Awareness

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Action

A Critical Integralism for the Challenges of Our Time

Daniel J. O'Connor

Realization: Volume I
AWARENESS-IN-ACTION
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A Critical Integralism for the Challenges of Our Time

DANIEL J. O'CONNOR
To Karen
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I began writing this compact book four years ago as a brief digression at the beginning of an article on my particular formulation of integral economics, wherein I thought it might be appropriate to clarify what I meant by the integral that I was using to reconstruct this economics. That article was being written for an academic audience at the First Biennial Integral Theory Conference, so my digression to explicate the critical integral praxis that had long resided inchoate, in the back of my mind, was written in a formal academic style. Two years after that first draft of an article, which was incompletely satisfying enough to encourage further effort, I began writing once again during intermittent pockets of time between projects. My intent was to write a long academic article, or perhaps a series of articles, but certainly not a book, and I think that creative tension between what I wanted this to be and what it apparently needed to be accounts for the relative density and directness of the resulting presentation.

The ideas articulated in this book are precisely the same as those I introduced at that conference, and although this articulation is not as comprehensive as some scholars might prefer, or as accessible as some practitioners might like, I do hope it is sufficient to foment the sort of action-oriented discourses I have in mind. It should come as no surprise that I don’t anticipate a large audience for a rather speculative book of philosophy by an unknown author who didn’t even have the good sense to secure the services of a reputable academic publisher or a brazen literary agent. Nevertheless, I do anticipate a savvy audience of scholar-practitioners who recognize that the worldly challenges in response to which these ideas are being
proposed simply will not wait two more years while I take the standard route to publication. Consequently, I have chosen to self-publish this first edition and to do so with a Creative Commons license that relieves you of any financial cost to read, discuss, and share this book as widely as you choose.

Should you choose to read, discuss, and share this work, it will help to remember that its primary purpose is to seed derivative applications in such real-world fields of human action as economics, business, politics, governance, sociology, journalism, and activism. While I have already been doing so in economics and business, there is no shortage of opportunities for critical integral reconstruction of established theories and practices within, between, and beyond disciplinary and institutional boundaries. If you would like to apply Awareness-in-Action in your particular field, please let me know. I would be glad to help in any way I can.

Daniel J. O'Connor
Bainbridge Island, Washington
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You must realize what action is, what wrong action and inaction are as well. The true nature of action is profound, and difficult to fathom.

He who can see inaction in the midst of action, and action in the midst of inaction, is wise and can act in the spirit of yoga.

With no desire for success, no anxiety about failure, indifferent to results, he burns up his actions in the fire of wisdom.

~ Bhagavad Gita
This work represents an inquiry into the essential nature of human action in all its forms and fields. By *human action*, I mean to suggest a rather comprehensive scope of inquiry into anything and everything people do, regardless of how purposeful or spontaneous, mental or physical, independent or interdependent these actions might seem. The myriad forms of this *human doing*—from writing, speaking, and conversing to giving, taking, and trading, to working, playing, and creating to learning, developing, and evolving—serve as creative expressions of, and logical complements to, the equally comprehensive notion of *human being*. In short, human action encompasses *what* we do, *how* we do, *why* we do, and ultimately *who* we are as we do.

My approach to the philosophy of human action, or *praxiology*, might be best described as a process of *integral reconstruction*. As a *reconstruction*, my intent is to clarify and formalize the tacit knowledge and intuitive competencies that must, logically, be presupposed by all people in order for them to act in any situation. To whatever extent such universal presuppositions might be validated, these would, logically, serve as necessary premises for all subsequent inquiries into, and hypotheses about, the many fields of human action, from economics and business to politics and governance to sociology and social work to journalism and activism. Thus, my focus of inquiry includes those *essential presuppositions* without which people could not act as they really do and, correspondingly, those *essential premises* without which we cannot know what human action really is.
As a distinctively integral reconstruction, my intent is to emphasize those insights that appear to be essential for a post-postmodern philosophy of human action that honors the full potential and variety of the human experience, which necessarily includes our experience of the worlds beyond humanity. Just as the adjective integral offers us two complementary definitions—comprehensive or essential—so too does the process of integral theorizing offer us two complementary approaches with two corresponding results. In contrast to a comprehensivist approach to integralism characterized by the construction of an inspiring, encyclopedic meta-narrative, I prefer an essentialist approach characterized by the distillation of a compelling, universal meta-paradigm—a paradigm of paradigms, if you will. Nevertheless, by focusing deeply on the quintessential features of all human action in real-world contexts, I propose in this work the broad contours of a meta-paradigm—an integral aperspectival/apractical meta-paradigm, to be precise—with the potential to enact a seemingly infinite plurality of differential perspectival/practical narratives at least suggestive of a comprehensive meta-narrative, the specifics of which are by definition beyond anyone’s sole capacity to articulate. It is therefore so much the better that I, at least, won’t be enticed to try.

Therefore, this work actually represents two mutually implicating lines of inquiry into the possibility of an integral philosophy of human action and an action-oriented integral philosophy, both of which are centered on the essential perspectives and practices that appear to be governing the actions of all people in their efforts to realize their full potential in real-world situations. In pursuing these lines of inquiry, I gratefully incorporate and, where necessary, carefully reformulate the extraordinary insights of three primary theorists—Jürgen Habermas, Ken Wilber, and Chris Argyris—whose collective body of work already contains much of the content needed for this initial reconstruction. Having engaged with this collective body of work since 1994, both in theory and in practice, I bring to this effort a commitment to help realize what I see as some of the latent potential in each of their brilliant philosophical programs.

Granted, in my preliminary effort to articulate a form of integral philosophy that is as realistic as it is idealistic and as fallibilistic as it
is humanistic, with a pragmatic focus on the way people can, should, and already do act in the world, my contribution may be little more than a clarification of my own novel vision of the nexus between Habermas’s critical theory, Wilber’s integral theory, and Argyris’s action science. Nevertheless, the logic of this vision and its demonstrated capacity to reconstruct established views within these fields should justify the effort required of you, the reader. More to the point, the real promise of the critical integralism I call Awareness-in-Action is in its potential to (re)define the common core of all the various forms and fields of human action, so that those of us concerned with such matters might learn how to respond more effectively to the interdependent political, economic, social, and ecological challenges of our time.

Beginning with the self-evident reality of human action—that people act—the question arises as to the ideal conditions that must be presupposed by all people in order for them to act in any situation. Is it possible to articulate any fundamental presuppositions of human action that can withstand our efforts to invalidate them, through logic and other direct experience, and at least approach a believable universality?
My first proposal is to consider that action can only be understood from some perspective and that this leads to a worthwhile inquiry into what perspectives are possible and, furthermore, what perspectives are really essential to all human action. In other words, what perspectives must be presupposed by all people in order for them to act in any situation?
This inquiry into the perspectival nature of human action begins with a focus on primordial perspectives, where primordial means original or first created and, therefore, (phenomeno)logically prior to any other type of perspective that might arise in the course of human action. As we will see, the primordial perspectives are precisely those that are always already active in every action situation.

Triadic Perspectives

My search for primordial perspectives begins with Jürgen Habermas’s theory of communicative action, a remarkably comprehensive, multi-disciplinary critical theory rooted in the deep structures of linguistic communication. The core of this particular approach to the study of human action is formal pragmatics, which is a quasi-universal theory of language use that Habermas introduces as an effort “to identify and reconstruct the universal conditions of possible understanding” or, alternatively, the “general presuppositions of communicative action.” His aim is to make theoretically explicit those implicit competencies that account for the actual conduct of linguistic communication and its consequential social order in (post)modern societies.

Formal pragmatics is based in part on the pioneering work of Karl Bühler, who developed a theory of language functions that “starts from the semiotic model of a linguistic sign used by a speaker (sender) with the aim of coming to an understanding with a hearer
(receiver) about objects and states of affairs. He distinguishes three functions of the use of signs: the cognitive function of representing a state of affairs, the expressive function of making known experiences of the speaker, and the appellative function of directing requests to addressees.” In Bühler’s own words, the linguistic sign “‘is a symbol in virtue of being correlated with objects and states of affairs, a symptom in virtue of its dependence on the sender, whose subjectivity it expresses, and a signal in virtue of its appeal to the hearer, whose external or internal behavior it steers...’.” (Fig. 1)

Therefore, by virtue of the three ways in which each sign can be understood, every linguistic expression employing a sign simultaneously functions as an expressive symptom of the speaker, an appellative signal to the hearer, and a representative symbol of the world. As Habermas summarizes Bühler’s pragmatics, “language represents a medium... that simultaneously serves three different, although internally related, functions. Expressions that are employed communicatively serve to express the intentions (or experiences) of a
speaker, to represent states of affairs (or something the speaker encounters in the world), and to establish relations with an addressee. The three aspects of a speaker coming to an understanding with another person about something are reflected therein."

Building on this triadic model of language functions, particularly via the speech act theory of J. L. Austin and John Searle, Habermas proposes that all communicative actions either explicitly or implicitly raise and redeem three validity claims that correspond with three domains of reality, or three worlds, to which the action relates as well as three performative attitudes, or modes of communication, that can be adopted by the actor in relation to these worlds. Language is fundamental to Habermas’s view of human action not because of what is said with language but because the use of language itself raises and redeems these validity claims and structures the domains of reality to which actors relate in the three communicative modes they can adopt with every action. Consequently, in his view, “language and reality inextricably permeate one another. All experience is linguistically saturated such that no grasp of reality is possible that is not filtered through language.”

As he sees it, “language is the medium through which speakers and hearers realize certain fundamental demarcations. The subject demarcates himself: (1) from an environment that he objectifies in the third-person attitude of an observer; (2) from an environment that he conforms to or deviates from in the ego-alter [second-person] attitude of a participant; (3) from his own subjectivity that he expresses or conceals in a first-person attitude; and finally (4) from the medium of language itself.” Habermas regards the medium of language itself not as a fourth mode of communication nor as a fourth domain of reality comparable to the first three, but as a “special region; precisely because language... remains in a peculiar half-transcendence in the performance of our communicative actions..., it presents itself to the speaker and the actor (pre-consciously) as a segment of reality sui generis.”

When used in these three communicative modes, “language can be conceived as the medium of interrelating three worlds; for every successful communicative action there exists a threefold relation between the utterance and (a) ‘the external world’ as the totality of
existing states of affairs, (b) ‘our social world’ as the totality of all normatively regulated interpersonal relations that count as legitimate in a given society, and (c) ‘a particular inner world’ (of the speaker) as the totality of his intentional experiences. We can examine every utterance to see whether it is true or untrue, justified or unjustified, truthful or untruthful because in speech, no matter what the emphasis, grammatical sentences are embedded in relations to reality in such a way that in an acceptable speech action segments of external nature, society, and internal nature always come into appearance together.”

These co-arising segments of the three worlds, or the three domains of reality, are the specific validity claims to those realities that constitute every communicative act. With regard to these validity claims, a communicative actor “claims truth for a stated propositional content or for the existential presuppositions of a mentioned propositional content. He claims rightness (or appropriateness) for norms (or values), which, in a given context, justify an interpersonal relation that is to be performatively established. Finally, he claims truthfulness for the intentions expressed.” In adopting the various communicative modes and in making specific claims of truth, rightness, and truthfulness, the communicative actor is simultaneously accessing his or her own background knowledge of all that is true, right, and truthful—the actor’s own particular perspective on the three domains of reality—and presuming its validity for the purposes of supporting the present claims.

As illustrated in Figure 2, which is my adaptation of Bühler’s model to Habermas’s formal pragmatics, each of Habermas’s modes of communication—the *expressive personality*, the *conformative participant*, or the *objectivating observer*—places a primary emphasis on one corresponding type of reality claim—*sincerity*, *rightness*, or *truth*—in the context of its corresponding domain of reality—*my inner world*, *our social world*, or *the external world*. While it is certainly possible to craft a statement that engages all three modes in relative balance, thereby explicitly issuing claims to all three types of reality, it is far more common that just one of the communicative modes is given primary emphasis. When we do this, the other two modes, along
with their corresponding validity claims and domains, typically serve in secondary supporting roles.

For example, I might share with you my assessment of a mutual colleague’s performance at work based on whatever observations and interpretations I’ve made in the recent past. In doing so, I would be using the objectivating observer as my primary mode, making a variety of third-person truth claims, describing the facts and circumstances of his performance in the context of the relevant third-person validity domain, such as the acknowledged or assumed performance of all the other people in our company. Despite what may appear to be an exclusively third-person mode of communication, I would also be enacting the other two modes in a secondary capacity, at least implying that, in the first-person expressive personality, I am being sincere about my assessment of our colleague and, in the second-person conformative participant, I am justified in discussing his performance with you.
A typical response from you would engage the same third-person objectivating observer, perhaps challenging some of my truth claims about our colleague or my understanding of the company-wide performance that serves as context. We might then discuss our different points of view, learn from one another, and move toward a shared understanding of our colleague’s performance—not necessarily complete agreement, but at least an understanding of each other’s assessment. However, you might surprise me by choosing not to respond to my truth claims about our colleague, choosing instead to adopt a conformative participant mode and challenge my implied right to even discuss this matter with you. Perhaps you are my boss and you do not think it is appropriate for me to be assessing our colleague because he is my peer and also reports to you. Alternatively, you might adopt the first-person expressive personality mode and accuse me of being less than sincere in my assessment, perhaps because you suspect that I am unwilling to criticize the performance of a colleague who also happens to be my friend. Such a response would certainly entice me to shift to my own expressive personality mode as well, likely to defend my previous statements as quite sincere, given that now I am being assessed by you and our mutual assessment of our colleague has been backgrounded for the moment while we determine how much we trust each other.

Such is the dynamic, multi-perspectival nature of even the simplest of conversations. Habermas refers to a person’s capacity to engage in such conversations, whether in spoken or written form, as communicative competence, which he defines as the ability to embed well-formed sentences in relation to reality, including:

- The competence to communicate in the first-person mode of an expressive personality in relation to my inner world, and to do so in such a way that the communicative act sincerely conveys what is intended, so that the hearer/reader can trust the speaker/writer;
- The competence to communicate in the second-person mode of a conformative participant in relation to our social world, and to do so in such a way that the communicative act satisfies recognized norms or accepted self-images, so that the hearer/reader can share values with the speaker/writer; and
The competence to communicate in the third-person mode of an objectivating observer in relation to the external world, and to do so in such a way that the communicative act accurately represents relevant facts and circumstances, so that the hearer/reader can share knowledge with the speaker/writer.¹⁸

As clarified by Thomas McCarthy, one of Habermas’s finest interpreters, these three aspects of communicative competence relate to three corresponding distinctions considered fundamental to every communication situation:

- The competence to communicate in the first-person mode, with an eye toward intrapersonal sincerity, is a precondition for the ability to make “the distinction between the individuated self (Wesen: essence) and the various utterances, expressions and actions in which it appears (Erscheinung: appearance).”
- The competence to communicate in the second-person mode, with an eye toward interpersonal rightness, is a precondition for the ability to make “the distinction between what is (Sein) and what ought to be (Sollen).”
- The competence to communicate in the third-person mode, with an eye toward impersonal truth, is a precondition for the ability to make “the distinction between a public world (Sein: being, that which really is) and a private world (Schein: illusion, that which merely seems to be).”¹⁹

Habermas conceives of this multi-perspectival communicative competence not just as an ideal to be sought in actual communication situations, but as a universal human capacity to be developed as an integral feature of one’s psychological development.²⁰ Drawing on the developmental psychology of Jane Loevinger, Lawrence Kohlberg, and Jean Piaget, Habermas reconstructs a multi-level hierarchy of communicative competence that aligns his three communicative modes of expressive personality, conformative participant, and objectivating observer with the corresponding structures of Loevinger’s ego, Kohlberg’s moral, and Piaget’s cognitive lines of psychological development. As with the developmental theories he incorporates, Ha-
bermas’s proposed levels of communicative competence emerge in an irreversible sequence of increasingly complex and encompassing structures representing people’s growing capacity for autonomous, yet consensual action.\textsuperscript{21} Therefore, Habermas proposes a triadic theory of human action grounded in a formal-pragmatic model of communicative competence acquired through multiple levels of ego, moral, and cognitive development, culminating in highly autonomous, integrated identities capable of adopting reflective relations with, moving fluidly between, and generating novel contributions to three distinct domains of reality framed by the first-person, second-person, and third-person perspectives.

Furthermore, this triadic theory of human action applies to the collective dimension of social evolution just as much as the individual dimension of personal development. For Habermas locates in the development of communicative competence the capacity for reason itself. As he sees it, in claiming a three-fold validity in every communicative act, however insignificant or implicit the claims may be, speakers and writers are inviting hearers and readers to evaluate the claims offered and respond with their own counter-claims, thereby initiating the reasoned pursuit of mutual understanding. Building on Immanuel Kant’s triadic partition of reason, Habermas’s communicative reason differentiates and integrates what are traditionally referred to as the aesthetic reason of intrapersonal sincerity, the practical reason of interpersonal rightness, and the theoretical reason of impersonal truth. “In these validity claims,” says Habermas, “communication theory can locate a gentle but obstinate, a never silent although seldom redeemed claim to reason, a claim that must be recognized de facto whenever and wherever there is to be consensual action.”\textsuperscript{22} In his view, this consensual action, governed by a growing capacity for communicative reason within and between the three worlds of sincerity, rightness, and truth, is the very process by which (post)modern societies, with what Max Weber described as their increasingly rationalized institutions of art, morals, and science, have emerged from premodern traditional societies.\textsuperscript{23} Therefore, as one might expect from a theory of social evolution in which language, reason, and communication are central features, Habermas’s offers unprecedented insights into the manner in which communication
guides the social learning processes by which societies adapt to new challenges, both in the realm of goal-oriented strategic action as well as consensus-based communicative action, and institutionalize progressively more complex, justifiable socio-technical capacities in an evolutionary sequence that appears to be recapitulated in the developmental sequence of individuals within society.

Granted, Habermas is not the first to propose a multi-level theory of human development and evolution. But he is the first, as far as I know, to propose a multi-perspectival theory of human development and evolution based on the very deep linguistic structures of normal, everyday communicative competence. Furthermore, as he has so ably demonstrated, Habermas’s particular approach to critical theory has the extraordinary capacity to transcend yet include, through reconstructive critique, a host of more specific theories, particularly those with all or part of a triadic structure implicitly, if not explicitly, based on the first-, second-, and third-person perspectives of language itself. As such, it constitutes a meta-theory, or a theory of theories, which I define as a relatively content-free, yet context-rich theory that integrates, via some combination of creative vision and conceptual logic, a large variety of relatively context-free, yet content-rich theories.24

Awareness-in-Action may therefore be understood in terms of:

- the three modes of communication that can be adopted by the actor: expressive personality, conformative participant, objectifying observer;
- the three domains of reality to which it unavoidably and irreducibly relates: my inner world, our social world, the external world;
- the three validity claims it raises or redeems in every communicative action: sincerity, rightness, truth; and
- the three lines of communicative competence that personally develop and socially evolve through multiple levels of increasing capacity: self, moral, cognitive.

The three interdependent, irreducible perspectives thus represented by each set of action interpretations are the first-person, second-person, and third-person perspectives that co-arise in every actor’s awareness and find immediate expression in the corresponding
system of *intrapersonal, interpersonal, and impersonal* pronouns at the pre-conscious root of language itself.

**Quadratic Perspectives**

Extending this inquiry into the primordial perspectival nature of human action brings us to Ken Wilber’s *all-quadrant, all-level—AQAL* (pronounced “ah-qwal”)—formulation of integral theory, a multi-disciplinary meta-theory in which he proposes that the development and evolution of human consciousness, indeed all of existence, can be understood through four interdependent, irreducible perspectives: the *intentional, behavioral, cultural, and social.*

Apparently inspired and certainly informed by earlier attempts to master much of the same meta-theoretical terrain—such as those by Habermas, Talcott Parsons, Erich Jantsch, Jean Gebser, Pitirim Sorokin, and Sri Aurobindo—Wilber’s particular formulation of integral theory represents an ambitious attempt to construct the most comprehensive integration of philosophical, scientific, and spiritual ideas yet conceived within the confines of a developmental-evolutionary meta-narrative. By his own account, Wilber “examined over 200 developmental sequences recognized by various branches of human knowledge—ranging from stellar physics to molecular biology, anthropology to linguistics, developmental psychology to ethical orientations, cultural hermeneutics to contemplative endeavors—taken from both Eastern and Western disciplines, and including premodern, modern, and postmodern sources.” Through an inductive rather than deductive approach, he “noticed that these various developmental sequences all fell into one of four major classes—the four quadrants—and, further, that within those four quadrants there was substantial agreement as to the various stages or levels in each.” Wilber’s reference to *quadrants* is due to the particular graphical illustration, a two-by-two matrix, he consistently uses to depict these four perspectives on the many levels of existence, with *intentional* being upper-left, or UL, *behavioral* being upper-right, or UR, *cultural* being lower-left, or LL, and *social* being lower-right, or LR. (Fig. 3)
This spatial arrangement of the quadrants reveals the underlying logic that gives Wilber’s model its considerable explanatory power. From upper to lower, the intentional and behavioral are both individual perspectives that focus on the development of individuals in the context of collectives, while the cultural and social are both collective perspectives that focus on the evolution of collectives comprised of individuals. From left to right, the intentional and cultural are both subjective perspectives that focus on the interior aspects of development and evolution, while the behavioral and social are both objective perspectives that focus on the exterior aspects of development and evolution. Thus, each quadrant can be characterized not only as its own unique perspective on existence, but also as a pair of secondary perspectives, each of which is shared with one of its adjacent quadrants: intentional being the individual-subjective
aspect of existence, behavioral being the individual-objective aspect of existence, cultural being the collective-subjective aspect of existence, and social being the collective-objective aspect of existence.

These logical connections between the quadrants, based on the underlying shared perspectives within each, lead to the most insightful and provocative aspect of Wilber’s integral theory: the correlations across all quadrants at each level of existence. Not only does Wilber infer an emerging consensus regarding the nature and sequence of levels within each quadrant of developmental and evolutionary theory, but he also infers a strong correlation among these sequences of levels across all quadrants such that each level within one quadrant has direct correlates in all the other quadrants. He therefore hypothesizes a mutual-causal correspondence among all the quadrants at each level of existence, indeed at each moment of existence, such that every kosmic occasion manifests as, and can be understood in terms of, its interdependent intentional-behavioral-cultural-social aspects. This forms the basis of an all-quadrant, all-level —AQAL— formulation of integral theory with proposed quasi-universal applicability to every field of theoretical endeavor because, in Wilber’s view, every such field can be enhanced through some sort of all-quadrant, all-level reconstruction.35

For just one example that is most relevant to my inquiry, drawing on the ideas of Ferdinand de Saussure and Charles Sanders Peirce, among others, Wilber proposes the broad outline of a more comprehensive version of semiotics, which is the scientific study of signs and their use in all types of language and communication.36 In his formulation of integral semiotics, Wilber defines a sign as “any aspect of reality that signifies another, to another,”37 which is a definition so fundamental as to suggest a universal scope of inquiry including, but by no means limited to, conventional spoken/written language. All such signs are composed of an intentional (UL) signified (i.e., the subjective idea or association) and a behavioral (UR) signifier (i.e., the objective word or mark) and exist in corresponding contexts of cultural (LL) semantics (i.e., meaningful interpretations of signifieds) and social (LR) syntax (i.e., functional rules for signifiers).38,39 As he sees it, the purpose of pragmatics, or language use, is therefore to integrate the four interdependent quadrants of every
semiotic occasion, notwithstanding the all-too-plausible argument that they are never completely consistent.

Furthermore, because in his view all kosmic occasions are semiotic, though not necessarily pragmatic, Wilber proposes the extension of this quadratic formulation across his full spectrum of kosmic development and evolution as outlined in Figure 3, implying, among other things, that communicative semiosis occurs on every level of reality. In what he regards as a key insight necessary for this potential multi-level semiotics, Wilber locates the actual referent, the specific aspect of reality to which the sign refers, in the cultural (LL) quadrant, claiming that “the real referent of a valid utterance exists in a specific worldspace.” Thus, because each level of development and evolution includes its own emergent semantic worldspace (LL), that level of semantics provides all the participants in that level with access to phenomenologically real referents disclosed as specific, subjectively apprehended signifieds (UL) that are unavailable to participants who are limited to prior levels of consciousness, even when the corresponding behavioral signifiers (UR) and social syntax (LR) are available to them.

Within the quadratic levels of human development and evolution, Wilber denotes the various levels of consciousness with a series of colors derived from the spectrum of visible light, an effective technique used for centuries in illustrations of the yogic chakra system. As Figure 4 illustrates, these proposed levels of consciousness, that Wilber synthesized from dozens of research-based theories of psychological development and socio-cultural evolution, appear to have unfolded in all four quadrants simultaneously and thereby manifested in progressively more transcendent, yet inclusive intentional-behavioral-cultural-social perspectives. He emphasizes that “these levels are not rigidly separate and isolated, but, like the colors of a rainbow, infinitely shade and grade into each other.” He also makes a distinction between the quasi-universal deep structures of intentional-behavioral-cultural-social capacities that are common to all who pass through a particular level of consciousness and the plurality of historically contingent, culturally specific, personally expressive surface structures that can manifest from each deep structure (e.g., formal-operational rationality supports many different
personal intelligences just as rational-modernity supports many different socio-cultural institutions). In this sense, AQAL is presented as a quasi-universal, multi-structural pattern of progressively more transcendent, yet inclusive deep structures of intentional-behavioral-cultural-social consciousness.

In addition to quadrants and levels, Wilber loosely incorporates into AQAL additional theories that address the multiple lines of consciousness (e.g., cognitive, moral, ego), multiple states of consciousness (e.g., gross, subtle, causal, witness), and multiple types of consciousness (e.g., Enneagram personality types) as documented by psychologists over the years. Wilber’s meta-theoretical contribution is to highlight the benefits of recognizing and juxtaposing these distinct features of consciousness as relevant to any comprehensive understanding (e.g., people may be operating from different levels.
across different lines; people may access multiple states from the same level; and people may maintain the same personality type through multiple levels). Even this meta-theoretical contribution is not without some precedent, as can be seen in such proto-AQAL formulations as the triadic, multi-level, multi-line meta-theory of Habermas,45 the quadratic, multi-level meta-theory of Parsons,46 the dyadic, multi-level, multi-state meta-theory of Jantsch,47 and the dyadic, multi-level, multi-line, multi-state meta-theory of Sri Aurobindo.48

While I do accept the basic hypothesis of mutual-causal correspondence among the intentional, behavioral, cultural, and social aspects of every occasion, I find no need to accept or reject Wilber’s proposed hierarchies of structural levels outlined in Figures 3 and 4. My inquiry is focused on the primordial perspectives of human awareness-in-action, not some theory, or synthesis of theories, of kosmic or even human development and evolution. Hence, the approach Wilber took to formulate and justify his multi-perspectival meta-theory in terms of empirical levels of development and evolution is entirely different from the approach I am taking to formulate and justify my own multi-perspectival meta-theory. Furthermore, my general acceptance of lines, states, and types as empirical features of human awareness-in-action should not be misconstrued as an agreement with the particular manner in which these features have been appended to the AQAL formulation or, for that matter, with the AQAL formulation itself. As will become clear in due course, all the ideas from Wilber, Habermas, and others incorporated herein have been integrally reconstructed and therefore redefined, even if some of the established terminology has been retained for purposes of continuity within these established fields.

Awareness-in-Action may therefore be understood in terms of four interdependent, irreducible perspectives—intentional, behavioral, cultural, social—each of which represents a pair of constituent perspectives that form a secondary set of four interdependent, irreducible perspectives—individual, collective, subjective, objective.
The Tri/Quad Conflation

The question now arises regarding the precise relationship between Wilber’s quadratic perspectives and Habermas’s triadic perspectives on human action, development, and evolution. In the series of books and articles published from 1995 through 2007, including the earliest and latest presentations of AQAL, Wilber makes it perfectly clear that he considers the quadratic perspectives and the triadic perspectives to be identical and interchangeable, with:

- the first-person perspective being identical to his individual-subjective intentional perspective, the conflated form of which he labels with the pronoun I in his upper-left (UL) quadrant;
- the second-person perspective being identical to his collective-subjective cultural perspective, the conflated form of which he labels with the pronoun We in his lower-left (LL) quadrant, often noting that this first-person plural pronoun is intended to represent the relationship between first-person I and second-person You; and
- the third-person perspective being identical to his combined individual-objective behavioral and collective-objective social perspectives, the conflated forms of which he labels with the pronoun It in his upper-right (UR) quadrant and a pseudo-pronoun Its in his lower-right (LR) quadrant.

Wilber allocates Habermas’s triadic validity claims into the same corresponding quadrants, with intrapersonal sincerity in the intentional (UL), interpersonal rightness in the cultural (LL), and impersonal truth in the behavioral (UR) and social (LR), except in those instances when he uses a fourth claim to nonpersonal functional fit in the social (LR) quadrant, thereby framing functional fit as a second type of truth claim in relation to the propositional truth of the behavioral (UR) quadrant.

For one long, illustrative example, in The Eye of Spirit, Wilber elaborates on his use of the labels I, We, It, and Its to denote the intentional (UL), behavioral (UR), cultural (LL), and social (LR) perspectives, respectively, by emphasizing that:
...each of these quadrants is described in a different language. That is, they each have a different but quite valid phenomenology, and thus each of them is natively described in a distinct language.

Thus, the events and data found in the Upper-Left quadrant are described in “I” language. The events and data of the Lower-Left quadrant are described in “we” language. And both of the Right-Hand quadrants, because they are empirical and exterior, can be described in “it” language. Thus, the four quadrants can be simplified to three basic domains: I, we, and it.

Because none of the quadrants can be reduced to the others, likewise none of these languages can be reduced to the others. Each is vitally important, and forms a crucial part of the universe on the whole—not to mention a vital part of a comprehensive understanding of the psychology and sociology of human beings. Here are just a few of the important ingredients of these three major domains of I, we, and it:

I (Upper Left)—consciousness, subjectivity, self and self-expression (including art and aesthetics); truthfulness and sincerity; first-person accounts

We (Lower Left)—ethics and morals, worldviews, common context, culture; intersubjective meaning, mutual understanding, appropriateness, justness; second-person accounts

It (Right Hand)—science and technology, objective nature, empirical forms (including brain and social systems); propositional truth (in both singular and functional fit); third-person accounts

Science—empirical science—deals with objects, with “its,” with empirical patterns. Morals and ethics concern “we” and our intersubjective world of mutual understanding and justness. Art and aesthetics concern the beauty in the eye of the beholder, the “I.”

And yes, this is essentially Plato’s the Good (morals, the “we”), the True (in the sense of propositional truth, objective truths or “its”), and the Beautiful (the aesthetic dimension as perceived by each “I”).

These three domains are also Sir Karl Popper’s rather famous distinction of three worlds—objective (it), subjective (I), and cultural (we). Many people, myself included, consider Jürgen Habermas the world’s foremost living philosopher, and these three great do-
mains correspond exactly with Habermas’s three validity claims: objective truth, subjective sincerity, and intersubjective justness.

Of enormous historical importance, these three domains showed up in Kant’s immensely influential trilogy—The Critique of Pure Reason (objective science), The Critique of Practical Reason (morals), and The Critique of Judgment (aesthetic judgment and art).

Even into the spiritual levels of development, these three domains show up as, to give only one example, the Three Jewels of Buddhism, namely: Buddha, Dharma, and Sangha. Buddha is the enlightened mind in each and every sentient being, the I that is no-I, the primordial awareness that shines forth from every interior. Buddha is the “I” or the “eye” of Spirit. Sangha is the community of spiritual practitioners, the “we” of Spirit. And Dharma is the spiritual truth that is realized, the “It” or “isness” or “thusness” or “suchness” of every phenomenon.

Dozens of other examples could be given, but that’s the general picture of these great domains of I, we, and it. And this is obviously crucial for integral studies, because any comprehensive theory of human consciousness and behavior will want to honor and incorporate all four quadrants, or simply these three great domains, each possessing a different validity claim and a quite different language. This is simply another example of the pluralistic, multimodal, and multidimensional attitude that is a defining hallmark of an integral approach: all-level, all-quadrant.

I quote Wilber at length in order to convey both the content and the style with which he consistently equates and conflates the triadic perspectives of Habermas and other theorists with his own quadratic perspectives, beginning with a definition of the quadratic perspectives, seamlessly transitioning to an exposition of the triadic perspectives, and then cycling back to conclude with the quadratic perspectives, as if they are literally interchangeable. I also do so in order to convey the full extent of his justification for the equation and conflation of these two meta-theories, as this passage is the entire presentation. All of the references mentioned at the beginning of this section include passages consistent with the one I chose to quote from his first major paradigmatic formulation of AQAL. Some of the passages describing this conflation of the triadic and quadratic meta-theories, such as the most recent book, also include visual illustrations of this equation and conflation, depicting a triadic
model of beauty, goodness, and truth (the so-called “Big Three”) arranged to correlate with an adjacent model of the quadrants. In Figure 5, I offer a more complete, yet entirely consistent, illustration of what I term the tri/quad conflation.

![Tri/Quad Conflation Diagram]

Figure 5. Wilber’s Tri/Quad Conflation

The correlations among these various triadic theories of philosophy, spirituality, society, and communication are very compelling and, as far as I am concerned, uncontroversial. Prior to Wilber’s formulation of the tri/quad conflation, which was first published in 1995, Habermas had already incorporated some of these theories within his own triadic meta-theory of human action, development, and evolution. Such correlations certainly attest to the very deep and powerful nature of the first-, second-, and third-person perspectives of human language, reason, and communication. But these correlations among different versions of the triadic perspectives have nothing to do with the more general question of whether or not the triadic perspectives as a meta-theory should be equated and
conflated with the quadratic perspectives. This more general question is of tremendous importance, given the fact that the tri/quad conflation is Wilber’s primary means of incorporating the wealth of triadic theories, and particularly Habermas’s triadic meta-theory, into his own quadratic meta-theory.

Wilber’s answer to this question has been perfectly clear and consistent. From his first publication of the AQAL meta-theory in 1995 to his latest publication in 2007, Wilber has consistently equated and conflated these two models, using them in his teachings as if they are interchangeable, sometimes emphasizing the quadrants and their multiple dyadic components while de-emphasizing the big three, sometimes de-emphasizing the quadrants while emphasizing the big three as the beautiful, good, and true, the 123 of God, the art, morals, and science of modernity, or self, culture, and nature. In every instance, the correspondence between the first-, second-, and third-person perspectives and, respectively, the intentional (UL), cultural (LL), and combined behavioral (UR) and social (LR) quadrants is exactly the same. Moreover, his definitions of each quadrant and his examples of the theories that each quadrant frames and the methods that each quadrant requires are fused with his understanding of the corresponding definitions, theories, and methods framed by the first-, second-, and third-person perspectives so conflated. All this is just as it should be if one interprets these two multi-perspectival meta-theories as one and the same.

Triadic Quadratic Perspectives

In a complete departure from Wilber’s tri/quad conflation, I recognize Habermas’s triadic perspectives and Wilber’s quadratic perspectives as two entirely differentiated, yet nevertheless tightly integrated, multi-perspectival frames of reference for human action, development, and evolution. As I see it, each of the first-, second-, and third-person perspectives has within it all four intentional, behavioral, cultural, and social perspectives, which are identified and realized by each one of us from within each of the three personal perspectives we use to frame our actions in our worlds.\(^\text{55}\) (Fig. 6)
The easiest way to understand this is to recognize that the system of personal pronouns that signifies the first-, second-, and third-person perspectives includes singular and plural pronouns as well as subjective and objective pronouns for each of the three personal perspectives. These four types of pronouns—singular and plural, subjective and objective—correspond perfectly with the four secondary perspectives in Wilber’s quadratic model—individual and collective, interior and exterior. Moreover, just as each of Wilber’s quadratic perspectives is comprised of a unique pairing of these secondary perspectives, so too are the specific pronouns comprised of their own unique pairings of singular-subjective, singular-objective, plural-subjective, and plural-objective. Therefore, each of the first-, second-, and third-person perspectives is its own fully quadratic perspective represented by what I refer to as a quadratic pronoun that perfectly tracks the intentional-behavioral-cultural-social aspects of each personal perspective. Finally, just as both the triadic perspectives
and the quadratic perspectives are interdependent and irreducible in their own separate ways, the integration of the two models as just described produces a single set of interdependent, irreducible *triadic quadratic perspectives* that co-arise in every actor’s awareness and find immediate expression in the system of *triadic quadratic pronouns* at the pre-conscious root of language itself.

With regard to the triadic perspectives, it should be clear from Figure 6 that the perennial philosophical ideals of first-person freedom (denoted 1), second-person *justice* (denoted 2), and third-person *truth* (denoted 3)—my preferred terminology for the classical *beauty, goodness,* and *truth* and interchangeable with *sincerity, rightness,* and *truth*—have each been rendered fully quadratic and will therefore reveal some interesting new ways of understanding the nature and pursuit of these three perspectives on *reality*. In short, there are reality claims to, and reality domains of, *intention* (UL), *behavior* (UR), *meaning* (LL), and *function* (LR) associated with each and every triadic perspective. For example, instead of confusing our understanding of interpersonal justice (2) with an exclusively cultural (LL) interpretation in which shared *meaning* is the only valid consideration, as in the tri/quad conflated AQAL, we can now frame our inquiry in terms of the intentional (2UL), behavioral (2UR), cultural (2LL), and social (2LR) facets of a fully quadratic interpersonal justice (2AQ), while still allowing for an even more expanded inquiry into the fully quadratic nature of the corresponding intrapersonal freedom (1AQ) and impersonal truth (3AQ).

Likewise, with regard to the quadratic perspectives, Figure 6 reveals that there are now three distinct perspectives on each quadrant corresponding with the first-, second-, and third-person perspectives within which one can understand each quadrant. Thus, there are reality claims to, and reality domains of, first-person freedom (1), second-person *justice* (2), and third-person *truth* (3) associated with each and every quadratic perspective. For example, instead of confusing our understanding of individual behavior (UR) with a purely impersonal pursuit of truth (3), as in the tri/quad conflated AQAL, we can now frame our inquiry in terms of the intrapersonal, interpersonal, and impersonal perspectives on behavior (123UR), or behavioral perspectives on action, such as the comparative behavioral
features of a claim to freedom (1_{UR}), a claim to justice (2_{UR}), and a claim to truth (3_{UR}), while still allowing for an even more expanded inquiry into the fully triadic nature of the corresponding intentional (123_{UL}), cultural (123_{LL}), and social (123_{LR}) perspectives in that action situation (123_{AQ}).^56

Hence, this new formulation of triadic quadratic perspectives (123_{AQ}) has the potential to increase the explanatory and interpretive power of the constituent meta-theories of Habermas and Wilber, while clearing away the confusions caused by Wilber’s mistaken tri/quad conflation.^57 From within the first-person perspective of a freedom that is expressed and reflected in pragmatic personification (1_{AQ}), awareness-in-action presupposes and can be understood in terms of:

- the intentional or individual-subjective I (1_{UL}), which is experienced intrapersonally as the root of consciousness and implied source of my actions;
- the behavioral or individual-objective me (1_{UR}), which is experienced intrapersonally as the conduct of my actions as seen by the I reflexively coordinating my behavior in relation to my intention;
- the cultural or collective-subjective we (1_{LL}), which is experienced intrapersonally as the meaningful context of shared identity established through a lifetime of enculturation and often referenced in relation to the intentional I as if to justify action or diffuse responsibility; and
- the social or collective-objective us (1_{LR}), which is experienced intrapersonally as the functional context of shared conduct established through a lifetime of socialization and often referenced in relation to the behavioral me or reflexively in relation to the cultural we.

Furthermore, from within the second-person perspective of a justice that is engaged and interpreted in pragmatic participation (2_{AQ}), awareness-in-action presupposes and can be understood in terms of:

- the intentional or individual-subjective you (2_{UL}), which I experience interpersonally as the presumed root of your con-
consciousness and the interpreted intentions behind your actions;

• the behavioral or individual-objective you (2_{UR}), which I experience interpersonally as the engaged conduct of your behavior in relation to my behavior as well as what I interpret to be your intention;

• the cultural or collective-subjective you (2_{LL}), which I experience interpersonally as my interpretation of your meaningful context of shared identity that you have established through a lifetime of enculturation, some portion of which we evidently share; and

• the social or collective-objective you (2_{LR}), which I experience interpersonally as the functional context of shared conduct that you have established through a lifetime of socialization, some portion of which is evidently shared by us.

Finally, from within the third-person perspective of a truth that is observed and inferred in pragmatic representation (3_{AQ}), awareness-in-action presupposes and can be understood in terms of:

• the intentional or individual-subjective he or she (3_{UL}), which I experience impersonally as the presumed root of his or her consciousness and the inferred intentions behind his or her actions;

• the behavioral or individual-objective him or her (3_{UR}), which I experience impersonally as the observed conduct of his or her actions in relation to my and your behavior as well as what I infer to be his or her intention;

• the cultural or collective-subjective they (3_{LL}), which I experience impersonally as the inferred meaningful context of shared identity that he or she has established through a lifetime of enculturation, some portion of which we evidently share; and

• the social or collective-objective them (3_{LR}), which I experience impersonally as the observed functional context of shared conduct that he or she has established through a lifetime of socialization, some portion of which is evidently shared by us.
Therefore, the triadic quadratic perspectives differentiate and integrate the pragmatic personification, participation, and representation of awareness-in-action that are designated, respectively, by the first-, second-, and third-person quadratic pronouns.

**Implicit Rules**

The model of triadic quadratic perspectives and the new approach to integral perspectivism this represents did indeed arise in my own direct awareness, not in the first instance as an effort in meta-theory reconstruction, but in response to a process of self-inquiry into the specific perspectives that I was taking in my moment-to-moment awareness-in-action. I simply paid close attention to what I was seeing, thinking, and speaking, and asked myself what perspective it implied and how this perspective related to all the others. As the answers became clear, the whole pattern formed rather quickly. As a secondary process, I have attempted to explicate some of the implicit rules or design principles I have discovered in this perceptual meta-theory. I outline below some of my hypotheses regarding rules that appear to be universally operative in order to convey the non-arbitrary nature of the model just presented and preclude any immediate misinterpretations:

1. All quadratic perspectives are identified by a quadratic pronoun, which is an internally consistent set of singular-subjective, singular-objective, plural-subjective, and plural-objective pronouns corresponding, respectively, with the intentional (123UL), behavioral (123UR), cultural (123LL), and social (123LR) perspectives. All triadic quadratic perspectives are identified by an internally consistent set of first-person (1AQ), second-person (2AQ), and third-person (3AQ) quadratic pronouns representing the 12 primordial perspectives (123AQ) of Awareness-in-Action.

2. Individual pronouns in the intentional (123UL) and behavioral (123UR) are always paired with appropriate collective pronouns in the cultural (123LL) and social (123LR), because each implicates the other in every action. There is no such thing as an individual perspective without its contextual collective
or a collective perspective without its constituent individuals. Likewise, subjective pronouns in the intentional (123ul) and cultural (123ll) are always paired with appropriate objective pronouns in the behavioral (123ur) and social (123lr), because each implicates the other in every action. There is no such thing as a subjective perspective without its complementary objective or an objective perspective without its complementary subjective. Finally, first-person (1aq), second-person (2aq), and third-person (3aq) perspectives and their corresponding pronouns mutually implicate one another in every action. There is no such thing as a first-, second-, or third-person perspective in isolation without the other two corresponding perspectives.

3. The use of any particular pronoun (or noun) in thought or communication always implies three other pronouns that constitute the specific quadratic pronoun and eight additional pronouns that constitute the remainder of the specific triadic quadratic pronoun already operative in the action situation. Some formulation of triadic quadratic pronouns and therefore perspectives is always already operative in every action situation. It is not that you must construct it reflectively; it is already here, right now, in your own active awareness.

4. The first-person perspective (1aq) is always the person who is taking the triadic quadratic perspectives and this first-person is always identified in the intentional (1ul) and behavioral (1ur) by first-person singular I-me (i.e., the I-me near the center of my application of this model refers to the real I-me near the center of my own actual triadic quadratic perspectives; and I should never be paired with it as in Wilber’s tri/quad conflated AQAL). Likewise, the first-person perspective is always identified in the cultural (1ll) and social (1lr) by the first-person plural we-us (i.e., we should never be paired with it or its as in Wilber’s tri/quad conflated AQAL, but always with us).

5. The second-person perspective (2aq) is always identified in the intentional (2ul) and behavioral (2ur) by second-person singular you-you. However, it can be identified in the cultur-
al (2LL) and social (2LR) by either the standard second-person plural you-you (or y’all-y’all) or the first-person plural we-us (e.g., when I am discussing my relationship with you and we are both focused on our reciprocal perspectives on we-us).

6. The third-person perspective (3AQ) is always identified in the intentional (3UL) and behavioral (3UR) by third-person singul- 
sars such as she-her, he-him, or it-it. However, it can be identified in the cultural (3LL) and social (3LR) by either the standard third-person plurals they-them or these-those, a second-person plural you-you (e.g., when I am discussing with you your relationship with him or her and therefore the plural you-you could be used in the cultural and social of both the second- and third-person), or a first-person plural we-us (e.g., when I am discussing with you my relationship with him or her, which may or may not include singular you, so the second-person in this example could also be the same we-us inclusive of the third-person or the standard you-you).

7. Indefinite pronouns are only operative within the purely quadratic perspectives, with each such pronoun making reference to one or more of the intentional-behavioral-cultural-social perspectives (e.g., anyone-anything-everyone-everything, one-one-all-all). This indefinite quadratic perspectivism, which I denote XAQ, is by definition not triadic, not 123AQ, because it collapses or reduces the fully triadic intentional (123UL), behavioral (123UR), cultural (123LL), and social (123LR) perspectives and, therefore, specified identities, to indefinite intentional (XUL), behavioral (XUR), cultural (XLL), and social (XLR) perspectives and, therefore, generalized identities.

8. Possessive pronouns and adjectives are operative throughout the triadic quadratic perspectives, as they are the means by which I act possessively, laying claim for myself and on behalf of others to the content framed by the primordial perspectives as well as the perspectives themselves. The specific pattern of singular-subjective (123UL), singular-objective (123UR), plural-subjective (123LL), and plural-objective (123LR) possessives includes the first-person my-mine-our-ours (1AQ), second-person your-yours-your-yours (2AQ), and third-person
his/her-his/hers-their-theirs (3AQ). In contrast to the pronouns used for identification of people, other conscious beings, and various non-personal things, the possessives are used to identify the very same aspects and elements of reality in order to attribute their ownership and/or relationship to people and other conscious beings. Furthermore, the first-person singular possessives, my and mine (1UL+UR), are the means by which I can act possessively with regard to all the triadic quadratic perspectives (123AQ), which are, in a sense, mine as they have clearly arisen in my non-perspectival awareness (denoted 0), that I nevertheless try to possess with my perspectival action (with consistently disappointing results, I might add).

9. Reflexive pronouns are operative in the singular and plural halves of all quadratic pronouns, as they are the means by which the subjective I (1UL) interacts with the objective me (1UR) (e.g., I surprise myself) as well as the means by which I attribute the capacity for reflexive action to others, as when you interact with you (2UL+UR) (e.g., you know yourself), she interacts with her (3UL+UR) (e.g., she supports herself), we interact with us (1LL+LR) (e.g., we educated ourselves), all of you interact with all of you (2LL+LR) (you protect yourselves), and they interact with them (3LL+LR) (e.g., they reward themselves).

10. The first-person singular-subjective (1UL) perspectival pronoun, I, appears to be the originary or enactive perspectival, the first among equals with regard to all the other perspectival pronouns in the triadic quadratic perspectives, because none of the others can arise in awareness unless the I at the apparent source of conscious action also arises. The awareness of I is (phenomeno)logically prior to the other perspectival pronouns and I can remain as the locus of perspectival awareness after the other perspectival pronouns subside. Therefore, triadic quadratic perspectival reality itself, to whatever extent it is enacted, appears to originate with the pronoun I, which is identified with each and every experience of reality it claims, that is, each and every form it names (e.g., I know this; I want that; I like you, but not him.).
11. From the perspective of the first-person singular-subjective (1UL) pronoun, I, my triadic quadratic perspectives (123AQ) frame the intrapersonal intentional-behavioral-cultural-social facets (1AQ), the interpersonal intentional-behavioral-cultural-social facets (2AQ), and the impersonal intentional-behavioral-cultural-social facets (3AQ) of my enactive self-image/world-viewing. At any point in time, my enacted self-image/world-view encompasses my unique, comprehensive integral narrative, my own personal theory of everyone and everything, including my understanding of your own and his or her own unique versions of the same magnificent drama (or comedy, tragedy, etc.).

12. The triadic quadratic perspectives (123AQ) frame absolutely everyone and everything I can possibly experience within my circle of non-perspectival integral awareness (0). There is nothing missing, the proof of which is to name anyone or anything that you think is left out and upon doing so recognize that whoever or whatever it is can be signified, indeed is already implicitly signified, by one of the perspectival pronouns in your triadic quadratic perspectives.

Given this formal presentation of the implicit rules of triadic quadratic perspectivism (denoted TQP), it bears emphasizing that anyone reading this book is already capable of following these perspectival rules, for the most part pre-consciously, as a necessary pre-condition for taking all these perspectives, for the most part quite consciously. While TQP may be immediately recognizable as a conceptual meta-theory with enhanced explanatory and interpretive capabilities, it is even more important to recognize it as the perceptual meta-theory that appears to be always already active in our situational awareness-in-action—empirical and normative evidence, it seems, of our latent potential for more integral awareness-in-action. Furthermore, by accurately differentiating and integrating the triadic (123) and the quadratic (XAQ) meta-theories within triadic quadratic perspectivism, the latent potential (123AQ) of both Habermas’s and Wilber’s meta-theories can be more fully realized. The full implications of TQP for our understanding of the basic triadic perspectives—being first-, second-, and third-person—and the basic quadratic
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perspectives—being intentional, behavioral, cultural, and social—of awareness-in-action, not to mention the structures of progressively more conscious awareness-in-action that may develop and evolve throughout all 12 primordial perspectives, appear to be rather significant and will require the remainder of this book to introduce. That being said, the immediate implications of TQP include more integral reconstructions of *semiotics, pragmatics, and praxiology*.

**Immediate Implications**

TQP frames a more integral *semiotics*, which is the study of signs and their use in all types of communication, incorporating the triadic semiotics of Bühler and the quadratic semiotics of Wilber. Recall that Wilber’s *indefinite* sign, which is *any aspect of reality that represents another to another*, is composed of an intentional *signified* (XUL) (i.e., the subjective idea or association) and a behavioral *signifier* (XUR) (i.e., the objective word or mark) and exists in corresponding contexts of cultural *semantics* (XLL) (i.e., meaningful interpretations of signifieds) and social *syntax* (XLR) (i.e., functional rules for signifiers). As a potential complement without apparent contradiction, Bühler’s *pragmatic* sign “*is a symbol in virtue of being correlated with objects and states of affairs [3], a symptom in virtue of its dependence on the sender [1], whose subjectivity it expresses, and a signal in virtue of its appeal to the hearer [2], whose external or internal behavior it steers…*” By recognizing that *each* of Wilber’s quadratic perspectives of a sign is simultaneously present in *each* of Bühler’s triadic perspectives of a sign, and vice versa, we can see the primordial contours of a TQP formulation of *integral semiotics* (123AQ).

Furthermore, by recognizing the *pragmatic* implications of this integral semiotics, we can see the contours of a more integral pragmatics that further illuminates the study of spoken/written language use. Recall that each of Habermas’s modes of communication—the *expressive personality* (1), the *conformative participant* (2), or the *objectivating observer* (3)—places a primary emphasis on one corresponding claim to reality—*sincerity, rightness, or truth*—in the context of its corresponding domain of reality—*my inner world, our social world, or the external world*. (Fig. 2) Given that Habermas’s formal pragmatics
is based in large part on Bühler’s triadic semiotics, in which every linguistic expression employing a sign simultaneously functions as an expressive symptom of the speaker (1), an appellative signal to the hearer (2), and a representative symbol of the world (3), we may now reconstruct each of Habermas’s modes of communicative reason and action to include its own corresponding intentional (123UL), behavioral (123UR), cultural (123LL), and social (123LR) aspects of pragmatic, or linguistically enacted, reality (123AQ).

Finally, by recognizing the pragmatic and semiotic foundations of praxiology, which I have defined as the study of human action in all its forms and fields, we can now see the primordial contours of an integral praxiology that incorporates the insights and terminology of integral semiotics and pragmatics. Thus, every human action employing a linguistic sign is a triadic quadratic pragmatic and semiotic action that simultaneously differentiates and integrates: (Fig. 7)

- a personified symptom of the speaker/writer in the form of an intrapersonal claim to freedom, denoted 1AQ or F1,
- a participative signal to the hearer/reader in the form of an interpersonal claim to justice, denoted 2AQ or J1, and
- a representative symbol of some other person or aspect of the world in the form of an impersonal claim to truth, denoted 3AQ or T1,

each of which simultaneously manifests in the appropriate corresponding forms of intentional signifieds (123UL), behavioral signifiers (123UR), cultural semantics (123LL), and social syntax (123LR), notwithstanding the all-too-plausible argument that the claimed contents of these primordial perspectives are never completely consistent in any particular action situation (123AQ), hence always already implicating additional, yet indeterminate, action situations.

However, if TQP frames the 12 primordial perspectives of each and every sign of human action, then where exactly are the referents to which these signs refer? Regarding this, I question Wilber’s decision to locate the referent exclusively in his semantics (XLL) quadrant. While I appreciate his reasons, I do not think it is imperative to locate it in this quadrant in order to support his larger hypothesis concerning the developmental/evolutionary spectrum of semantic world-spaces within which referents can, or cannot, be apprehend-
ed. In my view, the capacity to apprehend the referent of a sign, or in this formulation the referent of a semiotic action, is better framed as a triadic quadratic semiotic capacity with constraints that can be described, for example, in terms of the actor’s deep/surface structures of consciousness, which are, in essence, relatively stable conditions of possible awareness-in-action. Just because one actor lacks the semiotic capacity to understand another’s semiotic action does not necessarily mean that the referent of that action must be located exclusively in the semantics (Xll) quadrant.

Therefore, given the more-or-less constrained triadic quadratic semiotic capacity of the particular actor, I, where, then, is the referent to which my semiotic action refers? This can be deduced by unpacking some of the concepts already presented. Wilber’s definition of a sign as any aspect of reality that represents another to another implies that the referent to which a sign refers is an aspect of reality
represented by a sign. In other words, what is typically regarded by some semioticians as the real referent of a sign is simply the reality referred to by the sign or, in my version of semiotics, the reality signified by the triadic quadratic semiotic action. Given that TQP frames the whole of enacted reality from the perspective of the enactive origin, I, we can see that every potential referent of mine is framed within the 12 primordial perspectives of my semiotic action, which is governed by my more-or-less constrained semiotic capacity. These 12 primordial perspectives are themselves general domains of reality for all of us, hence primordial referents, signified by the system of personal pronouns we all use as primordial signs.

Furthermore, if all kosmic occasions are semiotic, as Wilber claims, then certainly all human actions are semiotic, if not also pragmatic, and thus all of my present actions signify the twelve semiotic realities I enact—including my views of me and you, us and them, him and her, these and those—as countless, intertwined, ever-receding series of past reflected and future projected action situations in which every sign is but a referent of another sign of a sign, ad infinitum. Finally, if my present actions can be referred to as past actions within my future actions, as any semiotician or pragmatician would likely agree, then all my actions defer signification of at least some portion of the reality I enact with those actions, pending future actions that will never, try as I might, complete the signification of my reality. Hence, it appears as though my situational action-in-awareness, however integral, is never really done.

Once again, these definitions are so fundamental as to suggest a universal scope of semiotic inquiry including, but by no means limited to, conventional spoken/written language and the reason and communication for which it serves as primary medium. Such an integral semiotics should certainly include complementary, extra-linguistic forms of semiosis, from the instinctive and intuitive to the energetic and empathic to the mathematical and musical, all of which are constitutive of the manifold semiotic reality of awareness-in-action. Hence, to the extent that integral praxiology entails the pragmatic use of spoken/written language, the resulting integral pragmatics should be informed by the more fundamental, more encompassing, extra-linguistic field of integral semiotics. Being so informed, this
integral pragmatics acknowledges the semiotic multiplicity in each action situation, even if only through the pragmatic medium of speaking/hearing and writing/reading about this manifold semiotic reality.

The essential elements of this integral pragmatics are framed within TQP, which is centered on action as expressed in the form of verbs, the use of which appears to differentiate and integrate the triadic quadratic pronouns that serve—both explicitly and implicitly—as spatially distributed subjects and objects of conjugated verbs, just as in the typical sentence structure of subject-verb-object (e.g., “I see you.”). The many forms of action, all the specific verbs, can be rendered in past, present, and future tenses and further modified by the use of adverbs, just as the many types of spatially distributed pronouns can be rendered more specific by the use of nouns and further modified by the use of adjectives. With these we have the basic grammatical elements of the sentence, which typically fulfills one of several generic functions, including the declarative (e.g., “There are moons orbiting Jupiter.”), the interrogative (e.g., “How do you know that?”), the imperative (e.g., “Look through this telescope.”), and the exclamative (e.g., “Wow, there really are moons orbiting Jupiter!”).

Furthermore, in addition to these generic functions recognized by all linguists, we can differentiate the triadic functions emphasized by Bühler and Habermas, which correspond with the three personal perspectives of representative truth, participative justice, and personified freedom. Given that the four sentences just illustrated are all variants of the impersonal representative function (i.e., declarative representative, interrogative representative, etc.), we can further illustrate the intrapersonal personified or expressive function (e.g., “I’m worried about the implications of this discovery.”) and the interpersonal participative or appellative function (e.g., “We really shouldn’t tell the Church.”), both of which may also have declarative, interrogative, imperative, and exclamative variants in use.

Finally, by incorporating conditional logic into these multifunctional sentences, often in the form of if-then clauses, we open each action situation to a wide range of logical possibilities for truth, justice, and freedom, from those we may regard as necessarily real
(e.g., “If the Pope looks through this telescope, then he too will see Jupiter’s moons.”) to those we may regard as *possibly real* (e.g., “If the Pope looks through this telescope, then he may revise Church doctrine.”) to those we may regard as *necessarily unreal* (e.g., “If nobody looks through the telescope again, then the moons of Jupiter won’t really matter.”), all of which we can nevertheless *realize* in some relative sense within that action situation.

The *sentence*, in turn, is the primary communicative act in spoken/written *language*, the communicatively competent use of which constructively enacts the variegated spacial-temporal realities—the *dimension* and *duration* of experience—that each and every one of us realizes differently through the triadic quadratic perspectives common to all of us. Recall that, for Habermas, “language and reality inextricably permeate one another. All experience is linguistically saturated such that no grasp of reality is possible that is not filtered through language.”

In subtle contrast to the Kantian recognition that our knowledge of reality is always informed by, and therefore conformed to, the structures and content of our reasoning minds, Habermas contends that “the reality facing our propositions is not ‘naked,’ but is itself already permeated by language. The experience against which we check our assumptions is linguistically structured and embedded in contexts of action. As soon as we reflect on a loss of naïve certainties, we no longer face a set of basic propositions that are ‘self-legitimating.’ That is, there are no indubitable ‘starting points’ beyond the bounds of language, no experiences that can be taken for granted within the bounds of reasons.”

Wilber would evidently concur, as he accepts the essential postmodern insights into the linguistically-mediated *constructivism*, *contextualism*, and *perspectivism* of reality, at least as we can know it through reason. Thus, reality as we know it is not some universal object given to the pure reason of some universal subject—as in * naïve realism*—but is to some extent a personal interpretive construction, the specifics of which are dependent upon a particular context which can always shift to another context, and, therefore, no contextualized perspective on reality should be unduly privileged as if it were universally context-transcendent. As he emphasizes, “language does not merely report the world, represent the world, describe the
world. Rather, language creates worlds, and in that creation is power. Language creates, distorts, carries, discloses, hides, allows, oppresses, enriches, enthralls.” So “if we are to use language as a tool to understand reality, we had better start by looking very closely at that tool.” Furthermore, Wilber emphasizes the enactive nature of all efforts to understand reality, wherein experiential realities are “brought forth or enacted in part by the activity of the subject doing the experiencing. Thus, one activity (or paradigm) will bring forth a particular set of experiences—experiences that are not themselves innocent reflections of the one, true, real, and pregiven world, but rather are co-created and co-enacted by the paradigm or activity itself, and, accordingly, one paradigm does not give ‘the correct view’ of the world and therefore it cannot be used (as if it did) in order to negate, criticize, or exclude other experiences brought forth by other paradigms.” Hence, my constrained capacity to embed well-formed sentences in relation to my triadic quadratic perspectival reality—which is a more integral standard of communicative competence—may also constitute my constrained capacity to constructively enact my contextual reality, one triadic quadratic perspectival sentence after another.

Awareness-in-Action may therefore be understood in terms of three interdependent, irreducible perspectives—first-person, second-person, third-person—each of which includes four constituent interdependent, irreducible perspectives—intentional, behavioral, cultural, social—all four of which are experienced intrapersonally, interpersonally, and impersonally from within each of the actor’s three distinct personal perspectives, thus forming a set of triadic quadratic perspectives that co-arise in every actor’s awareness and find immediate expression in the system of triadic quadratic pronouns at the pre-conscious root of semiotic and pragmatic action-in-awareness.
Once we recognize the triadic quadratic pattern of primordial perspectives that are always already active in every action situation, we can begin to explore the more subtle complexities of triadic quadratic perspectivism.

**Inherent Mutuality**

Although it may appear complex at first, Figure 6 is just the most basic form of triadic quadratic perspectivism, which I refer to as the 1<sup>st</sup> Derivative and denote as TQP<sup>1</sup>. For within each of the second- and third-person perspectives of human awareness-in-action, there is a derivative set of triadic quadratic perspectives owing to the fact that whomever is identified as a second- or third-person in relation to some first-person is a *person* in his or her own right and therefore the origin of his or her own unique TQP<sup>1</sup> actions, *interacting* with the *I-me* in the original TQP<sup>1</sup>. These reciprocal triadic quadratic perspectives are illustrated in Figure 8 as the 2<sup>nd</sup> Derivative of TQP, denoted TQP<sup>2</sup>.<sup>67</sup>

Thus, in relating to *you* within *my* second-person perspective (2<sub>AQ</sub>), *I* (1<sub>UL</sub>) recognize that *you* (2<sub>UL</sub>) are *your* own origin of awareness-in-action and therefore possessor or *your* own triadic quadratic perspectives (2.123<sub>AQ</sub>), the first-person singular of which *you* obviously regard as *I-me* (2.1<sub>UL+UR</sub>), the second-person singular of which includes, for the moment, *I-me* (1<sub>UL+UR</sub>), whom *you* regard as a *you-you* (2.2<sub>UL+UR</sub>), and the third-person singular of which includes any
third-persons to whom, or to which, you are referring, such as she-her (2.3UL-UR), which may, but need not, be the same third-person to whom or to which I am also referring in my triadic quadratic perspectives (3UL-UR). In my efforts to understand you and to help you understand me, I would do well to pay attention to your triadic quadratic perspectives (2.123AQ) just as you would do well to pay attention to mine (123AQ) as derivative aspects of the second-person perspective in which you recognize me (2.2.123AQ).

Likewise, in referring to some third-person (3AQ), such as her, I (1UL) recognize that she (3UL) is her own origin of awareness-in-action and therefore possessor of her own triadic quadratic perspectives (3.123AQ), the first-person singular of which she obviously regards as I-me (3.1UL-UR), the second-person singular of which may, but need not necessarily, include my you-you (2UL-UR) but will nevertheless be regarded by her as a you-you (3.2UL-UR), and the third-person singular of which includes any third-persons to whom, or to which, she is
referring, such as a he-him (3.3UL+UR), which could, but need not necessarily, be I-me (1UL+UR) or you-you (2UL+UR). In my efforts to understand her, however impersonal these efforts may be, I would do well to pay attention to her triadic quadratic perspectives (3.123AQ) just as she may be curious about mine (123AQ) as derivative aspects of the third-person perspective in which she may recognize me (3.3.123AQ).68

The simple recognition of another person’s TQP\(^1\) awareness-in-action in relation to one’s own TQP\(^1\) awareness-in-action opens the more complex, interdependent TQP\(^2\) and reveals the inherent mutuality of our situational awareness-in-action (123.123AQ). This inherent mutuality appears to be grounded in a cultural-social we-us (123.123LL+LR) with which I, you, and she must simultaneously identify in order to establish the fundamental mutuality of our action situation. In addition to that grounded mutuality that we all must share, each of us can, but need not necessarily, recognize additional collective identities in the course of our action situation, such as:

- a we-us with which only I identify (1LL+LR), such as my relationship with someone other than you or her to which I refer in our—mine, yours, and hers—action situation and to which you refer as a plural you-you (2.2LL+LR) and she refers as a they-them (3.3LL+LR);
- a we-us with which only you identify (2.1LL+LR), such as your relationship with someone other than me or her to which you refer in our—mine, yours, and hers—action situation and to which I refer as a plural you-you (2LL+LR) and she refers as a they-them (3.3LL+LR);
- a we-us with which only she identifies (3.1LL+LR), such as her relationship with someone other than me or you to which she refers in our—mine, yours, and his/her—action situation and to which I and you refer as they-them (3LL+LR and 2.3LL+LR);
- a we-us with which only I and you identify (12.12LL+LR), such as your relationship with me to which you and I refer in our—mine, yours, and hers—action situation and to which she refers as a they-them (3.3LL+LR);
- a we-us with which only I and she identify (13.13LL+LR), such as her relationship to me to which she and I refer in our—
mine, yours, and hers—action situation and to which you refer as a plural you-you (2.2LL+LR and 2.3LL+LR); and

- a we-us with which only you and she identify (23.12LL+LR), such as your relationship to her to which you and she refer in our—mine, yours, and hers—action situation and to which I refer as a plural you-you (2LL+LR and 3LL+LR).

This suggests that all collectives are originally, and indeed ultimately, we-us identities, which would make sense simply because each of us—I, you, she—is a unique active I with our own respective first-person quadratic perspective in which each of us always identifies a we-us in the collective perspectives. To put this another way, just as there are no individual identities that are not recognized, first and foremost, as first-person individual-subjective I (1UL) and individual-objective me (1UR), likewise there are no shared identities that are not recognized, first and foremost, as first-person collective-subjective we (1LL) and collective-objective us (1LR). As we will see, these seven permutations of the we-us perspectives within TQP² are sufficient for the mutual identification of all people, indeed all sentient beings, with the capacity for mutual identification.

This TQP² formulation further clarifies the distinctions between each of the triadic perspectives with regard to all of the quadratic perspectives. As we saw with TQP¹, from within the first-person perspective of a freedom that is expressed and reflected in pragmatic personification (1AQ), awareness-in-action presupposes and can be understood in terms of:

- the intentional or individual-subjective I (1UL), which is experienced intrapersonally as the root of consciousness and implied source of my own actions;
- the behavioral or individual-objective me (1UR), which is experienced intrapersonally as the conduct of my actions as seen by the I reflexively coordinating my behavior in relation to my intention;
- the cultural or collective-subjective we (1LL), which is experienced intrapersonally as the meaningful context of shared identity established through a lifetime of enculturation and often referenced in relation to the intentional I as if to justify action or diffuse responsibility; and
the social or collective-objective us (1_{LR}), which is experienced intrapersonally as the functional context of shared conduct established through a lifetime of socialization and often referenced in relation to the behavioral me or reflexively in relation to the cultural we.

Furthermore, from within the second-person perspective of a justice that is engaged and interpreted in pragmatic participation (2_{AQ}), awareness-in-action presupposes and can be better understood by:

- **recognizing in your actions (2_{AQ})** the same general quadratic perspectives that are, for you, intrapersonally experienced facets of your own first-person action as expressed and reflected by you (2.1_{AQ}), interpersonally experienced facets of your own second-person action as engaged and interpreted by you (2.2_{AQ}), and impersonally experienced facets of your own third-person action as observed and inferred by you (2.3_{AQ});
- **engaging and interpreting your TQP validity claims as I experience these claims within my second-person perspective (2.123_{AQ}); and**
- **receiving feedback and learning about my own TQP validity claims (123_{AQ}), which are disclosed and experienced as I engage and interpret interpersonally (2.2_{AQ}).**

Finally, from within the third-person perspective of a truth that is observed and inferred in pragmatic representation (3_{AQ}), awareness-in-action presupposes and can be better understood by:

- **recognizing in his actions (3_{AQ})** the same general quadratic perspectives that are, for him, intrapersonally experienced facets of his own first-person action as expressed and reflected by him (3.1_{AQ}), interpersonally experienced facets of his own second-person action as engaged and interpreted by him (3.2_{AQ}), and impersonally experienced facets of his own third-person action as observed and inferred by him (3.3_{AQ});
- **observing and drawing inferences about his TQP validity claims as I experience these claims within my third-person perspective (3.123_{AQ}); and**
• receiving feedback and learning about my own TQP validity claims (123AQ), which are disclosed and experienced as I observe and infer impersonally (3.3AQ).

Once again, triadic quadratic perspectivism differentiates and integrates the pragmatic personification, participation, and representation of human awareness-in-action that are designated, respectively, by the various permutations of first-, second-, and third-person quadratic pronouns. But in its TQP\(^1\) formulation, these three modes of dialogical reason are only active in a unilateral way, because my action does not fully recognize your action and his or her action in bilateral and trilateral ways. It is only in TQP\(^2\) that the inherently mutual nature of awareness-in-action is revealed. This suggests a continuous shifting of minds—my mind, your mind, and his or her mind—through interdependent personification, participation, and representation while engaged in action oriented toward mutual understanding of what really is free, just, and true for each and all of us (123.123AQ). Recognizing this inherent mutuality is one of the most important shifts of mind necessary to understand TQP.

Although Habermas does not recognize the fully quadratic nature of his triadic perspectives, he does emphasize that “fundamental to the paradigm of mutual understanding is... the performative attitude of participants in interaction, who coordinate their plans for action by coming to an understanding about something in the world. When ego carries out a speech act and alter takes up a position with regard to it, the two parties enter into an interpersonal relationship. The latter is structured by the system of reciprocally interlocked perspectives among speakers, hearers, and nonparticipants who happen to be present at the time. On the level of grammar, this corresponds to the system of personal pronouns. Whoever has been trained in this system has learned how, in the performative attitude, to take up and to transform into one another the perspectives of the first, second, and third persons.”\(^69\)

Building on Habermas, I am proposing that, by virtue of our evident facility with the system of personal pronouns, most of us are in possession of this tacit knowledge of the reciprocally interlocked triadic quadratic perspectives that structure all our actions in our worlds. Hence, any meta-theory that is purportedly formulated on
the perspectival basis of personal pronouns should faithfully reflect the actual system of personal pronouns used by every communicatively competent person. Accordingly, it is not enough to make reference to the first-, second-, and third-person perspectives as if each is an undifferentiated whole represented by a single personal pronoun, such as I, you, and him, or, as with Wilber, I, we, and it. By engaging this system of personal pronouns through the use of language in everyday reason and communication, we do a great deal more than simply identify the obvious body-based distinctions between me, you, and him. We also exert subtle, but relentless pressures to mentally differentiate and integrate the individual/collective as well as the subjective/objective aspects of all three personal perspectives for all three of us. Simply using each of the distinct personal pronouns in relation to the others—such as I-me, I-we, you-me, us-them, she-they—brings a certain creative tension to every action situation that results, through years of mutual practice, in the establishment of a remarkably durable, universally recognizable, and personally actionable meta-theory of mutual identification.

The linguistic evolution that appears to have generated this semiotic, pragmatic, and praxiological meta-structure of mutual identification suggests that it cannot be so easily dismissed as an arbitrary assemblage of perspectives from which selected perspectives might be eliminated or to which additional perspectives might be appended in an ad hoc fashion. As if to highlight this point, even the TQP illustrations in Figures 6-8 depict what appear to be clearly differentiated perspectives, with solid lines marking off well-defined white spaces for each content-free perspective. It suggests, for example, that my perspectival awareness of me is clearly differentiated from my perspectival awareness of you, and our shared awareness of we-us is just as clearly differentiated from our shared awareness of they-them. And yet, a moment’s reflection on one’s actual experience of such perspectives might suggest far less clearly defined boundaries. After all, where exactly in my awareness of our relationship does the me end and you begin? Where precisely do we-us transition to they-them in the course of my reflections on our conversations about them? Is there really a clear boundary between who we are and who I am? And if so, where exactly are you in the we that we share? It therefore
occurs to me that perhaps the crisp, solid lines of TQP might be better rendered as fuzzy, permeable transitions between fundamentally overlapping, yet nevertheless, primordial perspectives.

However, the primordial signs we use to designate these primordial perspectives—the system of reciprocally interlocked personal pronouns at the preconscious root of language itself—do not appear to admit such a gradual transition between \( I \) and \( me \), \( me \) and \( you, us \) and \( them \), or \( you \) and \( we \). Any attempt to think, speak, write, and converse about the everyday complexities of our life experiences while deliberately overlapping, conflating, swapping, or eliminating the pronouns used to designate adjacent primordial perspectives would result not in communicative \textit{nuance}, but in \textit{chaos}. Even the simplest accounts of \textit{who said what to whom} and \textit{who will do what when} would be rendered incoherent as conversations erupt in conflict. In other words, any attempt in a real-world action situation to unilaterally ignore the \textit{implicit rules} revealed in TQP\(^1\) will foment conflict and likely fail amidst the \textit{inherent mutuality} revealed in TQP\(^2\). Evidently, these primordial signs, and therefore the corresponding perspectives of reality to which they refer, tend to arise in a rather clearly differentiated perspectivism that nevertheless at least implies a less clearly designated continuum of awareness-in-action no less real.

Yet another feature of this mutual identification via TQP\(^2\) is revealed in the perspectival terms we often use to attribute our respective reality claims to one another. These triadic quadratic \textit{possessives}, illustrated in Figure 9, are the means by which each of us acts possessively, laying claim for ourselves and on behalf of each other to the specific \textit{content} framed by each of the 36 distinct \textit{contexts} enacted in the TQP\(^2\) derivative of our situational awareness-in-action. But this is about more than just the content of these perspectives. The possessives are the primary means by which we proclaim and maintain our relationships to specific people, other conscious beings, and non-sentient things. \( I \) relate to reality through \textit{my} particular TQP and in proclaiming \textit{my} relationships to reality through the use of TQP possessives, \( I \) lay claim to \textit{my} reality, as if to own it, control it, and protect it, as much as \( I \) may also try to disown it, share it, and improve it. After all, it is \textit{mine}; unless it is \textit{yours} or \textit{hers}, \textit{ours} or \textit{theirs}.
Granted, this is just the way our language works. Possessive adjectives and pronouns are linguistic tools that help us manage our pragmatic actions in the world. But language has evolved to represent who we are and how we act and language in turn shapes who we are and how we act. The possessives certainly do contribute to interpersonal conflict rooted in the sense of identification and ownership we often feel toward our parochial views on reality, to say nothing of our mutually-exclusive ownership of so much of reality. At the same time, the possessives appear to play an essential role in facilitating personal ownership of, and therefore accountability for, the reality claims made and the reality contexts implied in every action situation—ownership and accountability without which mutual realization would not happen. In the course of doing so, the possessives facilitate a measure of dis-identification from, and therefore self-reflexive relationships with, one’s own reality claims.
and contexts. For example, if I pre-consciously possess the perspectives, thoughts, feelings, and actions that arise in my awareness, then I can cultivate a conscious distinction between who I am and what I experience. This supports the development of an increasingly autonomous, yet integrated identity and the mature interpersonal relationships it can maintain.

Therefore, in somewhat of an irony, the sheer possessiveness of human action and the conflict it fuels co-arises with a shared capacity for personal development and the mutual identification it requires. As we will see, this personal development via mutual identification requires the continuous use not only of possessive but also reflexive pronouns, as they are the means by which I develop a paradoxical measure of possessive identification with, and dis-identification from, myself as I am able to (re)cognize it in me. Likewise, from my perspective, it appears that this latently possessive reflexive capacity shows up in your view of yourself, his view of himself, and her view of herself, as well as our view of ourselves, your view of yourselves, and their view of themselves.

**Mutual Reflexivity**

While Habermas’s formal pragmatics is grounded in Bühler’s triadic model of language functions in which a speaker comes to an understanding with a hearer about someone or something in the world, it is George Herbert Mead who provides Habermas with a pragmatic account of the developmental dynamics within and between these personal perspectives. “Mead starts from the view that identity formation takes place through the medium of linguistic communication. And since the subjectivity of one’s own intentions, desires, and feelings by no means eludes this medium, the agencies of the ‘I’ and the ‘me,’ of ego and superego, issue from the same process of socialization.” Thus, “the process of socialization is at the same time one of individuation.... As a principle of individuation he adduces not the body but a structure of perspectives that is set within the communicative roles of the first, second, and third person.”
By my reading, Mead engages in a form of reflexive self-inquiry by asking “where in conduct does the ‘I’ come in as over against the ‘me’?”71 As if recording his own discoveries, he observes that “the ‘I’ of this moment is present in the ‘me’ of the next moment…. I become a ‘me’ in so far as I remember what I said…. It is because of the ‘I’ that we say that we are never fully aware of what we are, that we surprise ourselves by our own action. It is as we act that we are aware of ourselves. It is in memory that the ‘I’ is constantly present in experience…. If you ask, then, where directly in your own experience the ‘I’ comes in, the answer is that it comes in as a historical figure. It is what you were a second ago that is the ‘I’ of the ‘me.’”72

At first glance, this appears to be a recapitulation of Kant’s self-inquiry, which discloses the fundamental distinction between empirical self-consciousness—which can be interpreted as the objective me known only in hindsight—and transcendental self-consciousness—which would be the subjective I who can know the objective me, but whose spontaneous nature, intuitively apperceived, forever eludes empirical self-observation. As Kant describes it, “the I that I think is distinct from the I that it, itself, intuits…; I am given to myself beyond that which is given in intuition, and yet know myself, like other phenomena, only as I appear to myself, not as I am.”73 Mead, however, follows his self-inquiry until he discovers, enfolded in the me, not just the reflection of a monological I, but the generalized behavioral expectations of other people—all of you—with whom the individuated I has been dialogically socializing in the course of its development.

He then proposes that, “the ‘I’ is the response of the organism to the attitudes of the others; the ‘me’ is the organized set of attitudes of others which one himself assumes. The attitudes of the others constitute the organized ‘me’, and then one reacts toward that as an ‘I.’”74 Mead contends that, “the separation of the ‘I’ and the ‘me’ is not fictitious. They are not identical, for… the ‘I’ is something that is never entirely calculable. The ‘me’ does call for a certain sort of an ‘I’ in so far as we meet the obligations that are given in conduct itself, but the ‘I’ is always something different from what the situation itself calls for…. The ‘I’ both calls out the ‘me’ and responds to it. Taken together they constitute a personality as it appears in social
experience. The self is essentially a social process going on with these two distinguishable phases. If it did not have these two phases there could not be conscious responsibility, and there would be nothing novel in experience."\(^75\) He emphasizes that, “both aspects of the ‘I’ and the ‘me’ are essential to the self in its full expression. One must take the attitude of the others in a group in order to belong to a community; he has to employ that outer social world taken within himself in order to carry on a thought.... On the other hand, the individual is constantly reacting to the social attitudes, and changing in this co-operative process the very community to which he belongs.... Those two constantly appearing phases are the important phases in the self.”\(^76\)

In Habermas’s view, “by introducing the expression ‘me’ to refer to the identity of the sociated individual, Mead is systematically connecting the role taking effective in socialization with the speech situations in which speakers and hearers enter into interpersonal relations as members of a social group. ‘Me’ stands for the aspect that ego offers to an alter in an interaction when the latter makes a speech-act offer to ego. Ego takes this view of himself by adopting alter’s perspective when alter requests something of ego, that is, of me, promises something to me, expects something of me, fears, hates or pleases me, and so forth. The interpersonal relation between the speaker and the one spoken to, I and thou, first and second person, is set up in such a way, however, that in adopting the perspective of a vis-à-vis, ego cannot steal away from his own communicative role. Taking the attitude of alter, so as to make the latter’s expectations his own, does not exempt ego from the role of first-person; it is he who, in the role of ego, has to satisfy the behavior patterns he first took over from alter and internalized.”\(^77\)

Thus, in terms of TQP\(^1\), the individual-subjective I (1\(_{UL}\)) remains pragmatically differentiated from the individual-objective me (1\(_{UR}\)), allowing the I a certain freedom to choose, in each action situation, how to respond to the interpersonal (2) expectations internalized in the intrapersonal (1) perspective of me. The reflexive structure of the intrapersonal relation between I and me (1\(_{UL-UR}\)) wherein I interact with myself, thus mirrors, in a general way, the mutual structure of the interpersonal relation between the reflexive I-me (1\(_{UL-UR}\)) and the
reflexive you-you (2UL+UR) wherein you-you and I-me interact with each other. This mutual reflexivity is then mirrored in the collective-subjective-objective we-us wherein we interact with ourselves, which constitutes my collective perspectives (1LL+LR) and part of yours (2LL+LR) and on occasion part of his or hers (3LL+LR) as well, as when we are all (123.123LL+LR) identified in the same action situation, as we all must be at a fundamental level.

Furthermore, in terms of TQP\(^2\), my ability to recognize the individual-subjective you in relation to the individual-objective you, that is, your intentions (2UL) that I interpret in contrast to your behavior (2UR) that I engage, is reinforced by my own first-person experience of the individual-subjective I (1UL) in relation to the individual-objective me (1UR)—a reflexive experience of responsible freedom that I attribute to you-you, as your own unique enactive I in reflexive relationship with your me, in order to establish an interpersonal relation. The individual-subjective-objective you-you (2UL+UR) is my perspective on your I-me (2.1UL+UR), as well as your you-you (2.2UL+UR) and your he-him (2.3UL+UR), each of which has its own corresponding collective-subjective-objective perspectives—your we-us (2.1LL+LR), your you-you or we-us (2.2LL+LR), and your they-them, you-you, or we-us (2.3LL+LR)—as enacted by your I (2.1UL) and engaged by me in my second-person collective-subjective-objective perspectives (2LL+LR) as either you-you or we-us. This forms my fully quadratic second-person perspective in the 2\(^{nd}\) Derivative, which identifies your complete set of triadic quadratic perspectives (2.123AQ).

Finally, as I shift my attention from the interpersonal relations I have with all of you, to the impersonal relations I have with all of them, I attribute to each of them the same triadic quadratic perspectives as I attribute to each of you, each set of which is enacted by a responsibly free person, a unique enactive I in reflexive relationship with her own me, whom I recognize in the individual-subjective-objective she-her (3UL+UR) and the collective-subjective-objective perspectives (3LL+LR), which can be identified as either we-us, you-you, or they-them depending upon which collective is relevant to her role in the present action situation. Similar to my perspectives on you, the individual-subjective-objective she-her (3UL+UR) is my perspective on her I-me (3.1UL+UR), as well as her you-you (3.2UL+UR) and her he-him
(3.3\text{UL+UR}), each of which has its own corresponding collective-subjective-objective perspectives—her we-us (3.1\text{LL+LR}), her you-you or we-us (3.2\text{LL+LR}), and her they-them, you-you, or we-us (3.3\text{LL+LR})—as enacted by her I (3.1\text{UL}) and engaged by me in my third-person collective-subjective-objective perspectives (3\text{LL+LR}) as either they-them, you-you, or we-us. This forms my fully quadratic third-person perspective in the 2\text{nd} Derivative, which identifies her complete set of triadic quadratic perspectives (3.123\text{AQ}).

Therefore, in this TQP\text{2} formulation of integral pragmatics, the development of my identity, I-me, in relation to all of you, as discovered by Mead and elaborated by Habermas, actually implies the development of your identity and his or her identity as well as the evolution of each of our collective identities via the pragmatic identification of all 12 primordial perspectives of the first-person (123\text{AQ}), second-person (2.123\text{AQ}), and third-person (3.123\text{AQ}) in every action situation (123.123\text{AQ}). Essential to this TQP\text{2} identification is the reflexivity within, and mutuality between, each subjective-objective identity—I-me, you-you, and she-her as well as we-us, you-you, and they-them—as well as the mutual mutuality by which each of us recognizes each of our primordial perspectives of reality. Recognizing this latently possessive mutual reflexivity is critical to understanding the developmental-evolutionary dynamics of human awareness-in-action.

As if echoing Mead’s phases of the self,\textsuperscript{78} but with a monological emphasis reminiscent of Kant’s transcendental/empirical self-consciousness,\textsuperscript{79} Wilber points to the distinctions between the I and the me before describing their roles in personal development.

If you get a sense of your self right now—simply notice what it is that you call ‘you’—you might notice at least two parts to this ‘self’: one, there is some sort of observing self (an inner subject or watcher); and two, there is some sort of observed self (some objective things that you can see or know about yourself…). The first is experienced as an ‘I,’ the second as a ‘me’ (or even ‘mine’). I call the first the proximate self (since it is closer to ‘you’), and the second the distal self (since it is objective and ‘farther away’). The both of them together—along with any other sources of selfness—I call the overall self. These distinctions are important because, as many researchers have noted—from Sri Ramana Maharshi\textsuperscript{80} to Robert Kegan—
during psychological development, the ‘I’ of one stage becomes a ‘me’ at the next. That is, what you are identified with (or embedded in) at one stage of development (and what you therefore experience very intimately as an ‘I’), tends to become transcended, or disidentified with, or de-embedded at the next, so you can see it more objectively, with some distance and detachment. In other words, the subject of one stage becomes an object of the next.

In summary, “the overall self… is an amalgam of all of these ‘selves’ insofar as they are present in you right now: the proximate self (or ‘I’), the distal self (or ‘me’), and at the very back of your awareness, that ultimate Witness (the transcendental Self, antecedent Self, or ‘I-I’). All of those go into your sensation of being a self in this moment, and all of them are important for understanding the development or evolution of consciousness.”

Although it is unclear how Wilber’s AQAL formulation might provide for any perspectival differentiation between his proximate self, or subjective I, his distal self, or objective me, and his antecedent self, or ultimate witness, TQP clearly identifies the proximate self as the first-person individual-subjective I (1UL), the distal self as the first-person individual-objective me (1UR), and the antecedent self as the integral awareness (0) within which all my triadic quadratic perspectives co-arise, all of which comprise what I will call the integral/différantial self (123AQ). Accepting for the moment the provisional validity of the antecedent self, the background witness, or I-I, to which Ramana Maharshi consistently directed our attention, we might hypothesize that the proximate self, the subjective I that I think I am (1UL), is but the antecedent self, the integral awareness that I am (0 or TQP0), when it is semiotically, pragmatically, and praxiologically identified with a deep structure of awareness-in-action through which it differentially enacts, or actively refracts, the distal self, the objective me that I appear to be in hindsight or foresight (1UR), along with all the other primordial perspectives of my integral/différantial self (123AQ or TQP1).

Then, accepting for the moment the provisional validity of deep structures of awareness-in-action that have emerged in one or more multi-structural sequences through time—regardless of how universal/particular or hierarchical/heterarchical any sequence may appear to be—we might hypothesize that it is this antecedent self that is
periodically identifying, de-identifying, and re-identifying—Ramana Maharshi would say continuously mis-identifying—with whatever deep structures appear to be governing my awareness-in-action, thus providing that self-evident continuity of awareness (phenomeno-) logically prior to the active (re/de)identification of the proximate I that I think I am habitually observing the distal me that I think I was and will be in relation to all the other primordial perspectives with which I can identify. This, as Wilber would generally concur, is further suggestive of the antecedent self as that integral awareness that is, in and of itself, whether the proximate I that I think I am (focused on the distal me that I think I was and will be) realizes it or not, uninterrupted by changing states of awareness-in-action—such as waking, dreaming, and sleeping—in the course of an ordinary day and changing structures of awareness-in-action—from preformal to formal to postformal—in the course of an extraordinary life.

While this distal me is not literally the proximate I that I was (any more than it is the proximate I that I will be)—as if the intentional capacities of an earlier structure could simply transfer over to become behavioral capacities of a later structure—it is nevertheless the objective perspective through which the proximate I that I think I am now can literally re-cognize the proximate I that I think I was then as the intentional signified corresponding with the behavioral signifier, me, of a temporal stage now past. This, I think, is what Mead means when he says that “the ‘I’ of this moment is present in the ‘me’ of the next moment…. I become a ‘me’ in so far as I remember what I said…. If you ask, then, where directly in your own experience the ‘I’ comes in, the answer is that it comes in as a historical figure. It is what you were a second ago that is the ‘I’ of the ‘me.’” This more nuanced reconstruction may still be consistent with Kegan’s developmental logic, whereby the capacities experienced as subject in one’s knowing within one structure of consciousness gradually transition over many years to become object in one’s knowing from the more encompassing perspective of the higher-order subject, provided that my past I-me can be known as a pragmatic object in relation to my present pragmatic subject (e.g., I now know something more about who I was and how I acted, which is another way of saying I now know something more about my past I-me). Thus, reconciling Mead,
Kegan, and Wilber, we might say that I become aware of who I was just a moment ago when I regard the me that I appear to be right now—as the distal me is but the proximate I in hindsight or foresight—and yet, in doing so, I can also become aware of who I was many years ago, when I was acting through what I can only now recognize—perhaps with the assistance of a good developmental theory—as a previous structure of awareness-in-action still operative as an interpretable-observable sub-structure of my current intentional-behavioral I-me.

Furthermore, if indeed the proximate I that I think I am (1UL) is but the antecedent self, the integral awareness that I am (0 or TQP⁰), when it is semiotically, pragmatically, and praxiologically identified with a deep structure of awareness-in-action through which it differentially enacts, or actively refracts, the distal me that I think I was and will be (1UR), along with all the other primordial perspectives of my integral/différantial self (123AQ or TQP¹), then it is reasonable to attribute the same to each of your integral/différantial selves (2.123AQ) and each of their integral/différantial selves (3.123AQ) amidst our situational awareness-in-action (123.123AQ or TQP²). What makes this all the more interesting is the fact that my understanding of your own I-me (2.1UL-UR), which I regard as the proximate-distal selves at the reflexive origin of you-you (2UL-UR), and her own I-me (3.1UL-UR), which I regard as the proximate-distal selves at the reflexive origin of she-her (3UL-UR), is supported, yet also limited by my semiotic, pragmatic, and praxiological capacities, or the proximate I that I think I am (1UL) as the structured origin of my awareness-in-action, which is situationally interdependent with the proximate I that you think you are and the proximate I that she thinks she is. It then follows (phenomeno-) logically that my second-person you-you perspectives (2UL-UR) and third-person she-her perspectives (3UL-UR) are governed by my active structure of awareness—the relative surprise of the proximate I that I think I am (1UL) in reflexive contrast to the relative familiarity of the distal me that I think I was and will be (1UR)—even though these perspectives refer to your intentions-behaviors (2.123UL-UR) governed by the proximate I that you think you are (2.1UL) as the structured origin of your awareness-in-action and her intentions-behaviors (3.123UL-UR) governed by the proximate I that she thinks she is (3.1UL).
as the structured origin of her awareness-in-action, which in turn subtly influence the proximate I that I think I am as well as the distal me that I think I was and will be, and therefore how I regard you-you and she-her. This frames the mutual, reflexive, developmental dialogue between the surprising (123.123UL) and the familiar (123.123UR) phases of each of our individuated integral/différantial selves—mine (123UL+UR), each of yours (2.123UL+UR), and each of theirs (3.123UL+UR)—co-arising in our situational awareness-in-action (123.123AQ).86

Rounding out these developmental reconstructions of the intentional-behavioral perspectives (123.123UL+UR) of each of our integral/différantial selves—mine, each of yours, and each of theirs—are the shared cultural-social perspectives (123.123LL+LR) of each of our integral/différantial selves (123.123AQ). Once again, accepting for the moment the provisional validity of deep structures of awareness-in-action that have emerged in one or more multi-structural sequences through time—regardless of how universal/particular or hierarchical/heterarchical any sequence may appear to be—we might hypothesize that, as each of us develops through our mutual, reflexive awareness-in-action (123.123UL+UR), the seven permutations of the proximate we that each of us thinks we are (123.123UL) and the distal us that each of us thinks we were and will be (123.123LR) will tend to evolve in concert. These collective perspectives on what it all means and how it all works begin with the fundamental we-us with which all three of us must identify in order to identify with each other, which will likely be governed by a structure of awareness-in-action that is no more evolved than what all of us can access in this situation. This might be thought of as a situation-specific capacity for pragmatic meaning-function and semiotic semantics-syntax with which we can all identify—one that still allows for the additional six less-widely-shared permutations of the proximate we that we think we are and the distal us that we think we were and will be, governed by structures of awareness-in-action that may be different from the structure in which our situational action-in-awareness is currently grounded.

Among other things, this reconstruction clarifies the perspectival basis for the existence of human collectives of all scales—such as relationships, groups, organizations, societies—that appear to be governed by structures of awareness-in-action that are situationally
different from those accessible by their individual members in other situations, including the potential co-existence of multiple multi-structural patterns of human development and evolution that nevertheless share in the we-us of a common humanity. It also clarifies the perspectival basis by which widely shared structures of pragmatic meaning-function and semiotic semantics-syntax, particularly when embedded in long-lived institutional designs, influence the life-long development of individuals by overtly encouraging individual and collective action, learning, and development consistent with the widely shared structure, while covertly discouraging action, learning, and development inconsistent with that structure. Finally, it clarifies the perspectival basis by which each structure of pragmatic and semiotic action within a multi-structural sequence can manifest differently depending upon whether it is doing so concurrent with, prior to, or subsequent to the institutionalization of that same structure in large-scale collectives.

Therefore, it appears as if the triadic quadratic perspectivism of human awareness-in-action may help us frame—indeed, may already be framing—the entire, multi-structural metologue of human development and evolution as it actually unfolds through the intrapersonal, interpersonal, and impersonal experiences of the intentional, behavioral, cultural, and social aspects of our situational awareness-in-action.

**Reflexive Différance**

This pragmatic mutuality and reflexivity that appears to be so essential to the development and evolution of identity implies an underlying semiotic mutuality and reflexivity of comparable significance. While Habermas does not offer his own particular version of semiotics, he does embrace Bühler’s triadic semiotics as foundational to his own triadic pragmatics. Furthermore, we can verify the extent to which Habermas accepts both the reflexive and the mutual nature of semiotic action by way of his critique of Charles Sanders Peirce’s semiotics. Briefly, as Wilber explains, Peirce’s model includes three features: i) a sign that corresponds with Saussure’s
signifier that Wilber frames, correctly, in my view, within his behavioral signifier quadrant (XUR); ii) an interpretant that corresponds with Saussure’s signified that Wilber frames, again correctly, in my view, within his intentional signified quadrant (XUL); and iii) an object that corresponds with Saussure’s referent that Wilber frames, incorrectly, in my view, within his cultural semantics quadrant (XLL).88

As Habermas interprets him, “Peirce seems to regard the intersubjective relationship between a speaker and hearer, and the corresponding participant perspectives of the first and second person (in contrast to the perspective of an uninvolved third person), as such aspects that may be disregarded. He seems to believe that the fundamental semiotic structure can be completely defined without any recourse to forms of intersubjectivity, no matter how elementary. In any event, he generally leaves off from his logical-semiotic analyses at the point where speaker-hearer perspectives come into play.”89 It is important to recognize that when Habermas uses the term intersubjective in this and the following passage, he is using it in reference to what he elsewhere refers to, and what I consistently refer to, as the interpersonal relationship between people who regard one another in the second-person perspective, as I regard you and you regard me. This should not be misinterpreted as equating exclusively to the collective-subjective perspective that we can share. Triadic quadratic perspectivism clarifies that not only is the collective-subjective perspective (XLL) categorically different from the interpersonal perspective (2AQ), but it has intrapersonal (1LL), interpersonal (2LL), and impersonal (3LL) differentiations (e.g., we, you-plural, they) that can only be legitimately undifferentiated within a properly identified indefinite collective-subjective perspective (XLL) (e.g., everyone).90

Habermas locates the source of what he sees as Peirce’s monological reductionism in his tendency to conceive of mutual understanding as a literal fusion of first-person ego and second-person alter, which “not only implies the dissolution of contradictions, but also the extinguishing of the individuality of those who are able to contradict each other—their disappearance within a collective representation…. Peirce conceives of the identity of the individual as the mirror-image of the mechanical solidarity of a group: ‘Thus every man’s soul is a special determination of the generic soul of the
family, the class, the nation, the race to which he belongs.” In contrast, Habermas draws approvingly on Mead as “the first to conceive language as a medium that socializes communicative actors only insofar as it simultaneously individualizes them. The collective identities of the family, class, and nation stand in a complementary relation to the unique identity of the individual; the one may not be absorbed by the other.”

Then, as if mapping the essential perspectives of semiotic and pragmatic action, the notation for which I have inserted for clarity, Habermas argues that “ego [1] and alter [2] can agree in an interpretation and share the same idea only insofar as they do not violate the conditions of linguistic communication but maintain an intersubjective [i.e., interpersonal 2.2] relationship that requires them to orient themselves toward each other as first person [1UL-UR or I-me] is oriented toward second person [2UL-UR or you-you]. This means, however, that each must distinguish himself from the other [12UL-UR or my view of I-me vs. you-you and 2.12UL-UR or your view of I-me vs. you-you] in the same way that both in common must distinguish themselves in the first-person plural [12LL-LR or my view of we-us and 2.12LL-LR or your view of we-us] from others as third persons [3LL-LR or my view of they-them and 2.3LL-LR or your view of they-them, which then implies 3UL-UR or my view of she-her/he-him and 2.3UL-UR or your view of she-her/he-him]. Were the dimension of possible contradiction and difference [between each other] to close, then linguistic communication would contract into a type of communion that no longer needs language as the means of reaching mutual understanding.”

Recalling the correlations between Peirce’s, Saussure’s, and Wilber’s semiotic models, it appears that Habermas agrees with Peirce’s differentiated reflexivity between objective sign (i.e., signifier, XUR) and subjective interpretant (i.e., signified, XUL), while criticizing his neglect of the differentiated mutuality between the first-person signified-signifier (1UL-UR) and the second-person signified-signifier (2UL-UR), with at least a nod to the third-person signified-signifier (3UL-UR) as well as the mutual mutuality by which each of these persons differentiates the signifieds-signifiers associated with each of these persons (123.123UL-UR)—a critique that must therefore extend to Saussure’s and Wilber’s semiotic models. Hence, the undifferentiated
communion that Habermas critiques might be illustrated in our context as the indefinite quadratic perspectivism (X_{AQ}) of Figure 10 in which anyone and anything, everyone and everything, are presumed to be understandable, if not yet understood, by anyone and everyone, without recourse to theories, let alone practices, of linguistically-mediated mutual understanding between real people using specific first-, second-, and third-person perspectives (123.123_{AQ}). This monological, rather than dialogical, meta-theory actually frames Wilber’s proposed semiotics in which the perspectival analysis of semiotic occasions is limited to an indefinite quadratic differentiation/integration of the intentional signifieds (X_{UL}), behavioral signifiers (X_{UR}), cultural semantics (X_{LL}), and social syntax (X_{LR}).

Wilber’s recognition of cultural semantics (X_{LL}) and social syntax (X_{LR}) as essential aspects of semiotic occasions, as well as the multiple levels of consciousness through which these indefinite quadratic
(X_{AQ}) semiotic occasions can occur, certainly represent conceptual advances beyond Peirce’s and Saussure’s models. Nevertheless, neither of these important differentiations can overcome the inherently monological nature of a semiotic occasion in which the dialogical differentiation of specific first-, second-, and third-person perspectives is completely ignored in favor of a generic indifference attributed to anyone and anything, everyone and everything. In Figure 10, all personal specifics that would be signified by 123.123_{AQ} pronouns in TQP have been unconsciously reduced to indefinite generics that can only be signified by X_{AQ} pronouns. Indeed, in a critique that applies equally to Wilber’s indefinite quadratic semiotics, Habermas concludes that Peirce “neglects that moment of Secondness that we encounter in communication as contradiction and difference, as the other individual’s ‘mind of his own’.”

Therefore, owing to the mutual reflexivity of our situational awareness-in-action, each of my semiotic and pragmatic actions depicted in Figure 7 must be understood as both a response to and a catalyst for your semiotic and pragmatic actions and his semiotic and pragmatic actions, as in Figure 11. More precisely, my personified symptoms of freedom (1_{AQ}), participative signals of justice (2_{AQ}), and representative symbols of truth (3_{AQ}), each comprised of its appropriate corresponding intentional signifieds (123_{UL}), behavioral signifiers (123_{UR}), cultural semantics (123_{LL}), and social syntax (123_{LR}), arise in more-or-less direct reference to those complementary and contradictory pragmatic significations of yours (2.123_{AQ}) and his (3.123_{AQ}) amidst our situational awareness-in-action (123.123_{AQ}). Thus, not only does my action simultaneously signify and defer signification of the TQP reality I enact with this action (123_{AQ}), but my action signifies and thereby also defers signification of the distinct and inherently different TQP realities that both you (2.123_{AQ}) and he (3.123_{AQ}) each enacted with previous action or may be expected to enact with subsequent action.

This invokes the polysemic neologism/neographism of Jacques Derrida’s différance, which signifies for many hearers/readers both the differ and defer aspects of semiotic action, with the respective spacial and temporal connotations and implications. As Jonathan Culler explains, “the verb différer means to differ and to defer. Diffé-
rance sounds exactly the same as différence, but the ending ance, which is used to produce verbal nouns, makes it a new form meaning ‘difference-differing-deferring.’” Thus, only by embracing the cognitive dissonance between the spoken sound and written sight of différence—phoneme vs. grapheme—can we begin to grasp Derrida’s intended meaning. As his innovative etymology suggests, différance invites a new way of engaging with a variety of latently hierarchical conceptual oppositions prevalent in communication, philosophy, theology, and literature, such as speaking/writing, presence/absence, and being/beings.

Derrida’s explorations of semiotic and pragmatic différance were triggered by his encounter with Saussure’s radical semiological proposition that, at its most fundamental level of analysis, language is comprised not of words, whether spoken or written, nor even of signs, with their signifiers and signifieds, but of the relational differ-
ences between all the sign elements of the language. As Derrida quotes him: "'Everything that has been said up to this point boils down to this: in language there are only differences. Even more important: a difference generally implies positive terms between which the difference is set up; but in language there are only differences without positive terms. Whether we take the signified or the signifier, language has neither ideas nor sounds that existed before the linguistic system, but only conceptual and phonic differences that have issued from the system. The idea or phonic substance that a sign contains is of less importance than the other signs that surround it.'"  

Therefore, "if in the linguistic system there are only differences, Derrida notes, 'the play of differences involves synthoses and referrals that prevent there from being at any moment or in any way a simple element that is present in and of itself and refers only to itself. Whether in written or in spoken discourse, no element can function as a sign without relating to another element which itself is not simply present. This linkage means that each 'element'—phoneme or grapheme—is constituted with reference to the trace in it of other elements of the system. This linkage, this weaving, is the text, which is produced only through the transformation of another text. Nothing, either in the elements or in the system, is anywhere simply present or absent. There are only, everywhere, differences and traces of traces.'"  

For Derrida, the ubiquity of semiotic and pragmatic différance has a spacializing and temporalizing effect on all signification and communication, with some far-reaching implications for all philosophical investigations of a (post)metaphysical nature:

Différance is what makes the movement of signification possible only if each element that is said to be 'present,' appearing on the stage of presence, is related to something other than itself but retains the mark of a past element and already lets itself be hollowed out by the mark of its relation to a future element. This trace relates no less to what is called the future than to what is called the past, and it constitutes what is called the present by this very relation to what it is not, to what it absolutely is not; that is, not even to past or future considered as a modified present. In order for it to be, an interval must separate it from what it is not; but the interval that con-
stitutes it in the present must also, and by the same token, divide the present in itself, thus dividing, along with the present, everything that can be conceived on its basis, that is, every being—in particular, for our metaphysical language, the substance or subject. Constituting itself, dynamically dividing itself, this interval is what could be called spacing; time’s becoming-spacial or space’s becoming-temporal (temporalizing). And it is this constitution of the present as a ‘primordial’ and irreducibly nonsimple, and, therefore, in the strict sense nonprimordial, synthesis of traces, retentions, and protensions... that I propose to call... différance. The latter (is) (both) spacing (and) temporalizing.103

Therein lies the basis for Derrida’s deconstructive critique of the philosophical metaphysics of a presence forever presumed, yet never realized, which can be interpreted as the systematic disclosure, via perspectivist, constructivist, (con)textualist reinterpretation, of the unrecognized spacial-temporal différance inhering in the mistaken presumption of the identity of meaning—that is, the mutual reflexive (con)fusión of intentional signifieds (123.123UL) and behavioral signifiers (123.123UR)—so prevalent in speaking/hearing and so readily exposed in writing/reading. This (con)fusión is commonly experienced when I presume to say exactly what I mean and mean exactly what I say and you presume to hear exactly what I say and know exactly what it means, which then supports our shared presumption of a mutual understanding in which all potential pluralistic meanings have been unconsciously reduced to little more than an indefinite behavioral signifier (XUR) of our conscious indifférance. While this presumption of presence may contain traces of past understandings that have stood the test of time, at least as you and I have come to believe, it also contains traces of future misunderstandings rooted in the very real différance we ignored to secure this moment of apparent presence—present deferrals that will produce future differences. In Derrida’s view, this monological presumption of presence and the dialogical différance it necessarily suppresses has infected a variety of philosophical writing and contributed to the aporia of metaphysical certainty evidenced in what Habermas critiques as the modern philosophy of the subject, whose monological presumption of a purely subjective reason conveniently encounters an objective world independently given to that pure reason and thus entirely understanda-
ble, once and for all, using nothing more than re-present-ative symbols of truth, with little regard for participative signals of justice or personified symptoms of freedom.\textsuperscript{104}

As Habermas elaborates, “the self-relating subjectivity [of the quintessential modern subject] purchases self-consciousness only at the price of objectivating internal and external nature. Because the subject has to relate itself constantly to objects both internally and externally in its knowing and acting, it renders itself at once opaque and dependent in the very acts that are supposed to secure self-knowledge and autonomy. This limitation, built into the structure of the relation-to-self, remains unconscious in the process of becoming conscious. From this springs the tendency toward self-glorification and illusionment, that is, toward absolutizing a given level of reflection and emancipation.”\textsuperscript{105} Therefore, in the active pursuit of understanding that universal reality apparently given to the monological reason of modernity’s ever-present objective subject, that subject has tended to unconsciously objectivate and subjugate, instrumentalize and universalize the countless unique enactive versions of it-self—each and every one of us—in the midst of its self-proclaimed and largely symbolic emancipation and enlightenment.

According to Habermas, this evidently postmodern critique of the modern philosophy of the subject has been for nearly two centuries an essential, if heterodox, theme in the philosophical discourse of modernity, wherein:

\ldots the accusers raise an objection that has not substantially changed from Hegel and Marx down to Nietzsche and Heidegger, from Bataille and Lacan to Foucault and Derrida. The accusation is aimed against a reason grounded in the principle of subjectivity. And it states that this reason denounces and undermines all un Concealed forms of suppression and exploitation, of degradation and alienation, only to set up in their place the unassailable domination of rationality. Because this regime of a subjectivity puffed up into a false absolute transforms the means of consciousness-raising and emancipation into just so many instruments of objectification and control, it fashions for itself an uncanny immunity in the form of a thoroughly concealed domination. The opacity of the iron cage of a reason that has become positive disappears as if in the glittering brightness of a completely transparent crystal palace. All parties are united on this point: \textit{These} glassy facades have to shatter.\textsuperscript{106}
Unfortunately, in the course of shattering the glassy facades of modernity’s invisible cage, the postmodern deconstructive intervention reveals its own perspectivist, constructivist, and (con)textualist tendencies toward a different sort of metaphysical aporia in which what Culler refers to as “the contextual determination of meaning and the infinite extendability of context,” if (mis)interpreted as the ultimate indeterminacy of meaning, would seem to be deconstructing the metaphysical identity of meaning at the considerable cost of undermining what Habermas defends as the validity basis of meaning. By strategically repositioning the serious language of logic and philosophy as merely a special case of the more encompassing nonserious language of rhetoric and literature so susceptible to continuous deconstructive reinterpretation, Derrida attempts to expose the absolutistic pretentions of modernity’s ever-present objective subject while simultaneously immunizing his method against any critique that uses the philosophical logic now subordinated to the expressive-aesthetic relativism of rhetorical and literary criticism. In this effort, Habermas suggests, Derrida becomes ensnared in a performative contradiction wherein the validity basis of a fully triadic dialogical reason arising in real-world contexts of everyday communication, if presumed to have been successfully deconstructed along with the admittedly deficient monological reason of modernity’s ever-present objective subject, would undermine the validity of deconstructive discourse itself, which “can never be wholly absolved of the idea that wrong interpretations must in principle be criticizable in terms of consensus to be aimed for ideally. The interpreter does not impose this idea on his object; rather, with the performative attitude of a participant-observer, he takes it over from the direct participants, who can act communicatively only under the presupposition of intersubjectively identical ascriptions of meaning.” Nevertheless, in my view, this critique of the self-contradictory potential in deconstructive postmodernism does not, itself, constitute a deconstruction of deconstruction, for it would appear that only deconstruction could accomplish that feat, and, in so doing, preserve itself indefinitely in the arbitrary equivalence of all fleetingly meaningful versions of relative reality—a narcissistic, nihilistic vortex of never-present subjective objects akin to what Wilber once described as aperspectival madness.
Instead, it provides an indication of the potential for post-postmodern reconstruction of the powerful insights of postmodern deconstruction within a more integral/différential semiotics, pragmatics, and praxiology. For the triadic quadratic perspectivism of semiotic and pragmatic action—that is, the integrated differentiation of my personified symptoms of freedom (1AQ), participative signals of justice (2AQ), and representative symbols of truth (3AQ), each comprised of its appropriate corresponding intentional signifieds (123UL), behavioral signifiers (123UR), cultural semantics (123LL), and social syntax (123LR), co-arising in mutual reflexive différance with each of your pragmatic significations (2.123AQ) and each of their pragmatic significations (3.123AQ)—reveals semiotic différance to be a primordial complex of deconstructive intervals within our reconstructive awareness-in-action (123.123AQ). Hence, if we define deconstruction, in general, as the revelation of semiotic différance inherent in all semiotic and pragmatic action, while further recognizing the primordial perspectival origin of semiotic différance, then deconstruction can be redefined as the revelation of triadic quadratic perspectival differentiations amidst the reconstructive integrations of our situational awareness-in-action.

Consequently, the dimension and duration of awareness-in-action is always already marked by spacial difference and temporal deferral, by traces of actions near and far, past and future—mine, yours, and hers, as well as ours, yours, and theirs—such that each situational action-in-awareness is as much an effect as it is a cause of its integral différance. In other words, action can be realized in the here and now only if this action is not something wholly given, in and of itself, to this situation, but rather a situational synthesis of traces to implicated actions near and far, past and future, and thus, by definition, not here and not now. With a nod to Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari,\textsuperscript{112} we might say that action in the here and now is rhizomatically self-situating in the milieu of its own spacial-temporal multiplicity of enfolding/unfolding traces to relevant actions that are not here and not now, yet différantially integral to the one action appearing right here, right now. Therefore, due to the mutual reflexive différance of our situational awareness-in-action, each of our triadic quadratic perspectival actions signifies to some extent the different realities that
all of us enact, while simultaneously deferring signification of at least some portion of these different realities, pending future actions that will never, try as we might, complete the signification of our respective realities. Hence, it appears that our mutual, reflexive, différantial actions-in-awareness, however integral, are never really done.

**Différantial Integration**

As soon as TQP\(^1\) is opened enough to fully identify the conscious actors with whom I am directly interacting, this being TQP\(^2\), then the complex, interpenetrating nature of awareness-in-action is revealed. For in the most basic of interactions framed by TQP\(^2\), that exemplar in which I act, you act, and s/he acts in relation to one another, we enact three unique, yet interpenetrating versions of TQP\(^1\), each of which frames 12 direct and 24 indirect perspectives within the self-evident reality of our situational awareness-in-action. From each of our different perspectives as a unique enactive origin of our situational awareness-in-action, each of us raises and redeems—either explicitly or implicitly—12 perspectival claims to reality (R\(^1\)), while simultaneously presuming 12 perspectival contexts of reality (R\(^1\)). Therefore, from each of our different perspectives as an origin of our TQP\(^2\) awareness-in-action, each of us has the potential to identify and realize: (Fig. 11)

- *my* personified symptoms of freedom (1\(_{AQ}\)), each of *your* personified symptoms of freedom (2.1\(_{AQ}\)), and each of *their* personified symptoms of freedom (3.1\(_{AQ}\)), each comprised of its corresponding intentional signifieds (123.1\(_{UL}\)), behavioral signifiers (123.1\(_{UR}\)), cultural semantics (123.1\(_{LL}\)), and social syntax (123.1\(_{LR}\)) of freedom, collectively denoted 123.1\(_{AQ}\) or F\(^2\);
- *my* participative signals of justice (2\(_{AQ}\)), each of *your* participative signals of justice (2.2\(_{AQ}\)), and each of *their* participative signals of justice (3.2\(_{AQ}\)), each comprised of its corresponding intentional signifieds (123.2\(_{UL}\)), behavioral signifiers (123.2\(_{UR}\)), cultural semantics (123.2\(_{LL}\)), and social syntax (123.2\(_{LR}\)) of justice, collectively denoted 123.2\(_{AQ}\) or J\(^2\); and
• my representative symbols of truth (3AQ), each of your representative symbols of truth (2.3AQ), and each of their representative symbols of truth (3.3AQ), each comprised of its corresponding intentional significeds (123.3UL), behavioral signifiers (123.3UR), cultural semantics (123.3LL), and social syntax (123.3LR) of truth, collectively denoted 123.3AQ or T².

Thus, from each of our different perspectives, it seems that the fully quadratic domains of freedom, justice, and truth are, in a sense, fully quadratic and triadic. More precisely, impersonal truth is a third-person reality claim as each of us expresses it, but the realizing of truth is inherently, inevitably a first-, second-, and third-person affair that we all must engage together—not as a regulative principle to be accepted or rejected upon reasonable reflection, but as a presupposed condition of our situational awareness-in-action. The same can be said for interpersonal justice and intrapersonal freedom.

Awareness-in-Action reveals that each of our actions is in reference to the others’ actions and each such action includes specific reality claims, whether expressed or implied, that are raised and redeemed in response to the others’ specific reality claims, all of which inform a complete semiotic and pragmatic dialogue regarding what really is free (F²), just (J²), and true (T²)—indeed, what is real (R²)—for all three of us. It certainly seems as though the perspectival nature of our situational awareness-in-action is arranged in such a way that I cannot realize my personified symptoms of freedom (1AQ or F¹), my participative signals of justice (2AQ or J¹), or my representative symbols of truth (3AQ or T¹) without realizing each of yours (2.123AQ) and each of theirs (3.123AQ) at the same time (123.123AQ or FJT²). And because the same conditions are presupposed by each of you and by each of them, we cannot help but pursue these ideals together in every action situation.

This TQP² formulation of integral/différential semiotics, pragmatics, and praxiology accounts for a different form of presupposed firstness, secondness, and thirdness essential to every semiotic, pragmatic, and praxiological occasion—my reality, your reality, and his or her reality—not just as I can realize each, as in TQP¹, but as each of us can realize each of ours. Furthermore, while embracing the mutual, reflexive, différantial, and ultimately integral nature of human
Awareness-in-action, this formulation reveals a fundamental flaw in all versions of semiotics and pragmatics—from Saussure’s and Peirce’s to Bühler’s and Habermas’s to Derrida’s and Wilber’s—that reduce human awareness-in-action to selected perspectives that can only exist as parts of a whole that is always already no less integral/différantial than TQP². Finally, by systematically deconstructing and reconstructing the more extreme forms of modernity’s *ever-present objective subject* and postmodernity’s *never-present subjective object*, TQP² may serve to expose the metaphysical premises of all metatheories and meta-narratives of *anyone* and *anything, everyone* and *everything*, which are presumed to be realizable by *anyone* and *everyone* without the need for theories, let alone practices, of linguistically-mediated mutual understanding between real people using specific first-, second-, and third-person perspectives (123.123AQ).

Awareness-in-Action may therefore be understood as the mutual, reflexive, différantial integration of *my* triadic quadratic perspectival reality, *your* triadic quadratic perspectival reality, and *his* or *her* triadic quadratic perspectival reality, not just as *I* can identify *each* of our distinct realities, but as *each* of *us* can identify *each* of *ours* as an essential dimension of *our* situational awareness-in-action.

**Integral Aperspectivism / Différantial Perspectivism**

Once again, the formal explication of performative rules belies the tacit knowledge and mutual acceptance of such rules that we inadvertently reveal whenever we make a concerted effort to understand one another in some real-world action situation. This is worth remembering as we consider the fact that each of the new second- and third-person perspectives just derived within each of the original second- and third-person perspectives of TQP² can be further differentiated into their own unique TQPs because each person just identified is a unique origin of awareness-in-action. This 3rd Derivative, TQP³, may seem unduly complex, but it includes such believable examples as *my* understanding of *your* understanding of *his* understanding of *me* (2.3.3AQ), which I could begin disclosing after *you* tell *me* what *your* business partner thinks of *my* resume, and *my*
understanding of her understanding of his understanding of her (3.3.2_{AQ}), which might be my account of a conversation I had with a friend who told me how her husband feels about her choice of career.

![Figure 12. Triadic Quadratic Perspectivism – 3\textsuperscript{rd} Derivative](image)

As Figure 12 illustrates, TQP\textsuperscript{3} has the capacity to simultaneously identify seven people explicitly or implicitly referenced in each moment of a specific action situation, thus framing seven sets of primordial perspectives for a total of 84 distinct perspectives (123.123.123_{AQ}). The point, of course, is not that all 84 perspectives must be explicitly identified in either of these conversations, but rather that these perspectives are already implicitly identified in the conversations. The open question in every situation is to what extent we may choose to inquire into these implicated perspectives in order to increase the transparency and accountability of our awareness-in-action. Should we choose to inquire, we will discover within the many layers of perspectives within perspectives within perspectives the previously hidden fault lines of mutual reflexive différance that
render such integral inquiries both challenging and rewarding, seemingly without end.

If TQP\(^2\) reveals the mutual, reflexive, différential integration of human awareness-in-action, then TQP\(^3\) confirms the fractal pattern of differentiation that reveals through potentially endless repetition its integral aperiodical nature. For with every second- and third-person perspective being potentially differentiated into yet another unique set of TQP, \(I\) appear to possess the potential to bring ever more awareness to the inherent perspectivism and contextualism of action situations that are nevertheless still framed within \(my\) original set of TQP. Hence, by virtue of its triadic quadratic perspectival meta-structure, awareness-in-action radically opens to a rhizomatic multiplicity of unique, interdependent sets of triadic quadratic perspectives, each set of which appears to be enacted by a unique origin of awareness-in-action, a unique enactive \(I\), with the potential

![Figure 13. Triadic Quadratic Perspectivism – Infinite Derivative](image)
to identify within its own perspectives all the other uniquely enacted sets of triadic quadratic perspectives, theoretically free of spacial or temporal limits. (Fig. 13)

Furthermore, as the personal particulars of this potentially limitless aperspectivism shift from one moment to the next, awareness-in-action rhizomatically reconfigures into countless new permutations of triadic quadratic perspectivism, each momentary multiplicity of which is simultaneously enacted by all the unique enactive Is as regarded from the perspective of each unique enactive I. This Infinite Derivative, TQP\(^\infty\), reveals the infinitely differentiated integration and infinitely integrated differentiation of a veritable kaleidoscope of self-imaging/world-viewing as seen through all the eyes, literally all the unique Is, that have ever been or could ever be identified in my circle of awareness. Therefore, TQP\(^\infty\) frames the ideal that each and every one of us can ultimately realize each and every one of us as unique members of a universal civilization grounded in the ultimate realization of integral aperspectival freedom (F\(^\infty\)), justice (J\(^\infty\)), and truth (T\(^\infty\)), and therefore ultimate reality (R\(^\infty\)).\(^{113}\)

As a novel way of articulating integral aperspectivism, TQP\(^\infty\) is suggestive of Jean Gebser’s “space-and-time-free aperspectival world where the free (or freed) consciousness has at its disposal all latent as well as actual forms of space and time, without having either to deny them or to be fully subject to them.”\(^{114}\) It frames a quantitative extensification of consciousness, in terms of the number of people with whom, and perspectives with which, one can actively identify, inclusive of all that has been and all that might be, while simultaneously framing, as the necessary pre-condition, a qualitative intensification of consciousness in terms of the clarity of awareness present in each person. In Gebser’s evocative terminology, the presentation, or making present, that is revealed in this differentiation/integration of all perspectives requires a capacity beyond rational thought that he calls verition, encompassing the arational perception and impartation of verity, meaning truth or reality, which “signifies the whole and renders it transparent wherever we succeed in liberating ourselves from spatially-bound conceptuality without reverting to irrationality.”\(^{115}\) However, this presentiating verition is not, for Gebser, an active practice so much as an infusive illumination emanating from what
he variously terms the *ever-present origin*, the *originary presence*, and the spiritual *diaphainon* that, again, renders diaphanous, or transparent, one’s manifest experience of the integral aperspectival world.\textsuperscript{116}

Furthermore, TQP\textsuperscript{∞} is also a novel way of conceptualizing Wilber’s post-metaphysical proposition that every knowledge claimant should specify the situation-specific *kosmic addresses* of *perceiver* and *perceived* in order to preclude the charge that his or her knowledge claim is based on the metaphysical myth of the unitary pre-given world or, worse yet, some given myth without empirical evidence.\textsuperscript{117}

In contrast to Wilber’s AQAL, however, TQP\textsuperscript{∞} reveals the vision-logic of integral aperspectival *perception*, by the unique enactive *I* near the center of TQP\textsuperscript{1}, of all the other unique enactive *I*s, each of whom is the direct or indirect *perceiver* of all the other perspectives that are *perceived* within each and every action situation. Thus, in my view, there is *no* human awareness-in-action—from TQP\textsuperscript{1} all the way to TQP\textsuperscript{∞}—in which the kosmic addresses of each and every situationally-relevant perceiver-perceived are *not* already identified—whether explicitly or implicitly—in the action situation itself, which therefore invites inquiry and advocacy about the actual coordinates of these perceptual addresses as part of the dialogue about the perspectival reality claims made in that situation. Even more significantly, due to the infinitely differentiated integrations and infinitely integrated differentiations of this integral aperspectivism, TQP\textsuperscript{∞} ultimately accounts for the integral/différential kosmic addresses of *any* and *every* perceiver and perceived that can possibly exist at any time and any place in *my* circle of awareness.

I am reminded of The Jewel Net of Indra, a wonderful metaphor of existence from the *Avatamsaka Sutra* of Mahayana Buddhism that deeply inspired the Hua-yen School of Chinese Buddhism. As Francis Cook eloquently recounts:

> Far away in the heavenly abode of the great god Indra, there is a wonderful net that has been hung by some cunning artificer in such a manner that it stretches out infinitely in all directions. In accordance with the extravagant tastes of deities, the artificer has hung a single glittering jewel in each ‘eye’ of the net, and since the net itself is infinite in dimension, the jewels are infinite in number. There hang the jewels, glittering like stars of the first magnitude, a wonderful sight to behold. If we now arbitrarily select one of these
jewels for inspection and look closely at it, we will discover that in its polished surface there are reflected all the other jewels in the net, infinite in number. Not only that, but each of the jewels reflected in this one jewel is also reflecting all the other jewels, so that there is an infinite reflecting process occurring. The Hua-yen school has been fond of this image, mentioned many times in its literature, because it symbolizes a cosmos in which there is an infinitely repeated interrelationship among all the members of the cosmos. This relationship is said to be one of simultaneous mutual identity and mutual intercausality.\(^{118}\)

In one sense, TQP\(^\infty\) is a conceptualization of Indra’s Net, with each I-centric set of triadic quadratic perspectives serving as a polished jewel in each eye of the net, transparent, yet reflective, with twelve facets that ideally reveal the entire space-time continuum of interpenetrating I-centric sets of triadic quadratic perspectives. But much more than a conceptual meta-theory, TQP\(^\infty\) is the perceptual meta-theory that appears to be always already active in our situational awareness-in-action—empirical and normative evidence, it seems, of our latent potential for integral aperspectival awareness-in-action.\(^ {119}\)

Nevertheless, while being integrally aperspectival, TQP is also d\(\text{iff}\)\(\text{érantially perspectival}\) in that it only reveals everyone else’s enacted TQPs consistent with the differing capacities of each actor as enacted in his or her own original TQP\(^1\). In other words, I am subject to my own indeterminately constrained semiotic, pragmatic, and praxiological capacities that not only limit my ability to enact derivative TQPs that fully identify everyone else’s TQPs, but in turn limit everyone else’s ability to enact derivative TQPs that identify mine. This Indeterminate Derivative, TQP\(^N\), frames the inherently indeterminate nature of integral/d\(\text{iff}\)\(\text{érantial reality rooted in the semiotic, pragmatic, and praxiological capacities active in the specific action situation, and does so in a manner consistent with the way each and every one of us actually experiences these invisibly opaque, surprisingly durable, supportive limits on our situational awareness-in-action (123.123AQ).\(^ {120,121,122}\) (Fig. 14)

TQP\(^N\) frames the indeterminate intentional-behavioral-cultural-social contexts within which I can identify with some of you more so than with others of you, and with some of them more so than with others of them, but not all of you or all of them to the same depth, not
yet anyway, and so the mutual reflexive différantial action continues—mine, yours, and hers as well as ours, yours, and theirs—as we all struggle to create enough aperspectival space to eventually integrate all our differentiated self-imaging/world-viewing. Therefore, TQP^N frames the complementarity between the context-transcendent ideality of TQP^∞ and the context-immanent reality of TQP^1, between which each and every one of us is indeterminately constrained in our capacities to consciously realize each and every one of us as unique members of a universal civilization, limited as we are to the relative realization of différantial perspectival freedom (F^N), justice (J^N), and truth (T^N), and therefore relative reality (R^N).

![Figure 14. Triadic Quadratic Perspectivism – N^th Derivative](image)

Notwithstanding the world-disclosing function of language and its inherent capacity to mediate the comforting illusion of a relatively coherent interdependence within which I can see, think, feel, judge, act, and learn in relation to each of you and each of them, this same language harbors a world-obscurring function that secretly undermines
and forever defers even the situational truth, justice, and freedom we nevertheless claim with every action we take. As we become more aware of this decidedly mixed blessing in progressively more challenging pragmatic action situations, we learn to engage that same language in its world-constructing function of relativistic reinterpretation. From one perspective, this deconstructive disclosure of previously obscured différance is a necessarily generative dynamic that can promote, if nothing else, a de-marginalization and re-contextualization of particular perspectives otherwise ignored and thereby devalued in whatever passes for established knowledge. But from another, less optimistic perspective, it can generate a veritable cacophony of irredeemable validity claims so divergent as to induce despair among those reasonable enough to care about the pursuit of real knowledge. What, then, is the potential for a world-transforming coalescence of integral/différential knowledge—that is, knowledge of what is true, just, and free for each and all of us—if all such pursuits are to be mediated by scores of ubiquitously opaque languages through which nothing, not even what I consider to be certainly real, is ever really present?

In his attempt to bridge the transcendent and immanent dimensions of language use, Habermas contends that “the world-disclosing function of language allows us to see everything we encounter in the world not merely from the point of view of specific aspects and relevant properties but also as elements of a whole, as parts of a categorially organized totality. Although it does have a relation to rationality, it itself is, in a certain sense, a-rational.... Linguistic world-disclosure stands in a complementary relation to the rational accomplishments of subjects in the world who are fallible, though capable of learning. Seen in this way, reason can withdraw into the idealizations of validity claims and the formal-pragmatic presupposition of worlds; it renounces every form of totalizing knowledge, no matter how concealed, while nonetheless requiring of the communication communities—set in their contingent lifeworld contexts—a universalist anticipation of a muted ‘transcendence from within’ that does justice to the irrefutably unconditional character of what is held-to-be-true and what ought-to-be.”

As if anticipating our own muted transcendence from within the
linguistic confines of our diffé rantial perspectivism, our every utter-
ance appears to lay claim to that irrefutably unconditional reality we
can as yet merely intuit and idealize in the presupposed ultimatum
of integral aperspectivism. Responding to this unspoken, unwritten
ultimatum, our ever-present, never-ending play of linguistic diffé-
rance—time’s becoming-spacial and space’s becoming-temporal—poses
no threat to Indra’s Net. If anything, the play enlivens and strengthens
the Net by challenging each and every one of us to present
ourselves and remain present to—to presentiate—the (dis)continuous
unfolding/enfolding of integral diffé rance implicating—or rather
absentiating—each and every one of us as the countless, unique,
enactive Is of the Net. For the language that discloses, obscures, and
ultimately (re/de)constructs our world-viewing plays a concurrent
role in simultaneously disclosing, obscuring, and ultimately (re/de)-
constructing our self-imaging through the same integral/différantial
awareness-in-action.

This TQP\textsuperscript{N} formulation of integral/différantial semiotics, prag-
matics, and praxiology reveals that each triadic quadratic perspec-
tival action presupposes every triadic quadratic perspectival action
with any number of derivative triadic quadratic perspectival actions
in a radically open-ended, yet reliably closed-minded meta-structure
of Awareness-in-Action. Indeed, each diffé rantial action can be
interpreted as a unique, situation-specific synthesis of traces to every
relevant diffé rantial action arising in integral awareness. Alterna-
tively, we might say that each diffé rance presupposes every diffé-
rance that makes any diffé rance in the diffé rantial integralism of
Awareness-in-Action. I am therefore proposing that our tacit
knowledge of the reciprocally interlocked triadic quadratic perspec-
tives, as outlined in TQP\textsuperscript{N}, constitutes the potentially infinite, yet
always indeterminate meta-structure of our integral/différantial self-
imagining/world-viewing—the semiotic, pragmatic, and praxiological
(a)perspectivism of human awareness-in-action.

Awareness-in-Action may therefore be understood as the inte-
gral aperspectival, yet diffé rantial perspectival self-imaging/world-
viewing by which we—I, each of you, and each of them—disclose, yet
obscure, and ultimately realize each of our unique, yet interpenetrat-
ing visions of reality.
Nowhere / Now-here

While there is in principle no limit to the number of derivatives that one must presuppose in order to act, there is in principle one person who sets the limit for each and every action, who sets the focus each and every moment, choosing who and what warrants attention and what sort of attention to offer, and therefore what kind of knowledge to gain and the extent to which it will be shared. That person is the unique enactive I who limits the otherwise limitless derivatives of my own triadic quadratic perspectives and thereby limits the otherwise limitless derivatives of anyone else’s triadic quadratic perspectives that refer to mine. And when I inquire into who I am—right now, right here—my triadic quadratic perspectives (TQP\textsuperscript{N} or 123.123\textsubscript{AQ}) dissolve into what might be described as the ever-present, all-inclusive integral awareness (TQP\textsuperscript{0} or 0) from which, in the next moment, my triadic quadratic perspectives co-arise once again as the differ\textacute{a}ntial action resumes. (Fig. 15)
The practice of self-inquiry, the Sanskrit name for which is *atma vichara*, is a subtle, silent inquiry, *vichara*, into *who I am* at the apparent source of all perspectives, thoughts, feelings, and actions, the sustained practice of which transcends the mental flow and purportedly reveals the integral awareness that *I am*, the real self, *Atman*, at one with absolute reality, *Brahman*, illuminating all manifest perspectives, thoughts, feelings, and actions. In the words of Ramana Maharshi, its finest teacher, “the first and foremost of all the thoughts that arise in the mind is the primal *I*-thought. It is only after the rise or origin of the *I*-thought that innumerable other thoughts arise. In other words, only after the first personal pronoun, *I*, has arisen, do the second and third personal pronouns (*you, he, etc.*) occur to the mind; and they cannot subsist without the former. Since every other thought can occur only after the rise of the *I*-thought and since the mind is nothing but a bundle of thoughts, it is only through the enquiry *Who am I?* that the mind subsides. Moreover, the integral *I*-thought, implicit in such enquiry, having destroyed all other thoughts, gets itself finally destroyed or consumed, just as the stick used for stirring the burning funeral pyre gets consumed.”

Hence, as already proposed, the first-person singular-subjective (1UL) pronoun, *I*, appears to be the *originary or enactive perspective*, the *first among equals* with regard to all the other perspectival pronouns, because none of the others can arise in awareness unless the *I* at the apparent source of conscious action also arises. Therefore, triadic quadratic perspectival reality itself, to whatever extent it is *enacted*, appears to originate with the pronoun *I*, which is *identified* with each and every experience of reality it claims, that is, each and every *form* it *names* (e.g., *I know this; I want that; I like you, but not him.*). The awareness of *I* is (phenomeno)logically prior to the other perspectival pronouns and *I* can remain as the locus of perspectival awareness after the other perspectival pronouns subside. Furthermore, when practicing self-inquiry, *I* am attempting to use the *I* in its capacity as the sole *locus* of perspectival awareness to then make that same *I* the sole *focus* of perspectival awareness—that is, turning the subjective *I* back around as if to make an object of *itself*—thus making it all but impossible for the other perspectival pronouns to arise
in relation to that I. Then, after sustaining this contemplative inquiry into *who I am*, the I that I think I am as the implied origin of all that I think I do within the world that I think I know—the *ahamkara*—tends to subside, leaving nothing but the integral awareness *that I am*. As integral awareness, the self-evident reality that I exist, that *I am*, not that *I am this or that* nor that I am *not* this or that, but simply that *I am*, reveals itself as the only self-evident reality.

Subsequent to this realization, notwithstanding my lingering tendency to identify *myself* with the I that I think I am as the implied origin of all that I think I do—that is, the I that resides exclusively within the confines of the 1ūl perspective—there is no ignoring the (phenomeno)logical distinction between, on the one hand, this perspectival I that is aware in the midst of its perspectival action, and, on the other hand, *my* awareness of this perspectival I as it seems to be aware of its perspectival action. This deeper and more integral awareness feels less confined to the 1ūl perspective of which it is now so evidently aware—suggestive of the I-I witnessing described by Ramana Maharshi—and more clearly illuminates *all* the triadic quadratic perspectives (123AQ) that co-arise within this non-perspectival awareness (0). After all, these are *my* personal perspectives on anyone and anything, everyone and everything that can possibly be apprehended in *my* circle of awareness. Within that circle of awareness, thoughts emerge, seemingly at random, beckoning the I that I often think I am to assume ownership as if it was the original author. If I choose to complete these thoughts, to silently speak a new sentence, then I simultaneously enact the semiotic, pragmatic, and praxiological features of *my* all-too-familiar self-imaging/world-viewing. If instead I choose to inquire as to whom these thoughts appear to be emerging, then these thoughts dissolve uncompleted and only this awareness remains, as it is, a familiar emptiness to be filled with surprises. It therefore begins to appear as if, during the course of *my* moment-to-moment awareness-in-action, the self-evident reality of human action—*that I do*—is always already absolutely realized in the self-evident reality of human being—*that I am*.

This implies that the ever-present realization of integral awareness that is always already presupposed in every différential action is always already being relatively realized in never-ending différential
action, subject to the indeterminately constrained semiotic, pragmatic, and praxiological capacities of each and every actor. If so, then perhaps the integral awareness (TQP⁰) within which all my différential action (TQPᴺ) arises is none other than the primordial referent—in this case, the never-changing, non-perspectival, absolute reality (R⁰) infusively illuminating all the transient, perspectival, relative realities (Rᴺ)—signified by all my différential actions. More precisely, perhaps my personified symptoms of freedom (1ᴬQ or Fᴺ), participative signals of justice (2ᴬQ or Jᴺ), and representative symbols of truth (3ᴬQ or Tᴺ), each comprised of its appropriate corresponding intentional signifieds (123UL), behavioral signifiers (123UR), cultural semantics (123LL), and social syntax (123LR), co-arising in mutual reflexive différente with each of your pragmatic significations (2.123AQ) and each of their pragmatic significations (3.123AQ), signify, first and foremost, the integral awareness (0) that each of us brings to our différential action situation (123.123AQ). Hence, the perspectival pronouns as primordial signs and the perspectives themselves as primordial referents could possibly be but perspectival differentiations of identity in the primordial semiosis by which all the différential signs and referents, names and forms, of our self-imaging/world-viewing arise in the integral awareness that we secretly, silently are.

As we have seen, within this hypothesis of the integral/differential self, the proximate I that I think I am (1UL) is but the integral awareness that I am (0 or TQP⁰) when it is semiotically, pragmatically, and praxiologically identified with a deep structure of awareness-in-action through which it différentially enacts, or actively refracts, the distal me that I think I was and will be (1UR), along with all the other primordial signs and referents of my integral/differential self (123AQ or TQP¹). This hypothesis contains a trace back to the Advaita Vedanta philosophy of non-dual reality, in which, as Dennis Waite notes, language is recognized as the medium through which the silent awareness of the integral self, Atman, at one with absolute reality, Brahman, manifests through speech as the differentiated names and forms, nama-rupa, of our worldly experience.⁰¹²⁶ Indeed, one sentence after another, seemingly without limit, our communicatively competent use of spoken/written language, informed by extra-linguistic, multi-media signification, (re/de)constructively enacts the
variegated spacial-temporal realities—the dimension and duration of experience—that each and every one of us realizes différantly through the triadic quadratic perspectives common to all of us. But it is this very use of language that reinforces the confusion between, on the one hand, the integral awareness that may well illuminate all manifestations of differential action, and, on the other hand, the linguistically-confined I that I think I am as the implied origin of all that I think I do within the world that I think I know. For in every sentence spoken, written, or thought, there is implied a first-person individual-subjective I who is speaking, writing, or thinking, in light of whose differental perspective this latest act of “illumined manifestation” might appear to have little more significance than a whisper in the wilderness, notwithstanding whatever bluff and bluster might accompany its expression. Nevertheless, even this seemingly insignificant sentence might enfold within its differental signification a primordial trace of the integral awareness that is its secret, silent source of illumination.

Therefore, the spacial-temporal realization of our ever-present, never-ending awareness-in-action—its dimension and duration as well as its difference and deferral—appears to be always already marked by traces of differental manifestation and integral illumination—potential awareness-in-action as-yet-unrealized, at least in this situation. Due to the differental realization of our awareness-in-action, each of our differentiated actions signifies to some extent the different realizations that all of us enact, while simultaneously deferring signification of at least some portion of those realizations, pending future actions that will never, try as we might, complete the mutual reflexive differental signification of our integral realizations. Regardless, while the differental realization (R^N) of awareness-in-action is never really done (R^∞), the integral realization (R^0) of awareness-in-action is always already.

As to the predictable Derridean challenge that this hypothesis of primordial semiosis might be just another metaphysical doctrine of presence, the definitive post-metaphysical response—following Wilber’s post-metaphysical maxim that the meaning of a statement is the means of its enactment—is to offer an exemplary practice by which the appropriately skeptical practitioner might realize in his or her
own direct awareness the real nature of this purportedly primordial semiosis. Thus, given the persuasive critique of the metaphysics of presence offered by an integrally reconstructed deconstruction, as proposed in my formulations of integral/différantial semiotics, pragmatics, and praxiology, what is the potential for a post-metaphysics of presence that is consistent with this integral/différantial semiotics, pragmatics, and praxiology? The answer begins with the recognition that, if all différantial actions contain a primordial trace of the integral awareness that is their secret, silent source, then integral/différantial semiotics, pragmatics, and praxiology cannot be limited to différantial action conditioned by the relative I that I think I am in the course of this action. So if I am serious about the deconstructive revelation of primordial perspectival differentiations amidst the reconstructive integrations of my situational awareness-in-action, then I must follow this purportedly primordial trace back to the source and see for myself whatever there is to see. Because the most immediate semiotic source of all these ideas to which I can direct my attention is the I that I think I am as I say what I think I say, it is to this I that I must direct my inquiry. This brings me back to the practice of self-inquiry, atma vichara, as taught by Ramana Maharshi. In his view, “self-enquiry is the one infallible means, the only direct one, to realise the unconditioned, absolute being that you really are.”

Awareness-in-Action may therefore be understood as the active differentiation of triadic quadratic perspectivism from the integral awareness that is nowhere to be found as long as one is actively searching, yet now-here as long as one inquires deeply into the identity of the actor.
If my interest was limited to formulating an integral meta-theory with the capacity to describe human action in its many forms and fields, then triadic quadratic perspectivism would suffice as a general outline. After all, it can incorporate many of the essential ideas of Habermas and Wilber, who may be justifiably regarded as the leading meta-theorists of the last half-century. But any meta-theory of human action that merely describes action or, worse yet, the results of action, regardless of how clear and comprehensive that description may appear, falls short of its inherent potential if it does not also prescribe action that can guide people toward a direct, personal experience of that which has been so clearly and comprehensively described. Therefore, my second proposal is to consider that perspectival action can only be understood through practical action and that this leads to a worthwhile inquiry into what practices are really essential to all human action. In other words, what practices must be presupposed by all people in order for them to act in any situation?
This inquiry into the practical nature of human action begins with the *action science* of Chris Argyris and several of his colleagues, including Donald Schön, Robert Putnam, and Diana McLain Smith. Action science constitutes “an inquiry into how human beings design and implement action in relation to one another,” and builds on such ideas as the *action research* of Kurt Lewin, the *community of inquiry* of Charles Sanders Peirce and John Dewey, and the *critical theory* of Jürgen Habermas. It is a rigorous way of understanding how adults *reason, act, and learn* in the midst of challenging social situations, with a particular emphasis on the collaborative generation and application of *actionable knowledge*.

As Argyris clarifies, “actionable knowledge is not only relevant to the world of practice; it is the knowledge that people use to create that world.... Knowledge that is actionable, regardless of its content, contains causal claims.... That means that actionable knowledge is produced in the form of if-then propositions that can be stored in and retrieved from the actor’s mind under conditions of everyday life.... In order for propositions to be actionable, they have to specify the action strategies that will achieve intended consequences, and they also have to specify the underlying values that must govern these actions. The action strategies have to be specified as rules that can be used both to design and produce... conversations and to construct criteria to assess the actions’ effectiveness.” Thus, much more than a *descriptive* theory of *applicable knowledge* gained through traditional social science methods, action science offers a *prescriptive* theory of *actionable knowledge* that helps people reflect
on the social worlds they create and learn to change them in ways more congruent with the values they espouse.

Argyris’s work can be situated within a larger field of more general action science, or *dialogical praxiology*, that includes a variety of alternatives such as: Lewin’s *action research,* Schön’s *action-reflection learning,* Douglas McGregor’s *theory x/y,* Bill Torbert’s *action inquiry,* Reg Revans’s *action learning,* Edgar Schein’s *process consultation,* Stew Shapiro’s *action-reflection inquiry,* David Kolb’s *experiential learning,* Malcolm Knowles’s *adult learning,* William Isaacs’s *dialogue,* Robert Kegan’s and Lisa Leahy’s *immunity to change,* David Cooperrider’s *appreciative inquiry,* and Otto Scharmer’s *theory u.* What they all have in common appears to be a focus on helping mature, self-directed adults develop even greater capacity for effective action in the world through enhanced self-awareness, reflective inquiry, collaborative learning, and more constructive, less defensive patterns of communication.

Within this extraordinary field, I find Argyris’s work to be particularly insightful with respect to the way people draw on tacit knowledge to design actions in order to achieve their own desired results and yet, in so doing, subconsciously enact patterns of actions that impair their ability to learn from experience and ultimately undermine their achievement of the results they desire. He refers to this paradoxical capacity for knowledgeable, yet counterproductive action as *skilled incompetence.* The significance of this insight for an integral praxiology, or for that matter a praxiological integralism, concerned with the tacit knowledge governing the actions of people in their efforts to realize their full potential in real-world situations cannot be easily overstated. Drawing inspiration from Hannah Arendt, Argyris contends that “the study of learning that serves action reaches to the core of human social life. Action is how we give meaning to life. It is how we reveal ourselves to others and to ourselves. It is through action that we create social structures intended to create and preserve the social order necessary for managing our lives, our organizations, and our societies.”

As we will see, this eminently practical, yet deeply significant connection between *learning* and *action* is central to Habermas’s understanding of large-scale social evolution. “It is my conjecture,”
Habermas declares, “that the fundamental mechanism for social evolution in general is to be found in an automatic inability not to learn. Not learning, but not-learning is the phenomenon that calls for explanation.”\textsuperscript{146} Taken out of context, one might interpret this as an optimistic, perhaps naively optimistic, assessment of human potential, as if Habermas is arguing for the presence of a universal and automatic ability to learn that effectively negates the possibility of any inherent obstacles to learning. Yet Habermas himself has spent decades studying and describing in voluminous detail both the function and dysfunction of (post)modern society and the ever-present crisis-potential so many of us unwittingly endure—evidence, it would seem, of the difficulty we all have with communicative reason and the deep action-learning it entails.\textsuperscript{147} Habermas is no naïve optimist. Regardless, if the action-learning at the heart of social evolution was a reasonably efficient and effective mechanism, we would have done it all by now.

I would like to think that Habermas is trying to shift our attention away from the all-too-common focus on how people succeed in learning, developing, and evolving, perhaps because an exclusive focus on the many ways we can succeed in these endeavors may inadvertently blind us to the many ways we can also fail to learn, develop, and evolve. If this is the case, then he is actually trying to preclude naïve optimism by calling for a more careful study of people’s tendency to not learn, despite their inherent capacity to learn. Indeed, “not learning, but not-learning is the phenomenon that calls for explanation.”\textsuperscript{148} To my knowledge, Argyris’s action science is all-but-unique in offering a balanced, rigorous, and practical treatment of people’s tendency to not learn, despite their inherent capacity to learn, as essential aspects of human action. Furthermore, in my interpretation, it has the additional benefit of being a decades-long, real-world application of Habermas’s critical theory.

Argyris, Putnam, and McLain Smith specifically position action science as an exemplary new form of critical theory\textsuperscript{149} congruent with Habermas’s early formulation in Knowledge and Human Interests\textsuperscript{150} and Raymond Geuss’s concise presentation in The Idea of a Critical Theory.\textsuperscript{151} Given Habermas’s subsequent transition from an epistemological focus on logical-methodological rules and their corre-
sponding *knowledge-constitutive interests*, with an eye toward the critique of ideology and false consciousness, to a formal-pragmatic focus on *performative attitudes* in everyday communication, with an eye toward the critique of systematic failures in societal rationalization, it is worth asking whether action science is still consistent with Habermas’s more evolved critical theory. In my assessment, it is even more congruent and may have even anticipated some of Habermas’s later developments in communicative action and discourse ethics, given the fact that action science is an exemplary method of communicative action-learning that was fully formulated and empirically and normatively validated before Habermas’s *The Theory of Communicative Action* was published in English. While I have not conducted extensive research into the matter, action science is the only such method I have encountered with any explicit link to Habermas’s critical theory, whether in its early or later formulation. My presentation in this book of the parallels between action science and Habermas’s *Communication and the Evolution of Society, The Theory of Communicative Action*, and many subsequent works therefore moves beyond the initial positioning by Argyris, Putnam, and McLain Smith and represents my own interpretation.

**Consensus-Based, Goal-Oriented, Error-Prone Knowledgeable Action**

The central concept in action science is the *theory of action*. A theory of action may be thought of as a subconscious accumulation of actionable knowledge that tells people how to design their actions in order to achieve their intended results within particular social situations, including how to learn from experience to design more effective actions. It represents a taken-for-granted way of reasoning, acting, and learning that seems to have been so successful in meeting past challenges that it is now assumed to be the best way to engage with one’s social world. The main reason people develop these tacit theories of action is because the daily challenge of interpreting real-world social situations and designing actions to achieve desired results would otherwise be very difficult and time-consuming.
Therefore, people simplify the challenge by drawing on a repertoire of tacit action design principles or best practices that they have learned throughout a lifetime of more-or-less-effective socialization.

This theory of knowledgeable action is often illustrated in terms of a dynamic process model of an action situation, the structure of which includes a three-step sequence of action values that govern the design of specific action strategies that contribute to the generation of certain action consequences. The action consequences include the intended and the unintended consequences of action, each of which can generate positive feedback for more of the same or negative feedback indicating the need for a change. Both positive and negative feedback are included in the single-loop action-learning that either validates or invalidates the current action strategy. When it is invalidated, people may design any number of new action strategies consistent with the action values until they produce results that appear to validate the latest action strategy. (Fig. 16)

![Diagram of Argyris's Theory of Action](image)

If all these new action strategies are invalidated by single-loop action-learning, an additional feedback loop may be activated and the action values that governed the original selection of desired consequences and the original design of action strategies will be brought into question. Unfortunately, because these action values are largely tacit and are intertwined with our well developed, yet
Zealously guarded story of who we are in the world, they are very difficult to surface, critique, and revise without some dialogue and the pressure that only crisis seems to provide. Nevertheless, if successfully revised through this double-loop action-learning, new action values lead to a new interpretation of the situation, a new vision of desired consequences, and new possibilities for action strategies, which, in turn, generate entirely new action consequences to be evaluated once again. (Fig. 16)

Overall, the continuous, rapid, and largely tacit dynamics of this action-learning can produce an extraordinary variety of action consequences, from creative innovations to destructive misunderstandings, all of which can be traced back to the action strategies and action values of all the people who created them, as well as the more-or-less effective practices of single-loop and double-loop learning that supported them. And because theories of action guide human action on all degrees of scale, it is possible to envision very large-scale dynamics of action-learning based on this relatively simple model. As I will attempt to demonstrate, this model may help us understand the mutual, reflexive, différential, and ultimately integral action-learning of couples, families, groups, organizations, markets, governments, social movements, and whole societies.

As will become clear in due course, the action science theory of double-loop action-learning is consistent with Habermas’s communicative action, by which he means social action oriented toward mutual understanding. Habermas contends that, owing to the validity basis of everyday language use, communicative action is governed by a tacitly shared commitment between actors to not only raise but subsequently redeem their validity claims through reasoned justification in pursuit of a mutual understanding of what really is true, just, and free in each action situation. “Because the idea of coming to a rationally motivated, mutual understanding is to be found in the very structure of language, it is no mere demand of practical reason but is built into the reproduction of social life.” Communicative action thus requires for its validation a practical, dialogical learning process in which all actors’ actions are discursively evaluated in terms of the claims to impersonal truth, interpersonal justice, and intrapersonal freedom that these actions explicitly or implicitly raise.
In contrast, the action science theory of single-loop action-learning is consistent with Habermas’s *strategic action*, by which he means *social action oriented toward the unilateral success of each actor*.\textsuperscript{160} As a social form of *purposive-rational action*, which is also known as *instrumental action*, strategic action requires for its validation a *technical, monological* learning process in which each actor’s actions are evaluated unilaterally in terms of “the empirical efficiency of technical means and the consistency of choice between suitable means”—in other words, the extent to which each actor’s chosen action produced that actor’s desired results and was consistent with that actor’s self-determined preferences.\textsuperscript{161} As a purposive-rational form of *social action*, strategic action-learning certainly does require communication between the actors competing for their own unilateral success, for example as we might see in a negotiation between opposing lawyers or that between a hiring manager and a job applicant. But it is a form of communication in which the validity claims to intrapersonal freedom (i.e., sincerity, honesty) and interpersonal justice (i.e., respect, morality) are at best suspended, or naively taken for granted, in favor of impersonal claims to the strictly limited truth of each actor’s success in relation to the other actor(s).\textsuperscript{162}

As Figure 17 more clearly illustrates, the action consequences of both strategic and communicative action are *mutual* consequences that must be *reflexively* evaluated by each actor in terms of his or her own *différent* standards for strategic and communicative learning. It also suggests the manner in which communicative action-learning can establish the action values that govern strategic action, that is, the subsequently-presumed conditions of truth, justice, and freedom within which *mutually-beneficial* goal-oriented action may ensue. In my interpretation, the inherent mutuality, reflexivity, and différence of both forms of social action-learning is what distinguishes Habermas’s and Argyris’s approaches to the study of human action—what I have termed *dialogical praxiology*—from the more common *monological* praxiology originating with Ludwig von Mises\textsuperscript{163} and Tadeusz Kotarbiński,\textsuperscript{164} which is limited to purposive-rational or instrumental action by individual actors without regard for what I consider to be the presupposed mutual reflexive différence of all human awareness-in-action.
It is easy to conclude, on the basis of Habermas’s critiques of purposive-rational action, including its mutual form of strategic action, both of which he often characterizes as teleological due to their overriding emphasis on action consequences, that communicative action is either not goal-oriented or at odds with goal-oriented action. However, he does attempt to rectify these misunderstandings when he notes that “my critics have on occasion overlooked the fact that both models of action [i.e., strategic and communicative] attribute to the actors a capacity for setting goals and for goal-directed action, as well as an interest in executing their own plans of action.”

Indeed, Habermas does recognize that communicative action has two primary aspects: “the teleological aspect of realizing one’s aims (or carrying out one’s plan of action) and the communicative
aspect of interpreting a situation and arriving at some agreement. In communicative action participants pursue their plans cooperatively on the basis of a shared definition of the situation. If a shared definition of a situation has first to be negotiated, or if efforts to come to some agreement within the framework of shared situation definitions fail, the attainment of consensus, which is normally a condition for pursuing goals, can itself become an end. In any case, the success achieved by teleological action and the consensus brought about by acts of reaching understanding are the criteria for whether a situation has been dealt with successfully or not…. Participants cannot attain their goals if they cannot meet the need for mutual understanding called for by the possibilities of acting in the situation—or at least they can no longer attain their goals by way of communicative action.”166 It is therefore rather useful to have a single, integrated model of human action, such as Figure 17, in which mutual, reflexive, différantial, yet integral consensus-based, goal-oriented action-learning is framed simultaneously in terms of its strategic and communicative dynamics.

For Habermas, mutual understanding and, ideally, consensus is the implicit telos of all communication and its pursuit through communicative action-learning is the guiding force of social evolution. Strategic action-learning is therefore not an equal complement to, but rather a partial derivative of communicative action-learning, which is consistent with the action science account. Nevertheless, strategic action-learning may be the means by which the insights and innovations developed through communicative action-learning find expression and generate consequences in real-world action situations. Thus, framing social evolution as a bi-dimensional action-learning process, Habermas contends that:

whereas Marx localized the learning processes important for evolution in the dimension of objectivating thought—of technical and organizational knowledge, of instrumental and strategic action, in short, of productive forces—there are good reasons meanwhile for assuming that learning processes also take place in the dimension of moral insight, practical knowledge, communicative action, and the consensual regulation of action conflicts—learning processes that are deposited in more mature forms of social integration, in new productive relations, and that in turn first make possible the in-
troduction of new productive forces. The rationality structures that find expression in [impersonal] world views, [interpersonal] moral representations, and [intrapersonal] identity formations, that become practically effective in social movements and are finally embodied in institutional systems, thereby gain a strategically important position from a theoretical point of view.\textsuperscript{167}

He also clarifies that in his view social evolution, or bi-dimensional action-learning, is dependent upon two initial conditions: “evolutionary challenges posed by unresolved, economically conditioned, system problems” and, fortuitously, “new levels of [individually acquired] learning that have already been achieved in worldviews and are latently available but not yet incorporated into action systems and therefore remain institutionally inoperative.”\textsuperscript{168} Therefore, in short, it is a combination of consensus-based communicative action-learning about \textit{the things worth doing} and goal-oriented strategic action-learning about \textit{how to get these things done} that yields the new actionable knowledge that may, in response to evolutionary challenges, eventually be institutionalized throughout society.

If indeed the pursuit of mutual understanding and consensus through communicative action-learning really is the guiding force of social evolution, then it might be fair to say that the \textit{absence} of mutual understanding and consensus about how to deal with evolutionary challenges of political, economic, social, and ecological significance serves as the necessary \textit{catalyst} for this innovative action-learning that tends to emerge at the margins of society. Drawing an analogy between social and biological evolution, Habermas notes that “species reproduce themselves when sufficiently many exemplars avoid death; societies reproduce themselves when they avoid passing on too many errors.”\textsuperscript{169} If so, then Argyris’s focus on \textit{skilled incompetence}—that all-too-common paradoxical capacity for knowledgeable, yet counterproductive action that people demonstrate in the midst of challenging social situations—takes on new significance in this evolutionary context.\textsuperscript{170} So too does the \textit{proactive detection and correction of error}, which, as we will see in Chapter 4, features prominently in the action science method of double-loop learning designed to overcome this skilled incompetence.\textsuperscript{171} Completing his evolutionary analogy, Habermas surmises that, “if the survival ability of organisms is a test case for the learning process of the
species, then the corresponding test cases for society lie in the dimension of the production and utilization of technically and practically useful knowledge.”

In other words, our prognosis for further evolution, which requires effective responses to the multi-faceted challenges of our time, is contingent upon our ability to deconstruct and reconstruct actionable knowledge about these challenges. Hence, in Habermas’s view, “the level of development of a society is determined by the institutionally permitted learning capacity, in particular by whether theoretical-technical [i.e., strategic] and practical [i.e., communicative] questions are differentiated, and whether discursive learning processes can take place.” Further evolution of the society—whether it happens and what forms it takes—will then be influenced by the extent to which the current institutions, such as organizations, markets, governments, schools, families, communities, and the media foster both strategic and communicative action-learning.

Having framed social evolution as a bi-dimensional action-learning process with both communicative-practical and strategic-technical aspects, Habermas draws upon the insights of developmental psychology to enhance this interpretation with “a developmental logic that incorporates a distinction between formally characterized levels of learning and the learning processes that are possible at each level.” As McCarthy summarizes:

Habermas construes organizational principles of society as sociostructural innovations that institutionalize developmental-logical levels of learning; they establish the structural conditions for technical and practical learning processes at particular stages of development. Principles of organization circumscribe ranges of possibility within which institutional systems can vary, productive forces can be developed and utilized, and system complexity and steering capacity can be increased. The concrete embodiments of these abstract principles [of organization] are the “institutional nuclei” that function as relations of production and determine the dominant form of social integration.... Social evolution can then be thought of as a bi-dimensional learning process (cognitive/technical and moral/practical), the stages of which can be described structurally and ordered according to a developmental logic.
In Habermas’s own words, "‘collectively shared structures of consciousness are understood as levels of learning, i.e. as structural conditions of possible learning processes. Evolutionary learning consists then in the constructive acquisition of new levels of learnings. It is reflexive learning, i.e. learning applied to the structural conditions of learning.’”

While in general agreement with Habermas’s developmental-evolutionary analysis, Wilber elaborates on the same passage from McCarthy by emphasizing that “there is, of course, only one way such a developmental-structural theory of social evolution can succeed—namely, in a careful distinction between the ‘quasi-universal’ or deep structures of a level of development and the contingent, variable, or surface structures of that stage. Although Habermas rarely uses those terms, nor are his ideas on the topic precisely those of my own, he nevertheless has clearly recognized and responded to the problem...” through his careful distinction between abstract principles of organization, or deep structures of action-learning shared by all societies at some level, and the ranges of possibility for concrete embodiment, or surface structures of action-learning particular to different societies at that same level. In my interpretation, regardless of how we conceptualize these multi-structural patterns of development and evolution (e.g., whether strictly universal, hierarchical, etc.), each of the deep structures within an overall multi-structural pattern—the relatively stable conditions of possible action-learning—is none other than the actionable knowledge guiding knowledgeable action at some temporal stage of human history. Evolutionary action-learning, therefore, consists in the deconstruction and reconstruction of these deep structures of actionable knowledge within potentially infinite, yet always indeterminate multi-structural patterns—that is, the mutual, reflexive, différantial, yet integral action-learning about the deep-structural conditions of possible action-learning that are presently institutionalized throughout society.
Deeply Meaningful, Broadly Functional, Partially Presumed Actionable Knowledge

In his subsequent refinement of this critical theory of social evolution, Habermas frames his inquiry in terms of the empirical connections between stages of social integration measured by increases in rationality and stages of system integration measured by increases in complexity. He contends that:

if we understand the integration of society exclusively as social integration, we are opting for a conceptual strategy that... starts from communicative action and construes society as a lifeworld. It ties social-scientific analysis to the internal perspective of members of social groups and commits the investigator to hermeneutically connect up his own understanding with that of the participants. The reproduction of society then appears to be the maintenance of the symbolic structures of the lifeworld.... If, on the other hand, we understand the integration of society exclusively as system integration, we are opting for a conceptual strategy that presents society after the model of a self-regulating system. It ties social-scientific analysis to the external perspective of an observer and poses the problem of interpreting the concept of a system in such a way that it can be applied to interconnections of action.

Echoing his earlier work on the methodological distinctions between empirical-analytic explanation and historical-hermeneutic interpretation, Habermas re-emphasizes that, “the fundamental problem of social theory is how to connect in a satisfactory way the two conceptual strategies indicated by the notions of ‘system’ and ‘lifeworld’.”

While maintaining his focus on human action and his strong preference for communicative action, Habermas appears to be modifying his earlier account of the essential role played by strategic action-learning in the bi-dimensional dynamics of social evolution. He argues that “it is only possible to analyze these connections [between stages of social integration and stages of system integration] by distinguishing mechanisms for coordinating action that harmonize the action orientations of participants from mechanisms that stabilize nonintended interconnections of actions by way of functionally intermeshing action consequences. In one case, the integration
of an action system is established by a normatively secured or communicatively achieved consensus [using language as the medium], in the other case, by a nonnormative regulation of individual decisions that extends beyond the actors’ consciousnesses [using power or money as steering media]. This distinction between a social integration of society, which takes effect in action orientations, and a systemic integration, which reaches through and beyond action orientations, calls for a corresponding differentiation in the concept of society itself.... Society is conceived from the perspective of acting subjects as the lifeworld of a social group. In contrast, from the observer’s perspective of someone not involved, society can be conceived only as a system of actions such that each action has a functional significance according to its contribution to the maintenance of the system.”

Having reinterpreted the history of (post)modernity through these two complementary social theories, Habermas offers a metatheoretical account of the bi-dimensional dynamics of social evolution intended to incorporate the strengths and overcome the weaknesses of each constituent theory, while establishing an explanatory/interpretive basis for what appears to be the beginning of a critical theory of post-postmodernity. As he summarizes, “Marx starts from problems of system integration, Weber from problems of social integration....

a. Learning capacities first acquired by individual members of society or by marginal groups make their way into the society’s interpretive system via exemplary learning processes. Collectively shared structures of consciousness and stocks of knowledge represent a cognitive potential—in terms of empirical knowledge and moral-practical insight—that can be utilized for societal purposes.

b. Societies learn through resolving system problems that present evolutionary challenges. By this I mean problems that overload the steering capacity available within the limits of a given social formation. Societies can learn in an evolutionary sense by drawing upon moral and legal representations contained in world-views to reorganize systems of action and shape new forms of social integration. This process can be understood as an institutional embodiment of rationality structures already developed at the cultural level.
c. The establishment of a *new form of social integration* makes it possible to implement available (or to produce new) technical-organizational knowledge, that is to say, it makes possible a *heightening of productive forces* and an expansion of systemic complexity. Thus learning processes in the area of moral-practical consciousness function as a pacemaker in social evolution.

Hence, in light of this bi-dimensional meta-theory, “evolutionary advances are marked by institutions that make it possible to solve whatever system problems are producing a crisis, and to do so in virtue of features that derive from their embodiment of rationality structures.”

One way to engage with Habermas’s conception of society as simultaneously lifeworld and system is to accept without challenge that the *society-as-lifeworld* represents the perspective of *participants-in-action*, while the *society-as-system* represents the perspective of *observers-of-action*. At first glance, this suggests that the lifeworld/system perspectives are aligned with the *subjective/objective* perspectives of human action as depicted in the left/right sides of triadic quadratic perspectivism. Wilber would seem to agree, as he incorporates Habermas’s lifeworld/system into his cultural/social (LL/LR) perspectives of human evolution, elaborating extensively on the distinctions between *functionalist* inquiry into the social—*how does it function?*—and *hermeneutical* inquiry into the cultural—*what does it mean?*. Hence, while the *functional* distinctions between premodern, modern, and postmodern eras—such as agricultural monarchies, industrial nation-states, and informational networks—might be *objectively observable* in terms of system dynamics, the *meaningful* distinctions between their corresponding lifeworlds—such as prerational-mythic, rational-scientific, and postrational-linguistic—require *subjective interpretation*. Wilber also emphasizes the fully quadratic nature of human evolution, wherein any new *holon*, such as an innovation, emerges within an established worldspace of *selection pressures* (i.e., previously validated knowledge) on the basis of which this innovation must be *tetra-meshed* (i.e., validated), not only in terms of the *collective* dimension of subjective *meaning* (LL) and objective *function* (LR), but also in terms of the *individual* dimension of subjective *intention* (UL) and objective *behavior* (UR). Wilber thus
frames the co-emergent *tetra-dimensional* features of human development and evolution—*intentional-behavioral-meaningful-functional* or, alternatively, *individual-collective* and *subjective-objective*—that are less clearly delineated, yet nevertheless implied in Habermas’s account. (Fig. 4)

Unfortunately, Wilber mistakenly equates and conflates these tetra-dimensional features of human development and evolution with the *tri-dimensional* features articulated in Habermas’s theory of communicative action, conflating first-person *sincerity* or *beauty* (1) with individual-subjective *intention* (UL), second-person *rightness* or *goodness* (2) with collective-subjective *meaning* (LL), and third-person *truth* (3) with both individual-objective *behavior* (UR) and collective-objective *function* (LR).\(^{187}\) (Fig. 5) This tri/quad conflation renders incoherent what would otherwise have been a perfectly useful, if wholly monological, indefinite quadratic account of human development and evolution (*X\text{AQAL}*) highlighting the interdependent intentional-behavioral-meaningful-functional features presumed to be applicable to *anyone* and *anything*, *everyone* and *everything*, while nevertheless ignoring the dialogical differences between specific first-, second-, and third-person quadratic perspectives.\(^{188}\) (Fig. 10) In contrast, triadic quadratic perspectivism (123.123\_AQ) appears capable of framing the entire, multi-faceted integral/différential dialogue of human development and evolution as it actually unfolds through the intrapersonal, interpersonal, and impersonal dimensions of intention, behavior, meaning, and function. (Fig. 14)

A second glance at Habermas’s account—again accepting without challenge that the *society-as-lifeworld* represents the perspective of *participants-in-action* while the *society-as-system* represents the perspective of *observers-of-action*—reveals a subtle shift in the previously established parallels between his lifeworld/system and Argyris’s theory of action. Regarding society-as-lifeworld, Habermas’s harmonization of *action orientations* via normatively secured or communicatively achieved consensus remains consistent with Argyris’s tacit presumption or deliberate validation of *action values* via communicative or double-loop action-learning. However, regarding society-as-system, Habermas’s functionally intermeshed *action consequences* via non-normative regulation from beyond the actors’ consciousnesses
suggests the need for a wider, system dynamics explanation for Argyris’s primarily-actor-produced *action consequences* than can be inferred from the actors’ own strategies and values, without necessarily invalidating these features of action for partial explanation. Such a system dynamics would seek to explain the action consequences between Actors 1 and 2 in Figure 17 in terms of the functional fit with a variety of other media-steered action consequences, with little regard for any of the actors, action values, or action strategies implied, as if the system operates by its own internal logic of power or money.

In my view, however, even those systems of human action that really do function by an internal logic that can be conceptualized and quantified without regard for particular actors and their values and strategies must, nevertheless, engage all these actors in their own unavoidably myopic, but adequately rewarding strategic pursuits in order for the system itself to function. The institutionalized systems of power and money do not function of their own systemic volition, but rather provide the systemic incentives and constraints that induce actors to exercise their own strategic volition, the consequences of which inadvertently contribute to the (dys)functional system dynamics largely beyond their respective purviews. Moreover, whatever the functionalist logic of the society-as-system may appear to be, that logic did not originate and propagate itself in the absence of powerful, wealthy actors personally involved in the logical design of these functionalist systems that, not surprisingly, further accumulate and concentrate power and wealth to the primary benefit of these designers and their successors. Indeed, Habermas’s concurrent account of social evolution appears to admit that all such institutionalized systems, however impersonally functionalist and extra-linguistic they may appear in operation, are designed, managed, and periodically redesigned by communicatively-informed, strategically-oriented actors using language as a medium. Additionally, their technical innovations in response to what they regard as system dysfunction can be traced, at least in theory, all the way back through a web of communicative action-learning to entirely different actors whose antecedent acts of individual learning were, at the time, a cognitive, moral, and volitional advance be-
yond—or perhaps just an alternative to—the mainstream institutional standards.

Likewise, notwithstanding Wilber’s wholesale incorporation of Habermas’s actor-agnostic, functionally-intermeshed *system* into his account of the collective-objective social (LR) quadrant, he also appears to echo Habermas’s communicative/strategic complementarity in his engagement with Marx’s correlated *superstructure/base*, although he places more emphasis on the tendency for technological innovation in the LR quadrant (i.e., *techno-economic base* or *productive forces*) to emerge in advance of the corresponding worldviews in the LL quadrant (i.e., *cultural superstructure* or *productive relations*), thus implying, contra-Habermas, that it may be *strategic* action-learning, rather than *communicative* action-learning, that serves as the pace-maker in socio-technical evolution. But, again, Wilber views this dynamic through the *tetra-dimensional* facets of human development and evolution, which suggests that he wishes to place equal emphasis across the *individual/collective* and *subjective/objective* dimensions, without intentionally privileging any at the expense of the others.

While these interpretations of the Habermasian lifeworld/system are reasonable and reconcilable—and all the more compelling given the Argyrisian and Wilberian implications as yet merely suggested—I believe a more careful reconstruction of these important ideas is necessary in order to preclude the inadvertent reduction of *triadic* quadratic perspectivism ($123.123_{AQ}$) (Fig. 14) to an *indefinite* quadratic perspectivism ($X_{AQ}$) (Fig. 10) that, while precluding the distortions of the tri/quad conflated AQAL, would nevertheless ignore the dialogical nature of human action, development, and evolution. This begins with a deeper look at Habermas’s formulation of the lifeworld that will, in turn, suggest some previously unacknowledged depth in the system view of society.

**Reconstructing Lifeworld/System**

Elaborating on the phenomenological lifeworld theories of Edmund Husserl and Alfred Schütz, Habermas positions the lifeworld as the deep-seated background knowledge on the basis of which every new action situation arises. For him, the concept of the life-
world is an essential feature of the theory of communicative action, with the *implicit structure* of the former supporting the *explicit process* of the latter, which, in turn, more-or-less implicitly/explicitly reproduces the former, while both, being linguistically constituted, bear the familiar triadic logic of perspectival language itself. Thus, “action, or mastery of situations, presents itself as a circular process in which the actor is at once both the *initiator* of his accountable actions and the *product* of the [impersonal] traditions in which he stands, of the [interpersonal] solidary groups to which he belongs, [and] of [intrapersonal] socialization and learning processes to which he is exposed.”

As he elaborates, “one can... imagine the components of the lifeworld—cultural paradigms [3], legitimate orders [2], personality structures [1]—as condensed forms of, and sediments deposited by, the following processes that operate by way of communicative action: reaching understanding, action coordination, and socialization. What enters into communicative action from the resources of the background of the lifeworld, flows through the sluice gates of thematization, and permits the mastery of situations, constitutes the stock of knowledge preserved within communicative practices. This stock of knowledge solidifies, along paths of interpretation, into interpretive paradigms that are handed down; the knowledge becomes compressed, in the network of interactions of social groups, into values and norms; and it condenses, by way of socialization processes, into attitudes, competencies, modes of perception, and identities. The components of the lifeworld result from and are maintained through the continuation of valid knowledge, the stabilization of group solidarities, and the formation of accountable actors. The web of everyday communicative practices extends across the semantic field of symbolic contents just as much as in the dimensions of social space and historical time, constituting the medium through which culture [3], society [2], and personality structures [1] develop and are reproduced.” By my reading, these impersonal, interpersonal, and intrapersonal lifeworld resources that Habermas describes as *the stock of knowledge preserved within everyday communicative practices* may be interpreted in Argyrisian terms as the *actionable knowledge* from which people draw in order to design their knowl-
edgeable actions in real-world situations and to which people contribute via communicative learning in the wake of these actions.

In Habermas’s conception, the immediate certainty, totalizing power, and impenetrable holism of the lifeworld suggest a massive background consensus that silently stabilizes the inherent instability of each and every action situation in which novel claims to valid truth, justice, and freedom are in question. Without this massive background consensus, the ever-present, never-ending potential for differential novelty and conflict among communicative actors with inherently unique perspectives on what really is true, just, and free would overwhelm even the noblest commitments to consensus. The lifeworld thus serves a paradoxical function as ground. “It keeps contingency in check through proximity to experience. Using sureties that we obtain only from experience, the lifeworld erects a wall against surprises that themselves originate from experiences. If knowledge of the world is defined on the basis that it is acquired a posteriori, whereas linguistic knowledge, relatively speaking, represents an a priori knowledge, then the paradox may be explained by the fact that, in the background of the lifeworld, knowledge of the world and knowledge of language are integrated.” The Habermasian lifeworld might therefore be interpreted as the massive background consensus of actionable knowledge presumed to be valid by all the participants in any particular action situation and therefore taken for granted as the indefinite, unproblematic reality within which their knowledgeable actions ensue. The presumption of validity would have to be strong enough to render this actionable knowledge relatively invisible to the sort of awareness typical in human action—so strong, in fact, that each participant actually presumes, without question, that the other participants share this presumption of validity.

Ironically, however, it is the lifeworld’s proximity to everyday experience, without which it cannot so readily ground everyday experience, that nevertheless exposes it to the differential contingency inherent in human action, wherein one person’s tacit certainties can be challenged, at any moment, by another’s perspective on the situation. As the actionable knowledge previously presumed to be valid is surprisingly, even chaotically, exposed to the light of reason-
able dialogue at the myriad sites of everyday awareness-in-action, the structures of the widely-shared lifeworld are gradually deconstructed and reconstructed in indeterminate ways. Amidst what Habermas characterizes as “an ever more extensive and ever more finely woven net of linguistically generated intersubjectivity,” cultural traditions (3) once guaranteed gradually succumb to reflective critique and revision, social norms (2) become objectified in discursive procedures of legitimation, and personal identities (1) further individuate in self-authorship and self-realization. “Rationalization of the lifeworld means differentiation and condensation at once—a thickening of the floating web of intersubjective threads that simultaneously holds together the ever more sharply differentiated components of culture, society, and person…. The more abstractly the differentiated structures of the lifeworld operate in the ever more particularized forms of life, the more the rational potential of action oriented toward reaching understanding evolves solely by these means.”

Hence, the massive background consensus of actionable knowledge that is presumed to be valid by all the participants in any particular action situation is unavoidably opened within that situation to dialogical deconstruction and reconstruction by increasingly reasonable participants for whom the validity basis of knowledgeable action can no longer be so easily ignored.

In recognizing the essential role of increasingly competent communicative action-learning in the reproduction of the lifeworld, Habermas invites us to recognize as well the (re/de)constructive functions of language itself, which, at its communicative best, mediates the increasingly reasonable (re/de)construction of:

- **impersonal** lifeworld structures, resulting in progressively more accurate traditions, histories, and worldviews;
- **interpersonal** lifeworld structures, resulting in progressively more moral laws, norms, and memberships; and
- **intrapersonal** lifeworld structures, resulting in progressively more sincere roles, autobiographies, and personalities.

Furthermore, each of these (re/de)constructive functions contributes, in a secondary fashion, to the other two complementary functions (e.g., reasonable worldviews inform legitimate groups and effective parenting; reasonable norms enhance the transmission of culture
and the socialization of individuals; and reasonable personalities challenge social norms and cultural worldviews.). As a universal medium, then, language ensures that each and every newly arising action situation is seamlessly contextualized within the existing lifeworld conditions, such as they are, even as these lifeworld conditions become increasingly contingent upon the substantive content and procedural conduct of increasingly reasonable action situations.

Likewise, because the (re/de)constructive practice of communicative action-learning can only ever be more-or-less (in)competent from one action situation to the next, the universal medium of language ensures that any significant impairment of necessary communicative action-learning will generate negative consequences for the contextualized conditions of the lifeworld. As Habermas puts it, “the individual reproduction processes can be evaluated according to standards of the rationality of knowledge, the solidarity of members, and the responsibility of the adult personality. Naturally the measurements within each of these dimensions vary according to the degree of structural differentiation of the lifeworld,” by which he means the degree to which the lifeworld itself has already been opened to, and is therefore contingent upon, relatively competent communicative action-learning. Hence, “the degree of differentiation also determines how great the need for consensual knowledge, legitimate orders, and personal autonomy is at a given time.” As he sees it, significant disturbances in the communicative action-learning necessitated by the evolving structural conditions of the lifeworld can eventually manifest as a three-fold crisis in the lifeworld itself, featuring:

- an impersonal loss of meaning with secondary effects such as a withdrawal of legitimation and a crisis in education;
- an interpersonal anomie with secondary effects such as an unsettling of group identity and an alienation of group members; and
- an intrapersonal psychopathology with secondary effects such as a withdrawal of motivation and a rupture of tradition.

In my view, regardless of the specifics, the greater the need for communicative action-learning in newly arising action situations—which increases as existing structures of actionable knowledge prove
insufficient to contend with ever-more-challenging situations—the greater will be the crisis-potential embedded in these action situations. Furthermore, the greater the sustained disturbance to communicative action-learning in these ever-more-challenging action situations—which is a function of how deliberately designed, powerfully enforced, and tacitly accepted that disturbance really is—the more confusing and painful will be the representative symbols, participative signals, and personified symptoms of this evolutionary crisis. Finally, the more confusing and painful the signs of evolutionary crisis, the greater the opportunity for evolutionary action-learning about, not only the signs of the crisis, but the deep-structural conditions of possible action-learning that are presently arrested throughout society.

In terms of triadic quadratic perspectivism, Habermas clearly and repeatedly defines his lifeworld construct, as with communicative action, in the first-, second-, and third-person perspectives of language. The terminology he uses to denote the triadic structures of the lifeworld can be confusing when presented in the same context as similar terms used to denote different, but nevertheless related, perspectives, such as the cultural (LL) and social (LR) originating with Wilber. Even Habermas himself uses slightly different terms to denote the same three perspectives on the lifeworld from one book to the next. Hence the lifeworld that finds expression in world views (3), moral representations (2), and identity formations (1) in the terminology of one book, finds comparable expression in cultural traditions (3), social solidarity (2), and personal identity (1) in that of another, and in cultural paradigms (3), legitimate orders (2), and personality structures (1) in that of yet another. Nevertheless, all the contexts from which these terms are extracted make it very clear that he is defining the deep-seated, background knowledge supporting third-person, second-person, and first-person orientations of communicative action. For example, consider this clarification: “I use the term culture for the stock of knowledge from which participants in communication supply themselves with interpretations as they come to an understanding about something in the world. I use the term society for legitimate orders through which participants regulate their memberships in social groups and thereby secure solidarity. By
I understand the competences that make a subject capable of speaking and acting, that put him in a position to take part in processes of reaching understanding and thereby to assert his own identity.” Clearly, the perspectival structure of Habermas’s lifeworld should be designated as triadic (123), not indefinite (X).

While Habermas does not acknowledge the fully quadratic perspectives that further differentiate the three personal perspectives in TQP, his descriptions of the 123 lifeworld as a massive background consensus certainly have a collective, rather than individual, connotation, and the details of these descriptions have a subjective more so than objective connotation. Furthermore, in one interesting passage in The Theory of Communicative Action, Habermas does note that “the members of a collective count themselves as belonging to the lifeworld in the first-person plural, in a way similar to that in which the individual speaker attributes to himself the subjective world to which he has privileged access in the first-person singular.” Thus, in terms of TQP, if I am, you are, and s/he is, then we are members of our lifeworld, or, alternatively, we share a common background consensus regarding the meaning of our actions that Habermas calls a lifeworld. This suggests that the lifeworld is a cultural, or collective-subjective, stock of presumed, yet undoubtedly meaningful, actionable knowledge. There are good reasons, therefore, to recognize the meaningful or interpretivist connotations in Habermas’s lifeworld, as Wilber certainly has, and with my triadic quadratic reconstruction of Wilber’s tri/quad conflated 2/LL quadrant, Habermas’s triadic structuring of the lifeworld can be fully honored as 123LL.

Although the I is the originary or enactive perspective, the first among 12 equals, in TQP, the we seems to play a uniquely important role as the collective subject with whom I, you, and s/he simultaneously identify as an essential presupposition for our mutual reflexive differential awareness-in-action. Moreover, because human action is inherently mutual, the shared identification via the perspective of we is deeply significant. I simply cannot interact with you or her without identifying with each of you via our common we, even if the content of our interaction pertains to other collectives with whom we identify in any of the other six permutations of we. If we share nothing that we can all acknowledge, even if only as a
presumed consensus of the most fundamental presuppositions of human action, then we may not be able to recognize each other enough to communicate. In a sense, the we serves as a 123.123

descending perspectival lynchpin connecting all the unique Is in the multiple
derivatives of TQPN relevant to any action situation. (Fig. 18)

However, as we recognize one another in the course of our situational awareness-in-action, the proximate we that each of us thinks we are (123.123LL) creates a moment-by-moment reflection/projection in the corresponding perspectives of the distal us that each of us thinks we were and will be (123.123LR)—a reflection/projection with which each of us (123.123ULL-UR) must mutually, reflexively engage in order to learn from, and plan for our awareness-in-action (123.123AQ). This suggests that the moment the we that each of us thinks we are arises to signify the more-or-less-presumed-valid consensus meaning behind our awareness-in-action, so too does the corresponding us

Figure 18. Triadic Quadratic Perspectivism – Nth Derivative
Shared Cultural-Social Perspectives
that each of us thinks we were and will be arise to signify the more-or-less-presumed-valid consensus function behind our awareness-in-action, thereby grounding our knowledgeable action in a more-or-less-presumed-valid background consensus knowledge of an even more actionable nature—both meaningful and functional.

What, then, is the status of the 123.123_{LR} in relation to Habermas’s lifeworld/system theories of social evolution? If the Habermasian lifeworld should be interpreted as the massive background consensus of actionable knowledge presumed to be valid by all the participants in any particular action situation, then why wouldn’t this include a massive background consensus of actionable knowledge concerning both the 123.123_{LL} meaning and the 123.123_{LR} function of human action? After all, if participants-in-action view society-as-lifeworld, as Habermas contends, and if 123.123_{LL} and 123.123_{LR} perspectives are always already enacted by participants-in-action, as I contend, then the lifeworld could be construed more expansively as both 123.123_{LL} and 123.123_{LR}. Besides, when Habermas notes that “the members of a collective count themselves as belonging to the lifeworld in the first-person plural,” he does not stipulate that this is only the first-person subjective plural, we, and not also the first-person objective plural, us. While I suspect he means the we, primarily, there can be no we without its corresponding us—a fact with which Habermas would undoubtedly agree, but in which he has little interest due to the absence of the quadratic perspectives in his formulation of the triadic perspectives.

Alternatively, if observers-of-action view society-as-system, as Habermas contends, and if there are no observers-of-action who are not always already participants-in-action, as I contend, then the system could be construed as nothing more than somebody else’s system framed in the 3_{LR}, and even this could be contested based on the fact that 3_{LR} is nevertheless a perspective enacted by a participant-in-action, acting as an observer capable of representing his, her, or their system. Ultimately, if the lifeworld is to be limited to the 123.123_{LL}, simply by definition, and if the system is defined as a logical complement to the lifeworld in a dyadic theory of society, as can be inferred from Habermas, then we might simply reconstruct the system as 123.123_{LR} and recognize the additional explanatory
and interpretive power of a seemingly paradoxical participant-centered theory of society-as-system. Better yet, if we set aside the lifeworld/system concepts and their more limiting subjectivist/objectivist connotations rooted in monological social theories in which there are no genuinely dialogical perspectives, then we can more readily acknowledge the balanced complementarity of the meaningful and functional aspects of the more-or-less widely-shared, partially-presumed actionable knowledge guiding knowledgeable action in real-world situations.

**Uncertain Certainty / Certain Uncertainty**

These perspectival reconstructions frame a more practical formulation of integral/différantial praxiology, pragmatics, and semiotics, wherein the deceptively simple dynamics between what are typically defined as stocks of knowledge and flows of action can be more carefully articulated. Just as all knowledgeable action is triadic quadratic perspectival, so too is the actionable knowledge gradually learned, subsequently employed, and eventually revised by this knowledgeable action. After all, the 12 primordial perspectives of TQP do co-arise in every actor’s awareness and structure the very deepest manifestations of whatever actionable knowledge each and every one of us uses as the basis for knowledgeable action.

Furthermore, regardless of how we might conceptualize the multi-structural patterns of human development and evolution, each of the deep structures within an overall multi-structural pattern—the actionable knowledge guiding knowledgeable action at some temporal stage of human history—may be reasonably interpreted as the relatively stable conditions of possible awareness-in-action. If so, then the triadic quadratic perspectivism of human awareness-in-action may be framing the entire, multi-structural metalogue of human development and evolution as it actually unfolds through the intrapersonal, interpersonal, and impersonal experiences of the intentional, behavioral, cultural, and social aspects of our situational awareness-in-action. This is a significant proposition that nevertheless simply reiterates my reconstruction from Chapter 2, in which
the dialogical development of *my* identity, *I-me*, in relation to *all of you*, as discovered by Mead and elaborated by Habermas, actually implies the development of *each of your* respective identities and *each of their* respective identities as well as the evolution of *each of our* collective identities via the identification of all 12 primordial perspectives of the first-person (123AQ), second-person (2.123AQ), and third-person (3.123AQ) in every real action situation (123.123AQ). If this reconstruction is valid, then the *pacemaker in human evolution* might be defined in terms of the quality of the TQP\textsuperscript{N} dialogue arising in each and every real action situation, wherein the surprisingly novel actions of some unique enactive Is (123.123UL) may in due time, through the *tri-tetra-meshing* of a deepening, widening dialogue (123.123AQ), contribute to the source code of an as-yet-uncertain (r)evolutionary advance beyond the institutionalized structures of actionable knowledge that are presently active throughout society.

In the most basic of interactions framed by the Indeterminate Derivative, TQP\textsuperscript{N}, that exemplar in which *I* act, *you* act, and *s/he* acts in relation to one another, *we* enact three unique, yet interpenetrating versions of TQP\textsuperscript{N}, each of which frames an indeterminate total of at least 36 reciprocally interlocked perspectives within the integral/différantial reality of *our* situational awareness-in-action. From *each* of *our* different perspectives as an origin of *our* situational awareness-in-action—a unique enactive I—*each of us* raises and redeems—either explicitly or implicitly—three unique, yet interpenetrating sets of triadic quadratic perspectival *claims to reality* (RN), while simultaneously presuming three unique, yet interpenetrating sets of corresponding triadic quadratic perspectival *contexts of reality* (RN). Therefore, from *each of our* different perspectives, *each of us* has the potential to identify and realize, in the course of knowledgeable action, the more-or-less-presumed reality of a stock of actionable knowledge regarding:

- *my* personified symptoms of freedom (1AQ), *each of your* personified symptoms of freedom (2.1AQ), and *each of their* personified symptoms of freedom (3.1AQ), each comprised of its corresponding intentional signifieds (123.1UL), behavioral signifiers (123.1UR), cultural semantics (123.1UL), and social
syntax (123.1LR) of freedom, collectively denoted 123.1AQ or FN;

- *my* participative signals of justice (2AQ), *each* of *your* participative signals of justice (2.2AQ), and *each* of *their* participative signals of justice (3.2AQ), each comprised of its corresponding intentional signifieds (123.2UL), behavioral signifiers (123.2UR), cultural semantics (123.2LL), and social syntax (123.2LR) of justice, collectively denoted 123.2AQ or JN; and

- *my* representative symbols of truth (3AQ), *each* of *your* representative symbols of truth (2.3AQ), and *each* of *their* representative symbols of truth (3.3AQ), each comprised of its corresponding intentional signifieds (123.3UL), behavioral signifiers (123.3UR), cultural semantics (123.3LL), and social syntax (123.3LR) of truth, collectively denoted 123.3AQ or TN.

From each of our different perspectives, it seems as if the fully quadratic contexts of intrapersonal freedom (FN), interpersonal justice (JN), and impersonal truth (TN)—thus, *personal* or *relative* reality (RN)—can be more-or-less taken for granted as the opaque yet invisible actionable knowledge in the context of which all our content-rich knowledgeable action unfolds (123.123AQ).

To be sure, the portion of this more-or-less presumed TQPN actionable knowledge that *all* of *us*—*I*, *each* of *you*, and *each* of *them*—further presume to be shared in the form of *our* massive background consensus of what *it* all means and how *it* all works might be best framed in the 123.123LL+LR perspectives. But we never really know if what *I* presume to be part of the massive background consensus is likewise presumed by *each* of *you* and *each* of *them*. *Each* of *us* has a unique perspective on *our* consensus—123LL+LR vs. 2.123LL+LR vs. 3.123LL+LR—that, ironically, precludes a complete consensus, whether passively presumed or actively pursued. Hence, there must be some contingency lurking within the seemingly non-contingent depth of consensus meaning and some indeterminacy spreading across the seemingly deterministic breadth of consensus function, for sociocultural certainties can never really be secure from some unexpected, indirect challenge emerging within an everyday action situation. I suspect it is the socialized *me* that *I* think *I* was and will be who defensively guards the premature closure to the presumed consen-
sus about our presumed knowledge and the I that I think I am who can, at any moment, without conscious intent or advance notice, reveal some element of our seemingly secure yet curiously secret consensus to the light of reason and the possibility of invalidation, however ironically, by any one of us.

Therefore, the presumed-valid actionable knowledge that we presumably share in the deep structures of 123.123LL meaning and 123.123LR function simply cannot eliminate the uniqueness that I can express in my 123AQ knowledgeable actions, that each of you can express in your 2.123AQ knowledgeable actions, and that each of them can express in their 3.123AQ knowledgeable actions, even though these unique actions are necessarily grounded by the presumed-valid actionable knowledge that we—I, each of you, and each of them—presumably share. Such is the familiar surprise that emerges from the dialectical interplay between the relatively uncertain certainty of our actionable knowledge and the relatively certain uncertainty of our knowledgeable action, the ever-present, never-ending potential for which all reasonable people must intuitively presuppose.

Awareness-in-Action may therefore be understood in terms of the deeply meaningful, broadly functional, partially presumed stock of TQP\textsuperscript{N} actionable knowledge that serves as the situationally relevant ground for the consensus-based, goal-oriented, error-prone flow of TQP\textsuperscript{N} knowledgeable action by which this actionable knowledge is surprisingly, inevitably, indeterminately deconstructed and reconstructed.
Although Habermas’s ideas can certainly enhance the descriptive theory of action developed by Argyris and his colleagues, I believe that Argyris’s practical insights into human action in real-world contexts can lend to Habermas’s, and therefore my own, ideas some additional empirical and normative support. As introduced in the previous chapter, action science is a rigorous way of understanding how adults reason, act, and learn in the midst of challenging social situations, with a particular emphasis on the collaborative generation and application of actionable knowledge. Argyris describes the action scientist as “an interventionist who seeks both to promote learning in the client system and to contribute to general knowledge. This is done by... enacting communities of inquiry in communities of practice.” More specifically, this “involves working with a community to create conditions in which members can engage in public reflection on substantive matters of concern to them and also on the rules and norms of inquiry they customarily enact.... A frequent focus of reflection... is the reconstruction and criticism of the rules and norms of inquiry customarily enacted in the community of practice, as these determine the system’s capacity for learning.”

In contrast to the empirical-analytic social science method of explanation, which is oriented toward the understanding of human action in its objective forms, and the historical-hermeneutic social science method of interpretation, which is oriented toward the understanding of human action in its subjective forms, action science incorporates both of these complementary approaches in support of the critical-reflective method of intervention, which is oriented toward the
emancipation of human action from the as-yet-unacknowledged objective and subjective limits previously established in the course of that human action. Consistent with these tenets of critical social science,\textsuperscript{210} which are, in turn, largely based on Habermas’s early work in critical theory,\textsuperscript{211} the key features of action science include “(1) empirically disconfirmable propositions that are organized into a theory; (2) knowledge that human beings can implement in an action context; and (3) alternatives to the status quo that both illuminate what exists and inform fundamental change, in light of values freely chosen by social actors.”\textsuperscript{212} Thus, as a critical-reflective interventionist with an emancipatory interest, the action scientist enacts a community of inquiry within an existing community of practice, thereby helping the members of this community reflect on the social world they have created and learn to change it in ways more congruent with the values they espouse.\textsuperscript{213}

Argyris and his colleagues spent decades engaging with groups of people—typically executives, managers, consultants, and other professionals—to conduct a unique form of critical discourse aimed at discerning the primary theory of action—action values, action strategies, and action consequences—that characterizes each of their client communities of practice. Over time, Argyris accumulated a general body of actionable knowledge regarding human action in real-world situations. His general hypothesis with respect to the theory of action is that people tend to espouse practices consistent with open, honest, responsible communication (i.e., communicative action) while nevertheless engaging in systematically distorted communication (i.e., latently or blatantly strategic action) that undermines their relationships and their performance, and they are at best only partially aware of the discrepancy and its unintended negative consequences.\textsuperscript{214} Argyris therefore makes a distinction between a person’s espoused theory of action—that the person claims to follow—and that person’s theory-in-use—that can be inferred from the person’s actions—and remains open-minded about the degree of fit between the two. Because the theories he is referring to are not merely people’s descriptive theories of the life they want to create but their own prescriptive theories of how best to create the life they really want—in other words, prescriptive theories of action values rather than descrip-
tive theories of action consequences—what Argyris is framing is the hypothesis that most people have an espoused praxis that is very different from the actual praxis they are using in the world, and they are almost entirely unaware of the discrepancy. It is as if people already have a reflective idea about how to create more of the results they want, in personal meaning, interpersonal relationships, the organizations in which they work, and the social, economic, and political contexts in which they participate, yet they follow a very different and far less effective praxis that secretly undermines their efforts in every action situation.

Strategic Action

Although it might seem natural to expect a great variety of theories of action to surface from their research with clients, Argyris and his colleagues have discovered just one general model, with two variations. The most common is Model I, the action values of which are:

- define goals and try to achieve them;
- maximize winning and minimize losing;
- minimize generating or expressing negative feelings; and
- be rational.\textsuperscript{215}

These action values are like design principles employed in varying degrees from one person to the next, from one situation to the next, in the design of particular action strategies. Regardless of the chosen ratios of these action values, the action strategies that people design almost always include: i) advocating courses of action in ways that discourage inquiry; ii) claiming ownership of the task definition and execution; iii) treating their own views as obviously correct while ignoring inconsistencies between their words and actions; iv) making unillustrated and often covert attributions and evaluations about other people and the action situation; v) withholding critical information, creating rules to censor information and behavior, and holding private meetings; vi) acting defensively with regard to oneself and selected others by blaming, stereotyping, and
leaving potentially embarrassing facts unstated; and vii) intellectualizing difficult situations while suppressing one’s own and ignoring other people’s negative feelings.216

In terms of TQP, note that what all these action strategies have in common is the underlying motivation to gain unilateral control over other people—being the second-person perspective (2)—and the impersonal action situation—being the third-person perspective (3)—in order to protect the actor and achieve the actor’s desired results—being the first-person perspective (1). With regard to the quadratic perspectives, it is not difficult to discern the behavioral (123UR) nature of the action strategies, which can be readily observed, and the intentional (123UL) nature of the action values, which can be interpreted from that behavior, and at least infer the presence of the corresponding cultural (123LL) and social (123LR) aspects consistent with the mutual nature of Model I.

Furthermore, Model I appears to be an actionable version of Habermas’s strategic action, which he defines as social action oriented toward the unilateral success of each actor.217 Although the Model I action values do not specifically call for actors to ignore their own claims to freedom, justice, and any truth beyond the efficacy of their own actions, the corresponding action strategies do create circumstances in which such claims are rather easily ignored simply because they are, according to the values, irrelevant to each actor’s success as s/he defines it. Any inquiry into these presumed-irrelevant validity claims will tend to arouse the actors’ defensiveness, because such inquiry is contrary to the action values and therefore regarded as threatening to each actor’s success as s/he defines it. Then, with defensiveness aroused on the basis of subconscious action values, each actor will tend to respond with action strategies characterized by subtle forms of deception, coercion, and further defensiveness, without necessarily being aware of these behaviors, except to the extent that these can be rationalized as appropriate responses to the other actors’ more obvious deceptive, coercive, and defensive behaviors. The only questions worth asking in strategic action-learning are whether or not the actor has chosen the best means to the desired, or the given, end and whether or not the other actors have contributed to these means by doing whatever
it is the first actor wanted done. Therefore, Argyris and his colleagues appear to have discovered that most people approach most social situations, particularly those that appear interpersonally challenging due to the raising of controversial claims to truth, justice, and freedom, with some personalized version of the derivative strategic action that Habermas has critiqued in relation to the more integral approach of communicative action.218

The predictable consequences of Model I actions include “defensive interpersonal and group relationships, low freedom of choice, and reduced production of valid information. There are negative consequences for learning, because there is little public testing of ideas. The hypotheses that people generate tend to become self-sealing. What learning does occur remains within the bounds of what is acceptable. Double-loop learning does not tend to occur. As
a result, error escalates and effectiveness in problem solving and in execution of action tends to decrease.” As suggested by Figure 19, the action values and action strategies of Model I effectively preclude communicative action-learning, rendering sub-conscious or normatively inappropriate whatever communicative competence might exist and rewarding the exclusive focus on strategic action-learning with at least temporary validation of the action strategies and implied validation of the unexamined, yet evidently dysfunctional, strategic action values. By precluding communicative action-learning, Model I makes it impossible to address in a constructive manner whatever specific claims to truth, justice, and freedom triggered the defensive reasoning and action. Thus, ironically, Model I is most likely to undermine reason, action, and learning in precisely those situations when effective reason, action, and learning are most needed.

“Most people hold espoused theories inconsistent with Model I; and, when confronted with our predictions about the strategies they will use, seek to demonstrate that our predictions are not valid. But even when Model I has been explained and people are trying to produce action that does not fit the model, they are unable to do so. This result holds whenever people are dealing with double-loop issues, which is to say whenever they are dealing with threatening issues. At best, they are able to produce strategies consistent with opposite Model I, the mirror image of Model I.” The action values of Opposite Model I are:

- everyone participates in defining purposes;
- everyone wins, no one loses;
- express feelings; and
- suppress the cognitive intellective aspects of action.

Whether it appears as an espoused theory or as a theory-in-use, Opposite Model I suggests people’s growing awareness of their own and others’ problematic communication and an attempt to remedy the situation by adopting an antithetical approach—the unexamined rationale apparently being that if doing things one way has created such a mess, perhaps doing just the opposite will clean up the mess. But in its attempt to privilege all perspectives simultaneously, as if they are all equally valid and therefore immune to discourse, Oppo-
site Model I can serve to entrench certain contexts of meaning and function wherein real discourse concerning the relative validity of everyone’s perspectives on truth, justice, and freedom is rendered normatively inappropriate, despite no shortage of opinionated conversation. Still more remarkable is the possibility that Opposite Model I forms a necessary complement to the overtly controlling and actively aggressive strategies of Model I in the sense that its overtly dependent behavior typically masks an underlying action strategy of covert control and passive aggression. The paradox embedded in both versions of Model I is that one’s theory of effective social action will often require those with whom one collaborates to act in complementary ways that one defines as ineffective and, regardless of intent or effort, ultimately everyone will be rendered ineffective and unsuccessful by the dysfunctional dynamics of the complementary Models I.221 Regardless of the specific action strategies employed, the negative consequences of Opposite Model I for personal effectiveness and satisfaction, interpersonal relationships, and double-loop learning are the same as for Model I.

It must be emphasized that these types of interactions do not happen because people self-consciously plan them this way. They happen because people have deeply ingrained and almost entirely subliminal mental models telling them just what to do in order to achieve their intended results—results that in the case of strategic action always entail some version of self-protective unilateral success that is contingent upon getting other people to act in ways that support one’s own unilateral success, often to their own detriment. For the most part, people are not aware of the roles they unwittingly play in their own disappointing strategic interactions. Remember, this is skilled incompetence: skilled, because these are spontaneous applications of tacit knowledge acquired through experiential learning, and incompetence, because these actions are ultimately counterproductive by the actor’s own standards, at least in the long run. Moreover, the skillfulness of this communicative incompetence is often so pronounced as to deceive the actor about the existence of his or her own incompetence, partly because it is so much easier to attribute, secretly of course, the incompetence to others. This accounts for the popularity of the dysfunctional defensive routine known as
triangulation, wherein you and I have a secret conversation about his problematic behavior and intentions, which seems to empower us at his expense and give us the shared illusion of a mutually validated critique that nevertheless must, curiously, remain a secret from the person most likely to present us with invalidating feedback.

As individuals who have learned Model I and Opposite Model I over many years of socialization come together to form collaborative groups, organizations, networks, governments, and whole societies, they tend to enact socio-cultural patterns called limited learning systems. Once established, these limited learning systems guide the socialization and performance of new members, indoctrinating them into the particulars of each system’s version of Model I and Opposite Model I. Argyris and Schön created a model of a limited learning system congruent with the Models I, called Model O-I (with “O” signifying “organization”).

Model O-I “states that when individuals programmed with Model I theory-in-use deal with difficult and threatening problems, they create primary inhibiting loops... in the form of conditions of undiscussability, self-fulfilling prophesies, self-sealing processes, and escalating error, and they remain unaware of their responsibility for these conditions. Primary inhibiting loops lead to secondary inhibiting loops such as win-lose group dynamics, conformity, polarization between groups, and organizational games of deception. These secondary inhibiting loops reinforce primary inhibiting loops and together they lead people to despair of double-loop learning in organizations.” Because of these inhibiting loops, limited learning systems tend to camouflage their own dysfunction via organizational defensive routines that protect their members from the embarrassment that would result from the awareness of their own tacit conspiracy in creating the dysfunctional system performance. “All organizational defensive routines are based on a logic that is powerful and that has profound impact on individuals and organizations. The logic is to: i) craft messages that contain inconsistencies; ii) act as if the messages are not inconsistent; iii) make the ambiguity and inconsistency in the message undiscussable; and iv) make the undiscussability of the undiscussable also undiscussable.”
With regard to TQP, note that the intentional (123UL) action values and behavioral (123UR) action strategies of the complementary Models I are now more explicitly matched by the cultural (123LL) defensive routines and social (123LR) system dysfunction of the corresponding Model O-I. Furthermore, although it isn’t highlighted in the action science account other than as polarization between groups, I infer that much of the shared motivation behind the limited learning system is the members’ desire to gain collective unilateral control over other collectives with which they engage—being the collective second-person perspective (2LL+LR)—and the collective impersonal action situation—being the collective third-person perspective (3LL+LR)—in order to protect the members and achieve their desired results—being the collective first-person perspective (1LL+LR). In other words, our limited learning system, of which we are almost entirely unaware, nevertheless exists in order to protect us and help us achieve our desired results by unilaterally controlling the collective you with whom we directly engage and the collective them with whom we do not engage but whose actions impact our ability to succeed. Many an organizational strategy has been created on the basis of this underlying motivation and many a cross-functional organizational change initiative has been undermined by the same. Furthermore, in my interpretation, Model O-I is obviously at work between political parties in government, between nations in international policy disputes, and in many of the other inter-group, inter-organizational, and inter-societal conflicts we encounter. As the collective perspective of strategic action-learning, Model O-I has the potential to contribute new insights to Habermas’s critique of the systematic failures in societal rationalization that impair large-scale social evolution.225

Finally, because each of the individuals and collectives regarded within second- and third-person perspectives possesses a theory of action, and according to Argyris most likely Model I or Opposite Model I for individuals and the corresponding Model O-I for collectives, we can see that a complete account of any particular theory of action would have to include the actor’s understanding of other people’s theories of action. “When the situation that the actor frames involves other people, then the framing will include the agent’s beliefs about
the intentions and beliefs of other people. The consequences of action include the reactions of those others, which themselves depend on how they frame the situation and on their beliefs about the intentions and beliefs of the original actor.” As a result, “one’s theory-in-use includes a vast store of information about what people are like and how they will respond in various situations.” Therefore, the complementary Models I, each with its own nuanced version of Model O-I, can be reasonably interpreted and carefully reconstructed into two distinct, yet interrelated triadic quadratic theories of action, or praxes, with unprecedented explanatory and interpretive power framed in at least the 2nd Derivative of triadic quadratic perspectivism, and therefore TQP\(^N\) (123.123\(_AQ\)).

**Communicative Action**

Perhaps the most surprising aspect of action science is that these insights into human action, with all their unfortunate implications about the way we work and live with one another, are the product of a fully informed, completely democratic collaboration among action scientists and their thousands of clients around the world, many of whom are business executives and management consultants. In line with the critical-reflective tenets of action science, critiques of Model I, Opposite Model I, and Model O-I are presented to clients in the form of explanatory and interpretive hypotheses that clients can openly evaluate. If their judgment leads them to do so, clients may challenge these hypotheses on the basis of what they regard as superior explanations and interpretations, which are then put to the test in real action situations. The fact that such powerful and critical insights were developed with the full co-operation and acknowledgement of clients lends considerable credibility to the method. Furthermore, the fact that action science uses the real world of human decision making, indeed management decision making, as its proving ground distinguishes it from the ever-growing body of far more popular decision science research (e.g., Kahneman & Tversky) conducted in less realistic, controlled environments.
But if action scientists are able to engage with their clients in a way that so clearly and collaboratively reveals the clients’ own dysfunctional action-learning by the clients’ own admission, how are they able to get past their clients’ defensive routines and open up the dialogue necessary to validate such claims? The answer is Model II, a dialogical praxis based on the following action values:

- valid information;
- free and informed choice;
- internal commitment to the choice; and
- vigilant monitoring of its implementation in order to detect and correct error.  

If the critical discourse analysis represented by the Models I is a descriptive approach to explaining, interpreting, and critiquing clients’ own prescriptive theories-in-use, Model II is a prescriptive approach to a form of critical discourse that can engage and transform their Model I and Opposite Model I theories-in-use. Thus, Model II is normative, but in an unbiased and impartial way, without regard to who is engaged or what is at issue. The challenge for the action scientist is to partner with clients to create conditions in which these normative ideals can be fully realized in what might be described as a series of extraordinary conversations about the clients’ own patterns of communication—patterns which, as the action scientist openly hypothesizes, indicate some degree of systematically distorted communication and impaired double-loop learning. Toward that, specific action strategies emphasize “sharing control with those who have competence and who participate in designing or implementing the action. Rather than unilateral advocacy (Model I) or inquiry that conceals the agent’s own views (opposite Model I), in Model II the agent combines advocacy and inquiry. Attributions and evaluations are illustrated with relatively directly observable data, and the surfacing of conflicting views is encouraged in order to facilitate public testing of them.”

Model II looks simple enough in writing, but it is very difficult to implement consistently because practicing Model II involves triggering Model I and Opposite Model I. This is threatening to people who have come to regard these as normal ways of communicating and decision making, while simultaneously confusing these...
with their own espoused theories of action, the social virtues of which are broadly consistent with Model II principles. People practicing Model I or Opposite Model I often imagine themselves to be already practicing something generally consistent with Model II, which makes the actual practice of Model II a rather challenging proposition from their perspective—simultaneously unnecessary, yet paradoxically quite difficult and threatening. Nevertheless, Model II can be learned with diligent practice and used to transform Model I and Opposite Model I theories-in-use. The most impressive fact with respect to this method is that it has been validated, both empirically and normatively, by the clients with whom Argyris and his colleagues have engaged. As a genuinely critical social science in which the inherently mutual, reflexive, and differential nature of human action is self-consciously recognized in the practice of the social science practitioner, action science not only allows but requires that the method itself be evaluated by all participants in the natural course of its application.

“The consequences of Model II action strategies should include minimally defensive interpersonal and group relationships, high freedom of choice, and high risk taking.” Additional consequences include the establishment of empirically disconfirmable processes, public testing of theories, learning both within and across frames of reference, improved quality of life characterized by high authenticity and freedom of choice, greater effectiveness in solving difficult problems, and increased long-run effectiveness. Furthermore, when members of a group or organization practice Model II, they enact a more effective learning system, Model O-II, in which inquiry replaces inhibiting loops and defensive routines, previously undiscussable issues are brought to the surface, assumptions are tested and corrected, self-sealing processes are interrupted, dysfunctional group and intergroup dynamics decrease, deception, camouflage, and defensive reasoning are reduced, single-loop and double-loop learning occurs, and overall organizational performance improves.

Recognizing Argyris’s Model II as a form of mutual reflexive dialogue consistent with his postformal, (post-)postmodern 5th Order of consciousness—interindividual self, interpenetration of self and other, and dialectical cognition—
developmental theorist Robert Kegan offers some valuable insight into the subtle reframing necessary to transcend the limitations of formal, (post)modern 4th Order methods like the twin Models I. “In essence, the [5th Order] view bids disputants to do several things: (1) consider that your protracted conflict is a signal that you and your opponent have probably become identified with the poles of the conflict; (2) consider that the relationship in which you find yourself is not the inconvenient result of the existence of an opposing view but the expression of your own incompleteness taken as completeness; (3) value the relationship, miserable though it might feel, as an opportunity to live out your own multiplicity; and thus, (4) focus on ways to let the conflictual relationship transform the parties rather than on the parties resolving the conflict.”\textsuperscript{233}

He further notes that “Argyris... has been candid in reporting that even highly-advantaged, graduate-educated, organizationally high-ranking adults have a great deal of difficulty mastering—or simply cannot master—what it is he is teaching. But this should be no surprise, because what he and other postmodern conflict resolutionists are asking people to do is organize experience at a level of complexity beyond the fourth order of consciousness, something few people are yet able to do. Refusing to see oneself or the other as a single system or form, regarding the premise of completeness as a tempting pretense, constructing the process of interacting as prior to the existence of the form or system, facing protracted conflict as a likely sign of one’s own identification with false assumptions of wholeness, distinctness, completeness, or priority—all of these ways of constructing reality require that the epistemological organization of system, form, or theory be relativized, moved from subject in one’s knowing to object in one’s knowing. They all require a ‘trans-systemic,’ ‘multiform,’ or ‘cross-theoretical’ epistemological organization. In other words, they all require the fifth order of consciousness.”\textsuperscript{234}

In my reconstruction, Models II and O-II cover the same essential TQPs as we saw with Models I and O-I, which means this dialogical praxis can be framed in at least the 2\textsuperscript{nd} Derivative of triadic quadratic perspectivism, and therefore TQP\textsuperscript{N} (123.123\textsubscript{AO}). But in contrast to the twin Models I, this TQP\textsuperscript{N} reconstruction of Model II
prescribes how people can generate actionable knowledge concerning their own and others’ patterns of reasoning, acting, and learning in difficult situations in which differential claims to truth, justice, and freedom are at issue. Model II helps people systematically transform their own and others’ reactive strategies of private self-protection within a first-person perspective and unilateral control within second- and third-person perspectives into creative strategies of public self-reflection and multi-lateral control—pre-requisites for the mutual, reflexive (in)validation of any controversial claims previously considered too threatening to discuss. It also helps people become more aware of their own and others’ action values (123.123UL) and action strategies (123.123UR), as well as the defensive cultures (123.123L) and dysfunctional systems (123.123LR) to which they contribute, thereby making it possible for them to consciously choose more effective alternatives for which they are more willing to be held accountable. Finally, Model II helps people discover, maintain, and transform situationally relevant portions of the previously presumed actionable knowledge supporting their mutual actions. In particular, the presumed consensus regarding what it all means—123.123LL meaning—and how it all works—123.123LR function—previously embedded in the opaque yet invisible background of mutual, reflexive, differential action situations gradually becomes more transparent through the honest disclosure of valid information, more amenable to revision by uncoerced choice, and more responsibly held amidst shared accountability for past and future consequences. Therefore, Model II can be reasonably interpreted and carefully reconstructed into a TQP^N praxis with significant normative scope and emancipatory potential, transcending yet including within its purview both Model I and Opposite Model I, much like a synthesis sublates both thesis and antithesis.

Although, to my knowledge, Habermas is unfamiliar with the work of Argyris and his colleagues, I think action science may constitute the single best practice of communicative action to emerge from, and in parallel with, Habermas’s extraordinary achievement in the theory of communicative action—a critical practice consistent with his critical theory. In her presentation of Habermas’s critical theory, Jane Braaten makes a very useful distinction between diagnostic and
therapeutic types of critical theory. “A therapeutic explanation is a therapy—a method of treatment—that dissolves false consciousness and thereby emancipates the subject.... Therapeutic explanations rest on, but are not confined to, diagnostic explanations. A diagnostic explanation explains the causes of a crisis, and thus opens the way to confronting it, but it is not itself the means of emancipation.” While Habermas’s theory of communicative action may therefore be positioned as a diagnostic critical theory, which is consistent with Braaten’s assessment, Argyris’s practice of communicative action is clearly a therapeutic critical theory—a theory of practice—wherein the emancipatory interests of specific communities of practice are fulfilled with the guidance of the action scientist serving as an interventionist with both diagnostic and therapeutic roles. Although the focus of Argyris’s critical practice has been limited to the relatively small scale of groups and organizations, the insights of an integrally reconstructed action science may be applicable on all degrees of scale, as a way of explaining, interpreting, and evaluating the mutual, reflexive, differential, and ultimately integral action-learning of couples, families, groups, organizations, markets, governments, social movements, and whole societies—in other words, the large-scale domain of Habermas’s critical theory of (post)postmodernity.

Ideal Realism / Real Idealism

As presented in Chapter 1, Habermas’s theory of communicative action is grounded in a formal-pragmatic model of communicative competence acquired through multiple, sequential structures of personal development and corresponding social evolution. He proposes as the highest level in this hierarchy of communicative competence a universal ethics of speech, corresponding with a postformal level of consciousness beyond Loevinger’s autonomous level of identity and Kohlberg’s highest level of morality, based on universal ethical principles. More recent research in adult developmental psychology that builds on the pioneering work of Loevinger, Kohlberg, and Piaget—Habermas’s source material from the 1970s—
suggests that this postformal level of communicative competence idealized by Habermas corresponds reasonably well with Wilber’s *Turquoise* level of consciousness,\(^{238}\) Susanne Cook-Greuter’s *Construct-Aware* level of identity,\(^{239}\) Bill Torbert’s *Alchemist* action-logic,\(^{240}\) Jenny Wade’s *Transcendent* consciousness,\(^{241}\) and the most mature attainments in Kegan’s 5th *Order* consciousness.\(^{242}\) Without the benefit of this subsequent research into (post-)postformal consciousness, Habermas nevertheless points to the communicative competence that might accompany its widespread emergence and thereby establish, via a more mature form of communicative action-learning, a cosmopolitan post-postmodern society.\(^{243}\)

In his critique of exclusively cognitivist conceptions of communication as well as formal-operational conceptions of morality, Habermas contends that “ego identity requires not only cognitive mastery of general levels of communication but also the ability to give one’s own needs their due in these communication structures; as long as the ego is cut off from its internal nature and disavows the dependency on needs that still await suitable interpretations, freedom, no matter how much it is guided by principles, remains in truth unfree in relation to existing systems of norms.”\(^{244}\) Thus, “only at the level of a universal ethics of speech, can need interpretations themselves—that is, what each individual thinks he should understand and represent as his ‘true’ interests—also become the object of practical discourse.”\(^{245}\) By my reading, the concept of *validity* for the universal ethics of speech recognizes not only all people as private persons, and therefore the substantive content of sincerity, rightness, and truth as these are understood by each autonomous person, but also all private persons as members of a fictive world society, and therefore the procedural conduct by which people may discursively validate all potential claims to sincerity, rightness, and truth. The purpose of such a philosophical inquiry is therefore to discover and articulate *universal context-transcendent norms* for the validation of all particular context-immanent claims to what is free, just, and true for particular people in particular situations.
Habermas frames his search for these context-transcendent norms in terms of discourse. In his parlance, a discourse ensues whenever one participant’s specific validity claim to sincerity, rightness, or truth is challenged by another participant in communication. In contrast to the relatively normal communication in which validity claims are naively taken for granted, “discourse is that ‘peculiarly unreal’ form of communication in which the participants subject themselves to the ‘unforced force of the better argument,’ with the aim of coming to an agreement about the validity or invalidity of problematic claims. The supposition that attaches to such an agreement is that it represents a ‘rational consensus,’ that is, that it is the result not of the peculiarities of the participants or of their situation but simply of their subjecting themselves to the weight of evidence and the force of argument. The agreement is regarded as valid not merely ‘for us’ (the actual participants) but as ‘objectively’ valid, valid for all rational subjects (as potential participants). In this sense discourse is, as Habermas puts it, ‘the condition for the unconditioned.’

Habermas justifies these strong idealizations by recourse to an argument that, as the discourse participants attempt to come to a mutual understanding of what really is sincere, right, and true for each and every participant, the discourse itself is at least implicitly evaluated by participants in terms of how well it fulfills the characteristics of an always already presupposed ideal speech situation. He characterizes the ideal speech situation as a “reconstruction of the general symmetry conditions that every competent speaker who believes he is engaging in [discourse] must presuppose as adequately fulfilled. The presupposition of something like an ‘unrestricted communication community,’ an idea that Apel developed following Peirce and Mead, can be demonstrated through systematic analysis of performative contradictions. Participants in [discourse] cannot avoid the presupposition that... the structure of their communication rules out all external or internal coercion other than the force of the better argument and thereby also neutralizes all motives other than that of the cooperative search for truth.” In other words, to
assert that _we arrived at a mutual understanding after I coerced you into recognizing the validity of what I said_ or that _your views on the issue were rationally justified when you ridiculed my views_ is to commit a performative contradiction that communicatively competent people immediately recognize as invalid. Recognizing this logic is rather powerfully suggestive of a deeper intuitive know-how that participants in discourse demonstrate even in the absence of explicit norms.

According to Raymond Geuss, Habermas defines the ideal speech situation even more specifically as “a situation of absolutely uncoerced and unlimited discussion between completely free and equal human agents.” He argues that to be a human agent is to participate in a speech community and, furthermore, to be someone _we_ can recognize as a human agent is to participate in _our_ speech community. “But no agent can be even potentially a member of a speech community who cannot recognize the difference between true and false statements in a general way or who doesn’t in some way know what it means for a statement to be true. But what it means for a statement to be true is that it would be the one on which all agents would agree if they were to discuss all of human experience in absolutely free and uncoerced circumstances for an indefinite period of time. So anyone we recognize as a human agent will thereby stand committed to agreeing with us on what to count as conditions of ‘free and uncoerced discussion,’ and hence must in some way share our views on what are conditions of freedom and what [are] conditions of coercion.”

As McCarthy elaborates, “this freedom from internal and external constraint can be given a [formal]-pragmatic characterization; there must be for all participants a symmetrical distribution of chances to select and employ speech acts, that is an effective equality of chances to assume dialogue roles. If this is not the case, the resultant agreement is open to the charge of being less than rational, of being the result not of the force of the better argument but, for example, of open or latent relations of domination, of conscious or unconscious strategic motivations. Thus the idea of truth points ultimately to a form of interaction that is free from all distorting influences. The ‘good and true life’ that is the goal of critical theory
is inherent in the notion of truth; it is anticipated in every act of speech.”

Habermas claims “that all human agents in every action they perform (and, in particular, in every speech act) must ‘presuppose’ the ideal speech situation, or ‘assume it counterfactually,’ that is they must ‘act as if’ their present situation was ‘ideal,’ although they can never know that it is and will generally have reason to believe that it is not.” We approach discourse anticipating an ideal speech situation and “this anticipation alone is the warrant that permits us to join to an actually attained consensus the claim of a rational consensus. At the same time it is a critical standard against which every actually realized consensus can be called into question and tested.” The ideal speech situation may serve as “a transcendental criterion of truth, freedom, and rationality. Beliefs agents would agree on in the ideal speech situation are ipso facto ‘true beliefs,’ preferences they would agree on are ‘rational preferences,’ interests they would agree on are ‘real interests.’ The agents are ‘free’ if their real situation is one which satisfies the conditions of the ideal speech situation.”

Clearly, Habermas regards the ideal speech situation as the presupposed context-transcendent norms of discourse without which any particular context-immanent discourse, however short of the ideal it may fall, cannot be actually engaged nor adequately explained. He contends that “the ideal speech situation is neither an empirical phenomenon nor a mere construct, but rather an unavoidable supposition reciprocally made in discourse.... It is not merely a regulative principle in Kant’s sense; with the first step toward agreement in language we must always in fact make this supposition. On the other hand, neither is it an existing concept in Hegel’s sense; for no historical reality matches the form of life that we can in principle characterize by reference to the ideal speech situation. The ideal speech situation would best be compared with a transcendental illusion were it not for the fact that... this illusion is also the constitutive condition of rational speech. [Therefore,] the anticipation of the ideal speech situation has... the significance of a constitutive illusion which is at the same time the appearance of a form of life.”
We can enhance our understanding of Habermasian discourse by first recognizing it as a form of awareness-in-action framed in TQP^N. What I have already proposed is that the realization of my specific claims to quadratic freedom, justice, and truth is unavoidably interdependent with the realization of your claims and his or her claims, not as a regulative principle to be accepted or rejected upon reasonable reflection, but as a presupposed condition of our situational awareness-in-action. In awareness-in-action, each of our triadic quadratic actions is in reference to the others' triadic quadratic actions and each such action includes specific reality claims, whether expressed or implied, that are raised and redeemed in response to the others' specific reality claims, all of which inform a complete dialogue regarding what really is free (F^N), just (J^N), and true (T^N)—indeed, what is relatively real (R^N)—for all three of us.

Furthermore, the ideal speech situation can be interpreted as stretching both the dimension and duration as well as the difference and deferral of this TQP^N dialogue to the extremes as logical presuppositions for mutual understanding and agreement regarding what is ultimately real in any dialogue. This is suggestive of the integral aperspectival, yet différential perspectival action framed in TQP^∞, which illustrates the infinitely differentiated integrations and infinitely integrated differentiations of a veritable kaleidoscope of self-imaging/world-viewing as seen through all the eyes, literally all the unique Is, identified in my circle of awareness. TQP^∞ frames the ideal that each and every one of us can ultimately realize each and every one of us as unique members of a universal civilization grounded in the ultimate realization of freedom (F^∞), justice (J^∞), and truth (T^∞), and therefore ultimate reality (R^∞).

Accordingly, we might define the ideal speech situation more comprehensively as an ideal action situation in which what it means for an action to be free, just, and true is that all of us would agree that it is free, just, and true if we were to communicatively contemplate all of human experience in absolutely free and uncoerced circumstances for an indefinite period of time. Despite the evidence that each and every one of us has indeed pursued our own marginally satisfying notions of freedom, justice, and truth in ways that apparently require others to curtail their pursuits of the same, there also appears
to be no way to ignore forever our semiotic, pragmatic, and praxiological interdependence in ultimate realization. Hence, the presupposed ideality of \( \text{TQP}_\infty \) weaves us together in an ever-present, never-ending metalogue that ultimately includes, by virtue of the limitless derivatives in this integral aperspectival, yet différantial perspectival exemplar, all private persons as members of a fictive world society, or, better yet, all sentient beings as members of a fictive universal civilization.

**Fictitious Premises / Counter-factual Presuppositions**

Unfortunately, there is some potential for misinterpretation and misapplication of the ideal speech situation by people seeking, through seemingly unbounded and interminable conversation—but not necessarily dialogue—the resolution to the very real defenses and dysfunctions associated with strategic action. In terms of action science, a tendency toward unbounded and interminable conversation is often associated with Opposite Model I action values—everyone participates, everyone wins, no one loses, express feelings, and suppress intellect—which arise in complementary contradiction to the conversation-stifling, debate-promoting Model I action values—define and achieve goals, maximize winning, minimize losing, minimize negative feelings, and be rational—while generating many of the same defensive routines and dysfunctional dynamics. A superficial interpretation of the ideal speech situation by people enacting either of the Models I may very well lead to the mistaken conclusion that it implies action values and strategies consistent with Opposite Model I. Nevertheless, a proper understanding of how Opposite Model I prevents the open, honest disclosure and evaluation of reality claims in favor of overtly dependent, covertly controlling, persistently deceptive, and systematically distorted communication should preclude any confusion with the ideal speech situation.

That being said, Model II practitioners are careful not to prematurely foreclose discourse simply because it may descend into the circulating ignorance of Opposite Model I, for attributing to a particular discourse that has not yet begun, let alone run its course, the dysfunctional anti-discourse action values of Opposite Model I is
more likely to be made by those enacting the anti-discourse Model I than by those genuinely enacting Model II. In other words, Model II practitioners have the capacity and often the willingness to effectively engage in discourse with Model I and Opposite Model I practitioners when they at least espouse a commitment to Model II action values. However, if those practicing either of the strategic modes of communication are not committed to at least trying to raise their discourse to Model II standards, then Model II practitioners will typically recognize the futility of any further engagement and exit the situation.

Such an exit will appear to the Model I and Opposite Model I practitioners as a violation of their respective action values—in the case of the former, a refusal to rationally debate over pre-determined conclusions, and in the case of the latter, a refusal to concede to an irrationally pre-determined consensus. These predictable interpretations will, in turn, appear to support the evaluation that the unrecognized Model II practitioner has failed to justify his or her claims to reality in what passes for discourse among the necessarily antagonistic Model I and Opposite Model I practitioners. The anticipation of these common misinterpretations and negative evaluations thus presents the Model II practitioner with a practical dilemma in every action situation in which a mutual understanding of the substantive issues of concern requires a common level of discourse beyond the capacity of some people who nevertheless consider themselves worthy participants in that discourse.

As if to illustrate this confusion between ideal discourse and unlimited conversation with an insufficient appreciation for the nuances of real discourse, Habermas draws approvingly on the pragmatic rules of Robert Alexy, who specifically characterizes these rules as being stimulated by and corresponding to the ideal speech situation. As Habermas summarizes, Alexy’s rules of discourse include:

- Every subject with the competence to speak and act is allowed to take part in a discourse.
- Everyone has an equal opportunity to participate in the discourse.
  - Everyone is allowed to question any assertion whatever.
Everyone is allowed to introduce any assertion whatever.
Everyone is allowed to express his attitudes, desires, and needs.
- No speaker may, by internal or external coercion, be prevented from exercising his rights as laid down in the preceding rules.\textsuperscript{257}

As clear and compelling as Alexy’s pragmatic rules appear to be, it is difficult to imagine their effective use with people whose normal patterns of communication are characterized by systematic deception, subconscious coercion, and durable defensive routines based on unexamined action values that make it normatively inappropriate and personally threatening to even begin such a discourse with the people who are already involved in the situation. These are the standard conditions we all encounter in the real world of institutionalized human action and the primary reason why the action scientist as interventionist with the high level of communicative competence reflected in Model II can be so important in the conduct of effective discourse. Furthermore, Alexy’s pragmatic rules fall well short of the Model II standard by claiming, in essence, that every discourse is always open to every participant in order to express anything without simultaneously providing for some form of mutual accountability by which the contributions of each participant are openly evaluated as part of the discourse, with each participant’s future participation to be determined on this basis. In short, Alexy’s pragmatic rules have some similarities to Argyris’s Opposite Model I that should give us more than a little pause, not with respect to the ideal speech situation, at least as I am reconstructing it, but certainly with respect to Alexy’s particular practical formulation.

Nevertheless, Habermas does inadvertently point to some better ideas concerning these context-transcendent norms, ironically, in the context of identifying the fictitious premises of his theory of society-as-lifeworld that, in his view, call for the complementary theory of society-as-system. “When we conceive of society... [from the perspective of participants in a lifeworld], we are accepting three fictions. We are presupposing (a) the autonomy of actors, (b) the independence of culture, and (c) the transparency of communication.”\textsuperscript{258}
Regarding the autonomy of actors, Habermas contends that, while members of a lifeworld demonstrate autonomy in the way they act responsibly toward their own and others’ criticizable validity claims, it is fictitious to assume that society consists only of relationships entered into by autonomous, responsible actors and can therefore be explained solely in terms of the intentions and decisions of those involved. Regarding the independence of culture, he contends that “in the situation of action, the lifeworld forms a horizon behind which we cannot go; it is a totality with no reverse side. Accordingly, it is strictly meaningless for members of a... lifeworld to inquire whether the culture in whose light they deal with external nature [3], society [2], and internal nature [1] is empirically dependent on anything else.” Finally, regarding the transparency of communication, he contends that as long as members of a lifeworld “maintain a performative attitude, [they] cannot reckon with a systematic distortion of their communication, that is, with resistances built into the linguistic structure itself and inconspicuously restricting the scope of communication.... There can be no pseudoconsensus in the sense of convictions brought about by force; in a basically transparent process of reaching understanding—which is transparent for the participants themselves—no force can gain a footing.”

The remarkable implication of these fictitious premises of society-as-lifeworld is that these would logically have to be the counter-factual presuppositions of the communicative action that more-or-less consciously (re)produces the society-as-lifeworld and, therefore, the context-transcendent norms of discourse. Thus, in light of my proposed reconstruction of Habermas’s lifeworld/system dichotomy into the meaningful (123.123ll) and functional (123.123lr) aspects of a more integral actionable knowledge (123.123aq), it appears that these presuppositions of communicative action might serve to integrate, rather than dissociate, the meaningful lifeworld and functional system of awareness-in-action. Furthermore, these reconstructed presuppositions of communicative action—from autonomy to responsibility to non-coercion to transparency—bear a striking resemblance to the action values of Argyris’s empirically and normatively validated method of communicative action: Model II. Thus, in light of my proposed reconstruction of Argyris’s Model II into a more integral
knowledgeable action (123.123\(\omega\)), it appears that these action values—valid information, free and informed choice, internal commitment, and vigilant monitoring—may be sufficiently idealistic as to approach the Habermasian ideal speech situation, while being sufficiently realistic for practical application in real speech situations dominated by Model I and Opposite Model I. Finally, while these action values appear to constitute quasi-universal context-transcendent norms for the realization of most context-immanent claims, it remains for me to discern the meta-practical limits toward which these action values point and to refine them accordingly.\(^262\)

**Primordial Practices**

With this substantial foundation established, I now return to the question that opened this second line of inquiry: What practices must be presupposed by all people in order for them to act in any situation? In light of the subtle complexity of integral perspectives that appear to be always already activated in the many derivatives of triadic quadratic perspectivism, what are the integral practices that appear to be always already activating the many derivatives of triadic quadratic perspectivism?

Based on the role these primordial practices are supposed to play within our situational awareness-in-action, these would seem to have certain features worth articulating, however provisionally. For example, if these practices are always already activating the triadic quadratic perspectives that are always already activated, then:

- These practices are *always already available for discovery*—right here, right now—implied in every action one takes.
- These practices are *deceptively counter-factual* in that most action appears to be a contradiction of their ideal form, yet *re-assuringly intuitive* in that most actors idealize themselves acting this way.
- These practices are *relatively content-free* in the sense that these do not convey *applicable* knowledge of what we can, should, and do know, yet *radically content-oriented* in the
sense that these do convey actionable knowledge of how we can, should, and do learn.

- These practices are context-transcendent norms of human action in all its forms and fields and context-immanent evidence of human action in all its particular manifestations.
- These practices are tacit knowledge of human action that we already possess and latent potential for human action that we have yet to realize.
- These practices are fractal by design and (re/de)constructive at all degrees of depth and scale throughout the potentially infinite, yet always indeterminate meta-structure of triadic quadratic perspectival (TQP\textsuperscript{N}) awareness-in-action.

Overall, these primordial practices characterize a multiplicity of real action situations that can approach the ideal action situation in which integral aperspectival freedom (F\textsuperscript{∞}), justice (J\textsuperscript{∞}), and truth (T\textsuperscript{∞}) are ultimately realized (R\textsuperscript{∞}). Consistent with these features, I propose that regardless of the specific forms and fields of awareness-in-action, people act through the primordial practices of transparency, choice, and accountability with respect to the triadic quadratic perspectives:\textsuperscript{263}

- Transparency generally means disclosing and acquiring all the relevant knowledge and information within the relevant perspectives pertaining to a particular action, free of any deception or distortion that may undermine one’s ability to reason, act, and learn. Ultimately, it refers to the primordial transparency of one’s own triadic quadratic perspectival self-imaging/world-viewing.
- Choice generally means taking perspectives and making decisions in the context of one’s awareness, free from coercion by others and free to create by oneself, however deliberately or spontaneously. Ultimately, it refers to the primordial choice to enact one’s own triadic quadratic perspectival self-image/world-view within choiceless awareness.
- Accountability generally means accepting responsibility for one’s thoughts, feelings, words, and deeds, following through on commitments made, sharing responsibility for the intended as well as unintended consequences of action,
and learning from experience in all perspectives. Ultimately, it refers to the primordial accountability for one’s own triadic quadratic perspectival self-imaging/world-viewing.

As a complement to the meta-theory of triadic quadratic perspectivism, transparency, choice, and accountability (denoted TCA) collectively constitute a meta-practice, by which I mean a relatively content-free, yet context-rich practice with the capacity to integrate, via some combination of creative vision and conceptual logic, a large variety of relatively context-free, yet content-rich practices from all the forms and fields of awareness-in-action. I am therefore proposing that the meta-practice of transparency, choice, and accountability comprises a significant portion of that intuitive knowledge without which people could not act as they really do and, correspondingly, a significant portion of those essential premises without which we cannot know what human action really is.

Collectively, the practices of transparency, choice, and accountability generally entail discovering and expressing what is honest, right, and true in every action situation in order to promote mutual reflexive awareness, learning, and trust consistent with the degree of commitment present in that situation. But this cannot happen without surfacing the inherent différance and inevitable conflict rooted in the triadic quadratic perspectival nature of human action, including the latent as well as blatant deception, coercion, and defensiveness corrupting so many interactions, all of which nevertheless implies the very transparency, choice, and accountability we presuppose in every action situation. If we can suspend time and open space for the unavoidable reality of this différance-disclosing, conflict-ridden, but nevertheless integral dialogue, then we can genuinely inquire into the subtle intervals between behavior and intention, function and meaning, mine and yours, ours and theirs, as much out of curiosity as any desire for resolution. Thus, TCA may be thought of as a presupposed imperative to pay attention to, and take responsibility for, our TQP awareness-in-action, partly because this is essential to the learning that supports more effective choices in the future, and partly because such practices reveal our previously unrecognized contributions to the contextual realities we often take for granted.
As these practices intensify in contemplative communication, we become more aware of the linguistically-constructed nature of our indeterminate realities ($R^N$), wherein my personified symptoms of freedom ($1_{AQ}$), participative signals of justice ($2_{AQ}$), and representative symbols of truth ($3_{AQ}$), each comprised of its corresponding intentional signifieds ($123_{UL}$), behavioral signifiers ($123_{UR}$), cultural semantics ($123_{LL}$), and social syntax ($123_{LR}$), really do co-arise in mutual reflexive différance with those pragmatic significations of yours ($2.123_{AQ}$) and theirs ($3.123_{AQ}$), not only as a meta-theory ($TQPN$), but as a corresponding meta-practice ($TCA^N$). For one sentence after another, the language that discloses, obscures, and ultimately (re/de)constructs our world-viewing plays a concurrent role in simultaneously disclosing, obscuring, and ultimately (re/de)constructing our self-imaging through the same integral/différantial action-in-awareness. Amidst the intensifying transparency of pragmatic and semiotic reality construction, choices proliferate along the deconstructive/reconstructive edge of provisional freedom, justice, and truth, seemingly unbounded but for the unavoidable accountability for unpredictable consequences that accompanies such awareness. Ultimately, the I that I think I am as the implied origin of all that I think I do within the world that I think I know approaches the same deconstructive/reconstructive edge, revealing its essential absence in light of the essential presence of awareness-in-action.

Awareness-in-Action may therefore be understood as the meta-practice of transparency, choice, and accountability with respect to the meta-theory of triadic quadratic perspectivism, both of which are always already active in our situational awareness-in-action.
— Part III —

Integral Praxis

I began this inquiry with the self-evident reality of human action—*that people act*—and proceeded to clarify what appear to be the essential perspectives and practices of all human action in real-world contexts. Having outlined a *meta-theory* and corresponding *meta-practice* of human action, it remains for me to integrate these complementary aspects of what might be termed a *meta-praxis*, by which I mean a relatively content-free, yet context-rich *theory-of-practice/practice-of-theory* with the capacity to integrate, via some combination of creative vision and conceptual logic, a large variety of relatively context-free, yet content-rich theories and practices from all the forms and fields of human action. The key to appreciating the deeper significance of this proposed meta-praxis is to recognize that my inquiry into the perspectival and practical nature of human action has been, at least implicitly, just as much about the perspectival and practical nature of integral philosophy. In light of this, my final proposal is to consider that an *integral philosophy of human action* that is grounded in the essential presuppositions of awareness-in-action might provide some direct insight into the essential premises for an *action-oriented integral philosophy* concerned with helping people realize their full potential in the full variety of real-world situations.
Having discerned what appear to be the primordial perspectives and corresponding primordial practices that are always already active in our situational awareness-in-action, we can now clarify the contours of the *primordial praxes* implied by their integration.

**Primordial Praxes**

The essence of Awareness-in-Action ($A^N$) can be summarized as the meta-practice of *transparency, choice, and accountability* ($TCA^N$) with respect to the meta-theory *triadic quadratic perspectivism* ($TQP^N$), both of which appear to be always already active in every situational action-in-awareness. In that quintessential situation framed by the Indeterminate Derivative of Awareness-in-Action ($A^N$), that exemplar in which *I* act, *you* act, and *s/he* acts in relation to one another, *we* enact three unique, yet interpenetrating versions of $TCA^N \times TQP^N$, each of which frames a total of 36 reciprocally interlocked perspectives on the self-evident realization ($R^N$) of our situational awareness-in-action. From each of our different perspectives as a unique enactive origin of our situational awareness-in-action, each of us indeterminately *realizes*, through the practice of transparency, choice, and accountability ($TCA^N = R^N$), three unique, yet interpenetrating sets of triadic quadratic perspectival *claims to reality* ($TQP^N = R^N$), while simultaneously *realizing*, through the same practice of transparency, choice, and accountability ($TCA^N = R^N$), three unique, yet interpenetrating sets of corresponding triadic quadratic perspectival *contexts of*
reality $(TQP^N = R^N)$, all of which constitute the integral/différantial realization $(R^N)$ of our situational awareness-in-action.

Therefore, the primordial praxis of realization entails the requisite practice of transparency, choice, and accountability $(TCA^N)$ with respect to my pragmatic significations of reality $(123_{AQ})$, each of your pragmatic significations of reality $(2.123_{AQ})$, and each of their pragmatic significations of reality $(3.123_{AQ})$, each comprised of its corresponding intentional signifieds $(123.123_{UL})$, behavioral signifiers $(123.123_{UR})$, cultural semantics $(123.123_{LL})$, and social syntax $(123.123_{LR})$ of reality, all of which appear to co-arise in the integral awareness $(0)$ that each of us brings to our différantial action situation $(A^N = TCA^N \times 123.123_{AQ} = R^N)$. Furthermore, from each of our different perspectives as an origin of our situational awareness-in-action—each of us being a unique enactive $I$—each of us has the potential to engage in three primary modes of integral/différantial realization:265,266 (Fig. 20)

- **Authentication** is the **intrapersonal** mode of realization that entails the requisite practice of transparency, choice, and accountability with respect to my personified symptoms of freedom $(1_{AQ})$, each of your personified symptoms of freedom $(2.1_{AQ})$, and each of their personified symptoms of freedom $(3.1_{AQ})$, each comprised of its corresponding intentional signifieds $(123.1_{UL})$, behavioral signifiers $(123.1_{UR})$, cultural semantics $(123.1_{LL})$, and social syntax $(123.1_{LR})$ of freedom, collectively denoted $A^N > TCA^N \times 123.1_{AQ} = AF^N$. Authentication is the intrapersonal praxis by which each of us (in)validates each of our relatively knowledgeable actions in terms of its honesty and authenticity, consistent with each of our indeterminate realizations of awareness-in-action, thereby (re/de-) constructing our actionable knowledge of freedom.

- **Legitimation** is the **interpersonal** mode of realization that entails the requisite practice of transparency, choice, and accountability with respect to my participative signals of justice $(2_{AQ})$, each of your participative signals of justice $(2.2_{AQ})$, and each of their participative signals of justice $(3.2_{AQ})$, each comprised of its corresponding intentional signifieds $(123.2_{UL})$, behavioral signifiers $(123.2_{UR})$, cultural semantics

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(123.2LL), and social syntax (123.2LR) of justice, collectively denoted $A_N > TCA_N \times 123.2AQ = LJ_N$. Legitimation is the interpersonal praxis by which each of us (in)validates each of our relatively knowledgeable actions in terms of its morality and legitimacy, consistent with each of our indeterminate realizations of awareness-in-action, thereby (re/de)constructing our actionable knowledge of justice.

- Confirmation is the impersonal mode of realization that entails the requisite practice of transparency, choice, and accountability with respect to my representative symbols of truth ($3AQ$), each of your representative symbols of truth ($2.3AQ$), and each of their representative symbols of truth ($3.3AQ$), each comprised of its corresponding intentional signifieds (123.3UL), behavioral signifiers (123.3UR), cultural semantics (123.3LL), and social syntax (123.3LR) of truth, collectively denoted $A_N > TCA_N \times 123.3AQ = CT_N$. Confirmation is the impersonal praxis by which each of us (in)validates each of our relatively knowledgeable actions in terms of its accuracy and cogency, consistent with each of our indeterminate realizations of awareness-in-action ($A_N$), thereby (re/de)constructing our actionable knowledge of truth.

As an integration of the substantive meta-theory of triadic quadratic perspectivism ($TQP^N$) with the procedural meta-practice of transparency, choice, and accountability ($TCA^N$), authentication, legitimation, and confirmation ($ALC^N$) collectively constitute a substantive/procedural meta-paradigm of realization ($RN$) called Awareness-in-Action ($AN$), by which I mean a relatively content-free, yet context-rich theory-of-practice/practice-of-theory with the capacity to integrate, via some combination of creative vision and conceptual logic, a large variety of relatively context-free, yet content-rich theories and practices from all the forms and fields of human awareness-in-action. Furthermore, while this substantive/procedural meta-paradigm of realization may be immediately recognizable as a conceptual meta-paradigm with quasi-universal (re/de)constructive capabilities within, across, and beyond established disciplinary and institutional paradigms, it is even more important to recognize it as the perceptual meta-paradigm that appears to be always already active in our
situational awareness-in-action—empirical and normative evidence, it seems, of our latent potential for more integral/différantial realization. Finally, this substantive/procedural and empirical/normative formulation of integral/différantial semiotics, pragmatics, and praxiology accounts for a different form of presupposed firstness, secondness, and thirdness essential to every semiotic, pragmatic, and praxiological occasion—my realization, each of your realizations, and each of their realizations—not just as I can realize each of our respective realities, but as each of us can realize each of our respective realities as différantly integral to our respective realizations.

![Diagram](image)

**Figure 20. Awareness-in-Action**

Awareness-in-Action may therefore be understood as the substantive/procedural, the integral/différantial, and the empirical/normative meta-paradigm of realization in three modes—authentication, legitimation, and confirmation—by which we—I, each of you, and each of them—(re/de)construct our actionable knowledge of reality in three
forms—freedom, justice, and truth—to guide knowledgeable action that is progressively more real—or free, just, and true.

**(A)Perspectival / (A)Practical**

From each of our different perspectives as an origin of our situational awareness-in-action, freedom ($F^N$), justice ($J^N$), and truth ($T^N$) are, respectively, first-, second-, and third-person claims to, and contexts of, reality as each of us experiences them. However, the authentication of our personified symptoms of freedom ($AF^N$), the legitimation of our participative signals of justice ($LJ^N$), and the confirmation of our representative symbols of truth ($CT^N$) are each inherently, inevitably first-, second-, and third-person realization praxes that we all must engage together, not as a regulative principle to be accepted or rejected upon reasonable reflection, but as a presupposed condition of our situational awareness-in-action ($A^N$). Thus, Awareness-in-Action appears to be *perspectival* arranged in such a way that I cannot (in)authenticate my personified symptoms of freedom ($TCA^N \times 1_{AQ}$), (de)legitimate my participative signals of justice ($TCA^N \times 2_{AQ}$), or (dis)confirm my representative symbols of truth ($TCA^N \times 3_{AQ}$) without inevitably (in)authenticating, (de)legitimating, and (dis)confirming each of yours ($TCA^N \times 2.1_{2AQ}$) and each of theirs ($TCA^N \times 3.1_{2AQ}$) as essential dimensions of our integral/différantial realization ($A^N = TCA^N \times 123.123_{AQ} = ALC^N = R^N$).

Likewise, each of these primordial *praxes*—authentication, legitimation, confirmation—foregrounds one of the three primordial *perspectives*—intraperonal freedom, interpersonal justice, or impersonal truth—as each of us identifies it, while backgrounding the other two primordial perspectives for which the corresponding reality claims might be presumed, in a specific action situation, to be sufficiently realized. However, due to the *primordial practices* of transparency, choice, and accountability engaged by all of us with respect to the foregrounded reality claims—practices that have no predetermined boundaries—there is always the potential for each of us to challenge any of the backgrounded claims and thereby shift to the corresponding praxis. Thus, Awareness-in-Action also appears to be *practically* arranged in such a way that even we cannot
(in)authenticate our claims to freedom \( (TCA^N \times 123.1_{AQ} = AF^N) \),
de(leg)itimate our claims to justice \( (TCA^N \times 123.2_{AQ} = LJ^N) \), or
(dis)confirm our claims to truth \( (TCA^N \times 123.3_{AQ} = CT^N) \) without
inevitably engaging in all three of these primordial praxes as essential
dimensions of our integral/différantial realization \( (A^N = TCA^N \times 123.123_{AQ} = ALC^N = R^N) \).

As suggested by the substantive/procedural vision-logic of Figure 20, our mindful practice of situational awareness-in-action in its
many forms and fields can facilitate a qualitative intensification of our
integral/différantial realization in terms of the clarity of awareness
present in each of our actions, as well as a quantitative extensification
of our integral/différantial realization in terms of the number of
people with whom, and perspectives with which, each of us can
actively identify. For with every second- and third-person perspec-
tive being potentially differentiated into yet another unique set of
TQP\(^1\) originating in yet another unique enactive \( I, each \ of \ us \) appears
to possess the potential to bring ever more transparency, choice, and
accountability to the différantial perspectivism, constructivism, and
contextualism of our action situations that are, nevertheless, still
framed within each of our original sets of TQP\(^1\). Indeed, the dimension
and duration of awareness-in-action is always already marked by
spacial difference and temporal deferral, by traces of actions near and
far, past and future—mine, yours, and hers, as well as ours, yours, and
theirs—such that each situational action-in-awareness is as much an
effect as it is a cause of its integral différence. In other words, action
can be realized in the here and now only if this action is not some-
thing wholly given, in and of itself, to this situation, but rather a
situational synthesis of traces to implicated actions near and far, past
and future, and thus, by definition, not here and not now. We might
therefore say that action in the here and now is rhizomatically self-
situating in the milieu of its own spacial-temporal multiplicity of
enfolding/unfolding traces to relevant actions that are not here and
not now, yet différantially integral to the one action appearing right
here, right now.

Consequently, by virtue of its presupposed \( TCA^\infty \times TQP^\infty = ALC^\infty \) meta-structure, each situational action-in-awareness radically
opens to a rhizomatic multiplicity of unique, interdependent permu-
utions of triadic quadratic perspectival reality (TQP∞), each permutation of which appears to be enacted by a unique origin of awareness-in-action, a unique enactive I, with the potential to realize (TCA∞) within its own primordial perspectives all the other uniquely enacted permutations of triadic quadratic perspectival reality, theoretically free of spacial or temporal limits. Furthermore, as the personal particulars of this potentially limitless aperspectival/apractical realization (ALC∞ = R∞) shift from one moment to the next, the apractical realizing (TCA∞ = R∞) rhizomatically reconfigures this awareness-in-action into countless new permutations of aperspectival reality (TQP∞ = R∞), each momentary multiplicity of which is simultaneously realized by all the unique enactive Is—all the interdependent realizers—as regarded from the perspective of each unique enactive I. This Infinite Derivative of Awareness-in-Action (A∞) reveals the infinitely differentiated integration and infinitely integrated differentiation of a veritable kaleidoscope of self-imaging/world-viewing as seen through all the eyes, literally all the unique Is, that have ever been or could ever be identified in my circle of integral awareness (A0).

Awareness-in-Action may therefore be understood as the one ideal action situation (A∞) in which each and every one of us can ultimately realize (R∞) each and every one of us as unique members of a universal civilization grounded in the ultimate realization (R∞) of integral aperspectival freedom (AF∞), justice (LJ∞), and truth (CT∞), and, thus, ultimate reality (R∞).

Nevertheless, while being aperspectival/apractical in the one ideal action situation, awareness-in-action is perspectival/practical in the many real action situations because our actual realizations in any particular situation are contingent upon the différantial capacities of each actor as enacted in his or her own original awareness-in-action. In other words, I am subject to my own indeterminately constrained semiotic, pragmatic, and praxiological capacities rooted in deep structures of actionable knowledge that not only limit my ability to realize (TCA^N) those realities directly realized by every unique enactive I in my awareness-in-action (TQP^N), but also limit the ability of those unique enactive Is to indirectly realize those realities that are directly realized by me. Each of us is, therefore, indeterminately
limited in our respective capacity for authentication, legitimation, and confirmation, while inadvertently limiting each other’s capacity for authentication, legitimation, and confirmation. This Indeterminate Derivative of Awareness-in-Action ($A^N$) therefore highlights the inherently indeterminate nature of integral/différential realization ($TCA^N \times TQP^N = ALC^N = R^N$) rooted in the deep structures of actionable knowledge that each of us brings to our situational awareness-in-action, and does so in a manner consistent with the way we actually experience these invisibly opaque, surprisingly durable, supportive limits on our situational awareness-in-action.

$A^N$ frames the indeterminate intentional-behavioral-cultural-social contexts within which I can identify with some of you more so than with others of you, and with some of them more so than with others of them, but not all of you or all of them to the same depth, not yet anyway, and so the mutual reflexive différential action continues—mine, yours, and hers as well as ours, yours, and theirs—as we all struggle to create enough aperspectival/apractical space to eventually integrate all our perspectival/practical self-imaging/world-viewing. This $A^N$ formulation of integral/différential semiotics, pragmatics, and praxiology reveals that each perspectival/practical action presupposes every perspectival/practical action with any number of derivative perspectival/practical actions in a radically open-ended, yet reliably closed-minded meta-structure of Awareness-in-Action. Indeed, with each différential action being a unique, situation-specific synthesis of traces to every relevant différential action arising in integral awareness, we might say that each différance presupposes every différance that makes any différance in the différential integralism of Awareness-in-Action.

Awareness-in-Action may therefore be understood as the many real action situations ($A^N$) in which each and every one of us is indeterminately constrained in our capacities to ultimately realize each and every one of us as unique members of a universal civilization committed to the authentication of freedom ($AF^N$), legitimation of justice ($LJ^N$), and confirmation of truth ($CT^N$), and, thus, indeterminate realization ($R^N$).

These reconstructions highlight the empirical/normative complementarity between the context-immanent realization of an empirically
justifiable Awareness-in-Action ($A^N$)—the real action situation—which is inherently particular, content-rich, and perspectival/practical, and the context-transcendent idealization of a normatively justifiable Awareness-in-Action ($A^\infty$)—the ideal action situation—which is inherently universal, content-free, and aperspectival/apractical. Notwithstanding the constrained semiotic, pragmatic, and praxiological capacity unfolding in these real action situations ($A^N$), every such real action situation is always already enfolding as potential the integral aperspectival/apractical realization, by the unique enactive $I$ at the origin of $A^1$, of all the other unique enactive $Is$, each of whom is the direct or indirect realizer of all the relative realities that can be realized within each and every real action situation, hence the ideal action situation ($A^\infty$). Thus, there is no human awareness-in-action in which the kosmic addresses of each and every situationally relevant realizer-realized are not already being identified—whether explicitly or implicitly—in the action situation itself, which therefore invites requisite practices of transparency, choice, and accountability concerning these actual addresses as part of the authentication, legitimation, and confirmation of the reality claims made in that situation. Even more significantly, the normatively ideal action situation enfolding/unfolding within every empirically real action situation ultimately accounts for the kosmic addresses/addressing of each and every realizer-realized that can possibly be regarded as relatively real at any time and any place within the integral awareness that each of us brings to our différantial action, hence ultimate realization.

**Absolute Relativism / Relative Absolutism**

By framing a potentially infinite, yet always indeterminate metalogue of integral/différantial realization, Awareness-in-Action opens space and suspends time for the perspectives/practices of all people, without equating all these perspectives/practices or privileging any particular perspectives/practices on the basis of authority, popularity, or otherwise biased norms of dialogue. This radically inclusive pluralism seems to imply a reconstructive, rather than deconstructive, form of absolute relativism, wherein the (in)validation of anyone’s
claim to any aspect of reality, however widely shared that (in)validation might be, is always provisional and contingent upon inclusion of additional counter-claims by additional participants in the ever-present, never-ending metalogue. By presupposing the fallible nature of their particular claims to freedom, justice, and truth in anticipation of the need to justify these claims to others, it seems that people are also presupposing the relativistic nature of realization itself, which appears to originate in the inherently relativistic Is assuming ownership of each and every claim to reality.

This, furthermore, is another way of saying that realization is, in context, whatever the participants in dialogue mutually determine it to be, provided that the dialogue of empirical realization is conducted on the basis of certain substantive and procedural norms considered essential by those participants. Even then, whatever consensus version of triadic quadratic perspectival reality (TPQN) these participants might construct, together with the consensus version of transparency, choice, and accountability (TCA N) they use to construct it, will almost certainly be deconstructed and reconstructed by some of those third-persons observing, but not yet participating, in the contextualized dialogue (ALC N). Nevertheless, the presupposed norms of any such open-ended dialogue—the TCA∞ × TPQ∞ = ALC∞ at least implicitly idealized by all participants—never really fail to govern even the most discordant of empirical situations, thus welcoming the play of différance consistent with the integral rules of the game. In this way, the validity basis of realization insures the reconstructive nature of this absolute relativism against the extremes of a deconstructive indeterminacy of realization that would, in the absence of any validity basis, lead inexorably to an arbitrary equivalence of all fleetingly meaningful versions of perspectival/practical realization—a completely différantial, but non-integral, aperspectival/apractical madness.

Alternatively, this AN metalogue also seems to imply a libertarian, rather than authoritarian, form of relative absolutism, by virtue of the fact that every person who engages in any dialogue intuitively presupposes, despite what may be an altogether contrary experience, the immediate potential for absolute realization of freedom, justice, and truth. By pursuing these intrapersonal, interpersonal,
and impersonal aspects of absolute realization within the semiotic, pragmatic, and praxiological confines of dimensional-durational experience, it appears that people are also presupposing the existence of as-yet-uncertain, but nevertheless ultimate conclusions regarding every contextualized claim to freedom, justice, and truth via an ideal metalogue of ultimate realization ($R^\infty$) characterized by complete autonomy for, and complete responsibility to, all participants. As each relativistic dialogue converges on a satisfactory conclusion regarding what really is free, just, and true in a particular context, the participants will tend to attribute to their new insights an additional measure of this ultimate status and proceed to act as if their consensus realization is relatively absolute—a meaningful-functional certainty that can, henceforth, be taken for granted as part of the contextual ground for their future actions, at least until another challenge presents itself.

This, however, might be another way of saying that any ultimate realizations of freedom, justice, and truth—thus, reality itself—to whatever extent such relative absolutes can be conceived in dimensional-durational experience, can only be fully acknowledged as such to the extent that everyone in the world has communicatively contemplated all of human experience with requisite degrees of transparency, choice, and accountability for an indefinite period of time. Short of this normative ultimatum, and with the absolute relativism of an ever-present, never-ending metalogue thus implied, there is no space or time in which an authoritarian absolutism—a deceptive, coercive, defensive decree regarding what must be real for anyone and everyone—can be confirmed, legitimated, and authenticated.

The source of this seemingly paradoxical, mutually implicating absolute relativism/relative absolutism is to be found in the integral/différantial complementarity of Awareness-in-Action—that is, the dynamic interplay between the absolute realization ($R^0$) of the integral awareness that we are ($A^0$) and the relative realization ($R^N$) of the différantial action that we do ($A^N$). Because the absolute realization of the integral awareness that we are is often only relatively realized in the différantial action that we do, it is often only relatively idealized in the form of an ultimate realization ($R^\infty$) that can only ever
signify in spacial-temporal form the absolute realization (R⁰) always already beyond the relativity of dimensional-durational awareness-in-action. Without blurring the important distinctions between objective and subjective aspects of reality or between intrapersonal honesty, interpersonal morality, and impersonal truth, such presuppositions of ultimate realization do introduce an inescapable epistemic dimension to all relativistic pursuits of absolute realization. Nevertheless, these presuppositions do not reduce absolute realization to relative realization, or, for that matter, ontology to epistemology, for it appears that the very ideal of ultimate realization is but the semiotic, pragmatic, and praxiological experience of the as-yet-merely-intuited absolute realization without which such relativistic pursuits would lose all significance.

Therefore, in summary, the (dis)confirmation of relative truth (CT⁰) in fully quadratic form (123.3AQ) presupposes the never-ending potential for ultimate truth (CT∞) based on the ever-present intuition of absolute truth (CT⁰). Likewise, the (de)legitimation of relative justice (LJ⁰) in fully quadratic form (123.2AQ) presupposes the never-ending potential for ultimate justice (LJ∞) based on the ever-present intuition of absolute justice (LJ⁰). Finally, the (in)authentication of relative freedom (AF⁰) in fully quadratic form (123.1AQ) presupposes the never-ending potential for ultimate freedom (AF∞) based on the ever-present intuition of absolute freedom (AF⁰). Nevertheless, while ignoring the absolutely real (R⁰) and pursuing the relatively ideal (R∞) from within the semiotic, pragmatic, and praxiological confines of the relatively real (R⁰), we may come to discover in the ultimate realization (R∞) of our différantial action the reflected refraction of the integral awareness (R⁰) without which such manifestation could never have been illuminated. Hence, as if seeking to illuminate all manifestation, we eventually discover the active refraction of integral awareness revealed in every knowledgeable action and reflected in all actionable knowledge.

Awareness-in-Action may therefore be understood as the absolutely relative, yet relatively absolute metalogue in which our—mine, each of yours, and each of theirs—relative realizations (RN) presuppose the never-ending potential for ultimate realization (R∞) based on the ever-present intuition of absolute realization (R⁰).
Enfolding / Unfolding

To the extent that our situational awareness-in-action can be understood as the authentication, legitimation, and confirmation by which we (re/de)construct actionable knowledge of freedom, justice, and truth to guide knowledgeable action that is progressively more free, just, and true, it may also be understood as our contribution to the ever-widening, never-ending metalogue of human development and evolution. As I proposed in Chapter 2, Awareness-in-Action may help us frame—indeed, may already be framing—the entire, multi-structural metalogue of human development and evolution as it actually unfolds through the intrapersonal, interpersonal, and impersonal experiences of the intentional, behavioral, cultural, and social aspects of our situational awareness-in-action. If so, then human development and evolution can be explained, interpreted, and evaluated in terms of the meta-practice of transparency, choice, and accountability with respect to the meta-theory of triadic quadratic perspectivism in each and every real-world action situation. Furthermore, once we recognize in this situational awareness-in-action the actual dialogues of human development and evolution as it actually unfolds through the intrapersonal, interpersonal, and impersonal experiences of the intentional, behavioral, cultural, and social aspects of our situational awareness-in-action. If so, then human development and evolution can be explained, interpreted, and evaluated in terms of the meta-practice of transparency, choice, and accountability with respect to the meta-theory of triadic quadratic perspectivism in each and every real-world action situation. Furthermore, once we recognize in this situational awareness-in-action the actual dialogues of human development and evolution, we can also use this meta-paradigm to explain, interpret, and evaluate the abstract dialogues about human development and evolution.

This suggests that situational awareness-in-action, in all its empirical indeterminacy ($A^N = TCA^N \times TQP^N = ALC^N = R^N$), may be understood as the actual dialogues of human development and evolution in which surprisingly novel claims to reality are subjected to the rigors of integral/différantial realization in familiar real-world contexts, the subsequent authentication, legitimation, and confirmation of which constitute the abstracted dialogues about human development and evolution, both past actual and future potential. If so, then the pacemaker in human evolution might be defined in terms of the quality of the realization ($R^N$) dialogue arising in each and every real action situation, wherein the surprisingly novel actions of some unique enactive Is may in due time, through the tri-tetra-meshing of a deepening, widening dialogue, contribute to the source code of an as-yet-uncertain (r)evolutionary advance beyond the institutionalized standards of actionable knowledge. Furthermore, the deepening...
capacities for awareness-in-action that emerge through the progressive realizations of these unique enactive Is—the capacity, that is, for increasingly differentiated integration and increasingly integrated differentiation toward an implicated aperspectival/apractical ultimatum (R∞)—would indeterminately deconstruct and reconstruct all the actionable knowledge previously realized by these Is, including the multifarious stories and theories about their own development and evolution—both past actual(s) and future potential(s).

That being said, it is worth emphasizing that Awareness-in-Action merely clarifies those essential TQP\textsuperscript{N} perspectives into which we must inquire if we are to generate, via TCA\textsuperscript{N} practices, valid insight into our own or anyone else’s deep structures of actionable knowledge, as these structures are, in the most general sense, relatively stable conditions of possible awareness-in-action and, hence, possible realization. It does not, however, presuppose any particular levels, any particular multi-level theories, or any particular multi-structural patterns of human development and evolution—or, for that matter, even the existence of human development and evolution—beyond what can be discerned as our latent potential for integral/différantial realization. Whatever this phenomenon we call human development and evolution really is and regardless of how we describe its multi-structural patterns—from multi-leveled hierarchy to multi-cultural heterarchy to multi-layered holonarchy or from multi-phasic cycle to multi-stage spiral to rhizomatic multiplicities—it appears to be integrally/différantially realized through the potentially infinite, yet always indeterminate awareness-in-action of the multifarious Is participating in this phenomenon.

Therefore, if multi-structural patterns of human development and evolution actually exist—regardless of what those patterns are or how universal/particular they may be—then we must have created, can only discover, and should certainly be verifying/falsifying any such hypothesized multi-structural patterns through the normative practices of transparency, choice, and accountability with respect to the triadic quadratic perspectivism of our situational awareness-in-action (A∞ = TCA∞ × TQP∞ = ALC∞ = R∞). After all, the ideal action situation appears to be the deepest of the apparent deep structures, the most universal of the apparent universal structures, of
actionable knowledge guiding knowledgeable action in real action situations—that ultimate meta-structure of realization through which all (multi-)structures of realization are indeterminately deconstructed and reconstructed in the natural course of our ever-present, never-ending awareness-in-action.

It should therefore not surprise us to discover that all empirical content evidencing (multi-)structures of awareness-in-action always already evidences the normative meta-structure of that awareness-in-action. If so, then as theories of human development and evolution become more sophisticated they may tend to describe the triadic quadratic perspectivism as well as the transparency, choice, and accountability actually inscribing the awareness-in-action being used with increasing sophistication to study the awareness-in-action being studied, even if researchers had no conscious pre-disposition to do so. As important as these theories may be to a comprehensive understanding of situational awareness-in-action, the particular multi-structural patterns they describe do not appear to be universal presuppositions of the knowledgeable action that actually (re)creates the actionable knowledge that is only ever subsequently described in various theories of development and evolution, which are, in turn, only ever provisionally validated through the awareness-in-action of the participants in these theoretical dialogues. Consequently, particular theories of human development and evolution, however universal they may appear to particular people, at a particular time, in a particular place, may not be the best foundation upon which to construct an integral or a critical meta-theory with universalist aspirations.

This radically post-metaphysical formulation suggests the need for a necessary humility with respect to the dialogue about human development and evolution, one that recognizes the unavoidable relativity and inherent fallibility of each of our unique perspectives and practices within that dialogue, as well as the developmental-evolutionary implications of that dialogue itself, as can only ever be revealed through the dialogues of authentication, legitimation, and confirmation. Regardless of whether our situational awareness-in-action is self-consciously about individual development—mine, yours, or his/hers—and collective evolution—ours, yours, or theirs—the
(a)perspectival and (a)practical (pre)suppositions we bring to that awareness-in-action appear to inscribe the many ways we actually realize that development and evolution. Hence, the quality of our engagement in these realization dialogues would seem to determine the quality of our contributions to the actual dialogues of human development and evolution—not only what we contribute, but how we contribute—while subtly transforming any participation we might have in the various formal and informal dialogues that purport to be about the leading edge of human development and evolution. In due time, these abstracted dialogues about the past actual(s) and future potential(s) of human development and evolution should gradually (re/de)construct to reflect whatever (re/de)construction is presently unfolding in the leading-edge dialogues of human development and evolution, which may or may not involve many of the same people.

Awareness-in-Action may therefore be understood as an (a)perspectival/(a)practical metalogue of, and about, human development and evolution, enfolding within its visual-logical meta-structure all multi-structural patterns of human development and evolution that might actually unfold in the course of our ever-present, never-ending awareness-in-action, at least to whatever extent these multi-structural patterns might be authenticated, legitimated, and confirmed by the multifarious Is enfolding/unfolding that (re/de)constructive realization.

Bias & Crisis

There is certainly nothing easy about the requisite practice of transparency, choice, and accountability with respect to the triadic quadratic perspectivism in challenging action situations, notwithstanding the possibility that we intuitively commit to these unrealistic ideals in every real action situation. With each and every one of us being implicated in an ever-present, never-ending metalogue in which questions of truth, justice, and freedom are always at issue, is it really any wonder that we are almost always in conflict concerning what really is true, just, and free for each and every one of us? Per-
haps it is because we have good reason to anticipate this inevitable conflict over the inherent différance of our various actions that we seem so predisposed to rationalize and compromise rather than justify and modify our views, defending and controlling rather than disclosing and inquiring. Where intuition and reason meet at the myriad sites of everyday awareness-in-action, we anticipate more than just the ideals to be realized in this very moment \((A^\infty = TCA^\infty \times TQP^\infty = ALC^\infty = R^\infty)\). We also anticipate the yawning chasm between the ideal and the real \((A^N = TCA^N \times TQP^N = ALC^N = R^N)\) as an inescapable interval of indeterminate depth, scale, and outcome.

Anticipating this interval, we tend to enact some of the différential conflict we would prefer to avoid in the form of persistent biases rooted in the perspectival nature of Awareness-in-Action. This realization bias may be defined as an absence of requisite degrees of transparency, choice, and accountability afflicting our approach to integral/différential realization, sustaining my tendency to regard my pragmatic significations of reality \((1AQ)\), each of your tendencies to regard your pragmatic significations of reality \((2.1AQ)\), and each of their tendencies to regard their pragmatic significations of reality \((3.1AQ)\) as inherently more valid than either of the others' and thereby impairing our ability to create actionable knowledge of reality. Due to realization bias, each of us tends to overestimate our own capacity for reason, action, and learning and, hence, the validity of our own realizations, while underestimating that of the others, thereby impairing the honesty, morality, and accuracy of all of our awareness-in-action.

As with the meta-paradigm of realization itself, this realization bias appears to arise in three primary modes:

- **Authentication bias** is an absence of requisite degrees of transparency, choice, and accountability afflicting the intrapersonal mode of realization, sustaining my tendency to regard my personified symptoms of freedom \((1AQ)\), each of your tendencies to regard your personified symptoms of freedom \((2.1AQ)\), and each of their tendencies to regard their personified symptoms of freedom \((3.1AQ)\) as inherently more valid than either of the others' and thereby impairing our ability to create actionable knowledge of freedom. Due to
authentication bias, each of us tends to overestimate our own capacity for intrapersonal reason, action, and learning and, hence, the validity of our own intrapersonal realizations, while underestimating that of the others, thereby impairing the honesty and authenticity of all of our awareness-in-action.

- Legitimation bias is an absence of requisite degrees of transparency, choice, and accountability afflicting the interpersonal mode of realization, sustaining my tendency to regard my participative signals of justice (2AQ), each of your tendencies to regard your participative signals of justice (2.2AQ), and each of their tendencies to regard their participative signals of justice (3.2AQ) as inherently more valid than either of the others’ and thereby impairing our ability to create actionable knowledge of justice. Due to legitimation bias, each of us tends to overestimate our own capacity for interpersonal reason, action, and learning and, hence, the validity of our own interpersonal realizations, while underestimating that of the others, thereby impairing the morality and legitimacy of all of our awareness-in-action.

- Confirmation bias is an absence of requisite degrees of transparency, choice, and accountability afflicting the impersonal mode of realization, sustaining my tendency to regard my representative symbols of truth (3AQ), each of your tendencies to regard your representative symbols of truth (2.3AQ), and each of their tendencies to regard their representative symbols of truth (3.3AQ) as inherently more valid than either of the others’ and thereby impairing our ability to create actionable knowledge of truth. Due to confirmation bias, each of us tends to overestimate our own capacity for impersonal reason, action, and learning and, hence, the validity of our own impersonal realizations, while underestimating that of the others, thereby impairing the accuracy and cogency of all of our awareness-in-action.

Realization biases appear in a variety of forms—from self-deceptions\textsuperscript{270} to logical fallacies\textsuperscript{271} to cognitive biases,\textsuperscript{272} and from psychological projections\textsuperscript{273} to personality clashes\textsuperscript{274} to development-
tal insufficiencies—but can only persist in the absence of requisite degrees of transparency, choice, and accountability with respect to the triadic quadratic perspectivism of real-world action situations. In the absence of requisite $TCA^N \times TQP^N = ALC^N = R^N$, we tend to unilaterally control communication about controversial issues, emphasizing verifying rather than falsifying evidence for our own views and rationalizing arguments in order to defend our respective versions of reality against valid critique from those with whom we cannot help but seek validation. While impairing our efforts to mutually (in)validate novel claims to freedom, justice, and truth in one action situation after the next, these realization biases secretly and systematically undermine the validity of our actionable knowledge of freedom, justice, and truth, which feeds forward into progressively less justifiable reality claims even more prone to inspiring the realization biases on which each of our unilateral realizations increasingly depend.

When presented with choices about what information to consume and with whom to communicate, we tend to make selections that exacerbate our realization biases and contribute to the ideological balkanization of politics, economics, religion, and the media, wherein who we are is all-too-easily reduced to what we believe regardless of why we believe it or how we might change that belief. We tend to filter the infinite cornucopia of information available to us in this hyper-mediated, postmodern world in order to satisfy our own ideological pre-conceptions, facilitated by our freedom to choose only those news channels, news feeds, and discussion groups we prefer and complicated by the deliberate and hidden biases used by editors and search engines to pre-filter and pre-package what they publish and present as if it is unbiased knowledge. Mesmerized by the entertaining appearance of one-click access to everyone and everything worth knowing, we risk becoming a fragmented society of self-referencing, self-justifying, self-deceiving sub-cultures whose parochial presumptions about what really is free, just, and true seem to require ever less dialogue in order to validate the ever increasing production and consumption of conveniently consistent information. This ideological balkanization thus presents the deceptive appearance of mutual validation in the form of collective reali-
zation biases sustaining our tendencies to regard our versions of freedom, justice, and truth (123$_{AQ}$), your tendencies to regard your versions of freedom, justice, and truth (2.123$_{AQ}$), and their tendencies to regard their versions of freedom, justice, and truth (3.123$_{AQ}$) as inherently more valid than either of the others’ and thereby impairing all of our abilities to create actionable knowledge of freedom, justice, and truth (123.123$_{AQ}$).

Awareness-in-Action may therefore be understood as a tendency toward realization bias in three primary modes—authentication, legitimation, and confirmation biases—in which we—I, each of you, and each of them—tend to regard our own capacity for realization as inherently superior to that of the others and thereby impair our ability to create actionable knowledge of reality—or freedom, justice, and truth.

Nevertheless, even these realization biases would be readily manageable were it not for the intervening power of institutions—whether political, economic, or social in nature—the communicative norms of which all-too-often covertly, if not overtly, preclude the context-transcendent norms of authentication, legitimation, and confirmation we nevertheless presuppose with every context-immanent action-in-awareness. This institutionalized preclusion (ALC$_{N}^{N}$ = R$_{N}$) of our presupposed realization (ALC$_{\infty}^{\infty}$ = R$_{\infty}$) is most commonly revealed in the relatively stable patterns of institutionalized awareness-in-action in which the reasonable justification of situationally relevant claims to truth, justice, and freedom is subverted, via the institutionalized power to deceive, coerce, and defend, into the unreasonable rationalization of corresponding claims to success as defined by the institution. In these powerfully subverted patterns of institutionalized awareness-in-action, then, success takes on the deceptive, coercive, defensive appearance of substantive truth, justice, and freedom without recourse to procedures of transparency, choice, and accountability that would otherwise challenge the accuracy, morality, and honesty of that success. When political, economic, and social institutions—from governments to corporations to universities—subordinate the conscientious pursuit of truth, justice, and freedom, independent of success, to that of success, independent of truth, justice, and freedom, they institutionalize within these very
patterns of awareness-in-action the latent potential for political, economic, and social crisis.

The subversion of justifiable knowledge into rationalizable success that can only be sustained by a corrupted form of institutionalized power depends for its success on the tacit acceptance of a critical mass of institutionalized actors willing to defer indefinitely the very dialogue they nevertheless presuppose as a cognitive, moral, and volitional potential with every single action. This tacit acceptance of success over knowledge, which is typically engineered by those in power through deceptive propaganda, coercive incentives, and defensive routines, appears to render unnecessary the sort of critical integral dialogue that would otherwise tend to emerge spontaneously in challenging action situations in which controversial claims to reality confront common presumptions about reality. After all, how much dialogue is really necessary to determine the extent to which people have succeeded in fulfilling uniform standards of success while conforming to norms against dialogue? Likewise, how much dialogue is likely to emerge in an institutional context that defines ideal action as nothing other than that which successfully avoids dialogue? Being normatively unnecessary, such dialogue is more readily deflected, refused, or punished by those powerful actors who find themselves challenged on occasion to live up to the context-transcendent norms of honesty, morality, and accuracy they inadvertently imply even in their efforts to stifle any such dialogue. Hence, where knowledge and power meet at the myriad sites of everyday awareness-in-action, we anticipate more than just the inescapable interval between the ideal and the real. We also anticipate the epic struggle to discern the subtle forces of deception, coercion, and defensiveness within, between, and beyond established institutions that threaten indeterminately our every attempt to realize some justifiable measure of the ideal in this real life.

As the one field of Awareness-in-Action fractures along the hidden fault lines of TQP_N, our nascent capacities for integral/différential realization begin to (re)emerge in the seemingly inevitable realization crisis of our own making. A realization crisis may be defined as the dawning awareness of the extent to which our actionable knowledge of reality has been systematically undermined by
increasingly conspicuous disregard for requisite degrees of transparency, choice, and accountability in our approach to integral/ différantial realization, such that we no longer trust the institutionalized procedures for (in)validating our pragmatic significations of reality (123.123_{AQ}). In a realization crisis, the honesty, morality, and accuracy of our realizations—our sense of situational reality—is in serious doubt due to a perceived widespread breakdown in reason, action, and learning.

As with the meta-paradigm of realization itself, the potential for realization crisis appears to arise in three primary modes:

- Authentication crisis is the dawning awareness of the extent to which our actionable knowledge of valid freedom has been systematically undermined by increasingly conspicuous disregard for requisite degrees of transparency, choice, and accountability in the intrapersonal mode of realization, such that we no longer trust the institutionalized procedures for (in)validating our personified symptoms of freedom (123.1_{AQ}). In an authentication crisis, the honesty and authenticity of our intrapersonal realizations—our sense of situational freedom—is in serious doubt due to a perceived widespread breakdown in intrapersonal reason, action, and learning.

- Legitimation crisis is the dawning awareness of the extent to which our actionable knowledge of valid justice has been systematically undermined by increasingly conspicuous disregard for requisite degrees of transparency, choice, and accountability in the interpersonal mode of realization, such that we no longer trust the institutionalized procedures for (in)validating our participative signals of justice (123.2_{AQ}). In a legitimation crisis, the morality and legitimacy of our interpersonal realizations—our sense of situational justice—is in serious doubt due to a perceived widespread breakdown in interpersonal reason, action, and learning.

- Confirmation crisis is the dawning awareness of the extent to which our actionable knowledge of valid truth has been systematically undermined by increasingly conspicuous disregard for requisite degrees of transparency, choice, and ac-
countability in the impersonal mode of realization, such that we no longer trust the institutionalized procedures for (in)validating our representative symbols of truth (123.3AQ). In a confirmation crisis, the accuracy and cogency of our impersonal realizations—our sense of situational truth—is in serious doubt due to a perceived widespread breakdown in impersonal reason, action, and learning.

These definitions of realization crisis in three modes offer explanatory, interpretive, and evaluative insights—at an admittedly high level of abstraction—into the subtle features of systematic deception, distortion, coercion, corruption, dysfunction, and disruption that can manifest at all degrees of depth and scale in all the fields of awareness-in-action, from politics and government to economy and business to society and community. Consider, for example, some of the more critical and controversial issues of our time—from the politics of perpetual war to the economics of perpetual debt to the sociology of perpetual propaganda—each of which might be characterized in more general terms as a realization crisis-in-progress wherein the very procedures by which we attempt to understand these institutionalized threats to truth, justice, and freedom are, at best, suspect and, at worst, corrupted by those who benefit most in terms of power and wealth from whatever lack of freedom, justice, and truth the rest of us are forced, or allowed, to endure. Among other things, this implies that the underlying cause of the interdependent crises afflicting humanity—whether specifically construed as political, economic, social, or ecological in nature—can be more generally construed as the institutionalized disregard for requisite degrees of transparency, choice, and accountability with respect to the triadic quadratic perspectivism in challenging action situations.

Generally speaking, the greater the need for transparency, choice, and accountability in newly arising action situations—which increases as institutionalized structures of actionable freedom, justice, and truth prove insufficient to contend with ever-more-challenging situations—the greater will be the realization crisis-potential embedded in these action situations. Furthermore, the more systematic the disregard for requisite procedures of transpar-
ency, choice, and accountability in these ever-more-challenging action situations—which is a function of how deliberately designed, powerfully enforced, and tacitly accepted that disregard really is—the more confusing and painful will be the personified symptoms, participative signals, and representative symbols of the inevitable, yet indeterminate realization crisis. Finally, the more confusing and painful the signs of realization crisis, the greater will be the opportunity for integral/différantial dialogue about, not only the signs of crisis, but the deep-structural conditions of possible authentication, legitimation, and confirmation that are presently arrested throughout society. The quality of this integral/différantial dialogue about the substantive/procedural conditions of possible realization within, between, and beyond established institutions, whether normatively permitted or, more likely, obstructed by those institutions, is therefore critical to the genuinely progressive, yet always indeterminate evolution of society. Lacking sufficient quality, progressive evolution in the deep structures of actionable freedom, justice, and truth throughout society is deferred and distorted into perpetual change in the superficial content of these established structures—the promises and policies, products and services, programs and opinions that circulate with ever-greater success through ever-more-powerful multi-institutional networks—providing those of us in the uncritical masses with the comforting illusion of perpetual progress to mask the systematic regress in our cognitive, moral, and volitional capacities.

With the pressure that only crisis seems to provide, we bring more awareness to our predicament, drawing intuitively on our self-evident capacity to bear witness to our crumbling certainties, which is the necessary pre-condition for the différance-disclosing, conflict-ridden dialogues needed in response to the realization crisis. That response, however, requires awareness-in-action: the damned if I do, damned if I don’t choice that each and every one of us makes when we dare to utter something genuinely novel in an all-too-familiar situation in which the vast majority of people appear to be suffering under the pretense of a knowledge sufficiently integral as to require no critical dialogue, while nevertheless rewarding quiet allegiance. As if appealing to a deeper community that does not yet exist, I source from within my own intuition the controversial claims to a
more authentic approach to freedom, a more legitimate approach to justice, and a more cogent approach to truth, expecting these procedural claims to be swiftly rejected by everyone I know, while trusting that these may in due time, through the *tri-tetra-meshing* of a deepening, widening dialogue, contribute to an as-yet-uncertain (r)evolutionary advance beyond the institutionalized structures of actionable knowledge that fomented the current realization crisis. Unbeknownst to *me, you* too are making surprisingly similar claims against familiar indifférance, as is *she* and *he*, such that it is only a matter of time before we can engage in the requisite degrees of (in)authentication, (de)legitimation, and (dis)confirmation needed to resolve the realization crisis, at least between *us*, if not yet between *us* and *them*. As we bring more awareness to this deepening, widening, (r)evolutionary dialogue, we (re)establish more coherent, justifiable procedures of transparency, choice, and accountability with respect to the triadic quadratic perspectivism in these ever-more-challenging action situations, thereby (re/de)constructing our actionable knowledge of freedom, justice, and truth in order to guide knowledgeable action that is progressively more free, just, and true.

Awareness-in-Action may therefore be understood as the institutionalized potential for *realization crisis* in three primary modes— authentication, legitimation, and confirmation crises—in which *we—I, each of you, and each of them*—realize the extent to which *our* actionable knowledge of reality—freedom, justice, and truth—has been systematically undermined by increasingly conspicuous disregard for requisite degrees of transparency, choice, and accountability with respect to the triadic quadratic perspectivism of our knowledgeable actions.

It bears repeating that there is certainly nothing easy about Awareness-in-Action. Regardless of how conscientious we are, our real efforts to fulfill the ideals of $TCA^{\infty} \times TQP^{\infty} = ALC^{\infty} = R^{\infty}$ will always fall short, even when they nevertheless produce what we regard as acceptable realizations in each specific situation. Due to the inherent fallibility of human action, we cannot escape the awareness that, regardless of how satisfied we are with the validity of our actions, including the validity of other people’s actions on our behalf, this validity remains provisional and open to reasonable chal-
lenge from any one of us and any one of them, at any time and any place. Once again, each action presupposes every action with any number of derivative actions in our radically open-ended, yet reliably closed-minded real action situations. Nevertheless, the ultimate futility of any search for perfect freedom, justice, and truth does little to dissuade us from the utter necessity of our search for provisional freedom, justice, and truth, rooted as it is in the propositional nature of action-in-awareness—the putting forward of différantial claims to reality with each and every worldly action, as if expressions of unrelenting faith in the integral awareness that must, ultimately, redeem these claims in integral/différantial realization.

I Am that I Act / I Act that I Am

In pointing to the possibility of an absolute realization ($R^0$) of the integral awareness that I am ($A^0$) that is (phenomeno)logically complementary to the relative realization ($R^N$) of the différantial action that I do ($A^N$), while being relatively idealized as the ultimate realization ($R^\infty$) of my integral/différantial awareness-in-action ($A^\infty$), as I have done periodically throughout this book, my aim is to at least frame the essential discourses of realization in terms of Awareness-in-Action. While the traditional discourses of absolute realization are often laden with the terminology of spirituality further burdened with diverse religious connotations and certain scientific condemnations, this is for me a philosophical proposition with both meta-theoretical and meta-practical implications for all the forms and fields of human action. Thus, what if awareness-in-action really is the active differentiation of triadic quadratic perspectivism from the integral awareness that is nowhere to be found as long as one is actively searching, yet now-here as long as one inquires deeply into the identity of the actor? Likewise, what if awareness-in-action really is the active refraction of integral awareness revealed in every knowledgeable action and reflected in all actionable knowledge? More to the point, what if I really am someone other than the I that I think I am as the implied origin of all that I think I do within the world that I think I know? Obviously, these propositions beg the
question: Who am I?

As introduced in Chapter 2, the practice of self-inquiry, the Sanskrit name for which is atma vichara, is a subtle, silent inquiry, vichara, into who I am at the apparent source of all perspectives, thoughts, feelings, and actions, the sustained practice of which transcends the mental flow and purportedly reveals the integral awareness that I am, the real self, Atman, at one with absolute reality, Brahman, illuminating all manifest perspectives, thoughts, feelings, and actions. In the words of Ramana Maharshi, its finest teacher, “the first and foremost of all the thoughts that arise in the mind is the primal I-thought. It is only after the rise or origin of the I-thought that innumerable other thoughts arise. In other words, only after the first personal pronoun, I, has arisen, do the second and third personal pronouns (you, he, etc.) occur to the mind; and they cannot subsist without the former. Since every other thought can occur only after the rise of the I-thought and since the mind is nothing but a bundle of thoughts, it is only through the enquiry Who am I? that the mind subsides. Moreover, the integral I-thought, implicit in such enquiry, having destroyed all other thoughts, gets itself finally destroyed or consumed, just as the stick used for stirring the burning funeral pyre gets consumed.”

Hence, the first-person singular-subjective (1UL) pronoun, I, appears to be the originary or enactive perspective, the first among equals with regard to all the other perspectival pronouns, because none of the others can arise in awareness unless the I at the apparent source of conscious action also arises. Therefore, triadic quadratic perspectival reality itself, to whatever extent it is enacted, appears to originate with the pronoun I, which is identified with each and every experience of reality it claims, that is, each and every form it names (e.g., I know this; I want that; I like you, but not him.). The awareness of I is (phenomeno)logically prior to the other perspectival pronouns and I can remain as the locus of perspectival awareness after the other perspectival pronouns subside. Furthermore, when practicing self-inquiry, I am attempting to use the I in its capacity as the sole locus of perspectival awareness to then make that same I the sole focus of perspectival awareness—that is, turning the subjective I back around as if to make an object of itself—thus making it all but impos-
sible for the other perspectival pronouns to arise in relation to that I. Then, after sustaining this contemplative inquiry into who I am, the I that I think I am as the implied origin of all that I think I do within the world that I think I know—the ahankara—tends to subside, leaving nothing but the integral awareness that I am. As integral awareness, the self-evident realization that I exist, that I am, not that I am this or that nor that I am not this or that, but simply that I am, reveals itself as the only self-evident realization.

To the seeker who asked “What is this awareness and how can one obtain and cultivate it?” Ramana answered, “You are awareness. Awareness is another name for you. Since you are awareness, there is no need to attain or cultivate it. All that you have to do is to give up being aware of other things, that is of the not-Self. If one gives up being aware of them then pure awareness alone remains, and that is the Self.” Of the countless objects of awareness with which Ramana would have me cease to identify, none is more significant and challenging than the persistent thought that I have not yet realized the Self—a thought that appears to be endemic to any inquiry into my potential for Self-realization. Embracing this paradox, he reminds me that “realization is nothing to be gained afresh; it is already there. All that is necessary is to get rid of the thought ‘I have not realized.’ Stillness or peace is realization. There is no moment when the Self is not. So long as there is doubt or the feeling of non-realization, the attempt should be made to rid oneself of these thoughts. They are due to the identification of the Self with the not-Self. When the not-Self disappears, the Self alone remains. To make room, it is enough that objects be removed. Room is not brought in from elsewhere.”

As Wilber elaborates in his foreword to Ramana’s Talks, “you are already aware of the sky, you already hear the sounds around you, you already witness this world. One hundred percent of the enlightened mind or pure Self is present right now.... As Ramana constantly pointed out, if the Self (or knowledge of the Self) is something that comes into existence—if your realization has a beginning in time—then that is merely another object, another passing, finite, temporal state. There is no reaching the Self—it is reading this page. There is no looking for the Self—it is looking out of your eyes right now. There is no attaining the Self—it is reading these words. You simply,
absolutely cannot attain that which you have never lost. And if you do attain something, Ramana would say, that’s very nice, but it’s not the Self.”

Indeed, as Ramana consistently taught during the course of his entire adult life, “Self-Inquiry directly leads to Realization by removing the obstacles which make you think that the Self is not already realized.”

Nevertheless, there is effort required for self-inquiry and therefore at least an implied attainment in mind, whether we call it self-realization, enlightenment, liberation, or something else. To this, Ramana might say, “I am is the goal and the final reality. To hold to it with effort is vichara. When spontaneous and natural it is realisation.” In other words, “the effort is directed to extinguishing the I-thought and not for ushering in the true I. For the latter is eternal and requires no effort on your part.” But if the real I, the eternal Self I really am, is ever-present and requires no effort on my part, then why must I make the effort of self-inquiry? Why can’t I just be my real Self? In one sense, I can, by simply realizing that I already am. After all, Ramana reminds me, “nothing else is so self-evident as I am.”

But in another sense, I cannot. Because as long as I identify myself as the I-thought at the center of all that I do, acting as if I am just this actor, it seems I cannot escape from the compulsive effort to attain one result after another. No matter how significant it may be, action is all I can do.

It therefore occurs to me that perhaps the self-evident reality that I act secretly obscures the self-evident reality that I am. But upon closer inspection, it appears as if the me perspective in which I regard the I that I was when I acted as I did as well as the I that I will be when I act as I might habitually distracts and obscures the present awareness that I really am. Beyond the tenuous focus of my situational awareness-in-action, I tend to lose myself in the me that is, through my reflections of past actions and projections of future actions, acting as if it is the I when, in fact, the me is like a movie of the actor I was and will be, with the me’s endless monologue on the past and future I being thus confused with the present awareness that I am even as I act. Amidst this reflexive (con)fusion, I ignore the present as if to invest myself in the me that will be, in the very next moment, the I that I was just a moment ago, as if my future could
somehow be secured by deferring my present until it becomes my past, as if my identity is somehow more real when it becomes a temporal object to be seen by the present subject who sees. But the distractions do not end with me, for this movie of who I was and who I will be would not be so believable if it did not appear to implicate who you were and who you will be as well as who she is and who she will be, with who we were and who we will be in all the various permutations rounding out the endless dialogue of who I think I am as this integral/différantial self. And if each of you and each of them are anything like me, then we all share this tendency to lose our-present-selves in shadowy reflections of past actions and shadowy projections of future actions, acting as if our storied images of who we were and who we will be can possibly illuminate who we really are when we really act. Realizing this, I see that I am far more active than I am typically aware, and far more aware than I typically act.

So if I care to explore or dare to awaken, the best I can do is to inquire deeply into the I that I think I am as the implied origin of all that I think I do—right here, right now—and interrupt this differential confusion with the integral awareness that I am even as I act. More to the point, Ramana assures me that “to do self-enquiry and be that I am is the only thing to do. I am is reality. I am this or that is unreal.” But if this is the only thing worth doing, does this mean I have to give up doing everything else? On the contrary, Ramana says “the life of action need not be renounced.... If you meditate in the right manner then the current of mind induced will continue to flow even in the midst of your work.... Your actions will tend to follow your meditations of their own accord.... There is no conflict between work and wisdom.” In his view, “self-enquiry is the one infallible means, the only direct one, to realise the unconditioned, absolute being that you really are.”

Therefore, the best I can say is that I am this integral awareness that is, in and of itself, whether the proximate I that I think I am (focused on the distal me that I think I was and will be) realizes it or not, uninterrupted by changing states of awareness-in-action—such as waking, dreaming, and sleeping—in the course of an ordinary day and changing structures of awareness-in-action—from prefor-
mal to formal to postformal—in the course of an extraordinary life. More to the point, I am this ever-present, all-inclusive integral awareness in which the realizer, the perspectival I with which I habitually identify, and the realized co-arise in the relative realization of never-present, always-exclusive triadic quadratic perspectival action, such as it is. Furthermore, by logical extension, so too are each of you and each of them this very same ever-present, all-inclusive integral awareness in which the realizer, the perspectival I with which each of you and each of them habitually identify, and the realized co-arise in the relative realization of never-present, always-exclusive triadic quadratic perspectival action. If so, then all my apparent choices could be traced back to the one primordial choice to enact this particular triadic quadratic perspectival self-imaging/world-viewing in choiceless awareness, the actual realization of which would imply the primordial transparency of, and primordial accountability for, that self-imaging/world-viewing. Moreover, the particular self-imaging/world-viewing enacted by each of you and each of them could also be traced back to the primordial transparency, choice, and accountability from which these originated.

That being said, integral awareness is not the thought that I am this ever-present, all-inclusive integral awareness in which the perspectives and practices of différantial action arise. On the contrary, integral awareness is that which is aware of the thought that I am this integral/différantial awareness-in-action—indeed, that which is aware of all the subjects and objects co-arising in my awareness-in-action, regardless of what these subjects and objects of awareness might say about that awareness. So if I can resist the temptation to think my way to an ultimate conclusion, no matter how simple or sophisticated that conclusion might be, while sustaining the inquiry into who I am—which is always right here, right now—then I might just realize who I really am as I really act. Likewise, if each of you and each of them can sustain the very same self-inquiry, then perhaps we can all realize, once and for all, who we really are as we really act. But, of course, the real question is whether I, any of you, or any of them will do anything different in the wake of this declarative imperative, or if we will choose instead to defer indefinitely our integral realizations of this so-called awareness-in-action, at least until we are
convinced of its différantial reality. Regardless, even if the *différantial realization* of awareness-in-action \((A^N)\) is never really done \((A^\infty)\), the *integral realization* of awareness-in-action \((A^0)\) is always already.

Awareness-in-Action may therefore be understood as the ever-present realization of the integral awareness that *we—I, each of you, and each of them—are* amidst the never-ending realization of the différantial action that *we—I, each of you, and each of them—do.*
As I have attempted to convey with the preceding synopsis, Awareness-in-Action has the potential to serve as a critical integral meta-paradigm of extraordinary scope and depth. As such, it clarifies the presupposed perspectives and practices of human awareness-in-action in all its myriad forms—from writing, speaking, and conversing to giving, taking, and trading, to working, playing, and creating to learning, developing, and evolving—inclusive of anything and everything people do, regardless of how purposeful or spontaneous, mental or physical, independent or interdependent these actions might seem. To whatever extent these universal presuppositions might be regarded as provisionally valid, these would, logically, serve as necessary premises for all subsequent inquiries into, and hypotheses about, the many fields of human awareness-in-action, from economics and business to politics and governance to sociology and social work to journalism and activism. I am therefore proposing that this meta-paradigm of realization in three modes—authentication, legitimation, and confirmation—constitutes a significant portion of that intuitive knowledge without which people could not act as they really do and, correspondingly, a significant portion of those essential premises without which we cannot know what human action really is.
Post-metaphysical Proceduralism

Awareness-in-Action not only describes how people really do reason, act, and learn in all these forms and fields, but also prescribes how people really should reason, act, and learn if they are interested in creating actionable knowledge of freedom, justice, and truth that supports knowledgeable action that is more free, just, and true. In bridging the empirical realization and normative idealization of human awareness-in-action, this formulation also signals a decisive shift from the metaphysics of unconditional declaratives, or substantive statements of what we know to be real, independent of how we know it, to the post-metaphysics of conditional imperatives, or procedural statements of how we should act if we want to know what is real. Thus, in the form of a conditional imperative, if we want more freedom, justice, and truth in our lives and in the lives of those around us, then we should engage in the meta-practice of transparency, choice, and accountability with respect to the meta-theory of triadic quadratic perspectivism in challenging action situations.

This formulation is therefore consistent with Habermas’s emphasis on procedural rather than substantive conceptions of reason, wherein the standards of what is or is not reasonable are grounded in the conduct of dialogue rather than the content of that dialogue—in how we validate knowledge rather than what we currently regard as valid knowledge. So instead of attributing degrees of reasonableness to specific claims to reality, such as my truth claim versus your truth claim, any such attributions should be directed at the specific practices of realizing by which you and I attempt to justify our respective claims and determine what really is true. Furthermore, as already demonstrated, this formulation incorporates wholesale the other major themes in Habermas’s post-metaphysical philosophy, including the shift from foundationalist to fallibilist premises in validation and the expansion of exclusively impersonal-representative conceptions of realization to include interpersonal-participative and intrapersonal-personified conceptions based on the pragmatic perspectives and historic contexts of communicative reason.

Although he does not specifically position his work as such, Argyris’s action science is an impressive exemplar of post-metaphysical
proceduralism at work in real-world communities of practice. As explored in Part II, the action science method is centered on a form of critical-reflective dialogue consistent with the procedural norms of valid information, free and informed choice, internal commitment to the choice, and vigilant monitoring of its implementation in order to detect and correct error. Consistent with these intentional values, specific behavioral strategies include “sharing control with those who have competence and who participate in designing or implementing the action,” replacing “unilateral advocacy... or inquiry that conceals the agent’s own views” with a forthright combination of advocacy and inquiry, illustrating “attributions and evaluations with relatively directly observable data,” and encouraging “the surfacing of conflicting views... in order to facilitate public testing” of these views.

The primary purpose of such dialogue is, according to Argyris and his colleagues, to help each community of practice create actionable knowledge of its own patterns of reason, action, and learning consistent with the most rigorous standards of critical social science, including: “(1) empirically disconfirmable propositions that are organized into a theory; (2) knowledge that human beings can implement in an action context; and (3) alternatives to the status quo that both illuminate what exists and inform fundamental change, in light of values freely chosen by social actors.” Argyris justifies this bridging of the empirical and the normative by ensuring that both the substantive content and procedural conduct of dialogue are open to potential critique by all participants as an essential feature of that dialogue.

Yet another form of post-metaphysical proceduralism features prominently in Wilber’s procedural model of valid knowledge, which calls for the grounding of any substantive theory with a practical injunction to take a specific action, followed by an experiential apprehension of the empirical evidence resulting from that action, and culminating in a communal (dis)confirmation of whatever theoretical knowledge was claimed. Wilber’s proceduralism is modeled, not on the norms of dialogue as with Habermas and Argyris, but on the scientific method, the systematic rigor of which he would like to see extended from the natural sciences in which it originated to the established social and emerging spiritual sciences essential to a more
integral understanding of reality, without confusing or conflating any of these domains with the others.

Accordingly, Wilber’s notion of experiential apprehension establishes an extraordinarily broad scope for valid knowledge—all quadrants, levels, lines, states, and types—that he intends to be limited only by the requirement that any claim to valid knowledge be justified by recourse to a practical injunction through which others can apprehend in their own direct awareness the empirical evidence that purportedly justifies that claim. As he emphasizes, such a practical injunction will generally take the form of what I have described as a conditional imperative: If you want to know that, then do this. “This injunction, exemplar, or paradigm is, as Thomas Kuhn pointed out, an actual practice, not a mere concept.” Once properly engaged, “the injunction or exemplar brings forth a particular data domain—a particular experience, apprehension, or evidence…. This apprehension, data, or evidence is then tested in the circle of those who have completed the first two strands; bad data or bad evidence is rebuffed, and this potential falsifiability is the third component of most genuine validity claims; it is not restricted to… sensory claims alone: there is sensory experience, mental experience, and spiritual experience and any specific claim in each of those domains can potentially be falsified by further data in those domains.”

Wilber’s insistence that each and every form of valid knowledge is enacted by a practical injunction consistent with Thomas Kuhn’s widely misunderstood notion of a paradigm may be one of his most significant challenges to the contemporary discourses about everything from the new science to new age spirituality to conscious evolution, which tend to equate their purportedly new paradigms with theories worth adopting rather than practices worth engaging. For his part, Kuhn gradually distanced himself from the misappropriated term paradigm, even going so far as to propose instead, in the second edition of The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, the theft-deterring term “disciplinary matrix: disciplinary because it refers to the common possession of the practitioners of a particular discipline; matrix because it is composed of ordered elements of various sorts each requiring further specification.” He further clarified that “all or
most of the objects of group commitment that my original text makes paradigms, parts of paradigms, or paradigmatic are constituents of the disciplinary matrix and as such they form a whole and function together.”

As for the shared understandings comprising the disciplinary matrix that defines a scientific community, Kuhn identifies: i) symbolic generalizations that are logical, formal, or readily formalizable; ii) models and heuristics that supply metaphors and analogies; iii) values concerning the evaluation of evidence and the relative merits of competing theories (e.g., accuracy, consistency, simplicity, plausibility); and iv) exemplars, or shared examples, of concrete problem-solutions that show scientists how their normal puzzle-solving work is to be done. With regard to this fourth element, exemplars, Kuhn specifically notes that “for it, the term paradigm would be entirely appropriate, both philologically and autobiographically; this is the component of a group’s shared commitments which first led me to the choice of that word.” In Kuhn’s view, this disciplinary matrix, or paradigm in the broad sense, not only defines the membership of a specific scientific community in terms of who actually understands and implements the paradigm, but also explains the source of the socio-technical community structure by which most scientific knowledge progresses. As he discovered, scientific fields progress through an alternating rhythm of what we might call evolution, characterized by relatively stable periods of highly productive knowledge accumulation consistent with the established paradigm of the community, and revolution, characterized by relatively turbulent intervals during which the community, in whole or in part, adopts a new paradigm that better accounts for an expanded body of empirical evidence, thereby initiating a new period of scientific evolution.

Wilber’s further emphasis on the necessity of communal (dis)confirmation that adheres to an empirically non-reductionist version of Karl Popper’s rather strict standard of falsifiability presents yet another challenge to those inclined toward metaphysical theorizing. Building on the premise of fallibilism advocated by Habermas, wherein theories are only ever recognized as provisionally valid and therefore subject to revision, falsifiability requires that theories be
formulated in a way that facilitates systematic revision and potential refutation in light of a preponderance of falsifying evidence. In Popper’s view, “the criterion of the scientific status of a theory is its falsifiability, or refutability, or testability.” While advocating for the standard of falsifiability in all domains of knowledge identified in his AQAL integral theory, Wilber condemns the reductionist forms of empiricism with which it is typically paired in communities of practice within, or overly influenced by, the physical sciences:

As it is now, the Popperian falsifiability principle has one widespread and altogether perverted use: it is implicitly restricted only to sensory data, which, in an incredibly hidden and sneaky fashion, automatically bars all mental and spiritual experience from the status of genuine knowledge. This unwarranted restriction of the falsifiability principle claims to separate genuine knowledge from the dogmatic, but all it actually accomplishes, in this shrunken form, is a silent but vicious reductionism. On the other hand, when we free the falsifiability principle from its restriction to sensory data, and set it free to police the domains of mental and spiritual data as well, it becomes an important aspect of the knowledge quest in all domains, sensory to mental to spiritual. And in each of those domains, it does indeed help us to separate the true from the false, the demonstrable from the dogmatic.

Be that as it may, it is equally important to preclude any reductionist forms of falsifiability itself that may creep into our disciplined pursuits of genuine knowledge within and across the various domains of a fully resurrected empiricism honoring whatever we can apprehend in our own direct awareness. Note, for example, that in the passage quoted two pages prior, Wilber claims that “this apprehension, data, or evidence is then tested in the circle of those who have completed the first two strands; bad data or bad evidence is rebuffed, and this potential falsifiability is the third component of most genuine validity claims.” At first glance, this may appear to be a simple misstatement, because of course it is not empirical evidence that should be rejected if it fails to conform to the accepted theory, but rather the accepted theory that should be challenged by any preponderance of falsifying evidence. However, he vigorously asserts the same claim in a subsequent book, twice, just prior to the passage quoted above, arguing that “the validity of these data is
demonstrated by the fact that bad data can indeed be rebuffed, which is where Popper enters the picture," and “whereas bad data in those domains are indeed falsifiable, but only by further data in those domains, not by data from lower domains!”"^{308}

While it may be appropriate, on occasion, for scientists to marginalize some empirical evidence in favor of better evidence resulting from more effective and consistent applications of a practical injunction, this has nothing to do with the practice of falsification. The standard of falsifiability is not supposed to police the domains of sensory, mental, and spiritual data in service to accepted theories in those domains, because doing so will likely be in service to the confirmation biases of theorists who favor the accepted theories. As Popper himself warned, “if we are uncritical we shall always find what we want: we shall look for, and find, confirmations, and we shall look away from, and not see, whatever might be dangerous to our pet theories. In this way it is only too easy to obtain what appears to be overwhelming evidence in favor of a theory which, if approached critically, would have been refuted.”^{309} Wilber is not unaware of this, as he does note, amidst his contradictory misinterpretations of falsifiability, that “genuine knowledge must be open to disproof, or else it is simply dogma in disguise.”^{310} But it is theories—not empirical evidence—that must be open to disproof, because it is theories—not empirical evidence—that can become dogma in disguise. Thus, if one is to apply the strict standard of falsifiability in whatever domain of reality, it is the accepted theory that should be falsifiable in light of a preponderance of acceptable evidence, and certainly not the inverse.

This is important because any such misunderstanding of falsifiability within a community of practice purporting to be practicing falsification would exacerbate whatever tendencies that community might already have toward the social mode of instrumental rationality known as strategic action. In strategic action, as we have already seen, the predominant standard of validity is not falsifiable or even verifiable truth—let alone justice and freedom—but rather rationalizable success, indeed unilateral success, of one theory over another, one theorist over another, or one community over another, based on a systematically biased filtering of the empirical evidence. If Argyris’s
action science is any indication, the professional communities of practice in which knowledge is created and disseminated may already be governed by the dialogue-stifling, debate-promoting norms of strategic action—define and achieve goals, maximize winning, minimize losing, minimize negative feelings, and be rational—which tend to preclude, through tacit habits of deception, coercion, and defensiveness, the sort of dialogue in which established orthodoxy can be reasonably (dis)confirmed in light of a growing body of empirical evidence.\textsuperscript{311} When proceeding under the guise of a distorted notion of falsifiability that targets acceptable evidence in service to accepted theory, this instrumental preclusion of transparency, choice, and accountability institutionalizes the confirmation, legitimation, and authentication biases by which individuals and communities tend to regard their own established theories as inherently more valid than emerging alternatives and thereby impair their ability to create, through (re/de)constructive dialogue, actionable knowledge of truth, justice, and freedom.\textsuperscript{312}

In my view, falsifiability implies, as another conditional imperative, that if we are serious about the progressive quest for increasingly valid theories enacted by exemplary forms of practice, then we should actively seek empirical evidence that can falsify, in addition to that which can verify, our theories and thereby challenge ourselves to develop better theories that take into account an increasingly comprehensive body of evidence. By this interpretation, falsifiability actually supports a proactive approach to theoretical innovation intended to balance a potentially biased standard of verifiability that, for all of its grounding in empirical evidence of apparent justifiability, ignores the prototypically postmodern recognition of the theory-laden nature of empirical evidence and, therefore, the empirical bias toward verifying the currently accepted theory.\textsuperscript{313} Furthermore, a sophisticated application of falsifiability, similar to that advocated by Imre Lakatos, would require that any proposed falsification of the accepted theory be justified, not simply by the empirical falsification of one or more of its constituent propositions or predictions, but by recourse to a more acceptable theory offering a more comprehensive explanation and interpretation of all the relevant empirical evidence.\textsuperscript{314} In this way, the standard of falsifiability can support,
though certainly not guarantee, *progressive* theoretical *reconstruction* rather than potentially *regressive* theoretical *deconstruction*.\(^{315}\)

Interestingly enough, Kuhn’s research reveals that “once it has achieved the status of a paradigm, a scientific theory is declared invalid only if an alternate candidate is available to take its place. No process yet disclosed by the historical study of scientific development at all resembles the methodological stereotype of falsification by direct comparison with nature. That remark does not mean that scientists do not reject scientific theories, or that experience and experiment are not essential to the process in which they do so. But it does mean... that the act of judgment that leads scientists to reject a previously accepted theory is always based upon more than a comparison of that theory with the world. The decision to reject one paradigm is always simultaneously the decision to accept another, and the judgment leading to that decision involves the comparison of both paradigms with nature *and* with each other.”\(^{316}\) Hence, it would seem that the key to successful application of any standards of falsification and verification is to legitimate these standards in the Kuhnian paradigm of the scientific community—specifically the *values* and *social practices* that supply the standards and procedures for critically evaluating the merits and demerits of competing theories as well as the exemplary practices that tend to (re)create these theories.

From a *meta-theoretical* perspective, the enduring challenge in such a disciplined proceduralism is to preclude any form of *perspectival confusion* whereby the empirical evidence apprehended in one perspective (e.g., objective quantitative evidence) is used—either mistakenly or unfairly—to invalidate a theory that is based on empirical evidence apprehended in another perspective (e.g., subjective qualitative evidence). Such perspectival confusion may be one source of the occasional *paradigm clashes* that arise between established and/or emergent communities of practice, whose paradigms are, as Kuhn observed, at least somewhat *incommensurable* because the exemplars of one community cannot disclose the evidence so readily disclosed by exemplars of another, and even to the extent that some evidence overlaps, each paradigm will tend to inform different theoretical interpretations of that shared evidence. This is
certainly part of the inspiration for my inquiry into meta-theory—as I’m sure it was for Habermas and Wilber before me—and I believe that triadic quadratic perspectivism may constitute an integral theory necessary—though not necessarily sufficient—to preclude the paradigm clashes that undermine our quest for realization.

From a meta-practical perspective, the enduring challenge in such a disciplined proceduralism is to preclude any form of practical coercion whereby the provisional validity of one theory/practice (e.g., the orthodox paradigm) is presumed—either overtly or covertly—to invalidate alternative theories/practices (e.g., heterodox paradigms) simply because the orthodoxy wants to preclude a paradigm change within their field. Unfortunately Popper’s falsifiability, even in its most inclusionary (e.g., Wilber) and sophisticated (e.g., Lakatos) reinterpretations, can do little more than support the disciplined justification of impersonal truth within communities of practice that have, by other means, managed to transform their deceptive, coercive, and defensive habits of reason and communication. The communal (dis)confirmation of truth, even when secured from confirmation bias in principle or in practice, cannot in itself secure the (de)legitimation of interpersonal justice (i.e., respect, morality) and the (in)authentication of intrapersonal freedom (i.e., sincerity, honesty) that necessarily co-arise in parallel with every justification of impersonal truth, particularly during revolutionary intervals of paradigm change. This is certainly part of the inspiration for my inquiry into meta-practice—as I’m sure it was for Habermas and Argyris before me—and I believe that transparency, choice, and accountability may constitute an integral practice necessary—though not necessarily sufficient—to preclude the deception, coercion, and defensiveness that undermines our quest for realization.

In his most recent book, Wilber distills his procedural model of valid knowledge—injunction, apprehension, confirmation—down to a memorable post-metaphysical maxim: The meaning of a statement is the means of its enactment. In other words, substantive meaning is to be validated only through procedural means. While placing a primary emphasis on the practical injunction from his original model, Wilber’s maxim might be generously interpreted to imply the experiential apprehension of the meaning so enacted as well as the communal
confirmation without which the verbal equation established by the word *is* between *the meaning of a statement* and *the means of its enactment* would be severed. Hence, to the extent that all three procedural elements may be justifiably interpreted within this one maxim, it appears to be a useful alternative. However, it is not without some precedent.\(^{319}\)

A central premise in Habermas’s pragmatic theory of meaning and validity is his contention that “*we understand a speech act when we know what makes it acceptable.*” In other words, “a hearer understands the meaning of an utterance when... he knows those *essential conditions* under which he could be motivated by a speaker to take an affirmative position.”\(^{320}\) Restating Habermas’s premise in Wilberian form suggests that *the meaning of a statement is knowledge of the conditions that would make it valid.* As we have already seen, the essential conditions under which one person will affirm the validity of another’s statement are, for Habermas, the situation-specific satisfaction of the context-transcendent norms of discourse, which he has articulated in terms of the *ideal speech situation.* Thus, more concisely, *the meaning of a statement is the discourse of its validation.* Given the apparent contrast between Wilber’s *means of enactment* and Habermas’s *discourse of validation*, we might want to remind ourselves of the practical injunctions of Habermasian discourse, which I have already explored in terms of the Argyrisian exemplar of critical-reflective discourse, the intentional values and behavioral strategies of which were recapitulated near the beginning of this section. Better yet, we could look for sufficiently *dialogical* versions of practical injunction, experiential apprehension, and communal confirmation consistent with a procedural approach to the discourse-centered validation of substantive theory.

Hence, consider again the paradigmatic features of critical-reflective action science as articulated by Argyris and his colleagues. The standard of “empirically disconfirmable propositions that are organized into a theory” is clearly recognizable as the *falsifiable substance* of any scientific approach to impersonal truth, although it stops short of differentiating a more inclusive empirical falsifiability/verifiability applicable to the dialogues of interpersonal justice and intrapersonal freedom, which are always at least implicated in
any dialogue of truth. Furthermore, the standard of “knowledge that human beings can implement in an action context” is just as clearly recognizable as the injunctive procedure that should accompany any substantive theory, and especially those in the social and spiritual sciences in which the objects of theory include human subjects themselves. Finally, the standard of “alternatives to the status quo that both illuminate what exists and inform fundamental change, in light of values freely chosen by social actors” may be interpreted as the actors’ apprehended experience of what is in relation to what might be, with this creative tension between the empirical real and the normative ideal being the special province of distinctively critical-reflective paradigms, which, as Wilber himself once recognized, have applicability across the spectrum of natural, social, and spiritual sciences. Thus, in light of my proposed integral reconstruction of both Argyrisian and Habermasian theories of critical-reflective discourse—including essential insights from Wilber, Kuhn, and Popper, as well as Bühler, Mead, and Derrida—the genuinely post-metaphysical genealogy of Awareness-in-Action should now be reasonably clear.

More significantly, this exploration suggests that the themes of post-metaphysical philosophy are more-or-less consciously recognized in every action situation in which even explicit claims to freedom, justice, and truth convey meaning only to the extent that they are actively justified—hence verified or falsified—in direct experiential awareness, while the potential for such active justification is always presupposed in every action situation. Indeed, the presupposed ideality of awareness-in-action, denoted $A^\infty = TCA^\infty \times TQP^\infty = ALC^\infty$, appears to be implicitly post-metaphysical, even when the actual reality of awareness-in-action, denoted $A^N = TCA^N \times TQP^N = ALC^N$, appears to be explicitly metaphysical. Thus, even when human action in real-world situations displays, as it so very often does, a preponderance of assertions without injunctions, assumptions before apprehensions, and satisfaction in lieu of realization, all such human actors presuppose the counter-factual potential for post-metaphysical actions that do justice to the inherently fallible, yet irreducibly necessary practices of transparency, choice, and accountability with respect to the triadic quadratic perspectivism in that situation.
The mindful practice of Awareness-in-Action, then, is intended to establish these post-metaphysical ideals (TCA\(^\infty\) × TQP\(^\infty\)) in the context of all relatively (post-)metaphysical real action situations (TCA\(^N\) × TQP\(^N\)), by justifying controversial assertions with actionable injunctions, illuminating familiar assumptions with novel apprehensions, and finding satisfaction in the progressive (in)authentication, (de)legitimation, and (dis)confirmation of both substantive theories and procedural practices.

Awareness-in-Action is therefore formulated with the intent to differentiate and integrate substantive and procedural conceptions of realization, wherein the standards of what is or is not real are grounded in the perspectival content of reality as well as the practical conduct of realizing, in what we regard as real as well as how we realize what is real. Hence, the substantive meta-theory of reality—meaning intrapersonal freedom (123.1\(AQ = FN\)), interpersonal justice (123.2\(AQ = JN\)), and impersonal truth (123.3\(AQ = TN\))—mutually implicate the corresponding procedural meta-practice of realizing—meaning transparency, choice, and accountability with respect to freedom (TCA\(^N\) × FN = AF\(^N\)), justice (TCA\(^N\) × JN = LJ\(^N\)), and truth (TCA\(^N\) × TN = CT\(^N\)). Likewise, bracketing the (phenomeno)logical extremes of relative realization (R\(^N\)), substantive theories of absolute reality (R\(^\infty\)) and ultimate reality (R\(^\infty\)) mutually implicate corresponding procedural practices of absolute realizing (R\(^\infty\)) and ultimate realizing (R\(^\infty\)). Finally, as conveyed in the deliberately redundant notation for indeterminate realization (R\(^N\)), a term with both substantive and procedural connotations, the triadic quadratic perspectivism (TQP\(^N\)) of substantive reality (R\(^N\)) mutually implicates the transparency, choice, and accountability (TCA\(^N\)) of procedural realizing (R\(^N\)). With this in mind, I offer a new post-metaphysical maxim: The (integral/différantial) reality of a declarative is the imperative to (integrally/différantially) realize it.

Awareness-in-Action may therefore be understood as a substantive/procedural meta-paradigm of realization centered on the procedural meta-practice of transparency, choice, and accountability with respect to the substantive meta-theory of triadic quadratic perspectivism, which can be integrally/différantially realized in each and every action situation, thus facilitating the empirically and normatively
justifiable (in)authentication, (de)legitimation, and (dis)confirmation of each and every action claiming knowledge of reality.

**Integral Différentialism / Différential Integralism**

If indeed Awareness-in-Action is applicable to each and every form and field of human awareness-in-action, then this meta-praxis provides the means by which we can proactively create actionable knowledge within, across, and beyond established disciplinary and institutional boundaries in service of greater freedom, justice, and truth. More specifically, this relatively content-free, yet context-rich meta-praxis clarifies what appear to be some of the essential premises for an action-oriented integral philosophy concerned with helping people realize their full potential in the full variety of real-world situations.

Awareness-in-Action embraces the general idea—though not the specific formulation—of Wilber’s post-metaphysical integral methodological pluralism, which aims at a meta-paradigmatic integration of paradigmatic pluralism consistent with his AQAL formulation of integral theory. With regard to the meta-paradigmatic aspect of integral methodological pluralism, Wilber proposes three integrative principles—nonexclusion, enfoldment, enactment—in order to create the conceptual space necessary to incorporate a great variety of paradigmatic practices already in use by disciplined scholar-practitioners seeking valid knowledge in their respective fields:

**Nonexclusion** means that "Everybody is right"—or more technically, that the experiences brought forth by one paradigm cannot legitimately be used to criticize, negate, or exclude the experiences brought forth by other paradigms. The reason that "everybody is right" is called enactment, which means that no experience is innocent and pregiven, but rather is brought forth or enacted in part by the activity of the subject doing the experiencing. Thus, one activity (or paradigm) will bring forth a particular set of experiences—experiences that are not themselves innocent reflections of the one, true, real, and pregiven world, but rather are co-created and co-enacted by the paradigm or activity itself, and, accordingly, one paradigm does not give "the correct view" of the world and there-
fore it cannot be used (as if it did) in order to negate, criticize, or exclude other experiences brought forth by other paradigms. However, if one practice or paradigm includes the essentials of another and then adds further practices—such that it "enfolds" or includes the other—then that paradigm can legitimately be claimed to be more integral, which is the enfoldment principle. Together, these guiding principles give us an Integral Methodological Pluralism that is the warrant for AQAL metatheory.324

Wilber contends that, “these three regulative principles—nonexclusion, enfoldment, enactment—are principles that were reverse engineered, if you will, from the fact that numerous different and seemingly ‘conflicting’ paradigms are already being competently practiced all over the world; and thus the question is not, and never has been, which is right and which is wrong, but how can all of them already be arising in a Kosmos? These three principles are some of the items that need to be already operating in the universe in order for so many paradigms to already be arising, and the only really interesting question is how can all of those extraordinary practices already be arising in any universe?”325

With regard to the paradigmatic aspect of integral methodological pluralism, Wilber proposes a set of eight complementary methods, or families of paradigms, framed by the four quadrants of his AQAL integral theory: phenomenology and structuralism as the inside and outside of his intentional UL, hermeneutics and ethnomethodology as the inside and outside of his cultural LL, autopoiesis and empiricism as the inside and outside of his behavioral UR, and social autopoiesis and systems theory as the inside and outside of his social LR.326 As he describes it, integral methodological pluralism “involves, among other things, at least 8 fundamental and apparently irreducible methodologies, injunctions, or paradigms for gaining reproducible knowledge (or verifiably repeatable experiences). The fundamental claim of AQAL Integral Theory is that any approach that leaves out any of these 8 paradigms is a less-than-adequate approach according to available and reliable human knowledge at this time.”327 He says that the easiest way to understand this dyadic quadratic model:

…is to start with what are known as the quadrants, which suggest that any occasion possesses an inside and an outside, as well as an individual and a collective, dimension. Taken together, this gives
us the inside and the outside of the individual and the collective. These are often represented as I, you/we, it, and its (a variation on 1st, 2nd, and 3rd-person pronouns; another variation is the Good, the True, and the Beautiful; or art, morals, and science, and so on—namely, the objective truth of exterior science, or it/its; the subjective truth of aesthetics, or I; and the collective truth of ethics, or thou/we).... If you imagine any of the phenomena (or holons) in the various quadrants, you can look at them from their own inside or outside. This gives you 8 primordial perspectives—the inside and the outside view of a holon in any of the 4 quadrants.328

Thus, as the above passage clearly states, this revised version of AQAL asserts the existence of perspectives for the inside and the outside of the individual and the collective, and, by virtue of the tri/quad conflation just invoked, it simultaneously asserts the existence of perspectives for the inside and the outside of the first-, second-, and third-person, which are, respectively, the inside of the individual, the inside of the collective, and the outsides of the individual and the collective.

While accepting the validity of Wilber’s formulation of integral methodological pluralism, Sean Esbjörn-Hargens offers a refinement that explicates the epistemological and ontological pluralism implied by Wilber’s methodological pluralism. His more encompassing notion of integral pluralism clarifies the mutually implicated epistemological pluralism of who enacts, the methodological pluralism of how they enact, and the ontological pluralism of what is enacted—in short, who × how × what.329 Using climate change as an example, Esbjörn-Hargens contends that, “we do not have a simple case of many perspectives looking differently at a single object (e.g., a circle of people looking at a red ball in the middle) but rather have multiple perspectives using a variety of techniques, practices, and injunctions to enact multiple objects that overlap with and diverge from each other in numerous ways to generate an object that goes under the signifier of [climate change].”330 His key point is that, in addition to the multiple methods of any methodological pluralism, we must also recognize the multiple subjects and the multiple objects that, as he puts it, en-ter-act to create all the multiple realities, which are, in his view, already articulated in AQAL.331,332
Unfortunately, Wilber’s tri/quad conflated, dyadic quadratic formulation of primordial perspectives, which serves as the conceptual framework for his integral methodological pluralism—that is, the integral theory on which his integral practice is based—is completely inconsistent with the actual primordial perspectives of human awareness-in-action, thus rendering incoherent his particular formulations of integral theory and practice. While the methods themselves are relatively valid as they are employed by various scholar-practitioners in their respective fields, the multi-perspectival methodology that Wilber designed to differentiate and integrate these methods is inconsistent with the primordial perspectives that are always already active in the work of all these scholar-practitioners—inconsistent, that is, with the essential or integral perspectivism they implicitly enact in every situation. Furthermore, as demonstrated in my critique of this formulation in Appendix A, because the tri/quad conflated, dyadic quadratic perspectives of AQAL are conceptual products of a deceptively simple confusion between equation/conflation and differentiation/integration with respect to the purely triadic (123) and purely quadratic (X_{AQ}) primordial perspectives—1 = X_{UL}; 2 = X_{LL}; 3 = X_{UR+LR}—these AQAL perspectives simply do not exist anywhere in human awareness-in-action other than as illogical, irredeemable claims that they exist.

Hence, it is not just that AQAL is not quite primordial enough, as would be the concern with any multi-perspectival meta-theory purporting to be primordial enough to serve integral methodological, epistemological, and ontological purposes, but rather that AQAL completely distorts the triadic (123) and quadratic (X_{AQ}) perspectives purportedly differentiated and integrated within AQAL, rendering incoherent each and every perspective in AQAL and, thus, any methodology, epistemology, or ontology based on AQAL. After all, if the tri/quad conflated AQAL is not the correct way to articulate the primordial perspectives of human awareness-in-action and triadic quadratic perspectivism is correct, then each and every attempt to apply AQAL in some field of theory or practice is actually preventing people from realizing in their own active awareness the primordial perspectival meta-theory of TQP that is, nevertheless, always already implicitly active in those action situations. Neverthe-
less, Wilber’s general idea of an integral methodological pluralism, consistent with the principles of nonexclusion, enfolding, and enactment, remains quite promising to the extent that it invites alternative formulations of paradigmatic pluralism and meta-paradigmatic integralism consistent with these premises. Likewise, many of the important insights offered by AQAL scholar-practitioners, including Esbjörn-Hargens’s emphasis on epistemological, methodological, and ontological pluralisms, can nevertheless be retained within alternative formulations that are free from the contradictory constraints of AQAL.

As an alternative to AQAL, Awareness-in-Action offers what appears to be a more coherent and justifiable formulation of paradigmatic pluralism and meta-paradigmatic integralism that is consistent with the principles of nonexclusion, enfolding, and enactment, but grounded instead in the primordial perspectives and practices of our situational awareness-in-action. Awareness-in-Action encompasses both the ever-present realization ($R^0$) of the integral awareness that I am ($A^0$) and the never-ending realization ($R^\infty$) of the differantial action that I do ($A^\infty$), which are indeterminte-ly realized ($R^N$) in each and every situational action-in-awareness ($A^N$) through the procedural meta-practice of transparency, choice, and accountability ($TCA^N$) with respect to the substantive meta-theory of triadic quadratic perspectivism ($TQP^N$). More specifically, Awareness-in-Action is a meta-paradigm of realization that entails the requisite practice of transparency, choice, and accountability ($TCA^N$) with respect to my pragmatic significations of reality ($123AQ^0$), each of your pragmatic significations of reality ($2.123AQ^0$), and each of their pragmatic significations of reality ($3.123AQ^0$), each comprised of its corresponding intentional signifieds ($123123UL$), behavioral signifiers ($123123UR$), cultural semantics ($123123LL$), and social syntax ($123123LR$) of reality, all of which appear to co-arise in the integral awareness ($0$) that each of us brings to our differantial action situation ($A^N = TCA^N \times 123123AQ = R^N$). It therefore includes the (a)perspectival/(a)practical realizations of each and every realizer-realized that can possibly be regarded as relatively real within my circle of integral awareness—that is, the potentially infinite, yet
always indeterminate epistemological-ontological multiplicities of my methodological awareness-in-action.

![Diagram: Awareness-in-Action as a Praxiological Integralism/Différantialism](image)

Awareness-in-Action constitutes a substantive/procedural form of meta-paradigmatic integralism—a praxiological integralism—from which a substantive/procedural form of paradigmatic pluralism—a praxiological différantialism—is derived based on its primordial perspectival structure. As already presented, the triadic praxes of authentication \((AF^N)\), legitimation \((LJ^N)\), and confirmation \((CT^N)\) constitute the most important differentiation of integral/différantial realization \((RN)\) without which people tend to confuse and conflate intrapersonal, interpersonal, and impersonal modes of realization: (Fig. 21)

- Authentication is the intrapersonal mode of realization that entails the requisite practice of transparency, choice, and accountability with respect to my personified symptoms of
freedom \( (1_{AQ}) \), each of your personified symptoms of freedom \( (2.1_{AQ}) \), and each of their personified symptoms of freedom \( (3.1_{AQ}) \), each comprised of its corresponding intentional signifieds \( (123.1_{UL}) \), behavioral signifiers \( (123.1_{UR}) \), cultural semantics \( (123.1_{LL}) \), and social syntax \( (123.1_{LR}) \) of freedom, collectively denoted \( A^N > TCA^N \times 123.1_{AQ} = AF^N \). Authentication is the intrapersonal praxis by which each of us (in)validates each of our relatively knowledgeable actions in terms of its honesty and authenticity, consistent with each of our indeterminate realizations of awareness-in-action, thereby (re/de-) constructing our actionable knowledge of freedom.

- Legitimation is the interpersonal mode of realization that entails the requisite practice of transparency, choice, and accountability with respect to my participative signals of justice \( (2_{AQ}) \), each of your participative signals of justice \( (2.2_{AQ}) \), and each of their participative signals of justice \( (3.2_{AQ}) \), each comprised of its corresponding intentional signifieds \( (123.2_{UL}) \), behavioral signifiers \( (123.2_{UR}) \), cultural semantics \( (123.2_{LL}) \), and social syntax \( (123.2_{LR}) \) of justice, collectively denoted \( A^N > TCA^N \times 123.2_{AQ} = LJ^N \). Legitimation is the interpersonal praxis by which each of us (in)validates each of our relatively knowledgeable actions in terms of its morality and legitimacy, consistent with each of our indeterminate realizations of awareness-in-action, thereby (re/de-) constructing our actionable knowledge of justice.

- Confirmation is the impersonal mode of realization that entails the requisite practice of transparency, choice, and accountability with respect to my representative symbols of truth \( (3_{AQ}) \), each of your representative symbols of truth \( (2.3_{AQ}) \), and each of their representative symbols of truth \( (3.3_{AQ}) \), each comprised of its corresponding intentional signifieds \( (123.3_{UL}) \), behavioral signifiers \( (123.3_{UR}) \), cultural semantics \( (123.3_{LL}) \), and social syntax \( (123.3_{LR}) \) of truth, collectively denoted \( A^N > TCA^N \times 123.3_{AQ} = CT^N \). Confirmation is the impersonal praxis by which each of us (in)validates each of our relatively knowledgeable actions in terms of its accuracy and cogency, consistent with each of our indeterminate
realizations of awareness-in-action \((A^N)\), thereby (re/de)constructing our actionable knowledge of truth.

Within each of these triadic praxes, we can further differentiate a quadratic pluralism oriented toward the integral/différantial realization of each of our claims to the intentional, behavioral, meaningful, and functional aspects of freedom, justice, and truth: (Fig. 21)

- Praxiological intentionalism entails the requisite practice of transparency, choice, and accountability with respect to our individual-subjective intentions, which includes my claims to intentional freedom, justice, and truth \((123_{UL})\), your claims to intentional freedom, justice, and truth \((2.123_{UL})\), and his or her claims to intentional freedom, justice, and truth \((3.123_{UL})\), denoted \(TCA^N \times 123.123_{UL} = ALC^N_{UL} = A^N_{UL}\). Praxiological intentionalism is the praxis by which each of us (in)validates the intrapersonal, interpersonal, and impersonal intentions or, more broadly, the personified, participative, and representative signifieds that each of us brings to the action situation, consistent with each of our indeterminate realizations of awareness-in-action.

- Praxiological behavioralism entails the requisite practice of transparency, choice, and accountability with respect to our individual-objective behaviors, which includes my claims to behavioral freedom, justice, and truth \((123_{UR})\), your claims to behavioral freedom, justice, and truth \((2.123_{UR})\), and his or her claims to behavioral freedom, justice, and truth \((3.123_{UR})\), denoted \(TCA^N \times 123.123_{UR} = ALC^N_{UR} = A^N_{UR}\). Praxiological behavioralism is the praxis by which each of us (in)validates the intrapersonal, interpersonal, and impersonal behaviors or, more broadly, the personified, participative, and representative signifiers that each of us brings to the action situation, consistent with each of our indeterminate realizations of awareness-in-action.

- Praxiological interpretivism entails the requisite practice of transparency, choice, and accountability with respect to our collective-subjective meanings, which includes my claims to meaningful freedom, justice, and truth \((123_{LL})\), your claims to meaningful freedom, justice, and truth \((2.123_{LL})\), and his or her
claims to meaningful freedom, justice, and truth (3.123_{LL}), denoted TCA^N \times 123.123_{LL} = ALC^N_{LL} = A^N_{LL}. Praxiological interpretivism is the praxis by which each of us (in)validates the intrapersonal, interpersonal, and impersonal meanings or, more broadly, the personified, participative, and representative semantics that each of us brings to the action situation, consistent with each of our indeterminate realizations of Awareness-in-Action.

- Praxiological functionalism entails the requisite practice of transparency, choice, and accountability with respect to our collective-objective functions, which includes my claims to functional freedom, justice, and truth (123_{LR}), your claims to functional freedom, justice, and truth (2.123_{LR}), and his or her claims to functional freedom, justice, and truth (3.123_{LR}), denoted TCA^N \times 123.123_{LR} = ALC^N_{LR} = A^N_{LR}. Praxiological functionalism is the praxis by which each of us (in)validates the intrapersonal, interpersonal, and impersonal functions or, more broadly, the personified, participative, and representative syntax that each of us brings to the action situation, consistent with each of our indeterminate realizations of awareness-in-action.

Likewise, within each of these triadic praxes, we can also differentiate a secondary quadratic—or perhaps, more accurately, a quadratic dyadic—pluralism oriented toward the integral/différantial realization of each of our claims to the individual, collective, subjective, and objective aspects of freedom, justice, and truth: (Fig. 21)

- Praxiological individualism entails the requisite practice of transparency, choice, and accountability with respect to our individual intentions-behaviors, which includes my claims to intentional-behavioral freedom, justice, and truth (123_{UL-UR}), your claims to intentional-behavioral freedom, justice, and truth (2.123_{UL-UR}), and his or her claims to intentional-behavioral freedom, justice, and truth (3.123_{UL-UR}), denoted TCA^N \times 123.123_{UL-UR} = ALC^N_{UL-UR} = A^N_{UL-UR}.

- Praxiological collectivism entails the requisite practice of transparency, choice, and accountability with respect to our collective meanings-functions, which includes my claims to
meaningful-functional freedom, justice, and truth (123\text{LL+LR}), your claims to meaningful-functional freedom, justice, and truth (2.123\text{LL+LR}), and his or her claims to meaningful-functional freedom, justice, and truth (3.123\text{LL+LR}), denoted TCA^N \times 123.123\text{LL+LR} = ALC^N_{\text{LL+LR}} = A^N_{\text{LL+LR}}.

- Praxiological subjectivism entails the requisite practice of transparency, choice, and accountability with respect to our subjective intentions-meanings, which includes my claims to intentional-meaningful freedom, justice, and truth (123\text{UL+LL}), your claims to intentional-meaningful freedom, justice, and truth (2.123\text{UL+LL}), and his or her claims to intentional-meaningful freedom, justice, and truth (3.123\text{UL+LL}), denoted TCA^N \times 123.123\text{UL+LL} = ALC^N_{\text{UL+LL}} = A^N_{\text{UL+LL}}.

- Praxiological objectivism entails the requisite practice of transparency, choice, and accountability with respect to our objective behaviors-functions, which includes my claims to behavioral-functional freedom, justice, and truth (123\text{UR+LR}), your claims to behavioral-functional freedom, justice, and truth (2.123\text{UR+LR}), and his or her claims to behavioral-functional freedom, justice, and truth (3.123\text{UR+LR}), denoted TCA^N \times 123.123\text{UR+LR} = ALC^N_{\text{UR+LR}} = A^N_{\text{UR+LR}}.

Therefore, within both of these alternative overlapping triadic quadratic formulations, we find 12 distinct complementary primordial praxes, each of which might be further described as a diverse cluster of discrete praxes that share a single primordial perspective while enacting different empirical features of that perspective, including, but not limited to, an indeterminate plurality of relatively stable (multi-)structural patterns of awareness-in-action. Nevertheless, regardless of where we place the differential emphasis on the primordial praxes of this praxiological différantialism, TCA^N \times TQP^N are the substantive/procedural features of the praxiological integralism by which this différantialism is derived and therefore enactive of each and every primordial praxis. Simply put, the metaparadigmatic integralism of Awareness-in-Action always already infuses a constitutive paradigmatic différantialism that includes all the primordial praxes of Awareness-in-Action.
However, the ever-present, never-ending potential for novelty in human action, which applies to the conduct as well as the content of that action, means that each and every one of us will conduct each and every one of our respective praxes in a different way simply due to the différantial integralism of the Awareness-in-Action we all nevertheless share. Even if all three of us agree, for example, to the definition of a praxis designed to (dis)confirm the objective truth claims of our shared social context (123.3LR) through a specific form of impersonal praxiological functionalism (CT²LR), each of us will enact that praxis differently and in so doing create a praxis that is, as we all might agree, at least marginally unique. The implications of this are interesting because it means that each and every one of us enacts a unique version of each and every pluralistic praxis—and of the integral meta-praxis itself—even when we all agree in theory on what that praxis is and how to do it well. When we actually do it, each of our versions will be somewhat unique and therefore the realities enacted by you, me, and her will be somewhat unique as well—not necessarily enough to cause a conflict between each of us, but if not between us, then more likely between us and them. Hence, this différantial integralism only begins with the differentiation of the primordial praxes common to all of us. It then differentiates further to include the différantialism within, between, and beyond disciplinary and institutional boundaries common to some of us and ultimately differentiates enough to embrace every conceivable praxis that might originate from any one of us—from any unique enactive I in the potentially infinite, yet always indeterminate derivatives of integral aperspectival/apractical Awareness-in-Action.

Therefore, due to the origin of praxiological integralism/différantialism in the unique enactive I whose purview, by virtue of TCA∞ × TQP∞, potentially includes each and every other unique enactive I—each of whom is the direct or indirect realizer of all the other perspectives that are realized within each and every action situation—it appears that each praxis presupposes every praxis with any number of derivative praxes in the radically open-ended, yet reliably closed-minded meta-praxis of Awareness-in-Action. Hence, each direct realization presupposes every direct realization with any number of indirect realizations in the potentially infinite, yet always
indeterminate epistemological-ontological multiplicities of methodological Awareness-in-Action. Nevertheless, regardless of who is enacting these integral/différantial praxes in all their potentially infinite diversity, $TCA^\infty \times TQP^\infty$ are the normative ideals apparently presupposed in every empirically real action situation, and therefore the essential premises by which each of our unique versions of integral/différantial praxiology should be guided. Simply put, the empirical diversity of praxiological integralism/différantialism in real action situations mutually implicates the normative unity of praxiological integralism/différantialism in the ideal action situation.

Awareness-in-Action may therefore be understood as an integral différantialism / différantial integralism centered on a paradigm of paradigms that encompasses both the ever-present realization of the integral awareness that we are and the never-ending realization of the différantial action that we do—an essentialist formulation that facilitates a comprehensivist application honoring the full potential and variety of the human experience, including our experiences of the worlds beyond humanity.

(R)Evolutionary Criticalism

Finally, as a distinctively critical integral philosophy, Awareness-in-Action offers actionable insights into the subtle sources of deception, distortion, coercion, corruption, dysfunction, and disruption that can manifest at all degrees of depth and scale in all the forms and fields of human action. It does so by virtue of the empirical/normative complementarity between the context-immanent realization of any particular action and the context-transcendent idealization of all universal action. More precisely, human action is always already critical as well as integral, due to the creative tension between what is and what could, should, and would be, if only real actions in all their empirical diversity ($A^N = TCA^N \times TQP^N = ALC^N = R^N$) conformed to the normative unity of ideal action ($A^\infty = TCA^\infty \times TQP^\infty = ALC^\infty = R^\infty$). Awareness-in-Action can therefore be described as a critical integralism, which captures the idea of an inherently critical meta-paradigm infusing an otherwise integral meta-paradigm, thus
grounding its essentialist/comprehensivist aspirations in the unavoidably (r)evolutionary challenge of human action in real-world contexts.334

The term critical, as used in contemporary critical theory, generally refers to a class of social scientific theories and practices that share a similar commitment to the interdisciplinary critique of what is from the perspective of what might be. More specifically, in the wake of Habermas’s early formulation,335 critical social science can be usefully described as a normative method of critical-reflective intervention that transcends, yet includes the traditional social science methods of empirical-analytic explanation, which is oriented toward the functional understanding of society in its objective forms, and historical-hermeneutic interpretation, which is oriented toward the meaningful understanding of society in its subjective forms.

Within the society-wide object-domain of critical theory, common issues of concern to critical theorists have included:

- ideology, false consciousness, projection, and coercion in social relations;336
- distorted and dysfunctional communication in groups and organizations,337 and in socio-cultural evolution;338
- crisis tendencies in advanced capitalist democracies, particularly those rooted in lifeworld/system conflicts;339
- dysfunction in structural-hierarchical human development, including translational distortions within each level and transformational demands between lower and higher levels;340
- critical evaluation of critical theory itself as a necessary part of its application;341
- critical reflexivity and community-based practice of the social science practitioner;342 and
- methodological, epistemological, and ontological presuppositions of social and other sciences.343

While there is no single, definitive formulation of critical theory, Geuss’s concise synopsis based on the early work of Habermas and his predecessors at the Frankfurt School344 offers a meta-theoretical articulation sufficient for our present purposes. “A critical theory is a very complicated conceptual object; it is addressed to a particular
group of agents in a particular society and aims at being their ‘self-consciousness’ in a process of successful emancipation and enlightenment. A process of emancipation and enlightenment is a transition from an initial state of bondage, delusion, and frustration to a final state of freedom, knowledge, and satisfaction.”

Although Habermas seems to use emancipation more prominently than enlightenment, Geuss contends that both terms have an interdependent meaning across the multiple sources of critical theory. As he clarifies, “various texts inform us that ‘emancipation and enlightenment’ refer to a social transition from an initial state to a final state which has the following properties:

a. The initial state is one both of false consciousness and error, and ‘unfree existence.’

b. In the initial state false consciousness and unfree existence are inherently connected so that agents can be liberated from one only if they are also at the same time freed from the other.

c. The ‘unfree existence’ from which the agents in the initial state suffer is a form of self-imposed coercion; their false consciousness is a kind of self-delusion.

d. The coercion from which the agents suffer in the initial state is one whose ‘power’ or ‘objectivity’ derives only from the fact that the agents do not realize that it is self-imposed.

e. The final state is one in which the agents are free of false consciousness—they have been enlightened—and free of self-imposed coercion—they have been emancipated.”

The emphasis on self-imposed deception and coercion that we find in critical theory does not, in my interpretation, preclude the simultaneous existence of deception and coercion from others with whom one is living and working. As I see it, the intrapersonal forms of deception and coercion are internalized, likely via the socialized me that is habitually (con)fused with the enactive I, from the externalized forms of deception and coercion—both conscious and deliberate as well as subconscious and inadvertent—that one encounters in his or her interpersonal and impersonal relationships. Nevertheless, once internalized through decades of far-less-than-ideal socialization, a particular habit of self-imaging/world-viewing that is mistakenly
considered to be valid and defended as such against all normal challenges is indeed a form of self-imposed deception and coercion that is best revealed and revised through a practice of well-informed, well-facilitated mutual, reflexive, différantial, yet integral realization, which is the distinctively critical aim of Awareness-in-Action.

Continuing his meta-theoretical synopsis, Geuss contends that "a typical critical theory... will be composed of three main constituent parts:

a. A part which shows that a transition from the present state of society... to some proposed final state is 'objectively' or 'theoretically' possible, i.e. which shows:
   i. that the proposed final state is inherently possible i.e. that given the present level of development of the forces of production it is possible for society to function and reproduce itself in this proposed state;
   ii. that it is possible to transform the present state into the proposed final state (by means of specified institutional or other changes).

b. A part which shows that the transition from the present state to the proposed final state is 'practically necessary,' i.e. that:
   i. the present state is one of reflectively unacceptable frustration, bondage, and illusion: (a) the present social arrangements cause pain, suffering, and frustration; (b) the agents in the society only accept the present arrangements and the suffering they entail because they hold a particular world-picture; (c) that world-picture is not reflectively acceptable to the agents, i.e. it is one they acquired only because they were in conditions of coercion;
   ii. the proposed final state will be one which will lack the illusions and unnecessary coercion and frustration of the present state; the proposed final state will be one in which it will be easier for the agents to realize their true interests.

c. A part which asserts that the transition from the present state to the proposed final state can come about only if the agents adopt the critical theory as their 'self-consciousness'
and act on it.”

As this description makes perfectly clear, the special province of critical theory is that creative tension between the empirical reality of what is—such as a present state of bondage, delusion, and frustration—and the normative ideality of what might be—such as a final state of freedom, knowledge, and satisfaction—within any specific context of human action. However, a careful reading also reveals a decidedly substantive and potentially metaphysical bias toward the content of real/ideal human action that stops short of differentiating the corresponding procedural conduct of real/ideal human action that can account for the inherently active transition from what is to what might be. Without such a post-metaphysical differentiation, the critical theory is hampered by an over-emphasis on the substantive critique that has already been conducted by the theorist and an under-emphasis on the procedural critique that will have to be conducted by those practitioners charged with making this critical transition in real-world situations. Perhaps with some irony due to the all-too-common tendencies toward instrumental rationality so well documented by later critical theorists, a critical theory that is heavy on communicated substance and light on communicative procedure is more likely to be rationalized in counter-productive monological action than justified in adaptive dialogical action. As Argyris has discovered in real-world communities of practice, the widely-enforced, yet self-imposed forms of deception and coercion characteristic of instrumental rationalization are bolstered by pernicious defensive routines that make it normatively inappropriate for members to even discuss the possibility that the critique in question might be valid for their community. Hence, the absence of potential enlightenment and emancipation are due to institutionalized procedures of deception, coercion, and defensiveness that require for their resolution the (re)institutionalization of procedural transparencies, choice, and accountability.

In contrast to a purely substantive form of criticalism focused on the content of real/ideal action, in which critique is limited to a declarative imperative to adopt a contextualized critical theory, Awareness-in-Action is also a procedural form of criticalism focused on the conduct of real/ideal action, in which critique is led by a declarative imperative to initiate and act on it.
imperative to engage a contextualized critical praxis of realization: \(A^N = TCA^N \times TQP^N = ALC^N = R^N\). Additionally, this particular formulation of substantive/procedural criticalism is thoroughly integral/différéntial, as it encompasses both the absolute realization of the integral awareness that we are—hence, the *integral enlightenment* and *emancipation* that is nowhere yet now-here—and the relative realization of the différéntial action that we do—hence, the *différéntial enlightenment* and *emancipation* that is our ultimate destiny. Because the absolute realization of the integral awareness that we are is often only relatively realized in the différéntial action that we do, it is often only relatively idealized in the form of an *ultimate* realization \(R^\infty\) that can only ever signify in spacial-temporal form the absolute realization \(R^0\) always already beyond the relativity of dimensional-durational awareness-in-action. This appears to give rise to the distinctively critical tension between, on the one hand, the *empirical* realization of a particular, content-rich, context-immanent, perspectival/practical awareness-in-action—the action situation that is *already realized*—and, on the other hand, the *normative* realization of a universal, content-free, context-transcendent, aperspectival/apractical awareness-in-action—the action situation that is *always idealized*—both of which are *always already* aspects of our situational awareness-in-action.

With these formulations in mind, we can carefully reconstruct Geuss’s outline of a critical theory by redefining the *present state* as the empirically justifiable realization of human action in some specific real-world context \(A^N = TCA^N \times TQP^N = ALC^N = R^N\) and the *proposed final state* as a credible approximation to the normatively justifiable realization of human action in that same real-world context \(A^\infty = TCA^\infty \times TQP^\infty = ALC^\infty = R^\infty\). Once again, in my view, human awareness-in-action is always already critical due to the creative tension between *what is* and *what could, should, and would be*, if only *real actions* \(A^N\) conformed to the presuppositions of *ideal action* \(A^\infty\). Hence, we can see in the three parts of a critical theory outlined above a general account of the creative tension between the present state of *what is* and the proposed final state of *what could be* in part a, *what should be* in part b, and *what would be* in part c. Alternatively, we might like to re-phrase this more personally in terms of
the creative tension between the present state of *who we are* and the
proposed final state of *who we could be* in part a, *who we should be* in
part b, and *who we would be* in part c. Furthermore, we can see at
least a substantive suggestion of the corresponding critical praxes of
impersonal *(dis)confirmation* in part a, interpersonal *(de)legitimation* in
part b, and intrapersonal *(in)authentication* in part c by which we
could, should, and would transform, through mutual, reflexive,
différantial, yet integral critique, our conduct and, thus, also the
content of that conduct. In doing so, we would be mindfully practic-
ing Awareness-in-Action as our self-consciousness in a process of
integral/différantial emancipation and enlightenment—a(n) *(r)*evolu-
tionary praxis of integral/différantial *realization*—not as a metaphysi-
cal meta-theory to be discussed and deferred indefinitely, but as a
post-metaphysical meta-paradigm to be enacted and evaluated
immediately in real-world action situations.

Consistent with this reconstruction, deliberate applications of
Awareness-in-Action may be described as critical integral *interven-
tions* fallibilistically oriented toward the integral/différantial realiza-
tion of situational awareness-in-action, within and beyond the
context of the semiotic, pragmatic, and praxiologica
capacity constraints previously established in the course of that awareness-in-
action. As I use the term, *intervention* is quite simply the mindful
practice of Awareness-in-Action through which we cannot help but
act in ways that may present challenges to those with whom we are
interacting, particularly if our actions are designed to address what
we regard as insufficient degrees of $TCA^N \times TQP^N$ in established
institutions or disciplines whose members may prefer to maintain
the status quo. Even the most conscientious efforts to create actiona-
ble knowledge of freedom, justice, and truth—*enlightenment*—that,
in turn, supports knowledgeable action that is more free, just, and
true—*emancipation*—are typically resisted, often vehemently, by
those who benefit most in terms of power and wealth from whatever
lack of freedom, justice, and truth others are forced, or allowed, to
endure. However, without denying its *(r)*evolutionary implications
and applications, it is important to remember that Awareness-in-
Action is primarily about bringing more awareness to our own
actions and creating conditions in which others may do the same so
that we may all realize more of the ideal potential we presuppose with every action we take.

Bearing in mind the mutual, reflexive, and différantial nature of these critical integral interventions, we mindful practitioners of Awareness-in-Action will recognize our own substantive and procedural fallibility and, hence, the need for (in)authentication, (de)legitimation, and (dis)confirmation of any such intervention—and of the realization paradigm itself—as essential features of that intervention and the very means to our own situational realization. Therefore, if the underlying cause of the interdependent crises afflicting humanity—whether specifically construed as political, economic, social, or ecological in nature—can be more generally construed as the conspicuous disregard for requisite degrees of transparency, choice, and accountability with respect to the triadic quadratic perspectivism in challenging action situations, then the most effective (r)evolutionary responses to these crises would require critical integral interventions to (re)establish these post-metaphysical norms of Awareness-in-Action, thereby facilitating our mutual, reflexive, différantial, yet integral realization of the relatively unfree, unjust, untrue, and, therefore, unreal conditions in which we have, unwittingly, been living and working.351

Awareness-in-Action may therefore be understood as a critical integralism attuned to the interdependent political, economic, social, and ecological challenges of our time. Thus, if we want to realize more freedom, justice, and truth in our lives and in the lives of those around us, then we should engage in the meta-practice of transparency, choice, and accountability with respect to the meta-theory of triadic quadratic perspectivism in challenging action situations.
In lieu of a more traditional conclusion in which I would summarize what I have already presented in the preceding chapters, I think it preferable to make an object of all that has been presented and invite some attention to the justification considerations at least implied in the formulation and presentation of Awareness-in-Action. If, as I have proposed, the reality of a declarative is the imperative to realize it, then the reality of my proposed realization meta-paradigm, Awareness-in-Action, should be justifiable by recourse to some exemplary procedure by which you, the reader, might realize for yourself the substantive reality of the whole hypothesis, including the claims to truth, justice, and freedom either expressed or implied in this book. Beyond the justification of integral reconstruction that I painstakingly demonstrated in the course of writing this book and that you necessarily engaged in the course of reading this book, there remains much potential for wider dialogues of confirmation, legitimation, and authentication within the pluralistic communities of scholar-practitioners committed to the continuing evolution of integral theory, critical theory, and action science. Hence, the very formulation of Awareness-in-Action provides the normative procedures for its own critical integral verification or falsification—\( A^\infty = TCA^\infty \times TQP^\infty = ALC^\infty = R^\infty \)—as any formulation of action science, critical theory, or integral theory very well should.

Furthermore, given that I have intentionally formulated Awareness-in-Action as a realization meta-paradigm, the imperative to realize these purported realities can also include mindful engagement in a paradigmatic application of Awareness-in-Action—that is, the
meta-practice of transparency, choice, and accountability with respect to the meta-theory of triadic quadratic perspectivism—in any form or field of human awareness-in-action. Any such critical integral intervention within, between, or beyond established disciplinary and institutional boundaries can proceed with the secondary aim of either verifying or falsifying the propositions of Awareness-in-Action while engaged in the primary task of paradigmatic reconstruction guided by these provisionally validated propositions. After all, if my hypothesis is something less than correct, or perhaps deeply flawed in some way that awaits discovery in the midst of application, then you will be able to make a significant contribution to what I think we can both agree is a worthwhile, yet unfinished project.

Finally, given that the essential premises of Awareness-in-Action are based on what I hypothesize to be the essential presuppositions of the awareness-in-action already being practiced by each and every one of us, the imperative to realize these purported realities requires nothing so much as bringing a more contemplative awareness to your own situational action, just as I brought to mine prior to making these discoveries. You simply pay close attention to who you are and how you act in various situations—pay attention, that is, to the perspectives and practices emerging in every situational action-in-awareness—and see if you can discover for yourself some of the fundamental presuppositions in your own awareness-in-action. After all, if my hypothesis is correct, then you too will realize in your own active awareness the latent potential for integral aperspectival/apractical awareness-in-action generally consistent with my particular formulation for Awareness-in-Action.

If nothing else, bringing more awareness to your own actions and creating conditions in which others may do the same should help us all to realize more of the ideal potential we presuppose with every action we take.
He who fails to keep turning
the wheel thus set in motion
has damaged the working of the world
and has wasted his life, Arjuna.

But the man who delights in the Self,
who feels pure contentment and finds
perfect peace in the Self—
for him, there is no need to act.

Without concern for results,
perform the necessary action;
surrendering all attachments,
accomplish life’s highest good.

~ Bhagavad Gita
APPENDICES
As presented in Part I, a central feature of Ken Wilber’s all-quadrant, all-level, or AQAL, formulation of integral theory is the particular way he equates and conflates the quadratic perspectives—intentional, behavioral, cultural, social—for which his meta-theory is best known with the triadic perspectives—first-person, second-person, third-person—exemplified by the meta-theory of Jürgen Habermas. In the series of books and articles published from 1995 through 2007, including the earliest and latest presentations of AQAL, Wilber makes it perfectly clear that he considers the quadratic perspectives and the triadic perspectives to be identical and interchangeable, with:

- the first-person perspective (1) being identical to his intentional perspective, the conflated form of which he labels with the pronoun I in his upper-left (UL) quadrant;
- the second-person perspective (2) being identical to his cultural perspective, the conflated form of which he labels with the pronoun We in his lower-left (LL) quadrant, noting that this first-person plural pronoun is intended to represent the relationship between first-person I and second-person You; and
- the third-person perspective (3) being identical to his combined behavioral and social perspectives, the conflated forms of which he labels with the pronoun It in his upper-right (UR) quadrant and Its in his lower-right (LR) quadrant.\(^{353}\)

I refer to this essential feature of the AQAL formulation as the tri/quad conflation and offer Figure A1 as an illustration.
In a complete departure from Wilber’s tri/quad conflation, I recognize Habermas’s triadic perspectives and Wilber’s quadratic perspectives as two entirely differentiated, yet nevertheless tightly integrated, multi-perspectival frames of reference for human action, development, and evolution. As I see it, each of the first-, second-, and third-person perspectives has within it all four intentional, behavioral, cultural, and social perspectives, which are identified and experienced by each one of us from within each of the three personal perspectives we use to frame our actions in our worlds. I therefore reconstructed in Part I a triadic quadratic perspectivism (123.123_{AQ}) based on 12 primordial perspectives: (Fig. A2)

- a first-person, all-quadrant perspective of freedom (i.e., beauty), denoted 1_{AQ}, signified by the singular-subjective pronoun I in the intentional quadrant, or 1_{UL}, the singular-objective pronoun me in the behavioral quadrant, or 1_{UR}, the plural-
subjective pronoun \textit{we} in the \textit{cultural} quadrant, or 1_{LL}, and the plural-objective pronoun \textit{us} in the \textit{social} quadrant, or 1_{LR};

- a \textit{second-person, all-quadrant} perspective of \textit{justice} (i.e., \textit{goodness}), denoted 2_{AQ}, signified by the singular-subjective pronoun \textit{you} in the \textit{intentional} quadrant, or 2_{UL}, the singular-objective pronoun \textit{you} in the \textit{behavioral} quadrant, or 2_{UR}, the plural-subjective pronoun \textit{you} (or occasionally \textit{we}) in the \textit{cultural} quadrant, or 2_{LL}, and the plural-objective pronoun \textit{you} (or occasionally \textit{us}) in the \textit{social} quadrant, or 2_{LR}; and

- a \textit{third-person, all-quadrant} perspective of \textit{truth}, denoted 3_{AQ}, signified by the singular-subjective pronouns \textit{he}, \textit{she}, or \textit{it} in the \textit{intentional} quadrant, or 3_{UL}, the singular-objective pronouns \textit{him}, \textit{her}, or \textit{it} in the \textit{behavioral} quadrant, or 3_{UR}, the plural-subjective pronouns \textit{they} or \textit{these} (or occasionally \textit{you} or \textit{we}) in the \textit{cultural} quadrant, or 3_{LL}, and the plural-objective pronouns \textit{them} or \textit{those} (or occasionally \textit{you} or \textit{us}) in the \textit{social} quadrant, or 3_{LR}.

As I demonstrated in Part I, triadic quadratic perspectivism differentiates and integrates these complementary meta-theories toward a more integral/différantial semiotics, pragmatics, and praxiology consistent with the primordial perspectives of our situational awareness-in-action.

However, as an unintended consequence of my discovery, the presence of triadic quadratic perspectivism reveals what appears to be a fundamental problem with Wilber’s formulation, thereby raising the disconcerting prospect of a \textit{tri/quad fallacy} at the heart of AQAL. The reason the tri/quad fallacy is a worthwhile critique is because the tri/quad conflation is an essential feature of AQAL and one of the most significant contributions Wilber has made to the wider field of integral theory. It is the conceptual lynchpin that purportedly integrates in a very particular way two enormous bodies of philosophical thought, one \textit{triadic} and primarily Habermasian and the other \textit{quadratic} (and therefore also \textit{dyadic}) and primarily Wilberian, into what may be justifiably described as the most comprehensive and popular version of integral theory yet created. The ontological, epistemological, and methodological location, so to speak, of the triadic perspectives in relation to the quadratic perspec-
tives should be one of the more significant lines of inquiry within the Wilberian integral community, if not also the wider field of integral theory.\textsuperscript{354,355} If Wilber's tri/quad conflated AQAL is not the correct way to integrate these two distinct meta-theories and triadic quadratic perspectivism is correct, then all of Wilber's teachings that hinge on this tri/quad conflation—such as his triadic or quadratic reinterpretations of significant ideas from other fields—will need to be reconstructed to conform to triadic quadratic perspectivism. Much to everyone's benefit, such integral reconstructions would acknowledge the major difference between the triadic and quadratic meta-theories and use that difference to enhance them both in ways that the tri/quad conflated AQAL has always precluded.

At the risk of digressing at the outset, I feel it is important to note that I do not typically engage in significant critique of the source material that I simultaneously incorporate into my own reconstructive proposals. It seems unnecessarily argumentative to

\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{figure_a2}
\caption{Triadic Quadratic Perspectivism – N\textsuperscript{th} Derivative}
\end{figure}
critique, for just one example, Habermas’s triadic perspectives due to the fact that they fail to differentiate the quadratic perspectives later identified by Wilber and subsequently integrated by me into triadic quadratic perspectivism. Likewise, I would find no need to critique the absence of the triadic perspectives if Wilber’s AQAL had been presented as a purely quadratic meta-theory with no tri/quad conflation. It is only because Wilber’s formulation attempts to integrate the triadic and the quadratic perspectives in a manner contrary to mine that I would even consider clarifying the differences by way of critique. Furthermore, it is only because Wilber’s tri/quad conflation is so essential to his AQAL formulation and all its purportedly integral, or post-postmodern, applications to other fields of theory and practice that I would invest the effort in such a rigorous critique. After all, if the tri/quad conflated AQAL is not the correct way to articulate the primordial perspectives of human awareness-in-action and triadic quadratic perspectivism is correct, then each and every attempt to apply AQAL in some field of theory or practice is actually preventing people from realizing in their own active awareness the primordial perspectival meta-theory of TQP that is, nevertheless, always already implicitly active in those action situations. Hence, I offer this initial statement on the tri/quad fallacy with the caveat that it can only be understood in the context of, and therefore should only be read after reading, at the very least, Part I of the present work. In what follows, I repeat none of what I presented in the work to which this critique is appended.

**Formulation & Interpretation**

Reviewing Wilber’s tri/quad conflated perspectivism of Figure A1 in light of the alternative offered by the triadic quadratic perspectivism of Figure A2, one central problem becomes immediately apparent. The tri/quad conflation is inconsistent with the actual system of interlocking personal pronouns at the preconscious root of pragmatic human action, a system of personal identifiers that in all likelihood evolved in conjunction with the corresponding personal perspectives that human beings developed the capacity to take as a
necessary pre-condition for conscious interaction. In TQP, these personal pronouns are recognized as the *primordial signs* we use to identify the various facets of reality, or *primordial referents*, we experience through the *primordial perspectives* of our situational awareness-in-action. The trouble with Wilber’s tri/quad conflation begins with his explicit equation and conflation of first-, second-, and third-person perspectives with, respectively, his UL, LL, and UR+LR quadrants, with little justification for this allocation beyond repeated assertions of its validity. The trouble mounts when it becomes clear that the tri/quad conflation distorts each of the three personal perspectives to such a degree that they are practically unrecognizable, constraining what TQP reveals to be fully quadratic personal perspectives—1_{AQ}, 2_{AQ}, 3_{AQ}—with which each one of us identifies as an essential pre-condition for everyday action in real-world situations to just one or two quadrants each—UL, LL, UR+LR—with no recognition of the inherent contradiction. Apart from the obvious confusion arising from such a formulation, it begs the question of *whose* perspectives are these intentional (UL), behavioral (UR), cultural (LL), and social (LR) perspectives if not specifically *mine* (1_{AQ}), *yours* (2_{AQ}), or *his* (3_{AQ})? *Who*, in Wilber’s view, is enacting these four domains of reality and raising and redeeming the corresponding reality claims? Is this *originary* or *enactive* perspective represented somewhere in these *enacted* perspectives, or is it hovering above the lighted page, looking at the multi-perspectival map from some presumed meta-perspective that is inescapably uni-perspectival?

If we reverse the tri/quad conflation and re-consider AQAL as if Wilber had never attempted to incorporate this dimension of Habermas’s triadic meta-theory, we can still appreciate its great strength. For even after such a deconstruction, a pure quadratic form of AQAL, relieved of the distortions of the tri/quad conflation, offers impressive explanatory and interpretive power in the multi-disciplinary realm of human development and evolution. After all, Wilber’s inductive synthesis of scores of distinct multi-level theories of development and evolution is not necessarily diminished by the reversal of the tri/quad conflation. For the essence of AQAL, what really distinguishes it from so many of its constituent dyadic and monadic theories, is the mutual-causal correspondence among *all* the
quadrants at each level of existence, indeed at each moment of existence, such that every occasion manifests as, and can be understood in terms of, its interdependent intentional-behavioral-cultural-social aspects. This is why, in Part I, I presented AQAL in two steps, beginning with a purely quadratic formulation that might be appreciated on its own merits, followed by the tri/quad conflation that, for Wilber, is always presented as an essential feature of the quadratic formulation. After reversing the tri/quad conflation, it is quite apparent that this pure quadratic form of AQAL would be a metatheory of anyone and everyone, anything and everything, consistent with the indefinite quadratic perspectivism ($X_{AQ}$) of Figure A3. This $X_{AQ}$ perspectivism can only be understood in terms of triadic quadratic perspectivism ($123_{AQ}$), because it is, by definition, not triadic in that it reduces the fully triadic intentional ($123_{UL}$), behavioral ($123_{UR}$), cultural ($123_{LL}$), and social ($123_{LR}$) perspectives and, therefore, specified identities, to indefinite perspectives and, therefore, generalized identities. Instead of $123_{AQ}$, it is $X_{AQ}$.

![Figure A3. Indefinite Quadratic Perspectivism](image-url)
Unfortunately, Wilber has never presented AQAL as a purely quadratic meta-theory relieved of the distortions caused by the tri/quad conflation. All of Wilber’s presentations of AQAL, from his first in 1995 to his latest in 2007,\textsuperscript{357} include the tri/quad conflation and thereby expressly, pre-emptively contradict any indefinite (X) interpretation or application of the quadrants (AQ) or levels (AL). For Wilber, the tri/quad conflation is the AQ in AQAL and therefore precludes any X\textsubscript{AQAL} formulation, interpretation, or application. Nevertheless, Wilber’s standard visual illustrations of AQAL, like Figures 3 and 4, are actually X\textsubscript{AQAL} maps of intentional-behavioral-cultural-social levels of existence. Look again at Figure A4 below, which has become the iconic image of AQAL, and really think about it. This model actually signifies nothing other than Wilber’s hypothesized levels of existence attributable to anyone and everyone, anything and everything. All specified identities for individuals and collectives that can be signified by first-, second-, and third-person (123) pronouns such as I, you, and he, and we, you, and they, have been reduced to generalized identities that can only be signified by indefinite (X) pronouns such as anyone and everyone, each and all, despite Wilber’s claim that I am in the UL, we are in the LL, it is in the UR, and all the other its are in the LR. In Figure A4, all personal specifics that would be signified by 123\textsubscript{AQ} pronouns in TQP have been reduced to indefinite generics that can only be signified by X\textsubscript{AQ} pronouns.

It appears that Wilber does not realize this because he consistently asserts in the text surrounding these illustrations that the tri/quad conflation simultaneously renders this X\textsubscript{AQ} model as genuinely 123 based on what I regard as the mistaken interpretation that:

- X\textsubscript{UL}, which is anyone’s individual-subjectivity, equates with an undifferentiated 1, which is the entire first-person or intrapersonal perspective;
- X\textsubscript{LL}, which is everyone’s collective-subjectivity (or even just anyone’s collective-subjectivity), equates with an undifferentiated 2, which is the entire second-person or interpersonal perspective; and
- X\textsubscript{UR+LR}, which is anyone’s individual-objectivity and everyone’s collective-objectivity (or anyone’s collective-objectivity),
equates with an undifferentiated 3, which is the entire third-person or impersonal perspective.

If these equations were valid, then this purely quadratic illustration, Figure A4, would be capable of framing, without confusion or contradiction, the simplest of triadic action situations, such as that in which I am having a conversation with you about his level of consciousness. According to the tri/quad conflation, the first-person I should be framed in the intentional UL quadrant, the second-person you should be framed in the cultural LL quadrant, and the third-person he should be framed in the combined behavioral UR and social LR quadrants, while all three of us tetra-arise through these four quadrants at some level of existence. Now, is that what Figure A4 appears to be illustrating? I think not. Clearly, the tri/quad conflation renders incoherent even the simplest of perspectival interpretations.
of normal, everyday action situations. Neither I, nor you, nor he can be found anywhere in this model, particularly if we are all supposed to occupy it simultaneously yet within the specific quadrants to which each of us has been restricted by the tri/quad conflation essential to AQAL.

Notwithstanding Wilber’s inadvertent visual illustration of what can be reinterpreted as a purely quadratic and useful version of AQAL, it is important to recognize that this indefinite formulation of a deconstructed AQAL, $X_{AQAL}$, has never been presented by Wilber because AQAL has always included the tri/quad conflation as an essential feature of its formulation. One of the more tedious implications of this fact is that the specific quadratic perspectives rendered triadic within triadic quadratic perspectivism ($123_{AQ}$) are not the same as the quadrants in AQAL, because Wilber’s definitions of these quadrants have always been conflated with the definitions of the corresponding first-, second-, or third-person perspectives according to the tri/quad conflation. For example, the cultural perspectives in my TQP and X formulations ($123_{LL}$ and $X_{LL}$) are not the same as the cultural LL quadrant in AQAL, because the cultural LL quadrant in AQAL conflates the entire second-person perspective, which in TQP is a fully quadratic $2_{AQ}$, into the definition of what would otherwise be a pure $X_{LL}$ in the absence of the tri/quad conflation. While TQP differentiates and integrates the intrapersonal ($1_{LL}$), interpersonal ($2_{LL}$), and impersonal ($3_{LL}$) perspectives on the collective-subjective cultural perspective, and while the X formulation then reduces these $123_{LL}$ perspectives to an indefinite $X_{LL}$, AQAL conflates the unacknowledged $X_{LL}$ with the unacknowledged fully quadratic interpersonal perspective, $2_{AQ}$, and only this interpersonal perspective, in a manner that distorts the meaning of both and renders the conflated perspectives, $X_{LL} = 2_{AQ}$, inconsistent with the cultural perspective in either its $123_{LL}$ or its $X_{LL}$ formulations. Therefore, it is inaccurate to infer that TQP is simply a $123_{AQ}$ elaboration of some pre-existing $X_{AQ}$ formulation of AQAL, because no such $X_{AQ}$ formulation of AQAL has ever existed prior to the formulation of TQP. The reason for any confusion, however, is none other than the tri/quad conflation.
From AQAL v1 to AQAL v2

In what appears to be an effort to address the unacknowledged X_{AQ} reductionism secretly lurking in the original AQAL formulation, notwithstanding the contradictory claims of the tri/quad conflation that impair what could have been a useful, though monological, X_{AQAL} formulation without delivering a genuinely dialogical 123_{AQAL} synthesis, Wilber has in recent years augmented AQAL by differentiating what he terms the insides and outsides of the four individual quadrants, as illustrated in Figure 5. He says that, the easiest way to understand this:

...is to start with what are known as the quadrants, which suggest that any occasion possesses an inside and an outside, as well as an individual and a collective, dimension. Taken together, this gives us the inside and the outside of the individual and the collective. These are often represented as I, you/we, it, and its (a variation on 1st, 2nd, and 3rd-person pronouns; another variation is the Good, the True, and the Beautiful; or art, morals, and science, and so on—namely, the objective truth of exterior science, or it/its; the subjective truth of aesthetics, or I; and the collective truth of ethics, or thou/we).... If you imagine any of the phenomena (or holons) in the various quadrants, you can look at them from their own inside or outside. This gives you 8 primordial perspectives—the inside and the outside view of a holon in any of the 4 quadrants.... We inhabit these 8 spaces, these zones, these lifeworlds, as practical realities.

Thus, as the above passage clearly states, this dyadic quadratic version of AQAL asserts the existence of perspectives for the inside and the outside of the inside and the outside of the individual and the collective, and, by virtue of the tri/quad conflation just invoked, it simultaneously asserts the existence of perspectives for the inside and the outside of the first-, second-, and third-person, which are, respectively, the inside of the individual, the inside of the collective, and the outsides of the individual and the collective.

If we really do, as Wilber claims, inhabit the eight perspectives of Figure A5 as practical realities, then where am I, where are you, and where is he? Whose perspectives are these dual intentional, behavioral, cultural, and social perspectives if not specifically mine, yours, or
his? Who is enacting these eight domains of reality and raising and redeeming the corresponding reality claims? Is this originary or enactive perspective represented somewhere in these enacted perspectives, or is it hovering above the lighted page, looking at the multi-perspectival map from some presumed meta-perspective that is inescapably uni-perspectival? If the meaning of an assertion is the means of its enactment, as Wilber asserts in his proposal for integral post-metaphysics, then what is the means of enactment, the action we can take, that will disclose the meaning, indeed the existence, of these tri/quad conflated, dyadic quadratic perspectives of AQAL? Despite Wilber’s illustrations of these proposed tri/quad conflated, dyadic quadratic perspectives throughout much of his latest book, I have found no coherent answers to any of these questions.

These dyadic quadratic perspectives might be reasonably interpreted as Wilber’s attempt to differentiate a more genuinely participative perspective as the inside view of the quadrants from the origi-
nal observational perspective as the outside view of the quadrants, notwithstanding his prior claim that the original AQAL already framed the observational perspective with the exterior right-hand (RH) quadrants and the participative perspective with the interior left-hand (LH) quadrants. This interpretation would entail the fabrication of a dyadic quadratic version of the indefinite pronoun such as the one depicted in Figure A6, in which anyone and everyone who participates in quadratic development and evolution is also observable as anything and everything that develops and evolves.

![Figure A6. Wilber's AQAL Zones](image)

In a less logical variation of the indefinite participant / observer interpretation, these dyadic quadratic perspectives might be interpreted as Wilber’s inadvertent incorporation of a fully quadratic first-person perspective—I-me-we-us—as the inside view of the quadrants and a fully quadratic third-person perspective—he-him-they-them, she-her-they-them, or it-it-these-those—as the outside view of the
quadrants, which would obviously beg the question of where we can find a genuine second-person quadratic perspective. Given that Wilber has never published such a quadratic pronoun in any first-, second-, or third-person form, this interpretation, depicted in Figure A7, would seem to be less likely than the indefinite participant / observer interpretation. That said, Wilber does make repeated reference throughout his latest book to the insides and outsides of each of the quadrants using generic first-person and third-person notation, respectively, thereby providing just enough support for this interpretation to guarantee confusion when considered in the context of the contradictory tri/quad conflation he invokes while introducing this model in the passage just quoted.

![Figure A7. Wilber's AQAL Zones](image)

In a still less likely, but nevertheless plausible, interpretation, these dyadic quadratic perspectives might be interpreted as Wilber's inadvertent incorporation of a fully quadratic first-person perspec-
tive—*I-me-we-us*—as the interior (LH) quadrants and a fully quadratic *third-person* perspective—*he-him-they-them, she-her-they-them, or it-it-these-those*—as the exterior (RH) quadrants, which would obviously beg the question, once again, of where we can find a genuine *second-person* quadratic perspective. This interpretation, depicted in Figure A8, if it has any validity, would seem to be not only inadvertent on Wilber’s part, but rather well disguised throughout his text, with no shortage of perspectival notation to contradict it in favor of the previous interpretation. Still, it might help to explain his selection and allocation of various zone-specific methods in his *integral methodological pluralism*, such as the thoroughly *impersonal, third-person methods of autopoiesis and social autopoiesis* for the insides of the right-hand quadrants and *empiricism and systems theory* for the outsides of the right-hand quadrants.\(^{364}\)

![Figure A8. Wilber’s AQAL Zones](image-url)
However, these three alternative interpretations could only be the case if Wilber is also acknowledging that the original formulation of AQAL was never more than a quadratic indefinite perspective ($X_{AQ}$), a quadratic third-person perspective ($3_{AQ}$), or a hybrid first-person / third-person perspective ($1_{UL\,LL} / 3_{UR\,LR}$). Such an acknowledgement would necessarily entail the simultaneous admission that the tri/quad conflation was always an error, for the simple reason that an exclusively indefinite ($X_{AQ}$), an exclusively impersonal ($3_{AQ}$), or a hybrid intrapersonal / impersonal ($1_{UL\,LL} / 3_{UR\,LR}$) formulation of the original AQAL would negate the tri/quad conflation by which the third-person (3) is equated only with the combined behavioral UR and social LR quadrants, the second-person (2) is equated only with the cultural LL quadrant, and the first-person (1) is equated only with the intentional UL quadrant. But Wilber’s most recent book reiterates the tri/quad conflation verbatim in three separate passages, one of which, as we have seen, is part of the introduction of the new dyadic quadratic formulation. Furthermore, an even more recent article by Sean Esbjörn-Hargens, presenting the authoritative overview of AQAL on behalf of Wilber’s Integral Institute, describes and illustrates the tri/quad conflation and the dyadic quadratic perspectives as parts of a single, seamless presentation. Thus, my depictions of Wilber’s new AQAL formulation in Figure A5 and in the various interpretations I offered in Figures A6-A8 include appropriate references to the first-person, second-person, and third-person perspectives allocated to their corresponding quadrants consistent with Wilber’s many presentations of the tri/quad conflation.

The aforementioned article by Esbjörn-Hargens is particularly relevant because he is arguably the most knowledgeable, sympathetic, articulate, and prolific scholar working in the tradition of Wilber’s AQAL formulation of integral theory. In his presentation of Wilber’s dyadic quadratic formulation of AQAL, Esbjörn-Hargens differentiates the inside quadratic perspectives that every individual possesses as his or her own embodied awareness from the outside quadratic perspectives from which any phenomenon can be viewed. He follows Wilber’s recent change in terminology by referring to the former as the quadrants of an individual and the latter as the quadrivia of any phenomenon. In a footnote from his latest book, Wilber
distinguishes the inside and outside views of each quadrant in terms of the view through and the view from, emphasizing that “all individual (or sentient) holons HAVE or POSSESS 4 perspectives through which or with which they view or touch the world, and those are the quadrants (the view through). But anything can be looked at FROM those 4 perspectives—or there is a view of anything from those perspectives—and that is technically called a quadrivium.”

As Esbjörn-Hargens summarizes it, “the quadrants represent the native ways in which we experience reality in each moment and quadrivia represent the most common ways we can and often do look at reality to understand it.” More helpfully, Esbjörn-Hargens illustrates each of these distinct quadratic formulations in a manner consistent with Figures A9 and A10.

As useful as these quadratic models might first appear, we nevertheless must ask ourselves exactly what perspectives, and whose perspectives, they actually illustrate. As I suggested above, these
complementary quadratic formulations appear to illustrate either: a) a differentiated participative/observational version of the indefinite quadratic perspectives in which anyone and everyone who participates in quadratic development and evolution is also observable as anything and everything that develops and evolves; or b) an inadvertent and incomplete attempt to differentiate a fully quadratic first-person perspective—I-me-we-us—and a fully quadratic third-person perspective—he-him-they-them, she-her-they-them, or it-it-these-those—without making any provision for a fully quadratic second-person perspective—you-you-you-you. But once again, these alternative interpretations could only be the case if Esbjörn-Hargens and Wilber are simultaneously acknowledging that the tri/quad conflation was an error from the start and is now recognized as completely inconsistent with whichever of these interpretations they actually intend.

![Figure A10. Wilber's AQAL – Quadrivia](image)

Instead, Esbjörn-Hargens not only embraces the tri/quad conflation in its entirety, presenting a visual illustration nearly identical to
Figure A1, but he also attempts to describe his quadratic illustrations through its invocation. For example, regarding the inside quadratic perspectives, or quadrants, that every individual possesses, he invites the reader to “notice right now how you are engaged in all three perspectives: first-person (e.g., noticing your own thoughts as you read this), second-person (e.g., reading my words and interpreting what I am trying to convey), and third-person (e.g., sitting there aware of the light, sounds, and air temperature around you). Do you see how you are always experiencing the world from all four quadrants—right here, right now? It is that simple.”

But is it really as simple as AQ = 123 = AQ, or, even more simply stated, 4 = 3 = 4? Later in the same article, Esbjörn-Hargens introduces Wilber’s AQAL-based eight-fold methodology by way of a recapitulation of the dyadic quadratic formulation depicted in Figure A5. As he tellingly summarizes it, “each of the perspectives associated with the four quadrants can be studied through two major methodological families, namely from either the inside (i.e., a first-person perspective) or the outside (i.e., a third-person perspective). This results in eight distinct zones of human inquiry and research. These eight zones comprise what integral theory calls integral methodological pluralism (IMP), which includes such approaches as phenomenology (an exploration of first-person subjective realities), ethnomethodology (an exploration of second-person intersubjective realities), and empiricism (an exploration of third-person empirical realities).”

Thus, it would appear that $4 \times 2 = 8 = 3$, or, more charitably, $4 \times 2 = 8 \div 2 = 3$. With this we have returned to Wilber’s original outline of these perspectives for the inside and the outside of the inside and the outside of the individual and the collective, and, by virtue of the tri/quad conflation seamlessly invoked, the conflated perspectives for the inside and the outside of the first-, second-, and third-person, which are, respectively, the inside of the individual, the inside of the collective, and the outsides of the individual and the collective.

Clearly, the result of the persistent tri/quad conflation together with this dyadic quadratic formulation is an even more confused assemblage of perspectives that cannot possibly exist simultaneously without serious contradictions. AQAL asserts a complete first-person (1) perspective confined entirely to the intentional UL quad-
rant (as per the tri/quad conflation) that is experienced intrapersonally (1) from the inside and observed impersonally (3) from the outside (as per the dual perspectives on this quadrant), while allowing for the co-existence of a first-person (1) plural perspective in the cultural LL quadrant even though that quadrant is serving double duty as the entire second-person (2) perspective (as per the tri/quad conflation) and potentially additional first-person (1) perspectives as the inside views of the behavioral UR and social LR (which would have to be the case if the four inside views together represent a quadratic first-person (1) perspective or even a quadratic indefinite (X) participant perspective), despite the simultaneous assertion that these two right-hand (UR+LR) quadrants, and therefore the inside (1) and outside (3) views of these quadrants, represent only the entire third-person (3) perspective, exclusive of any first-person (1) or second-person (2) perspectives (as per the tri/quad conflation).

Evaluation & Implication

In my evaluation, the original formulation and the more recent reformulation of AQAL are both riddled with contradictory definitions—whether expressed or implied—of the first-person (1), second-person (2), and third-person (3) perspectives in relation to the intentional (UL), behavioral (UR), cultural (LL), and social (LR) perspectives, all of which appear to be rooted in the erroneous tri/quad conflation. This leads to the hypothesis that AQAL has been burdened from the start with an illogical formulation appropriately termed the tri/quad fallacy. More precisely, a triadic quadratic perspectival interpretation of AQAL reveals the inherent tri/quad fallacy whereby the following illogical perspectival equations are nevertheless asserted—explicitly and implicitly—in the tri/quad conflation:

- \( X_{UL} = 1 = 1_{AQ} \), meaning the indefinite individual-subjective intentional UL perspective (e.g., anyone) equals, and is thus interchangeable with, an undifferentiated first-person perspective (for which there is no single pronoun, but Wilber uses I), and therefore, via TQP, equals, and is thus inter-
changeable with, the first-person intentional-behavioral-cultural-social perspectives (e.g., I-me-we-us).

- $X_{LL} = 2 = 2_{AQ}$, meaning the indefinite collective-subjective cultural LL perspective (e.g., everyone) equals, and is thus interchangeable with, an undifferentiated second-person perspective (for which there is no single pronoun, but Wilber uses we), and therefore, via TQP, equals, and is thus interchangeable with, the second-person intentional-behavioral-cultural-social perspectives (e.g., you-you-you-you).

- $X_{UR+LR} = 3 = 3_{AQ}$, meaning the indefinite individual-objective behavioral UR and collective-objective social LR combined perspective (e.g., anything and everything) equals, and is thus interchangeable with, an undifferentiated third-person perspective (for which there is no single pronoun, but Wilber uses it), and therefore, via TQP, equals, and is thus interchangeable with, the third-person intentional-behavioral-cultural-social perspectives (e.g., he-him-they-them).
As Figure A11 illustrates, each of these illogical perspectival equations actually contains three constituent equations of its own and can therefore be read in three parts. The first part of each equation (e.g., $X_{UL} = 1$) denotes an explicit assertion contained in Wilber’s tri/quad conflation. The second part of each equation (e.g., $1 = 1_{AQ}$) denotes an explicit assertion contained in my triadic quadratic perspectivism. The third part of each equation is revealed when we remove the middle variable (e.g., 1) and collapse the remaining two variables into a single equation (e.g., $X_{UL} = 1_{AQ}$) that denotes the implicit assertion contained in Wilber’s tri/quad conflation as revealed through triadic quadratic perspectivism. While the explicit equations in the tri/quad conflation are the source of the problem and erroneous in and of themselves, the implicit equations revealed through TQP clarify the precise nature and extent of the tri/quad fallacy.

Bearing in mind the distinctions between the explicit assertions of the tri/quad conflation and the explicit assertions of triadic quadratic perspectivism, which together reveal the implicit assertions that form the object of my critique, we can express the tri/quad fallacy even more concisely in terms of the following illogical perspectival equations: (Fig. A11)

- $X_{UL} = 1_{AQ}$
- $X_{LL} = 2_{AQ}$
- $X_{UR+LR} = 3_{AQ}$

Furthermore, we can recognize the tri/quad fallacy not just as a meta-theoretical product, but also as a meta-theoretical process. If triadic quadratic perspectivism accurately represents the perspectival nature of human awareness-in-action, then the tri/quad fallacy could be interpreted as the enactment of these illogical equations. Thus, by turning these formulas around and attempting to signify with “$\Rightarrow$” the idea of an enacted equation, I offer this representation of what Wilber and everyone else who accepts his formulation of AQAL are attempting to do:

- $1_{AQ} \Rightarrow X_{UL}$
- $2_{AQ} \Rightarrow X_{LL}$
- $3_{AQ} \Rightarrow X_{UR+LR}$
The implications of these *illogically enacted equations*, embedded as they are in the conceptual architecture of AQAL, which Wilber intends to represent the primordial perspectives of integral epistemological, methodological, and ontological pluralism, appear to be rather significant.376

Despite Wilber’s assurances that all the AQAL perspectives are immediately available in one’s own direct awareness and consistent with the personal pronouns contained in every major language,377 there are in fact *no pronouns* that actually refer to *any perspectives* that meet the definitions supplied by AQAL.

- There is no pronoun that can accurately refer to the mistakenly equated and conflated $X_{UL}$, which can only be signified by a singular subjective indefinite pronoun (e.g., *one* or *anyone*), and $1_{AQ}$, which can only be signified by the first-person quadratic pronoun (i.e., *I-me-we-us*). Furthermore, even in the explicit form of the tri/quad conflation, there is no pronoun that can accurately refer to the mistakenly equated and conflated $X_{UL}$ and an undifferentiated $1$, which cannot be signified by any single pronoun, but even if loosely signified by Wilber’s *I*, is still inconsistent with $X_{UL}$.

- There is no pronoun that can accurately refer to the mistakenly equated and conflated $X_{LL}$, which can only be signified by a plural subjective indefinite pronoun (e.g., *many* or *everyone*), and $2_{AQ}$, which can only be signified by a second-person quadratic pronoun (e.g., *you-you-you-you*). Furthermore, even in the explicit form of the tri/quad conflation, there is no pronoun that can accurately refer to the mistakenly equated and conflated $X_{LL}$ and an undifferentiated $2$, which cannot be signified by any single pronoun, but even if loosely signified by Wilber’s *we*/*you*, is still inconsistent with $X_{LL}$.

- There is no pronoun or pair of pronouns that can accurately refer to the mistakenly equated and conflated $X_{UR+LR}$, which can only be signified by a pair of singular and plural objective indefinite pronouns (e.g., *anyone* and *everyone*), and $3_{AQ}$, which can only be signified by a third-person quadratic pronoun (e.g., *he-him-they-them*). Furthermore, even in the ex-
plicit form of the tri/quad conflation, there is no pronoun that can accurately refer to the mistakenly equated and conflated \( X_{UR+LR} \) and an undifferentiated 3, which cannot be signified by any single pronoun, but even if loosely signified by Wilber’s its and/or it, is still inconsistent with \( X_{UR+LR} \).

Triadic quadratic perspectivism reveals the tri/quad conflated perspectives of AQAL to be completely inconsistent with the actual system of interlocking personal pronouns at the pre-conscious root of pragmatic human action—the *primordial signs* we use to identify the various facets of reality, or *primordial referents*, we experience through the *primordial perspectives* of our situational awareness-in-action. The absence of these primordial signs in AQAL implies the absence of their corresponding primordial referents among the mistakenly equated and conflated perspectives of AQAL. Furthermore, Wilber’s claim that the study of AQAL is *psycho-active*, that its primary *signifiers* (i.e., \( X_{UL} = 1 = I \), \( X_{LL} = 2 = we \), and \( X_{UR+LR} = 3 = it/its \)) automatically activate in the minds of readers the first-, second-, and third-person *signifieds*,\(^{378}\) is undermined by the fact that these AQAL signifiers clearly do not accurately signify the primordial signifieds of human awareness-in-action. If it is even appropriate to attribute psycho-activation to a meta-theory, then only the accurately depicted first-, second-, and third-person signs of TQP would be capable of automatically activating in the minds of readers the first-, second-, and third-person referents. Therefore, the tri/quad fallacy appears to imply that the AQAL perspectives resulting from these illogically enacted equations simply *do not exist* anywhere in human awareness-in-action other than as illogical, irredeemable claims that *they exist*.

If so, then what exactly are people doing when they purport to be using AQAL in some deliberate application, such as a multi-perspectival analysis of an important issue or a multi-perspectival reconstruction of an academic theory? While the answers to this question may vary, depending upon each person’s understanding of AQAL, one thing seems certain: any claim that one is accurately applying AQAL or that, more generically, AQAL works, should be justified by clearly identifying the tri/quad conflated perspectives of AQAL (i.e., \( X_{UL} = 1 = I \), \( X_{LL} = 2 = we \), and \( X_{UR+LR} = 3 = it/its \)) as they
appear in specific, real-world applications, both pre- and post-conflation. That being said, one of the most surprising practical implications of the tri/quad fallacy, defined as it is by three illogical perspectival equations that render their constituent perspectives all-but-meaningless upon conflation, is that there does not appear to be any way to apply AQAL without contradicting the actual definitions of AQAL. If this is the case, then even the most conscientious scholar-practitioner of AQAL must engage in some form of more-or-less intentional work-around in order to bypass both the explicit and the implicit equations of the tri/quad conflation. The most sensible work-around is to apply either:

- a simplified X\textsubscript{AQ} framework that ignores any conflated triadic perspectives, and therefore ignores the distinctions between the personal claims to freedom (1), justice (2), and truth (3) (i.e., beauty, goodness, and truth) in favor of the non-triadic indefinite claims to intentional (X\textsubscript{UL}), behavioral (X\textsubscript{UR}), meaningful (X\textsubscript{LL}), and functional (X\textsubscript{LR}) validity; or
- a simplified 123 framework that ignores any conflated quadratic perspectives, and therefore ignores the distinctions between the indefinite claims to intentional (UL), behavioral (UR), meaningful (LL), and functional (LR) validity in favor of the personal claims to non-quadratic freedom (1), justice (2), and truth (3) (i.e., beauty, goodness, and truth).

However, due to the particular formulation of the tri/quad conflation, wherein otherwise valid perspectives originating in either a purely quadratic (X\textsubscript{AQ}) or a purely triadic (123) set of perspectives are erroneously equated and conflated with one another, there is no valid X\textsubscript{AQ} or 123 meta-theory remaining within AQAL. Once the X\textsubscript{UL} is conflated with the 1, the X\textsubscript{LL} is conflated with the 2, and the X\textsubscript{UR+LR} is conflated with the 3, there is no way to accurately discern the original X\textsubscript{AQ} or 123 within the conflated confines of AQAL, because each quadratic or triadic perspective now implicates its conflated associate in a newly created, mutually distorted meaning. It appears, therefore, that the purely quadratic and the purely triadic meta-theories mistakenly equated and conflated within the formulation of AQAL actually ceased to exist upon conflation within AQAL.
Both of these simplified applications, therefore, are contradictory to AQAL because of the tri/quad conflation they may seek to bypass and yet, ironically, both may be popularly, if inaccurately, regarded as consistent with AQAL because of the tri/quad conflation. How can this be possible? I suspect it is in part because most people, following Wilber’s lead, more-or-less-consciously confuse the both/and necessity of the tri/quad conflation, which requires them to recognize the perspectival equations that comprise its formulation, with an either/or option that allows them to choose either a pure non-conflated 123 framework or a pure non-conflated \(X_{AQ}\) framework in each application while still claiming to be applying AQAL. But according to AQAL, AQAL cannot be reduced to either \(X_{AQ}\) or 123 without contradicting AQAL, because according to the tri/quad conflation, \(X_{AQ}\) always already equals 123, thus making it impossible to apply either a pure \(X_{AQ}\) framework or a pure 123 framework without negating the claimed equation between the two. Notwithstanding these understandable tendencies toward the unavoidably inaccurate application of the inherently contradictory perspectives of AQAL, when one uses either an \(X_{AQ}\) framework or a 123 framework in some deliberate integral application, one is not actually applying AQAL because these simplified frameworks are inconsistent with the perspectival equations of the tri/quad conflation essential to AQAL.

If these logical implications of the tri/quad fallacy are valid, then the challenge they present to the meta-theoretical and meta-practical premises of AQAL date all the way back to its origin. Beginning with his first presentation of AQAL in 1995, through the meta-narrative that many regard as his magnum opus, *Sex, Ecology, Spirituality*, Wilber has been quite articulate, even passionate, and occasionally polemical, about the need to preclude the all-too-common philosophical and scientific reductionism by which individual-subjective (UL) and collective-subjective (LL) interiors of existence are collapsed into the individual-objective (UR) and collective-objective (LR) exteriors of existence. But while rescuing these left-hand depths from their right-hand surfaces, reclaiming the intentional from the merely behavioral and the meaningful from the merely functional, he inadvertently enacts his own new form of pseudo-integral reductionism whereby a genuinely triadic (123) formulation of these otherwise
merely quadratic \((\text{X}_{\text{AQ}})\) perspectives is at once *claimed*, yet *prevented* by way of the illogically enacted equations of the tri/quad fallacy. This infects AQAL with a more subtle and confusing form of the modern *myth of the given* by secretly reducing the \(123_{\text{AQ}}\) kosmos to an indefinite quadratic holonarchy \((X_{\text{AQAL}})\) with which I cannot help but to engage monologically as a relatively isolated subject hovering above the lighted page, unable to locate *myself* in *my* own adopted map of the kosmos except to the extent that I am willing to reduce *myself* to just *anyone* \((X_{\text{UL}})\) in this purportedly integral theory of *everything*. This is the myth of the *integral* given at once *denied*, yet nevertheless *enacted* by way of the tri/quad fallacy.

Furthermore, because of the way this AQAL reductionism is conceptually engineered, there is no valid way to salvage either a simple quadratic \((\text{X}_{\text{AQ}})\) or a simple triadic \((123)\) meta-theory from the AQAL corpus without explicitly acknowledging the original error and rescinding the tri/quad conflation. Doing so, however, would undermine the perennial claim, since *Sex, Ecology, Spirituality*, that AQAL is a visionary-logical synthesis of triadic and quadratic meta-theories and corresponding meta-narratives of human development and evolution. Once the conceptual lynchpin of the tri/quad conflation is removed, these two enormous bodies of philosophical thought—one triadic and primarily Habermasian and the other quadratic and primarily Wilberian—would appear to go their separate ways with all their constitutive theories and stories, practices and protagonists, until a more coherent meta-theoretical integration can be enacted. The significance of these implications is in direct proportion to the significance attributed to this particular feature—the tri/quad conflation—of Wilber’s AQAL, which will naturally be assessed differently from one reader to the next. It is, however, central to all his teachings since 1995 and the primary frame of reference for his ever-popular *integral vision*.

Therefore, it appears that in his sincere attempt to create an integrated meta-theory that is *both* \(123\) and \(X_{\text{AQ}}\), thus a fully triadic quadratic \(123_{\text{AQ}}\), Wilber has created one that is *neither* \(123\) nor \(X_{\text{AQ}}\), and therefore tends to disintegrate upon application into one that is *either* \(123\) or \(X_{\text{AQ}}\), but in either case *not* really AQAL. The resolution to this tri/quad fallacy presents itself as soon as we recognize its
origin in a deceptively simple confusion between equation/conflation and differentiation/integration with respect to the purely triadic and purely quadratic meta-theories. By accurately differentiating and integrating the triadic (123) and quadratic (X_{AQ}) meta-theories within triadic quadratic perspectivism, the latent potential (123_{AQ}) of both Habermas’s and Wilber’s multi-perspectival meta-theories can be more fully realized in the integral aperspectival / différantial perspectival meta-paradigm of Awareness-in-Action.

**Invitation**

Throughout this presentation I have tried to make a careful distinction between what I regard as the incontrovertible facts of the tri/quad conflation, which can be verified by reviewing the many specific references offered, and the controversial claims of the tri/quad fallacy, which constitute my evaluative critique of the tri/quad conflation in light of my hypothesized triadic quadratic perspectivism. Between these incontrovertible facts and controversial claims lies the realm of logical interpretation, wherein I have attempted to present a concise, rigorous re-interpretation of the conflation, while being sincere from the beginning that I have already hypothesized an implicated fallacy. Clearly, if the claims of the tri/quad fallacy are ever to be validated to widespread satisfaction, it will require additional reflection and discourse among those who understand both the tri/quad conflation and triadic quadratic perspectivism.

Given the tenuous nature of the discourse within the Wilberian integral community, wherein the ideas of AQAL are often conflated with the person of Wilber in the minds of both detractors and defenders alike, I feel it might be worthwhile to disavow any affinity for either political faction and affirm my sincere intent to contribute to a more integral discourse about integralism itself. If you, the reader, cannot see that this critique is offered in the context of a much larger, deeper appreciation for Wilber’s good intentions and inspiring contributions to the field of integralism, as well as the context of a reconstructive contribution of my own to which this deconstructive critique is but a reluctant afterthought, then I suspect
the potential for discourse between us shall remain unrealized. If, however, seeing the contexts in which I have offered this critique, you would like to engage in discourse about these ideas, then consider this an invitation.
- 1 -

Awareness-in-Action may be understood in terms of three interdependent, irreducible perspectives—first-person, second-person, third-person—each of which includes four constituent interdependent, irreducible perspectives—intentional, behavioral, cultural, social—all four of which are experienced intrapersonally, interpersonally, and impersonally from within each of the actor’s three distinct personal perspectives, thus forming a set of triadic quadratic perspectives that co-arise in every actor’s awareness and find immediate expression in the system of triadic quadratic pronouns at the pre-conscious root of semiotic and pragmatic action-in-awareness.

- 2 -

Awareness-in-Action may be understood as the mutual, reflexive, différantial integration of my triadic quadratic perspectival reality, your triadic quadratic perspectival reality, and his or her triadic quadratic perspectival reality, not just as I can identify each of our distinct realities, but as each of us can identify each of ours as an essential dimension of our situational awareness-in-action.

- 3 -

Awareness-in-Action may be understood as the integral aperspectival, yet différantial perspectival self-imaging/world-viewing by which we—
I, each of you, and each of them—disclose, yet obscure, and ultimately realize each of our unique, yet interpenetrating visions of reality.

Awareness-in-Action may be understood as the active differentiation of triadic quadratic perspectivism from the integral awareness that is nowhere to be found as long as one is actively searching, yet now-here as long as one inquires deeply into the identity of the actor.

Awareness-in-Action may be understood in terms of the deeply meaningful, broadly functional, partially presumed stock of TQP\textsuperscript{N} actionable knowledge that serves as the situationally relevant ground for the consensus-based, goal-oriented, error-prone flow of TQP\textsuperscript{N} knowledgeable action by which this actionable knowledge is surprisingly, inevitably, indeterminately deconstructed and reconstructed.

Awareness-in-Action may be understood as the meta-practice of transparency, choice, and accountability (TCA\textsuperscript{N}) with respect to the meta-theory of triadic quadratic perspectivism (TQP\textsuperscript{N}), both of which are always already active in our situational awareness-in-action.

Awareness-in-Action may be understood as the substantive/procedural, the integral/différantial, and the empirical/normative meta-paradigm of realization in three modes—authentication, legitimation, and confirmation—by which we—I, each of you, and each of them—(re/de)construct our actionable knowledge of reality in three forms—freedom, justice, and truth—to guide knowledgeable action that is progressively more real—or free, just, and true.
Awareness-in-Action may be understood as the one *ideal action situation* \((A^\infty)\) in which each and every one of us can *ultimately realize* \((R^\infty)\) each and every one of us as unique members of a universal civilization grounded in the *ultimate realization* \((R^\infty)\) of integral aperspectival freedom \((AF^\infty)\), justice \((LJ^\infty)\), and truth \((CT^\infty)\), and, thus, *ultimate reality* \((R^\infty)\).

Awareness-in-Action may be understood as the many *real action situations* \((A^N)\) in which each and every one of us is *indeterminately constrained* in our capacities to ultimately realize each and every one of us as unique members of a universal civilization committed to the authentication of freedom \((AF^N)\), legitimation of justice \((LJ^N)\), and confirmation of truth \((CT^N)\), and, thus, *indeterminate realization* \((R^N)\).

Awareness-in-Action may be understood as the *absolutely relative*, yet *relatively absolute* metalogue in which *our*—*mine, each of yours, and each of theirs*—*relative realizations* \((R^N)\) presuppose the never-ending potential for *ultimate* realization \((R^\infty)\) based on the ever-present intuition of *absolute* realization \((R^0)\).

Awareness-in-Action may be understood as an *(a)perspectival/ (a)practical* metalogue *of, and about*, human development and evolution, *enfolding* within its visual-logical meta-structure all multi-structural patterns of human development and evolution that might actually *unfold* in the course of our ever-present, never-ending awareness-in-action, at least to whatever extent these multi-structural patterns might be authenticated, legitimated, and confirmed by the multifarious *I*s enfolding/unfolding that *(re/de)constructive realization.*
Awareness-in-Action may be understood as the ever-present realization of the integral awareness that we—I, each of you, and each of them—are amidst the never-ending realization of the differential action that we—I, each of you, and each of them—do.

Awareness-in-Action may be understood as a tendency toward realization bias in three primary modes—authentication, legitimation, and confirmation biases—in which we—I, each of you, and each of them—tend to regard our own capacity for realization as inherently superior to that of the others and thereby impair our ability to create actionable knowledge of reality—or freedom, justice, and truth.

Awareness-in-Action may be understood as the institutionalized potential for realization crisis in three primary modes—authentication, legitimation, and confirmation crises—in which we—I, each of you, and each of them—realize the extent to which our actionable knowledge of reality—freedom, justice, and truth—has been systematically undermined by increasingly conspicuous disregard for requisite degrees of transparency, choice, and accountability with respect to the triadic quadratic perspectivism of our knowledgeable actions.

Awareness-in-Action may be understood as a substantive/procedural meta-paradigm of realization centered on the procedural meta-practice of transparency, choice, and accountability with respect to the substantive meta-theory of triadic quadratic perspectivism, which can be integrally/differentially realized in each and every action situation, thus facilitating the empirically and normatively justifiable (in)authentication, (de)legitimation, and (dis)confirmation of each and every action claiming knowledge of reality.
Awareness-in-Action may be understood as an integral differentialism / différential integralism centered on a paradigm of paradigms that encompasses both the ever-present realization of the integral awareness that we are and the never-ending realization of the differential action that we do—an essentialist formulation that facilitates a comprehensivist application honoring the full potential and variety of the human experience, including our experiences of the worlds beyond humanity.

Awareness-in-Action may be understood as a critical integralism attuned to the interdependent political, economic, social, and ecological challenges of our time. Thus, if we want to realize more freedom, justice, and truth in our lives and in the lives of those around us, then we should engage in the meta-practice of transparency, choice, and accountability with respect to the meta-theory of triadic quadratic perspectivism in challenging action situations.
I mention in this introduction some of the more obvious fields of human action, including economics, business, politics, governance, sociology, social work, journalism, and activism. I might just as well include philosophy, psychology, education, law, and medicine. Furthermore, once we come to terms with the universal nature of human awareness-in-action in all its myriad forms, it appears as if every field of inquiry—including physics, biology, ecology, engineering, religion, spirituality, literature, entertainment, and art—might be defined as a field of human action without detracting from its particular distinctiveness. Finally, beyond the academy, the fields of human action certainly include marriage, domestic partnership, parenting, friendship, and the practice of community. The question, therefore, is what isn’t a field of human action?

The adjective integral is defined in two complementary ways: (Source: http://www.answers.com/topic/integral)

1. Essential or necessary for completeness; constituent.
2. Possessing everything essential; entire.

4 Habermas (1979; 1984; 1987).
5 Habermas (1979, 1).
6 Habermas (1984, 275, emphasis added).
7 Habermas (1984, 275, emphasis added).
8 Habermas (1992b, 57).
9 Habermas (1992b, 58).
10 Habermas (1979).
11 Habermas (2003, 30).
In his discussions of formal pragmatics, Habermas (1979) typically refers to *speech acts* together with the related terms of *speaker* and *hearer*, likely due to the speech act theory from which he draws some of his ideas. However, given that formal pragmatics is the basis for his theory of communicative action, it seems entirely appropriate to use the term *communicative act*, in part due to its more inclusive connotations of both *speaking* and *writing*, and therefore *speaker/writer* and *hearer/reader*. By coincidence, in his preface to Bühler’s (2011, xx) recently republished *Theory of Language*, Werner Abraham emphasizes that Bühler’s model of language functions is a model of the *communicative act*, notwithstanding Bühler’s own emphasis on speech act theory and the sound of the linguistic sign. This more inclusive terminology of the communicative act between speaker/writer and hearer/reader does not, however, ignore the distinctions between spoken and written acts of communication, as well as their constituent spoken and written signs—*phoneme* and *grapheme*—that, while not highlighted by Habermas, are likely appreciated by him, and certainly by me, in the wake of Jacques Derrida’s deconstruction (Derrida, 2002; Culler, 1982; Habermas, 1990c).

Furthermore, by illustrating the *communicative act* in the peculiar geometry of Bühler’s (2011, 34-5) overlapping circle/triangle, my intent is to highlight, in terms of pragmatics, his insightful semiotic distinction between the *concrete sound* of the linguistic sign, represented by the circle, and its *abstract meaning*, represented by the triangle. In short, where the circle (concrete sound) extends beyond the triangle (abstract meaning), the concrete sound includes information ignored in the abstract meaning. Where the triangle (abstract meaning) extends beyond the circle (concrete sound), the abstract meaning includes information ignored in the concrete sound. As we will see, this distinction between what may be more generally termed the *objective* and *subjective* aspects of a linguistic sign, which Ferdinand de Saussure (Chandler, 1994) referred to as the *signifier* and *signified*, is essential to Derrida’s (2002) deconstruction and an important feature of the more integral/différantial semiotics I present in this book.

Finally, Habermas (1979, 66-67) typically refers to the third-person communicative mode using either the adjective *objective* or the noun *observer* and the second-person mode as either the adjective *conformative* or the noun *conformator*. 

12 Habermas (1979, 66-67).
13 Habermas (1979, 67).
14 Habermas (1979, 67).
15 Habermas (1979, 65-6).
16 Habermas (1979, 68).
17 In his discussions of formal pragmatics, Habermas (1979) typically refers to *speech acts* together with the related terms of *speaker* and *hearer*, likely due to the speech act theory from which he draws some of his ideas. However, given that formal pragmatics is the basis for his theory of communicative action, it seems entirely appropriate to use the term *communicative act*, in part due to its more inclusive connotations of both *speaking* and *writing*, and therefore *speaker/writer* and *hearer/reader*. By coincidence, in his preface to Bühler’s (2011, xx) recently republished *Theory of Language*, Werner Abraham emphasizes that Bühler’s model of language functions is a model of the *communicative act*, notwithstanding Bühler’s own emphasis on speech act theory and the sound of the linguistic sign. This more inclusive terminology of the communicative act between speaker/writer and hearer/reader does not, however, ignore the distinctions between spoken and written acts of communication, as well as their constituent spoken and written signs—*phoneme* and *grapheme*—that, while not highlighted by Habermas, are likely appreciated by him, and certainly by me, in the wake of Jacques Derrida’s deconstruction (Derrida, 2002; Culler, 1982; Habermas, 1990c).
participant, while referring to the first-person mode using only the adjective expressive. For purposes of symmetry and clarity, I have added the noun personality to this first-person communicative mode, consistent with Habermas’s intended meaning and consistent with his use of this same term for the first-person structures of the lifeworld as described in subsequent works (1987, 119-152; 1998b). Regarding validity claims, I have chosen to lead with the term sincerity rather than truthfulness to denote the first-person validity claim in order to preclude confusion with the third-person claim to truth. Habermas uses the terms truthfulness and sincerity interchangeably, but, unfortunately, many people mistakenly use the terms truthfulness and truth interchangeably.

18 Habermas (1979, 29).
20 Habermas (1979, 29).
22 Habermas (1979, 97).
23 Habermas (1979, 95-177).

24 In the preface to the first volume of The Theory of Communicative Action, Habermas (1984, xli) appears to contradict my meta-theoretical interpretation of his critical theory when he states, with undue modesty, “the theory of communicative action is not a metatheory but the beginning of a social theory concerned to validate its own critical standards.” Granted, but in his effort to validate these standards of critique, Habermas has, perhaps inadvertently, articulated a very powerful meta-theory, the object domain of which includes a breathtaking variety of theories from such fields as sociology, psychology, post/modern philosophy, linguistics, communication, and systems theory. On the following page, he (Habermas, 1984, xlii) elaborates by acknowledging that “every sociology that claims to be [a] theory of society encounters the problem of employing a concept of rationality—which always has a normative content—at three levels: It can avoid neither the metatheoretical question concerning the rationality implications of its guiding concepts of action nor the methodological question concerning the rationality implications of gaining access to its object domain through an understanding of meaning; nor, finally, can it avoid the empirical-theoretical question concerning the sense, if any, in which the modernization of societies can be described as rationalization.”

26 Habermas (1979; 1984; 1987).
I mention these particular authors—Habermas (1979; 1984; 1987), Parsons (Habermas, 1987, 199-299), Jantsch (1980), Gebser (1985), Sorokin (1970), and Sri Aurobindo (1990; 1999)—because their meta-theorizing appears to have informed and inspired Wilber’s and because the substance of their respective contributions appears to be under-appreciated by those who nevertheless appreciate Wilber’s AQAL. Having studied some of these authors prior to encountering their ideas within Wilber’s work, I suspect I may have a different appreciation for their ideas just for having encountered them earlier. Careful study of these works by anyone seriously interested in Wilber’s version of integral philosophy would likely be rewarding and by no means entirely historical in nature.

Unbeknownst to Wilber, a very similar quadratic semiotic model was published by Louis Hjelmslev in 1961 and elaborated upon by several linguists in the following decades. As Daniel Chandler (1994, 2) outlines it, Hjelmslev’s model began with Saussure’s signifier and signified and then distinguished between the form and substance of each, with the form of the signifier being syntax, the form of the signified being semantics, the substance of the signifier being the printed or spoken words and the substance of the signified being the subject matter or human content. This quadratic semiotics, as far as it goes, is identical to Wilber’s.
Interestingly, functional fit is a special type of validity claim that Habermas (1987) uses in his bi-dimensional lifeworld/system theory of society, wherein the consequences of action are deemed valid to the extent that they are a functional fit within the actor-agnostic, media-steered society-as-system. The three primary validity claims included in his formal pragmatics and his theory of communicative action—truthfulness, rightness, and truth—are associated with the alternative vision of society-as-lifeworld. As Habermas uses them, the three validity claims of the lifeworld, which Wilber associates with his intentional-UL, cultural-LL, and behavioral-UR, represent a categorically different type of analysis than the one functional claim of the system, which Wilber associates with the social-LR as a co-equal complement to the other three validity claims. In Part II, I propose a triadic quadratic perspectival reconstruction of the lifeworld/system theory of society that honors Habermas’s distinctions while still preserving what I regard as Wilber’s correct insight into the equal validity of all four quadrants at each moment of existence, notwithstanding what I regard as his incorrect conflation of triadic and quadratic perspectives in AQAL. See Appendix A for a critique of Wilber’s tri/quad conflation.

I present throughout this book a new system of perspectival/practical notation that may facilitate, in subsequent publications by me and others, more efficient and effective communication about the major features of Awareness-in-Action. This notation emerged in the course of my articulation of these ideas and can be interpreted as an alternative to Wilber’s (2003c; 2007) AQAL-based integral mathematics of primordial perspectives.

As should be clear from the presentation in Part I, my perspectival signs are entirely consistent with the visual-logical geometry of the integral/
differential meta-theory of triadic quadratic perspectivism, which is based on accurate definitions of the first-, second-, and third-person perspectives, as well as the individual-subjective, individual-objective, collective-subjective, and collective-objective perspectives within each of these personal perspectives. Furthermore, the *practical signs* I introduce in reference to my proposed meta-practice build on these perspectival signs to yield at least the beginning of an internally consistent system of signs that unfolds from, and enfolds into one single sign of non-dual Awareness-in-Action. While it is necessary to study this text in order to learn this corresponding notation, it is *not* necessary to learn the notation in order to understand this particular text. So if the notation is more of a distraction, then simply ignore it and concentrate on the surrounding text to which it refers.

With regard to the most elementary perspectival notation, Wilber typically uses 1p for the first-person, 2p for the second-person, 3p for the third-person, and 123p when referring to all three personal perspectives. Furthermore, he equates and conflates his 1p with his UL quadrant, his 2p with his LL quadrant, his 3p with his combined UR and LR quadrants, and therefore his 123p with all four of his quadrants, or AQ. In contrast, I have omitted the “p” in my triadic perspectival notation, 123, as it is an unnecessary term that obstructs the use of subscript notation for the quadratic perspectives, such as $1_{AQ}$, which designates the *first-person, all-quadrant* perspective found only in triadic quadratic perspectivism.

57 See Appendix A for a critique of the tri/quad conflation that is central to Wilber’s AQAL formulation of integral theory.


59 Habermas (1984, 275, emphasis added).

60 Habermas (1979, 68).

61 Wilber (2000d, 701-4).

62 Habermas (2003, 30).

63 Habermas (2003, 36).

64 Wilber (2000e, 186).

65 Wilber (2000e, 192-3).

66 Wilber (2003d, part i).

67 To put a finer point on this, note that I am using the interrogative pronoun *whomever* rather than *whatever*. To the extent that a third-person perspective is referencing a *sentient whom* rather than an *insentient what*, the sentient whom is regarded as presupposing his or her own triadic quadratic perspectives. Debates concerning whether and where to draw the line between
sentience and insentience, as well as whether and where to draw the line between TQP sentience and pre-TQP sentience can await future discourse. For now, we should note that all such discourse about the forms and fields of human action, not to mention the merits and demerits of various formulations of integralism, happens within the frame of TQP and includes sentient “whoms” as the most important referents in the third-person perspective. In other words, I don’t much care what that chair across the room thinks, but I do care what the person sitting in that chair thinks. She or he, as the case may be, tends to be more significant to most of my action situations than it can ever be, which does not diminish the more fundamental role it plays in supporting or impeding these action situations. In contrast, naïve realists seem to be particularly obsessed with the philosophical status of chairs. And rocks. But they don’t much care about people.

68 When illustrating the third-person perspectival pronouns, I will typically use either the feminine (she-her, her-hers) or masculine (he-him, his-his) variety, rather than both, in order to streamline what will, I’m sorry to say, be some rather complex illustrations.

69 Habermas (1990a, 296-7).
70 Habermas (1992d; 1987, 58).
71 Mead (1967, 173-4).
72 Mead (1967, 174-5).
73 Brook (2008).
74 Mead (1967, 175).
75 Mead (1967, 178).
76 Mead (1967, 199-200).
77 Habermas (1987, 58-9).
78 Mead (1967, 173-200).
79 Brook (2008).
80 To my knowledge, Ramana Maharshi (1974, 1992, 1997, 2001) never taught any theory of multi-stage psychological development consistent with Wilber’s (1999c, 465-6) attribution in this passage, wherein “the ‘I’ of one stage becomes a ‘me’ at the next” and “the subject of one stage becomes an object of the next.” Ramana’s (1997, 41) actual teaching as it pertains to the subjective I-thought, which I quote verbatim in this book, is categorically different from Kegan’s multi-stage developmental logic and should not be conflated in this manner.

81 Wilber (1999c, 465-6).
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82 Ramana (2001).
83 Wilber (2000d, 628-9).
84 Mead (1967, 174-5).
86 In a subsequent work, Wilber (2007, 131) further clarifies that “healthy development converts 1st-person subjective to 1st-person objective or possessive (I to me or mine) within the I-stream, whereas unhealthy development converts 1st-person subjective to 2nd- or 3rd-person (I to yours, his, theirs, it) within the I-stream. The former is healthy dis-identification, the latter is pathological dissociation.” Although Wilber’s (2007, 119-41) triadic account of developmental logic in terms of the first-, second-, and third-person perspectives is basically correct and does a nice job of integrating Freudian shadow with Keganesque light, it still retains the confusions of his (2007, 18-23, 224-5) tri/quad conflation, wherein the first-, second-, and third-person perspectives are mistakenly equated and conflated with, respectively, what would otherwise be indefinite intentional (XUL), cultural (XLL), and combined behavioral (XUR) and social (XLR) perspectives, thus rendering the proposed developmental logic completely incoherent. Nevertheless, by reconstructing Wilber’s triadic account of healthy/unhealthy development within the triadic quadratic perspectivism of the integral/différantial self, we can clearly identify the light and the shadow of personal development, wherein, for example, healthy development (re/de)constructs the deep-structural capacities of yesterday’s I-me within the deeper-structural capacities of today’s I-me, while unhealthy development represses and projects both negative and positive aspects of I-me (IUL-UR) to either you-you (2UL-UR) or she-her (3UL-UR). Furthermore, TQP frames the very important dialogical distinctions between, in the first derivative (TQP1), my disowned projections onto what I regard as your intentions-behaviors (2UL-UR) or her intentions-behaviors (3UL-UR), and, in the second derivative (TQP2), what I regard as your own first-hand experience of your intentions-behaviors (2.123UL-UR) or her own first-hand experience of her intentions-behaviors (3.123UL-UR) that necessarily challenge my projections in the course of our mutual, reflexive development. Without these TQP2 dialogical distinctions, there is no way to perspectively account for the development in which I might eventually re-integrate my projections onto you and her, while we come to realize who we really are in relation to one another (123.123AQ).
88 Wilber (2000d, 703).
Habermas (1992c, 91).

This is in contrast to Wilber’s AQAL formulation, in which he equates and conflates an unacknowledged indefinite collective-subjective perspective (XLL) with an undifferentiated interpersonal perspective (2), resulting in the distortion of both original perspectives in his LL quadrant, which he then alternately refers to as an intersubjective perspective, a second-person perspective, a first-person plural perspective, a cultural worldview perspective, and a lifeworld perspective. See Appendix A for a critique of the tri/quad conflation.

Habermas (1992c, 110).

Habermas (1992c, 110). I should note that this particular passage by Habermas is unusually articulate in its differentiations of the pragmatic-semiotic perspectives essential to any such analysis, which comes fairly close to identifying the first-, second-, and third-person perspectives in both their individual and collective dimensions, merely implying the corresponding subjective-objective differentiation already contained in Peirce’s model, and more than merely implying the beginning of a second-derivative differentiation. This is a great deal more articulated than nearly everything else he has written on the topic, which is typically limited to a simple triadic differentiation that, at best, alludes to the mutual nature of this triadic differentiation.


Defenders of Wilber’s semiotic model might attempt to counter this critique by claiming that his indefinite quadratic semiotics of intentional signified (XUL), behavioral signifier (XUR), cultural semantics (XLL), and social syntax (XLR) is a deliberately simplified version of my triadic quadratic semiotics and that the differentiation/integration of the first-person symptoms of freedom (123.1AQ), second-person signals of justice (123.2AQ), and third-person symbols of truth (123.3AQ) are therefore implied in his indefinite quadratic semiotics. Apart from the fact that Wilber has never mentioned or referenced Bühler’s triadic semiotics, or any other semiotics based on the first-, second-, and third-person perspectives, the more salient counterpoint to such an evidence-free claim would be that Wilber’s tri/quad conflation makes it perfectly clear that he equates and conflates the first-person (1) with the intentional (UL), the second-person (2) with the cultural (LL), and the third-person (3) with the combined behavioral (UR) and social (LR), without ever acknowledging the existence of the indefinite quadratic perspectives (XAQ), let alone the triadic quadratic perspectives (123AQ). There-
fore, even if Wilber were to have discovered Bühler’s triadic semiotics through a more careful reading of Habermas, he would have mistakenly equated and conflated the first-person expressive _symptoms_ (1) with the intentional _signifieds_ in his UL quadrant, the second-person apppellative _signals_ (2) with the cultural _semantics_ in his LL quadrant, and the third-person representative _symbols_ (3) with the combined behavioral _signifiers_ and social _syntax_ of his UR and LR quadrants.

Such a tri/quad conflated semiotics would have been completely incoherent. Ironically, the best we can say of Wilber’s indefinite quadratic semiotics is that it stops short of the tri/quad conflation that would be necessary to render it consistent with his own flawed formulation of AQAL. It is this very _inconsistency_ with AQAL that renders Wilber’s indefinite quadratic semiotics immediately useful in triadic quadratic semiotics, as there is no need for a deconstructive effort to salvage a pure quadratic semiotics from the tri/quad conflation of AQAL before properly integrating it with a triadic semiotics to yield a genuinely triadic quadratic semiotics. Unfortunately, if Wilber mistakenly believes that his indefinite quadratic semiotics is an “AQAL semiotics,” and thus congruent with the tri/quad conflation essential to AQAL, which seems very likely, then he may also mistakenly believe that this indefinite quadratic semiotics already differentiates and integrates a genuine triadic semiotics of first-, second-, and third-person perspectives. Clearly it does not, as illustrated in Figures 7 and 11.

See Appendix A for a critique of the tri/quad conflation.

96 Habermas (1992c, 110-1).
98 Culler (1982, 97).
100 Derrida (2002, 559).
104 Habermas (1990a).
105 Habermas (1990e, 55).
106 Habermas (1990e, 55-6).
108 Habermas (1990d, 193) quoting Culler (1982, 181) on Derrida’s deconstruction: “If serious language is a special case of nonserious, if truths are
fictions whose fictionality has been forgotten, then literature is not a deviant, parasitical instance of language. On the contrary, other discourses can be seen as cases of a generalized literature, or archi-literature.” Habermas (1990d, 205): “For Derrida, linguistically mediated processes within the world are embedded in a *world-constituting* context that prejudices everything; they are fatalistically delivered up to the unmanageable happening of text production, overwhelmed by the poetic-creative transformation of a background designed by archwriting, and condemned to be provincial. An aesthetic contextualism blinds him to the fact that everyday communicative practice makes learning processes possible (thanks to built-in idealizations) in relation to which the world-disclosive force of interpreting language has in turn to prove its worth. These learning processes unfold an independent logic that transcends all local constraints, because experiences and judgments are formed only in the light of criticizable validity claims.”

109 Habermas (1990d, 198).
110 Habermas (1990c; 1990d).
111 Wilber (2000e, 198).
112 Deleuze and Guattari (1987, 23).

113 TQP¹ has 12 primordial perspectives, all of which are *mine*. TQP² derives a new set of 12 primordial perspectives for each of the second and third persons referenced in TQP¹—*yours* and *his/hers*—which adds an additional (2 × 12 =) 24 perspectives. TQP³ derives a new set of 12 primordial perspectives for each of the new second and third persons referenced in TQP², which adds an additional (4 × 12 =) 48 perspectives. TQP⁴ derives a new set of 12 primordial perspectives for each of the new second and third persons referenced in TQP³, which adds an additional (8 × 12 =) 96 perspectives. TQP⁵ derives a new set of 12 primordial perspectives for each of the new second and third persons referenced in TQP⁴, which adds an additional (16 × 12 =) 96 perspectives. In summary, the total number of primordial perspectives identified in TQP⁵ is 12 + (2 × 12) + (4 × 12) + (8 × 12) + (16 × 12) = 12 + 24 + 48 + 96 + 192 = 372. The total number of unique, enactive *Is* identified in TQP⁵, each of whom enacts his or her own complete set of 12 primordial perspectives, is 31 (= 372 ÷ 12).

Regarding the graphical design of Figure 13 in relation to Figure 12, note that the increasing derivatives of TQP, from the 4th to the Infinite, are all framed as deeper/wider permutations within the 3rd Derivative perspectives of 2.2.2ₐₒₐ, 2.2.3ₐₒₐ, 2.3.2ₐₒₐ, 2.3.3ₐₒₐ, 3.2.2ₐₒₐ, 3.2.3ₐₒₐ, 3.3.2ₐₒₐ, and 3.3.3ₐₒₐ. This is the fractal pattern of differentiation from which TQP² and TQP³ were derived. Beginning with Figure 12, if you can imagine delineating each of
these additional derivatives using the same light gray lines used to delineate TQP\(^3\), you will see that the white space within these 3\(^{rd}\) Derivative perspectives fills up with gray ink at the 5\(^{th}\) Derivative, leaving just a sliver of white in each from the 4\(^{th}\) Derivative first-person perspectives that were not further differentiated: 2.2.2.1\(_{AQ}\), 2.2.3.1\(_{AQ}\), 2.3.2.1\(_{AQ}\), 2.3.3.1\(_{AQ}\), 3.2.2.1\(_{AQ}\), 3.2.3.1\(_{AQ}\), 3.3.2.1\(_{AQ}\), and 3.3.3.1\(_{AQ}\). Thus, when depicting the Infinite Derivative TQP\(^\infty\) on such a small scale, I can only use this 5\(^{th}\) Derivative.

114 Gebser (1985, 117).
115 Gebser (1985, 529).

116 The term integral-aperspectival was coined by Jean Gebser (1985) in the mid-20\(^{th}\) century in reference to the emerging structure of consciousness he so brilliantly clarified through painstaking documentation and interpretation of art, literature, social science, and natural science, yet never modeled in any visual-logical way. While TQP presents one particular version of an integral aperspectival meta-theory—the only one of which I am aware—it should not be misconstrued as an attempt to represent Gebser’s theory of consciousness any more than his theory of consciousness should be necessarily attributed to TQP. Simply put, Gebser’s integral-aperspectival consciousness is neither triadic nor quadratic and therefore not TQP. That being said, there appears to be enough commonality to warrant these preliminary observations in advance of a more systematic inquiry and reconstruction.

118 Cook (1989, 214).

119 TQP\(^\infty\) also reminds me of certain features of the ancient process philosophy of Taoism. In his reconstruction of the key concepts in Taoist cosmology, Roger Ames (1989, 113-44) explores the deeper meaning of tao, the holistic field from which Taoism gets its name, and te, the particular focus, which is an equally significant concept emphasized in Lao-Tzu’s seminal text, Tao-te-ching. In short, Ames (1989, 136) suggests that “tao be understood as an emerging pattern of relatedness perceived from the perspective of an irreducibly participatory te.” He (1989, 132) further clarifies that “tao in its broadest meaning is the ‘spontaneous’… ‘self-evidencing’ process of all that is as it presents for a given particular. It would be a contradiction to suggest that the all-embracing tao is entertained from some objective perspective beyond it; rather it is always engaged from some particular perspective within it. This, then, is the basis of the polar relationship of tao as field and te as a particular focus.”

In my interpretation, the particular focus, te, is suggestive of the unique enactive I with which the triadic quadratic perspectival field, tao, of infinitely
particularized and interrelated Is appears to co-arise in a continuous practice of mutual, reflexive, differential, yet integral presencing. This further suggests that tao might be interpreted as the spontaneously self-evidencing complementarity between an ever-present context-immanent reality that nevertheless presupposes a never-present context-transcendent ideality, both of which are necessarily construed from the variegated perspectives of those particular Is, \( te \), who constitute these contexts. That being said, in this philosophy as in life, while the field, tao, attracts most of the attention, it is the focus, \( te \), that deserves a closer look. Ames (1989, 125-6) contends that:

\( te \), at a fundamental cosmological level, denotes the arising of the particular in a process vision of existence. The particular is the unfolding of a sui generis focus of potency that embraces and determines conditions within the range and parameters of its particularity.... The range of its particularity is variable, and is contingent upon the way in which it interprets itself and is interpreted. It is a focus because its context, in whatever direction and degree, can alternatively be construed as ‘self’ or ‘other.’ The presencing of particulars... is characterized by an inherent dynamism which, through its own disposition and self-direction, interprets the world. It has the possibility of making a direction appropriate by expressing itself in compromise between its own disposition and the context which it makes its own.... There is an openness of the particular such that it can through harmonization and patterns of deference diffuse to become coextensive with other particulars, and absorb an increasingly broader field of ‘arising’ within the sphere of its own particularity. As a particular extends itself to encompass a wider range of ‘presencing’ or ‘rising,’ the possibilities of its conditions and its potency for self-construal are proportionately increased.

Therefore, each and every particular focus, or unique enactive I, has the potential to deepen and broaden the TQP field of its own harmonious presencing and, in so doing, contribute to the harmonious presencing of all the other particular focused Is in that field. The question, then, is how do we do this? In Taoism, the type of action characteristic of this harmonious presencing is called wu-wei, which is commonly misinterpreted by Western scholars as some sort of acquiescent non-action that contrasts with conventional instrumental notions of antagonistic proaction/reaction. Ames (1989, 137), however, reinterprets wu-wei as “a negation of that kind of ‘making’ or ‘doing’ which requires that a particular sacrifice its own integrity in acting on behalf of something ‘other,’ a negation of one particular serving as a
‘means’ for something else’s ‘end.’ Wu-wei is the negation of that kind of engagement that makes something false to itself... and that kind of relatedness between two particulars that will compromise their opportunity for ‘self-evidencing,’” He (Ames, 1989, 138) further argues that “wu-wei... is bidirectionally deferential in that it entails both the integrity of the particular and its integration in context.... Wu-wei... is the particular authoring itself, on the one hand, deferring to the integrity of its environment, and at the same time demanding that the environing conditions defer to its integrity.”

In my interpretation, wu-wei is consistent with the requisite practices of transparency, choice, and accountability (TCA\textsuperscript{N}) by which each and every particular focus, I, realizes its potential to deepen and broaden the triadic quadratic perspectival (TQP\textsuperscript{N}) field of its own harmonious presencing and, in so doing, contribute to the harmonious presencing of all the other particular focused Is in its field. Hence, the emerging integrity of my particular self-imaging/world-viewing should not require you to sacrifice your own emerging integrity nor her to sacrifice her own emerging integrity in order that each of us may actively integrate each of our emergent selves/worlds in our indeterminate realization (A\textsuperscript{N} = TCA\textsuperscript{N} × TQP\textsuperscript{N} = R\textsuperscript{N}). On the contrary, it appears that my emerging integrity may actually depend upon yours and hers, just as ours may depend upon theirs, as we are all presently implicated and eventually explicated in this integral aperspectival/apractical field of potentially harmonious presencing. Despite the evidence that each and every one of us has indeed pursued our own marginally satisfying notions of truth, justice, and freedom in ways that apparently require others to curtail their pursuits of the same, there also appears to be no way to ignore forever our semiotic, pragmatic, and praxiological interdependence in ultimate realization (A\textsuperscript{∞} = TCA\textsuperscript{∞} × TQP\textsuperscript{∞} = R\textsuperscript{∞}).

There is an unfortunate similarity between the terms I must use to denote the indeterminate, N, number of derivatives of TQP, that are always specific personal perspectives, and the indefinite, X, personal perspectives that are always generic personal perspectives. Indeterminate, N, is a quantitative variable that can be any integer from 0 to infinity. Indefinite, X, is not a quantitative variable, but rather a qualitative status of a pronoun and corresponding perspective regarded as generic, rather than specific, as universal, rather than particular (e.g., each, all, one, many, anyone, everyone, anything, everything). The presupposition of a dynamic indeterminate derivative of TQP reality, denoted R\textsuperscript{N}, is therefore radically different from the presupposition of a static indefinite reality, whether monadic, dyadic, or quadratic, all of which might be denoted R\textsuperscript{X}. By placing the non-quantitative X in the power position reserved for a quantitative variable, this sign is
intended to signify, if not also induce, the cognitive dissonance that post-postmodern philosophers should, in my opinion, experience when presented with a *monological* meta-theory or meta-narrative of *anyone* and *everyone*, *anything* and *everything*, purported to be *dialogical*, if not also *integral*.

121 According to Merriam-Webster (http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/indeterminate) and Wikipedia (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Indeterminate_form) the term *indeterminate* has two mathematical definitions. It can characterize both a system of equations with an infinite number of potential solutions and any of seven undefined mathematical expressions: \(0/0, 0^0, 0\times\infty, \infty^0, \infty/\infty, \infty-\infty, 1^\infty\). While I am certainly no mathematician and do not want to read too much into these indeterminate expressions, I find it interesting that the three variables used in these seven expressions—\(0, 1, \infty\)—appear to be the only *determinate* derivatives of the otherwise *indeterminate*—\(N\)—derivatives of triadic quadratic perspectivism. In other words, the 1st Derivative of Awareness-in-Action, TQP\(^1\), in which the 12 primordial perspectives co-arise within the implied Zero Derivative of Awareness-in-Action, TQP\(^0\), is always already open, of necessity due precisely to its personal perspectival structure, to the implied Infinite Derivative of Awareness-in-Action, TQP\(^\infty\), all three of which—\(0, 1, \infty\)—are necessary to frame the field of possibilities for the otherwise Indeterminate Derivatives of any particular, situated Awareness-in-Action, TQP\(^N\).

122 The perspectival notation for TQP\(^N\) is rendered as 123.123\(_{AQ}\), which is the same as that denoting the 2nd Derivative TQP\(^2\). The 2nd Derivative is the most basic TQP derivative in which the fractal pattern of differentiation is established and the inherent mutuality, reflexivity, and différance of human action can be recognized. Why limit the Nth Derivative perspectival notation to the 2nd Derivative? Because it gets very cumbersome to add additional 123s for a variable, \(N\), that can theoretically climb to infinity. Thus, it is necessary to recognize that additional derivatives are *always implied* as potential. That is the meaning of the Indeterminate Derivative. I have considered the possibility of adding three ellipsis points after the 2nd Derivative, such as 123.123…\(_{AQ}\), but this pushes the subscript quadratic notation away from the triadic notation, thus reducing the clarity of the combined notation. Therefore, 123.123\(_{AQ}\) denotes *at least* the 2nd Derivative TQP, which is how I typically present TQP\(^N\).

123 Habermas (1998c, 336-8).
126 Ananda Wood (n.d.), for example, translates and explains the insights of
the 5th century linguistic philosopher, Bhartrihari, whose phenomenological analysis of language tracks the cartography of multi-state consciousness profiled in the Mandukya Upanishad, one of the most significant source texts in Advaita Vedanta.

As Dennis Waite (2007, 4) introduces it, Advaita, meaning not-two, is a nondual philosophy of Self-realization rooted in the Vedanta, meaning the final sections and culminating wisdom of the Vedas, the sacred texts of ancient India purportedly written 2,000 to 3,000 years ago after being passed down orally for thousands of years prior to that. Known also as the Upanishads, which means sitting near the teacher, the Vedanta teachings are grounded in direct experience of Self-realization by rishis, or seers, who are the forebears of contemporary seers like Ramana Maharshi. The Mandukya Upanishad, described by Waite (2007, 586) as possibly the single most important Upanishad and by the 8th century sage Adi Shankara (Nikhilananda, 2006, 2) as the quintessence of all the Upanishads, focuses exclusively on the sacred sound, sign, and word Aum, which is widely recognized in Devanagari script as ❝.

Swami Nikhilananda’s (2006, 9-11) masterful translation of the Mandukya Upanishad begins by equating Aum with the Real Self, Atman, and the Absolute Reality, Brahman, inclusive of “all this...,” “all that is past, present and future...,” and “that which is beyond the triple conception of time.” After declaring (Nikhilananda, 2006, 11) that “this Atman has four quarters,” it then outlines through a series of verses a cartography of multi-state consciousness correlated with the phonetic spelling of A-U-M, direct translations of which include the following:

- “The first quarter... is Vaiśvānara whose sphere (of activity) is the waking state, who is conscious of external objects,... and whose experience consists of gross (material) objects.” (Nikhilananda, 2006, 13) Furthermore, “he who is Vaiśvānara, having for its sphere of activity the waking state, is A, the first letter (of Aum) on account of its all-pervasiveness or on account of its being the first (these being the common features of both). One who knows this attains to the fulfillment of all desires and becomes the first (of all).” (Nikhilananda, 2006, 71)

- “The second quarter... is the Taijasa whose sphere (of activity) is the dream, who is conscious of internal objects,... and who experiences the subtle objects.” (Nikhilananda, 2006, 18) Furthermore, “Taijasa, whose sphere of activity is the dream state, is U, the second letter (of Aum) on account of superiority or on account of being in between the two. He who knows this attains to a superior knowledge, is treated equally by all alike and finds no one in his
line who is not a knower of Brahman.” (Nikhilananda, 2006, 72)

- “The third quarter... is Prājñā whose sphere is deep sleep, in whom all (experiences) become unified or undifferentiated, who is verily, a mass of consciousness entire, who is full of bliss and experiences bliss, and who is the path leading to the knowledge (of the two other states).” (Nikhilananda, 2006, 21) Furthermore, “Prājñā whose sphere is deep sleep is M the third... (letter) of Aum, because it is both the measure and that wherein all become one. One who knows this (identity of Prājñā and M) is able to measure all (realise the real nature of the world) and also comprehends all within himself.” (Nikhilananda, 2006, 73)

- “Turīya [the fourth] is not that which is conscious of the internal (subjective) world, nor that which is conscious of the external (objective) world, nor that which is conscious of both, nor that which is a mass of all sentiency, nor that which is simple consciousness, nor that which is insentient. (It is) unseen (by any sense organ), not related to anything, incomprehensible (by the mind), uninferable, unthinkable, indescribable, essentially of the nature of Consciousness constituting the Self alone, negation of all phenomena, the Peaceful, all Bliss and the Non-dual. This is the Ātman and it has to be realised.” (Nikhilananda, 2006, 47-8)

- “The same Ātman... is, again, Aum, from the point of view of the syllables. The Aum with parts is viewed from the standpoint of sounds. The quarters are the letters... and the letters are the quarters. The letters here are A, U and M.” (Nikhilananda, 2006, 70)

“That which has no parts (soundless), incomprehensible (with the aid of the senses), the cessation of all phenomena, all bliss and non-dual Aum, is the fourth and verily the same as the Ātman. He who knows this merges his self in the Self.” (Nikhilananda, 2006, 78)

As these rather esoteric verses nevertheless reveal, the phonemes of Aum designate more than the three primary states of consciousness that unfold within the fourth non-state source of all. They actually designate the three centers of consciousness who experience those states, or the identities who identify with the experiences of those states. This is a subtle but essential distinction that is lost in many translations and popularizations of this teaching. It is all too easy to imagine that the deeper states of consciousness described in spiritual philosophy are just extraordinary experiences given to the same experiencer, the same I, who ordinarily experiences the apparent world of the waking state—that is, the I that I think I am as the implied origin of all that I think I do within the world that I think I know.
But as Waite (2007, 299) clarifies, “the three states are unarguably separate states from the standpoint of the phenomenal world, with each having its own characteristics and apparent ‘ego.’ The waking state is called jagrat, with its waking ego of vishva (literally meaning ‘whole, entire,’ because the individual person seems to be ‘complete’), also referred to as vaishvAnara (literally ‘relating to or belonging to all men’). The dreaming state is svapna, with the dreaming-ego taijasa, literally ‘consisting of light.’ svapna also means sleeping but it is only the body that sleeps in this state—the mind is very active, constructing its own world out of itself, complete with its own space, time and causality. The true sleeping state—deep sleep—is called suShupti and the sleeper is Praj-na. In this state, both body and mind are inactive and time apparently stands still. It is the mind that, upon waking, claims that the deep-sleep experience was a blank since it was not present at the time. But clearly the Self must have been there—indeed it is never absent.” Therefore, to summarize, Vaiśvānara, A, is the gross self whose sphere of experience is the waking state, jagrat; Taijasa, U, is the subtle self whose sphere of experience is the dreaming state, svapna; and Prājña, M, is the causal self whose sphere of experience is the sleeping state, sușupti.

Furthermore, Nikhilananda (2006, 32) notes that, “the three apparent cognisers, Viśvā, Taijasa, and Prājña are really one, because a plurality of perceivers in the same state, namely, the waking, and in the same body is an absurdity, as that would preclude the possibility of the continuity of perception as revealed through memory. Therefore the apparently three different perceivers are identical and their apparent distinction is due to their identification with the three states…. The difference is only imaginary and empirical and due to the identification with different bodies [i.e., experiential worlds]. Really speaking, one Ātman alone manifests itself in different forms....” Ramana Maharshi (1974, 16-7) adds an additional distinction to the articulation of Ātman as Turiya, or the fourth. “The experiencers (jivas) of the three states of waking, dreaming and deep sleep, known as vishva, taijasa and prajna, who wander successively in these three states, are not the Self. It is with the object of making this clear, namely that the Self is that which is different from them and which is the witness of these states, that it is called the fourth (turiya). When this is known, the three experiencers disappear and the idea that the Self is a witness, that it is the fourth, also disappears. That is why the Self is described as beyond the fourth (turiyatita).”

Therefore, we might say that the real Self, Atman, at one with absolute Reality, Brahman, when not properly Self-identified, contracts to the mistaken identity of the causal self, Prājña, whose sphere of experience is typically limited to the sleeping state, sușupti, who when not properly identified
contracts further to the mistaken identity of the subtle self, Taijasa, whose sphere of experience is typically limited to the dreaming state, svapna, who when not properly identified contracts further still to the mistaken identity of the gross self, Viśvā, whose sphere of experience is typically limited to the waking state, jagrat, from whose perspective the ordinary experiences of waking, dreaming, and sleeping follow an involuntary daily cycle of multiphasic self-consciousness that disguises the depths of the Self ever-present.

One common way to experientially access the depths of the Self ever-present during the waking state is the meditative incantation of Aum in its capacity as the primordial mantra. Mantras are meaningful syllables, words, or short phrases that are recited aloud or silently as a form of meditation that concentrates, calms, and clears the mind. The word mantra is composed of the verb man, which means to think, and the word tra, which means instrumentality and, via the related verb trai, to protect or free. Therefore, this practice may be understood as the instrumental repetition of a particular thought, the mantra, in order to free the mind of other thoughts and initiate deeper awareness of the Self. As the primordial mantra, Aum encompasses all other mantras, as well as all sounds and all letters of the alphabet, given that A is the first sound the voice can make and M is the last, while U bridges the middle range between the two. When coupled with a series of yogic preliminaries, including steady posture, asana, controlled breathing, pranayama, withdrawn senses, pratyahara, and mental concentration, dharana, the meditative, dhyana, incantation, japa, of the mantra A-U-M, inclusive of the lingering silence after the M, is said to guide the locus of awareness, the subject rather than the object of awareness, from Viśvā to Taijasa to Prājña to Atman, culminating in the wakeful awareness of the Self, samadhi. (Vishnu-Devananda, 2003, 47, 55-6, 78) As Waite (2007, 596, 606, 589, 595) further clarifies, this “state of total peace and stillness achieved during meditation,” known as samadhi, has four distinct stages of emergence, from Self-realization with “doubt, uncertainty, or indecision,” vikalpa samadhi, to Self-realization “‘with’ [lingering] doubts about one’s identity with the one Self,” savikalpa samadhi, to Self-realization “‘without’ doubts about one’s identity with the one Self,” nirvikalpa samadhi, to Self-realization that is “full and lasting knowledge of the Self,” sahaja sthiti samadhi.

In one sense, Aum can be interpreted as a sound, sign, and word that designates, step-by-step, the meditative path back to the silent awareness within which, as which, all else arises and falls, as if those rishis who first discovered this path subsequently conceived a word that would adequately signify it in their spoken and written teachings. But in another, complementary sense, Aum can be interpreted as a discovery in itself, a revelation to
those *rishis* who first developed the capacity to remain fully aware through all their passing states of consciousness—gross/waking, subtle/dreaming, and causal/sleeping—to rest in the silent awareness that they, and we, really are, and to witness the manner in which this subtle sound permeates, indeed vibrates as, all manifest creation.

It is in light of this view that Bhartrihari (Waite, 2007, 258-63) apparently formulated his thesis that language is the means by which the silent awareness of the real Self manifests through speech into the differentiated names and forms of our worldly experience, tracking the A-U-M cartography of consciousness as it unfolds in each moment of more-or-less aware, but nevertheless wakeful, communication. In my reconstruction, weaving the essential terminology of the *Mandukya Upanishad* together with Ananda Wood’s (n.d., 29) account of Bhartrihari’s linguistics yields a general outline of what we might refer to as *primordial semiotics and pragmatics*:

- **A** designates the real Self in its constrained capacity as the *gross self*, Vaiśvaṇara, whose sphere of experience is that of the *waking state*, jagrat, and corresponds with the gross state of linguistic expression called *elaborating*, vaikhari, that is characterized by the “personal articulation of words and symbols” and the “changing world of perceived objects.” This is the state of differentiated names and forms, nama-rupa, elaborated through the use of spoken/written language, and corresponds with the specific content, and particularly the objective content, of the triadic quadratic perspectives. Simply put, this state has the potential to illuminate all the signs and referents of spoken/written language.

- **U** designates the real Self in its constrained capacity as the *subtle self*, Taijasa, whose sphere of experience is more commonly that of the *dreaming state*, svapna, and corresponds with (the wakeful experience of) the subtle state of linguistic expression called *mediating*, madhyama, that is characterized by the “succession of mental states through which symbols are formed and meanings are interpreted” and the “flow of happenings through which objects take shape and convey meaning.” This is the state in which all differentiated names and forms of the gross realm are enfolded as potential expressions of language, and corresponds with the differentiation of the triadic quadratic perspectives in the linguistic medium itself. Simply put, this state has the potential to illuminate the use of all language as well as all that is spoken/written with language.

- **M** designates the real Self in its constrained capacity as the *causal self*, Prājña, whose sphere of experience is most commonly that of
the sleeping state, *suṣupti*, and corresponds with (the wakeful experience of) the causal state of linguistic expression called *seeing*, *pashyanti*, that is characterized by a “quiet insight and latent potentiality continuing at the depth of mind” and a “subtly intelligible order and causation of nature’s functioning.” This is the state in which all differentiated perspectives and distinct languages are enfolded as latent potential, and corresponds with the causal *I* that enfolds/unfolds the triadic quadratic perspectives of the subtle state. Simply put, this state has the potential to illuminate the causal source of all languages prior to their use, as well as the use of all language and all that is spoken/written with language. (Incidentally, the dissolution/resolution of the causal *I* within the background of integral awareness is depicted, as a transitional moment out of perspectival space-time, in Figure 15.)

- *Silence* designates the non-dual awareness that is the real Self, *Atman*, at one with absolute Reality, *Brahman*, and corresponds with (the wakeful experience of) the self-illuminating origin of linguistic expression called *beyond*, *para*, that is characterized as a “pure and unconditioned seeing, quite unmixed with any passing states or differentiated objects” and the “ultimate identity of knowing and being.” This is the realization of who we really are beyond the constrained capacities of the gross, subtle, and causal selves, and corresponds with the circle of integral awareness illuminating all differential action manifesting through the apparent agencies of the causal, subtle, and gross selves in our situational awareness-in-action. Simply put, this illuminates the Silence of the Self, *mouna*, that is beyond all communicative language but nevertheless powerfully transmissive. Ramana Maharshi (2001, 151), whose preferred method of teaching was indeed Silence, declared that “*mouna* is not closing the mouth. It is eternal speech.... That state which transcends speech and thought is *mouna***. He (2001, 162-3) also mentioned that “what one fails to know by conversation extending to several years can be known in a moment in Silence, or in front of Silence.... That is the highest and most effective language.”

Therefore, as the inverse of the multi-state *meditation* that guides us back to the silent illumination behind our worldly experience, there is a multi-state *signification* by which this silent illumination manifests through the use of language as the differentiated names and forms of our self-imaging/world-viewing. In both interpretations, the states of our situational awareness-in-action are none other than the *illumination/manifestation* of the integral/
différential Self both discovered and designated as *Aum*—the primordial *Sound of Silence*.

Thus, as Wood (n.d., 39) notes, *Aum* is often described as *bijakshara*, the unique, unchanging *seed syllable* that enfolds as latent potential all the other syllables, words, sentences, stories, and languages with which we construct, deconstruct, and reconstruct our relative realities, the very sound of which draws the contemplative mind back to the deep silence of the Self. This implies that *Aum* literally is *the sound within all sounds, the sign of all signs, and the word behind all words*—that *primordial semiosis* from which all triadic quadratic perspectival *signs* and *referents, names and forms*, are derived in the integral awareness we secretly, silently are. In this view, *Aum* would be the *Self-referencing sign* and *Self-signifying referent* of a new multi-state depth dimension in integral/différential semiotics, pragmatics, and praxiology. This is all the more suggestive of triadic quadratic perspectivism as the *mandala* of Awareness-in-Action—the *sacred circle* of integrally aperspectival, yet différentially perspectival self-imaging/world-viewing by which *we—I, each of you, and each of them*—alternately manifest and illuminate *each* of our unique, yet interpenetrating visions of reality.

This hypothesis of primordial semiosis through which integral awareness manifests as différential action clarifies the depth perspective in my reconstruction of Derrida’s (1996; 2002) deconstructive critique of the phonocentric (con)fusion of subjective, intentional signifieds (123ul) with objective, behavioral signifiers (123ur), which, in his view, leads to the philosophical metaphysics of a presence forever presumed, yet never realized. Primordial semiosis traces this (con)fusion state-by-state back from its acute manifestation in the fully differentiated Self-as-gross-self, *Viśvā*, in its sphere of elaborating semiosis, *vaikhari*, to its deeper, intuited origins in the Self-as-subtle-self, *Taijasa*, in its sphere of mediating semiosis, *madhyama*, the Self-as-causal-self, *Prājña*, in its sphere of seeing semiosis, *pashyanti*, and the *integral Self, Atman*, as the illuminating origin beyond semiosis, *para*, yet paradoxically of semiosis itself. In view of this primordial semiosis, all différential signs that are so understandably susceptible to a more fully elaborated deconstruction nevertheless contain a *primordial trace* of the *Self-referencing sign* and *Self-signifying referent* *Aum*, which is but the vocal manifestation of the real Self, *Atman*, at one with absolute Reality, *Brahman*, that is therefore the secret, silent integral source of all these différential signs.

As to the predictable Derridean challenge that this hypothesis of primordial semiosis might be just another metaphysical doctrine of presence, the definitive post-metaphysical response—following my integral post-metaphysical maxim that *the reality of a declarative is the imperative to realize
it—is to offer an exemplary practice by which the appropriately skeptical practitioner might realize in his or her own direct awareness the real nature of this purportedly primordial semiosis. Thus, given the persuasive critique of the metaphysics of presence offered by an integrally reconstructed deconstruction, as proposed in my formulations of integral/différantial semiotics and pragmatics, what is the potential for a post-metaphysics of presence that is consistent with this integral/différantial semiotics and pragmatics? The answer begins with the recognition that, if all différantial actions contain a primordial trace of the integral awareness that is their secret, silent source, then integral/différantial semiotics and pragmatics cannot be limited to action conditioned by the relative I that I think I am.

Therefore, if I am serious about the deconstructive revelation of primordial perspectival differentiations amidst the reconstructive integrations of my situational awareness-in-action, then I must follow this purportedly primordial trace back to the source and see for myself whatever there is to see. Because the most immediate semiotic source of Aum, Atman, and Brahman to which I can direct my attention is the I that I think I am as I say what I think I say, it is to this I that I must direct my inquiry. This brings me back to the practice of self-inquiry, as taught by Ramana Maharshi. The practice of self-inquiry, the Sanskrit name for which is atma vichara, is a subtle, silent inquiry, vichara, into who I am at the apparent source of all perspectives, thoughts, feelings, and actions, the sustained practice of which transcends the mental flow and purportedly reveals the integral awareness that I am, the real self, Atman, at one with absolute reality, Brahman, illuminating all manifest perspectives, thoughts, feelings, and actions. In his (Ramana, 1992, 51) view, “self-enquiry is the one infallible means, the only direct one, to realise the unconditioned, absolute being that you really are.”

128 Ramana (1992, 51).
130 Argyris, Putnam, & McLain Smith (1985, 4).
133 Schön (1983).
136 Marquardt (1999).
140 Isaac (1999).
143 Scharmer (2007).
144 Argyris (1986).
145 Argyris (1993, 1).
146 Habermas (1975, 15).
147 Habermas (1975; 1979; 1984; 1987; 1990b).
148 Habermas (1975, 15, emphasis added).
150 Habermas (1971).
152 Habermas (1979; 1984; 1987).
154 Habermas (1979; 1984; 1987).
155 Argyris et al. (1985, 80-1).
156 I have taken the liberty of revising one of the terms in the theory of action—changing the term governing values to action values—in order to facilitate a better understanding of the model as well as better integration with related models in this work.
157 Argyris et al. (1985, 80-8); Argyris (1990, 94); Argyris (1993, 50).
158 Argyris et al. (1985, 80-8).
159 Habermas (1987, 96).
160 Habermas (1979, 41, 117-9).
161 Habermas (1979, 117).
162 Habermas (1979, 118; 1975, 15).
164 Kotarbiński (2002).
165 Habermas (1998a, 203).
166 Habermas (1987, 126-7).
167 Habermas (1979, 97-8).
168 Habermas (1979, 98, 122).
169 Habermas (1979, 173).
170 Argyris (1986).
171 Argyris et al. (1985, 99).
172 Habermas (1979, 173).
173 Habermas (1975, 8).
175 McCarthy (1994, 246).
177 Wilber (1999d, 292).
178 Habermas (1987, 117).
179 Habermas (1987, 150-1).
180 Habermas (1971, 308).
181 Habermas (1987, 151).
182 Habermas (1987, 117).
183 While I am not aware of any particular positioning by Habermas of his critical theory as distinctively post-postmodern either in form or intent, I think it is a justifiable interpretation in light of his evidently post-postmodern embrace of post-metaphysical philosophy, as explicitly described in Postmetaphysical Thinking (1992), as well as his critical engagement with both modern (e.g., philosophy of the subject) and postmodern (e.g., deconstruction) philosophy that nevertheless retains reconstructed forms of their enduring strengths (e.g., modern reason and postmodern language), an exemplary demonstration of which can be found in The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity (1990). Still, it is possible that I am reading too much of my own formulation into Habermas’s engagement with (post)modernism, as Awareness-in-Action is, in part, a modest attempt to continue the postmodern linguistic turn, not simply away from modernism, but all the way back around to reconstruct at least some of the essential insights of (post)modernism within a more integral, or post-postmodern, semiotics, pragmatics, and praxiology.
184 Habermas (1987, 313-4).
185 Wilber (2000a, 115-57).
186 Wilber (2003a, part ii; part iii).
188 See Appendix A for a critique of the tri/quad conflation central to AQAL.
Habermas (1987, 313-4).

190 Wilber (2000a, 115-57).

191 Wilber (2003a, part iii).


193 Habermas (1987, 135).

194 Habermas (1998b, 247-8).

195 Habermas (1998b, 236-46),


197 Habermas (1990b, 345-6).

198 Habermas (1987, 140-4).

199 Habermas (1987, 141-2).

200 Habermas (1987, 142-3).

201 Habermas (1979, 98).

202 Habermas (1987, 137-8).

203 Habermas (1998b, 247).

204 Habermas (1987, 138).

205 Habermas (1987, 131).

206 Wilber (2000a, 115-57).

207 Habermas (1987, 131).

208 Argyris, et. al. (1985, 36).

209 Argyris, et. al. (1985, 34-5).

210 Morrow and Brown (1994, 57; 146-9).

211 Habermas (1971, 308).

212 Argyris, et. al. (1985, 5).

213 Argyris, et. al. (1985, 6).

214 Argyris et al. (1985, 81-3).

215 Argyris et al. (1985, 90-1).

216 Argyris et al. (1985, 89-91).

217 Habermas (1979, 41, 117-9).

218 Habermas (1979; 1990).

219 Argyris et al. (1985, 89).

220 Argyris et al. (1985, 91-2).
The use of the term *formal* in Habermas’s *formal pragmatics* should not be misinterpreted as being in any way related to the common use of the term *formal* to describe various *formal-operational* and *postformal* levels in developmental psychology. Thus, *formal* pragmatics is not a *formal-operational* pragmatics. Indeed, it is more accurately described as *postformal*-operational in that it is concerned with universal presuppositions of possible understanding well beyond the language use of formal-operational actors.

Habermas will also, in some essays and books, such as (1990f, 88), refer to *discourse as argumentation*. Because this term has unfortunate connotations in
American English, exacerbated by the disgraceful anti-discourse *arguing* of so many cable television news pundits and internet commenters, I prefer to use the term *discourse* exclusively.


249 Habermas (1990f, 88).


251 McCarthy (1994, 308).


253 Habermas (1975, xvii-xviii).


256 Alexy (1990, 151-190).

257 Habermas (1990f, 89).

258 Habermas (1987, 149).

259 Habermas (1987, 149).

260 Habermas (1987, 149).

261 Habermas (1987, 150).

262 As suggested above, Habermas points to an apparent connection between these context-transcendent norms of discourse and the post-formal levels of ego, moral, and cognitive development subsequently documented by several researchers. By positioning Argyris’s Model II as a partial answer to Habermas’s search for context-transcendent norms of discourse and thereby implying that it may also be a paradigmatic exemplar of the universal ethics of speech among all people as members of a fictive world society, I draw attention to the question of how the various action science models relate to the as-yet-merely-implicit levels of Awareness-in-Action.

While Argyris does not acknowledge levels of psycho-social development as even a background for action science, I think it is reasonable to interpret Argyris’s articulation of Model I, Opposite Model I, and Model II as indicative of three sequential levels of consciousness in Wilber’s (1999c, 627-47; 2007) spectrum: *Orange*, *Green*, and *Teal*. Similarly, I interpret his articulation as being generally indicative of: Torbert’s (2004, 104-17) *Achiever, Individualist*, and *Strategist* action-logics, Cook-Greuter’s (2002) *Conscientious, Individualist*, and *Autonomous* levels of identity, Jenny Wade’s (1996, 131-74) *Achievement, Affiliative*, and *Authentic* levels of consciousness, and Kegan’s (1994, 307-52) *4th Order*, an intermediate *late-4th / early-5th Order*, and *5th Order* consciousness. In the familiar terms of socio-cultural evolution as
well as philosophy, these three levels correspond with **modernity, postmodernity, and post-postmodernity**, with the latter also being referred to by Wilberians as **integral**.

Furthermore, provided that the focus of the post-postmodern Model II discourse is not limited to the transformation of modern Model I and post-modern Opposite Model I, as is so often the case in action science interventions and literature, and provided that the Model II practitioners fully engage the multiple derivatives of triadic quadratic perspectival action-learning, the Model II practices are open to higher levels of awareness-in-action beginning with Wilber’s (1999c, 627-47; 2007) *Turquoise*, Torbert’s (2004, 177-208) *Alchemist*, Cook-Greuter’s (2002; 2008) *Construct-Aware*, and Wade’s (1996, 175-202) *Transcendent*. In other words, there is little in the action values of Model II that precludes and much that supports the emergence of higher levels of post-postformal, post-postmodern action-learning. For those with a specific interest in the intersection of action science with adult developmental psychology, I know of no better source than the excellent *action inquiry* of Bill Torbert and his associates (2004).

All that being said, in my view, the specific levels of consciousness identified in any particular theory of human development or evolution belong in the realm of **theory**, not **meta-theory**, because these structural levels are not **primordial** perspectives or practices of human awareness-in-action. As important as these various theories of multi-level consciousness may be to a comprehensive understanding of awareness-in-action, the particular sequences of levels they describe do not appear to be universal presuppositions of the awareness-in-action that actually (re)creates the actionable knowledge that is **only ever subsequently described** in various theories of multi-level consciousness, which are themselves **only ever provisionally validated** through awareness-in-action.

263 O’Connor (2003; 2005; 2008a; 2008b; 2010).

264 As I use the terms, an **integral praxis** is a type of **meta-praxis**, but likely not the only type of meta-praxis. Based on this distinction, I will in some passages make reference to Awareness-in-Action as a general meta-praxis that, by definition, integrates multiple constitutive praxes, while elsewhere describing it as a distinctively integral praxis that still, by definition, integrates multiple differential praxes.

265 O’Connor (2008b).

266 My choice of the terms **authentication, legitimation, and confirmation** to refer to the **intrapersonal, interperson al, and impersonal modes of Awareness-in-Action** is based on a variety of considerations, including the use of identical
or similar terms by Wilber, Habermas, and Argyris to refer to different, but not entirely unrelated, aspects of human action, development, and evolution. In short, different theorists use these terms in different ways, and in this respect I am no different.

Argyris (1985) uses the term confirmation in reference to empirical validation in the context of his critical social science. My use of the term empirical is radically extensive/intensive in that it includes all 12 primordial perspectives for each and every person identified in an action situation. In my parlance, empirical validation is used interchangeably with realization and includes empirical confirmation of truth, empirical legitimation of justice, and empirical authentication of freedom. While Argyris does address issues of interpersonal rightness and intrapersonal sincerity consistent with Habermas’s formal pragmatics, I think his use of the term empirical is limited to truth claims and his use of confirmation is therefore linked exclusively to truth claims and, thus, constitutes a simplified, non-quadratic version otherwise consistent with my use of the term.

Wilber (1999b, 128; 1999c, 192; 2000d, 495-7; 2000e, 217-22) uses confirmation as the third strand of his procedural model of valid knowledge, which begins with a practical injunction to take a specific action, followed by an experiential apprehension of the result from the action, and culminating in a communal (dis)confirmation of the knowledge claimed by those who followed through on the injunction. Although the scope of Wilber’s definition of valid knowledge extends to every perspective in AQAL—all quadrants, levels, lines, states, types—AQAL does not recognize the fully triadic nature of each and every quadratic perspective arising in an action situation. Therefore, although he may intend for his confirmation to serve as a comprehensive form of dialogical validation that can, via his tri/quad conflation, address claims to interpersonal justice/goodness and intrapersonal freedom/beauty just as readily as it addresses claims to impersonal truth in all four quadrants, in reality it cannot do so within the confines of the tri/quad conflated AQAL. His actual use of the term confirmation is therefore similar to my actual use of the term: impersonal quadratic, at best, or a more reductionist indefinite quadratic validation.

In his early work on the developmental sociology of religion, Wilber (1999a, 13) used the term legitimacy to describe “how well a given religion provides meaning, integration, and value on a particular level” of development and the term authenticity to describe “how well a given religion promotes transformation to higher levels altogether.” With regard to methodology, he (1999b, 119-25) proposed structural-hermeneutical analysis to determine the degree of authenticity and functional-empirical analysis to
determine the degree of legitimacy of a particular religious expression. Approximately 20 years later, Wilber (2003a, part iii) defined legitimacy as “adequacy in horizontal translation” and authenticity as “adequacy in vertical transformation.... Thus, authenticity is a measure of the degree of depth or height of a belief system (so that a turquoise worldview is more authentic than a blue worldview), and legitimacy is a measure of how well that worldview functions at its own level. A particular worldview can be very legitimate (or happily accepted by most members of the culture) but not very authentic (e.g., it might be a purple or red belief structure). On the other hand, some worldviews might be very authentic (representing, say, turquoise or vision-logic cognitions) and yet not very legitimate (or not accepted by the ruling or ruled classes).” At first glance, there appears to be very little common ground between Wilber’s use of these terms and my use of the similar terms authentication and legitimation. However, I would suggest that Awareness-in-Action reconstructs orthodox theories of the developmental/evolutionary spectrum of all human actions, including religious insights and expressions, and thereby clarifies the issues addressed by Wilber (1999b), notably allowing for the intrapersonal (in)authentication, interpersonal (de)legitimation, and impersonal (dis)confirmation of each and every religious insight and expression, which is something AQAL has never been able to frame.

As for Habermas, his use of this terminology is limited to legitimation and legitimacy, which for him (1979, 178) “means that there are good arguments for a political order’s claim to be recognized as right and just; a legitimate order deserves recognition. Legitimacy means a political order’s worthiness to be recognized.” Setting aside his narrow focus on political orders, my use of legitimacy as the degree to which a particular action—including institutionalized actions—is considered just, right, and moral is similar, yet more inclusive and therefore more widely applicable to every form and field of human action.

267 The term Awareness-in-Action is intended to signify both the absolute realization of the integral awareness that I am and the relative realization of the différential action that I do, while precluding any latently hierarchical conceptual opposition within the complementarity of awareness/action. It is challenging to find the right terms to articulate nondual ideas without inadvertently denoting dualism, as is the case with the term nondual itself, which includes the term dual, and is therefore suggestive of precisely that which it is intended to not-suggest. Once understood as a deliberately dualistic term for nondualism, the linguistic tension in Awareness-in-Action might be appreciated for the meaning it carries and the inquiry it inspires. It
may also be permissible to use either of the terms awareness or action separately, often for purposes of brevity, without conveying any dualistic intentions. Thus, in my parlance, awareness and action are always awareness-in-action (or action-in-awareness), all three of which, careful readers will have noticed, are deliberately denoted with the same sign: A. Thus, \( A^0 \) signifies Awareness, the Zero Derivative (i.e., Integral) of Action, as well as the Zero Derivative of Awareness-in-Action, as all three are the same. Likewise, \( A^N \) signifies the Indeterminate Derivatives of Action, Awareness-in-Action, and, with a little extra interpretation, Awareness, which is integral to differential action.

Wilber (2007, 22, 50-70), as we have seen, typically defines both individual development and collective evolution in terms of an emergent hierarchy of progressively more transcendent, yet inclusive structures of consciousness—a colorful spectrum of consciousness with intentional, behavioral, meaningful, and functional facets—extending from prerational/premodern to rational/modern to postrational/postmodern levels and beyond. (Fig. 4) This multi-faceted, multi-leveled integral theory—termed AQAL for all-quadrant, all-level— informs one of the predominant discourses about human development and evolution, which emphasizes the as-yet-unrealized potential for (post-)postrational psycho-spiritual development of individuals and corresponding (post-)postmodern conscious evolution of small collectives assessed, or at least professed, to be acting from the highest echelons of that spectrum. This particular meta-theory has also become a popular tool for many students of Wilber’s work, who use it to inform their all-too-instrumental explanations, interpretations, and evaluations of various people, theories, and practices as part of that same discourse about what they see as the necessary progress to higher levels of development and evolution.

In my view, those who study theories of human development and evolution are not necessarily any less prone to the ALC biases whereby an overestimation of one’s own claims to truth, justice, and freedom, juxtaposed with an underestimation of everyone else’s claims to the same, mutually reinforces the all-too-common deceptive, coercive, and defensive habits of reason and communication characteristic of (pre/post)modern consciousness. Informing such consciousness with developmental-evolutionary theories, whether AQAL or any of the alternatives, does little, in and of itself, to enhance the awareness-in-action of those whose tacit structures of consciousness cannot help but to process this new knowledge in purely instrumental, strategic modes of rationality. That these theories tend to be monological in formulation, rather than dialogical, and descriptive
theories of applicable knowledge rather than prescriptive theories of actionable knowledge, further compounds the instrumental tendencies by giving readers the impression that application of the theory in real-world situations should require no new forms of practice from them beyond accurate recital of the theoretical content and unreflexive, unilateral explanation, interpretation, and evaluation of other people’s actions. And when some of these theories or their theorists make the claim that it is only from the highest levels of consciousness that one is able to recognize and understand all the lower levels of consciousness for their important, though subordinate, contributions—however true such a claim may be within the context of a particular theory—while then providing clear, concise descriptions of those lower levels, it tends to exacerbate the instrumental tendencies of many students of the theory, who, being so well-informed, subsequently imagine themselves capable of accurately recognizing and adequately understanding these many lower levels as they appear in the words and deeds of other people—but not so much themselves—which then implies to them that they must be operating from a superior level of consciousness, as per the theory. Needless to say, these are far less than ideal conditions for the integral/différantial discourses of authentication, legitimation, and confirmation that this controversial topic deserves.

269 For one example, a careful review of Kegan’s (1994, 314-5) theory reveals that he differentiates and integrates three distinct lines of consciousness—intrapersonal, interpersonal, and impersonal—that are all involved in this developmental logic by which the capacities experienced as subject in one’s knowing within one structure of consciousness gradually transition over many years to become object in one’s knowing from the more encompassing perspective of the higher-order subject. This suggests that the subjective-objective perspectives in developmental play are not limited to the first-person I-me, but would also include the second-person you-you and third-person she-her, thus 123UL+UR, that are, according to the implicit rules of TQP, all perspectives of my integral/différantial self. Furthermore, although Kegan’s (1994, 307-34) basic developmental logic does not go so far as to outline the mutual reflexive différance within and between the individuated perspectives of my integral/différantial self (123UL+UR), your integral/différantial self (2.123UL+UR), and her integral/différantial self (3.123UL+UR), his descriptions of the (post-)postformal, (post-)postmodern 5th Order of consciousness—e.g., interindividual self (123.1UL+UR), interpenetration of self and other (123.2UL+UR), and dialectical cognition (123.3UL+UR)—together with his (1994, 320-1) alignment of this 5th Order with Argyris’s Model II praxis—valid information, free and informed choice, and internal commitment and vigilant
monitoring—can be interpreted in terms of $TCA^N \times TQP^N = ALC^N$. In fact, without any deliberate attempt to do so, Kegan nevertheless comes rather close to outlining a research-based $TCA^N \times TQP^N$ theory of personal development, with five major structures of consciousness within the $123_{UL}$ and $123_{UR}$ perspectives, together with an evident sensitivity to the evolving socio-cultural contexts ($X_{LL+LR}$) that establish the challenges to, and opportunities for, this personal development.

For another example of a theory of personal development generally congruent with Awareness-in-Action, Susanne Cook-Greuter (2002) describes how self-awareness appears to develop through a sequence of increasingly complex perspectives on oneself and others that offer progressively more sophisticated ways of making sense of reality. These levels of awareness alternate in sequence between differentiating structures marked by a tendency toward individual agency and integrating structures marked by a tendency toward collective communion. Additionally, in a manner similar to Kegan’s developmental logic, the perspective-taking capacity evident at each level in Cook-Greuter’s spiral becomes, in a sense, the pragmatic object of the more encompassing perspective-taking capacity of the subsequent subjects. For example, the capacity to see oneself in relation to others both backward and forward in time in a relatively objective way, which is characteristic of the formal Conscientious structure (roughly Kegan’s 3rd Order), deepens and widens across two subsequent structures into the capacity to see, from the perspective of the (post-)postformal Autonomous seer (roughly Kegan’s 5th Order), the previously unrecognized relativism of the Conscientious seer embedded in cultural and social contexts across multi-generational time spans. Two structures beyond that, the psychologically mature Autonomous seer is newly recognized as an ego-centered, linguistically-constructed, high-functioning identity arising within the aperspectival ego-awareness of the Unitive seer. In short, Cook-Greuter (2002) appears to be positioning the variable capacity for perspective-taking as a qualitative indicator of that most central feature of personal development: identity. While she does not delineate the triadic or the quadratic perspectives within each structure of development, her research-based theory does resemble a simplified version of the multiple derivatives of triadic quadratic perspectivism, wherein the capacity to act through first-, second-, and third-person perspectives is gradually deepened through progressively more encompassing perspectives on the perspectives on the perspectives, with no apparent limits other than the quality of awareness we bring to each action situation.

270 For more on self-deception, see:
271 For more on logical fallacies, see:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Logical_fallacy

272 For more on cognitive biases, see:
See also Kahneman & Tversky (2000) for the definitive research findings on
decision science, with an emphasis on well-documented cognitive biases
and decision heuristics. See also Mercier & Sperber (2011) for an interesting
discussion concerning the possible argumentative purpose of reason, which
would seem to support the idea that ALCN Biases are the normal form of
reason, rather than a biased form of reason. Each implies the other, as far as I
am concerned.

273 For more on psychological projection, see:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Psychological_projection

274 For more on personality types, see:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Personality_type

275 For more on developmental psychology, see: Kegan (1994), Cook-Greuter

276 My oblique reference to an infinite cornucopia of information is inspired by
the Law of the Infinite Cornucopia. According to Wikipedia—
the Infinite Cornucopia, put forth by Polish philosopher Leszek Kołakowski
suggests that for any given doctrine one wants to believe, there is never a
shortage of arguments by which one can support it. A historian’s application
of this law might be that a plausible cause can be found for any given
historical development. A biblical theologian’s application of this law might
be that for any doctrine one wants to believe, there is never a shortage of
biblical evidence to support it.” To this we might add political, economic,
and sociological doctrines as well, in support of which no shortage of
apparent evidence and opinion can typically be gathered by those actively
seeking to verify, but not falsify, whatever it is they already believe to be
true, just, and free.

277 For an expanded treatment of these themes as they appear to be manifest-
ing in the debased political economic discourse of the United States, readers
might be interested in my (O’Connor, 2006) article entitled “The Political
Economics of Stephen Colbert,” wherein I explore (and lament) the current
situation by juxtaposing the ideas of the satirical pundit, Colbert, and the
serious philosopher, Jürgen Habermas.
The deepest/highest exemplars of what I call authentication, legitimation, and confirmation include the three principal yogas from the tradition of Vedanta: jnana yoga, bhakti yoga, and karma yoga. In my interpretation, the three yogas can be described as integral disciplines oriented toward absolute realization by way of the three primary modes of integral/différantial realization:

- **my** authentication of the Self-that-I-am through **my** self-inquiry is jnana yoga, the integral discipline of intrapersonal *knowledge or wisdom*, the dedicated practice of which may ultimately reveal the divine in *me* (TCA\(^N\times 1_{UL} = AF^{NUL} =/= R^0*);

- **my** legitimation of the Self-that-each-of-you-are through **my** selfless devotion to *each of you* is bhakti yoga, the integral discipline of interpersonal *devotion or compassion*, the dedicated practice of which may ultimately reveal to *me* the divine in *each of you* (TCA\(^N\times 2_{UL} = LJ^{NUL} =/= R^0*); and

- **my** confirmation of the Self-that-each-of-they-are through **my** selfless service to *each of them* is karma yoga, the integral discipline of impersonal *action or service*, the dedicated practice of which may ultimately reveal to *me* the divine in *each of them* (TCA\(^N\times 3_{UL} = CT^{NUL} =/= R^0*).

Likewise, *your* authentication of the Self through *your* self-inquiry, or jnana yoga, may ultimately reveal to *you* the divine in *you* (TCA\(^N\times 2.1_{UL} = AF^{NUL} =/= R^0*); *your* legitimation of the Self through *your* selfless compassion
toward each of us, or bhakti yoga, may ultimately reveal to you the divine in each of us \((TCA^N \times 2.2_{UL} = LJ_{UL}^{N_{UL}} /= R^0)\); and your confirmation of the Self through your selfless service to each of them, or karma yoga, may ultimately reveal to you the divine in each of them \((TCA^N \times 2.3_{UL} = CT_{UL}^{N_{UL}} /= R^0)\).

Finally, her authentication of the Self through her self-inquiry, or jnana yoga, may ultimately reveal to her the divine in her \((TCA^N \times 3.1_{UL} = AF_{UL}^{N_{UL}} /= R^0)\); her legitimation of the Self through her selfless compassion toward each of you and them, or bhakti yoga, may ultimately reveal to her the divine in each of you and them \((TCA^N \times 3.2_{UL} = LJ_{UL}^{N_{UL}} /= R^0)\); and her confirmation of the Self through her selfless service to each of them, or karma yoga, may ultimately reveal to her the divine in each of them \((TCA^N \times 3.3_{UL} = CT_{UL}^{N_{UL}} /= R^0)\).

Consistent with the teachings of contemporary Vedantin sages, such as Swami Vivekananda (1996) and Sri Aurobindo (1995; 1996), all three yogas, particularly if practiced by all of us as a genuinely integral yoga, may ultimately support Self-realization for all of us \((TCA^N \times 123.123_{UL} = ALC_{UL}^{N_{UL}} = R^0)\).

\(291\) Habermas (1992a, 34-9).

\(292\) Habermas (1992a).

\(293\) Argyris et. al. (1985, 98-102).

\(294\) Argyris et. al. (1985, 5).

\(295\) Argyris (1985, 79).


\(298\) Wilber (2000c, 379-80).


\(300\) Kuhn (1970, 182).

\(301\) Kuhn (1970, 182).

\(302\) Kuhn (1970, 182-7).

\(303\) Kuhn (1970, 186-7).

\(304\) Wilber (2000e, 217-22).

\(305\) Popper (2002a, 48).

\(306\) Wilber (2000e, 221).


\(308\) Wilber (2000e, 220-1).

\(309\) Popper (2002b, 124).
Wilber (2000e, 220).

Argyris, et.al. (1985, 90-1).

If indeed “science advances one funeral at a time,” as physicist Max Planck purportedly remarked, then it would seem that many of our most capable intellectuals would rather die than fundamentally change their minds about what they think is genuinely real, perhaps because their preferred reality is so intertwined with who they think they are as professionals. Kuhn (1970, 150-1) addressed this all-too-common resistance to paradigmatic revolution when he noted that:

Copernicanism made few converts for almost a century after Copernicus’ death. Newton’s work was not generally accepted, particularly on the Continent, for more than half a century after the Principia appeared. Priestly never accepted the oxygen theory, nor Lord Kelvin the electromagnetic theory, and so on. The difficulties of conversion have often been noted by scientists themselves. Darwin, in a particularly perceptive passage at the end of his Origin of Species, wrote: “Although I am fully convinced of the truth of the views given in this volume..., I by no means expect to convince experienced naturalists whose minds are stocked with a multitude of facts all viewed, during a long course of years, from a point of view opposite to mine. ... [B]ut I look with confidence to the future,—to young and rising naturalists, who will be able to view both sides of the question with impartiality.” And Max Planck, surveying his own career in his Scientific Autobiography, sadly remarked that, “a new scientific truth does not triumph by convincing its opponents and making them see the light, but rather because its opponents eventually die, and a new generation grows up that is familiar with it.”

These facts and others like them are too commonly known to need further emphasis. But they do need re-evaluation. In the past they have most often been taken to indicate that scientists, being only human, cannot always admit their errors, even when confronted with strict proof. I would argue, rather, that in these matters neither proof nor error is at issue. The transfer of allegiance from paradigm to paradigm is a conversion experience that cannot be forced. Lifelong resistance, particularly from those whose productive careers have committed them to an older tradition of normal science, is not a violation of scientific standards but an index to the nature of scientific research itself. The source of re-
sistance is the assurance that the older paradigm will ultimately solve all its problems, that nature can be shoved into the box the paradigm provides. Inevitably, at times of revolution, that assurance seems stubborn and pigheaded as indeed it sometimes becomes. But it is also something more. That same assurance is what makes normal or puzzle-solving science possible. And it is only through normal science that the professional community of scientists succeeds, first, in exploiting the potential scope and precision of the older paradigm and, then, in isolating the difficulty through the study of which a new paradigm may emerge.


315 The discourse between Kuhn, Popper, and Lakatos on such issues as paradigms, falsifiability, and the growth of scientific knowledge is fascinating, as much for the misunderstandings between these philosophers as for their positive contributions. See for example the articles by Kuhn (1974a; 1974b), Popper (1974), and Lakatos (1974), all contained in the single volume Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge.


317 Notwithstanding Wilber’s sincere intentions and assertions to the contrary, there are no domains of interpersonal justice/morality or intrapersonal freedom/honesty—by whatever names—anywhere to be found within the perspectives of AQAL, and therefore no practices of legitimation or authentication—by whatever names—to be found within his definitions of practical injunction, experiential apprehension, and communal confirmation. The primary source of any confusion about this is addressed in Appendix A: The Tri/Quad Fallacy.


319 Another philosophical maxim of interest is the pragmatic maxim articulated by Charles Sanders Peirce (1997, 56), on which his philosophy of pragmatism was based. “The maxim is intended to furnish a method for the analysis of concepts.... The method prescribed in the maxim is to trace out in the imagination the conceivable practical consequences—that is the consequences for deliberate self-controlled conduct—of the affirmation or denial of the concept; and the assertion of the maxim is that herein lies the whole of the purport of the word, the entire concept.” In other words, the meaning of an idea can be wholly assessed in terms of the expected difference its acceptance or rejection would make in human conduct.

While recognizing the deep connection between theory and practice,
Peirce is less concerned with the particulars of any *practical injunction* that might recreate the theoretical concept than he is with the *practical application* of the theoretical concept, the imagined consequences of which constitute the empirical experience to be apprehended and, presumably, evaluated by some unstated criteria. He is therefore focused not on the *practical means* by which knowledge can be validated in *theoretical* form, but on the *theoretical ends* by which knowledge can be validated in *practical* form. Thus, we might articulate this pragmatic maxim as *the meaning of a statement is the ends of its enactment*.

Unfortunately, due to the absence of any dialogical practice or perspective within its thoroughly monological formulation, the pragmatic maxim appears to be particularly susceptible to co-optation by an instrumental rationality that can do no better than assess the validity of a theory in terms of the *success* of its practical results as can be envisioned in monological thought (i.e., win/lose expectations). Unless that theory has already been provisionally validated on the basis of the more significant standards of truth, justice, and freedom, which are inherently dialogical, then the empirical results of its practical application, whether actual or imagined, once apprehended in direct experience, will have to be validated in full discourse—that is, if something more than instrumental success is desired.

320 Habermas (1984, 297-8).
321 Argyris, et.al. (1985, 5)
322 Wilber (1999b, 112-8).
324 Wilber (2003b, part ii; 2003d, part i)
325 Wilber (2003b, part ii).
327 Wilber (2007, 33).
329 Esbjörn-Hargens (2010, 146).
330 Esbjörn-Hargens (2010, 144).
331 Esbjörn-Hargens (2010, 157-8).
332 In a footnote from this article, Esbjörn-Hargens (2010, 168) mentions a conversation between Mark Edwards and himself in which they discuss the potential for an *integral theoretical pluralism*, centered on Wilber’s AQAL formulation of integral theory, with three levels of scale: “1) micro (e.g., how Integral Theory includes a pluralism of unit-level theories in its meta-
framework); 2) meso (e.g., how within Integral Theory there can be a pluralism of approaches to the AQAL model); and 3) meta (e.g., a diversity of metatheories of which Integral Theory is but one).” The problem with this conceptual scheme is that it is premised on the equation of AQAL, which is Wilber’s particular formulation of integral theory, with the whole field of integral theory—a premise enacted by using the two terms interchangeably. The only conceptual space acknowledged between AQAL and integral theory is that which allows for multiple approaches to AQAL—that is, one authoritative formulation of AQAL, being Wilber’s and his alone, and multiple interpretations of that formulation which can only ever be AQAL. The very same equation—AQAL = Integral (Theory, Model, Approach)—has been proactively asserted for over a decade by Wilber and his colleagues from Integral Institute and, more recently, Integral Life. For just one example, consider the recent article by Esbjörn-Hargens (2009) that presents the authoritative overview of AQAL on behalf of Wilber’s Integral Institute, the title of which is “An overview of integral theory: An all-inclusive framework for the 21st century.” Even less subtle are these two definitions of integral from the Integral Institute’s AQAL Glossary, which establishes the terminology for articles to be submitted to their Journal of Integral Theory and Practice: “1. Complete, balanced, whole, lacking nothing essential. In this general usage, ‘integral’ is typically lowercase. 2. When capitalized, ‘Integral’ is synonymous with AQAL. In this usage, ‘Integral Art,’ ‘Integral Ecology,’ or ‘Integral Business’ mean ‘AQAL Art,’ ‘AQAL Ecology,’ ‘AQAL Business,’ etc.”

The implications of this terminological equation certainly present some challenges for those of us working within the field of integral theory, whether capitalized or not, yet beyond the limits of AQAL. First, it implies that all valid critiques of AQAL are critiques of integral theory itself, which may also imply that these critiques constitute something other than integral theory. Thus, critiques of AQAL are regarded as critiques of the one and only Integral (Theory, Model, Approach) and, therefore, perhaps with some exceptions, not integral. Second, it excludes by authoritative definition all alternative formulations of integral theory from consideration as legitimate formulations of integral theory simply because they are not AQAL. Thus, alternatives to AQAL would have to be regarded as alternatives to the one and only Integral (Theory, Model, Approach) and, therefore, without exception, not integral. These implications may, in turn, assist advocates of AQAL in marginalizing as “non-integral” any major integral critiques of, or alternatives to, AQAL, while accepting only those minor critiques and alternatives that can be plausibly positioned as nothing more than alterna-
tive interpretations of, or ongoing refinements to, the ever-integral AQAL, thus still AQAL and, therefore, under the authoritative control of Wilber and his colleagues.

But it is the third implication that should be of greatest concern to those working comfortably within the limits of AQAL while advocating for its equation with Integral (Theory, Model, Approach), because this equation requires that integral theory itself, which is in the early stages of being established as a legitimate field of scholarship and practice, must live and die on the basis of Wilber’s AQAL formulation. Thus, any definitive refutation of AQAL would have to be regarded as a definitive refutation of the one and only Integral (Theory, Model, Approach) and, therefore, the death of integral theory as it is so narrowly and rigidly defined. Given the inevitability of one or more definitive refutations of AQAL, whether of the deconstructive or reconstructive variety, we should expect some of its more passionate advocates to become rather dogmatic in their efforts to undermine the necessary discourse within the integral community of scholar-practitioners, while the fate of “integral theory” itself, as a field of scholarship and practice, hangs in the balance. After all, if AQAL = Integral (Theory, Model, Approach), then the potential refutation of AQAL might be threatening to those who are personally and professionally invested in what they regard as the one and only integral theory, model, approach, vision, community, movement, etc.

It seems to me that generic terms that refer to whole fields of scholarly inquiry, like social theory, critical theory, or market theory, belong in the public intellectual domain, regardless of who might have first coined the term. Specific terms that refer to one theoretical formulation or another within a general field, like specific social, critical, or market theories, can certainly be capitalized and otherwise differentiated as a distinct, perhaps even predominant, school of thought or research program, but not to the exclusion of others working in the same general field. I recognize that Wilber and his colleagues have chosen to define “AQAL = Integral (Theory, Model, Approach)” as that specific formulation or school of thought within some larger and more general field of meta-theory or, as Esbjörn-Hargens (2009) has also proposed, integral studies. I do not take issue with the positioning of either AQAL or integral theory, whether capitalized or not, as specific fields within these more generic fields. What concerns me is the immediate reduction of the potentially wider field of integral theory to AQAL through this enacted equation. If there can be no legitimate integral theory that is not already AQAL, then what exactly is the future of this AQAL-delimited field of integral theory beyond marginal refinements in the
AQAL formulation and its extensive application to other domains of theory and practice? How can a field of scholarship and practice that was, by the definition of its sole founder and his colleagues, created in 1995 and formally named in 2000—which is essentially yesterday in academic terms—be expected to evolve if it is deliberately defined in a way that marginalizes or excludes the possibility of theoretical innovation right from the start? How can a field of scholarship and practice that is deliberately defined in a way that marginalizes or excludes the possibility of theoretical innovation avoid the inevitable descent into dogma disguised as discourse? Therefore, if Wilber, Esbjörn-Hargens, and their colleagues want “integral theory” to continue evolving into a field even more worthy of its name, I hope they will reconsider their short-sighted strategy to the benefit of the much wider, deeper, and more diverse field of integral theoretical pluralism that already, in fact, exists.

Nearly every term introduced in this praxiological pluralism—from intentionalism, behavioralism, interpretivism, and functionalism to individualism, collectivism, subjectivism, and objectivism—is burdened with problematic connotations that appear to be unavoidable. My intent is simply to offer relatively neutral descriptive terms closely aligned with the terms I use for the primary and secondary quadratic perspectives in TQP. It would be a mistake to assume that my use of any one of these terms is the same as its use in any particular philosophical school of thought. Furthermore, it is important to recognize that each and every one of these quadratic primordial praxes is fully triadic in multiple derivatives, thereby embracing the integral discourses of authentication, legitimation, and confirmation with respect to its limited domain. This alone renders each and every one of these primordial praxes distinct from any methods currently operating under any names. Therefore, instead of trying to interpret the meaning of my use of each term by analogy to its use by others, it would be far more effective to deduce the meaning from the whole context of Awareness-in-Action.

I coined the term critical integralism to capture the idea of an inherently critical meta-paradigm infusing an otherwise integral meta-paradigm, thus grounding its essentialist/comprehensivist aspirations in the unavoidably (r)evolutionary challenge of human action in real-world contexts. As I hold it, I think there may be room within this concept to embrace a number of alternative formulations/articulations of the nexus between integral theory and critical theory.

Wilber (2000d, 408) has loosely positioned his AQAL as an integral critical theory, following Jack Crittenden’s 1996 observation in the foreword to Wilber’s The Eye of Spirit, wherein he describes the manner in which Wilber
uses AQAL, a meta-theory that purportedly incorporates as many partial truths as possible from a wide variety of constituent theories, to critique the relative partiality of its constituent theories from the perspective of its more holistic integrations. This appears to be the same meta-theoretical technique used by Habermas (1984, 1987), for example in the two volumes of The Theory of Communicative Action. There is certainly some value in using a meta-theory to critique the partiality of various theories, and all the more value in using that meta-theory to systematically reconstruct those theories so that they are less partial, more integral. However, the critical integralism I am formulating and articulating is more ambitious.

Interestingly, Wilber’s earliest foray into a form of integral critical theory—about 15 years before he adopted the term integral theory to define his work—was also more ambitious. In A Sociable God, in which he outlines a proposal for a developmental sociology of religion, Wilber (1999b, 112-8) incorporates and extends Habermas’s (1971) formulation of critical-reflective social theory by making an interesting distinction between what he terms horizontal and vertical types of emancipatory interest. As he (Wilber, 1999b, 60-1) envisioned it, “a comprehensive, unified, critical sociological theory might best be constructed around a detailed, multidisciplinary analysis of the developmental-logic and hierarchic levels of relational (psychosocial) exchanges that constitute the human compound individual. The theory would be critical in two important ways: (1) adjudicative of each higher level of structural organization and critical of the comparative partiality of each lower level, and (2) critical of the distortions in exchange when and if they occur on any particular level. The latter is a criticism within a level and demands as its corrective a self-reflection on the historical formations that led to the distortions in the particular realm, economic, emotional, communicative, or spiritual. The former is a criticism between levels and demands as its corrective a growth to higher levels. The one is a horizontal emancipation, the other, a vertical emancipation. Neither can be dispensed with—growth to a higher level does not ensure the healthy normalization of a lower level, and healing a lower level does not in and of itself produce a higher level.”

With reference to a proposed five-level developmental-structural model of cognitive interests, Wilber (1999b, 112-8) mentions Marx, Freud, and Habermas as exemplars of, respectively, material-economic, emotional-sexual, and communicative levels of critique, while positing the need for analogous critical engagement with potential distortions that can arise in pursuit of two additional levels of cognitive interest: the soteriological interest in salvation and the gnostic interest in radical liberation. “Where soteriological interest wishes to present to the self a higher knowledge, liberation’s interest aims at
dissolving the self into higher knowledge as that knowledge, that is, as spirit’s knowledge of and as spirit. The former wishes, as self, to be saved by spirit; the latter wishes, as spirit, to transcend self.”

Awareness-in-Action \((TCA^N \times TQP^N = ALC^N = R^N = A^N)\) embraces all of these cognitive interests and this more complete notion of emancipation, while relaxing the strict distinctions between horizontal/vertical emancipation that are necessarily based on a developmental-structural theory of human action that, in practice, does not appear to be as primordial as the triadic quadratic perspectives through which any and all such development/evolution unfolds. Incidentally, the passages in the present work that address the perspectives and practices of Self-realization may be interpreted as soteriological articulations of both the soteriological and gnostic interests and aspects of Awareness-in-Action, with Ramana Maharshi being respectfully positioned as the exemplary critical integral gnostic interventionist.

Two additional contributions to the discourse of integral/critical theory came to my attention while writing this book. Daniel Gustav Andersen (2006; 2008; 2010) has published a series of three articles that outline what he calls a critical integral theory, the impressive erudition of which I find all the more fascinating because of the entirely different approach he takes to what may appear to be, at first glance, a similar line of inquiry. Martin Beck Matuštík (2007) takes yet another approach to what he calls integral critical theory, based on a “three-pronged model of material, socio-political, and spiritual critique of the present age.” If nothing else, the diversity of our different approaches to what I call critical integralism (and shall we include integral criticalism?) is suggestive of a great potential for future development of this appropriately différential discourse, to which I look forward.

335 Habermas (1971).
336 For example, Habermas (1971), Argyris, et.al. (1985), and Wilber (1999b).
337 For example, Argyris, et.al. (1985).
338 For example, Habermas (1979; 1987).
339 For example, Habermas (1975; 1979; 1987).
340 For example, Wilber (1999b, 60-1).
341 For example, Argyris, et.al. (1985).
342 For example, Argyris, et.al. (1985).
343 For example, Argyris, et.al. (1985), Habermas (1971; 1979; 1984; 1987), and Wilber (1999b; 2000d; 2003; 2007).
344 Habermas (1971).
There is an interesting similarity between this critical theory of social enlightenment and emancipation and the Four Noble Truths of Buddhism, which might be described as a critical theory of spiritual enlightenment and emancipation. As described in this article (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Four_Noble_Truths), “the four noble truths are: i) the truth of dukkha (suffering, anxiety, unsatisfactoriness); ii) the truth of the origin of dukkha; iii) the truth of the cessation of dukkha; and iv) the truth of the path leading to the cessation of dukkha.” My use of the terms enlightenment, emancipation, and realization embrace both the social and spiritual aspects, which I tend to designate in terms of the differential action that we do and the integral awareness that we are, without confusing or conflating the two.

One of the best examples of a large-scale, multi-sector realization (RN) crisis-in-progress is the current monetary crisis, which has had, and will continue to have, significant negative consequences for truth, justice, and freedom in specifically economic, political, social, and ecological contexts, at least until unprecedented monetary, banking, and financial reforms take place in the United States, Europe, China, and the other great powers to eliminate the root causes of the crisis. I (O’Connor, 2011) addressed this crisis in an article, Debt Trapped: Exploring Monetary Futures, which was written as a critical integral intervention into the decidedly indefinite functionalist (XLR) (post)modern political economic discourse about the US economy circa 2010. A consistent emancipatory/enlightenment interest is expressed throughout the article, in three seemingly different, yet deeply similar ways.

The primary intervention is an appropriately praxiological functionalist (3.123LR) critique of monetary policy and the system of money, banking, and finance that it sustains, which includes four complementary scenarios for the potential consequences of monetary policy choices given the current system design—hence, path-dependent potentials originating in the design of the monetary system and shaped by subsequent policy choices about how best to sustain that system—the plausible truths (3.123LR) of which dramatically illustrate the relative absence of economic truth (3.3LR), justice (3.2LR), and freedom (3.1LR) that the vast majority of us are unknowingly forced to accept as mandated conditions of our participation in the economy. In other words, the possibility that the very design of the monetary system and the
very conduct of monetary policy, characterized as they are by insufficient
degrees of transparency, choice, and accountability, hence institutionalized
deception, coercion, and defensiveness, would render plausible all four of
these scenarios raises serious questions about the extent to which the vast
majority of the population are living, working, borrowing, investing, and
nevertheless failing amidst economic conditions far less true, just, and free
than they believe.

The secondary intervention is a more subtle engagement with the read-
er (2.123AQ) that is intended to facilitate a shift in perspective from an out-
ward-focused cognition of an objectified world as an overwhelming given
(XLR) that tends to reduce one’s equally objectified sense of self to a solitary
figure, me (1UR) or, worse yet, anyone (XUR), in antagonistic resistance to that
unattractive world—the standard modern myth of the functionalist given—
to an inward-focused re-cognition of the reader’s own unique, active identi-
fication, I (1UL), with the integral awareness, I-I (0), that is always already
holding the entirety of this nevertheless challenging political economic
discourse (123.123AQ), including that which was, just a moment ago while
reading those scenarios (3.123LR), likely felt as a contracted objectified
identification, at best me (1UR), in tense opposition with an overwhelming
outward de-identification, everyone and everything else (XLR).

Given the premises of Awareness-in-Action, which are based on the
apparent presuppositions of human awareness-in-action, these two critical
integral interventions are complementary ways of engaging with the reader
regarding what appears, to me at least, to be a realization crisis-in-progress,
which points to the self-reflexive third intervention by which I (1UL) simul-
taneously acknowledge the obvious fact that I am the author of this admit-
tedly biased explanatory, interpretive, and evaluative narrative by gently
inviting the reader, in my second-person perspective (2.1UL), to re-cognize
his or her own causal role as accountable author of his or her own alterna-
tive narrative of what is (123.123AQ) from the perspectives of what could be
(123.3AQ), what should be (123.2AQ), and what would be (123.1AQ) amidst the
integral awareness (0) that he or she really is.

The Debt Trapped article is therefore indicative of one way that I use
Awareness-in-Action as a critical integral praxis with a thoroughly emanci-
patory/enlightenment interest in the presence of the past/future, in this case
offered to a very large potential audience of (post)modern participants in
the US political economic discourse for whom the causal role of monetary
policy and system in the economic, political, social, and ecological problems
they recognize nevertheless remains a mystery.

As another example of a critical integral intervention in the contentious
(post)modern political economic discourse, in 2002 I wrote A Crisis of Vision: Toward a More Integral Economics. I originally intended this to be the opening chapter of a long-since-transcluded book (O'Connor, 2003), but subsequently published it as an article (O'Connor, 2005). In this article, I introduce for the first time the critical integral practices of transparency, choice, and accountability, both as the major implicit themes of the contentious political economic discourse of the time—illustrated in terms of three complementary political-economic sub-cultures: libertarians, egalitarians, and authoritarians—and as a critical integral theory of the market that might serve to better inform this discourse by clarifying how the market is supposed to work, why it doesn’t generally work as promised, and what we can do to make it work for us. Awareness-in-Action is the present status of the critical integral (meta-)paradigm I introduced in A Crisis of Vision.

352 Stephen Mitchell (2000, 64-5).


354 Mark Edwards (2003) appears to have been the first to publish a proposed reconstruction of Wilber’s AQAL that is, in part, an effort to address some of the problematic symptoms of what I refer to as Wilber’s tri/quad conflation. “While there are,” as Edwards (2003, n.p.) introduced it, “many innovative aspects to Wilber’s current work on social perspectives, I believe that his I-We-It-Its model has deep-seated flaws that can be traced back to some fundamental inconsistencies in conceptualisations of the holon construct. One implication is that there is no real phenomenological space for "you" singular or "you" plural in Wilber’s model. This, combined with his reduction of the third person "he/she/it" to simply "it" and "them to "its", results in a model of perspectives that is inadequate for the representation and analysis of complex social dynamics and interactions.” While Edwards’s critique of AQAL was unknown to me prior to my (2008a, 2008b) publication of triadic quadratic perspectivism, and does not inform my argument in the tri/quad fallacy, I would be remiss if I did not draw attention to, and express appreciation for, his pioneering critique of AQAL. Having mentioned this, I should offer some brief remarks about what I see as a fundamental difference between our two views of integral perspectives.

Approaching his critical reconstruction of AQAL with a focus on the perspectives and dynamics of holons, rather than my approach focused on the perspectives and practices of human action, Edwards (2003, n.p.) reconstructs what he terms the Integral Holon with four quadrants that frame any holon’s UL experiential life and identity, UR behavioral life and identity, LL cultural life and identity, and LR social life and identity. He further claims that
there are in fact two different types of holons, individual and collective, each of which is a fully quadratic Integral Holon with its own subjectivity and objectivity, as well as a newly differentiated form of agency and communion characterizing, respectively, the new upper and lower quadrants of both individual and collective holons. Thus, instead of individual and collective dimensions characterizing the upper and lower quadrants of a quadratic holon, Edwards separates individual and collective holons and posits analogous dimensions of agency and communion for both. He then proposes that each pair of individual and collective quadratic holons can be framed in terms of the first-, second-, and third-person perspectives of language. This results in six distinct quadratic holons encompassing a total of 24 primordial, or indigenous, perspectives. However, due to the fact that there are only 12 primordial perspectival pronouns—the singular-subjective, singular-objective, plural-subjective, and plural-objective of the first-, second-, and third-person—he is compelled to re-use each set of individual subjective-objective pronouns (i.e., I-me, you-you, he-him / she-her) for both the upper and lower quadrants of the individual holons and re-use each set of collective subjective-objective pronouns (i.e., we-us, you-you, they-them) for both the upper and lower quadrants of the collective holons. For example, he separates what I understand to be a quadratic first-person perspective of human action, with UL-UR-LL-LR perspectives signified by the quadratic pronoun I-me-we-us, into a quadratic individual first-person holon, signified by the UL-UR-LL-LR pronouns I-me-I-me, and a quadratic collective first-person holon, signified by the UL-UR-LL-LR pronouns we-us-we-us.

When I interpret this in terms of triadic quadratic perspectivism, it appears that Edwards’s formulation accentuates the differentiation of perspectives at the expense of integration, resulting in a set of proposed primordial perspectives inconsistent with what I, at least, see as the perspectival presuppositions of human awareness-in-action. In fact, none of the 24 primordial perspectives identified by Edwards match any of the 12 primordial perspectives identified by me in TQP, despite what appears to be our shared desire to differentiate, at least, the triadic and the quadratic perspectives mistakenly equated and conflated in AQAL. The source of the surprisingly large rift between our two formulations is to be found in what I understand to be his claim that reality is composed of holons and, specifically, individual holons and collective holons, each of which possesses its own four quadrants based on its own inherent drives or dimensions of agency and communion, subjectivity and objectivity. In my view, which I still hold as a hypothesis, the individual and collective are inseparable aspects, not of holons, but of human awareness-in-action. As I proposed in Part I:
Individual pronouns in the intentional (123\textsubscript{UL}) and behavioral (123\textsubscript{UR}) are always paired with appropriate collective pronouns in the cultural (123\textsubscript{LL}) and social (123\textsubscript{LR}), because each implicates the other in every action. There is no such thing as an individual perspective without its contextual collective or a collective perspective without its constituent individuals. Likewise, subjective pronouns in the intentional (123\textsubscript{UL}) and cultural (123\textsubscript{LL}) are always paired with appropriate objective pronouns in the behavioral (123\textsubscript{UR}) and social (123\textsubscript{LR}), because each implicates the other in every action. There is no such thing as a subjective perspective without its complementary objective or an objective perspective without its complementary subjective. Finally, first-person (1\textsubscript{AQ}), second-person (2\textsubscript{AQ}), and third-person (3\textsubscript{AQ}) perspectives and their corresponding pronouns mutually implicate one another in every action. There is no such thing as a first-, second-, or third-person perspective in isolation without the other two corresponding perspectives.

Therefore, despite Edwards’s attempt to use personal pronouns to signify all 24 of his primordial perspectives, because his formulation requires him to use each pronoun twice, he may in fact be misusing each and every pronoun to signify perspectives that are not actually consistent with these pronouns—perspectives that, in my view, are not actually primordial. His version of integral perspectivism may suffer from the same general problem as Wilber’s, though much less so, namely that it is inconsistent with the actual system of interlocking personal pronouns at the preconscious root of semiotic and pragmatic human awareness-in-action—the primordial signs we use to identify the various facets of reality, or primordial referents, we experience through the primordial perspectives of our awareness-in-action. Edwards’s formulation is commendably freed from the major distortions of Wilber’s tri/quad conflation, but stops short, in my opinion, of a more compelling re-integration rooted in the self-evident reality of awareness-in-action, which is the only reality we know in which any such thing as a holon can be said to exist.

Lexi Neale (2009) appears to have been the third to publish a proposed reconstruction of Wilber’s AQAL that is, in part, an effort to address some of the problematic symptoms of what I refer to as Wilber’s tri/quad conflation. Although he was apparently unaware of my (2008a, 2008b) triadic quadratic perspectivism at the time of his publication, Neale’s AQAL Cube identifies the same primordial perspectives—a first-person, all-quadrant perspective, a second-person, all-quadrant perspective, and a third-person, all-quadrant perspective—in both personal and possessive forms, consistent with the 1st
Derivative of TQP. Beyond the identification of these three quadratic pronouns, Neale has yet to discover the multiple derivatives of TQP that reveal the inherently mutual, reflexive, différantial, and, ultimately, integral aperspectival nature of our situational awareness-in-action. Also of note is Chris Dierkes’s (2009) insightful review of Neale’s AQAL Cube—through which I discovered Neale’s article—including references to Edwards’s (2003) and mine (2008a).

356 Wilber (2000c, 373).
357 Wilber (2000a; 2007).
358 Wilber (2003c; 2007).
361 Wilber (2007).
364 Wilber 2007, 37).
368 Esbjörn-Hargens (2009, 5-7).
371 Esbjörn-Hargens (2009, 5-6).
373 Esbjörn-Hargens (2009, 6).
376 Wilber (2007, 42).
377 Wilber (2007, 2, 18, 34).
379 Wilber (2000a).
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