and brought to the UK via the University of Minnesota Press? Is it a mere historical curiosity, of interest only to those chronicling the feminisms of the 1970s? A little like finding Sappho's fragments really were the best bits? Is it not, perhaps, a little old-fashioned? Fortunately, Clément reminds us in the first few pages of the power of the archaic, in her discussion of her key figures, the sorceress and the hysteric:

> Michelet…does not hesitate: it is because the sorceress is the bearer of the past that she is invested with a challenging power. Freud sees the power of the repressed working in the same way: anachronism has a specific power of shifting, disturbance, and change. (p. 9)

So, in what ways can this perhaps rather archaic text be seen as possessed of a challenging power?—in what ways could it effect disturbance, and change? What are the historical and textual systems in which it exists? And how then is it to be read? Let us refer to Clément again. Her enquiry—to which the above is a response—runs as follows:

> Do the abnormal ones—madmen, deviants, neurotics, women, drifters, jugglers, tumblers,—anticipate the culture to come, repeat the past culture, or express a constantly present utopia? (p. 9)

Certainly, it is one of the abnormal ones. It eludes classification within any one genre. The attempt to read it as either fiction or theory, as either a socio-cultural study, or as autobiography, will result only in a headache for the reader. Rather it traverses (passes

across, through, and beyond) all these discursive boundaries, to produce a text in which the reader's desire is swept up and away.

The textual movement of desire is a central component of this text. Sandra M.Gilbert draws attention to the dance of desire at the heart of *The Newly Born Woman,* entitling her introduction, 'A tarantella of theory'. And certainly, the text offers a stimulating, celebratory, if not ecstatic, discourse on 'Woman'. The translated text is constructed in three parts; these texts intermingle, and interact. *The Newly Born Woman* constructs a domain, and it is as this that it has to be read. To segment the text by playing the author game (who writes what?) is to restrict its potentialities. The fluidity and complexity of *The Newly Born Woman* is perhaps most easily demonstrated by referring back to the French title, *La Jeune Née,* upon which Betsy M.Wing's excellent glossary elaborates.

> Hear here: *La Genêt:* a feminine writing outlaw. [The reference is to Jean Genêt, French writer, homosexual, and convicted criminal, who wrote of outlaws, outcasts, sexual masks, and social roles.]
>   Là je n'est: There, I, a subject, is not.
>   Là je une nais. There I, a subject [a feminine one], am born. (p. 166)

As this makes clear, the signifier 'Woman' is not only located on female bodies. 'Woman' floats (hysterically?) through the text. As one who is not, 'Woman' is dispersed through desire, through multiple hysteries and histories. Yet, in order to work with(in), the text also demands a network of intertextuality. The problem is deciding in which network it should be inserted; in what discursive practices, in what political company.

Sandra M.Gilbert's task is to introduce *The Newly Born Woman* to an American audience. She writes that 'For an American feminist—at least for this American feminist—reading *The Newly Born Woman* is like going to sleep in one world and waking in another' (p. x). For me, however, the fluidity of signifiers, and the play with the I/imaginary renders the reading of *The Newly Born Woman* more like a dream than an awakening. And Clément and Cixous embed in the structure of the text the necessity of awakening in the world. The final paragraphs discuss the production of discourses in the world of Late capitalism. After the flamboyance of the two preceding essays, the sober, pragmatic conclusion comes as quite a shock—a little like the cold plunge pool after dreaming in the steam rooms in a Turkish Bath. And like the plunge pool, it should work to clear one's head.

H: One sees the development of an international intrigue that is leading towards capitalist imbecilization in its most inhuman and most automatic, most formidable form. The selling out of all the countries, their handing over themselves in the way France has done with the   United States, is also done on condition of a complicitous silence. And to achieve it, they will not only silence the bulk of production of writing—of literature in general, whatever it may be—but they will also silence poetry…somehow, they fear it and they gag it.

C: And yet, in the same period, in the same movement whose capitalist reverse side you are describing, imperialism is coming apart, is defeated: in Indochina—what an event! …. Pessmism should be… only one perspective. I believe that the need for *dialectic*…

is making itself very real…this means of analysis and of comprehension…is the only true method. (pp. 159–60)

This is a familiar argument, but its presence in this text is worthy of attention. Its significance lies in its address to the world of the Symbolic, of the Real, of international relations in the context of American hegemony. So, what happens when *La Jeune Née* becomes *The Newly Born Woman;* when it receives American citizenship? Gilbert introduces *The Newly Born Woman* as an apolitical, literary citizen of unproblematic gender, with distinguished fathers—'She is born of Flaubert and Baudelaire, of Rimbaud and Apollinaire, as well as…of the *Malleus Maleficarum,* Freud, Genêt, Kleist, Hoffman, Shakespeare, and Aeschylus' (p. x)—and well connected Anglo-American literary female friends (Emily Dickinson, Virginia Woolf, Elizabeth Barrett Browning) and potential introductions (Mary Daly, Susan Griffin). Gilbert's introduction ignores and silences the final paragraphs, refusing, by remaining within the Imaginary of Woman and Literature, to pursue the threads which these final paragraphs provide for unravelling the translated text, and offers an (unintentionally) ironic elaboration upon the final paragraphs of *La Jeune Née.*

Throughout *The Newly Born Woman* there is an examination of the internal and external boundaries of the modern French state. 'The guilty one' explores the suppressions and repressions of western cultural history, locating these in part in the figure of the sorceress and the hysteric, but taking off from Sartre's observation that 'in an alienated society, all the alienations…symbolize one another' (*L'Idiot de la famille,* cited p. 71). 'Sorties' moves out, from/with the subjugation of the feminine, and out of 'France'—to the experiences on the margins of the French Empire. Cixous writes of her childhood in Algiers during the war against French occupation. This autobiographical account—writing the self/self writing—is a stunning portrayal of pain, of anguish, of multiple divisions of subjectivity; and yet also of the excitement of being 'in the world' and trying to make political and personal sense of it. This biographical, historical, geo-political specificity, gives *The Newly Born Woman* a power which works on, with, over and through, the more structuralist/ post-structuralist account of 'The guilty one'. Through reading, through multiple textual identifications, and rejections, the child grows, until fixed by her role, her identity as woman.

> I learned to read, to write, to scream, and to vomit in Algeria. (p. 71) … I am a woman.
>
> Then everything gets more complicated. I don't give upon war… struggle is more necessary than ever…the enemy is all over the place; not only are there class enemies, colonialists, racists, bourgeois and anti-semites against me— 'men' are added to them. (p. 74)

These pages are a clear statement of being formed in political struggle against the *patrie,* which speaks from a sense of being Other—indeed multiply Other—of existing in a culture where the 'first spectacle' was,

> how the white [French], superior, plutocratic, civilized world founded its power on the repression of populations, who had suddenly become 'invisible,' like

proletarians, immigrant workers, minorities who are not the right 'color'. Women. Invisible as humans. (p. 701)

This invisibility is replayed in Gilbert's introduction. She addresses the issue of Cixous's difference only to personalize, to universalize, to abstract from history, to incorporate difference—and therefore to deny it.

The rhetorical assimilation and negation which Gilbert operates is easily demonstrable, and is worthwhile paying attention to. Thus:

> Cixous's sardonically shuddering view of woman as having been 'night to his day…Black to his white. shut out of his system's space…is by no means alien to our consciousness. And of course her story of a girlhood as a dispossessed Algerian French Jew is one with which almost any immigrant—Jewish, black, Chicana, Italian, Polish-American-woman can identify. In fact, even if we were, like Dickinson, WASPs, Yankee princesses, couldn't we at least sympathise? That the so-called Myth of Amherst, pacing her father's turreted homestead in her white dress, didn't need either the Algerian revolution or the Vietnam war, either the Paris barricades or the New York ghettos to say 'Good Morning—Midnight/I'm coming home,' only makes Cixous's point more clear. As culture has constructed her, 'woman' *is* 'the dark continent' to which *woman* must return. (p. xvi)

Who are 'we'? Clearly, 'our' consciousness is that of Anglo-American literary historians, those who have read Elizabeth Barrett Browning, and remember Woolf's *Three Guineas* (while forgetting the multiple fascisms against which, the history in which, Woolf was writing). 'We' were/are the WASPs; 'we' can 'at least sympathise' and indeed through sympathizing, we can forget the existence of others, incorporating them into 'ourselves'. Indeed, 'we' can already write 'Good Morning—Midnight' without having to go through all those oppressions, battles, struggles, which 'immigrants' (i.e. non-WASPs) and other countries (Vietnam, Algeria, New York ghettos *(sic)*) have to experience. Because, as (WASP) women, 'we' are 'the dark continent'. 'We' can write, 'we' can claim the oppressions of all places, of all history, in order to bolster 'our' oppression as WASP women. We can dance the tarantella too. Rather than consider how mechanisms of power and desire actually work, and 'our' implication within them, 'we' can fly into 'the country of writing' …'to be regenerated'…'to be reborn' (p. xviii). Theory as cosmetic treatment for WASP women.

Gilbert's return of 'woman', indeed of all 'difference', to the binary division of gender silences those presences, those voices in *The Newly Born Woman* which speak of imperialism, domination, resistance, and the 'elsewhere'; which consider the realities, the worlds, in which women as well as men exist. La Genêt explicitly broke with locating oppression simply upon gender. Whereas 'the multiplicity of discourses which Cixous and Clément use in their text pluralizes and problematizes 'woman', and 'women'; in the introduction, 'woman' becomes un/problematically located on female bodies, which in turn become constructed in dominance to US WASPs.

In Clément and Cixous's text 'Woman' operates as an abstract concept which is privileged over the term 'Man'. As such it inverts and disrupts the binary system to which

Gilbert returns it. From being an abstract concept to help us think, operating at a number of levels, 'Woman' becomes 'something absolute and primary which is not merely posited'.[2]

Gilbert's presumptuous and arrogant reading amounts to a rhetorical imperialism, in which the main reason for the Vietnam war, the Algerian revolution, was to write a good line or two of poetry. It (dis)locates *La Jeune Née* into a predominantly Anglo-American literary intertextuality, which enables a suppression of those voices which disrupt Anglo-American humanism. It is, at best, theoretically and politically naïve.

Thus, in a disturbing, indeed uncanny way, *The Newly Born Woman* suffers the fate of the sorceress, the hysteric, the feminine role.

> The feminine role, the role of the sorceress, of hysteric is ambiguous, antiestablishment, and conservative at the same time…*conservative* because every sorceress ends up being destroyed, and nothing is registered of her but mythical traces. (p. 5)

Is this the fate to which *The Newly Born Woman* is condemned;—or are there possibilities of an escape? What textual networks should *The Newly Born Woman* be put in contact with, in order to consider its politics, its desires? What are the contexts which offer the most suitable *matrix* to begin to realize the transformations with which *The Newly Born Woman* is pregnant?

The final footnote to the final paragraphs is Gramsci's considerations on the political and the cultural. It is a relevant consideration—that 'if the cultural world for which one struggles is a living and necessary fact, its expansiveness will be irresistible, and it will find its artists' (cited p. 159). It may be that *The Newly Born Woman* can escape from the literary company in which it has been placed, that it will find readers as desirous of radical transformations as it is, and that other connections and desires will emerge with the reading of the text. Thus to conclude, let me suggest other company which would assist a political, an interesting, a positive, reading of *The Newly Born Woman*.

They are legion. Clear pointers are contained within the text, e.g. Lévi-Strauss, Mary Douglas, Sartre, Freud. And of course those who are acquainted with post-structuralist work will recognize the utilization of Derrida whose work is invoked and noted at the start of 'Sorties'. Their double textual strategy of political and historical analysis, combined with an account of how it is to be 'Other', recalls not only the work of Simone de Beauvoir, but also the work of Frantz Fanon. With regard to each essay, it seems to me that 'The guilty one' evokes Bakhtin's notion of the *carnivalesque;* in Bakhtin's work the *carnivalesque* contains disruption. That is, it is where 'the others' are kept, in a 'space' apparently segregated from the dominant order, but which also constructs a site from which the phantoms escape, whether into literature, or, as in Clément's account, the bodies of hysterics, or the cinema (p. 13). Bakhtin's emphasis on the potential of laughter as demystification and disruption is echoed in The laugh of the Medusa', and the notion of 'voice', which Cixous uses so effectively, is also a central notion in Bakhtin. 'Sorties' reads, in part, as a feminine elaboration upon Gramsci—who is not merely an endpoint but a presence throughout. Finally, I want to return to Gramsci, to relate his considerations on 'the personality' to Cixous's notion of difference. Both insist on the

importance of considering historical-cultural complexity. Both are full of the utopian desires which follow on from that realization.

> The personality is strangely composite: it contains Stone Age elements and principles of a more advanced science, prejudices from all past phases of history at the local level, and intuitions of a future philosophy which will be united the world over.[3]
>
> There is no 'destiny' no more than there is 'nature' or 'essence' as such. Rather, there are living structures that are caught up and sometimes rigidly set within historico-cultural limits so mixed up with the scene of History that it has been impossible (and is still very difficult) to think or even imagine an 'elsewhere'…. Let us imagine a real liberation of sexuality…. This cannot accomplished…without political transformations which are not equally radical (Imagine!)… Then… Difference would be a bunch of new differences. (p. 83)

This is a rich and exhilarating text. It deserves, and rewards close readings, from a plurality of perspectives. It does not preach 'truth' in a monologic sense. It is not a fixed utterance which can be neatly encapsulated in a formulaic sentence. The analysis and indeed the conclusions of Clément and Cixous can be disputed, argued with, but not ignored. But when one wakes from the dream of *The Newly Born Woman,* one sees the world differently, with reawakened desires of its possibilities. Meanwhile, we must hope that its difference will not be contained within the frame of humanist-feminism, or even within that other zone of the licensed *carnivalesque,* Literature.

London

NOTES

1 Elaine Marks and Isabel de Courtivron (eds), *New French Feminisms* (Brighton: Harvester Press, 1980). For an incisive exposition and discussion, see also Toril Moi, *Sexual/Textual Politics: Feminist Literary Theory* (London: Methuen, 1985).
2 Theodor Adorno, *The Jargon of Authenticity* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1986), p. 114.
3 Quintin Hoare and Geoffrey Nowell Smith (ed. and trans.), *Selections from the Prison Notebooks of Antonio Gramsci,* Lawrence & Wishart, 1976), p. 324.

GREGORY P.KELLY

• **Wolfgang Iser, *Walter Pater: The Aesthetic Moment,* translated from the German (1960) by David Henry Wilson. 'European Studies in English Literature' series (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), 192 pp., £25.00**

The editors of 'European Studies in English Literature' describe their series as being

'devoted to publishing translations into English of the best works written in European languages on English literature'. Wolfgang Iser's *Walter Pater: The Aesthetic Moment* deserves its distinction of being the first German work to be included in this series. Lucid, concise and completely free from jargonocentric verbiage, it offers a thorough examination of the privileged moment for which Pater's aesthetic has become famous. The only major complaint that one could reasonably lodge against this translation by David Henry Wilson is that it should not have taken nearly three decades to make its début into the English language.

Pater studies have long been dogged by 'influence' criticism, discussions which attempt to gauge the impact that the ideas of others have had on him, or that of his ideas on others. T.S.Eliot, for example, took both approaches in his rather dismissive essay 'The place of Pater' (1950), saying on the one hand that *Marius the Epicurean* was a hodgepodge of a don's classical learning, and on the other that its author was not 'wholly irresponsible' for some 'untidy lives' in the tragic generation of the 1890s. More recently, Pater's critics have tended to evaluate him on different terms. In *The Poetics of Belief* (1985), Nathan Scott Jr enlists Pater as a spokesman for *agape*, while Frank McGrath in *The Sensible Spirit* (1986) portrays him as a crucial link between German idealism and Anglo-American modernism. As his foreword makes clear, Iser is in the camp of Pater's later critics, despite his chronological distance from them.

Iser wrote his study of Pater during the heyday of New Criticism, a movement now fossilized and on display in the legion of literary theory anthologies. It was not enough for him to approach Pater's doctrine that art is autonomous with a critical method which purported the same. What is at stake, he maintains, is the problem that Paterian aestheticism set out to solve, and the difficulties incurred by its putative solutions. After clearing the ground with brief chapters on Pater criticism and the genealogy of autonomistic theories of art from Blake to Rossetti, Iser unfolds the problem to which Pater dedicated his career: how can a relativistic theory of art sustain itself without the comforting sanction of absolutist presuppositions? Iser is careful to illustrate that Pater's answer, even in its boldest formulation, was always tentative.

Given Pater's temperament and cultural milieu, neither of which receive Iser's attention, it is scarcely surprising that he performed only sceptical experiments on the question. Pater grew up in the company of uncertainty. Both his parents died before he reached university. When he sought ordination after taking a second-class degree in *Literae Humaniores*, one of his friends notified the Church authorities of his heterodoxy. Well after his conclusion to *The Renaissance* had scandalized the Senior Common Rooms of Oxford's colleges, he was still reluctant to engage in anything bearing a remote resemblance to controversy. His letters, superbly edited by Lawrence Evans (1970), reveal an astonishingly insipid personality, a persona, perhaps, behind which he could take refuge from a world in which he never felt wholly at ease. He lived a quiet, uneventful life with his sisters Hester and Clara until the summer of 1894, when he fell gravely ill. He died at the age of fifty-five.

Although there is some truth to the quip that his biography is a contradiction in terms, it does not fully explain the pains he took to present himself as an excruciatingly prudent man. As Michael Levey's treatment of the life (1978) suggests, his studied blandness was the result not only of his disposition but of his philosophical outlook. By the time his first

work, 'Coleridge's writings', was published in 1866, geology, Darwinism and the Higher Criticism had already exploded the logocentric underpinnings of his age. His readings in German philosophy cemented his iconoclastic attitude towards all systems of belief or thought which pretended to have access to some transcendental, immutable reality. Absolutes, he thought, reify experience. Our only option during this short interval of frost and sun is to intensify the moment as it passes, not to subsume it under any theory which would deny its primacy. Holding that truth is immanent and never ontologically determinant, Pater turned to the ephemeral moment as the locus of transitory significance. Iser asserts that in order to prop up his decentred aesthetic, Pater adopted a literary strategy that would combine history and myth with art.

Pater's concept of history was flavoured by what Iser calls 'Hegelian schematism', a view which McGrath's recent study would confirm. Lacking a definite teleology, history for Pater was but a succession of moments reflecting the development of a self in the boundless process of becoming. Only through its historical manifestations can the mind come to know itself. Little wonder, then, that Pater preferred periods of transition as settings for his historical fictions. Even in his apparently non-fictional analysis of the Renaissance, itself conventionally seen as the great cultural pivot of western civilization, Pater shows how this historical moment was comprised of still smaller moments. He began not with art from fourteenth-century Tuscany, but with stories from twelfth-century France (the term 'Twelfth-century Renaissance' had not yet been invented), and in so doing altered the boundaries of the Renaissance as a historical epoch. The effect of this redefinition was to deconstruct the Medieval/Renaissance opposition. 'The two are really continuous,' he wrote in his essay on Winckelmann, 'and there is a sense in which it may be said that the Renaissance was an uninterrupted effort of the middle age[s], that it was ever taking place.' Pater was consistent in matching his theses with corresponding antitheses, but was his synthesis of history and art successful?

Iser argues that it was not. If history functions as a mirror of the individual, then limits are automatically imposed on both. Such limits ran counter to Pater's distrust of metanarratives, a distrust Iser points to in *Plato and Platonism* and *Gaston de Latour*. Iser informs us that *Plato and Platonism* was thought by Pater to be his most important work, and as such is indispensable to the understanding of his aesthetic. It shows that 'if perfection is to be expected in history, it necessarily fades into Utopianism' (p. 92). Similarly, *Gaston* portrays the inadequacy of historical legitimation when its principal character stalemates himself into inertia: 'Gaston is always travelling without ever arriving; he is incapable of making a decision, and so he rushes from one possibility to another, and instead of mastering experience, he is left "darkling" in the shadow of events' (p. 104). Iser's critique of Gaston is remarkably like that made by Wilde of Marius. In the end, Pater fails to fuse history with art because in appealing to history, art negates it.

Myth is equally problematic as a sanction for aesthetic autonomy. Whereas history was employed by Pater as a temporary mediation of opposites, myth was designed to merge opposing forces into over-arching meanings (p. 113). It, too, features a Hegelian scheme, as its triad of (desired) effects indicate: unity between the human and natural worlds, the transfiguration of suffering into beauty and the reconciliation of opposites. 'The myth of Demeter and Persephone' reveals that myth for Pater was less a description of an

objective world than it was an expression of the imagination untroubled by any confrontation with history. In Iser's opinion, however, Pater's use of myth becomes flawed in 'Apollo in Picardy', a tale in which Apollo (dubbed Apollyon) returns to medieval Christendom only to wreak havoc. This clash of mythic opposites entails no unity, no transfiguration and no reconciliation: 'Apollyon, as representative of pagan Nature, finds himself changed from god to devil; in having to turn against himself, he gives presence to a deranged Nature which becomes tangible in an unrestrained Satanism' (p. 125). Pater's tapestries of myth and art emblematize their own shortcomings.

The structure of Iser's argument assumes Hegelian dimensions of its own in the section entitled 'The aesthetic existence', a series of small chapters outlining Pater's efforts to adjust his aesthetic theory according to the limitations set on it by historical and mythical legitimation. From this perspective—one is never sure if it is Iser's or Pater's—*Marius* is best seen as an anti-novel, strangely devoid of dramatic conflicts and recognizable personalities. Its punctured textuality is simply a blank slate, like Marius, who in turn is an intellectually promiscuous dilettante, motivated solely by the lust to experience multiple 'isms'. Like Gaston, Marius derives freedom from being an aporia made flesh, but again like him must suffer the consequences of his deconstructed subjectivity: he longs for an ideal of life, but the 'moment' he cherishes precludes any such ideal.

Likewise, *Imaginary Portraits* promises more than it can deliver. Each story is a self-contained 'moment', yet at the same time a symbolic refutation of the philosophy which celebrates the 'moment' for its own sake. The first story, 'A Prince of Courtly Painters', has as its subject not Watteau but melancholy, and the inability of art to eliminate it. Duplicating 'Apollo in Picardy', 'Denys l'Auxerrois' narrates the return of a figure from Greek myth, Dionysus, to medieval times. Beginning confidently as a *mise-en-abyme* when the priest decodes the story condensed onto the glass fragment, it ends as a self-consuming artefact when Denys is torn to pieces by the mob. 'Sebastian Van Storck' is an allegory of existential dead-ends in that Sebastian's abandoning aesthetic contemplation in favour of flexing his moral muscles short-circuits itself; he dies while rescuing a child, thereby disqualifying action as an alternative to inaction, which he had already rejected. 'Duke Carl of Dosenmold' commences with the discovery of bones, an opening which forecloses the possibility of the tale's theme, regeneration. The chaos of war both inspired and destroyed the Duke's ideal of contemplation. Thus Iser's examination concludes, reverberating with the implication that Pater had always been a seeker after something in art that was there in no satisfying measure, or not at all.

Apart from its tardy entry into English, there are a few other quibbles one could raise over Iser's discussion of the Paterian *œuvre*. The first is that Iser may be questioned on the logic he applies to Pater's aesthetic as it relates to his writings. He argues that because the aesthetic is self-contradictory, it follows that the fiction will also be self-contradictory. However, to state that the 'moment' causes the narrative ruptures in, say, *Imaginary Portraits* is not easily demonstrated. Iser uses expressions such as 'act out' and 'allegorise' to explain how the stories illustrate the fault of Pater's general aesthetic because there is no consistent and necessary connection between the two. What would Iser have written had Denys survived? Pater's intention to harmonize history and myth with art would not have changed. He would then be forced to admit that the story does

indeed achieve a reconciliation, a synthesis not possible under his characterization of Pater's aesthetic. Iser's wish to analyse Pater in terms of Pater is admirable, but it calls now and again for a somewhat more dexterous application.

The other issue concerns topics which Iser does not discuss. One is the problem of suffering. Although Pater sought to construct a mode of existence in which suffering would be sublimated into something beautiful, his writings often show that the experience of it has an immediacy which simply cannot be described as beautiful. In *Marius,* the passages depicting the horrors of the Coliseum are horrifying *and* stylistically alienated from those describing Marius's flighty strolls through the history of ideas. In these graphic passages, Pater seems to be suggesting that the philosophical problems of personal identity dissipate in the face of violent and sudden death. Like Morris Zapp, David Lodge's archetypal American professor, Pater's characters invite the reader to embrace a metaphysics of presence whenever a physical presence is threatened with termination. The complexities of that invitation can be teased out only if his writings are combed for their treatment of suffering.

The second issue concerns Pater's style, in particular his practice of euphuism. It is generally acknowledged by Pater's critics that his work exemplifies his ascetic aesthetic, duly informed as it was by his etymological expertise. But does his careful diction have the same effect on his reader that it had on himself ? He speaks in *Marius* of the pleasure one experiences upon deciphering a text built from an aesthetic of difficulty. Yet his prose often seems to be nothing more than picayune and pedantic. Its sentences, replete with lengthy and lumbering appositions, exhaust rather than excite, and the hapless reader would not be unjustified in feeling that, for all his rhetorical prowess, Pater did not accurately forsee the effect of his style on his audience, an oversight which may explain why he is no longer read outside of university classrooms, and probably never will be. No one but a dedicated Victorianist has the required patience to cut through his verbal jungles. Of course, this is not to say that one need be a Victorianist to approach Pater. Indeed, there is enough self-conscious indeterminacy in his literary corpus to give even the most addicted post-structuralist junkie a satisfying fix. The point is that for one so concerned with creating beautiful impressions, Pater did not seem to realize that his aesthetic principles often had anaesthetic side-effects.

Despite these murmurings, Iser's work cannot be judged on what it does not include. His examination of Pater is exceedingly well argued and well written. What is more, the timing of its (re)appearance is apt, for Pater wrote in an era analogous to our own, one searching for first principles yet simultaneously dubious of ever finding them. Both ages have spawned their respective prophets of certainty: the Victorians had Herbert Spencer; its post-modern grandchild has Terry Eagleton. And both have engendered their own nihilisms. Iser contends that Pater's response to the loss of metaphysical assurance prefigured those of many current authors. He also says that 'the parallels between his *fin de siècle* and our own fast-fading century make it all the more fitting that he should now emerge again from the shadows to which his aesthetic label has so long confined him' (p. x). Pater may not have discovered an unassailable sanction for his autonomous art, but these comments by Iser legitimate further investigations of his struggle to find one.

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PETER SEDGWICK

• **Dennis A.Foster,** *Confession and Complicity in Narrative* **(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987) 189 pp., £20.00**

'This is an essay about the motives for narrative.' Dennis Foster's study of narrative form presents itself in the form of an enquiry into the spheres of 'confession' and 'complicity'. The latter function *as* a path of entry into examining the ways in which meaning is controlled and orientated by a narcissistic sleight-of-hand on the part of the reader, the result being the creation of the imaginary persona of 'The Author'. It is this construct, Foster argues, which functions as a figure of authority and domination, a recourse whereby meaning is rendered external and 'other' by the reader, and it is this act of readerly complicity which in turn allows texts to be (falsely) regarded as objects embodying a message that requires drawing-out or, in the language of criticism, interpretation: the teasing-out of some intentional and self-authenticating meaning. Foster's position is one opposed to any conception of textuality as somehow embodying truth or truths that can be located in any particular instance of writing, the notion that the writer is in any sense an 'origin'. A quote from Lacan's 'Ecrits' at the head of the first chapter describes his viewpoint most succinctly: 'The function of language is not to inform but to evoke.' It is not a matter of a text bestowing meaning or truth upon the expectant reader, rather it is a case of the reader's response, with all the presuppositions on her or his part as to what will be found through the act of reading, that is the function of textuality. Thus 'writing', 'language', 'meaning', if one uses the terms in the formalist sense, are bound up with a series of a priori notions: the individual subject represented in the canonization of 'Great Authors', 'otherness', 'truth', the process of revealing knowledge about the author, about the nature and direction of narrative—to name a few. But, claims Foster, in the light of semiotics and what has come to be designated by the blanket term 'post-structuralism', our ideas about such things have been forced to change since 'all writing exists in a larger world of writing, of intertextuality…. The meaning of a work cannot be found within its own boundaries' (p. 1). In the light of this our understanding of what is 'special' about an author, about style and subject, must change. If authors are engaged in an on-going discourse prior to themselves which involves an essentially mimetic element (the intertextual), then what one finds in a text cannot help but exist in reference to an ever-broadening horizon of meaning inextricably bound to what has gone before and what comes after.

But why is confession the chosen subject of Foster's enquiry? Mainly it seems to be a matter of convenience: 'Confession may provide a form for exploring the motives for narrative. It seems clearly to be based upon a model of communication and yet it has been exploited by writers because it provides room for evasion' (p. 2). Confession is a prime, and more importantly eminently workable, example of the constant deferment of conclusive meaning that functions in a type of presentation that claims to deliver truth, to confess and in so doing reveal oneself 'in the flesh' to the expectant reader. Above all it

reveals the complicity of the reader's desire to locate the personality of the writer as central to that text, as both proclaimed subject and object. 'By calling on the listeners' need to understand, what they (the writers) can do is evoke in them (the readers) a sense of loss that is experienced as a desire for truth: that is, they can unsettle the listeners' sense of self-possession' (p. 3). Confession therefore discloses the necessity of going beyond the author's avowed intention and studying its effect, of accepting that 'it is a symptom of the narrator's desire to master his own story' (p. 4). The Author (as figure of authority) thus dissolves and we are left with a figure utilizing language in so far as it has developed out of the peculiarities of one life, yet a language that is never fully controllable, 'a discourse'. Reading thus becomes a conversation and confrontation between writer and reader. It is the reader's complicity that is the main object of Foster's analysis here because the requirement that all writing must 'make sense' bumps up against the evasive strategies of the confessional text. In this context the confessor, with implicit denial of the authenticity of the reader's sense of self-possession, becomes linked with a rebellion against rationality—with madness. The confessor, intentionally or otherwise, creates a written discourse that defies 'the obligation to understand' that someone trying to relate their own story or, as with Freud, the story of someone designated as neurotic, is attempting to present in the form of an ordered narrative. And when there is a failure to make sense 'like the sinner, Freud would rather admit to a personal failing than allow the possibility that the sustaining order of his universe might be a delusion' (p. 6). Because an assumption of intertextuality means that this is passed on to all narratives, Foster reaches the conclusion that desire is the motive for narrative in general: the failure to transmit knowledge on the part of the writer manifests itself in the reader's sense of incompleteness and ignorance, unwilling as the latter is to relinquish the illusion of authorship, which 'with its burden of passion is carried over to subsequent narratives. It helps explain why the story is so compelling' (p. 7). Such an account is, then, not merely concerned with confessions or books in general, it is also involved with questions of ontology, 'of self-presence, of being, [which] is, for western culture, a matter of life and death' (p. 10). At the core of Foster's thinking we thus find three central figures: Freud, Lacan, and Derrida, and with them a consequent concern with the nature of consciousness and the idea that it is not a self-evident result of individuality, but a consequence of the displacement inherent in the dynamics of Derridean 'différance'. Understanding evaporates, to be replaced by the intertextual intersubjectivity of shared discourse, hence: 'To a great extent our statements contain us, not we them' (p. 13).

One is then faced with a situation where the writer in confessing is arranging past sensations in such a way as to create a feeling of coherence, whilst simultaneously atoning for and re-living past guilt, and the reader, in the failure wholly to comprehend, becomes the subject of that guilt. Hence the reader becomes both narcissistic opponent and accomplice. Having got thus far Foster is obliged to set his own intentions in perspective:

> Just as this introduction has been less a marshalling of philosophic support than a reading of a tradition, the following chapters will not reveal the enduring presence of a previously undetected truth underlying all literature; rather it demonstrates an involvement in the process it examines, demonstrates that

reading is complicit in the motivations of writing. (p. 17)

Perhaps one should impose a few narcissistic, rationalist assumptions here in order to make sense of this. It is a matter of recognizing that a simplistic dualism such as that of writer/reader is no longer tenable: writers are 'always already' readers and vice versa. Complicity is inherent in the discourse itself.

So far I have concentrated solely on the first chapter of Foster's book, 'The confessional turn'. This is justifiable in that what follows can be rightly described as a working through of the principles expounded there. It is not my intention here to go through the many examples and readings that follow, his discussions of Hawthorne, Faulkner, Becket, James, and Augustine, but briefly to examine his reading of Kierkegaard's 'Diary of a seducer' (selected from the larger text of 'Either/Or'). What needs to be mentioned is that, as Foster points out himself, the texts he treats are not obviously confessional but repay reading in such terms, and in the light of the evasive nature of meaning, of sin, guilt and so on.

Kierkegaard's text is selected as one of Foster's 'Three exemplary readings' and serves admirably for his purposes in so far as it presents, in the form or guise of a 'diary', the figure of Johannes, intent on seducing a young woman through the utilization of social conventions, 'the conventional language of erotic love'. Thus we are presented with a dichotomy between the seducer's intentions and the woman's reading of his signs, a reading made possible only through our own of the confessional diary. But the diary itself is reputedly a transcription made secretly by one of Johannes's friends, 'A', which is then passed on to Victor Eremita, who is none other than the pseudonymous Kierkegaard. Unfortunately Foster fails to stress fully that the reader is, in a sense, reading at fifth-hand—consequently that there are no easy ways (even deceptively so) to approach a text that ensures the unsettling of the reader's sense of narrative continuity. He does mention that 'Authors and imitators, writers and readers are doubled and concealed within the "editions" of the text', but the point does not seem to be made that a constant process of deferment is at work in this piece that defies anyone to make rational sense of it, simply because one can never be completely sure as to 'who' one is talking about. Thus, who is confessing what? Is it really Johannes telling his diary of his desire or his deceit? Or 'A' his act of betrayal? Or Victor Eremita his complicity in that act? Or Kierkegaard his inability or unwillingness to be an authority over his own creation? 'Either/Or' would seem to be a particularly apt context in which to place such a literary dilemma. Indeed, Foster is more concerned to show that 'one element runs consistently through each "edition", based not on the details of the story but on a pattern of seduction…. The truly confessional nature of the narrative only emerges in "A"s response, the only text we have' (pp. 30–1). This in turn is passed 'from writer to reader, seducer to seduced' in a never-ending chain of complicity. But then Foster would perhaps be obliged to ask how he himself has been seduced into writing about such seductions, and one finds the inevitable displacement of his own desire not merely into the substance of his own text, but in its urge to constitute itself as writing and 'knowledge' concerned with its own grounds and status as such. Is, then, Foster's own text in some sense 'confessional'? At this point one reaches the inevitable question of the status of narrative, of delineating the boundaries and limits of a form that both provides the grounds for and is inseparable from

itself. This is why Foster's own text inevitably (and unwillingly) concretizes at the point where 'A' is selected as somehow bearing the mark of 'truth'—'the only text we have'—and where it still refers to an authority of '"A"'s response' as external to itself. Moreover, this is why all knowledge claims must bear the mark of Foster's modesty in recognizing his 'involvement…process' under examination. Such a text is useful in that it raises questions of reading in such a way as to highlight its own problematics, and also in that it is able to argue with a self-conscious rigour in the shadow of its own instability.

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References
These should be numbered consecutively in the text, thus: 'According to a recent theory,[4] …', and collected at the end of the paper in the following styles, for journals and books respectively:

J.Hartley and J.Fiske, 'Myth-representation: a cultural reading of *News at Ten'*, *Communication Studies Bulletin,* 4 **(**1977**)**, pp. 12–33. C.Norris, *The Deconstructive Turn* (London and New York: Methuen, 1983).

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Wiktionary

isomorphic

English

WOTD – 6 November 2013

Etymology

From *iso-* + *-morphic*.

Pronunciation

- (*UK*) enPR: īsəmô'fĭk, IPA^(key): /ˌaɪ.səˈmɔː.fɪk/
- (*US*) enPR: īsōmôr'fĭk, IPA^(key): /ˌaɪ.soʊˈmɔɹ.fɪk/
- Audio (US) (file)
- Audio (AU) (file)
- Rhymes: -ɔː(r)fɪk

Adjective

isomorphic (*not comparable*)

1. (*mathematics*) Related by an <u>isomorphism</u>; having a structure-preserving one-to-one <u>correspondence</u>.

   - **2003**, Bernd Siegfried Walter Schröder, page 254

     *Let A, B be the ordered sets in Figure 10.3. Let C be the direct product of infinitely many copies of the two element chain **2**. Then A^C is **isomorphic** to B^C, but A is not isomorphic to B.*

2. (*biology*) Having a <u>similar</u> structure or function to something that is not related <u>genetically</u> or through <u>evolution</u>.

   - **1993**, Marcus Jacobson, *Foundations of Neuroscience*, page 106

     The fact that different structures can be shown to be functionally **isomorphic** implies that they are analogous, not homologous.

3. Having identical relevant <u>structure</u>; being structure-preserving while undergoing certain <u>invertible</u> <u>transformations</u>.

   - **1981**, John Lyons, *Language and Linguistics: An Introduction*, page 60

     For example, in so far as written and spoken English are **isomorphic** (i.e. have the same structure), they are the same language: there is nothing but their structure that they have in common.

Usage notes

- In mathematics, this adjective can be used in phrases like "A and B are isomorphic", "A is isomorphic to B", and, less commonly, "A is isomorphic with B".

Antonyms

- <u>anisomorphic</u>
- <u>nonisomorphic</u>

Coordinate terms

- <u>anisomorphic</u>
- <u>heteromorphic</u>
- <u>homomorphic</u>

Derived terms

- <u>anisomorphic</u>
- <u>isomorphically</u>

Related terms

- <u>isomorph</u>
- <u>isomorphism</u>

- isomorphous

Translations

(*mathematics*) related by an isomorphism

- Catalan: isomòrfic
- Chinese:

  Mandarin: 同構 (zh), 同构 (zh) (tónggòu)

- Czech: izomorfní (cs)
- Dutch: isomorf (nl)
- Finnish: isomorfinen
- French: isomorphe (fr)
- German: isomorph (de)
- Hungarian: izomorf (hu)
- Irish: iseamorfach
- Japanese: 同型の (dōkei no)

- Latin: isomorpha *f*
- Lithuanian: izomorfinis
- Polish: izomorficzny
- Portuguese: isomorfo (pt), isomórfico (pt)
- Russian: изомо́рфный (ru) (izomórfnyj)
- Serbo-Croatian:

  Cyrillic: изоморфно
  Roman: izomorfno

- Spanish: isomorfo
- Swedish: isomorf (sv)

(*biology*) having a similar structure or function without genetic relation

- Catalan: isomòrfic
- Finnish: isomorfinen

- Irish: iseamorfach

having identical relevant structure

- Catalan: isomòrfic
- Finnish: isomorfinen

- Irish: iseamorfach
- Swedish: isomorf (sv)

Further reading

- **isomorphic keyboard** on Wikipedia.

Wiktionary

isomorphism

Contents

English

Etymology

iso- + *-morphism*

Pronunciation

- Audio (US) (file)

Noun

isomorphism (*plural* **isomorphisms**)

1. Similarity of form

    - **1984** Brigitte Asbach-Schnitker, "Introduction", *Mercury or The Secret and Swift Messenger*, →ISBN.

        The postulated **isomorphism** between words and things constitutes the characterizing feature of all philosophically based universal languages.

    1. (*biology*) the similarity in form of organisms, which may be due to convergent evolution or shared genetic background, e.g. an algae species in which the haploid and diploid life stages are indistinguishable based on morphology.

2. (*chemistry*) the similarity in the <u>crystal</u> structures of similar <u>chemical</u> <u>compounds</u>

- **1874** C. Rammelsberg, "<u>Crystallographic and chemical relations of the natural sulphides, arsenides, and sulpharsenides</u>" (http://books.google.co.uk/books?id=jOUE AAAAQAAJ&pg=PA197#v=onepage&q&f=true), *The Chemical News and Journal of Physical Science*, page 197.

    The **isomorphism** of compounds does not prove the **isomorphism** of their respective constituents.

3. (*sociology*) the similarity in the structure or <u>processes</u> of different <u>organizations</u>
2. A one-to-one correspondence

1. (*group algebra*) A <u>bijection</u> *f* such that both *f* and its <u>inverse</u> f^{-1} are <u>homomorphisms</u>, that is, structure-preserving mappings.
2. (*computer science*) a <u>one-to-one</u> <u>correspondence</u> between all the <u>elements</u> of two <u>sets</u>, e.g. the <u>instances</u> of two <u>classes</u>, or the <u>records</u> in two <u>datasets</u>
3. (*category theory*) A <u>morphism</u> which has an inverse; the composition of the morphism and its inverse yields either one of two identity morphisms (depending on the order of composition).

Synonyms

- (*in category theory*): <u>iso</u>

Antonyms

- <u>anisomorphism</u>

Related terms

- <u>isomorphic</u>
- <u>isomorphous</u>

Translations

the similarity in form of organisms of different ancestry	
- Bulgarian: изоморфи́зъм *m* (izomorfízǎm)	- Portuguese: isomorfismo ^(pt) *m*
- Czech: izomorfismus *m*	- Russian: изоморфи́зм ^(ru) *m* (izomorfízm)
- Finnish: isomorfismi ^(fi)	- Serbo-Croatian: izomorfizam ^(sh) *m*
- French: isomorphisme ^(fr) *m*	- Spanish: isomorfismo *m*
- Hungarian: izomorfizmus ^(hu)	- Tagalog: kasanyuan
- Italian: isomorfismo ^(it) *m*	- Ukrainian: ізоморфі́зм *m* (izomorfízm)

bidirectionally structure-preserving bijection	
- Chinese: Mandarin: 同構 ^(zh), 同构 ^(zh) (tónggòu) - Czech: izomorfismus *m*	- Finnish: isomorfismi ^(fi) - German: Isomorphismus ^(de) *m* - Hungarian: izomorfia - Icelandic: einsmótun *f*

- Danish: isomorfi *c*
- Dutch: isomorfisme ^(nl) *n*
- Esperanto: izomorfio
- Kazakh: изоморфизм (izomorfizm)
- Portuguese: isomorfismo ^(pt) *m*
- Spanish: isomorfismo *m*

See also

- **Isomorphism** on Wikipedia.
- Isomorphism (https://www.encyclopediaofmath.org/index.php/Isomorphism) on Encyclopedia of Mathematics
- isomorphism (https://ncatlab.org/nlab/show/isomorphism) on *n*Lab
- Isomorphism (http://mathworld.wolfram.com/Isomorphism.html) on Wolfram MathWorld
- Graph Isomorphism (http://mathworld.wolfram.com/GraphIsomorphism.html) on Wolfram MathWorld
- Natural Isomorphism (http://mathworld.wolfram.com/NaturalIsomorphism.html) on Wolfram MathWorld

Jean-Yves Pellegrin

"Only the Conversation Matters"
An interview with Richard Powers

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Jean-Yves Pellegrin

"Only the Conversation Matters"

An interview with Richard Powers

1   From Three Farmers on Their Way to a Dance (1985) to The Echo Maker (2006), American novelist Richard Powers explores the effects of modern science and technology on human lives. He teaches in the Creative Writing M.F.A. program at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign. He was elected a Fellow of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences in 1998, has been awarded a MacArthur Fellow (1989) and is the recipient of a Lannan Literary Award (1999).

2   Jean-Yves Pellegrin is Associate Professor of American literature at the University of Paris-Sorbonne (Paris IV). He has translated two novels by Richard Powers.

3   *J-Y. PELLEGRIN: Many critics describe you as a novelist who writes "content-intensive" books, but your novels might just as well be described as form-intensive. Your narratives obey strong structural constraints. The Gold Bug Variations is patterned on the overall configuration of Bach's Goldbergs. Many of your novels contain embedded story frames. Structural symmetry is central to the composition of Three Farmers on their Way to a Dance… So, to what extent do you consider these tight structures as a means of triggering ideas and inspiration? Do you see structure as a "story-making machine," as Georges Perec had it?*

4   R. POWERS. I think that most people's gut reaction is that structure somehow limits what you are able to do with narrative; it forecloses on possibilities. I think just the opposite: for certain kinds of compositional temperament, constraint is liberating. Finding the right form for certain content frees up infinite possibility that is absent when you can head in any direction. The artists that I most admire have discovered that inverse relationship between constraint and freedom: the more you constrain the outline of possibility, the richer the possibilities for filling in that outline. The trick lies in finding the specific constraint that is the most appropriate for the content. The constraint cannot be arbitrary, or it won't release you thematically to create. You mention for instance *The Gold Bug Variations*. My challenge in laying the groundwork for that book was to find a way to free up a story about variations, about how everything - all of life's limitless complexity - can come from almost nothing. The model for this unlimited variation, of course, is the genetic code, where all creatures on earth achieve this incredible diversity of form and function, all based on the same alphabet of four nucleotides. So I had to find a way of stripping down the basic material of the story to the smallest starting particulars in order to release the possibility of creating variation in every available literary mode. All of my novels have sought, in their formal constraint, the same kind of structural mirror that would release the themes for their stories. Each of the nine books finds its generating principle in a structure that is quite different from any of the other books. Each one has involved starting from scratch. Each book has had to teach me how to write it. The act of composing a book has been the act of reinventing myself as a writer every time.

5   *J-Y. P.: So ideas come first, and you look for the most appropriate form to express them?*

6   R. P.: I have never made a huge distinction between ideas and emotional urgencies. The new book that is going to be published this year in the United States[1] deals with the subject of neuroscience. It was wonderful to research contemporary neuroscience, and to read these researchers who are demonstrating the necessary interdependence of the brain activity that we would typically call high-level cognition – reason and logic – with the brain processes of emotional or visceral response. The one cannot exist without the other. Any starting idea also contains a visceral urgency, a need to solve some aspect of existence, some aspect of the world we have created. But I think you are right. If we make a broad distinction between top-down composition and bottom-up composition – top-down commencing with the terrain, theme, the abstract urgency, and the formal shape that drives this story; and bottom-up commencing with persons, faces, voices, and local events– I'm much more of a top-down writer by temperament. My process of writing consists of refining my imagination from the top down until I have enough sense of the story's internal urgency to begin to compose from the bottom up. The

first process releases the second. That means I have never succeeded in writing a book on a first draft. The first draft is rather the experiment I run to see where the tunnel from the top down and the tunnel from the bottom up are going to meet. Revision is where I figure out how to connect the two.

7 *J.-Y. P.: This intimate connection between content and structure makes a sense of profound system-like unity emerge from your novels. Is it correct to say that this places your work much closer to the aesthetics of early twentieth-century modernism than to the poetics of fragmentation and open-endedness that prevailed in the arts and literature at a later period?*

8 R. P.: That is an interesting point. I have often wondered if my connection does not even predate modernism in some way, if these books don't somehow resemble works of nineteenth-century encyclopaedic social survey, like a survey in a Dickens novel on, let's say, the social effect of the factory system or the law courts. What are the large-scale social institutions going to do to the characters? Every element of plot in such a book is somehow dominated by the desire to reveal this relationship; the plot multiplies and proliferates, but the book is strongly thematically dominated by its central concern. I think that is a risky compositional project these days, in the early twenty-first century, because we have become quite comfortable with the idea of the organic text, the open-ended text, the text that does not resolve its internal contradictions and that finds its aesthetics in a fragmentational roughness that is perceived to be analogical to the mode of existence we have created in the information age. But I would like to have things both ways. I want to tell a story that turns back on itself and creates this perpetual thematic enrichment and structural coherence, when the reader steps back and asks what has generated the narrative and how to make sense of all the disparate elements in the story; at the same time, at the level of scene and character, I also want narratives that generate some sense of suspense, surprise, and open-ended possibility. Do my books create a wholly thematically-resolved universe? I don't think so. Even though they are dominated by a set of themes, by turning those themes over and over again, they produce their own sense of runaway transformation. With luck, the reader will reach a moment when he feels that, no matter what underlying themes govern life, resonant particulars are always going to escape, transcend, or transform that order. It is one thing to say that every species on earth is generated by sequences of the same four nucleotides; but when you look at the spectrum of twelve million species, you can't see the family resemblance anymore; variations somehow escape their thematic control. Here's what I would consider an ideal response to my books: the reader begins in a sense of chaotic open-endedness – this story could go anywhere. He then gradually accumulates an awareness of the unifying material – the system-like quality that you mentioned, the constraining and all-shaping theme. Progressing through variation, the reader then feels the story pass yet one more threshold point where the variations escape the theme, and narrative once again recovers a place where anything can happen.

9 *J.-Y. P.: The encyclopaedic purpose, the social survey that you mention, is part of the function you assign to your fiction, which is to give the reader what you call "the big picture, the aerial view of how things work." Up to a certain point, this is what other writers with encyclopaedic leanings, like Don DeLillo or Thomas Pynchon, also do. But while these novelists suggest that the larger picture can only be approached asymptotically, if at all, and that it will finally dissipate into noise or blankness as soon as we reach for it, you seem to insist on making the big picture precipitate before the eyes of the reader. Do you think that literature has the power to salvage the "aerial view" from the exponentially increasing complexity of the information age?*

10 R. P.: I don't believe that art can solve existence, but I do believe that art can render us more capable of mapping our way through experience. It can make us suppler, more open to surprise possibility, more aware of our myopia, and more attuned to processes that are larger than ourselves. Think of the revolutions that happened in a number of physical sciences in our lifetime. In the past, the scientific project dreamed of perfect understanding through reductionism: as we got better and better at making our map, our empirical descriptions would finally arrive at a picture of reality that was isomorphic with reality itself. That dream died. It died in a number of different and very interesting ways. But this Laplacian notion – that

you could write down the differential equations of all moving particles in a space and predict the exact configuration of that space sometime in the future – died. That is no longer the goal of even the most vigorous of empirical reductionists. Instead, the vision of mainstream science now involves a richer understanding of the way complex systems work, of the way turbulence works, and of the way chaos propagates out of order while still enfolding strange kinds of hidden order inside what seem to be totally chaotic systems. So we have recast our notion of the relationship between formal order and disorder. This shifts our model for knowledge away from simple formulaic prediction towards rich simulation. We can best understand ecosystems by understanding some of the mathematics behind self-organization, emerging order and turbulence, and incorporating that math into models that, instead of trying to master reality in some kind of formally reductive way, instead recreate the systems that they describe by simulating them. Scientific knowledge has become more dynamic because the mapping is dynamic. As a writer, I have taken away from that revolution a belief in the bi-directional influence of local upon global and global upon local. The novelists that you mention, the artists to whom I owe the largest aesthetic debt, had this sense that as the local approached the big picture, the big picture would recede away from them, would disperse into unknowability. New scientific paradigms confirm that the local cannot map the global in a reduced and complete and consistent way, but nevertheless can understand something about the way local phenomena develop into large-scale event, and the way large-scale phenomena feed back downwards into the local. To put this in literary terms, we, as individuals can - even as we bump up in our ignorant ways against ourselves, our friends, family, loved ones and enemies, and against the conditions of our local systems - momentarily glimpse what it is that brought about the conditions for our local existence, and perhaps reach a better understanding of the relationship between our small existence and these larger historical conditions, and set in motion new historical processes.

11   *J.-Y. P.: The idea that you must be content with a glimpse of the big picture is also what your novels point to when describing the failure of all encyclopaedic endeavours: in Three Farmers, Sander's photographic encyclopaedia is doomed to incompleteness. In Plowing the Dark, the "Weather Room" proves unable to make long-term previsions, and in Gold Bug, the genetic code never allows you to say what evolution's next move will look like. All these encyclopaedic attempts are limited by the very fact that they have a fixed structure, that they have frames and edges, aren't they?*

12   R. P.: That's right. The failure of the encyclopaedic system to make a map equivalent to the place it maps resembles the failure of the model of control and mastery. This notion that somehow we can take dominion over these huge complex systems is doomed to failure. But a newfound understanding of the limits to control can ultimately lead to a humbling kind of connective discovery. Even as we strain for a kind of physical mastery, a knowledge that will give us control over time and space, the process itself leads us to how much more complicated, and how much more sensitive to turbulence and to local changes, those accretions really are. But that realization feeds back into the sense of local life being much richer and more surprising, and perhaps more consequential than the control model might ever have allowed. The place we are mapping is much richer and stranger than our hubris ever imagined, and that, in turn, creates a newfound need for reverence and ecological thinking on the part of all local protagonists.

13   *J.-Y. P.: Speaking of control and mastery, your narratives strike me as being very much in that vein though. They look highly controlled; nothing is left to chance. Each part fits neatly in the whole as a small touch in the big picture, or like a living cell relating to all the others in an organism. How much room do such tightly controlled narratives leave to the reader, what amount of leeway does he get as an interpreter? Or to put it differently, how do you steer clear of the pitfalls of didacticism?*

14   R. P.: I think in a number of ways. I would love my books to seem like Mondrian at thirty meters, and then like Jackson Pollock at thirty centimetres. From far away, they may seem as if they are kinds of crystalline perfections dominated by an architectonic sense, but then you get closer and start to see the peculiarities, the fractal breaking, and the rippling of these

structures. The protagonists in the stories, who are searching for a view of the world, find that the telescope is somehow pointed back upon them, and the knowledge that they succeed in acquiring is always situated, always contingent and qualified, and far messier than they ever anticipated. Ideally, these books leave their readers tinged with that nervousness of thinking, "This is an essay, a clean worldview that I am gradually closing in on." But there comes some moment in the story where the decisions, the character interaction, or the milieu shifts into an unexpected place, and the turbulence inside of the order is revealed. I want the narrative development to pull the rug out from underneath the reader's feet. The reader, who has been thinking up until this moment that he was reading one kind of book, now needs to completely reassemble all theories he had about what kind of book he is reading.

15   *J.-Y. P.: Still, when first reading Three Farmers, I was struck by the presence of what I viewed as instructions to the reader. I'm referring to those chapters in which the virtually lecturing narrator quotes at length from Walter Benjamin's The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction, and I thought that these passages were like captions accompanying the whole picture and telling me how I was supposed to look at it.*

16   R. P.: True. There are discursive elements in this novel, essayistic components. The story *does* contain factual knowledge; its rhetoric *does* employ rationality and formal argument. Each of the books employs the "didactic" in very different ways. *Three Farmers* employs it most overtly, cast as a series of almost university-like lectures. That book affords a wonderful case in point, because you read along thinking, I'm in some kind of burlesque, some kind of comic historical novel about these young men bumping up against history, making their way, and it is all very personal and very local. And all of a sudden you are in an essay about World War I, and following the essay, you shift into some kind of late twentieth-century domestic or personal quest novel. And there seems to be no common aesthetic component among these three. But little by little, these inimical narrative frames start to speak to each other. They are nested, or they form a kind of triangulation, inventing one another. And as these disparate frames draw closer, the reader might say, "Ah! This book is something about the way that didactic knowledge is not enough, experiential knowledge is not enough, and the blundering comic, ironic mode of knowing is not enough either; they are all somehow reciprocal processes, dependent on each other." And yet, as the modes weave even tighter and tighter, and you approach the end thinking these narrative frames will reveal their ultimate connective principle, the end of the book recasts that relationship, and you are left again with the need to reassemble your ideas about the narrative that you yourself have been creating and participating in.

17   This is precisely the way that the human brain creates the narrative of self. Introspectively, we feel that we are whole and solid. We have a sense of a unitary existence and personality. We go through the world, feeling coherent and continuous. And even in the face of extraordinary complications and interruptions, we find ways of justifying and restoring our sense of self. In fact, this entire construction of the unitary self is a fabrication. There are literally two or three hundred different kinds of independent processing modules distributed in the brain, interacting in ways that produce and sustain the emergence of consciousness. If one gets damaged or the network gets interrupted, the person suffering the damage might look very different to anyone on the outside. But he may still feel continuous and identical to himself. The books also function as complex, distributed systems: one voice inside a whole may insist, "Listen to me, I'm the head." Another says, "Listen to me, I'm the heart." Yet another says, "Listen to me, I'm the body, the sex drive," or "Trust to me, I'm the historical repository of memory and wisdom." We are complicated, we are fractured, we are multiple, we are reciprocal feedback processes constantly turning back on themselves, reinventing themselves, reconstructing. So, why shouldn't a book be as complicated as a human being? Why shouldn't it, on occasion, assert different kinds of ways of knowing the world? None of these ways is sufficient unto itself; only the conversation matters. The narrative that completely removes would-be essayistic knowledge is also a kind of sleight of hand. The thing to bear in mind about every book, even these books that curiously have this kind of disembodied lecturing voice, is that fiction always knows the world through situated, focalized, shared, distributed, reciprocal

processes. When a novel presents an idea, that idea always arises through a focalizer. What counts is not so much the idea about the world as the *relationship* between the thought and the character who thinks it. When someone asserts a fact about the world, they assert a fact about themselves, about how the world looks from their vantage point. So, again, the essayistic elements of the books, these factual litanies, are also always portraits of their focalizers – human beings who are historical products and who have deep emotional investments, people who need the world to look a certain way.

18   *J.-Y. P.: Don't the essayistic elements of your fiction pose the question of its transitivity? In Galatea 2.2, for instance, your namesake, trying to relate the story of his own family, says "I felt myself taking dictation, plans for a hypothetical Powers World that meant to explain in miniature where history had left me" (162). If you see your books as explanatory miniatures of the world at large, does it mean that they are imitative forms of that world in the same way as nineteenth-century realistic or naturalistic novels meant to mirror and explain the world we are familiar with?*

19   R. P.: I don't think so. Again, I think the move has been away from this notion of the static map that fixes a miniaturized correlative of the world and towards the notion of rich, networked simulation. Knowledge can no longer pretend to be cleaner than the world, but must also partake of the same kind of confusing, emergent, and unpredictable behaviour as the world. The knowledge contained in a book is provably as messy as the world; if you go back to that book a second time, it's never the same book. The simulation is still running. You, the reader, and I, the writer, are both part of this ongoing simulation, a historical process that is never fixed in time. So Powers World is itself always a kind of messy simulation that continues to dismantle and create itself in more ways than the creator of the simulation can anticipate. *Galatea* tells the story about our desire to create a machine that would be capable of understanding human story. But such a machine would necessarily have to evade the formal constraints programmed into its knowledge base, because if it didn't, it would never be capable of understanding all that is surprising about humans. Up until now, a lot of critical attention has been focused on the programmatic nature of my books, although the books themselves insist that the program is never enough. Something in every narrative always strives to evade or exceed the formal constraints of its frame.

20   *J.-Y. P.: This reflection in all your novels on the limits inherent in the program or the organizing structure suggests that, even if you're not so openly metafictional as other American writers of your generation, you constantly ponder on the limits of fiction, on what it can do and cannot do as an artefact. In the epigraph to Plowing the Dark, you quote from Auden's "In Memory of William Butler Yeats": "For poetry makes nothing happen: it survives / In the valley of its saying." And the lines contrast with the second part of the epigraph, an excerpt from Gertrude Stein's The Autobiography of Alice B. Toklas, which expresses the artist's – namely Picasso's – belief that art does make something happen, that it can make its wildest fantasies come true. Do you feel closer to Auden or to Picasso?*

21   R. P.: In the Gertrude Stein excerpt, Picasso and his friends are walking on a street in Paris during the war, and they see their first camouflaged cannon, and they say, "Wait a minute! The Army got their idea from us, from Cubism. We've changed the nature of warfare, inadvertently." I feel in the quote a mixture of surprise, shame, and pride. On the one hand, art, in creating its simulations, removes itself from the world of experience, a world it seemingly can't touch or alter in any significant way. But on the other hand, by removing himself from the world of experience and living inside the simulation of art, the reader opens himself to unforeseeable transformations that can alter the way he re-enters the world of pragmatics and material facts. The mind reserves the ability to operate upon all outside laws, and yet fiction operates upon the mind. So there is a chain of influence upon matter that propagates completely unpredictably.

22   I'm intrigued by the question of how metafictional my books are. If you define metafiction as that move within a work of art that calls attention to its artifice and deliberately lifts the experience of the art out of the level of complete imaginative identification into a meta-level awareness of the formal program, I would say my books are more difficult to recognize at

face value as being metafictional, because the movement between the frames that encourage visceral identification and the frames that compel meta-awareness are less distinct. You can't always be certain which side of that divide you are on. These books try to trouble the distinction between traditional mimetic fiction and conscious formal manipulation. They try to show that the world can't easily be partitioned into "thinking" and "feeling."

23   *J.-Y. P.: Is it one of the reasons why poetry is so present in your writing either through direct quotes or indirect references? Do you see poetic writing and lyricism as ways to blur that distinction between thinking and feeling?*

24   R. P.: I suppose, by many measures, I'm much more temperamentally attuned to poetry than to prose fiction. I wrote poetry privately for many years before writing my first story. My area of concentration in my literary studies was modernist poetry. It's a false binary, of course, but I incline more to lyricism than to narrative. I am much more viscerally attracted, both as a writer and as a reader, to a story that calls attention to itself as a verbal performance than to a story that tries to make its prose transparent.

25   Every one of my books uses lyric poems as prominent intertexts, quoting everything from the barroom doggerel of Kipling and Robert Service to the Psalms to German lieder to (my most frequent use) modernist poetry in English such as Yeats, Eliot, Stevens, and Roethke. And *Gold Bug* employed the device of having the narrator actually write poems herself. Left to my own devices, I probably would have never gotten into the story-telling business, and would have contended myself entirely with the musical and prosodic power of words. But as Yeats says, the fullest rewards come when we push towards our natural opposites…

26   Contemporary fiction is dominated by one immense aesthetic prohibition: show, don't tell. Lyricism goes against this law, and in most fictional quarters, poetic writing is highly suspect. But for me, lyricism is not at all opposed to story, but rather, a kind of narrative expectation that appeals to those parts of the brain that are almost pre-cognitive, the feeling regions rather than the reasoning regions. I would like to show how story knowledge and poetic knowledge – narrative feeling and lyrical feeling – are each part of a larger way of apprehending the world that novels can uniquely get to, when nothing is off limits.

27   *J.-Y. P.: I would like to shift gears slightly and ask you whether you would agree with the notion that, in your novels, fiction vacillates between commitment, especially political commitment, and a kind of retreat from the world, "calling attention to itself as a verbal performance.*

28   R. P.: I believe that the books do vacillate between outward psychic impulses and inward ones, but in trying to destabilize the boundary between the mimetic and the metafictional, the books also attempt to show the inseparability of those two impulses. Each of us continuously engages and disengages from life, retreating long enough to reformulate ourselves and then going back once more into the breach, even from one moment to the next. The two impulses are not only inseparable: the desire to fashion, alter, confront and remake the world has, as its generator, the ability to stand above or aside, and look at things as an outsider. So from one moment to the next, individual characters in these books will vacillate between those inward and outward impulses, conscripting art as an ally in both the world-evading and the world-changing processes.

29   *J.-Y. P.: This dual impulse is also what the opening words of Galatea refer to, applying it to fictions themselves rather than to the characters in fictions: "It was like so, but wasn't." This is how traditional Persian tales begin. Doesn't it point to the ambiguous nature and power of fictions? Fictional worlds bear a resemblance to the world, and in this respect they can say something about it, and perhaps change our way of looking at it. But at the same time, they really differ from the world; they don't really mean to say anything about it, and are at best (or at worst) just make-believe.*

30   R. P.:I wish I had remembered that line earlier, when we were talking about how metafictional the books are, because there you have my narrative posture in a nutshell: I want you to read the story I'm about to tell as a perfectly mimetic, realistic fiction, but I also want you to read it simultaneously as an insufficient analogy, as something that is not quite what it seems to be. Is the representational glass half full or half empty? Is fiction capable of simulating a world in a way that is as rich and as strange as the outside world, yet somehow more

comprehensible, or is it just "a shadow of a shadow of a shadow," a failed attempt to articulate some truth that will always remain well beyond any representation's capacity to name it? The crisis of representation is not unique to fiction. It is the crisis of being alive. We know intellectually that the map is not the place, that any utterance we make about the world is a bastard, partial, insufficient, faulty, and failed representation. Something in us knows that we live in this inescapable gap, this unavoidable *différance*. And yet, at the same time, the simple knowledge of that futility drives us to constantly revise our stories. And in fact, fiction has sometimes proven to be devastatingly effective in transforming the world *out there*, the world that representation can never quite get to. The map changes the place whether or not it suffices to represent it.

31   *J.-Y. P.: If the map can change the place, it seems at times that you wish it also had the power to become the place itself, as if, like Ebesen in* Plowing the Dark, *you had dreams of making the golem of art and fiction come to life. But, simultaneously, your novels convey the sense that, at the end of the day, when the story is over, the brick wall onto which the fiction has been projected becomes all brick wall again. Is that what you refer to in* Galatea *as "the loss fiction fails to repair"?*

32   R. P.: I want the golem to come to life. Sure. Guilty as charged. But the thing is: there is no "end of the day." There is just the next desire, the next attempted golem. That process of aspiring to make something come alive, to have our limited understanding of the world blaze into full-fleshed life, to have these variations on a theme step up and become some new living thing, is as inexorable as it is doomed. It fails, it breaks down, it falls apart. But the process doesn't stop there. It spills over to the next insufficient representation, the next implementation. What is the famous Beckett line? *"Ever tried. Ever failed. No matter. Try Again. Fail again. Fail better."*

33   As for the loss fiction fails to repair, I think it is the loss of growing. We are always falling away from the story we once thought about ourselves. Every experience shatters the map that we have made. And yet, somehow, the fossil of that earlier story stays with us. As we become something else, we yearn to grasp what we once were. And even that nostalgic impulse slowly falls away from us and becomes some new revision. We live in the gap between yesterday's story and today's story. All these processes are loose in time, being copied, destroyed, and revived. Stories cannot keep us from death, and yet they are our only protection against the knowledge of death. The curse of consciousness is to know your own end. But the amazing thing about story is that endings are the source of meaning. When we read the last page of a book, it retroactively changes all the pages that came before. So rather than putting an end to meaning, endings generate meaning, retroactively lending significance to all the stories that we try to tell.

34   *J.-Y. P.: The yearning for what we once were – the nostalgic remembrance of things past – is one of your important themes. Many of your novels have this elegiac tone to them. It is palpable in* The Time or our Singing; Prisoner's Dilemma *pays tribute to the dead father*; The Gold Bug Variation*s reads like an anamnesis…*

35   R. P.: Yes, absolutely. Every single book I have written has been tinged with the desire to come to terms with memory, the inescapability of memory, and the sometimes terrifying, sometimes liberating paradox of memory, namely, that retrieving the memory of an event already changes it. The brain that does the remembering is not the brain that did the storing. In a sense, the only thing you can remember is your last retrieval of the event, and each calling up in a new context changes what was stored there. And each loss of memory is a premonition of the ultimate loss of memory, the final dissolution. So I guess we have nothing else but "Once upon a time," and "It was so, but it wasn't so," and "Here, in what happened, is what might happen next."

Notes

1 Richard Powers, *The Echo Maker*. New York: Farrar, Straus & Giroux, October 2006.

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Jean-Yves Pellegrin, « "Only the Conversation Matters" », *European journal of American studies* [Online], Vol 2, No 1 | 2007, document 2, Online since 27 April 2007, connection on 14 February 2016. URL : http://ejas.revues.org/1145 ; DOI : 10.4000/ejas.1145

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Editor's notes This interview took place at the Sorbonne on the 20th of February 2006. Many thanks to Richard Powers for his exceptional kindness and patience.

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Mystique in Arabic Poetics: An Inquiry into Cultural Dominant

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Abstract

This paper argues that the paucity of innovative work in Arabic critical tradition is a ramification of an aesthetic of conformity to the dominant patterns in Arabia. The preoccupation with specific aspects in poetics does not contribute to the framing of intellectual debates past and present, but discloses an exclusionary discourse with a narrow scheme of knowledge. Such a limitation in epistemology is symptomatic of a wider one at the level of formative ideals. The present article attempts to unfold the crisis in this epistemology by problematizing the mainstream poetics of culture and seeking new possibilities of reflection beyond the edges of definition.

Keywords

1. Critical Assumptions

The critical anchors of poetics are cast into the moorings of ancient Arabic poetry as a repertoire of cultural heritage to be maintained and emulated by succeeding generations. Endowed with a canonical status, this poetry forms a "model for correct usage," while its "discourse principles and imagery" are a "yardstick by which later critics of a conservative bent judged the 'naturalness' of Arabic poetry" (Allen, 1989: p. 364). The internal harmony of the poem bespeaks an ingrained enchantment with fascinating expressions and splendid tropes, so does the concern do with classical tributes of the genius of craftsmanship and grandeur of style. In addition to the strident emphasis on poetic lineage, ancient Arabic poetry enjoys a privileged position in Arabia and is, thus, taken as definitive of the scope and interests of subsequent critical activities.

Arabic poetics conceives of the poem as an autonomous entity, an aesthetically motivated totality with an overwhelming sensuous power. Premised on the notion of *muhâkâh* "imitation", art is not isomorphic with real-

ity, nor is it a duplication of the raw flux or flow of actuality. Rather, art is a distinct order of imaginative activity that is both energized with its own inner life and free from extraneous influences (Ismail, 1922: p. 335). In *Arabic Poetry in the Golden Age*, Vincete Cantarino (1975) explains the imitative theory of Arabic poetry: "Imitation was not naturally concerned with either the intrinsic moral or real values or acts, but only insofar as they were the cause of an aesthetic delight in the soul of the percipient one" (86). The poet may draw on material from the external world of reality, but with his artistic genius he weaves "another life" of artistic novelty and wondrous beauty beyond the quotidian of actuality (99). Therefore, delving into the aesthetic and elucidating its rapturous power are the main focal points in traditional Arabic criticism.

The preoccupation with lyrical properties and intrinsic aspects aims at heightening one's perception of the myriad forms of beauty in art. The sobriety of expression and subtlety of figurative language are thought of as sources of pleasure, for instance. Because the ancient Arabic poem is characterized by a "profound congruence between vocal and acoustic values of speech" and "emotional and affective content" (Adonis, 2003, *Poetics* 14), poetic felicity is defined as an orchestrated symphony of internal tributaries-rhyme, rhythm, similes, metaphors, wording, rhetorical devises, and stylistic embellishments (Van Gelder, 1982, p. 28). Every formalistic aspect is perceived as contributing to deepening the overall effect of artistic ecstasy.

Besides, Arabic poetics exhibits a massive interest in form as the essence of creativity. This concern springs from the deeply rooted concept of "unity of content and diversity of expression" (Adonis, 2003, *Poetics* 14); the conceptual contents of poetry usually relate to matters common to one and all, while formalistic techniques are singular. The architectonic of the artefact is distinctive of artists. What distinguishes poems is not as much the profundity of thought as the verbal dexterity and moving lyricism of the poetic feel and flair of the deployed forms; that is, how the poem is composed matters more than what it says. Hence, the intrinsic worth of the poem is its weight in evaluation. Accordingly, poetry is defined as "*kalâm mawzûn muqaff â*, a rhythmic and rhymed speech" (Cantarino 44), thus focusing largely on formalistic aspects rather than cognitive ones.

Literary appreciation takes the form of impressionistic, laconic responses to the affective appeal of poetry. Under the spell of the sensuous power of the verse, the intense feelings aroused in the reader or listener are given vent to in terms of an amalgam of haphazardly articulated phrases of explanatory nature (Al-Rabi'I, 1996, p. 19). As "a temporary effect and a fast reaction without comprehensive or long thinking" (Ibrahim, p. 35), criticism does not proceed along methodological lines of analysis and rigorous reasoning. This is mainly because Arabic poetics espouses an end-oriented hermeneutics; the focus is on the end product of the literary experience with no reference to the processes through which meaning is made. As the meaning-making process remains a mystique, meaning esoteric, knowledge hermetic, what criticism offers is passionate articulations of impressions that are bereft of rigorous analytic reasoning.

The idiosyncratic explications of the verse occur at the micro-level of a single line or a short fragment. According to the prominent critic Mohammed Mandoor (1996), Arabic literature is a literature of particulars in which the primary unit of analysis is the one line of the poem (153). To assess the merit of a poem, it suffices the purpose to attend to one of its parts since all are innately the same. Because of such homogenizing conception and "atomistic" tendency (Stetkevych, 1989: p. 29), Arabic poetics universalizes the particular, sponsoring a universalist outlook that does not pay as much attention to differences as to commonalities. By relegating singularities of experience and peculiarities of expression to the background of critical activity, the established tradition of criticism espouses an essentialist poetics in which novelty is sacrificed for keeping intact the norm.

This absence of in-depth understanding of the complexity of thought is furthered through representing the poet as a mouthpiece of his tribe. Because the nature of his poem—panegyric, lampoon, eulogy, love, pride, or satire—depends largely on the immediate concerns of the community (Al-Shihri, 2000, p. 58), the poet is a medium for addressing causes greater than himself; he is a catalyzing agency for conceptualizing the perceptual collective in terms of the poetic individual. The poet's individuality is fulfilled by immersing it into the wider questions of the collectivity. Such impersonalizing impulse does not aim at achieving objectivity, but is an embodiment of the nature and culture of its homeland—an idiom of expression in the "concrete", a language of "few abstractions", a philosophy of "pithy sayings", a personal in terms of an impersonal, and an individual in the voice of the collective (Gibb, 1963: p. 34).

As the discussion above shows, the traditional status of Arabic poetics draws inspiration from an aesthetic of verisimilitude, according to which everything is conceived and conceptualized in the images of some ancient exemplars. The present conforms to the prescriptions of the past; it is a hermeneutics of closure that is not subject to contingencies of history. Like beads of a rosary, the critical assumptions in Arabic critical tradition are framed to

create aesthetic sensibility of a universalist metaphysics of meaning beyond temporality (Al-Musawi, 2006, p. 6).

2. Cultural Dominant

The Arab world is a site of contestation of forces with diverse ideologies (i.e., traditional, mystical, rational, modern, and national), of which the traditional discourse stands supreme and unmatched. Represented as essentially theo-centric, this discourse lays exclusive claims to truth as revealed in pristine Islam and, hence, attains unsurpassed social and political support. In *Islamic Philosophy from Its Origin to the Present*, the renown Muslim scholar Seyyed Hossein Nasr (2006) elaborates on the doctrines of the traditional stream as "archetypal realities in the universe" (227), beyond which every other voice is simply peripheral. He writes: "The few in the Islamic world who would cut this cord of reliance and declare the independence of reason from both revelation and intuition were never accepted into the mainstream of Islamic thought. They remained marginal figures" (264). "[I]n the land of prophecy," as he argues, the traditional paradigm contains the seeds of the "wisdom" of "Islamic revelation" and, hence, is "the ground upon which the religion is based" (271). With such powerful cultural capital, the fate of the traditional paradigm is internalized and perpetuated as the fate of the whole Arab-Muslim community.

The dominant paradigm in Arabia comes in the moderate dimension of a centrist culture that nurtures conservative views about discipline, reality, norms, knowledge, and stability. Didactic in orientation, the traditional paradigm pays a great deal of stress on ethics as the guiding principles for all one's deeds. Tradition prescribes rules of thinking and behaviour that contribute to moulding the character and preserving norms of grace and decency. The concern with nourishing such a morality of holding high societal mores and of literally abiding by traditions surpasses every other concern of the establishment.

Endowed with unquestioned authority, the traditional deployment of cultural resources validates specific structures of knowledge and furnishes certain acts of representation as legitimate and healthy to the well-being of the individual and the welfare of the state (Arkoun, 1988, *Arab Thought* 52). The rationale for stipulating conditions for knowledge formation resides in the concern to eliminate spectrums of thought with divergent orientations, for they have the potential to seduce minds into derailed tracks of deviation from the path of truth as mapped out by traditional authorities down the centuries.

Beneath the protectionist poetics of the cultural dominant, as the British historian of religions Karen Armstrong (2000) argues, are two correlated facts. First, communal welfare takes precedence over individual gains; precisely because, "social stability and order" are "more important than freedom of expression" (34). Ensuring the uninterrupted continuity of the held order outweighs all acts of individual innovation. Second, underlying this culture is mythic consciousness, which creates "a cast of mind that adapts and conforms to the way things are" (35). As all-pervading cultural codes, myths and rituals have a fundamental role in uniting members of the *ummah* [community] present and past and are crucial to strengthening the rhetoric of the held discursive thought structures through lulling minds in superstitions. In so doing, the dominant authority succeeds in driving consciousness into hibernation and in tightening its fist on real courses of action.

Besides, the emphasis on conformity to conventional principles is particularly explicit in the profound reverence attributed to received traditions and inherited values. Thereupon, strict adherence to moral standards is undisputable, and individuals need to abide literally by everything handed down to them via mainstream institutions and centres of learning. The weight of such cultural sacred is depicted as paramount in shaping subjectivities and directing knowledge and research. Inculcated into hearts and minds are specific meanings and memories of formative moments in the history of Arabic-Islamic civilization. Such narratives and accounts are represented as pregnant with rare treasures of meaning and profound truth despite time and space. For this sacrality, received traditions of thought are alleged to be the criteria for legitimating, assessing, or refuting any endeavour.

It is not surprising then that the portrait of the self is punctuated with the demands and directions of the mainstream ideology. Individual agency is measured against a background of compliance with the terms by which the society moves and reacts (Al-Musawi, 2006, p. 16); individuality is identification with the held premises. Human fulfillment is defined in terms of serving the causes of the existing order, deepening the spell of its influence, and safeguarding its sanctuary.

Thus, one could argue that the cultural poetics of the dominant paradigm is characterized by a unidimensional mode of thinking, a monologic discourse, an overriding concern for self-preservation, and a highly prescriptive mode of instruction. Such features bespeak a monolithic entity of narrow territorial imperatives. Underlying all

of this is the status quo of containment that is characteristic of authoritarian ideologies and totalitarian regimes.

3. Unfolding Crisis

In Arabic poetics, the critical spirit is in essence reflectionist. The self-independence of the artefact does not imply independent thinking and free expression, but rather restricts the scope of creativity to addressing cosmetic frills and superfluous aspects. Arabic poetics does not stimulate thinking "outside the box" of conventionality, either. It nurtures a shiftless cast of mind that addresses but what tradition allows and affirms but what fixtures validate. Beneath this explicit aggrandizement of tradition, however, is an implicit demonization of what falls beyond the commonplace. Such theoretical closure is inimical to developing critical consciousness of rhetorical devices and linguistic resources, of realities and promises, of changes and challenges, and of what it means and takes to create citizens of the world. Falling short of reflexivity is the diagnosis of the crisis in Arabic poetics.

As a consequence of the authoritarian practices of the traditional paradigm, the intellectual atmosphere lapses into insignificance, diminishing productivity and reducing potentiality across the board. "The hegemonic circulation of dry language, stagnant referentiality, and application of the dormant and the backward" wish only "to enforce and sustain power relations" (Musawi xiv). In other words, the melodramatic rhetoric of the traditional discourse is instrumental to manipulating the public and combating opposition; the dominant paradigm is a discourse of confinement. As pointed out earlier, the current paper attempts to look into the epistemological grounds the cultural dominant adduces to justify its rejectionist stance to innovation and modernity. In the subsequent parts of the article, section (A) addresses an array of critical reflections on the existing crisis in the Arab world as advanced in the contributions of major thinkers towards a reevaluation of Arabic-Islamic heritage, while (B) is the investigator's bone of contention.

A. Revaluation of Heritage

In contemporary critiques of Arabic-Islamic intellectual civilization, prominent writers and critics describe Arabic epistemology as in a state of crisis, on grounds of the enormous influence of the traditional discourse on all spheres of life. In *Historicity of Arabic-Islamic Thought*, Mohammed Arkoun (1996) problematizes the theological orthodoxy of the dominant patterns in the Arab world as at the root of stagnation and decline (13). The collaboration of the traditional streams with the ruling classes aims at furthering their influence on all sections of society (19-20). The traditional forces impose specific versions of reality as the cultural sacred, to the exclusion of other versions and interpretations. This ideological exploitation of religion serves political aspirations of hegemonic agenda. It is the mutual interest between religious authorities and political forces that suppresses all calls for change as outrageous of the cultural sacred, thus inviting retribution. This rhetoric of intimidation is what essentially sustains the existing social arrangements.

The Syrian-Lebanese poet-critic Adonis (pseudonym of Ali Ahmad Sa'eed) ascribes the conceptual rigidity in the Arab world to an obsession with the held premises of the traditional patterns and to the suffocation of all dynamic impulses of modernity. He explores the ideological underpinnings of the mainstream culture:

> This traditionalist culture is embodied in the uninterrupted practice of an epistemological method which sees truth as existing in the text, not in experience or reality; this truth is given definitively and finally and there is no other. The role of thought is to explain and teach, proceeding from a belief in this truth, and not to search and question in order to arrive at new, conflicting truths. (*Poetics* 78)

In *The Static and the Dynamic*, Adonis (1974-1979) continues to explain that the "traditionalist" pattern of Arabic-Islamic culture does not tolerate voices of dissent, nor does it provide a space to consider alternative possibilities. Exclusive and monologic, "traditionalist" discourse offers its "static" versions as embodiment of religion itself, thus promoting its politically motivated interpretations as the cultural sacred. Moreover, such a discourse perpetuates: 1) docile surrender of the individual and firm faith in the all pervasive power of absolutism, 2) fixation with the past and fear from the unknown, 3) primacy of content over form as the former is the undisputable given, and 4) conflict with anything modern (*Static* 1: pp. 58-62). Therefore, subordinating the "dynamic" to the "static" of the "traditionalist" culture is the prime cause for the prevalent stagnation (*Static* 3: p. 244). The self-enclosed and past-centred culture of this paradigm, as Adonis states, precipitates the fall into dogmatic shackles and dins of ignorance (*Static* 4: p. 217). As an iconoclast, he sees that the way out of the crisis consists in bringing about a radical transformation of traditional culture through appropriating the creative spirit of Western modernity as "the most revolutionary development in the history of mankind" (*Poetics* pp. 91-92).

In *Contemporary Arab Thought*, Ibrahim M. Abu-Rabi' (2004) locates the crisis engulfing the Arab world in the upper hand of the traditional intelligentsia (360). Unearthing the causes of social immobility, he points at *taqlid* [imitation] as the first and foremost factor to be addressed in this regard (366). The traditional emphasis on conformity as the essential mode of existence and functioning culminates in producing passive mentalities that merely reproduce same, though at times different but superficially, products. This objectification and defeat of human inquiring spirit is the life-force for traditional institutions and political constituencies, shaping subjectivities and manipulating directions of knowledge with a view only to feathering their own nest. Abu-Rabi' also remarks that the unequal distribution of wealth and the concentration of power in a few hands eventuate in deteriorating the material conditions of life and constraining creativity (374). Not only does the unquestioned authority of traditional forces curb the productive potential of society through policing activities, but it also implements policies of degradation and enfeeblement at all levels.

The conformist poetics of tradition is also delineated as the cause of crisis in the Arab world as reflected in many critiques offered by the Saudi critic Abdullah Mohammed Al-Gathami (1991). In *The Stance to Modernity*, he observes that the hegemonic practices of the traditional stream drains minds of creative potential and turns them into slaves to custom (40). This cultural enslavement continues to keep minds in hibernation. The crisis in Arabic poetics, as he continues to elaborate, stems from an epistemological limitation caused by three main factors: 1) Having no critical stance, 2) Having no understanding of the philosophy of innovation and the concept of modernity, and 3) Having a limited view of language (56). What Al-Gathami calls the "crisis of creativity and criticism" is, therefore, a translation of the blind subservience of the critical to the parameters of the cultural dominant, and of the collapse of epistemological scholarship into the precipice of metaphysical conceptions.

What cuts across most of the contemporary critiques of Arabic-Islamic heritage is a strident emphasis on the explicit poetics of conformity and the implicit politics of opportunism that characterize the *modus operandi* of the traditional paradigm. In his ambitious project of cultural rejuvenation, the Moroccan philosopher Mohammed Abed Al-Jabri (b. 1935) desediments the hidden layers of Arabic interiority. In *Problematiques of Contemporary Arabic Discourse* (1988) and the four volumes of *Critique of Arab Mind* (1984-2007): 1) تكوين العقل العربي [Composition of Arab Mind] (1st ed. 1984, 9th ed. 2006); 2) بنية العقل العربي [Structure of Arab Mind] (1st ed. 1986, 7th ed. 2004); 3) العقل السياسي العربي [Arab Political Mind] (1st ed. 1990, 6th ed. 2007); and 4) العقل الأخلاقي العربي [Arab Ethical Mind] (1st ed. 2001, 2nd ed. 2006), Al-Jabri (2007) finds conformity as a repercussion of an entrenched obsession with "origin". He argues that "origin" is internalized as the exclusive frame of reference and the most authentic source of guidance. "Origin", as he points out, refers to the inherited traditions of religious rulings and instructions that are held as criteria for the "construction of knowledge" (*Critique* 2: 113-16). It is a logo-centric culture that does not allow for deviation from its foundations.

The obsession with "origin" also discloses another dimension of Arabic inwardness: fixation with the past. Romanticized images of grandiose moments in the past are sources of life for Arabic mind, and are the last resort particularly at times of crisis. The enchantment with the past takes on growing significance with the progress of time. The drama of confrontation between Arab-Muslim self and modern realities of the present, however, exposes the inefficacy of the inherited forms of hermeneutics to make intelligible, let alone respond appropriately to, much of the cacophony of the *zeitgeist* (Al-Jabri, *Problematiques* 34). This drama continues to hold the self in paralysis so long as the conflict remains irresolvable, and the traditional streams keep nurturing grounds that are fundamentally resistant to modern ways of living and thinking. The interface of such divergent worldviews (i.e., tradition vs. modernity) is a *problematique*, as Al-Jabri states, the resolution of which calls for a reconstitution of the entire corpus of tradition (*Problematiques* 184).

The narrow ideological fixtures of the traditional discourse, as it is clear, clamp down all activities outside its orbit and disembody consciousness of all impulses to make new crossings. Instrumental to this discourse is a manipulative rhetoric which plays an interventionist role between single innovative acts and communally accepted norms, a role that considers innovation deviation, that filters consciousness from sullied thought, and that reminds one and all of the path of truth as prescribed in the existing accounts of received traditions.

B. Metaphysics of Adequacy

Paradigmatic of traditional culture is a metaphysics of adequacy that mediates between the monopoly of knowledge and the seizure of power. The metaphysics of adequacy characterizes the existing traditions as a self-sufficient entity, with categories of thought and methods of interpretation that offer full guidance on all matters and occasions. The meaning of everything is represented as already in there, completed, closed, and finalized awaiting unproblematic re-experience by individual human beings. No stone is left unturned by earlier genera-

tions of scholars and religious authorities; as such, traditional knowledge is to be imbibed wholeheartedly as a matter of celebration that all members of this culture are to take part in, affirm, and continue holding on to.

The metaphysics of adequacy is a rhetorical construct that renders sacred the traditional interpretations of formative moments in Islamic history. These interpretations are taken up to crystallize the pristine forms of Islam (Nasr, 2006: p. 260), as divinely revelations and infallible instructions, over and beyond which any quest for truth is deemed outrageous. Consequently, on no account is need felt to seek fresh avenues of thought other than the established ones (Arkoun, 1988, *Arab Thought* 52). Remarkable as it is that the overemphasis on the metaphysics of adequacy relies on its function both as proactive and as preemptive: "adequacy" represents the traditional discourse as the authentic source of unquestioned knowledge, thus dislodging other competing discourses, and preempts prospects of criticism that might be laid at its door. It then follows that the weight of traditionalism in any part of society is gauged against the scale and degree of the spell of influence the metaphysics of adequacy exercises on that part; the deeper entrenched the notion of adequacy in consciousness, the more secure the position of traditional forces. As such, one would argue that the halo and mystique of the traditional means of knowledge would continue to support their prestigious status as long as the knowledge-power nexus continues to be filtered by the metaphysics of adequacy.

The ramifications of the metaphysics of adequacy on Arabic poetics are massive, particularly in terms of reducing critical reflection to matters of aesthetic considerations. The preoccupation with the aesthetic, though necessary, is not enough and is a cause of crisis in the knowledge-making processes: poetics is not effective in furnishing critically equipped responses to, and explanations of, the logicality of today's cultural logic. Arabic poetics, as it stands, fails to account for the pluridimensional character of the human complex and for the logic of transience that characterizes all syndromes of thought in time. Not only do the critical monism and the anachronistic practices of interpretation in poetics diminish the thrill of experiences in the realm of art, subvert individual mobility, and marginalize different experiences, but they also function as ideological tools for indoctrinating minds and shaping individualities. In other words, owing to the pervasive presence of the metaphysics of adequacy in the interiority of the dominant patterns, Arabic poetics continues to recycle the same old concepts and concerns, formalizing intellectual activity, disembodying consciousness, and immobilizing cultural resources.

The crisis in Arabic critical tradition is a miniature of a wider one at the level of culture. Consequent to the prevailing conception of a fully-fledged culture, human activity as a whole is defined merely in terms of refashioning heritage and re-affirming its continuity. Thus acculturated, one and all are bound to mechanically and blindly reproduce the held ideals of the establishment; the traditional resources of meaning and knowledge are inculcated as adequate enough to meet all social needs of all times. The presupposition of the metaphysics of adequacy leaves no room for initiating new levels of critical reflection, but demands regurgitating the traditionally structured premises. Such politics of containment perhaps explains the defensive stance the traditional forces usually take in encountering other systems of thought, particularly those with subversive reading practices.

The nexus of the critical and the cultural is formulated along a relationship of symbiotic compatibility via the catalyst of adequacy. The strident stress on poetic lineage in Arabic poetics is an allotrope for partisanship and allegiance to the existing order; the critical task is defined as an upholder of tradition (Arkoun, 1988, *Arab Thought* 52). Keeping intact cultural heritage as validated by tradition, uncontaminated by strange incursions and devoted to its culturally sealed task, the self-enclosed and logo-centric poetics of Arabic tradition functions as a knee-capper to, and a reworking of, the formative ideals of the cultural dominant. The dominant rhetoric in its turn sanctifies the critical tradition as an exemplary repository of original values, whose contours are symbolic of the boundaries of the traditional sacred itself. It is interesting to remark that representing critical conventions as embodiments of the inwardness of Arabic-Islamic culture is a tactic for auto-immunizing the citadel of the dominant culture through freezing critical activity and for promoting the cultural poetics of the mainstream.

As it is obvious the "recipe" for political gains is the unrelenting representations of knowledge as a mystique with esoteric meanings and hermetic practices. And since the essence of such knowledge is mapped out as a metaphysical realm, its "adequacy" refutes every counterclaim. The maintenance of the metaphysics of adequacy is what legitimates the traditional paradigm as the cultural dominant and ensures its continuity.

4. Beyond Crisis

A critical exposé of the politics of the cultural dominant is a point of departure for transformation. Reevaluating

the validity, reliability, and viability of received traditions of thought is central to awakening consciousness from lethargy of custom and to emancipating it from the codified grooves of the metaphysics of adequacy and unenlightened complacency. Inquiring into what lurks behind what is usually taken for granted is the launching pad for inaugurating a new era of intellectual illumination and for battering down walls of ignorance.

For this revisionism to see the broad light of the day, there must be a critical awareness of the "realities" of the dominant discourse. Therein lies the role of the intelligentsia. Part of this role is to draw a clear line of demarcation between the religion of Islam as a heavenly creed and as a blueprint for life in its abundant forms and the religiosity of the traditional currents as worldly institutions with ideologies, protocols, and interests for power-seeking. "These forces manipulate theological discourse to preempt criticism and equate power control with religious infallibility" (Al-Musawi, 2006, p. 62). The metaphysics of adequacy needs to be exposed in terms of the wider network of filiations and affiliations it has with authorities-traditional and political. Reviewing the epistemological grounds of the whole metaphysical conceptions in circulation is crucial to promoting better understanding of received categories of knowledge and to formulating fresh ones. Disseminating such knowledge helps demystify a great deal of confusion, revise much of what is taken for granted, and unleash dormant energies for thinking and rethinking all afresh.

The intellectuals need also to set up forums for debating the existing state of affairs in the Arab world and assessing the repercussions on its larger picture, for negotiating possibilities of transformation as envisaged by different voices, and for developing reflexivity by opening up fresh epistemic sites for addressing wider comparative cultural poetics. Indeed, what needs addressing is rethinking the whole philosophy of education along new lines of pedagogical and cultural dynamics that keep abreast of advances in sciences and knowledge and bear relevance to the concerns and aspirations of all sections of society.

Of paramount significance to any project of cultural rejuvenation is also the introduction of the culture of difference as an existential necessity for promoting peaceful coexistence and complementary relations among human collectivities beyond all sectarian imperatives. The traditional stereotypes of the "Other" as a source of potential threat to the self need to be replaced with a different paradigm that celebrates difference and acknowledges the "Other" as the unknown part of the self and as a partner in construing, constructing, and reconstructing everything in temporality. Such a culture of "thinking together differently" breaks the wall and bridges the divide, dismantles politically fabricated barriers of hostility, and embraces a new hermeneutics of dialogue beyond difference.

Such a revisionist enterprise is undoubtedly institutional, but has seeds dormant in realizing the enormity of the crisis engulfing one and all. Developing such societal awareness is conducive to both mobilizing the public and initiating transformative projects; it is a commitment to causes greater than the self and a collective responsibility beyond all edges of definition.

## References

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Creolizing Political Institutions

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When completing the manuscript that became *Creolizing Political Theory*, I thought I had written what I had to say on this theme and would therefore turn to other, for me, new and distinct projects.[1] As I began actually to undertake them, however, I realized that if the whole point of creolizing were that it is a living manifestation of rigorous thinking, trying to leave it behind would be a mistake.

This was clear first when developing a course focused on Historical Women Political Thinkers. Using Lewis Gordon's *Introduction to Africana Philosophy* as a model, I wanted to see if unique themes emerged as women wrote about and argued for their substantive inclusion in political life, as had been the case when black writers across the Euromodern world undertook philosophical reflection.[2] Without the lens of creolization, I likely would have determined the selection of figures and texts quite differently. My primary interest was in looking at any and all works I could identify, but especially those that long pre-dated contemporary Euro-American feminist theory. As Penny Weiss observed, they exist in wonderful abundance, with origins across centuries and the globe.[3] I assumed that *how being female informed political reflection* would be expressed very differently in the hands of a 15th-century Italian-French self-supporting scribe turned writer, a 17th-century Ethiopian anti-colonial charismatic religious leader, an 18th-century Afro-Caribbean enslaved woman turned abolitionist activist, a 19th-century Eastern European revolutionary Marxist or Chinese anarchist, and a 20th-century Chicana. But what emerged with surprising regularity were, among other themes, grappling with the supposed illegitimacy of women as political thinkers and actors, their presumed monstrosity as they advanced conceptions of fundamentally altered ways of reproducing the human species, and concern with how distinct obligations tied to the ability to give birth informed analyses of war and other political conditions that led to premature and callous loss of life.

Similarly, in the research I am currently undertaking that explores statelessness and contemporary enslavement as core, rather than

aberrational features, of Euromodern political life, creolizing approaches emerged as necessary. On the matter of statelessness, it became clear that discussions of the theme undertaken among human rights scholar-activists and international lawyers had largely not been and must be put into conversation with historic and contemporary work on settler colonialism and indigenous thought and practice. Likewise, while it is indisputable that the trans-Atlantic trade racialized enslavement in ways without precedent that continue to cast a dense shadow over legally free black subjects, forced labor in the current moment combines older and newer political economic developments. This has led me to argue, against many detractors, that it is accurate to call some contemporary forms of unfreedom "slavery." This project culminates in an unapologetic effort to rethink political institutions in ways that respond directly to the anti-statism that currently abounds on the intellectual left. In short, in ways to which I will return at greater length, I contend that we must treat political institutions as creatures for which we are undoubtedly responsible and for which we must therefore fight with all of our creative resources. In so doing, I am joining scholars primarily engaged with Latin American political thought and practice, including Enrique Dussel's explorations translated into English as *Twenty Theses on Politics*, George Ciccariello-Maher's *We Created Chavez*, Katherine Gordy's *Living Ideology in Cuba*, and Angélica Maria Bernal's *Beyond Origins*.[4]

A central element of this challenge is illuminated by the work of Nathalie Etoke, as evident in this symposium and beyond it.[5] Part of what first motivated me to read Rousseau through Africana and Francophone Africana resources was that it struck me that an actual general will—*one as general as the society itself*—would be incredibly difficult for advantaged members of a polity to grasp. After all, they were regularly indulged in treating their highly particular and often parochial vantage points as isomorphic with reality itself. By contrast, it was racialized-colonized residents who knew the putative ideals of the societies of which they were apart along with their ongoing and fundamental compromising. Surely it was they who were *potentially* better poised to work through these contradictions to fathom a better approximation of the common good. My hope was for a "better approximation" rather than a "better accomplishment" because I assumed that a feature of emancipatory political action is its incompleteness, in the sense that it brings new conditions into being. As it does so, ways of being a person emerge along with predicaments that cannot be anticipated. Additionally, as I will return to with my discussion of Kevin Bruyneel's contribution to this symposium, even progressive actors frequently reproduce what is liminal to the settler colonial societies in which they reside. As I tried to struggle through this intuition in my dissertation, I had argued that in a society like the United States, it would be political subjects with what W.E.B. Du Bois called *double consciousness* and Paget Henry rearticulated as *potentiated double consciousness* who could best articulate a general will.[6] At the same time, their very ability

to do so made it unlikely people committed to *a will of some* masquerading as a general will would actually listen. Given the Francophone origins of the general will and the debates that were then raging over the permissibility of wearing hijabs in public spaces, especially in schools, I reached similar conclusions regarding that situation. In short, it was so clearly wrong that Muslim and non-Muslim African-descended French subjects, in seeking to be part of the French Republic, were framed as divisive, sullying, through their identitarianism or assertion of cultural backwardness, an otherwise vital general will. Instead, an actual general will, as opposed to a will of a select few of the French Republic, had to grapple with what they and these subjects, likely to be in the vanguard of such political reflection, shared.

The contemporary French leaders, as Nathalie Etoke observes, who, without any sense of irony, declare that France now seeks to turn inward, away from its previously imperial orientation, *should be visited by the ghost of Aimé Césaire*.[7] He would remind them that a distinctive feature of European political history and culture was its claimed ability to insulate itself from what transpired in its colonies. This was as evident in the claim that mere contact with French or English soil turned the slave into a free man or woman as that the callous brutality unleashed in the Caribbean and in Africa was the work of creoles, not French- or Englishmen. In fact, Césaire insisted, it was Europeans who were "settling" thoroughly occupied polities in the Americas, Africa, and Asia through torture, dispossession, and murder. Meanwhile, it was their counterparts in mainland, continental Europe who stomached this as acceptable Christian, European, and civilizing policy. But Césaire's point wasn't simply to engage in moral criticism. The aim was historical diagnosis: the transformations to the colonizers produced by their colonial endeavors returned home with them. It was not true that they could practice democracy at home and fascism abroad, for they returned with their sensibilities and characteristics. The implications were that what transpired as the supposedly extreme and exceptional events of *the holocaust* were nothing more than colonial policy returned home as domestic practice, colonial policy unleashed on fellow Europeans. We are in a similar moment now. With a globe made smaller by technologies that accelerate the speed of movement of people, goods, and ideas, the physical and psychic distance that Europe maintained from its colonies is collapsing. The moment exemplifies Patrick Wolfe's claim that practices of racialization or of racist violence intensify as colonizers are forced to share what they consider *their spaces* with the people they have colonized.[8] In short, the French leadership quoted by Etoke would rather hollow out the French state, ever narrowing the nation to which it refers and how they should thereby benefit, than having it embody the actual range of people and processes that generated its current form. Etoke underscores the especially stark irony of the French case. After all, it is no accident that the Francophone world is at the center of studies and debates over creolization. French and Francophone scholars authored most of its central terms and

texts. Still, or for precisely this reason, as French-speaking African peoples come to the metropole seeking a polity and political institutions that reflect the Francophone world's actual constitution, they are told not only that they are extraneous, but also that their presence is illicit. They exemplify the distinction between assimilation and creolization. If the former were an option, these Francophone subjects could become French by ceasing to be who they are. Creolization charts an alter-native (a linguistic move made by Sandy Grande) that does not leave such a singularly violent and exclusionary standard intact.[9]

Creolizing French political institutions and identities would have to resemble Etoke's own explorations in film that bring together different modes of analysis—those expressed in literature, philosophy, and song—to convey what it is to resist being cast into the zone of nonbeing.[10] In so doing, Etoke affirms, as Jean-Jacques Rousseau and Frantz Fanon, among many others, so compellingly argued, the production of knowledge cannot be disentangled from the colonial world of which it is part. What will be prized and treated as authoritative, after all, is not generated in a vacuum. Although academic and intellectual spaces are internally complex ones in which varieties of projects are undertaken, what Kevin Bruyneel calls "settler memory" organizes and prioritizes hegemonic accounts of what is worth knowing. At the same time, as Bruyneel illustrates, the actual history of the United States (or Canada or France) is far more creolized than the ways in which it is mobilized ideologically *as memory.*

What then would it mean for collective U.S. memory (or how history is marshalled in the political arena) to better reflect our actual past? As Bruyneel explores through critical engagement with W.E.B. Du Bois's magnificent *Black Reconstruction*, it would certainly feature Americans (or Canadians or the French) revisiting particularly pivotal or foundational moments in their past, for example, in the U.S. case, the Civil War and Reconstruction.[11] They would, as Du Bois does, challenge standard depictions of who and what had propelled these conflicts, how they unfolded, and what did not but might have transpired. With Du Bois, it was the general strike of black people refusing to continue to work and then stealing themselves from plantations who while thought not to be political actors in fact altered the course and nature of the events of what many Southerners still call "the Northern War of Aggression." In the short period that followed, in an effort to eradicate their enslavement, black people pushed for and inhabited institutions that could have reconstructed the entire, *not only the black*, South into something actually resembling a democratic republic. At the same time, as Bruyneel astutely emphasizes, Du Bois and historical and contemporary figures who share his political sensibilities could further creolize their creolizing account. After all, what Du Bois celebrates as a *splendid* failure occurs simultaneously with the Sioux Nation's successful effort to force the U.S. government into a peace

agreement that legally recognized their claim to territory. To engage in this more rigorous creolizing, they would have to pay due attention to the subjects and stories that remain liminal in their account, or those appearing only through their absent presence. More specifically, when discussing the relationship between ownership and political belonging, Du Bois mirrors, rather than challenges, the contours of settler memory. Rather than creolizing abolitionist and decolonizing approaches, he fails to connect how the land used to create the plantation South was "cleared" through forced removal of its original occupants. Similarly, his exploration of the unfulfilled promise of forty acres and a mule did not tie questions of expropriated labor to those of land dispossession and therefore could not consider whether forging an American present and future that better embodies a creolizing and therefore generalizing will would have to break fundamentally from conceptions of political standing tied to individualized private property rooted in the extraction of soil from America's original occupants. These shortcomings are in ample display in the depictions of native peoples Keisha Lindsay and I have traced in the writings of 18th-and 19th-century New World black writers seeking to make a case for their own rightful place in the emergent U.S. nation.[12]

Bruyneel's reflections in this symposium are tied to larger ones that he is undertaking along with Glen Sean Coulthard in the spirit of Patrick Wolfe, Vine Deloria Jr., and George Manuel and Michael Posluns on the relationship of the "black" to the "red."[13] In exactly the way that creolizing analysis should unfold, the forging of solidarity requires first disentangling and then engaging with the historical consequences of the specific, discrete, and complementary workings of settler colonialism. For instance, if the aim with African-descended peoples in the U.S. was to extract labor indispensable to national development while radically segregating such people from ever actually forming part of the nation to which the state referred, the goal with native peoples was evacuation. For this reason, if Indians were first repeatedly "removed" beyond white borders, when they were territorially engulfed, they were to be made extinct through their assimilation or de-Indianizing. For Deloria, while many black Americans sought full incorporation and membership in the U.S. polity through the initial stage of the Civil Rights movement, their Indian counterparts, in ways that resonated better with the nationalism of the Black Power movement, wanted to be left alone or outside the coercive embrace of the U.S. state. In Manuel and Posluns, the fourth world that would emerge with aboriginal peoples globally anticipated the Zapatista idea of *a world in which many worlds fit*. Inspired by revolutionary efforts in Tanzania to create a modern nation on a model distinct from those of Europe, it was to be one in which new technologies borne of human creativity could be used to express older values that prized the conditions of our continued existence over that which is novel or new. Crucially, for Manuel and Posluns, the desire to withdraw from the orbit of illegitimate occupying governments had nothing to do with

an impulse to be culturally pure or unchanging. Quite the opposite. As they argued so beautifully: cherishing a relationship with the land does not require continuing to use a wooden plough. Indeed, they celebrated distinct ideas that emerged from the shared situation of being aboriginal. They included in that category both those of whom they and other indigenous Canadians were aware (among them, the Maori, the Lapp, and the Welsh) and those whom they would still come to know. In other words, the creolization that could and would still emerge required the deliberate rejection of political systems premised upon avowed decreolization. In this way, Manuel and Posluns's analysis also shares much in common with Fanon, for whom the aim of colonization is to create a world of contraries or opposed, mutually exclusive universals that would not meet in relation. Through struggle against institutions that sought to make them real, contraries were turned into contradictions through which creolizing processes could and did unfold. In an older and more European-specific rendition of a similar point, Rousseau had argued that one could not forge a general will between people who thought all others were damned and the supposedly damned or between those who enriched themselves through immiserating others and the immiserated. In each such instance, since the self-conception of the former was premised on being outside of relations with the others who constituted the majority of the relevant whole, they had to be resisted for vital political alternatives to emerge.

Even if a revolutionary people can embody such creolizing relations, Michael Neocosmos asks whether these can be institutionalized or routinized in ways that do not banish a mobilized people into passivity. Neocosmos's answer appears to be no. This is what states are. This is what states do. We should therefore celebrate what are episodic moments of mass movements that generate concepts and experiences that exceed conditions and thinking that precedes and will follow them. Neocosmos does also offer the longer running model of the Haitian *bossales* who, within the technical orbit of a state, resisted its grasp and thereby its crushing logics. However, if politics, as Neocosmos describes it, cannot be extended to suffuse the conditions of ongoing, mundane life, how are we to understand its actual reach? Is it that, in fleeting moments, people cohere around shared political commitments regardless of their differential situations and can then recall this when the mobilization has passed? Or is it that self-governance can only continue where a decision is made to operate in the shadows of the predominant state system, not offering an offensive counter to it but operating in a refuge?

Put differently, Neocosmos has made a highly compelling case for the indispensability of dialectical thinking and approaches to politics with which I could not agree more. At the same time, it is clear that Neocosmos and I have different responses to the question of whether there can be legitimate political institutions. In Neocosmos's account, emancipatory

popular politics emerges in moments that *must be finite.* Efforts to translate these into state power, even when the leaders themselves are borne of this movement, inevitably collapse into a representative politics that sends the mobilized people back into the caves or into political passivity. Indeed, the newly instated, time and time again, retrench in direct proportion to the capaciousness of what generated them. This is not due to Max Weber's concern with the routinization of charisma. Instead the point is Rousseauian: popular sovereignty cannot be divided or represented. Failure to grasp this, for Neocosmos, leads Fanon into a mistaken view that frames the national bourgeoisie and its one-party state as a problem external to an otherwise revolutionary movement. For Neocosmos, Fanon is wrong to frame these actors as having hijacked and betrayed what otherwise might have been, if the implications are that there could have been any people who or party that would have acted differently. This is because it is an error, for Neocosmos, to treat revolutionary moments as something that can be made to endure, or as a transitional precursor transformed meaningfully into state power. At the same time, in his view, what transpires in those fleeting moments is not an approximation of a general will or a common good or a mobilized people or national consciousness. These are achieved and those involved experience this process of becoming.

Even as Rousseau described "the people" as dying from the moment of their inception and criticized governments as creating problems for the pursuit of the general will, he both described formerly colonized (Corsican) people whose general wills were still emergent and bothered to author a full-fledged portrait of a polity. The text was replete with doubt and qualification, revealing more about profoundly misleading conceptions of liberty than confidence in the models he delineated. But if emancipatory politics is not a narrow politics of experience, surely we do have to tend to better and worse ways of facilitating its extension. Without discussion of institutionalization, such emancipatory events would appear to collapse into the kind of regulative ideals that Neocosmos associates with the limits of analytical thought: they would enable us to affirm that another world is possible since, for a fleeting moment, we witnessed and knew it.

For most participants who undertake such activity at great risk, the exhilaration of the moment is not primarily a matter of being unburdened by divisive identities unleashed from the seismic weight of the colonial past and more about creating the conditions of a less compromised freedom and of fuller self-determination and dignity. Their politics, then, is not only about a collective subject mobilized in pursuit of the common good but the series of actions that set in motion expanded options for those doing the struggling. When the mobilization that cannot endure has come to an end, they should return to functional homes and clean water and excellent schools and a reprieve from state violence.

It is true that Fanon devoted more time to diagnosing what was wrong with the national bourgeoisie than the kinds of institutions that he thought could give continued expression to national consciousness. At the same time, he did offer some guidance. It came in his emphasis on assuring that it was citizens who undertook collective decision-making and planning. It was evident in his urging to refuse the hiring of foreign expertise if this would stall opportunities and divert resources that could be used to develop local skilled labor. Efficient solutions were to be eschewed if they did not extend the political thinking of the people as a whole. These comments are reminiscent of Rousseau's efforts to envision how a sovereign people could continue to be self-legislating. Logistical considerations had to follow more primary commitments, even if this required, as was supposedly the case in the Roman republic, citizens participating from the rooftops. There were also Fanon's cautions against collapsing into colonial divides between urban elites and rural majorities and his push to have, instead of a fixed political capital, one that moved throughout the physical territory of the nation. When he argues that those seeking to govern themselves should not just adopt a capitalist or Soviet model of economy and that each generation must live up to its mission, the message was that physically ousting settlers was not sufficient. Revolutionary struggle meant transforming the society from the bottom up, guided by a national consciousness that would transmute anti-colonial nationalism into a way of organizing a society for all, *especially the nobodies*.

If we take Fanon's sociogenetic diagnosis and argument seriously, then, it must extend to political institutions or to the potential meaning of the state. Just as these have changed their nature across time, they can still be altered. Or, we may not have exhausted their potential forms. Peopled by human beings, it is they or we who must make them run and who are thereby responsible for their character. We therefore cannot treat them with existential seriousness or as features of an unchanging natural world. If the specific concern is with how institutionalizing power and decision-making banishes collective agency, then that is the challenge to which our designs must directly respond. But to treat all political institutions as if they amount to the flawed, antipolitical, and illegitimate same is to fail to heed Lewis Gordon's analysis of Fanon's challenge to the anti-statism of Friedrich Engels.[14]

One central difference in Neocosmos and my reading of Rousseau is technical. Rousseau hated cosmopolitan politics and any other forms that tended, as Julia Suárez-Krabbe diagnoses, to mistake the internationalizing of a particular idea or practice for its inherent universalism.[15] For Rousseau, polities, political identities, and political wills aimed to be *general*, consisting in what meaningful differences had in common. There were generalities that were narrower—so government officials shared a general will tied to their professional location rather than the society itself—and this often made

them obstacles to the pursuit of an actual general will. At the same time, what mediate the particular and universal and could last, even if it remained fragile and prone to abuse and muting, were *generality* and the *general* will. This informs my own view of the relationship between generalizing and creolizing. While it is true that narrow identitatarianism is dislodged by arrays of people who share political commitments that seek an enlarged common good, this does not involve a transcendence of identity altogether. What emerges instead is a way of expressing who and what it is to be Algerian or South African or American that is organically tied to what is local while being open to contributing sources that always exceed narrowing hegemonic accounts of the relevant nations. *Loving the land does not require wielding a wooden plough.*

Rousseau and Fanon are exemplary figures for exploring the idea of creolization, as Neocosmos states, because of how fundamentally dialectical their thinking was. As Neocosmos describes it, they break fundamentally from analytical thought, demanding that we think beyond what we can experience or have known. In Rousseau's view, skepticism toward such an approach, which prevailed and prevails, is *to reason as tyrants* who seek to rationalize their particular abuse as endemic to the nature of power and politics itself. But, if the whole point about emancipatory politics or praxis is that it exceeds what was thinkable, it does so, first, in a dialectical relationship to existent ideas and ideals, even if framed in the negative. This is what I mean by a regulative ideal: anti-colonial struggle, in its initial moments, mobilizes an idea of the nation, which is more defensible than a country run for the benefit of foreign occupiers. If political participation is what makes a human being an adult, the argument continues, no one should be barred and one then opens the polity to the challenge of facilitating the different way of undertaking political life that must necessarily result. In other words, if most political ideals have only existed in compromised and contradictory form, in revolutionary action, these are reinvoked with the aim of more actually actualizing them. To say that emancipatory politics is mobilized around regulative ideals of what it is no longer to be enslaved or colonized is not to say that in it those mobilized don't experience what it is to be or become a sovereign people. There is no tension between these claims.

A dialectical reading would also mean that the realization of an actual general or creolizing will by one generation will inevitably be met by subsequent defeats. But politics is not only evident in the successful moment. Since, after all, what erupts positively and progressively only does so through considerable intermediary efforts and organizing. Through these efforts historical lessons that would be rendered invisible by those who would prefer they be forgotten are instead retold, rekindling the imagination of people who might otherwise believe that to think like anything other than a tyrant is naïve.

At the same time, I am under no illusions. In our world, states continue to act in kleptocratic and predatory ways, often increasing rather than counteracting the vulnerability of most citizens. Still, we know that they must work otherwise, even if we are not certain that they can. Ngũgĩ wa Thiong'o captures this predicament beautifully in his many novels and critical essays. Sonia Dayan-Herzbrun couldn't be more accurate in her celebration of his effective creolization of Marxism: of Ngũgĩ's ability to grasp structural relations diagnosed by Marx, but in language that grabs you by the guts and that explores expropriation and alienation in the context of neocolonial life through sustained attention to language, to the distinct potential roles of women and men, and to different forms and natures of knowing. For instance, review the passage quoted in Dayan-Herzbrun's essay: "It is part of that struggle for that world in which my health is not dependent on another's leprosery; my cleanliness not on another's maggot-ridden body; and my humanity not on the buried humanity of others." Dayan-Herzbrun rightly emphasizes that it was in response to the persistent efforts of a young woman who insisted that Ngũgĩ teach outside of the academy, where in the Queen's English he served only the children of the Kenyan bourgeoisie, that brought him in direct and ongoing contact with ordinary people who enlarged his conception of political life and action.

This assessment of Ngũgĩ's contributions is exemplified especially well in his 2006 *Wizard of the Crow*, a book that explicitly explores the seemingly impossible through pitting a voraciously corrupt neocolonial class that will settle for nothing less than absolute rule against those whose resistant aims must be and are thoroughly creolizing.[16] Consider the specifics: *The Ruler*, who remains nameless over the course of hundreds of pages, aims to consolidate complete control, insisting that the Country of Abruriria and he are referred to synonymously. His own self-aggrandizing version of contentious political events are "the news," while his prisons overflow with all variants of political dissidents. He regularly thins the ranks of his own citizens simply because he can. In one particularly extreme genuflecting moment, one of his ministers recommended that the Ruler be considered the author of any and everything that might be written or thought within the bounds of Abruriria. While everyone knows that the Ruler is sick, his pawns seek to divert attention from this obvious truth through announcing that plans are underway to erect a contemporary Tower of Babel that would triumph where biblical efforts had failed. Once finished, it would not only be the envy of the world, but would also put the Ruler in direct and ongoing contact with G-d—proximity G-d is assumed to welcome. What is more, anticipating the absurdities of the promises of the current president of the United States, it is announced that Banks of Europe and the United States would foot the bill! Despite the clear impossibility of the undertaking, the Ruler and his peons devote all their energies to this seemingly constructive activity.

In stark contrast to their illegitimacy, there are Kamiti and Nyawira, young adults seeking neither wealth nor dominion. He is an educated and thinking man who must seek employment from crooks and is plagued by an ability to smell the ethical character of people, most of whom, in being willing to be bought, literally stink. He can also sense possibility. He smells this first as a scent of flowers that Nyawira exudes. He is able to create his own occupation through creolizing the traditional role of sorcerer, in an environment in which none wish to admit that they all seek a piece of such power. Nyawira, however, as a true Fanonian, insists that one cannot heal individual people without mending their social world. This initially restorative politics must be one of unity that guides the deployment of force. It should grow from knowledge conceived as the discovery of magic within the ordinary and as emerging out of all people and from multiple places as a shared, collective asset. For Kamiti this involves continuing the legacy of cross-pollinating East Indian and East African traditions in an indigenous African politics that emerges through a dialogue with rather than subservient relationship to custodians of tradition. It must be built through more than relations of patronage in which some are always accruing indebtedness and instead nurture an infrastructure to enable citizens to take what they need with a duty to contribute what they can. The practical and romantic relationship and collaboration of Kamiti and Nyawira as portrayed in *The Wizard of the Crow* instantiates the possibility of combining a humanistic openness to resources of magic and spirituality with one that is primarily political. Their combined efforts culminate in tentative and gorgeous images of an alternative to what will be more of the same vampiric contempt for the future that institutionalizes terror to create situations that are ungovernable.

The text, then, offers insight into how a resistance movement that drew on the political mythos of Abruriria seized and made space within the vacuum created by necropolitical rule. In each instance, their performances demonstrated the shittiness of using a state solely as a means to advance one's own very narrow economic interests and demonstrated that alienated people who have determined not to tolerate the further abuse of what remains of their country can wield immense disruptive and potentially constructive power. The story also affirms that democratic theory must also be economic theory, that discussion of the kinds of practices that should constitute the former must also address the material conditions that are their prerequisite. In ways that have much resonance for contemporary residents of the United States, *The Wizard of the Crow* forces the reader to imagine mundane life in the heights and depths of political absurdity, in which the desires of a human being to be like a god dictate the fates and lives of millions. The Ruler's and his minister's strange and outlandish creativity is at times genuinely impressive, but it relies consistently on the disabling of all others. The story also illustrates the ongoing value of the idea of political legitimacy—it may seldom be embodied, but when it is, it is immediately

recognized and affirmed without coercion. Of necessity, it is profoundly creolizing, emerging out of an ability to forge out of a fractured environment, a vision of how differently collective life might be led, not simply drawing from ideas and practices of discrete national communities but from distinct domains of life, often thought to be profoundly opposed.

In Rousseau's words, it would *be reasoning as tyrants* and in Fanon's it would be a failure to be adequately sociogenetic in our approach, if we assume that states must always function in the same way. As Boaventura de Sousa Santos has repeatedly pointed out: colonialism exploits and alienates in multiple, discrete ways so that effective counters to it must figure out how to speak among these idioms so that their complementarity does not only serve the already forceful.[17] Creolization describes moments when this is achieved through collective efforts to grasp and then make material conditions that enable a more and more generalizing will, attentive always to those most prone to remain present only in their absences.

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