Anti-Israeli Terrorism, 2006:
Data, Analysis and Trends

Rocket fire into Israel from Lebanon and the Gaza Strip

Syrian-manufactured 220 mm rockets fired at Haifa by Hezbollah from the outskirts of Tyre (August 13, 2006)

Homemade Hamas Qassam rockets ready to be fired at Sderot (Al-Arabi TV, July 14, 2006)

The abductions of IDF soldiers led to the second Lebanon war and escalation in the Gaza Strip

The abducted soldiers, left to right: Ehud Goldwasser, Eldad Regev, Gilad Shalit (Israeli Foreign Ministry Website, January 11, 2007)
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Terrorism Overview, 2006

A. General description of anti-Israeli terrorism, 2006

1. This study examines and analyzes the terrorism directed against Israel, which continued during 2006 as a central factor influencing the agenda of the State of Israel. It examines the activities of the Palestinian terrorist organizations, Hezbollah and the global jihad, and compares their modus operandi with previous years. It also deals with the support given by Iran and Syria to the terrorist organizations operating against Israel as well as other factors influencing the extent and nature of anti-Israeli terrorism.

2. During 2006 the number of terrorist attacks carried out by the Palestinian terrorist organizations constantly continued to decline, especially suicide bombing attacks, despite the fact that motivation to carry out such attacks has been increasing. The decline in the number of suicide bombing attacks is a result of many factors, the most prominent of which are the successful counterterrorist activities of the Israeli security forces and Hamas’s policy of restraint, which because of political considerations, kept them from focusing their efforts on such attacks.

3. During 2006 abductions and rocket fire replaced suicide bombing terrorism as the dominant factor of the campaign against Israel. Abductions and rocket fire are less lethal than suicide bombing attacks, but their consequences have long-term strategic influences on the internal Israeli arena, on the Lebanese arena and on the entire Middle East, and those influences will continue to make themselves felt in Israel through 2007.

4. In 2006 events focused on two separate abductions of IDF soldiers. The most significant, which took place at Zar’it on the Lebanese border, was carried out by Hezbollah according to a modus operandi familiar from past attacks. Israel’s
uncompromising response caught Hezbollah by surprise and led to the 33-day second Lebanon war. The war temporarily overshadowed the Palestinian terrorist campaign and forced Israel to transfer its attention and efforts to the northern border. The other abduction, carried out by Hamas in collaboration with two other terrorist organizations, also escalated the confrontation and resulted in forceful IDF actions in the Gaza Strip for the first time since the disengagement of August 2005.

5. The second Lebanon war enabled Hezbollah, for the first time, to use its massive arsenal of advanced weapons (provided by Iran and Syria) against both Israel’s civilian population and the IDF. Especially menacing with respect to offensive capabilities were the massive volleys of rocket fire directed at civilian population centers in Israel on every single day of the fighting, a total of approximately 4,000 rockets which hit targets as far south as Hadera. Defensively, Hezbollah’s advanced anti-tank missiles were effective against Israeli ground forces in south Lebanon, as was the attack of a Chinese-made C-802 rocket fired at an Israeli Navy ship.

6. During the war the IDF succeeded in destroying some of Hezbollah’s long-range rockets, caused extensive damage to the organization’s military infrastructure and created a new situation in south Lebanon. The manifestations of that new situation were the transfer of three Lebanese army brigades to the south, the upgrading of the UNIFIL forces and pushing Hezbollah posts further back from the border. Nevertheless, Hezbollah continues to foster the myth that it was “victorious” in the war, based on its success to activate its rocket arsenal throughout the war and the Israeli failures, both in the way the army was put into action and on the home front. That has made it necessary for Israel to rethink and reorganize its military and political systems, based on the lessons of the war (a process which is still in progress). Hezbollah as well began, with the aid and support of Iran and Syria, reconstructing its damaged operational capabilities.
7. Hezbollah’s rocket and missile capabilities in the second Lebanon war served as a model for the Palestinian terrorist organizations, which make every effort to acquire advanced weapons, especially long-range rockets and anti-tank missiles. That is part of the buildup project currently being undertaken in the Gaza Strip, especially by Hamas, and which accelerated after the disengagement and Hamas’s rise to power.

8. As part of the project, during the past year Hamas and the other terrorist organizations have organized themselves in a quasi-military fashion, with both offensive and defensive elements. One aspect was a new military framework was established this year under the aegis of the Hamas government’s interior ministry, called the Executive Force. In addition, there have been massive amounts of weapons smuggled into the Gaza Strip mainly through a system of tunnels dug along the wide-open Philadephí route, including 122 mm Grad rockets and Konkurs second-generation anti-tank missiles. Massive amounts of homemade weapons have been manufactured, including rockets, anti-tank weapons and explosive devices; terrorist-operatives have received extensive training both in the Gaza Strip and abroad (Lebanon, Syria, Iran); and an enormous number of underground bunkers and tunnels have been built for both offensive and defensive purposes.

9. So far, the post-disengagement efforts of the terrorist organizations to copy the buildup process (including the ability to fire mortars and rockets) in Judea and Samaria have failed, principally because of Israel’s counterterrorist activities. However, despite the blows inflicted on the terrorists in Judea and Samaria, they continue to try to dispatch suicide bombers to carry out attacks in Israel. The Fatah and PIJ infrastructures in Nablus and Jenin, which are directed by external headquarters, continue as foci of terrorist activities in Judea and Samaria even though in 2006 their operational capabilities were inferior to those of former years.
B. Comparison between 2006 and the previous years

10. Since September 2000 the Palestinians terrorist organizations have waged an unremitting terrorist campaign against Israel (called by the Palestinians “the second intifada” or “the Al-Aqsa intifada”). During the campaign, which has been unprecedented in both extent and force since the beginning of the Israeli-Palestinian confrontation, terrorism has spiraled up and down and from time to time the terrorist organizations have made significant changes in their methods.

11. The peak of the terrorist campaign was during 2001-2002, and since then number and deadliness of the attacks have been in constant decline, although both formally and practically the confrontation has not ended. Attempts to formulate and adhere to partial or full ceasefire agreements have so far been unsuccessful because the PIJ and other organizations stubbornly continue carrying out attacks.

12. During 2005, in view of the disengagement, an internal Palestinian agreement was reached regarding a “lull in the fighting” which was never fully implemented and ended in January 2006. On November 25, 2006, PA chairman Abu Mazen and Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert reached an agreement regarding a ceasefire in the Gaza Strip. The terrorist organizations did not implement that agreement either, and to a certain extent terrorism from the Gaza Strip ratcheted up a notch with the suicide bombing attack in Eilat in January 2007.

13. The terrorist campaign waged against Israel by Hezbollah, which began while the IDF was in Lebanon for the first Lebanon war (1982-1985), continued during the era of the “security zone” (1985-2000). After the IDF left south Lebanon in May 2000 a new stage began: Hezbollah began accelerating the construction of its broad military infrastructure, particularly south Lebanon, kept up a controlled degree of tension along the border by means of sporadic attacks
attacks on IDF posts, abducting soldiers, firing rockets and mortars at Israel, and supported the Palestinian terrorist organizations in the PA with money, weapons and training.

14. Israel’s response was to adopt a policy of restraint intended to contain Hezbollah attacks and made do with treating the problem through the intervention of the international community. Such a policy enabled Israel to focus most of its efforts on Palestinian terrorism, which overshadowed the Hezbollah threat until the second Lebanon war and prevented deterioration along the Israeli-Lebanese border. Hezbollah policy was to continue the attacks while keeping the tension from boiling over. That, along with Israel’s policy of restraint generally enabled the settlements along Israel’s northern border to live their daily lives in a routine fashion during the six years after the IDF’s withdrawal from Lebanon. The price, however, was granting Hezbollah a free hand to construct a broad military infrastructure.

15. The abduction of two IDF soldiers on July 12, 2006, radically changed the situation which had lasted for six years. Israel abandoned its policy of restraint and, to Hezbollah’s surprise, responded forcefully (as Hassan Nasrallah publicly admitted after the war). Thus the abduction, which Hezbollah viewed as “playing by the rules,” and which they expected to produce a limited, localized Israeli response, turned into a full-fledged war between Israel and Hezbollah, leading to the creation of a new situation in south Lebanon and new “rules of engagement.”

C. Factors influencing the nature and extent of Palestinian terrorism, 2006

16. Four main factors, in our assessment, influenced the nature and extent of Palestinian terrorism in 2006, which was and is one of the main threats facing the State of Israel:
A. The effectiveness of the counterterrorism measures taken by the Israeli security forces in Judea and Samaria: During 2006 the Israeli security forces conducted intensive counterterrorism activities which included the detention of wanted terrorists, the exposure of weapons and the killing of terrorist-operatives who resisted detention. That successful activity severely damaged the terrorist infrastructures, both the leadership and the rank and file. In addition, along with the completion of many sections of the security fence (which has proved its effectiveness), it also led to an additional decline in the number of suicide bombing attacks and forced the terrorist organizations to make do with relatively simple attacks such as shootings and stabbings. At the same time, there was a sharp rise in the number of rockets launched from the Gaza Strip (where the terrorist organizations enjoy unfettered freedom of action) at Israeli population centers in the western Negev “in compensation” for operational difficulties in Judea and Samaria.

B. Dramatic developments in the internal Palestinian arena, the most important of which was the Hamas takeover of the Palestinian government after their victory in the Palestinian Legislative Council elections. That resulted in unending power struggles between PA chairman Israel Mazen and Hamas prime minister Ismail Haniya, and violent clashes between Israel and Hamas which led to increased anarchy in the Gaza Strip and the collapse of government institutions. Those events hampered the operational capabilities of the terrorist organizations and sometimes turned attention (especially that of Hamas) to internal Palestinian struggles for power and survival at the expense of terrorist activity against Israel. Hamas’s government commitments were also a restraining factor. Therefore, in our assessment, the cocktail of internal Palestinian developments was an important factor contributing to the decline in volume and change in nature of Palestinian terrorism during 2006. It is particularly worthwhile mentioning Hamas, which kept from focusing on suicide bombing terrorism and left the field open to the PIJ.

C. The Israel’s intensive activity in the Gaza Strip, which increased after Israel soldier Gilad Shalit was abducted: That
activity included infantry and armored operations in the northern and southern Gaza Strip and targeted killings carried out by the Israeli Air Force: senior terrorist-operatives were killed; arms storehouses and workshops for the manufacture of weapons were attacked; terrorist bases, training camps and terrorist organization offices were attacked; suspects were detained; and tunnels used for smuggling weapons were exposed. In addition, for the first time since the disengagement, two broad operations were carried out targeting the terrorist infrastructure: Operation Summer Rain during Israel and August, and Operation Autumn Clouds, in October and November. The Israel’s activity in the Gaza Strip made it hard for the terrorist organizations to continue the buildup and carry out terrorist attacks. However, it did not lead to the release of Gilad Shalit or a decrease in the amount of rocket fire, but rather spurred the terrorist organizations on to increase their efforts to launch rockets during Israel operations as the only response possible to Israel activity.

D. The second Lebanon war temporarily distracted Israel’s attention from the Gaza Strip and focused it on the northern border. During the war, Hezbollah attempted to activate the Palestinian terrorist organizations it supports to carry out abductions and suicide bombing attacks against Israel to open a second front. Their efforts failed, however, because of the efficacy of the Israeli security forces’ counterterrorism activities. After the war the Palestinian terrorist organizations, especially Hamas, made efforts to upgrade their weapons and other military capabilities, primarily standard rockets, such as the Grad (122 mm), and advanced anti-tank weapons (such as Konkurs missiles). That was done to create a balance of deterrence with Israel based on the model Hezbollah created in Lebanon.
D. Iranian and Syrian support for the terrorist organizations

17. Iran and Syria, two states which sponsor terrorism and are subject to increasing pressure from the international community, view the terrorist campaign waged by the Palestinian organizations and Hezbollah as an effective tool to harm and weaken Israel. The support they give the organizations and their terrorist campaign are also effective measures to strengthen the Iranian and Syrian regimes and the Iranian-Syrian axis (“the axis of evil”), to advance and increase the influence of both countries in Lebanon and the Arab-Muslim world and to strengthen their position versus the United States and the international community.

18. Considering Hezbollah as an important strategic asset, Iran and Syria helped it establish an enhanced military infrastructure in Lebanon, turning it from a guerilla terrorist organization into an organization with military ground capabilities similar to those of a sovereign state. The infrastructure included a defensive deployment and offensive options in the form of an enormous (more than 20,000) rocket arsenal, which was prematurely activated during the second Lebanon war. Since the war both Iran and Syria have helped Hezbollah rehabilitate its military capabilities, which had been partially destroyed. Conspicuous was the large-scale smuggling of arms from Syria into Lebanon (especially south Lebanon) in clear and direct contravention of the provisions of Security Council Resolution 1701.

19. The rise of Hamas to power in the PA and the achievements of Hezbollah in the second Lebanon war strengthened the positions of both organizations Iran and Syria. During the second half of 2006 both countries were conspicuous in their efforts to rehabilitate Hezbollah’s military infrastructure in Lebanon, as was Iran’s immense involvement in compensating Shi’ite Lebanese residents and in rebuilding Shi’ite areas damaged during the war. Conspicuous as well was the generous financial aid Iran promised Hamas prime minister Ismail Haniya ($250 million and aid for development projects) during the latter’s December 7-
11 visit to Tehran, and the frequent summit meetings held by the heads of the Syrian regime and the Hamas leadership.

20. In addition to the above, during 2006 Iran and Syria continued their “ordinary” aid to the Palestinian terrorist organizations at the “traditional” levels: direction of the activities of the terrorist organizations in the PA-administered territories continued coming from the terrorist organizations’ headquarters in Damascus, especially from the PIJ and Hamas’s “external” headquarters (the latter has become a dominant factor in Hamas’s internal balance of power); Iran’s funding for the activities of the terrorist organizations (especially the PIJ); providing the Palestinian terrorist organizations with weapons to be smuggled into the PA-administered territories; and allowing Palestinian terrorist-operatives to be trained in various military fields in camps in Iran, Syria and Lebanon.

E. Sources

21. This study is mainly based on data and information appearing in the Bulletins issued by the Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center (ITIC) during 2006. They were complemented by data received from the Israel Security Agency, the Operational Division of the IDF’s General Staff and from Military Intelligence. When there was a discrepancy between the sources, the data of the ITIC and the IDF’s Operational Division were usually preferred. The analyses and assessments in this study were prepared by the ITIC research staff.
Chapter I

The nature and extent of Palestinian terrorism, 2006

A. Magnitude: a reduction in the volume of terrorist attacks

1. In 2006, with the exception of rocket fire, the number of various Palestinian terrorist organization attacks continued to decline. The decrease in the number of terrorist attacks has progressively declined since the 2001 peak. A total of 2,135 attacks were carried out in 2006, compared with 2,365 in 2005.¹

2. With regard to regional distribution, approximately 50% of the attacks originated in the Gaza Strip, 45% in Judea and Samaria and 5% were carried out inside Israel by terrorists who had infiltrated from Judea and Samaria. The number of attacks from the Gaza Strip, including rocket fire (the most conspicuous type of attack), spiked in July and November although they were the months of extensive IDF activity in the Gaza Strip (Operations Summer Rains and Autumn Clouds).

3. Of all the attacks carried out, the most “prominent” were the following: in an attack near Kerem Shalom close to the Gaza Strip on June 25, two IDF soldiers were killed and one, Corporal Gilad Shalit, was abducted to the Gaza Strip. Attacks originating in Samaria included two suicide bombing attacks at the same fast food restaurant in Tel Aviv, both carried out by terrorists from Palestinian Islamic Jihad cells in Jenin and Nablus.

¹ The decreasing trend in the number of attacks is even more prominent if rocket attacks, which peaked during 2006, are eliminated.
Personal assaults include stabbings, attempts to run over individuals, and general attacks.

Terrorist attacks during the six years of the confrontation

Total number of attacks: 27,905
4. The decrease in the number of attacks, especially from Judea and Samaria, was primarily a function of the effective counterterrorist measures taken by the Israeli security forces. One of the outcomes was the sharp increase in the number of detentions on suspicion of terrorist activities: 6,968 suspects were detained, compared with 4,532 in 2005 (an increase of approximately 35%). Thirty-nine percent of the detainees belonged to Hamas, among them senior members holding offices in the government and the Palestinian Legislative Council. For the most part, the rest belonged to Fatah and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ). Among the detainees were 279 potential suicide bombers (See below on suicide bombing attacks).

**Distribution of detained Palestinians**

- **Hamas**: 39%
- **Fatah**: 31%
- **PIJ**: 25%
- **PFLP**: 5%

**B. Geography: Judea and Samaria vs. the Gaza Strip**

**Overview**

5. In the Gaza Strip, where there is no permanent presence of the Israeli security forces, the modus operandi of the terrorists differed from that used in Judea and Samaria. In Judea and Samaria, where a permanent presence exists and effective counterterrorist measures are taken, the terrorist organizations encountered difficulties which limited their freedom of action. In the Gaza Strip, where there
is no permanent IDF presence, the terrorist organizations enjoy a relatively high degree of freedom to both carry out terrorist attacks and build up their military strength.

**Terrorist activity in Judea and Samaria**

6. In 2006 the terrorist organizations in Judea and Samaria continued intensive efforts to both attack Israel and build up their forces. Particularly conspicuous were their efforts to carry out suicide bombing attacks, the overwhelming majority of which were prevented by Israeli security forces. There was a clear gap between terrorist organization motivation and their ability to put their plans into effect.

7. The IDF’s activities prevented the terrorist infrastructures from implementing their plans, especially cells located in Samaria (Jenin and Nablus). The IDF struck at every level, from leadership to operatives in the field. That created a vacuum which led to inexperienced operatives who were not supported by an organized, orderly infrastructure taking over leadership functions. To a large extent they relied on external direction from headquarters in Syria, Lebanon and the Gaza Strip. Thus the dominance and influence of the external leadership over the field workers consequently grew. Noticeable as well was the inter-organization and inter-area collaboration effected in an effort to overcome the damage done to operational capabilities.

8. There were two major suicide bombing attacks initiated by the PIJ in Samaria, both carried out at the same fast food restaurant near the old Central Bus Station in Tel Aviv. Many shooting attacks were also carried out and many side charges were laid along roads in the West Bank, especially by Fatah and the PIJ, although fewer than in 2005 (in 2006 129 side charges were laid in Judea and Samaria). The quality of the explosives used in side charges in Judea and Samaria remained low.
9. Beyond ordinary counterterrorist measures, the IDF took control of the prison in Jericho and detained five Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) operatives who had been involved in the October 2001 murder of Rehavam Ze’evi, the Israeli Tourism Minister, and other terrorist-operatives incarcerated there (Operation First Fruits, March 14). The operation was carried out in the wake of the departure of the American and British observers, who left because the Palestinian Authority failed to ensure their safety. One of the prisoners was Ahmad Sa’adat, PFLP secretary general, ‘Ahed Ghulmeh, head of the PFLP’s operational-wing and planner of Rehavam Ze’evi’s murder. Another was Fuad al-Shobaqi, senior PA financial figure, confidant of Arafat and behind the Karin A arms deal in January 2002.

![IDF forces encircle the Jericho prison (Al-Arabiya TV, March 14).](image)

**Smuggling weapons into Judea and Samaria**

10. Smuggling weapons to the terrorist organizations in Judea and Samaria continued and was carried out in a variety of ways: weapons were purchased from arms dealers, smuggled in from Jordan through the Dead Sea and the Judean Desert (despite the usually effective counterterrorist activities of the Jordanian security forces), from the Gaza Strip and from Israel. They also used weapons stolen from IDF bases or found after the IDF had left an area.
11. For example:

A. On October 15, on the shore of the Dead Sea opposite the Dargot cliffs in the Judean desert, weapons were found which had been smuggled in by boat from Jordan.

![Some of the weapons found on the Dead Sea shore opposite the Dargot cliffs](image1)

B. On October 23 several kilograms of TNT were confiscated at the Karni crossing after having been found in a truck on its way to Bitunia near Ramallah.

C. On December 9 two Palestinians were killed in Judea when dud shells blew up. A large collection of weapons was found in their home.

**The security fence and the buffer zone**

12. According to data provided by the Security Fence Project Management in the Israeli Defense Ministry, so far 406 of the 790 kilometers (252 of the 491 miles) of the security fence have been completed. In 2006, 110 kilometers (68 miles) were added: around East Jerusalem, Ofer-Elkana, the area of Karnei Shomron and Shomria-Metsudot Yehuda.

13. The security fence, the buffer zone, and even the sections of the fence which have not been completed, limit the ability of terrorist organizations to enter
Israel and present operational obstacles, especially for those organizations active in northern Samaria, making it difficult for them to carry out suicide bombing attacks within Israel. In 2006 terrorists did not cross the fence (as opposed to illegal workers and smugglers). Most of the terrorists who infiltrated to carry out suicide bombing attacks did so in the Jerusalem area (See the section on suicide bombing attacks).

14. According to statistics provided by the Israel Security Agency, since the August 2003 completion of the first section of the security fence and buffer zone, there has been a **drastic reduction in the number of mass-murder** attacks.

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2 In that context the remarks of Ramadan Abdallah Shalah, PIJ leader, should be noted: in a television interview he stated that the security fence built by Israel was a hindrance to the terrorist organizations and “if it weren’t there [their] situation would be entirely different” (Al-Manar TV, November 11).
attacks carried out in Israel:

A. Between August 2003 and the end of 2006 the terrorist organizations operating from Samaria carried out 12 such attacks, killing 64 Israelis and wounding 445.

B. Between the beginning of the current confrontation in September 2000 and the erection of the security fence and buffer zone in August 2003, they carried out 73 such attacks, killing 293 Israelis and wounding 1,950.

15. In general, the organizations operating in Samaria exploit the areas where the fence and buffer zone have not been completed to dispatch terrorists to Israel. Collaborating with organizations in Judea, especially around Ramallah, they infiltrate their operatives in through the areas around East Jerusalem and Judea.

16. Smugglers exploit the absence of the fence in Judea to infiltrate weapons from the Negev to the south of Mt. Hebron. In Samaria contraband is usually brought in through the crossing points in the West Bank.

Involvement in terrorism of Palestinians living and working in Israeli illegally

17. The terrorist organizations also make use of Palestinians living and working in Israel illegally to cope with the operative difficulties presented by the security fence and buffer zone. The illegals specialize in finding routes for infiltrating into Israeli territory by bypassing IDF roadblocks. The illegals also know smugglers and Israeli Arabs who help them (the illegals) enter Israel for financial reasons, despite the security threat they pose. In 2006 the Israeli security forces detained approximately 50 illegals who were involved in terrorist organization efforts to carry out attacks within Israel.

18. The Palestinian terrorist organizations also use drivers specializing in bringing illegals into Israel to infiltrate terrorists. According to data supplied by the ISA, the overwhelming majority of suicide bombing attacks in Israel were
carried out with the aid and support of such drivers.

19. For example, when the PIJ carried out the April 17 suicide bombing attack at the old Central Bus Station in Tel Aviv, they were aided by an operative named Muhammad Amudi from the village of Burqin (near Jenin in northern Samaria). During interrogation he stated that on the day of the attack he escorted the suicide bomber to Tel Aviv with the aid of an illegal Arab driver living in Jerusalem. He also stated that before the attack he had gone to Tel Aviv several times with drivers of illegals to examine the roads leading into Tel Aviv and to gather information about possible targets.

**Terrorism in Judea and Samaria directed from external headquarters**

20. Because of the leadership vacuum in Judea and Samaria there was increased involvement of external terrorist organization headquarters in directing the terrorists. That involvement was initiated either by the local terrorist infrastructures or proposed by members of the headquarters themselves. Their objective of external involvement was to upgrade the terrorist capabilities in Judea and Samaria.

21. External direction supported the establishment of terrorist infrastructures in Judea and Samaria by transferring funds, manufacturing weapons, providing technical know-how and sending in operatives. They transmitted instructions for terrorist attacks focused within Israel, but without notable success. In some instances the external direction was involved in all stages of terrorist activity, i.e., deciding the type and location of attacks, claiming responsibility and establishing contact between various organizations from various location.

22. Conspicuous examples of external headquarter direction:

   A. **Terrorist headquarters in the Gaza Strip, especially those of**
Fatah, the PIJ, Hamas and the Popular Resistance Committees (PRC): During the past two years Hamas has made an strong effort to upgrade the operational capabilities of its infrastructures in Judea and Samaria by sending operatives and transmitting technical operational know-how about manufacturing and firing rockets, manufacturing explosive devices and combat doctrine.

B. PIJ headquarters in Damascus: The PIJ in Damascus continues as the main source of direction and funding for PIJ operatives in Judea and Samaria. During the past year several instances of Fatah operatives working under the aegis of the PIJ were uncovered.

C. Hezbollah: Traditionally, Hezbollah in Lebanon has been in contact with Palestinian terrorist operatives in Samaria, particularly with Fatah in Nablus. According to ISA data, during the past year there was a sharp rise in the number of terrorist cells directed by Hezbollah in the Gaza Strip, Judea and Samaria. That activity included the transfer of funds, coordinated transfer of weapons and instructions for attacks (See below “Hezbollah activity in 2006”).

Terrorist organization activity in the Gaza Strip

23. After Israel’s disengagement from the Gaza Strip and the rise of Hamas to the government, the Strip continued as the focus for terrorist activity directed against Israel. Half of the attacks carried out in 2006 originated in the Gaza Strip, and killed 8 Israelis and wounded 203.

24. The terrorist organizations focused on launching rockets at Israeli population centers in the western Negev, more in 2006 than since the beginning of the confrontation. Most notable of the terrorist operations was the June attack on IDF forces near Kerem Shalom, during which two soldiers were killed and Corporal Gilad Shalit was abducted to the Gaza Strip. Terrorist organization defensive activities (including small arms fire, anti-tank missiles and side charges) focused on the IDF’s major operations. They were for the most part
ineffectual and led to lessons the terrorists learned and applied to the organizations’ buildup project (See below).

25. The terrorist organization headquarters in the Gaza Strip continued as a focal point for the direction and support of the terrorist infrastructures in Judea and Samaria. They dispatched terrorist operatives and transmitted know-how for the establishment of cells in Judea and Samaria and for carrying out terrorist attacks in the heart of Israel. The terrorists used tunnels to leave the Gaza Strip for Sinai or passed through the Rafah crossing and then infiltrated through the wide-open border between Egypt and Israel. Local Bedouin helped them to infiltrate into Israel using smuggling routes.

26. According to ISA data, 43 terrorist operatives from the Gaza Strip were detained. They tried to enter Israel through the Israeli-Egyptian border for terrorist activities, including suicide bombing attacks and abductions. In a number of instances weapons were found in their possession.

27. For example:

A. On **February 8** a PIJ operative and his escort who had come from the Gaza Strip via Sinai were detained in the Negev. The operative was a 17 ½ year-old suicide bomber wearing an explosive belt. His objective was to carry out a suicide bombing attack in Jerusalem.

B. At the **beginning of March** two PIJ operatives were detained. During interrogation one of them stated that several months previously their handlers had attempted to infiltrate them into Israel through Egypt.

C. In April two Hamas operatives from the Gaza Strip were detained. They had two hand grenades and two pistols in their possession.³

³ Another infiltration through the Sinai occurred at the end of January 2007 when a suicide bomber sent from the Gaza Strip carried out a suicide bombing attack in the southern Israeli city of Eilat.
Operations Summer Rains and Autumn Clouds

28. The Israeli security forces’ counterterrorist activities in the Gaza Strip were many and varied: there were two broad IDF operations (See below), Israeli Air Force attacks (targeted killings and attacks on the organizations’ military infrastructure) and detentions. More than 100 terrorist-operatives were detained for interrogation, especially in the areas of Rafah (southern Gaza Strip) and Beit Hanoun (northern Gaza Strip). The information received during their interrogations helped the struggle against the terrorist organizations, especially when the exact locations of tunnel openings were revealed.

29. Two major IDF operations in the Gaza Strip were particularly noteworthy in that they were the first IDF activities since the disengagement: Operation Summer Rains began on the night of June 27, after an IDF force near Kerem Shalom was attacked and Corporal Gilad Shalit was abducted. The operation combined air and ground forces and focused on the southern Gaza Strip. Its objective was to prevent Shalit’s being removed from the area and to damage the terrorist infrastructure and its capabilities, including those directly or indirectly related to the attack near Kerem Shalom.

30. During the operation infantry and armored forces took over the airport at Dahaniya (located in the southeastern Gaza Strip), the region dominating the Rafah district. At the same time roads in the southern Gaza Strip were attacked with artillery fire. Terrorist offices, weapons stores and squads were attacked from the air, as were three bridges in the center of the Gaza Strip (both to prevent Shalit’s being moved and terrorist-operative movement). While the operation was in progress in the Gaza Strip, approximately 80 Hamas operatives were arrested in Judea and Samaria, among them members of the Hamas government and Legislative Council.

31. Beyond damaging the terrorist infrastructures, the main objectives of the operation were not achieved. Gilad Shalit was not found and during July rocket
fire from the Gaza Strip peaked, with 191 identified hits in Israel (See below for rocket fire.)

IDF soldiers briefed at the Rafah crossing before Operation Summer Rains (Yannis Behrakis for Reuters, June 28)

32. The second major operation, Operation Autumn Clouds began on October 31. Its objective was to reduce the amount of rocket fire from the northern Gaza Strip by taking control of the area around the town of Beit Hanoun, a rocket launching focal point. The terrorist organizations, led by Hamas, which at the beginning of the operation sought direct contact with the IDF, carried out tactical attacks with anti-tank missiles, mortar and sniper fire, and side charges. On November 1 a Palestinian sniper killed Staff Sergeant Kiril Golshein; Hamas claimed responsibility for the attack.

33. During the operation infantry and armored forces encircled Beit Hanoun. IDF soldiers entered the town and remained for a number of days to conduct house-to-house searches and interrogations to find weapons and terrorists. At the same time, rocket-launching squads in various areas of the Gaza Strip were attacked. The objectives of Operation Autumn Rains were also not achieved and the volume of rocket fire increased significantly (157 identified hits in November).
Staff Sergeant Kiril Golshein (Photo courtesy of the IDF spokesperson)
Using civilians as human shields

Overview

34. The use of civilians as human shields, which is a gross violation of international laws governing the conduct of war, is a common Palestinian terrorist organization modus operandi. It was elaborated and refined in the Gaza Strip in 2006.

35. Civilians were used as human shields in the following ways:

   A. **Locating operational infrastructures within densely-populated areas.** They included stockpiles of weapons; workshops for weapons manufacture; bases, offices and headquarters; and tunnel-openings under residential buildings.

   B. **Exchanging fire with IDF forces from within residential civilian dwellings and public institutions, including mosques.**

   C. **Recruiting Palestinian civilians, including women and children,** and encouraging them to flock to areas where the IDF was fighting to serve as human shields, enabling terrorists to escape.

36. The following are examples of terrorist infrastructures located in densely populated areas that were targeted by the IDF in 2006:

   A house (encircled in red) in the Jabaliya refugee camp where Hamas stored weapons and explosive devices weighing dozens of kilograms. Next to the house is the family garage (encircled in green).
A one-storey industrial structure (encircled in red) in Khan Yunis which served as a machine shop for the manufacture of window frames and other metal products. It was also a weapons storehouse and manufacturing plant for the PIJ. It is located ten yards from a mosque.

A weapons storehouse and meeting place (encircled in green) for Hamas operatives in Tel Za'atar in the Jabaliya refugee camp.

A house in Rafah (encircled in red), near the Philadephi route, under which smugglers' tunnels were dug.
Hamas's central weapons storehouse (encircled in red) in the Jabaliya refugee camp

Tunnel used to smuggle weapons (encircled in red), found under a house in Rafah, close to the Philadelphi route.
Lathe (encircled in red) used by Hamas in the manufacture of weapons in the Tafah district of Gaza City.

Fatah weapons storehouse near an operative’s house in Beit Hanoun (encircled in red)
Deliberate gathering of Palestinian civilians at targets under attack

37. During the second half of 2006 the terrorist organizations used human shields more often than previously, and employed the tactic to prevent or hamper IDF operational activities. Palestinian civilians, including women and children, were encouraged to flock to locations under IDF attack to serve as human shields.

38. Examples of the use of the tactic:

A. On November 3, during Operation Autumn Rains, dozens of terrorist-operatives were “rescued” from Al-Nasr mosque in Beit Hanoun in the northern Gaza Strip when approximately 200 Palestinian women marched to the site, covered by the media. The procession marched to the mosque and mingled with the terrorists, thus succeeding in extricating them from the area by exploiting the fact that the IDF would avoid shooting at a group of women.

B. On November 18 hundreds of civilians, including women, children and adolescents, were brought to the house of Muhammad Barud (a senior PRC terrorist-operotive) in the Jabaliya refugee camp to prevent an Israeli Air Force attack on the house. That was done assuming, correctly, that the IDF would not deliberately blow up a house if many civilians were in the area. The “recruitment” of civilians was made possible because the IDF, as part of its efforts to avoid civilian casualties, telephoned the residents of the building to evacuate the premises before the attack (even at the price of making the attack less effective). Similar tactics were used by the terrorist organizations in other locations.
39. The Palestinian terrorist organizations consider the use of human shields a successful tactic because it has enabled them to extricate operatives and prevented Israeli Air Force attacks on houses of operatives where weapons were stored as well. That encouraged the terrorist organizations and they may try to use the tactic in the future.

Human shields: a crowd on the roof and in front of the house of Waal Rajeb al-Shaqra, a Hamas operative in Beit Lahia, who claimed the IDF telephoned to say they were about to blow his house up (ANB TV, November 20)
Exploiting the Karni and Erez crossings to carry out terrorist attacks

40. The Karni and Erez crossings continued as preferred targets for Palestinian terrorist activities, despite the fact that both are life-lines for the Gaza Strip population. Agricultural produce, medicine and merchandise pass through the Karni crossing, while people pass through Erez, including individuals seeking medical treatment. Attempts to carry out terrorist attacks and the many warnings of impending attacks led to the crossings’ being closed for long periods during the year.

41. The following types of attacks were carried out:

   A. There were attacks at the crossings themselves, such as exploding a tunnel under a crossing or infiltrating terrorists through tunnels to carry out killings. A mass-murder attack was prevented at the Karni crossing when a tunnel was discovered in August.\(^1\) On April 26 the IDF prevented the PRC from carrying out a combined shooting-car bomb attack at the Karni crossing.

   ![Five barrels of explosives discovered in the truck to be used in the attack at the Karni crossing (Photo courtesy of Israeli TV Channel 10, April 26).](image)

   B. Weapons are smuggled through the crossings. For example, in October

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\(^1\) According to an ISA report, Majd al-Qumbaz, a PRC operative, admitted during interrogation that there were plans dig a tunnel under the IDF’s administration building at the Karni crossing, to pack it with explosives and to blow it up.
an attempt was made to smuggle 6 kilograms (13.2 lbs) of TNT hidden in a metal cage designed to transfer merchandise from the Gaza Strip to Israel.

C. Terrorists are infiltrated into Israel and Judea and Samaria by exploiting permits for medical treatment. For example, in September Jabr Darabia, a PRC operative, was detained at the Erez crossing. He had received an permit for enter Israel for medical treatment and was supposed to reach the West Bank to set up a terrorist cell.

C. Types of terrorist attacks

Rocket and mortar fire

Overview

42. Rocket fire from the Gaza Strip continued throughout 2006 as the preferred modus operandi of the terrorist organizations. That was so despite the harsh criticism voiced by the Palestinian population, who suffered as a result. Most of the rockets were locally manufactured and had an approximate maximum range of 9 kilometers (6 miles), although some had a range of 12.5 kilometers (7 ¾ miles). In addition, also launched were a number of standard 122 mm rockets with a range of 20.4 kilometers (12 2/3 miles) which had been smuggled into the Gaza Strip.

43. Since the disengagement there has been a sharp increase in the number of rockets launched at the western Negev. (Until the disengagement, massive rocket fire was aimed at the Israeli settlements in the Gaza Strip.) The preferred targets during 2006 were the city of Sderot and civilians living in settlements in the western Negev, although attempts we made to launch rockets as far away as Ashqelon.

44. Following the disengagement, Hamas expected its Qassam rockets would become the strategic weapons of the next stage of the Israeli-Palestinian confrontation, as the suicide bombing attacks had been the weapon of choice.
during the previous years. Hamas also expected that in addition to intensive Qassam firing from the Gaza Strip, it would be able to copy its rocket-manufacturing capabilities in Judea and Samaria as a way of overcoming the security fence, and thus create a balance of deterrence with Israel. Their efforts to do so were unsuccessful.

**Rocket fire data**

*Range from the northern Gaza Strip*

45. In 2006, 861 rockets were fired at population centers in the western Negev, as compared with 222 in 2005 and 268 in 2004 (not including rockets fired at Israeli settlements inside the Gaza Strip). Mortar shell fire (which had previously targeted settlements in the Gush Katif and Gaza districts) declined significantly after the disengagement. In 2006 57 mortar shells were fired, compared with

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2 Ranges were calculated from launch points and not from the security fence on the Israeli-Gaza border. Standard 122 mm rockets, whose range is 20.4 kilometers, were not included, since only a few have been fired to date.
284 in 2005 and 1,213 in 2004.  

**Monthly distribution of rocket fire, 2006**

**Total: 861 hits**

**Rocket fire at Israel during the six years of the confrontation**

3 The data in this report were provided by the Operational Division of the IDF’s General Staff. They include identified hits only. The number of rockets actually fired is, in our estimation, 20%-30% higher.
46. As well as increasing the number of rocket launchings, the Palestinian terrorist organizations made efforts to improve technological capabilities to extend their range, which would allow them both to reach more Israeli population centers and move deeper into the Gaza Strip and away from IDF forces. Support and aid were provided by Hezbollah and Iran. The organizations also attempted to smuggle in standard rockets and to lengthen the shelf life of the locally manufactured rockets to build up reserves. On July 4, 2006, standard long-range 122 mm rockets were launched for the first time. They reached the center of Ashqelon, adding the city population to the list of rocket victims. The rockets involved were contraband Grads and which have a range of up to 20.4 kilometers (12 2/3 miles).

47. Along with extending range, efforts were made to enlarge warheads. The Qassams currently fired carry warheads of from five to seven kilograms (11 - 15.4 lbs) of locally manufactured explosives. The terrorist organization goal is to produce warheads weighing several dozen kilograms, and thus to increase the
damage they do.

An upgraded Qassam rocket which hit the center of Ashqelon

(Amir Cohen for Reuters, July 4)

48. **Monthly rocket fire distribution**: Ordinarily, 40-50 rockets fell every month. There were significant increases in June, July and November. In June the rise in rocket fire (140 hits) was accompanied by intensive terrorist activity in the Gaza Strip, part of which was the June 25 attack on an IDF force at Kerem Shalom in which two soldiers were killed and Corporal Gilad Shalit was abducted. The subsequent IDF operations, Summer Rains in the south, and Operation Autumn Clouds in the north led to spikes in terrorist rocket attacks in July and November. In December rocket fire returned to its “customary” level.

49. **Rocket fire fatalities**: Compared to suicide bombing attacks and other types of terrorist attacks, the level of fatality of rocket fire is relatively low. Despite the sharp increase in the number of rockets fired, there was a decrease in the number of Israelis killed and wounded compared with 2005. In 2006, two residents of Sderot were killed by rocket fire and two Beduin by mortar fire, and 88 individuals were wounded. In 2005, six civilians were killed and 132 civilian and members of the security forces were wounded although the incidence of rocket fire was much lower.

50. **Ranking the terrorist organizations in terms of rocket fire**: all the Palestinian terrorist organizations were involved in launching rockets. During the months of Hamas involvement, it fired the greatest number and there was a
sharp spike in launchings. During the months when Hamas was not involved (for example, since the ceasefire agreement reached at the end of November), the PIJ was responsible for the greatest number. Fatah/Al-Aqsa Martyrs' Brigades and the PRC also took part in rocket fire but were not significant factors.

51. Hamas and the PIJ's technical capabilities:

A. **Hamas has the most advanced technical capabilities for rocket production.** Its Qassams have a range of about 9 kilometers (5.6 miles). In addition, Hamas has manufactured a number of advanced rockets with double thrusts which give it a range of 12 kilometers (about 7 ½ miles). It can be assumed that Hamas and the other organizations will continue their efforts to increase the number, availability and range of their rockets and the size of their warheads. All that will be done by using improved technology and smuggling in standard rockets.

B. The PIJ, which manufactures **Al-Quds rockets**, is not as technologically advanced as Hamas. Most of its rockets have a maximum range of 5-7 kilometers (3-4.3 miles), compared with Hamas’s 6-9 kilometers (3.7-5.6 miles), putting them at a disadvantage during escalation, which requires an increase in rocket manufacture rate. On the other hand, when there is little rocket fire, PIJ rockets are more professional, although still not on the level of Hamas’s. The organization is currently making efforts to manufacture longer-range rockets and to expand its inventory.
52. **Launcher types and rocket fire**: in most instances, the terrorist organizations use improvised stationary single-barrel launchers. The launcher is constructed of a number of metal rods joined together and fixed to the ground. Usually only one rocket is fired at a time. In about a fourth of the attacks, two rockets are fired at the same time. Volleys of three or more rockets are rare and incidental. At times the rockets are launched from the back of a vehicle.

![](image)

**PIJ rocket fire from a multiple-barrel launcher (Al-Jazeera TV, January 21)**

53. **Launching areas and targets**: most rockets were launched from the area around Beit Hanoun in the northern Gaza Strip (which was also an area of intensive IDF activity). The main target was Sderot (See graph) and the surrounding smaller communities. There were also isolated incidents in which Hamas and PIJ rockets reached Ashqelon but so far the city is not under constant threat, as is Sderot.
Sderot in the crosshairs, 2006

Left: Israeli Defense Minister Amir Peretz examines the damage done by a Qassam rocket in Sderot (Reuters, May 31) Right: A house in Kibbutz Carmia hit by a Qassam rocket (Amir Cohen for Reuters, February 3)
Efforts to achieve rocket capabilities in Judea and Samaria

“Qassam rockets in the occupied [West] Bank – the next stage in deterrent weapons...” (Izzedine al-Qassam Brigades Website, 2005)

54. Since the disengagement, the terrorist organizations have tried to move mortar and rocket fire capabilities to Judea and Samaria. In 2006 they had no significant success because of difficulties in procuring the raw materials for manufacturing explosives.

55. A number of local cells actively worked to manufacture rockets but few of them managed to achieve launching capabilities. The most prominent were:

A. A Fatah cell in Tulkarm manufactured rockets under Hezbollah direction and with the aid of technical knowledge received from operatives in Jenin. They launched two experimental rockets, which misfired. One attempt was carried out on July 7 and the second on July 30, which targeted Bat Hefer, a community on the eastern Sharon Plain. Most of the cell members were detained.
B. On July 10 a PIJ cell operating in the village of Yamoun in northern Samaria tried unsuccessfully to fire a rocket at Ram-On, an agricultural community near Afula.

C. On May 8 a PIJ cell unsuccessfully launched a rocket at an IDF post near Jenin.

**Abductions**

56. The Palestinian terrorist organizations and Hezbollah abduct civilians and soldiers as bargaining chips in negotiations to release prisoners in Israeli jails. In 2006 both organizations captured Israeli soldiers, one is held by Hamas and the other two by Hezbollah. None of the three is being granted basic human rights, such as visits from Red Cross representatives, and no signs of life have been received. Both abductions have long-range strategic implications beyond the tactical significance of terrorist attacks.

57. In 2006 the Palestinian terrorist organizations carried out three abductions, one of them of an IDF soldier, whose release is still being negotiated eight months later, and two of civilians who were subsequently murdered. In 2005, on the other hand, there was only once such incident, the September abduction and murder of Sasson Nuriel. In addition, a number of abduction attempts were made but prevented by the Israeli security forces.

58. The most significant Palestinian terrorist abduction took place in the Negev
at Kerem Shalom on June 25. It was led by Hamas’s terrorist operatives and Hamas in Damascus. Its objective was to sabotage the attempts being made at the time by PA chairman Abu Mazen to effect calm and a compromise with Israel. The following is a general description of the attack:

A. In the early morning hours of June 25, a group of seven terrorists belonging to Hamas, the PRC and the Army of Islam\(^4\) attacked an IDF force at Kerem Shalom. Disguised in IDF uniforms, they attacked the soldiers from behind, having come through a tunnel dug from the outskirts of Rafah. The tunnel was between 700 and 800 meters (765-875 yards) long, approximately 300 (328 yards) of which were in Israeli territory.

B. The terrorists, armed with mortars and anti-tank weapons, split into three squads and simultaneously attacked a tank, an (empty) APC which immediately went up in flames an observation post. One two-man squad fired anti-tank weapons and threw charges and hand grenades (See illustration below).

C. The attackers cut a hole through the security fence and escaped into the Gaza Strip, taking one of the tank crew, Corporal Gilad Shalit, with them. Two other IDF members of the tank crew were killed and one was critically wounded; two soldiers manning an observation post were also wounded. So far all attempts to find and secure the release of the abducted soldier (Operation Summer Rains and mediated negotiations with Hamas) have failed.

\(^4\) The Army of Islam is a faction of the PRC and headed by Mumtaz Durmush. It has called itself the Army of Islam since the attack at Kerem Shalom and its activities have gradually come to resemble those of the Global Jihad, such as abducting foreign nationals and attacks sites which in their opinion offend Muslim morality.
59. Jews having contacts with the local Palestinian population and who travel along the roads in Judea and Samaria are targets for abduction. Because it is difficult to carry out abductions within Israel, readily available targets are preferred. In 2006 there were two abductions in Samaria, both of whose victims were murdered:
A. On June 25, the same day as the attack at Kerem Shalom, Eliahu Pinhas Oshri, 18, a resident of Itamar, a settlement in Samaria, was abducted on his way from Beitar Illit to his school in Neve Tzuf, and subsequently murdered. The Popular Resistance Committees (PRC) announced that they had abducted him and displayed his ID card. The attack was carried out by a Fatah/Al-Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades cell in Ramallah operating under PRC direction from the Gaza Strip. The members of the cell were arrested some days later by the Israeli security forces.

Left: Eliahu Pinhas Oshri. Right: His ID card displayed by the abductors

B. On July 27 Dr. Danny Ya’akobi, a resident of the settlement of Yakir in Samaria, was abducted and murdered. He apparently went to a garage in the village of Funduq (on the road leading to Kedumim, a settlement west of Nablus) to have his car serviced. Fatah/Al-Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades claimed responsibility for the murder.

Dr. Danny Ya’akobi
60. **Attempted abductions which were prevented:**

A. On July 21 a 21 year-old female terrorist from the Balata refugee camp in Nablus was detained on the seafront promenade in Tel Aviv on her way to carry out an abduction. She had been dispatched by the Fatah/Tanzim infrastructure in Balata, whose actions are directed by Hezbollah. During interrogation she admitted she intended to meet a Jewish man with whom she was in contact, use pills to drug him and abduct him to Nablus.

B. On July 20 a terrorist was detained trying to infiltrate Israel from Sinai. During interrogation he admitted to having been sent to Israel by a PRC operative in the Gaza Strip to abduct an Israeli, preferably a soldier, and to smuggle him into the Gaza Strip. He was to be used as a bargaining chip for the release of Palestinian prisoners. The terrorist was instructed to abduct a soldier, and should that fail, kill him and take his documents to the Gaza Strip for negotiations.

C. On June 15 an attempt was made to abduct two young girls waiting for a ride at the Rehalim junction, near Ariel. The terrorists were three Fatah/Al-Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades operatives from the Jenin region. They planned to murder the victims, bury them and negotiate for the release of a senior Fatah/Al-Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades operative in an Israeli jail (the brother of one of the terrorists involved in the abduction). They rented a car, drove it to the Rehalim junction and tried to abduct the two girls waiting at the bus stop, but managed to take only one. Their plan was foiled when they were stopped at an IDF roadblock after an IDF officer passing at the time realized what was happening and alerted the army.

61. In addition, there were abduction plans in Judea and Ramallah which were not carried out. The Israeli security forces exposed a number of terrorist cells which were about to put abduction plans into action.
Suicide bombing attacks

Overview

62. In 2006 the decline in the number of suicide bombing attacks continued, following the trend begun in 2002. During the year, four suicide bombing attacks were carried out, compared with seven in 2005 and 14 in 2004. Three were carried out by the PIJ and one by Fatah. Hamas did not carry out attacks in 2006.

63. As opposed to the terrorist organizations’ ability of to carry out suicide bombing attacks, there was an the increase in their motivation to do so. A clear indication was the detention of 279 potential suicide bombers in Judea and Samaria, an increase of 80% over the previous year (See below).

64. In 2006 as well as in 2005, the PIJ carried out most of the suicide bombing attacks in Israeli cities, although the number was smaller (three suicide bombing attacks in 2006, five in 2005). Until the autumn of 2004, Hamas carried out the greatest number of attacks, after which the PIJ became the dominant organization.

Realized suicide bombing attacks

65. In 2006 two lethal suicide bombing attacks were carried out by the PIJ, both of them at the same fast food restaurant at the old Central Bus Station in Tel Aviv. A third against a civilian target was carried out at Kedumim by Fatah. One suicide bombing attack were directed against IDF forces in the Gaza Strip by the PIJ. Most of the suicide bombers infiltrated, or intended to infiltrate, through the area around Jerusalem, exploiting the weak spot in the security fence.
Suicide bombing attacks during the six years of confrontation

66. In addition, since 2002 the number of casualties resulting from suicide bombing attacks constantly declined. In 2006, 15 individuals were killed in suicide bombing attacks and 104 wounded. There were 22 civilians killed in 2005 and 55 in 2004. Nevertheless, suicide bombing attacks remain the most lethal form of attack, and almost half of the 32 killed in terrorist attacks in 2006 were the victims of suicide bombing attacks.

Annual distribution of suicide bombing attacks
The four suicide bombing attacks carried out in 2006:

A. On January 19 a suicide bomber from Nablus blew himself up at a fast food restaurant at the old Central Bus Station in Tel Aviv, wounding 31 civilians, one seriously and the others slightly. The Jerusalem Battalions, the PIJ’s terrorist-operative wing, claimed responsibility for the attack. The terrorist was a second-year student at Al-Najah University in Nablus (a focal point for recruiting young suicide bombers) and active in the PIJ’s student organization on campus. He was dispatched by the PIJ infrastructure in Nablus and infiltrated into Israeli territory through the area around Jerusalem.

Left: Sami Antar, the suicide bomber who carried out the attack, in a pre-recorded statement (Al-Jazeera TV, January 19). Right: A poster commemorating Sami Antar, calling him “the hero of the heroic action in Tel Aviv, which sent shock waves through Zionist security” (from the PIJ Website).

B. On March 30 a suicide bomber disguised as an ultra-Orthodox Jew caught a ride with Jews in the area of Kedumim and blew himself up inside the car. The blast killed a married couple, residents of Kedumim, and two hitchhikers. Fatah/Al-Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades claimed responsibility for the attack. The suicide bomber was a terrorist-operative who had been in hiding since the beginning of the current violent confrontation because he was wanted by the IDF. The Fatah/Al-Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades cell in Nablus responsible for the attack received its instructions from Hezbollah.
C. On April 17, a suicide bomber blew himself up at the same fast food restaurant near the old Central Bus Station in Tel Aviv. The PIJ, which was responsible for the previous attack, claimed responsibility. The attack killed nine individuals and wounded about 80. Among those killed were the security guard, who had apparently tried to examine the bag the suicide bomber was carrying, and two laborers from Romania. The suicide bomber had been dispatched by the PIJ infrastructure in the Jenin region and infiltrated into Israel through the area around Jerusalem.

D. On November 6, during Operation Autumn Clouds, a female suicide bomber attempted to blow up a Givati Brigade force south of Beit Hanoun. The soldiers identified her as suspicious, and when they called to her to stop she blew herself up, slightly wounding one of them. The PIJ claimed responsibility for the attack. The suicide bomber was Mirfat Amin Masoud, a resident of the Jabaliya refugee camp and a cousin of Nabil Masoud, one of the suicide bombers who carried out the attack at Ashdod Port on March 14, 2004.
The suicide bomber reading her “will” (Al-Jazeera TV, November 6).

Prevented suicide bombing attacks

68. In 2006 there was a sharp increase in the motivation of the terrorist organizations to carry out suicide bombing attacks. According to Israel Security Agency data, 279 potential suicide bombers were detained in Judea and Samaria, a rise of 80% compared with 2005 (154 potential suicide bombers detained).

69. Most of the potential suicide bombers detained in 2006 were Fatah (126) and the PIJ (96) operatives, most often belonging to infrastructures in Samaria (Nablus and Jenin). Thirty were Hamas operatives, 23 of them from Judea.

70. The Israeli security forces prevented 71 attempted suicide bombing attacks in 2006, most of them originating in Judea and Samaria, some in the Gaza Strip. In 45 instances, the explosive devices were already strapped onto the terrorists’ bodies and were ready to be detonated when they were detained. Most of the attempts were carried out by PIJ and Fatah operatives from the areas of Jenin and Nablus in northern Samaria.

71. During the second Lebanon war extra effort was put into suicide bombing attacks, especially by Hezbollah-directed Fatah. All were prevented by the Israeli security forces.
72. Examples of suicide bombing attacks which were prevented:

A. On **November 23** on the outskirts of the Jabaliya refugee camp an IDF force identified as a suicide bomber a woman approaching carrying an explosive device. The 57 year-old woman, who had been dispatched by Hamas, approached the soldiers and who opened fire, and as a result the device blew up. Four soldiers were slightly wounded. It was the first time since the beginning of the confrontation that a woman of that age had been sent to carry out an attack.\(^5\)

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\(^5\) This suicide bombing attack was included in the list of those prevented because as far as is known, she did not detonate the device herself, rather it was detonated by the soldiers’ fire.
The suicide bomber reading her “will” (Al-Aqsa TV, November 23).

B. On November 5 a suicide bombing attack was prevented when a suicide bomber changed his mind. Those involved were detained and weapons were found near Hizma (in the Pisgat Ze’ev area in northern Jerusalem). The suicide bomber had been dispatched by the PIJ infrastructure in northern Samaria and instructed to infiltrate into Israel through the area around Jerusalem.

C. On August 9 a female suicide bomber and a female accomplice were detained at the Beit Iba roadblock near Nablus. The two had been dispatched by a Fatah/Tanzim cell.

D. On August 5 a suicide bomber wearing a powerful explosive belt was detained by the Israeli security forces. He had already been videoed reading his “will,” armed and wearing the belt. During interrogation he admitted that his target was the settlement of Alon Moreh in Samaria.

E. On July 30 the Israeli security forces detained a suicide bomber wearing an explosive belt and his accomplice near Deir Sharaf, in Samaria. A bag was found in his possession containing an explosive belt. The target for the attack was the city of Rehovot, south of Tel Aviv, and the two terrorists planned to infiltrate into Israel through the area around Jerusalem. The attack was orchestrated by the Fatah/Tanzim infrastructure in the Balata refugee camp in Nablus in collaboration with the PIJ and the PFLP.

F. On July 26 a Palestinian, resident of Qaddoum near Qalqilya, was caught. He was supposed to escort a suicide bomber to Israel. The attack was planned by the PIJ infrastructure in Jenin.

H. On July 19 a Palestinian, resident of the village of Azoun near Qalqilya, was detained northeast of Tel Aviv. He had been assigned to escort a suicide
bomber to the site of an attack near Oranit, northeast of Petah Tikva. The attack was planned by the Fatah/Tanzim infrastructure in the Balata refugee camp in Nablus and directed by Hezbollah.

H. On **July 17** a suicide bomber from Beit Furiq in the Nablus area was arrested in Jerusalem. In his possession was a bag with an explosive belt. He planned to carry out the attack in a densely crowded location in Bene Braq, east of Tel Aviv. He belonged to a Fatah cell in Ramallah which was directed by the PRC in the Gaza Strip.

The explosive belt found in the terrorist’s possession

I. On **May 29** an attempted suicide bombing attack in Tel Aviv was prevented when a terrorist was detained along with his weapons in Burin (near Nablus). He had been dispatched by the Fatah infrastructure in Nablus in collaboration with the PIJ and the PFLP. He planned to infiltrate into Israel through the area around Jerusalem.

J. On **March 29** a suicide bomber wearing an explosive belt was detained at the Beqa’ot roadblock, in the northern Jordan Valley. He had been dispatched by the Fatah infrastructure in Nablus to carry out a suicide bombing attack in Israel.

K. On **March 21** a suicide bombing attack was prevented in **Haifa** when a terrorist wearing an explosive belt was detained on the Jerusalem-Tel Aviv highway. He had been dispatched by the PIJ infrastructure in northern Samaria and had infiltrated into Israel through the area around Jerusalem.
The suicide bomber detained on the Jerusalem-Tel Aviv highway

**Stabbings**

73. In 2006 there was also a decline in the number of stabbing attacks. Seventeen stabbing attacks were carried out, compared with 23 in 2005. The decrease may indicate operational difficulties in carrying out the attacks, which are considered relatively simple. The attacks resulted in two Israelis being stabbed to death and 17 wounded, 15 of them civilians and two belonging to the security forces. In 2005 two were stabbed to death and eight were wounded.

**Stabbing casualties, 2006 vs 2005**
74. The more conspicuous stabbings:

A. On **December 13** a civilian security guard was stabbed and critically wounded near the Qalandia roadblock north of Jerusalem.

B. On **September 5** a 60 year-old Israeli man was stabbed at the entrance to a factory in the Atarot industrial zone in Jerusalem. The terrorist was a young Fatah operative from the village of Bitunia (near Ramallah).

C. On **August 10** an Italian tourist was stabbed to death near Herod’s Gate (the Flower Gate) in the Old City of Jerusalem. The terrorist fled the scene and his identity is unknown.

D. On **April 21** a young Palestinian who arrived at the A-Ram roadblock north of Jerusalem pulled out a knife and stabbed two Border Guard policemen. The terrorist was taken for questioning.

E. On **March 2** an Israeli truck driver was stabbed as he was unloading merchandise in the Atarot industrial zone north of Jerusalem. His attacker was a Palestinian who had been lying in wait for him. The driver was critically wounded.

F. On **February 28** a terrorist reached the Gush Etzion junction (where a number of drive-by shootings have taken place) and began stabbing Israelis waiting at the bus stop. A 25 year-old man was critically wounded and 17 year-old woman was slightly wounded. A policeman who happened to be there at the time shot and wounded the attacker, a 28 year-old Palestinian from Hebron.

G. On **February 18** a resident of Ma’aleh Adumim was found stabbed in the stomach. He stated that two Palestinians had stabbed him and fled. The knife used was found on the scene. The stabbers have not been caught.

H. On **February 5** a young Palestinian stabbed eight taxi passengers in Petah Tikva, killing a 53 year-old woman named Kinneret Ben Shalom, a resident of Petah Tikva, and slightly to critically wounding five others. Passersby managed to overcome the terrorist and he was detained. Fatah/Al-Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades claimed responsibility for the attack, but it was apparently his own idea.
75. In 2006 there was also a sharp drop in the number of shooting attacks in Judea and Samaria. During the year there were 608 attacks on civilians and Israeli security forces, compared with 1,170 in 2005. The attacks resulted in the deaths of two civilians and four members of the security forces, and wounded 17 civilians and 50 security forces members. In 2005 17 civilians and five members of the security forces were killed, and 31 and 48 wounded, respectively.

76. There were two shooting attacks in which Israelis were killed:

A. On March 1 Eldad Abir, a resident of Migdalim (on the trans-Samaria road southeast of Nablus), was shot and killed in a drive-by shooting near the gas station close to the settlement. Two hours later, an Israeli civilian was wounded in a drive-by shooting near the village of Nebi Elias, close to the settlement of Ma’aleh Shomron. Both attacks were apparently carried out by the same terrorist squad. Fatah/Al-Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades claimed responsibility.
B. On August 19 a terrorist opened fire on IDF soldiers stationed at the Beqa’ot roadblock in the northern Jordan Valley, killing Staff Sergeant Roi Farajun. The terrorist was a resident of the village of Tamun, near Jericho, whose organizational affiliation was not known. He arrived at the roadblock and joined the line of those waiting to pass through. When he reached the soldiers he firing his handgun. The other soldiers opened fire and killed him.
D. Victims of terrorism compared with the previous years of the confrontation

In 2006 32 Israelis were killed in terrorist attacks and 332 were wounded. Of those killed 25 were civilians and seven members of the security forces. Of the wounded 228 were civilians and 94 belonged to the security forces. That too was a continuation of the decrease in the number of killed and wounded since 2002 (without taking the second Lebanon war into consideration).

Civilians and security personnel killed

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The data do not include the second Lebanon war, during which 159 Israeli civilians and soldiers were killed and 625 wounded.
78. Despite the small number of suicide bombing attacks within the total, in 2006 they were also particularly deadly. Almost half of the victims (15 civilians) and of the civilian wounded (104) were the victims of four suicide bombing attacks. There were also five who were killed in shooting attacks and four by rockets and mortars. The others were killed by anti-tank missiles, stabbed, killed during the attack on IDF forces at Kerem Shalom and during counterterrorist activities.

79. The following table shows civilians and security personnel killed in terrorist attacks in 2006:
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event</th>
<th>Place</th>
<th>Number killed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>March 1</td>
<td>Shooting</td>
<td>Migdalim gas station</td>
<td>1 civilian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>March 16</td>
<td>Counterterrorist activity</td>
<td>Jenin</td>
<td>1 soldier</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>March 28</td>
<td>Mortar attack</td>
<td>Near Kibbutz Nahal Oz</td>
<td>2 civilians</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>March 30</td>
<td>Suicide bombing attack</td>
<td>Kedumim</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>April 17</td>
<td>Suicide bombing attack</td>
<td>Old Central Bus Station, Tel Aviv</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>June 11</td>
<td>Shooting</td>
<td>Highway between Ben-Shemen and Jerusalem</td>
<td>1 soldier</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>June 25</td>
<td>Anti-tank fire</td>
<td>Kerem Shalom (abduction of Gilad Shalit)</td>
<td>2 soldiers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>June 25</td>
<td>Abduction</td>
<td>Near Ramallah</td>
<td>1 civilian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>July 6</td>
<td>Counterterrorist activity</td>
<td>Al-Atatra (northern Gaza Strip)</td>
<td>1 soldier</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>July 17</td>
<td>Side charge</td>
<td>Nablus</td>
<td>1 soldier</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>July 27</td>
<td>Abduction</td>
<td>Village of Funduq (near Kedumim)</td>
<td>1 civilian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>August 10</td>
<td>Stabbing</td>
<td>The Dome of the Rock</td>
<td>1 tourist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>August 19</td>
<td>Shooting</td>
<td>Beqa’ot roadblock (northern Jordan Valley)</td>
<td>1 soldier</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>September 12</td>
<td>Shooting</td>
<td>Northern Gaza Strip</td>
<td>1 soldier</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Event</td>
<td>Location</td>
<td>Casualties</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---</td>
<td>------------</td>
<td>-----------</td>
<td>-----------------------</td>
<td>--------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15.</td>
<td>November 1</td>
<td>Shooting</td>
<td>Beit Hanoun (northern Gaza Strip)</td>
<td>1 soldier</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16.</td>
<td>November 15</td>
<td>Rocket fire</td>
<td>Sderot</td>
<td>1 civilian (female)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17.</td>
<td>November 21</td>
<td>Rocket fire</td>
<td>Sderot</td>
<td>1 civilian</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Distribution of killings according to type of attack**

![Bar chart showing the distribution of killings by type of attack](chart.png)

- **Security personnel** vs. **Civilians**
- Counterterrorist activities: 2 security personnel, 1 civilian
- Attack and abduction: 2 security personnel, 1 civilian
- Stabbing: 2 security personnel
- Suicide bombing attack: 15 security personnel
- Anti-tank missile: 3 security personnel, 1 civilian
- Shooting: 2 security personnel, 4 civilians
- Rockets and mortars: 4 civilians

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Security personnel</th>
<th>Civilians</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Counterterrorist activities</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attack and abduction</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stabbing</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Suicide bombing attack</td>
<td>15</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anti-tank missile</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shooting</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rockets and mortars</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
E. Funding terrorism

Smuggling funds to the terrorist organizations

80. In 2006 external terrorist headquarters and other directors continued pouring money into the PA-administered territories. The funds enabled the terrorist organizations to preserve and expand their terrorist-operative infrastructures, to pay terrorist operatives and activists, train operatives, purchase and manufacture weapons and carry out attacks against Israel. In our estimation, approximately $10 million were transferred to Judea and Samaria and almost $30 million to the Gaza Strip.

81. Many methods are used to smuggle funds into the PA-administered territories, including bank transfers, through “charity” funds and foundations, money changers, merchants and couriers. One go-between used by both Hamas and the PIJ is the Faiz Abu ‘Akr company in the Gaza Strip, owned by a Khan Younis businessman. It was outlawed by the Israeli Defense Ministry in January after it became clear that during the past few years it had transferred hundreds of thousands of dollars to terrorist-operatives in transactions camouflaged as business deals.

82. In addition to funds which go directly to terrorist-operatives, Hamas received tens of millions of dollars from funds and foundations operating in the Persian Gulf and Europe to finance its organizational and civilian infrastructures (the da’wah). Its civilian organizations are one of its main sources of power among the Palestinian population and also support the organization’s terrorist-operative network.

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7 The funds in question are earmarked only for direct operational and organizational purposes and not for the civilian infrastructure (the da’wah). Transferring funds to support terrorism is in direct opposition to the new UN convention regarding the prohibition of funding terrorism and to Security Council Resolution 1267, passed on October 15, 1999.
The security forces activity against terrorist funding

In 2006 the Israeli security forces carried out intensive activities to prevent terrorist funds from reaching the West Bank. An outstanding example was a broad-scale operation carried out on September 19, aimed at money changers in Judea and Samaria. Its objective was to prevent funds from reaching the terrorists. Money changers were arrested and equipment and funds were confiscated, as were documents and weapons found in their offices and houses. Harzallah’s money-changing office in the Gaza Strip was also targeted, since in recent years it had helped all the terrorist organizations smuggle funds into the PA-administered territories.

Operation against money changers
(September 19, 2006)

6 targets in Tulkarm
More than a million shekels, two weapons, computers and documents confiscated; two armed money-changers taken for questioning.

6 targets in Jenin
Tens of thousands of shekels, documents and computers confiscated

4 targets in Ramallah
4 million shekels, computers and documents confiscated

10 targets in Nablus
Two armed money-changers detained, large sums of money, computers, documents and two guns confiscated
84. According to Israel Security Agency data, during the operation about $5 million dollars and about 170,000 Jordanian dinars (almost $250,000 dollars) were found during searches of the houses and offices of 13 money changers in Jenin, Nablus, Tulkarm and Ramallah. They transferred funds to the terrorist organizations from the headquarters of Hamas, the PIJ and Hezbollah in Syria and Lebanon. The operation had a deterring effect on money changers in the West Bank.

85. In addition, according to ISA data, in 2006 86 terrorist-operatives dealing with financial matters were detained. One example was the detention of Iman Sayid, a Nablus resident and money changer, who admitted to having transferred tens of thousands of dollars originating with Hezbollah to wanted senior Fatah/Tanzim operatives in Nablus.

86. In 2006 the Israeli security forces targeted approximately 100 institutions belonging to Hamas’s civilian infrastructure in Judea, Samaria and Jerusalem (“charitable” societies, social and economic institutions, etc.). Individuals were detained, documents were confiscated and institutions were closed. Hamas’s da’wah institutions have also been Fatah targets during the recent violent clashes between the two organizations. Da’wah institutions (nourished by donations from charity foundations abroad) were damaged during the past year but they continue to function effectively while trying to change their modus operandi to ensure their survival.

**Financial support for the Hamas government**

87. Despite the international community’s financial embargo on the Hamas government, in 2006 enormous sums reached it and were used to finance the government’s and movement’s activities, and were also exploited to build up its military capabilities.

88. The Hamas government brought about $80 million in cash into the Gaza
Strip last year, most of the time openly, through the Rafah crossing, with the knowledge and compliance of the Egyptian government. The funds were primarily used by the Hamas government to pay PA employees’ salaries (as opposed to the delays in salary payment incurred by the security forces under Abu Mazen’s control). In addition, Hamas covered the cost of establishing the Executive Force, which is under the control of the interior ministry.

89. Several hundred millions of dollars were transferred to Abu Mazen. They did not reach the Hamas government but eased its financial burden because most of the money was used to pay PA salaries.

F. Involvement of women in terrorism

90. The involvement of women in terrorism, including suicide bombing terrorism, continued through 2006, and one of the four suicide bombing attacks was carried out by a female suicide bomber.

91. During the year the ISA detained 19 Palestinian women who were involved in terrorist activity against Israel. Nine of them belonged to the PIJ and seven to Fatah/Tanzim, and three to other organizations.

92. Particularly prominent in recent years has been the introduction of women into key positions in the PIJ. They deal mainly in administration, providing logistical support for terrorism in Judea and Samaria and directing “charitable societies” which serve to camouflage the activities of the PIJ. Women who played key roles also took part in the organization’s terrorist activities.

93. Some examples, provided by ISA reports, are:

   A. During August and September a network of women active in the PIJ was

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8 Much more money has been promised to the Hamas government, but so far most of the promises have not been kept. In particular, Hamas prime minister Ismail Haniya was promised $250 million during his visit to Tehran between December 7-11, 2006.
uncovered, which was an integral part of the organization’s terrorist infrastructure in Judea. One of the women detained, Wadha Fuqhaa, who was head of the PIJ office in Ramallah, revealed during interrogation that she had received money from the organization’s headquarters in Syria. Some of it had gone to fund the activities of a terrorist cell which carried out shooting attacks and laid charges in the Ramallah area. The money was passed to the terrorists by women couriers, who were also detained.

B. In October Warud Qasem, a Tira resident living in Israel as part of the family unification permission, was detained. She had helped Fatah/Al-Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades terrorist-operatives plan an attack on a restaurant in Ramallah. She was supposed to smuggle an explosive device into Israel along with a cousin from Nablus (who was illegally in Israel and had worked in the restaurant which was the planned target).

C. On July 21 a 21 year-old female terrorist from the Balata refugee camp in Nablus was detained in Tel Aviv as she was on her way to abduct an Israeli on the waterfront promenade. She had been dispatched by the Fatah/Tanzim infrastructure in Nablus.

G. Involvement of Israel Arabs in Palestinian terrorism

94. In 2006 the number of Israeli Arabs detained for involvement in Palestinian terrorism increased. Twenty-one terrorist cells were uncovered whose members included 24 Israeli Arabs, compared with 17 cells and 22 Israeli Arabs in 2005. However, in 2006 no Israeli Arab was involved in attacks which caused the deaths of Israeli citizens.

95. Most of those cells were directed by terrorist organizations in the West Bank, especially Samaria, and were set up in response to the operational difficulties faced by the terrorist organizations as a result of the security fence. The

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9 This section was based on ISA report.
organizations also used the cells in Israel to help smuggle high-grade weapons into Judea and Samaria to be used in terrorist attacks. For example, in November a network of arms dealers was exposed which had smuggled large quantities of weapons and ammunition from Israel into the West Bank. Ten members of the network were Israeli Arabs and three were Palestinians from the Jenin region.

96. There was prominent involvement of Israeli Arabs in arms dealings in the Negev region, where they aided and abetted the Palestinian terrorist organizations in the Gaza Strip and used the Sinai-Israel smuggling route. **Six of the 21 cells exposed in 2006 involved Israeli Arabs trading in arms in the Negev.** They dealt with smuggling arms to the terrorist infrastructures in the Gaza Strip, Judea and Samaria.

97. According to ISA data, about 40% of the Israeli Arabs involved in terrorism are Palestinians, male and female, who live in Israel as part of family unification program permission marriage. Under the provisions of the permission Palestinians may remain in Israel and receive Israeli ID cards. Their connections with Judea and Samaria make it potentially easy for the Palestinian terrorist organizations to recruit them. Not only do they have easy access to Israeli targets, but they enjoy complete freedom of movement.

98. In 2006 ten Palestinians in Israel under the family unification program were detained and admitted their involvement in terrorist activities, which included attempts to smuggle in side charges and transferring weapons into Israel.
Chapter II

The Palestinian Authority (PA), its security forces and the most conspicuous Palestinian terrorist organizations

A. The PA in the shadow of the Hamas government

1. On January 25, 2006, Hamas won a landslide victory in the Palestinian Legislative Council elections: 74 of the 132 seats. Fatah, the rival faction, which had led the Palestinian national movement since its inception, was roundly defeated, winning only 45 seats.

2. The Hamas victory sent shock waves not only through the Palestinian community but through the entire Middle East and the international community. For the first time in Middle Eastern history, an overtly terrorist organization with a radical Islamic ideology took over a government by means of a democratic election. The results of the election reflected the will of many Palestinians who were fed up with the rampant corruption and lack of effectiveness of the Palestinian Authority and Fatah under Arafat, and who sought a change they hoped to find with Hamas and the worldview it represented.

3. On March 29, 2006, the Hamas government was sworn in. It was composed of old-time members of the movement (who hold key offices), technocrats and affiliated professionals. Its establishment was clearly a Hamas effort to present an attractive government which included young, well-educated members and which would be able to effect the reforms the Palestinian population expected. Conspicuous by their absence were Fatah and other organizations, which refused to collaborate with Hamas, resolutely preferring to remain in the opposition.
4. During its first year the Hamas government showed itself to be ineffective in directing the affairs of the PA and demonstrated ideological intransigence. It often made clear that it had no intention of being flexible or ceding its ideological principles regarding the conflict with Israel. Its speakers have consistently refused to recognize the right of the State of Israel to exist or to accept a solution based on the concept of two states for two peoples, have rejected previous agreements between Israel and the Palestinians (especially the Oslo Accords). They have stressed their adherence to the strategy of “resistance” (i.e., terrorism and violence) as the way to squeeze political concessions out of Israel until its final destruction.
5. Such radical positions and the Hamas government’s growing reliance on Iran and Syria (“the axis of evil”) have met with strong resistance both within the PA and beyond. Internal resistance is led by the chairman, Abu Mazen, and Fatah, which waged violent clashes with Hamas (from a position of weakness), and since the first days of the Hamas government has engaged in power struggles against it. In addition, the government has been plagued by political isolation and an international economic embargo, placed on the Hamas government by the United States and the European countries because of its refusal to moderate its position toward Israel and to comply with the demands of the International Quartet.

6. All of the above have presented the Hamas government with difficult constraints, especially economic. The government finds it difficult to pay its employees regularly, a situation which contributed to the disintegration of the government’s functioning in both the Gaza Strip and West Bank. It also failed to rein in the growing anarchy, manifested by increasingly violent clashes between Hamas and Fatah (and the security forces loyal to Abu Mazen), and by the collapse of the PA’s governmental institutions. The violent clashes were joined by local clans and gangs of criminals, who find themselves more powerful in the wake of the breakdown of the government framework.

7. The focus of the violent clashes (accompanied by propaganda wars and mutual mudslinging campaigns) has been the Gaza Strip, where Hamas enjoys the advantage of power in the field, although recently Fatah and security forces operatives have tried to rally and fight back. The clashes spread to Judea and Samaria where Fatah and the Security Council have the advantage. The Mecca
accord (February 8, 2007) is supposed to lead to the establishment of a Palestinian national unity government and the end of the clashes, although the tensions and potential for the disintegration of the situation still exist.

B. The security forces

8. The security forces and services are an important focus of power in the internal Palestinian arena. Since the establishment of the Hamas government, it has worked to increase its control over them, especially among those directed by the interior ministry, particularly the police. Exceptional was the establishment of the Executive Force, set up by Hamas in the Gaza Strip as an alternative security force to those controlled by Abu Mazen and under the direction of the Presidential Office (General Intelligence, National Security, Military Intelligence, Presidential Guard/Force 17, etc.). In recent months the first steps were taken, without noticeable success, to establish branches of the Executive Force in Judea and Samaria, based on the Gaza Strip model.

9. The Executive Force, which takes orders from Sa’id Siyam, Hamas’s interior minister, is the Hamas government’s spearhead in enforcing public order and in its violent struggle against Fatah and the traditional security forces. It is also meant to take part in the fighting against IDF forces inside the Gaza Strip. Executive Force operatives were involved in some of the military actions against the IDF in the Gaza Strip and even in planning terrorist operations. However, so far, in general the Force has not been involved in direct terrorist attacks against Israel, although the potential is there.

10. The security forces loyal to Abu Mazen (which during the first years of the current violent conflict played a relatively active role in terrorist attacks against Israel originating with Fatah) avoid involvement in terrorism. In addition, on occasion they act to defuse ticking bombs and prevent attempts to fire mortars and rockets into Israeli territory. However, in general their status and the justification for their existence have seriously deteriorated on the Palestinian street during the years of confrontation. Today they find it difficult to cope with
Hamas and are not effective in preventing terrorism or preserving internal security.

C. The Hamas movement

Overview

11. In 2006 Hamas quickly built up its military might in the Gaza Strip, establishing itself as the central military and political power. At the same time it had a relatively restrained policy of terrorist attacks, a continuation of its policy of 2005, the year of “the lull in the fighting.” In our assessment that was a function of Hamas’s governmental commitments and its operational weakness in Judea and Samaria, a result of the success of Israeli security forces to prevent terrorist attacks. The violent clashes with Fatah and the security forces loyal to Abu Mazen also restrained Hamas by channeling the focus of its attention, military might and resources to the violent inter-Palestinian struggles.

12. Its policy of restraint regarding terrorist attacks was manifested in two main areas:

   A. **Hamas avoided focusing its efforts on suicide bombing attacks.**
      (Until the second half of 2004 it was the organization dominant in carrying out such attacks.)

   B. Hamas did take part in **rocket fire** from the Gaza Strip, but for most of the year its role was secondary and during some months it did not fire any rockets at all.¹ However, when it did participate in launching rockets (**June**, since the November 25 cease fire agreement, Hamas has not fired any rockets.)
July and November), it was the dominant factor and during those months the number of attacks increased significantly.

13. At the same time, Hamas’s terrorist-operative wing, the Izzedine al-Qassam Brigades, continued planning attacks which could be put into operation on short notice and shelving them for future use. They also worked ceaselessly to upgrade their operational capabilities in Judea and Samaria to create an additional terrorist focus against Israel.

The Gaza Strip

14. So far, Hamas has avoided firing rockets and violating the cease fire in the Gaza Strip agreed upon between Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert and Palestinian Chairman Abu Mazen on November 25. However, not only does it not prevent the other terrorist organizations from carrying out attacks against Israel, it actually encourages them (for example the January 2007 suicide bombing attack in Eilat) and enables them to continue launching rockets from the Gaza Strip.

15. The most glaring attack carried out by Hamas (along with the PRC and the Army of Islam) was against the IDF force at Kerem Shalom and the abduction of Corporal Gilad Shalit on June 25. Hamas has also obstinately led negotiations with Israel for his release, demanding in return the release of Palestinian prisoners, and will also enjoy the main political and image-improving benefits. As far as Hamas is concerned, abducting Israelis to use as hostages is a perfectly legitimate tactic and plays no part in the organization’s policy of restraint (it was Hamas which abducted and murdered Nuriel Sasson in September 2005).

16. Although with respect to terrorist attacks Hamas has kept a low profile, behind the scenes it has continued its involvement in supporting the other terrorist organizations. In 2006 it strengthened its collaboration with the PRC, which has occasionally functioned as a subcontractor, enabling Hamas to carry
out terrorist attacks without claiming responsibility. The collaboration between the two organizations was evident in the attack and abduction on June 25, which signaled Hamas’s return to terrorist attacks (for several months).

17. When Hamas returned to full-scale terrorist attacks it was the dominant organization in firing rockets at settlements in the western Negev, firing of hundreds of them. During Operations Summer Rains and Autumn Clouds, its operatives were the most belligerent and attacked the IDF with small arms, anti-tank missiles, mortar fire and explosive devices.

18. After the cease fire Hamas returned to focusing on its project of building up its military capabilities, exploiting the relative calm in the confrontation (See below). However, its attention was diverted to the worsening violent clashes with Fatah and the security forces.

**Judea and Samaria**

19. During 2006 the Hamas in Judea and Samaria did not carry out or attempt to carry out terrorist attacks within Israel. In certain instances attempts directed by Hamas in the Gaza Strip were made to carry out shooting attacks and abductions, especially in Judea.

20. Hamas’s attempts in Judea and Samaria to set up branches of the Executive Force and to join the security forces operating in those areas failed. Most of Hamas’s power remained in the municipal government in some of the cities and in the continued functioning and influence of its civilian infrastructure (the da’wah), despite the Israeli security forces concentrated counterterrorist activities.
D. The Palestinian Islamic Jihad

Overview

21. In 2006 the PIJ, directed by its headquarters in Damascus and with political, operational and financial support from Iran and Syria, continued as the dominant terrorist organization in carrying out suicide bombing. During periods when Hamas did not fire rockets, it was also the dominant organization in that field.

22. Contrary to Fatah and Hamas, the organization did not feel that political constraints or the needs of the Palestinian population committed it to a policy of restraint. It sought to escalate violence and deteriorate Israel’s security even after the cease fire agreement in the Gaza Strip was reached by Ehud Olmert and Abu Mazen.

The Gaza Strip

23. The PIJ’s terrorist infrastructures in the Gaza Strip played a dominant role in firing rockets at Israel. Its objective was to demonstrate its leadership and to create a kind of balance of deterrence between Judea and Samaria and the Gaza Strip. Since the cease fire agreed on at the end of November the PIJ has retained its dominant role as the organization firing the greatest number of rockets at Israeli settlements. It usually uses the excuse of “response” to the Israeli security forces’ counterterrorist activities in the West Bank, although the agreement
relates to the Gaza Strip. The organization has also stated its intentions to escalate rocket fire.

24. In addition to rocket fire, the PIJ in the Gaza Strip infiltrated terrorist-operatives through the Sinai peninsula into Israel to carry out attacks or to support the terrorist organization infrastructure in Judea and Samaria:

A. On February 8, 2006, PIJ operatives were detained in the Negev, having been dispatched through Sinai to carry out attacks in Israel. One of them was a 17 ½ year-old potential suicide bomber wearing an explosive belt who planned to blow himself up in Jerusalem.

B. At the beginning of March 2006 two PIJ operatives were detained who had been dispatched by the organization in Gaza Strip to Israel and the West Bank. One of them had been instructed to enter Israel to carry out a mass-murder attack using an automatic weapon. The other had been instructed to return to his home in Al-Aroub (north of Hebron) and to set up a PIJ cell which would operate against Israeli targets.2

Judea and Samaria

25. During the past few years the PIJ infrastructure in Samaria (in the Jenin region and, to a lesser degree, in Nablus) has been a focal point for dispatching suicide bombers to Israel. Its operatives maintain close contact with the organization’s headquarters in Syria, from which they receive money to finance their attacks and instructions for carrying them out.

26. In 2006 (and at the beginning of 2007) the Israeli security forces consistently inflicted significant blows on the organization’s infrastructure in the Jenin region. Nevertheless, it kept up its attempts to rehabilitate itself, even after

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the attack on its senior operatives, and to carry out both suicide bombing attacks in Israel and others in the Jenin region, such as laying side charges. (For example, on July 4 a complex attack involving a chain of explosive devices and a car bomb was prevented by the Israeli security forces.)

27. The PIJ is the only Palestinian terrorist organization which managed to carry out two suicide bombing attacks in 2006, both at the same fast food restaurant near the old Central Bus Station in Tel Aviv. The attacks, which originated with the organization’s infrastructure in Samaria, killed nine people. In addition the organization carried out a suicide bombing attack directed against IDF soldiers in the Gaza Strip.

28. Besides the attacks carried out, attempted attacks from Judea and Samaria were prevented (See suicide bombing attacks above). In addition, attacks from the Gaza Strip were also foiled (e.g., on March 7 a PIJ terrorist-operative was detained at the Erez crossing in the Gaza Strip. He used a forged medical permit to try to enter Israel with the intention of carrying out a mass-murder attack using an automatic weapon).

29. Although the PIJ carried out the greatest number of suicide bombing attacks in 2006, there was a decrease in the number it managed to carry out compared with 2005, when it was responsible for five such attacks, four of them in Netanya.
and Hadera. The decrease was a function of the Israeli security forces’ intensive counterterrorist activities in Samaria and the existence of the security fence, which makes it difficult for the terrorist organizations to infiltrate suicide bombers. Nevertheless, the PIJ cells, especially in northern Samaria, have shown that they can rehabilitate themselves quickly and still pose a terrorist threat to Israel.

30. According to ISA data, in 2006 more than 1,000 PIJ operatives were detained in Judea and Samaria, 96 of them potential suicide bombers. Some of the senior leaders in northern Samaria were killed during counterterrorism actions:

A. On May 14 Elias al-Ashqar was killed during an attempt to detain him. He had been involved in all the suicide bombing attacks carried out by the organization in 2005 and 2006.

B. On January 31 Nidal Abu Sa’deh was killed during an operation of the Israeli security forces. He coordinated the dispatching of suicide bombers to Israel and was directly involved in suicide bombing attacks carried out by the organization in 2005.

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3 Evident in statements made by PIJ Ramadan Abdallah Shalah, who specifically said that Israel’s security fence was an obstacle for the Palestinian terrorist organizations and that “if it weren’t there, the situation would be completely different.” For further information see our November Bulletin entitled “Ramadan Shalah, Palestinian Islamic Jihad leader, publicly admits that Israel’s security fence is an important obstacle to the terrorist organizations, and that ‘if it weren’t there, [their] situation would be entirely different’,” at http://www.terrorism-info.org.il/malam_multimedia/English/eng_n/html/pij151106e.htm and http://www.terrorism-info.org.il/malam_multimedia/English/eng_n/pdf/pij151106e.pdf.
31. Hamas’s sweeping victory in the elections shocked and frustrated Fatah activists and brought inter-generation struggles boiling to the surface. There were violent clashes, calls by Fatah activists for the dissolution of the movement’s institutions and for the resignation of the local leadership in the various districts. However, the escalation in violent confrontations with Hamas during the second half of 2006 gave rise to a sense of imminent threat and ranks were closed and recruits enlisted among Fatah activists in both the Gaza Strip and West Bank.

32. Operational infrastructures in the Gaza Strip and Judea and Samaria continued their involvement in terrorist activities, including efforts to carry out suicide bombing attacks. However, their operational level was relatively low.
The Gaza Strip

33. In 2006, Fatah elements in the Gaza Strip focused mainly on firing rockets at Israeli population centers in the western Negev, including after the cease fire agreement, but their role was secondary compared to that of Hamas and the PIJ. (Fatah elements collaborated with the PIJ in dispatching the suicide bombing attack who carried out the attack in Eilat in on January 29, 2007.)

Judea and Samaria

34. In Judea and Samaria the Fatah infrastructure in Nablus (and to a lesser extent in Jenin) has remained a focal point for terrorism despite the intensive counterterrorist measures taken by the Israeli security forces.

35. The Fatah infrastructure in Nablus returned to intensive activity when the “lull in the fighting” ended at the beginning of 2006. As part of that activity, it carried out terrorist attacks and manufactured weapons, which were also given to the PIJ and the PFLP. The Fatah infrastructure, which relied on direction from Hezbollah and the Gaza Strip headquarters, also tried to carry out suicide bombing attacks in Israel and operated against the IDF’s counterterrorist activity in West Bank cities. Following the Israeli security forces’ counterterrorist activities the Fatah infrastructure split into independent cells and the leadership vacuum was filled by inexperienced lower-level operatives.

36. The Fatah infrastructure was dealt a severe blow with the death of Fadi Kafisha in the Kasbah (Old City) in Nablus on August 31. That led to the rise in power of Fatah operatives in the refugee camps in the Nablus region, particularly those following Hezbollah instructions.
37. The most notable Fatah/Tanzim attack was the suicide bombing attack near Kedumim on March 30, when a suicide bomber disguised as an ultra-Orthodox Jew blew himself up inside a civilian Israeli vehicle on the road to Kedumim in Samaria. The blast killed four civilians: a married couple and two hitchhikers. Fatah operatives were also involved in the abduction and murder of Eliahu Pinhas Oshri, from the settlement of Itamar, on June 25.

38. Among the terrorist attacks which were prevented by the Israeli security forces, were: a Fatah suicide bombing attack within Israel on April 25, Holocaust Remembrance Day; another on July 4, when two car bombs from Jenin were destroyed before they could reach their targets.

F. The Popular Resistance Committees (PRC)

39. During 2006 the PRC was dealt a severe blow by the deaths of two of its leaders: Abu Yusuf al-Qoqa, in March, and Jamal Abu Samhadana, in June. Another blow was a factional split-off under Mumtaz Durmush. The faction
called itself the Army of Islam and adopted a modus operandi similar to that of the global jihad (See below on the global jihad in the Middle East).

40. The PRC, which in the past focused on attacks against Israelis in the Gaza Strip, had to retain its organizational relevance after the disengagement in August 2005. To that end it stepped up its rocket fire at Israeli settlements in the western Negev, although it launched fewer than the leading organizations.

PRC leader Al-Abed Yusuf al-Abed Qoqa (Abu Yusuf al-Qoqa), who was killed on March 31 when a car bomb exploded next to him.

Jamal Abu Samhadana, PRC leader killed when the Israeli Air Force attacked one of the organization’s training camps in the southern Gaza Strip on the night of June 8 (Photo from the PRC Website, www.moqawmh.com)

41. In addition to launching rockets, the PRC tried to carry out mass-murder attacks against Israeli targets at the crossings and around the Gaza Strip. They included:

A. An attempted suicide bombing attack at the Erez crossing on **February 1**: A sudden drop in the number of workers passing through the crossing

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4 The crossings were targets for terrorist attacks, although those most affected were the Gaza Strip residents, who rely on the crossings for merchandise, food, drugs, raw materials and passage out of the Strip for humanitarian reasons.
aroused the suspicions of a Coordination and Liaison Headquarters officer. Shortly thereafter two suspects were located with weapons in their possession. The security personnel at the crossing opened fire and killed them. Explosive belts were found on their bodies.

B. An attempted combined mass murder attack involving a car bomb and shooting at the Karni crossing on April 26: It was prevented by the Palestinian Preventive Security forces. The attack was directed by senior Hamas terrorist-operatives in the Gaza Strip, among them Ahmad Ghandour, head of Hamas in the northern Gaza Strip, and Ahmad Ja’bari, head of Hamas’s terrorist-operative wing in the Gaza Strip.

C. An attempted infiltration into Israel from the northern Gaza Strip on May 29: Three terrorist-operatives set up a ladder close to the fence. The
IDF fired from a tank and killed one of them. The attack was carried out in collaboration with Hamas and the PIJ.

D. Participation in the June 25 attack on the IDF post at Kerem Shalom: The terrorists entered Israeli territory through a tunnel. In the attack, which was the most conspicuous with PRC involvement, Gilad Shalit was abducted.

42. The Israeli security forces prevented a number of attempts made by the organization to attack within Israel through the Israeli-Egyptian border:

A. On June 11 two PRC terrorist-operatives were caught trying to enter Israel from Sinai. During interrogation they admitted that they had been dispatched to Israel carry out abductions and murder attacks.

B. On July 21 a PRC terrorist-operative was caught near the Israeli-Egyptian border while trying to infiltrate into Israel from Sinai. During interrogation he admitted to having been dispatched by an operative in the Gaza Strip to abduct an Israeli and bring him to the Gaza Strip as a bargaining chip in negotiations to free Palestinian prisoners. The instructions were to abduct an Israeli soldier and should he fail, he was to murder him and take his documents to the Gaza Strip for use in negotiations.

43. In 2006 the organization continued its efforts to development a terrorist infrastructure in Judea and Samaria directed from the Gaza Strip. Their success was limited. Most conspicuous was its involvement in the June 25 abduction and murder of Eliahu Pinhas Oshri, which was carried out by a Fatah/Tanzim cell operating under the direction of the PRC in the Gaza Strip.

44. During the past year Hamas increased its aid and support of the PRC. The close relations between the two organizations were revealed in an interview given by Abu Yusuf al-Qoqa, one of the organization’s senior operatives. He admitted that the organization “coordinated fully” with Hamas, received its support in practical matters, supported it politically and identified with its Islamic ideology. Appointing PRC leader Jamal Abu Samhadana (who died in an Israeli Air Force
attack on June 8) as inspector general of the interior ministry of the Hamas government and of the police only served to emphasize the strong connections between Hamas and the PRC.

Banner for the interview conducted with Abu Yusuf al-Qoqa before his death, as it appeared on the PRC Website. In the interview he revealed the close operational, ideological and political collaboration between the PRC and Hamas, although he claimed the organization maintained its independence (www.moqawmh.com, April 25, 2006).

G. The Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP)

45. During 2006 the IDF dealt a severe blow to the PFLP’s leadership in Judea and Samaria by detaining two of its leaders, Ahmad Sa’adat, the general secretary, and ‘Ahed Ghulmeh, head of the terrorist-operational wing. The detentions took place on March 14 during Operation First Fruits, during which five of the terrorists involved in the murder of Israeli Tourism Minister Rehavam Ze’evi were captured.

46. The organization’s operational center in Judea and Samaria remained in Nablus, where it is directed from the Gaza Strip and closely collaborates with Fatah. Most of its attacks are centered in Judea and Samaria.
Two PFLP heads detained by the IDF

Ahmad Sa’adat

Ahed Ghulmeh
Chapter III

The Palestinian terrorist organization buildup project, led by Hamas in the Gaza Strip

A. Background and general description

1. During 2006 the terrorist organizations increased their efforts to improve their operational capabilities in the Gaza Strip by attempting to copy the model of Hezbollah in Lebanon, which, in their opinion, proved itself. The project is led by Hamas, but organizations such as the PIJ are also involved. The project is supported by Iran, Syria and Hezbollah.

2. The project was accelerated after the disengagement in 2005, which created a new situation and hastened the establishment Hamas’s control of the Gaza Strip. The Philadelphi route and the Rafah crossing were left wide open and subject to extensive smuggling operations, which neither the Palestinian Authority nor Egypt has taken effective measures to prevent.

3. After the disengagement, it became easy for the Palestinian terrorist organizations, especially Hamas, to smuggle weapons into the Gaza Strip, mainly through a network of tunnels. Terrorist operatives also have easy access to the border and have been able to enter the Gaza Strip and leave it for training in Lebanon, Syria and Iran. In addition, the terrorist organizations are able to smuggle large sums of money into the Gaza Strip with little effort, funds earmarked for civilian, governmental and their own needs.
4. As the opportunities increased, Hamas and the other organizations’ motivation to upgrade their military-operational capabilities have grown. In our assessment, three main factors fed their motivation:

A. **The many difficulties encountered by the Hamas government during its first year, especially from Fatah and the Palestinian security forces loyal to Abu Mazen, which made it difficult to impose their control on the PA-administered territories:** The first year of the Hamas government was marked by a series of violent clashes between Hamas, and Fatah and the security forces. It was also marked by rising anarchy and a parallel crumbling of law and order. All those developments increased Hamas’s awareness that the movement had to fortify itself to withstand attacks from internal Palestinian opponents.

B. **The failure of the terrorist organizations to effectively confront with the IDF forces which reentered the Gaza Strip during Operations Summer Rains and Autumn Clouds:** Their failures during the IDF operations led them to examine their own military methods so that in the future they would be able to exact a higher price from IDF forces when they entered the Strip (with an eye to the potential threat of a massive IDF action in the Gaza Strip). That led them to make organizational changes and changes in their military methods in accordance with operational needs which surfaced during its self-examination of warfare against the IDF.

C. **Hezbollah’s success in fighting the IDF in south Lebanon and the damage inflicted on the civilian population in Israel:** That success turned Hezbollah into a model for the buildup project in the Gaza Strip. The results of the war made even more clear the **strategic importance of long-range rockets** in attacking Israel’s civilian population and the **effectiveness of advanced anti-tank missiles** in fighting the IDF.

5. Because of the Hamas leadership’s ambition to deprive Abu Mazen and Fatah of exclusive control of the security forces and to have the ability to activate
“governmental” security forces against its opponents, the Hamas government established the Executive Force. The Executive Force has about 5,500 men whose roots are in the Executive Force established three years previously by Muhammad Dahlan, at that time interior minister. The Executive Force is subordinate to the Hamas government’s interior minister, and its role is first and foremost to fight Hamas’s internal Palestinian enemies. The Executive Force is an adjunct of the Izzedine al-Qassam Brigades, Hamas’s terrorist-operative wing and its militia (murabitoun). All the above forces total more than 10,000 operatives, armed with weapons of varying quality.

6. In 2006 the buildup project led by Hamas was manifested in the following ways:

   A. **Organizational changes** and changes in its military methods, while institutionalizing and organizing headquarters and forces according to geography. The operational forces were divided into designated professional squads in various fields, such as anti-tank warfare, snipers, sabotage and infantry.

   B. **Smuggling massive amounts of standard and advanced weapons** into the Gaza Strip through tunnels, the Rafah crossing and by sea. Among the weapons which reached the Gaza Strip in 2006 were advanced Konkurs anti-tank missiles, 122 mm Grad rockets, standard explosives (most of which have not yet been employed against the IDF) and night-vision equipment. In addition to smuggling, they have upgraded their ability to manufacture weapons.

   C. **Constructing a defensive system on the outskirts of the densely populated Palestinian cities and villages** to prepare the ground for a possible IDF incursion. To that end a large number of tunnels and underground bunkers have been built (“the tunnel republic,” according to one Fatah spokesman) at the edges of populated areas. The tunnels are used for various purposes, such as hiding weapons, hiding terrorist-operatives and the secret passage of operatives to areas where fighting is going on. In addition offensive tunnels were built for purposes such as infiltrating into
Israeli territory, like the one used in the attack at Kerem Shalom. The tunnels also serve Hamas in its clashes with Fatah and the security forces loyal to Abu Mazen.

D. **Accelerating training and courses military operatives**, given in the Gaza Strip as well as in Iran, Syria and Lebanon. There are two categories of training: in actual warfare (infantry, anti-tank, anti-aircraft, artillery, naval roles, sabotage and intelligence) and in developing and upgrading **weapons manufacture**. The objectives of the training are to improve the organizations’ defensive and offensive capabilities, and to upgrade their own weapons manufacture. Operatives training abroad return to the Gaza Strip to transmit the know-they have acquired to local operatives.

7. In 2006 progress was made on the buildup project, although it was delayed by the violent internal clashes. On the other hand, attempts to export operational capabilities from the Gaza Strip to Judea and Samaria by sending operatives, know-how, money and direction **failed**. The main causes of their failure were Judea and Samaria’s different geography and demography, and the presence of the Israeli security forces and the effective counterterrorist measures taken by the Israeli security forces.

**B. The establishment of the Executive Force by the Hamas government**

8. The Executive Force (or Special Force) is subordinate to Hamas interior minister Sa'id Siyam and was established by Hamas in April-May 2006. Within a short time it became one of the movement’s main instruments for controlling the Gaza Strip. Its operatives wear uniforms, carry light arms and receive their salaries on time from the interior ministry. They are trained in the Gaza Strip and their commanders are gradually being sent to Iran and Syria for additional training.
9. The Hamas government regards the Executive Force as a governmental force in every respect. On the other hand, Abu Mazen and his supporters regard the force, which since its inception has been involved in violent clashes with Fatah and the old-guard security services, as illegal, and demand they be disbanded or integrated into existing security forces.

10. The Executive Force has consistently improved its capabilities in an attempt to establish itself as an alternative to the old-guard security services. Its deployment was extended and its role in enforcing public order was amplified to include duties previously carried out by the old-guard services. (For example, it secures government offices and performs police functions.)

11. The Executive Force maintains close contacts with Hamas’s terrorist-operative wing in the Gaza Strip, and apparently some of its members were involved in military actions against IDF forces in the Strip and even helped plan terrorist attacks. However, so far the Executive Force as a whole has not yet been involved in terrorist activity and has focused mainly on clashes with Hamas opponents.

12. Two of the Executive Force’s commanders have unequivocally terrorist backgrounds:

A. Jamal Jarah (Abu Ubeida), who heads the Force: Born in the Jabaliya refugee camp in 1965, he began as an operative in the Hamas security apparatus in the Gaza Strip, and in 1996 was arrested by the Palestinian security forces and imprisoned for a relatively long term. After his release he returned to planning and implementing terrorist attacks. On December 30 2003 he escaped an attempted IDF targeted killing.

B. Yussuf al-Zahar, a senior commander: Born in Egypt in 1953, he is the brother of Mahmoud al-Zahar, the Hamas government foreign minister, and an accountant by profession. When the Palestinian Authority was established he joined the Palestinian police, belonging at the same time to the Hamas security apparatus; he also aided Hamas by hiding large quantities of weapons in his house. He served as an aide to Salah Shahadeh,
head of Hamas’s terrorist-operative wing, who was killed by Israel in July 2002.

Yussuf al-Zahar (Jordanian weekly newspaper Al-Sabil, June 5, 2006)

13. With power struggles in the background between Fatah and Hamas the West Bank, the Hamas government authorized the establishment of an Executive Force there. However, attempts to establish branches in Judea and Samaria were unsuccessful for a variety of reasons: Hamas’s relative weakness in the West Bank compared with Fatah and supporters of Abu Mazen, Israeli security forces counterterrorist measures\(^1\) and the distances between cities in Judea and Samaria, which makes it difficult to run the Force in a centralized way.

C. Acquiring weapons and smuggling them into the Gaza Strip

14. 2006 was marked by significant increases in the quantity and quality of weapons smuggled into the Gaza Strip. They enabled the terrorist organizations to upgrade their ongoing activities and to promote the buildup process.

15. The following quantities of weapons were smuggled into to Gaza Strip, according to ISA data, updated to the middle of December 2006 (all amounts are approximations):

\(^1\) According to ISA data, the Israeli security forces detained 149 Executive Force operatives in Judea and 30 in Samaria.
A. **28 tons of standard explosives**, compared with six in 2005. Such a large quantity of standard explosives in the Gaza Strip means the charges and belts are more powerful and various options for terrorist attacks, such as exploding tunnels, have been improved.

B. **14,000 rifles**, compared with 9,300 in 2005, and five million rounds of ammunition, compared with two million in 2005.

C. **Other weapons**: 40 rockets, 20 advanced anti-tank missiles, 150 RPGs, 65 RPG launchers and ten anti-aircraft missiles.

16. Most of the weapons were smuggled in through tunnels under the Philadelphi route, which runs along the Israeli-Egyptian border, and some through the Rafah crossing and other above-ground passageways. Once the IDF forces evacuated the Philadelphi route (September 2005) and responsibility was passed to the Palestinians and Egyptians, smuggling became rapid and relatively secure. The Palestinians and Egyptians were ineffective when it came to dealing with intensive smuggling activity.

17. According to ISA data, during 2006 Israeli security forces destroyed the openings of 20 tunnels, and eight others were destroyed by Israeli Air Force bombings (after the individuals living in the houses into which the tunnels opened were warned to evacuate the premises).

18. Attempts to smuggle weapons in by sea were also prevented:

A. On January 6 a Lebanese navy patrol off the coast of Tripoli stopped a boat loaded with weapons and ammunition bound for the Gaza Strip. It was also carrying various types of explosives, electric detonators, RPGs and hand grenades. The boat had left the Nahr al-Bared refugee camp in northern Lebanon.
B. On May 9 and 13 the Israeli navy prevented attempts to smuggle hundreds of kilograms of standard explosives from Egypt to the Gaza coast. They were to be used in preparing side charges, explosive belts and rockets.

19. Notable were the high grade and advanced nature of the weapons smuggled into the Gaza Strip:

A. Second-generation Russian-made Konkurs anti-tank missiles, of the sort used by Hezbollah in Lebanon.
B. **122 mm Grad rockets** with a maximum range of 20.4 kilometers (almost 13 miles), a significant upgrade in comparison with the rockets possessed by the terrorist organizations.

C. **Night vision equipment.** In 2006 the terrorist organizations increased their efforts to smuggle starlight goggles and scopes into the Gaza Strip to improve their capabilities to fight and gather intelligence at night. Most of the equipment was second generation and could identify armored vehicles at 2 kilometers (1 ¼ miles) and personnel at 400 meters (about a quarter of a mile).
ITT Night-Quest: second generation starlight night vision scope. This type of scope was seized from the Palestinian terrorist organizations during Operation Defensive Shield (April 2002).

20. Judea and Samaria: The IDF’s intensive counterterrorist activity makes it difficult for the various organizations to manufacture weapons as they do in the Gaza Strip. The organizations have not yet succeeded in smuggling standard explosives and rockets into the West Bank and what they do have is far inferior to what has been found in the Gaza Strip. During the past year many smuggling attempts have been made, especially of Kalashnikov rifles, into Judea and Samaria, but not in large quantity.

D. Manufacturing weapons

21. In 2006 the terrorist organizations in the Gaza Strip continued their efforts to manufacture a significant amount of the weapons they use in their attacks, and by so doing to lessen their dependence on contraband arms smuggled in from Egypt (dependent to a great degree on the effectiveness of the measures taken by the Egyptians). Hamas and other prominent terrorist organizations have their own infrastructures for independent weapons manufacture. The organizations also pass along technical know-how and weapons to one another.

22. The infrastructures consist of lathes, workshops and laboratories set up in the midst of the civilian population. They use their homemade weapons for defensive purposes (to delay the movement of IDF forces along roads in the Gaza
Strip) and for offensive purposes (**rockets** fired at Israeli population centers and **explosive devices** used in terrorist attacks against the civilian population).

23. Deliberately placing their production lines in residential areas exposes the civilian population to danger from Israeli attacks and “work-related accidents.” For example, on December 29 two weapons “engineers” were killed when a highly powerful explosive device detonated in a home in the Zeitun neighborhood of Gaza City. The blast wounded civilians and caused extensive damage to the building.

24. Prominent among other weapons manufactured in the Gaza Strip are:

   **A. Anti-tank weapons**, including the production of Al-Yasin (named after Ahmad Yassin) rockets and their launchers, based on the Russian PG-2. Al-Bana (named for Hussein al-Bana) and Al-Batar rockets are also made.

   **B. Various types of explosive devices**, some of which may be made with standard materials:

   1) The model for the side charges was Hezbollah in Lebanon (for example the abduction July, during which an Israeli tank was destroyed). Conspicuous are Hamas’s homemade explosively formed
projectiles (EFPs) called shawaz (flame). They are more effective than those used by the other Palestinian terrorist organizations. Their effectiveness is a result of both improvements in manufacture and in the use of explosives of greater power produced using Iranian and/or Hezbollah know-how.

2) During the last months of 2006 such high-grade devices were used during four events. Two high-grade side charges were found on September 12 as part of a complex chain near the main road in the Gaza Strip, four were used to attack IDF forces in Beit Hanoun during Operation Summer Rains (October 31 to November 26). Hamas claimed responsibility for all four incidents.

Shaped Hamas shawaz side charge uncovered on September 12. Estimated penetration capability: 200 mm (8") of steel.

C. Manufacturing short-range rockets, mortars and mortar shells:

1) Hamas as the capability to manufacture a wide variety of Qassam rockets: advanced rockets with a maximum range of 9 kilometers (about 5 ½ miles) and those with double-grain propellants with a maximum range of 12-14 kilometers (about 7 ½ to almost 9 miles).

2) Hamas has tried to extend both the rockets’ range and shelf life, which today lasts only a few months. In our assessment, Hamas has a few hundred rockets at its disposal.
3) The PIJ also manufactures its own rockets, called Al-Quds and similar to the Qassams, although their ranges are shorter. The PIJ is currently trying to extend the Al-Quds’ range and to increase the number of rockets in its possession.

E. Underground fortifications

25. The Palestinian terrorist organizations in the Gaza Strip, especially Hamas, have conducted extensive fortification activity, copying Hezbollah’s model in Lebanon. They have made a particular effort to construct tunnels, bunkers and weapons’ stores for both offensive and defensive purposes. A large part of the underground fortification system is located in densely populated areas in cities, village and refugee camps, in gross violation of international laws governing the conduct of war and classified as a war crime. The terrorist organizations’ aspiration is to be able to carry out most of its warfare against the IDF from within populated areas, after a preliminary stage of containing and delaying the IDF’s advance (with anti-tank and sabotage squads).

Digging the tunnel, part of Hamas’s “tunnel war”
(Siraj Al-Aqsa TV, January 22)

26. The tunnels are dug by the terrorist organizations for four main objectives:

A. For smuggling: Most of the tunnels under the Egyptian border are used for smuggling both weapons and terrorist-operatives into the Gaza Strip (and out, if necessary), thereby avoiding checks at the border crossings. On
October 18 the IDF exposed 13 such tunnels along the Philadelphi route, representing only a fraction of the vast system.

A tunnel opening uncovered in a residential dwelling in Rafah

A smugglers’ tunnel exposed on the Egyptian border

B. For offensive purposes: the tunnels are also intended for infiltrating terrorists into Israel to attack IDF forces or carry out attacks. Such a tunnel was used in the attack in which Gilad Shalit was abducted. It had been dug from the outskirts of Rafah for a distance of 700-800 meters (approximately 4/10 – 1/2 mile), 300 meters (about 330 yards) of which were on the Israeli side of the border.²

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² On January 30, 2007 another such tunnel was uncovered near the Karni crossing, and was intended for use by terrorists to carry out an attack in Israel. In the estimation of ISA head Yuval Diskin, at least ten tunnels are currently being dug under the security fence between Israel and the Gaza Strip (Yediot Haaronot, February 6, 2007).
Tunnels for offensive purposes

Shaft of a terrorist-operative infiltration tunnel exposed on the Israeli side of the border

A tunnel exposed on the outskirts of Shuja’iya on October 27. Dug under a building in a residential area, it was approximately 13 meters (14 yards) deep and 150 meters (160 yards long). Apparently it was meant to be used by a terrorist cell planning an attack at the Karni crossing, possibly to abduct Israelis working there.

C. For transferring terrorist-operatives within the Gaza Strip: The tunnels in question were constructed between buildings in cities and towns, especially on the outskirts of built-up areas. They were primarily intended to serve as passages for operatives who would be able to appear above ground, hit IDF forces and disappear back into the tunnels. They were dug in response to lessons learned from the Israeli Air Force’s targeted killings, and to prevent terrorist-operatives from having to move above ground insofar as was possible. The terrorist organizations aspire to engage the IDF in battles within populated areas.
D. For **blowing up in attacks**: Some of the tunnels were meant to be packed with explosives and blown up, as part of Hamas's defensive program. They were dug under main roads (especially under the Saladin Road, the main road running along the Gaza Strip) with the objective of destroying armored IDF vehicles. Hamas opponents recently claimed that the explosives in the tunnels, some of which were detonated by the Palestinian security forces, were intended to assassinate senior PA public figures, including Abu Mazen and Muhammad Dahlan.

**E. Expanding the media infrastructure by Hamas**

27. As well as building up its military strength, Hamas is also upgrading its media infrastructure, considered an important weapon in the battle for hearts and minds. Here too, Hezbollah and Al-Manar TV have served as models. Hamas's media primarily have served the organization in its propaganda campaign – accompanied by mutual mudslinging and psychological warfare – against Abu Mazen and Fatah, which control the official PA written and electronic media.

28. During the second half of 2006 Hamas focused most of its efforts on upgrading its media capabilities, the most important of which were:

A. A new satellite television station was launched (an addition to its ground-based channel, which has limited reception) called **Siraj Al-Aqsa** (The Light of Al-Aqsa).

1) Siraj Al-Aqsa TV began broadcasting on October 15, 2006 from Dubai. Most of its material comes from the Gaza Strip, and some from Judea and Samaria (possibly from a studio which serves the station). The channel uses two Arab satellites: one belongs to the Arab satellite company **Arabsat** (most of whose stocks are in Saudi Arabian hands) and the other owned by **Nilesat**. Its programs are received in Judea and Samaria and in the Arab states as well. On January 31, 2007, it
broadcast for 22 hours without a break for the first time, and today broadcasts 24 a day.

2) During its first months of operation a large percentage of its broadcasts was devoted to religious programs reflecting Hamas’s radical Islamic ideology. It has continued with anti-Israeli propaganda, documents the activities of operatives of the Izzedine al-Qassam Brigades and the other terrorist organizations, and participated in the anti-Fatah mudslinging campaigns (especially against Muhammad Dahlan). The technological quality of the broadcasts is relatively low.

B. Hamas has upgraded its broad Internet infrastructure, which is mostly administered in Lebanon, directed from Damascus, and includes more than 20 sites in eight languages (Arabic, English, French, Russian, Farsi, Malaysian, Urdu and Indonesian). A separate Izzedine al-Qassam Brigades site was launched in English, sites were launched for Al-Aqsa TV and the Executive Force. In addition, technical and graphic improvements were made on Palestine-info, Hamas’s main Internet portal.

29. Hamas uses its Internet presence in its propaganda war against Abu Mazen and Fatah, to inculcate its radical Islamic ideology and encourage terrorism and violence against Israel. The movement gives high priority to the battle for hearts
and minds and psychological warfare by upgrading its media capabilities. To that end it has invested large amounts of money at a time when the Hamas government is bankrupt and the Palestinian population’s economic situation has deteriorated.
Chapter IV

Hezbollah activity in 2006

A. Overview

1. Until the second Lebanon war Hezbollah followed a policy designed to maintain controlled tension along the Israeli-Lebanese border by perpetrating sporadic acts of terrorism (attacks on IDF outposts in the Har Dov region, abductions, and rocket and mortar fire). The peak of Hezbollah’s activity in 2006 was the abduction of two IDF soldiers which triggered the second Lebanon war. All the while, the Lebanese government made no actual attempt to prevent such activity on its territory, as befits a sovereign country.

2. Motivating this policy was Hezbollah’s desire to maintain a “balance of deterrence” with Israel, perpetuate its own image as “the defender of Lebanon,” and preserve the organization’s warlike jihadist character. Israel adopted a policy of restraint designed to contain Hezbollah’s terrorist attacks and contented itself with dealing with the problem through the international community. The relative quiet that prevailed along the Israeli-Lebanese border most of the time, based on the “game rules” between Israel and Hezbollah, allowed Hezbollah (with massive assistance from Iran and Syria) to accelerate the buildup of its extensive military infrastructure, including an arsenal of over 20,000 rockets of various ranges (including long-range rockets capable of reaching the central areas of the State of Israel).

3. Parallel with its activity along the Israeli-Lebanese border, Hezbollah remained a significant force in assisting and funding the operations of the Palestinian terrorist organizations, including the various Fatah factions (mostly in Samaria). Of particular note were Hezbollah’s assistance to and
guidance of Fatah cells in the Nablus region and its attempts during the second Lebanon war to encourage suicide bombing attacks and abductions to open a second front with Israel.

**B. Activity along the Israeli-Lebanese border**

4. Prior to the abduction of the two soldiers, two incidents occurred along the Israeli-Lebanese border in 2006:

A. **On February 3**, Hezbollah fired some 40 mortar shells, anti-tank missiles, and small arms at IDF posts in the Har Dov region (Shebaa Farms). An IDF soldier was slightly wounded in the attack. IDF forces returned artillery fire and the Israeli Air Force attacked five Hezbollah targets in the eastern sector.

B. The clash began with a Katyusha rocket attack on the Galilee (Mt. Meron), for which no one claimed responsibility, and continued with air raids by the Israeli Air Force on two PFLP-GC (Ahmed Jibril’s organization) bases. There were also exchanges of fire between the IDF and Hezbollah along the border, triggered by a sniping attack that critically wounded an IDF soldier near Kibbutz Manara. It ended with a ceasefire achieved after the **Lebanese government** submitted a request through UNIFIL.
A day of battle in northern Israel: attacks by the IDF Air Force and artillery on Hezbollah outposts along the border (Al-Manar TV, May 28)

5. The peak of Hezbollah’s activity along the border was the abduction of two IDF soldiers in the vicinity of the village of Zar‘it (in the central sector of south Lebanon) on July 12. The abduction of the two reservists, Eldad Regev and Ehud Goldwasser, occurred as two armored IDF hummer jeeps were on a routine patrol between the villages of Zar‘it and Shtula. The attack was perpetrated by a Hezbollah squad that penetrated some 200 meters (about 22 yards) into Israeli territory, detonated side charges, and fired anti-tank missiles. As a result of the attack, three IDF soldiers were killed, two injured, and the two soldiers were abducted. The abduction was accompanied by massive fire on IDF forces and settlements along Israel’s northern border, similar to Hezbollah’s past modus operandi.

Some of the arms and equipment used by the Hezbollah squad responsible for the abduction, found several months after the second Lebanon war (photo: IDF Spokesman, January 11, 2007)
C. The second Lebanon war\(^1\)

6. In response to the attack and the abduction of the two IDF soldiers, on the night of July 12-13 the Israeli Air Force attacked Hezbollah’s arsenal of long-range strategic missiles (Zelzal and Fajr), destroying a significant part of it. Also attacked on July 13 were dozens of Hezbollah bases, outposts, and arms depots, as well as infrastructure targets across Lebanon.

7. **Israel’s reaction to the abduction of the two soldiers exceeded the scope expected by Hezbollah**, which failed to predict that the abduction would escalate into a war (as Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah admitted after the war). As of the morning of July 13, Hezbollah launched a massive, well-coordinated rocket attack on population centers in northern Israel, increasing the rockets’ range to encompass such population centers as Haifa, Safed, Tiberias, Afula, and Nazareth.

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8. The abduction of the IDF soldiers, which, in Hezbollah’s view, should have been a limited incident, thus turned into a full-scale war (the second Lebanon

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\(^1\) This document does not elaborate the second Lebanon war, detailing only some general characteristics of Hezbollah’s activity. For further information see our November 2006 Bulletin entitled “The use of Lebanese civilians as human shields: the extensive military infrastructure positioned and hidden by Hezbollah in populated areas. From within the Lebanese towns and villages deliberate rocket attacks were directed against civilian targets in Israel” (henceforth “The use of Lebanese civilians as human shields”) at [http://www.terrorism-info.org.il/malam_multimedia/English/eng_n/pdf/human_shields.pdf](http://www.terrorism-info.org.il/malam_multimedia/English/eng_n/pdf/human_shields.pdf).
war) that lasted for 33 days (until August 14). The war saw the (premature) use of the extensive offensive and defensive arsenals established by Hezbollah (with Syrian and Iranian assistance) over the course of many years:

A. The rocket arsenal: until the outbreak of the war, it was estimated at more than 20,000 rockets of various ranges (including long-range rockets capable of reaching northern and central Israel). Most of the rockets were concentrated in the “operative core” in south Lebanon. Most of them were also stored in designated depots dispersed in civilian buildings (residential houses and public institutions) in many settlements in south Lebanon. The arsenal was meant to provide Hezbollah with the ability to manage a sustained campaign against Israel and inflict considerable damage upon its civilian population. Thus, Hezbollah strove to create a balance of deterrence that would allow it to perpetrate terrorist attacks against Israel, encourage Palestinian terrorism in the Palestinian Authority-administered territories, and at the same time continue building up its military strength in Lebanon.

B. The military arsenal: based on the military infrastructure in the area south of the Litani river and in the Nabatiya region. It is designed to allow Hezbollah to wage guerilla warfare against the IDF by using advanced anti-tank missiles (such as laser-guided Kornet missiles), engineering forces, and infantry. The defensive military arsenal is based on the organization’s widespread deployment in the Shi’ite towns and villages south of the Litani and on waging persistent warfare from within population centers (as reflected in the organization’s operative plans seized during the course of the war). To complement the military infrastructure within population centers, Hezbollah also built outposts in unpopulated areas, but they play a secondary role in the organization’s overall defense concept.
9. Some of the arms and ammunition transferred by Iran and Syria to Hezbollah were made by Iran, some by Syria, and some by other countries (such as Russia and China). The most prominent arms in these three categories were:

A. **Iranian-made rockets** included the long-range Zelzal-1 (range: 125 kilometers, 77 miles) and Zelzal-2 (range: 210 kilometers, 130 miles); Fajr-5 (75 kilometers, 46 miles) and Fajr-3 (43 kilometers, almost 28 miles); Falaq-1 (10 kilometers, 6 miles) and Falaq-2 (11 kilometers, almost 12 miles), rockets with enlarged warheads used to hit fortified targets; and Naze’at rockets for ranges between 80-140 kilometers (almost 50-80 miles). Iran provided Hezbollah with improved anti-tank missiles of its own manufacture, equipped with a double warhead (TANDEM) with extremely high armor piercing capabilities. Iran also provided Hezbollah with an unmanned aircraft called Ababil, developed by the Iranian aircraft industry.

B. During the past years, Bashar Assad’s Syria provided Hezbollah with arms of its own manufacturing, unlike Hafez Assad who avoided providing the organization with Syrian arms. Noteworthy in this context are 220mm rockets with an 80 kg (176 lb) warhead and a range of approximately 70 kilometers (43 miles) and 302mm rockets with a 100 kg (220 lb) warhead and a range of approximately 100 kilometers (62 miles) (such rockets were launched by Hezbollah against Haifa and other population centers).

C. **Iran and Syria** provided Hezbollah with advanced arms and ammunition made by Russia and China. Worth mentioning are 122mm rockets made by China and Russia (extensively used during the war), Russian-made Konkurs anti-tank missiles, Russian-made

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2 For further information see our September and August 2006 Bulletins entitled “Hezbollah as a strategic arm of Iran,” at [http://www.terrorism-info.org.il/malam_multimedia/English/eng_n/pdf/iran_hezbollah_e1.pdf](http://www.terrorism-info.org.il/malam_multimedia/English/eng_n/pdf/iran_hezbollah_e1.pdf) and “Syria as a strategic prop for Hezbollah and Hamas” at [http://www.terrorism-info.org.il/malam_multimedia/English/eng_n/pdf/syria_strategy_e.pdf](http://www.terrorism-info.org.il/malam_multimedia/English/eng_n/pdf/syria_strategy_e.pdf).
**Kornet anti-tank missiles**, Chinese **C-802 shore-to-sea missiles** with a range of 65 nautical miles (approximately 120 kilometers, 74 land miles) and a 165 kg (363 lb) warhead (such as the missile that hit the Israeli Navy Ship Hanit off the coast of Beirut on July 14), and Russian-made **SA-7** and **SA-14 anti-aircraft missiles**.

10. The rocket arsenal built by Hezbollah **proved highly resilient** to Israel’s attacks and Hezbollah was able to use it during the entire course of the war against population centers as far south as Hadera. During the war, Hezbollah fired approximately **4,000 rockets** at northern Israel. **The rockets caused 53 deaths** (mostly civilians), one third of all the war casualties (159). During the 33-day war, 1,000,000 civilians were forced to live in bomb shelters, and some 350,000-500,000 civilians were uprooted and became displaced persons.³

### D. The rehabilitation of Hezbollah’s military infrastructure after the war

11. Since the end of the second Lebanon war, **Hezbollah, supported by Iran and Syria, has been engaged in a rapid process of rehabilitating its military strength** damaged in the war. It follows a well thought-out plan based on learning the lessons of the war and locating the weak spots that surfaced during it.

12. Within this context:

   **A. Hezbollah has rehabilitated most of the military infrastructure in south Lebanon** (south and north of the Litani) damaged in the war and gradually resumed its routine activities in the south.

³ For details see: “The use of Lebanese civilians as human shields”.

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B. For the time being it has given up its visible presence along the first line of outposts along the border, relying instead on gathering intelligence from bases in civilian houses in the villages along the border.

C. It has renewed large-scale smuggling of arms and ammunition from Syria into Lebanon, including to the south (mostly rockets, anti-tank weapons (including Kornet missiles), and anti-aircraft weapons).

D. It has recruited new operatives to replace those killed in the war and has begun training them in Lebanon and Iran.

13. The process of rehabilitating the military infrastructure is being carried out with the support of Iran and Syria and in blatant violation of Security Council Resolution 1701, taking advantage of the interest shown by the Lebanese army and UNIFIL forces deployed in the south to avoid a frontal confrontation with Hezbollah. Of particular note is the Lebanese government’s avoidance of taking effective action against the large-scale smuggling of arms and ammunition to Hezbollah and the Lebanese army’s avoidance of interfering with the rehabilitation of Hezbollah’s military infrastructure in south Lebanon.

E. Directing Palestinian terrorist activity in the PA-administered territories

14. In 2006, Hezbollah continued directing and assisting the activity of terrorist organizations in the Palestinian Authority-administered territories to improve their operative capabilities in their terrorist campaign against Israel.

15. According to Israel Security Agency data, there was an increase of some 150% in the number of Hezbollah-directed terrorist cells in the first half of 2006. On the eve of the second Lebanon war, there were approximately 80 Hezbollah-directed cells operating in the territories,

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4 This section is based on data provided by the Israel Security Agency.
about 50 of which were in Judea and Samaria and about 30 in the Gaza Strip. Most of them belonged to Fatah/Tanzim and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad.

16. The increase in the scope of Hezbollah’s activity in the territories was reflected in the large-scale recruitment of new groups and the strengthening of existing ones. Such activity included transfers of larger sums of money, preparations to deliver arms and ammunition, transfer of instructions to perpetrate terrorist attacks, and coordination of meetings between Palestinian terrorist operatives and their Hezbollah handlers in Arab countries.

17. Following are two examples of terrorist attacks in Judea and Samaria directed by Hezbollah operatives in Lebanon:

   A. **On March 30**, a suicide bomber disguised as an Orthodox Jew blew himself up inside an Israeli car that had given him a ride near Kedumim. The four Israelis in the car were killed. Hezbollah operatives in Lebanon had contacts with Fatah/Tanzim operatives in Nablus, who carried out the attack, and provided them with funds and instructions for perpetrating other terrorist attacks.

   B. **On July 17**, an explosive charge was activated against IDF forces engaged in counter-terrorist activity in Nablus. As a result, one IDF soldier was killed and several more were injured. Hezbollah operatives in Lebanon had contacts with the Fatah/Tanzim operatives in Nablus who carried out the attack and provided them with funds and instructions for perpetrating other terrorist attacks.

18. Following Hamas’s rise to power and the opening of the Rafah crossing, Hezbollah also increased its activity in the Gaza Strip. According to Israel Security Agency data, there are now approximately 30 cells in the Gaza Strip operated by Hezbollah.
19. The terrorist cells in the territories upgraded their operative capabilities with Hezbollah’s assistance, held meetings with Hezbollah operatives and senior Palestinian operatives in Lebanon, Syria, and other countries. The assistance extended by Hezbollah was reflected by the transferring large sums of money, training explosives experts, coordinating deliveries of arms and ammunition, and transferring know-how for rocket and mortar capabilities.

20. As the activity of Hezbollah-directed cells increased, so did the counter-terrorist activities of the Israeli security forces. According to Israel Security Agency data, about 35 Hezbollah-directed terrorist operatives from Judea and Samaria were detained in the first half of 2006.

F. Failure to open a second front during the second Lebanon war

21. The second Lebanon war resulted in a decrease of Hezbollah’s activity regarding Palestinian terrorist cells in Judea and Samaria. This was reflected primarily in a decrease in the transfer of funds to the various cells.

22. However, during that time Hezbollah attempted to urge the cells to perpetrate notable terrorist attacks inside Israeli territory to open a second front with Israel, parallel to the Lebanese-Israeli front. In practice, Hezbollah was unable to realize its intent, primarily due to the effective preventive IDF measures in Judea and Samaria.

23. During the course of the war, the Israeli security forces prevented nine planned suicide bombings and abductions. Noteworthy among them were:

A. A suicide bombing attack in Rehovot by a Fatah/Tanzim squad (July 30), when a warning triggered an intensive operation which led to the arrest of a suicide bomber and an accomplice who was supposed to lead him to the site
of the terrorist attack. Found in their possession was a bag with an explosive belt.

B. An abduction on the Tel-Aviv promenade (July 21) that was supposed to be perpetrated by a female terrorist. She was assisted by an Israeli Arab who drove her to Tel-Aviv and was also supposed to drive her back to Nablus.

C. A suicide bombing attack near the village of Oranit, east of Petah Tikva (July 19).

G. The attempt to broaden terrorist activities in the PA-administered territories after the war

24. After the second Lebanon war, Hezbollah exerted efforts to broaden its operative activities in the PA-administered territories while increasing its support of the various cells and transferring to them the methods of action it used during the war. Hezbollah placed an emphasis on improving the rocket and mortar capabilities of cells in Judea and Samaria. Hezbollah’s efforts did not bear fruit.

H. Collecting intelligence information about Israel

25. Parallel to Hezbollah’s involvement in encouraging terrorist activity in Israel, during the past two years the organization has placed greater emphasis on gathering information about Israel. Following are some of the areas about which the organization gathers information:

   A. The security infrastructure of the State of Israel

   B. The positions and movements of IDF forces along the Israeli-Lebanese border

   C. Alerts regarding Israel’s intentions to attack Lebanon

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5 This section is mostly based on Israel Security Agency data and partly on the study “The use of Lebanese civilians as human shields”.
D. Civilian infrastructures (electricity, energy, chemicals)

E. Israeli politics

F. Prevailing moods in Israeli society

26. During and after the second Lebanon war, Hezbollah relied on its sources to gather information about the locations hit by its rockets, the results of its rocket fire, IDF activity in Lebanon, and preparations of the IDF and of Israel’s home front for the continuing fighting.

27. **Methods of gathering intelligence about Israel:** Hezbollah has used a wide variety of methods to gather the information about Israel, some of which were revealed in the second Lebanon war. They include: listening to IDF communications, establishing a surveillance network along the border, monitoring the media (including Israeli media), and using human intelligence (agents and collaborators working for the organization).

**Methods of intelligence gathering in Hezbollah’s disposal**

Mobile observation posts found in residential rooms in a house in Meiss al-Jabal. Left: a long-range observation camera
Right: Listening to IDF forces: an observation, editing, and recording station found in one of the village houses. The receivers were set to a frequency used by the helicopter network of IDF’s North Command. Left: A computerized station for real-time observation analysis

28. Hezbollah seeks to recruit agents in Israel with access to its priority intelligence requirements, and with the ability to hold meetings abroad. Noteworthy among those are drug dealers (and other criminals), military and police (former and current), journalists, and businessmen. Hezbollah also attempts to recruit agents from among Israeli Arabs and foreign nationals who stay in Israel as tourists or for family visits.

29. As part of the information gathering on Israel, Hezbollah has formed an extensive network of connections with drug dealers and other criminal elements across Israel. The connections are based on drug smuggling from Lebanon which is controlled by prominent Lebanese drug dealers working for Hezbollah. For instance, Kaed Berro, a Lebanese drug dealer from the village of Kafir Kila, was also involved in the abduction of Elhanan Tannenbaum. Hezbollah facilitates the drug trade in exchange for information about Israel and for payment for the drugs.

30. One example of using a source in Israel involved with a Lebanese drug dealer was the arrest of Riyad Mazarib, a resident of Beit Zarzir, in July 2006. Under interrogation he admitted that during the war he had gotten information about IDF maneuvers, military planning for the operations in Lebanon, and locations
hit by Hezbollah rockets. The above information was delivered to a Lebanese drug dealer associated with Hezbollah.

31. The information gathered by Hezbollah’s collection systems is used as a basis for preparing a wide variety of terrorist attacks. The abduction that triggered the second Lebanon war is a recent example of activity based on precise intelligence in Hezbollah’s possession. Likewise, Hezbollah uses the information it gathers to create a file of Israeli targets (which it put to use during the war).

32. Due to the connections between Iran and Hezbollah, it may be assumed that Hezbollah’s information-collecting is also directed by Iran and that the information gathered is delivered by Hezbollah to relevant parties in Iran.
Chapter V

Iranian and Syrian support for Hezbollah and the Palestinian terrorist organizations

A. The objectives of Iranian and Syrian support

1. Iran and Syria, both members of the “axis of evil” and both under increasing pressure from the international community, continued viewing Hezbollah and the Palestinian terrorist organizations as a strategic asset and an important means for achieving all of their national goals.¹

2. These objectives can be summarized as follows:

A. Weakening the State of Israel by forming rifts in its society, damaging its economy by terrorist attacks from the PA-administered territories and from Lebanon, and preventing sustained ceasefires in the campaign of terrorism being waged against Israel. Hezbollah’s extensive military infrastructure in Lebanon, especially the significant rocket arsenal, is also meant to serve Iran and Syria’s military-strategic objectives, such as reprisal in the event of an attack against Iran or in an armed conflict between Israel and Iran and Syria.

B. Strengthening the radical Iranian-Syrian axis in the Middle East and on the international scene by entrenching Iranian and Syrian influence in Lebanon, in the Palestinian Authority, and throughout the entire Arab world. The terrorist organizations are also perceived as means

¹ Iran and Syria also have ideological differences and conflicts of interests on such fundamental issues as acceptance of Israel’s existence. These are not covered in the present study.
of strengthening Iran and Syria’s status vis-à-vis the United States and Western countries.

C. **Weakening pro-Western Arab regimes and rulers** which are fundamentally hostile to Iran and Syria, such as Fouad Siniora’s government in Lebanon and Mahmoud Abbas (Abu Mazen) in the PA-administered territories. At the same time, Iran and Syria strive to strengthen radical Islamic powers in Lebanon, the PA-administered territories, and other Arab countries.

D. **Ideologically**, Iran considers Hezbollah an effective instrument for exporting Khomeini’s Islamic revolution, **effectively serving Iran’s desire to achieve hegemony over the Middle East**. The importing of radical Islamic ideology to Lebanese Shi’ites is so far the only successful example. The Syrian Baath ideology is not as attractive as the Iranian Islamic radical ideology.

**B. Support for Hezbollah**

3. As a result of such views and strategy, in recent years Iran and Syria have increased their assistance to Hezbollah’s efforts to establish an upgraded military infrastructure. That infrastructure has turned Hezbollah from an organization with terrorist and guerilla warfare capabilities into an organization with military land capabilities approaching those of a country.

4. Iran and Syria’s assistance before the second Lebanon war was reflected by the following: **massive assistance with arms and ammunition** (especially providing large quantities of rockets, including long-range rockets capable of
reaching central Israel,\(^2\) and advanced anti-tank missiles), **funding** (Iran gives Hezbollah most of its annual budget), and **political backing** that allows Hezbollah to undermine the pro-Western Lebanese government and stand up to its opponents on the internal Lebanese scene.

5. In Iran and Syria’s view, the improved military infrastructure built by Hezbollah in south Lebanon is meant to give the organization **defensive survivability** as well as an **offensive option against Israel to be activated in due course**. The large rocket arsenal provided to Hezbollah by Iran and Syria is designed to allow **the attrition of Israel** by inflicting sustained damage to population centers deep inside Israeli territory, combined with terrorist attacks. In our assessment, Iran and Syria regard Hezbollah’s use of the offensive option in the second Lebanon war as **premature, since it was supposed to be activated in due course and according to Iran and Syria’s strategic considerations**.

6. **After the second Lebanon war, Iran and Syria have helped Hezbollah rebuild the military and civilian infrastructures hit by the IDF.** Such assistance is reflected by **providing Hezbollah with arms and ammunition and smuggling them into Lebanon** (in violation of Security Council Resolution 1701\(^3\)), and helping (mostly Shi’ite) Lebanese whose homes and property were damaged in the war. **On the Lebanese internal political scene,** Iran and Syria encourage Hezbollah to **topple Fouad Siniora’s pro-Western government** using a variety of subversive tactics (such as mass demonstrations and sit-down strikes which have already led to violent clashes).

\(^2\) Mohtashemi-Pour, an Iranian who played a key role in the establishment of Hezbollah, admitted in an unusual public statement that long-range Iranian-made Zelzal-2 rockets had been provided to Hezbollah and that the organization would not hesitate to use them (interview given to the Iranian reformist daily Sharq, August 3, 2006).

The personality cult of the Iranian leadership among Hezbollah terrorists

Posters with pictures of Iranian leader Khamenei and founder of the Islamic revolution Ayatollah Khomeini, found in rooms used by Hezbollah operatives in Shihin (right) and Bint Jbeil (left). Found in the possession of Hezbollah terrorists in the various villages were Iranian ideological materials, a clear testimony to the export of the Iranian revolutionary ideology to Lebanon.  

C. Support for the Palestinian terrorist organizations

7. As in previous years, in 2006 Iran and Syria continued providing support and assistance to the Palestinian terrorist organizations, especially the Hamas movement and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad. Damascus is still the seat of the Hamas external leadership (and currently the movement’s main source of power) led by Khaled Mashaal and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad leadership headed by Ramadan Abdallah Shalah. Bashar Assad’s regime allows those headquarters to direct the activities of their organizations in the PA-administered territories, including the terrorist-operative activity against Israel (transferring instructions to step up or reduce terrorist activity).

4 For further information see our September and August 2006 Bulletins entitled “Hezbollah as a strategic arm of Iran,” at http://www.terrorism-info.org.il/malam_multimedia/English/eng_n/pdf/iran_hezbollah_e1.pdf.
8. **In the military sphere**, Iranian and Syrian assistance to the Palestinian terrorist organizations in 2006 continued to follow patterns witnessed in previous years: transferring tens of millions of dollars to fund the terrorist organizations and terrorist acts (Iran is the main sponsor of the Palestinian Islamic Jihad), training terrorist operatives from the PA-administered territories (including sabotage training for Hamas operatives), and helping acquire arms and ammunition and smuggle them into the PA-administered territories and Arab countries.5

9. **In the political sphere**, Iran and Syria were visibly satisfied to see Hamas win the legislative council elections (January 2006) and establish a government, anticipating that that would assist them in building up their influence in the Palestinian Authority. **In the last year there was a significant increase in both countries’ activity on the Palestinian scene, which was more publicly noticeable than ever before.** Iran and Syria thus sought to take advantage of the new situation created in the PA-administered territories to promote their own interests.

5 In April 2006, the Jordanian authorities announced they uncovered the activity of terrorist groups belonging to Hamas on the kingdom’s territory. These terrorist groups, some of which were arrested by the Jordanian authorities, were involved in smuggling arms to Jordan and gathering information on targets, including buildings and prominent figures. The affair resulted in a severing of relations between the Jordanian regime and Hamas.
10. The following should be noted with regard to the support for the Palestinians in 2006:

A. The Iranians promised massive financial assistance to Hamas Prime Minister Ismail Haniya during his visit to Iran (December 7-11), held as part of a series of visits to Arab countries. During the visit, Haniya met with “leader” Khamenei and President Ahmadinejad, clearly positioning himself as part of the Iranian-Syrian axis. The Iranians promised Haniya a generous $250 million and expressed their willingness to assist in several development projects. The sum was meant, among other things, to cover the salaries of Palestinian Authority officials, fund allowances for prisoners held in Israeli jails, and help the unemployed. For the time being, only a small part of it has been transferred to Hamas.

B. Syria increased the frequency of its coordination meetings and briefings with senior Hamas representatives, including widely-publicized meetings held by Bashar Assad with Khaled Mashaal, the head of the Hamas Political Bureau, and the Hamas Prime Minister Ismail Haniya. At the same time, the Syrian regime continued its behind-the-scenes involvement in forming Hamas policy both on the internal Palestinian scene and with regard to Israel (encouraging terrorism, preventing ceasefire attempts, interfering with the negotiations for the release of abducted
soldier Gilad Shalit). That gave the Syrians, in their view, the ability to influence the Palestinian scene similar to their influence on shaping the new situation in Lebanon following the second Lebanon war.

Iranian President Ahmadinejad meets with Hamas leader Khaled Mashaal in Damascus (right) and with leaders of the terrorist organizations directed by Syria and Iran (left) (Al-Manar TV, January 20)
Chapter VI

Global Jihad in the Middle East in 2006

A. Overview

1. In 2006, global jihad in the Middle East was aimed against Western targets and against “infidel” Arab regimes rather than the State of Israel. Likewise, Israeli and Jewish institutions worldwide were not targeted by the global jihad in 2006.

2. The year 2006 saw the increase of the influences of global jihad ideology on the various terrorist organization operatives in the PA-administered territories. That was especially true for the Gaza Strip, which borders the Sinai Peninsula, a focal point of global jihad. The ideological influences on local operatives turned into local cells associating themselves with global jihad.

3. Nevertheless, it should be taken into account that global jihad organizations in the Middle East and elsewhere may direct their activities against Israel: Israel (and the Jewish people) have already been targets for global jihad acts of terrorism, and in 2006 Ayman al-Zawahiri, Bin Laden’s second-in-command, described Israel as “the scene of jihad” (i.e., an infidel country that is a legitimate target for attack).

4. Due to the potential threat posed to Israel by global jihad organizations in the Middle East, this study not only examines the activity of global jihad in the PA-administered territories but also presents an outline of its activity in the Arab
countries bordering Israel. Anti-American (and anti-American ally) global jihad activities in Iraq are not dealt with.

B. The Palestinian Authority

The Gaza Strip

5. In 2006 the influence of global jihad ideology on various Palestinian terrorist operatives increased, especially in the Gaza Strip. The presence of global jihad elements in Sinai (see below) also contributed to the spread of that influence to the Gaza Strip, since terrorist operatives there have almost free access to Sinai.

6. Several dozen terrorist operatives based in the PA-administered territories maintain contacts and are ideological affiliated with global jihad elements across the globe. Those operatives attempt to build a terrorist-operative infrastructure in the PA-administered territories by emulating the modus operandi of global jihad.

7. The Internet facilitates the penetration of global jihad ideology into the Gaza Strip. Terrorist operatives in the PA-administered territories surf Websites run by global jihad organizations, allowing them to receive ideological guidance, instructions for manufacturing arms and explosives, and information about tactics for the perpetration of complex terrorist attacks.

8. One example of the influence of global jihad elements on terrorist operatives in the Gaza Strip was the establishment of a faction named Army of Islam, led by Mumtaz Durmush, an ex-operative of the Popular Resistance Committees and member of a powerful clan in the Gaza Strip. Early this year, he and his followers left the PRC after a conflict with the organization’s leaders. The Army of Islam
was first heard of when it claimed partial responsibility for the abduction of Gilad Shalit in Kerem Shalom (June 25).

9. Mumtaz Durmush called his organization the Army of Islam and embraced a modus operandi characteristic of global jihad, including abducting foreigners and attacking sites that offend Islamic morals. The organization is known to perpetrate terrorist attacks with the cooperation or guidance of Hamas’s terrorist-operative infrastructure, and is also known to be associated with global jihad elements. The Army of Islam is one of the three organizations which claimed responsibility for the abduction of Gilad Shalit and was also responsible for the recent abduction of two Fox News reporters.

![Mumtaz Durmush (right) with one of his supporters](https://example.com)

Mumtaz Durmush (right) with one of his supporters
(the Hamas website, January 21)

**Judea and Samaria**

10. The Israeli security forces thwarted an attempt to establish a global jihad cell in Nablus. On February 20, 2006, two terrorist-operatives from Nablus had charges brought against them in the military court in Judea and
Samaria. Both had been detained by the Israeli security forces in December 2005. According to the charges, the global jihad operatives from Jordan affiliated themselves with a local cell in Nablus, whose members sought external sources of funding, and handled them. The Jordanians represented themselves to the operatives as Al-Qaeda.

11. In meetings held with the global jihad operatives, the members of the Nablus cell suggested perpetrating a double terrorist attack in the Jerusalem neighborhood of French Hill. They intended to use a suicide bomber and a car laden with explosives to maximize casualties, and even received funds for financing preparations for the terrorist attack. During their interrogation, they related that they had been instructed by their handlers to act covertly and strengthen themselves religiously. They also admitted they identified with the ideology of global jihad.

C. Israel’s neighbors

Overview

12. Throughout 2006 Iraq stood out as the main stronghold of global jihad in the Middle East. It was the focal point for a steady stream of operatives and arms from Syria and Iran. It was from this stronghold that terrorist operatives infiltrated into Israel’s neighbors (Egypt, Jordan, Syria, and Lebanon). The killing of Abu Mus’ab al-Zarqawi, the prominent Al-Qaeda leader in Iraq (June 7), was not a severe blow to global jihad and did not result in the cessation of its activity in Iraq and in other Arab countries.

Egypt

13. Of all the territories bordering Israel, the Sinai Peninsula stood out in 2006 as a focal point of global jihad presence, with the Egyptian security
services unable to put an end to it. \(^1\) The continued perseverance of the global jihad elements in Sinai coupled with its proximity to the Hamas-controlled Gaza Strip increase the potential threat it poses to both Israel and the Egyptian regime.

14. Of particular note are two terrorist attacks perpetrated in 2006 by the global jihad infrastructure in the Sinai Peninsula:

A. On the evening of April 24, three explosions occurred in the hotel area of Dahab, a resort town situated on the coast of the Red Sea. Twenty-four people were killed and approximately 150 wounded; foreign tourists were among the casualties. The terrorist attacks were perpetrated by suicide bombers who belonged to a terrorist infrastructure affiliated with global jihad. The operative format of the terrorist attack in Dahab was similar to that of previous terrorist attacks in Taba (October 2004) and Sharm el-Sheikh (July 2005). It was meant, like to its predecessors, to challenge the Egyptian regime by hitting the tourist industry.

B. On April 16, two other terrorist attacks took place in the Rafah region. A suicide bomber riding a bike blew himself up in the vicinity of a local

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\(^1\) Speaking at a press conference, Yuval Diskin, the head of Israel Security Agency, described the Sinai region as a “big arms depot” into which supplies flow from various countries. He said that in the long run,
airport near the multinational force base in the Egyptian part of Rafah. Another explosion occurred at a distance of some 700m (a little less than half a mile) from the first explosion, when a suicide bomber blew himself up near a police car. As a result, a police officer was lightly injured.

15. In December 2006 a network was uncovered in Egypt, comprised of about 15 operatives of various nationalities (mostly French) who, according to the Egyptian security forces, maintained contacts with global jihad elements to infiltrate operatives or suicide bombers into Iraq as part of the struggle against the coalition forces. The detainees were questioned and deported from Egypt to their countries of origin.

**Syria**

16. Syria plays a central part in helping the global jihad infrastructure establish itself in the Middle East, by providing logistic support, training centers, and a haven for global jihad operatives, especially those sent into and out of Iraq. Noteworthy was a statement made by a “senior American official” who said that Syria (and Iran) exercise control over the level of violence in Iraq, since most of Al-Qaeda’s terrorist operatives from countries such as Saudi Arabia and Sudan come to Syria. There they receive training and instruction and then cross the border into Iraq (Financial Times, January 31, 2007). Despite American appeals, the Syrian regime took no decisive action to put an end to the flow of operatives to Iraq.

17. However, the activity of global jihad elements also poses a threat to the Syrian regime. On June 2, the Syrian security forces confronted a group of about ten gunmen referred to by the regime as “Syrian fundamentalists”, who had infiltrated into an abandoned building near the customs administration in Damascus. One member of the Syrian counter-terrorist squad and four gunmen

the area was Israel’s “soft underbelly” (Ynet, February 5).
were killed in the fighting. Rifles, ammunition, and religious propaganda were found in the possession of the squad members (June 2).

**The hiding place of the squad (right) and the weapons found in its possession (left)**  
(Syrian TV, June 2)

18. On September 12 a squad of four terrorists attacked the US embassy in Damascus, situated near several other embassies, not far from the presidential palace. The attackers arrived on the scene in two cars, one of which was converted into a car bomb with explosive bricks and gas tanks. The four attackers apparently belonged to the **Army of Al-Sham (Jund al-Sham)** cell, affiliated with global jihad.

**Right: Syrian security forces closing off the area. Left: the damage caused to windows**  
(Al-Jazeera TV, September 12)
Lebanon

19. There are several (mostly Palestinian) cells operating in Lebanon which are ideologically associated with global jihad. Most of their infrastructure is based in Palestinian refugee camps in northern Lebanon. They also operate in the Bourj al-Barajneh refugee camp in Beirut and the Ain al-Hilweh refugee camp in Sidon. The activity of global jihad elements is mostly reflected in organizing courses for military training and indoctrination, also attended by operatives from outside of Lebanon. Some of the graduates are sent to Iraq or to their countries of origin to form cells of global jihad infrastructure.

20. In the months that followed the second Lebanon war, global jihad elements made extensive efforts to strengthen and entrench their infrastructure in Lebanon. That was the result of a decision made by the Al-Qaeda leadership to expand its presence in Lebanon to use it as a launching pad for terrorist attacks against Israel and foreign targets in Lebanon.

21. The Lebanese government attempts to act against global jihad elements. The Lebanese press reported that throughout 2006 and in early 2007 Lebanese security forces uncovered terrorist cells associated with global jihad:

A. In January 2006, the Lebanese security forces detained 13 Al-Qaeda operatives (seven Syrians, three Lebanese, a Saudi, a Jordanian, and a Palestinian). The interrogations shed light on their involvement in purchasing arms and possessing false identification. An investigation was launched against the squad members and charges were pressed.

B. In March 2006, the Lebanese army announced that its military intelligence had succeeded in uncovering and arresting a cell of eight terrorists, four Lebanese and four Palestinians, linked with global jihad. The squad members, who operated in Beirut, stored arms and ammunition throughout Lebanon (March 11).
Some of the arms and ammunition found in the possession of the terrorist cell uncovered by the Lebanese army (Al-Arabiya TV, March 11)

C. In January 2007 exchanges of fire took place between the Lebanese army and several dozen operatives belonging to the Army of Al-Sham, an organization affiliated with global jihad, who operated on the outskirts of the Ain al-Hilweh refugee camp in Sidon (the district of Ta’mir). About five people from both sides were injured. The Lebanese army took over the district; however, it avoided entering the Ain al-Hilweh refugee camp, which is controlled by the Palestinian terrorist organizations.

Jordan

22. In 2006, global jihad elements continued their efforts to perpetrate terrorist attacks against Western targets and tourist sites in Jordan. The Jordanian security services continued carrying out successful counter-activities and succeeded in thwarting a number of terrorist attacks.