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Phenomenology (philosophy)

Phenomenology (from Greek: phainómenon "that which appears"; and lógos "study") is the philosophical study of the structures of subjective experience and consciousness. As a philosophical movement it was founded in the early years of the 20th century by Edmund Husserl and was later expanded upon by a circle of his followers at the universities of Göttingen and Munich in Germany. It then spread to France, the United States, and elsewhere, often in contexts far removed from Husserl's early work.[1]

Phenomenology, in Husserl's conception, is primarily concerned with the systematic reflection on and study of the structures of consciousness and the phenomena that appear in acts of consciousness. This phenomenological ontology can be clearly differentiated from the Cartesian method of analysis which sees the world as objects, sets of objects, and objects acting and reacting upon one another.

Husserl's conception of phenomenology has been criticized and developed not only by himself but also by students such as Edith Stein, by existentialists, such as Max Scheler, Nicolai Hartmann, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Jean-Paul Sartre, and by other philosophers, such as Paul Ricoeur, Emmanuel Lévinas, and sociologists Alfred Schütz and Eric Voegelin.

Overview

Stephen Hicks writes that to understand phenomenology, one must identify its roots in the philosophy of Immanuel Kant (1724–1804).[1] In his Critique of Pure Reason, Kant distinguished between "phenomena" (objects as interpreted by human sensibility and understanding), and "noumena" (objects as things-in-themselves, which humans cannot directly experience).

According to Hicks, 19th-century Kantianism operated in two broad camps:

• structural linguistics and
• phenomenology.

Hicks writes, "In effect, the Structuralists were seeking subjective noumenal categories, and the Phenomenologists were content with describing the phenomena without asking what connection to an external reality those experiences might have."[2]

In its most basic form, phenomenology thus attempts to create conditions for the objective study of topics usually regarded as subjective: consciousness and the content of conscious experiences such as judgments, perceptions, and emotions. Although phenomenology seeks to be scientific, it does not attempt to study consciousness from the perspective of clinical psychology or neurology. Instead, it seeks through systematic reflection to determine the essential properties and structures of experience. [citation needed]

Husserl derived many important concepts central to phenomenology from the works and lectures of his teachers, the philosophers and psychologists Franz Brentano and Carl Stumpf.[3] An important element of phenomenology that Husserl borrowed from Brentano is intentionality (often described as "aboutness"), the notion that consciousness is always consciousness of something. The object of consciousness is called the intentional object, and this object is constituted for consciousness in many different ways, through, for instance, perception, memory, retention and protention, signification, etc. Throughout these different intentionalities, though they have different structures and different ways of being "about" the object, an object is still constituted as the identical object; consciousness is directed at the same intentional object in direct perception as it is in the immediately following retention of this object and the eventual remembering of it.

Though many of the phenomenological methods involve various reductions, phenomenology is, in essence, anti-reductionistic; the reductions are mere tools to better understand and describe the workings of consciousness, not to reduce any phenomenon to these descriptions. In other words, when a reference is made to a thing's essence or idea, or when one details the constitution of an identical coherent thing by describing what one "really" sees as being
only these sides and aspects, these surfaces, it does not mean that the thing is only and exclusively what is described here: The ultimate goal of these reductions is to understand how these different aspects are constituted into the actual thing as experienced by the person experiencing it. Phenomenology is a direct reaction to the psychologism and physicalism of Husserl's time. [citation needed]

Although previously employed by Hegel in his *Phenomenology of Spirit*, it was Husserl's adoption of this term (circa 1900) that propelled it into becoming the designation of a philosophical school. As a philosophical perspective, phenomenology is its method, though the specific meaning of the term varies according to how it is conceived by a given philosopher. As envisioned by Husserl, phenomenology is a method of philosophical inquiry that rejects the rationalist bias that has dominated Western thought since Plato in favor of a method of reflective attentiveness that discloses the individual's "lived experience."[4] Loosely rooted in an epistemological device, with Sceptic roots, called epoché, Husserl's method entails the suspension of judgment while relying on the intuitive grasp of knowledge, free of presuppositions and intellectualizing. Sometimes depicted as the "science of experience," the phenomenological method is rooted in intentionality, Husserl's theory of consciousness (developed from Brentano). Intentionality represents an alternative to the representational theory of consciousness, which holds that reality cannot be grasped directly because it is available only through perceptions of reality that are representations of it in the mind. Husserl countered that consciousness is not "in" the mind but rather conscious of something other than itself (the intentional object), whether the object is a substance or a figment of imagination (i.e., the real processes associated with and underlying the figment). Hence the phenomenological method relies on the description of phenomena as they are given to consciousness, in their immediacy.

According to Maurice Natanson (1973, p. 63), "The radicality of the phenomenological method is both continuous and discontinuous with philosophy's general effort to subject experience to fundamental, critical scrutiny: to take nothing for granted and to show the warranty for what we claim to know."

In practice, it entails an unusual combination of discipline and detachment to suspend, or bracket, theoretical explanations and second-hand information while determining one's "naive" experience of the matter. The phenomenological method serves to momentarily erase the world of speculation by returning the subject to his or her primordial experience of the matter, whether the object of inquiry is a feeling, an idea, or a perception. According to Husserl the suspension of belief in what we ordinarily take for granted or infer by conjecture diminishes the power of what we customarily embrace as objective reality. According to Rüdiger Safranski (1998, 72), "[Husserl and his followers'] great ambition was to disregard anything that had until then been thought or said about consciousness or the world [while] on the lookout for a new way of letting the things [they investigated] approach them, without covering them up with what they already knew."

Martin Heidegger modified Husserl's conception of phenomenology because of (what Heidegger perceived as) Husserl's subjectivist tendencies. Whereas Husserl conceived humans as having been constituted by states of consciousness, Heidegger countered that consciousness is peripheral to the primacy of one's existence (i.e., the mode of being of Dasein), which cannot be reduced to one's consciousness of it. From this angle, one's state of mind is an "effect" rather than a determinant of existence, including those aspects of existence that one is not conscious of. By shifting the center of gravity from consciousness (psychology) to existence (ontology), Heidegger altered the subsequent direction of phenomenology, making it at once both personal and mysterious. As one consequence of Heidegger's modification of Husserl's conception, phenomenology became increasingly relevant to psychoanalysis. Whereas Husserl gave priority to a depiction of consciousness that was fundamentally alien to the psychoanalytic conception of the unconscious, Heidegger offered a way to conceptualize experience that could accommodate those aspects of one's existence that lie on the periphery of sentient awareness.[5][6]
**Historical overview of the use of the term**

Phenomenology has at least two main meanings in philosophical history: one in the writings of G.W.F. Hegel, another in the writings of Edmund Husserl in 1920, and a third, deriving from Husserl's work, in the writings of his former research assistant Martin Heidegger in 1927.

- For G.W.F. Hegel, phenomenology is an approach to philosophy that begins with an exploration of phenomena (what presents itself to us in conscious experience) as a means to finally grasp the absolute, logical, ontological and metaphysical Spirit that is behind phenomena. This has been called a "dialectical phenomenology".

- For Edmund Husserl, phenomenology is "the reflective study of the essence of consciousness as experienced from the first-person point of view."[7] Phenomenology takes the intuitive experience of phenomena (what presents itself to us in phenomenological reflexion) as its starting point and tries to extract from it the essential features of experiences and the essence of what we experience. When generalized to the essential features of any possible experience, this has been called "Transcendental Phenomenology". Husserl's view was based on aspects of the work of Franz Brentano and was developed further by philosophers such as Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Max Scheler, Edith Stein, Dietrich von Hildebrand and Emmanuel Levinas.

Although the term "phenomenology" was used occasionally in the history of philosophy before Husserl, modern use ties it more explicitly to his particular method. Following is a list of thinkers in rough chronological order who used the term "phenomenology" in a variety of ways, with brief comments on their contributions:[8]

- Friedrich Christoph Oetinger (1702–1782) German pietist, for the study of the "divine system of relations"[9]
- Johann Heinrich Lambert (1728–1777) (mathematician, physician and philosopher) known for the theory of appearances underlying empirical knowledge.[10]
- Immanuel Kant (1724–1804), in the Critique of Pure Reason, distinguished between objects as phenomena, which are objects as shaped and grasped by human sensibility and understanding, and objects as things-in-themselves or noumena, which do not appear to us in space and time and about which we can make no legitimate judgments.
- G.W.F. Hegel (1770–1831) challenged Kant's doctrine of the unknowable thing-in-itself, and declared that by knowing phenomena more fully we can gradually arrive at a consciousness of the absolute and spiritual truth of Divinity, most notably in his Phenomenology of Spirit, published in 1807.
- Carl Stumpf (1848–1936), student of Brentano and mentor to Husserl, used "phenomenology" to refer to an ontology of sensory contents.
- Edmund Husserl (1859–1938) established phenomenology at first as a kind of "descriptive psychology" and later as a transcendental and eidetic science of consciousness. He is considered to be the founder of contemporary phenomenology.
- Max Scheler (1874–1928) developed further the phenomenological method of Edmund Husserl and extended it to include also a reduction of the scientific method. He influenced the thinking of Pope John Paul II, Dietrich von Hildebrand, and Edith Stein.
- Martin Heidegger (1889–1976) criticized Husserl's theory of phenomenology and attempted to develop a theory of ontology that led him to his original theory of Dasein, the non-dualistic human being.
- Alfred Schütz (1899–1959) developed a phenomenology of the social world on the basis of everyday experience that has influenced major sociologists such as Harold Garfinkel, Peter Berger, and Thomas Luckmann.
- Francisco Varela (1946–2001) Chilean philosopher and biologist. Developed the basis for experimental phenomenology and neurophenomenology.

Later usage is mostly based on or (critically) related to Husserl's introduction and use of the term. This branch of philosophy differs from others in that it tends to be more "descriptive" than "prescriptive".
Phenomenological terminology

Intentionality

Intentionality refers to the notion that consciousness is always the consciousness of something. The word itself should not be confused with the "ordinary" use of the word intentional, but should rather be taken as playing on the etymological roots of the word. Originally, intention referred to a "stretching out" ("in tension," lat. intendere[11][12]), and in this context it refers to consciousness "stretching out" towards its object (although one should be careful with this image, seeing as there is not some consciousness first that, subsequently, stretches out to its object. Rather, consciousness occurs as the simultaneity of a conscious act and its object.) Intentionality is often summed up as "aboutness."

Whether this something that consciousness is about is in direct perception or in fantasy is inconsequential to the concept of intentionality itself; whatever consciousness is directed at, that is what consciousness is conscious of. This means that the object of consciousness doesn't have to be a physical object apprehended in perception: it can just as well be a fantasy or a memory. Consequently, these "structures" of consciousness, i.e., perception, memory, fantasy, etc., are called intentionalities.

The cardinal principle of phenomenology, the term intentionality originated with the Scholastics in the medieval period and was resurrected by Brentano who in turn influenced Husserl's conception of phenomenology, who refined the term and made it the cornerstone of his theory of consciousness. The meaning of the term is complex and depends entirely on how it is conceived by a given philosopher. The term should not be confused with "intention" or the psychoanalytic conception of unconscious "motive" or "gain."

Intuition

Intuition in phenomenology refers to those cases where the intentional object is directly present to the intentionality at play; if the intention is "filled" by the direct apprehension of the object, you have an intuited object. Having a cup of coffee in front of you, for instance, seeing it, feeling it, or even imagining it - these are all filled intentions, and the object is then intuited. The same goes for the apprehension of mathematical formulae or a number. If you do not have the object as referred to directly, the object is not intuited, but still intended, but then emptily. Examples of empty intentions can be signitive intentions - intentions that only imply or refer to their objects.

Evidence

In everyday language, we use the word evidence to signify a special sort of relation between a state of affairs and a proposition: State A is evidence for the proposition "A is true." In phenomenology, however, the concept of evidence is meant to signify the "subjective achievement of truth." This is not an attempt to reduce the objective sort of evidence to subjective "opinion," but rather an attempt to describe the structure of having something present in intuition with the addition of having it present as intelligible: "Evidence is the successful presentation of an intelligible object, the successful presentation of something whose truth becomes manifest in the evidencing itself."

Noesis and Noema

In Husserl's phenomenology, which is quite common, this pair of terms, derived from the Greek nous (mind), designate respectively the real content, noesis, and the ideal content, noema, of an intentional act (an act of consciousness). The Noesis is the part of the act that gives it a particular sense or character (as in judging or perceiving something, loving or hating it, accepting or rejecting it, and so on). This is real in the sense that it is actually part of what takes place in the consciousness (or psyche) of the subject of the act. The Noesis is always correlated with a Noema; for Husserl, the full Noema is a complex ideal structure comprising at least a noematic sense and a noematic core. The correct interpretation of what Husserl meant by the Noema has long been
controversial, but the noematic sense is generally understood as the ideal meaning of the act[15] and the noematic core as the act's referent or object as it is meant in the act. One element of controversy is whether this noematic object is the same as the actual object of the act (assuming it exists) or is some kind of ideal object.[16]

Empathy and Intersubjectivity
In phenomenology, empathy refers to the experience of one's own body as another. While we often identify others with their physical bodies, this type of phenomenology requires that we focus on the subjectivity of the other, as well as our intersubjective engagement with them. In Husserl's original account, this was done by a sort of apperception built on the experiences of your own lived-body. The lived body is your own body as experienced by yourself, as yourself. Your own body manifests itself to you mainly as your possibilities of acting in the world. It is what lets you reach out and grab something, for instance, but it also, and more importantly, allows for the possibility of changing your point of view. This helps you differentiate one thing from another by the experience of moving around it, seeing new aspects of it (often referred to as making the absent present and the present absent), and still retaining the notion that this is the same thing that you saw other aspects of just a moment ago (it is identical). Your body is also experienced as a duality, both as object (you can touch your own hand) and as your own subjectivity (you experience being touched).

The experience of your own body as your own subjectivity is then applied to the experience of another's body, which, through apperception, is constituted as another subjectivity. You can thus recognise the Other's intentions, emotions, etc. This experience of empathy is important in the phenomenological account of intersubjectivity. In phenomenology, intersubjectivity constitutes objectivity (i.e., what you experience as objective is experienced as being intersubjectively available - available to all other subjects. This does not imply that objectivity is reduced to subjectivity nor does it imply a relativist position, cf. for instance intersubjective verifiability).

In the experience of intersubjectivity, one also experiences oneself as being a subject among other subjects, and one experiences oneself as existing objectively for these Others; one experiences oneself as the noema of Others' noeses, or as a subject in another's empathic experience. As such, one experiences oneself as objectively existing subjectivity. Intersubjectivity is also a part in the constitution of one's lifeworld, especially as "homeworld."

Lifeworld
The lifeworld (German: Lebenswelt) is the "world" each one of us lives in. One could call it the "background" or "horizon" of all experience, and it is that on which each object stands out as itself (as different) and with the meaning it can only hold for us. The lifeworld is both personal and intersubjective (it is then called a "homeworld"), and, as such, it does not enclose each one of us in a solus ipse.

Husserl's Logische Untersuchungen (1900/1901)
In the first edition of the Logical Investigations, still under the influence of Brentano, Husserl describes his position as "descriptive psychology." Husserl analyzes the intentional structures of mental acts and how they are directed at both real and ideal objects. The first volume of the Logical Investigations, the Prolegomena to Pure Logic, begins with a devastating critique of psychologism, i.e., the attempt to subsume the a priori validity of the laws of logic under psychology. Husserl establishes a separate field for research in logic, philosophy, and phenomenology, independently from the empirical sciences.[17]
Transcendental phenomenology after the *Ideen* (1913)

Some years after the publication of the *Logical Investigations*, Husserl made some key elaborations that led him to the distinction between the act of consciousness (*noesis*) and the phenomena at which it is directed (the *noemata*).

- "noetic" refers to the intentional act of consciousness (believing, willing, etc.)
- "noematic" refers to the object or content (noema), which appears in the noetic acts (the believed, wanted, hated, and loved ...).

What we observe is not the object as it is in itself, but how and inasmuch it is given in the intentional acts. Knowledge of essences would only be possible by "bracketing" all assumptions about the existence of an external world and the inessential (subjective) aspects of how the object is concretely given to us. This procedure Husserl called *epoché*.

Husserl in a later period concentrated more on the ideal, essential structures of consciousness. As he wanted to exclude any hypothesis on the existence of external objects, he introduced the method of phenomenological reduction to eliminate them. What was left over was the pure transcendental ego, as opposed to the concrete empirical ego. Now Transcendental Phenomenology is the study of the essential structures that are left in pure consciousness: This amounts in practice to the study of the noemata and the relations among them. The philosopher Theodor Adorno criticised Husserl's concept of phenomenological epistemology in his metacritique *Against Epistemology*, which is anti-foundationalist in its stance.

Transcendental phenomenologists include Oskar Becker, Aron Gurwitsch, and Alfred Schutz.

Realist phenomenology

After Husserl's publication of the *Ideen* in 1913, many phenomenologists took a critical stance towards his new theories. Especially the members of the Munich group distanced themselves from his new transcendental phenomenology and preferred the earlier realist phenomenology of the first edition of the *Logical Investigations*.

Realist phenomenologists include Adolf Reinach, Alexander Pfänder, Johannes Daubert, Max Scheler, Roman Ingarden, Nicolai Hartmann, Dietrich von Hildebrand.

Existential phenomenology

Existential phenomenology differs from transcendental phenomenology by its rejection of the transcendental ego. Merleau-Ponty objects to the ego's transcendence of the world, which for Husserl leaves the world spread out and completely transparent before the conscious. Heidegger thinks of a conscious being as always already in the world. Transcendence is maintained in existential phenomenology to the extent that the method of phenomenology must take a presuppositionless starting point - transcending claims about the world arising from, for example, natural or scientific attitudes or theories of the ontological nature of the world.

While Husserl thought of philosophy as a scientific discipline that had to be founded on a phenomenology understood as epistemology, Heidegger held a radically different view. Heidegger himself states their differences this way:

> For Husserl, the phenomenological reduction is the method of leading phenomenological vision from the natural attitude of the human being whose life is involved in the world of things and persons back to the transcendental life of consciousness and its noetic-noematic experiences, in which objects are constituted as correlates of consciousness. For us, phenomenological reduction means leading phenomenological vision back from the apprehension of a being, whatever may be the character of that apprehension, to the understanding of the Being of this being (projecting upon the way it is unconcealed).[1]

According to Heidegger, philosophy was not at all a scientific discipline, but more fundamental than science itself. According to him science is only one way of knowing the world with no special access to truth. Furthermore, the
scientific mindset itself is built on a much more "primordial" foundation of practical, everyday knowledge. Husserl was skeptical of this approach, which he regarded as quasi-mystical, and it contributed to the divergence in their thinking.

Instead of taking phenomenology as *prima philosophia* or a foundational discipline, Heidegger took it as a metaphysical ontology: "being is the proper and sole theme of philosophy... this means that philosophy is not a science of beings but of being."[1] Yet to confuse phenomenology and ontology is an obvious error. Phenomena are not the foundation or Ground of Being. Neither are they appearances, for, as Heidegger argues in *Being and Time*, an appearance is "that which shows itself in something else," while a phenomenon is "that which shows itself in itself."

While for Husserl, in the epoché, being appeared only as a correlate of consciousness, for Heidegger being is the starting point. While for Husserl we would have to abstract from all concrete determinations of our empirical ego, to be able to turn to the field of pure consciousness, Heidegger claims that "the possibilities and destinies of philosophy are bound up with man's existence, and thus with temporality and with historicality."[1]

However, ontological being and existential being are different categories, so Heidegger's conflation of these categories is, according to Husserl's view, the root of Heidegger's error. Husserl charged Heidegger with raising the question of ontology but failing to answer it, instead switching the topic to the Dasein, the only being for whom Being is an issue. That is neither ontology nor phenomenology, according to Husserl, but merely abstract anthropology. To clarify, perhaps, by abstract anthropology, as a non-existentialist searching for essences, Husserl rejected the existentialism implicit in Heidegger's distinction between being (sein) as things in reality and Being (Da-sein) as the encounter with being, as when being becomes present to us, that is, is unconcealed.[18]


**Phenomenology and Eastern thought**

Some researchers in phenomenology (in particular in reference to Heidegger's legacy) see possibilities of establishing dialogues with traditions of thought outside of the so-called Western philosophy, particularly with respect to East-Asian thinking, and despite perceived differences between "Eastern" and "Western".[19] Furthermore, it has been claimed that a number of elements within phenomenology (mainly Heidegger's thought) have some resonance with Eastern philosophical ideas, particularly with Zen Buddhism and Taoism.[20] According to Tomonubu Imamichi, the concept of Dasein was inspired — although Heidegger remained silent on this — by Okakura Kakuzo's concept of das-in-der-Welt-sein (being in the world) expressed in *The Book of Tea* to describe Zhuangzi's philosophy, which Imamichi's teacher had offered to Heidegger in 1919, after having studied with him the year before.[21]

There are also recent signs of the reception of phenomenology (and Heidegger's thought in particular) within scholarly circles focused on studying the impetus of metaphysics in the history of ideas in Islam and Early Islamic philosophy;[22] perhaps under the indirect influence of the tradition of the French Orientalist and philosopher Henri Corbin.[23]

In addition, the work of Jim Ruddy in the field of comparative philosophy, combined the concept of Transcendental Ego in Husserl's phenomenology with the concept of the primacy of self-consciousness in the work of Sankaracharya. In the course of this work, Ruddy uncovered a wholly new eidetic phenomenological science, which he called "convergent phenomenology." This new phenomenology takes over where Husserl left off, and deals with the constitution of relation-like, rather than merely thing-like, or "intentional" objectivity.[24]
**Phenomenology and Technoethics**

Phenomenology (philosophy) (from Greek: phainómenon "that which appears"; and lógos "study") is a broad philosophical movement emphasizing the study of conscious experience. It was founded in the early years of the 20th century by Edmund Husserl, expanded together with a circle of his followers at the universities of Göttingen and Munich in Germany and spread across to France, the United States, and elsewhere, often in contexts far removed from Husserl's early work.

**Phenomenological Approach to Technology**

James Moor has argued that computers show up policy vacuums that require new thinking and the establishment of new policies.[25] Others have argued that the resources provided by classical ethical theory such as utilitarianism, consequentialism and deontological ethics is more than enough to deal with all the ethical issues emerging from our design and use of information technology.[26] For the phenomenologist the ‘impact view’ of technology as well as the constructivist view of the technology/society relationships is valid but not adequate (Heidegger 1977, Borgmann 1985, Winograd and Flores 1987, Ihde 1990, Dreyfus 1992, 2001). They argue that these accounts of technology, and the technology/society relationship, posit technology and society as if speaking about the one does not immediately and already draw upon the other for its ongoing sense or meaning. For the phenomenologist society and technology co-constitute each other; they are each other's ongoing condition or possibility for being what they are. For them technology is not just the artifact. Rather, the artifact already emerges from a prior ‘technological’ attitude towards the world (Heidegger 1977).

**Heidegger's Approach (Pre-Technological Age)**

For Heidegger the essence of technology is the way of being of modern humans—a way of conducting themselves towards the world—that sees the world as something to be ordered and shaped in line with projects, intentions and desires—a ‘will to power’ that manifest itself as a ‘will to technology’. Heidegger claims that there were other times in human history, a pre-modern time, where humans did not orient themselves towards the world in a technological way—simply as resources for our purposes.[27] However, according to Heidegger this ‘pre-technological’ age (or mood) is one where humans’ relation with the world and artifacts, their way of being disposed, was poetic and aesthetic rather than technological (enframing).[27] There are many who disagree with Heidegger's account of the modern technological attitude as the ‘enframing’ of the world.[28] For example Andrew Feenberg argues that Heidegger's account of modern technology is not borne out in contemporary everyday encounters with technology.[27]

**Hubert Dreyfus Approach (Contemporary Society)**

In critiquing the artificial intelligence (AI) programme Hubert Dreyfus (1992) argues that the way skill development has become understood in the past has been wrong. He argues, this is the model that the early artificial intelligence community uncritically adopted. In opposition to this view he argues, with Heidegger, that what we observe when we learn a new skill in everyday practice is in fact the opposite. We most often start with explicit rules or preformulated approaches and then move to a multiplicity of particular cases, as we become an expert. His argument draws directly on Heidegger's account in Being and Time of humans as beings that are always already situated in-the-world. As humans 'in-the-world' we are already experts at going about everyday life, at dealing with the subtleties of every particular situation—that is why everyday life seems so obvious. Thus, the intricate expertise of everyday activity is forgotten and taken for granted by AI as an assumed starting point.[27] What Dreyfus highlighted in his critique of AI was the fact that technology (AI algorithms) does not make sense by itself. It is the assumed, and forgotten, horizon of everyday practice that make technological devices and solutions show up as meaningful. If we are to understand technology we need to 'return' to the horizon of meaning that made it show up as the artifacts we need, want and desire. We also need to consider how these technologies reveal (or disclose) us.[27]
Virtualization Theory

There seems to be at least one information technology theme that has attracted some sustained attention from phenomenologists (especially with regard to its ethical implications)—the phenomenon of virtualization or virtuality. The term ‘virtuality’ is used here to refer to the mediation of interaction through an electronic medium between humans and humans as well as between humans and machines. The Internet is the most evident example of the virtualization of interaction.

The proponents of the virtualization of society (and its institutions) argue that virtuality extends the social in unprecedented ways (Fernback 1997, Rheingold 1993a, 1993b, Turkle 1995, 1996, Benedikt 1991, Horn 1998). They argue that it opens up an entirely new domain of social being. For example Rheingold (1993a) argues that it offers ‘tools for facilitating all the various ways people have discovered to divide and communicate, group and subgroup and regroup, include and exclude, select and elect. Turkle suggests that cyberspace makes possible the construction of an identity that is so fluid and multiple that it strains the very limits of the notion [of authenticity]. People become masters of self-presentation and self-creation. There is an unparalleled opportunity to play with one’s identity and to ‘try out’ new ones. The very notion of an inner, ‘true self’ is called into question. An individual can literally decide to be who they wish to be. For example, the obese can be slender, the beautiful can be plain and the ‘nerdy’ can be elegant.

The claims by Rheingold, Turkle and others are certainly bold. If they are right then virtuality may indeed represent entirely new possibilities for humans to relate, extend, and express themselves, which should be encouraged, especially for those that have become excluded from the traditional domains of social relations, due to disability.

Phenomenologists would suggest that these responses are all important but they assume something more primary—i.e., the conditions that render such acts as the presentation of the self, ongoing communication and sharing meaningful and significant in the first instance. They might suggest that these social acts are all grounded in an already presumed sense of community. They might further argue that social interaction, community and identity (as we know it) are phenomena that are local, situated and embodied, which is characterized by mutual involvement, concern and commitment (Dreyfus 2001; Borgmann 1999, Ihde 2002, Introna 1997, Coyne 1995, Heim 1993). In other words that these phenomena draw on an implied sense of involvement, place, situation, and body for its ongoing meaning.

Borgmann (1999) argues that the unparalleled opportunity of virtuality suggested by Turkle comes at a cost. To secure the charm of virtual reality at its most glamorous, the veil of virtual ambiguity must be dense and thick. Inevitably, however, such an enclosure excludes the commanding presence of reality. Hence the price of sustaining virtual ambiguity is triviality. Indeed such fluid and multiple identity is only feasible as long as it is “kept barren of real consequences”.

Dreyfus (1999, 2001) argues, in a similar vein that without a situated and embodied engagement there can be no commitment and no risk. They argue that in such an environment moral engagement is limited and human relations become trivialized. Ihde (2002) does not go as far as Borgmann and Dreyfus in discounting the virtual as ‘trivial’. Coyne (1995) argues that the proximity of community has nothing to do with physical distance. He argues that proximity is rather a matter of shared concerns—i.e., my family is ‘close’ to me even if they are a thousand miles away and my neighbors may be ‘distant’ to me even if they are next door.
References

[2] Hicks, p. 43-44
[6] Partially based on
[8] Robert Sokolowski, Introduction to Phenomenology, Cambridge University Press (2000). Pp. 159–160. This use of the word evidence may seem strange in English, but is more common in German, which is the language Husserl wrote in.
[10] I.e. if A loves B, loving is a real part of A's conscious activity - Noesis - but gets its sense from the general concept of loving, which has an abstract or ideal meaning, as "loving" has a meaning in the English language independently of what an individual means by the word when they use it.
[12] On the Logical Investigations, see
[13] I have attempted to respond to the request for clarification of Heidegger's distinction between being and Being. My info source was http://www.uni.edu/boecker/NNhHeidegger2.doc. It was not copied and pasted but rephrased for copyright reasons.
[15] An account given by Paul Hsao (in Heidegger and Asian Thought) records a remark by Chang Chung-Yuan claiming that "Heidegger is the only Western Philosopher who not only intellectually understands but has intuitively grasped Taoist thought"
[22] Introna, L. (2005) Disclosing the Digital Face: The ethics of facial recognition systems, Ethics and Information Technology, 7(2)
External links

- What is Phenomenology? (http://www.phenomenologycenter.org/phenom.htm)
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Edmund Husserl

Born
April 8, 1859
Proßnitz, Moravia, Austria (present-day Prostějov, Czech Republic)

Died
April 28, 1938 (aged 79)
Freiburg, Germany

Era
20th-century philosophy

Region
Western Philosophy

School
Phenomenology

Main interests
Epistemology, Ontology, Mathematics

Notable ideas
Phenomenology, epoché, natural standpoint, noema, noesis, eidetic reduction, phenomenological reduction, retention and protention, Lebenswelt, pre-reflective self-consciousness

Edmund Husserl in about 1900.

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Edmund Gustav Albrecht Husserl (German: [ˈhʊsɐl]; April 8, 1859 – April 26, 1938) was a philosopher and mathematician and the founder of the 20th century philosophical school of phenomenology. He broke with the positivist orientation of the science and philosophy of his day, yet he elaborated critiques of historicism and of psychologism in logic. Not limited to empiricism, but believing that experience is the source of all knowledge, he worked on a method of phenomenological reduction by which a subject may come to know directly an essence.

Although born into a Jewish family, Husserl was baptized as a Lutheran in 1886. He studied mathematics under Karl Weierstrass and Leo Königsberger, and philosophy under Franz Brentano and Carl Stumpf. Husserl himself taught philosophy as a Privatdozent at Halle from 1887, then as professor, first at Göttingen from 1901, then at Freiburg from 1916 until he retired in 1928. Thereafter he gave two notable lectures: at Paris in 1929, and at Prague in 1935. The notorious 1933 race laws of the Nazi regime took away his academic standing and privileges. Following an illness, he died at Freiburg in 1938.

Edmund Husserl

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Philosophy portal
Life and career

Youth and education

Husserl was born in 1859 in Prostějov (German: Prossnitz), a town in the Bohemian province of Moravia, which was then in the Austrian Empire, after 1918 in Czechoslovakia, and since 1993 in the Czech Republic. He was born into a Jewish family, the second of four children (boy, boy, girl, boy). His father was a milliner (one who designs, makes, trims, or sells hats). His childhood was spent in Prostějov, where he attended the elementary school. Then Husserl traveled to Vienna to study at the Realgymnasium there, followed next by the Staatsgymnasium in Olomouc (Ger: Olmütz).[2][3]

At the University of Leipzig from 1876 to 1878, Husserl studied mathematics, physics, and astronomy. At Leipzig he was inspired by philosophy lectures given by Wilhelm Wundt, one of the founders of modern psychology. Then he moved to the Humboldt University of Berlin (at that time called the Friedrich William University) in 1878 where he continued his study of mathematics under Leopold Kronecker and the renowned Karl Weierstrass. In Berlin he found a mentor in Thomas Masaryk, then a former philosophy student of Franz Brentano and later the first president of Czechoslovakia. There Husserl also attended Friedrich Paulsen's philosophy lectures. In 1881 he left for the University of Vienna to complete his mathematics studies under the supervision of Leo Königsberger (a former student of Weierstrass). At Vienna in 1883 he obtained his Ph.D. with the work Beiträge zur Variationsrechnung ("Contributions to the Calculus of Variations").[2]

Evidently as a result of his becoming familiar with the New Testament during his twenties, he asked to be baptized into the Lutheran Church in 1886. Husserl's father Adolf had died in 1884. Prof. Herbert Spiegelberg writes, "While outward religious practice never entered his life any more than it did that of most academic scholars of the time, his mind remained open for the religious phenomenon as for any other genuine experience." At times Husserl saw his goal as one of moral "renewal". Although a steadfast proponent of a radical and rational autonomy in all things, Husserl could also speak "about his vocation and even about his mission under God's will to find new ways for philosophy and science," observes Spiegelberg.[4]

Following his doctorate in mathematics, he returned to Berlin to work as the assistant to Karl Weierstrass. Yet already Husserl had felt the desire to pursue philosophy. Then professor Weierstrass became very ill. Husserl became free to return to Vienna where, after serving a short military duty, he devoted his attention to philosophy. In 1884 at the University of Vienna he attended the lectures of Franz Brentano on philosophy and philosophical psychology. Brentano introduced him to the writings of Bernard Bolzano, Hermann Lotze, J. Stuart Mill, and David Hume. Husserl was so impressed by Brentano that he decided to dedicate his life to philosophy; indeed, Franz Brentano is often credited as being his most important influence, e.g., with regard to intentionality.[citation needed]

Following academic advice, two years later in 1886 Husserl followed Carl Stumpf, a former student of Brentano, to the University of Halle, seeking to obtain his Habilitation which would qualify him to teach at the university level. There, under Stumpf's supervision, he wrote Über den Begriff der Zahl (On the Concept of Number) in 1887, which would serve later as the basis for his first important work, Philosophie der Arithmetik (1891).[5]

In 1887 he married Malvine Steinschneider, a union that would last over fifty years. In 1892 their daughter Elizabeth was born, in 1893 their son Gerhard, and in 1894 their son Wolfgang. Elizabeth would marry in 1922, and Gerhard in 1923; Wolfgang, however, became a casualty of the First World War.[3] Gerhard would become a philosopher of law, contributing to the subject of comparative law, teaching in the USA and after the war in Austria.
Professor of philosophy

Following his marriage Husserl began his long teaching career in philosophy. He started where he was in 1887 as a Privatdozent at the Martin Luther University of Halle-Wittenberg. In 1891 he published his Philosophie der Arithmetik. Psychologische und logische Untersuchungen which, drawing on his prior studies in mathematics and philosophy, proposed a psychological context as the basis of mathematics. It drew the adverse notice of Gottlob Frege, who criticized its psychologism.\[6][7]

In 1901 Husserl with his family moved to the Georg-August University of Göttingen where he taught as extraordinarius professor. Just prior to this a major work of his, Logische Untersuchungen (Halle 1900–1901), was published. Volume One contains seasoned reflections on "pure logic" in which he carefully refutes "psychologism."[8][9] This work was well received and became the subject of a seminar given by Wilhelm Dilthey; Husserl in 1905 traveled to Berlin to visit Dilthey. Two years later in Italy he paid a visit to Franz Brentano his inspiring old teacher and to Constantin Carathéodory the mathematician. Kant and Descartes were also now influencing his thought. In 1910 he became joint editor of the journal Logos. During this period Husserl had delivered lectures on internal time consciousness, which several decades later his former student Heidegger edited for publication.[10]

In 1912 at Freiburg the journal Jahrbuch für Philosophie und Phänomenologische Forschung ("Yearbook for Philosophy and Phenomenological Research") was founded by Husserl and his school, and which published articles of their phenomenological movement from 1913 to 1930. His important work Ideen\[11] was published in its first issue. Before beginning Ideen Husserl's thought had reached the stage where “each subject is 'present' to itself, and to each all others are 'presentiated' (Vergegenwartigung), not as parts of nature but as pure consciousness."[12] Ideen advanced his transition to a “transcendental interpretation” of phenomenology, a view later criticized by, among others, Jean-Paul Sartre.[13] In Ideen Paul Ricœur sees the development of Husserl's thought as leading “from the psychological cogito to the transcendental cogito.” As phenomenology further evolves, it leads (when viewed from another vantage point in Husserl's 'labyrinth') to “transcendental subjectivity”.\[14] Also in Ideen Husserl explicitly elaborates the eidetic and phenomenological reductions.\[15][16] In 1913 Karl Jaspers visited Husserl at Göttingen.

In October 1914 both his sons were sent to the fighting on the Western Front of World War I. The next year his son Wolfgang was badly injured at the front. On March 8, 1916, on the battlefield of Verdun, Wolfgang Husserl was killed in action. The next year his son Gerhard was wounded in the war but survived, and his mother Julia died. In November 1917 one of his outstanding students and later a noted philosophy professor in his own right, Adolf Reinach, was killed in the war while serving in Flanders.[3]

Husserl had transferred in 1916 to the Albert Ludwigs University of Freiburg (Freiburg im Breisgau) where he continued bringing his work in philosophy to fruition, now as a full professor.\[17] Edith Stein served as his personal assistant during his first few years in Freiburg, followed later by Martin Heidegger from 1920 to 1923. The mathematician Hermann Weyl began corresponding with him in 1918. Husserl gave four lectures on Phenomenological method at University College, London in 1922. The University of Berlin in 1923 called on him to relocate there, but he declined the offer. In 1926 Heidegger dedicated his book Sein und Zeit ("Being and Time") to him "in grateful respect and friendship."[18] Husserl remained in his professorship at Freiburg until he requested retirement, teaching his last class on July 25, 1928. A Festschrift to celebrate his seventieth birthday was presented to him on April 8, 1929.
For Husserl 1933 was an ugly year, when the racial laws of the new Nazi regime were enacted. On April 6 Husserl was suspended from the University of Freiburg by the Badische Ministry of Culture; the following week he was disallowed any university activities. Yet his colleague Heidegger was elected Rector of the university on April 21–22, and joined the Nazi party. By contrast, in July Husserl resigned from the Deutsche Académie.\[3]\n
Despite retirement, Husserl gave several notable lectures. The first, at Paris in 1929,\[19]\nled to Méditations cartesiennes (Paris 1931).\[20]\nHusserl here reviews the epoche and transcendental reduction, presented earlier in his pivotal Ideen (1913), in terms of a further reduction of experience to what he calls a 'sphere of ownness.' From within this sphere, which Husserl enacts in order to show the impossibility of solipsism, the transcendental ego finds itself always already paired with the lived body of another ego, another monad. This a priori interconnection of bodies, given in perception, is what founds the interconnection of consciousnesses known as transcendental intersubjectivity, which Husserl would go on to describe at length in volumes of unpublished writings. There has been a debate over whether or not Husserl's description of ownness and its movement into intersubjectivity is sufficient to reject the charge of solipsism, to which Descartes, for example, was subject. One argument against Husserl's description works this way: instead of infinity and the Deity being the ego's gateway to the Other, as in Descartes, Husserl's ego in the _Cartesian Meditations_ itself becomes transcendent. It remains, however, alone (unconnected). Only the ego's grasp "by analogy" of the Other (e.g., by conjectural reciprocity) allows the possibility for an 'objective' intersubjectivity, and hence for community.\[21]\nBut more recently, scholars such as Kathleen Haney, James Mensch, and Dan Zahavi have worked to prove that Husserl's descriptions of intercorporeality and intersubjectivity might actually work much more efficiently to show how intersubjectivity in fact is given through embodiment. In 1934 José Ortega y Gasset came to visit him.

Later Husserl lectured at Prague in 1935 and Vienna in 1936, which resulted in a very differently styled work that while innovative is no less problematic: Die Krisis (Belgrade 1936).\[22]\nHusserl describes here the cultural crisis gripping Europe, then approaches a philosophy of history, discussing Galileo, Descartes, several British philosophers, and Kant. The apolitical Husserl before had specifically avoided such historical discussions, pointedly preferring to go directly to an investigation of consciousness. Merleau-Ponty and others question whether Husserl here does not undercut his own position, in that Husserl had attacked in principle historicism, while specifically designing his phenomenology to be rigorous enough to transcend the limits of history. On the contrary, Husserl may be indicating here that historical traditions are merely features given to the pure ego's intuition, like any other.\[24]\n
A longer section follows on the "life world" [Lebenswelt], one not observed by the objective logic of science, but a world seen in our subjective experience.\[26]\nYet a problem arises similar to that dealing with 'history' above, a chicken-and-egg problem. Does the life world contextualize and thus compromise the gaze of the pure ego, or does the phenomenological method nonetheless raise the ego up transcendent?\[27]\nThese last writings presented the fruits of his professional life. Since his university retirement Husserl had "worked at a tremendous pace, producing several major works."\[2]\n
After suffering a fall the autumn of 1937, the philosopher became ill with pleurisy. Edmund Husserl died at Freiburg on April 27, 1938, having just turned 79. His wife Malvine survived him. Eugen Fink, his research assistant, delivered his eulogy.\[28]\nGerhard Ritter was the only Freiburg faculty member to attend the funeral, as an anti-Nazi protest.

**Heidegger and the Nazi era**

Husserl was incorrectly rumoured to have been denied the use of the library at Freiburg as a result of the anti-Jewish legislation of April 1933.\[29]\nHowever, among other disabilities Husserl was unable to publish his works in Nazi Germany; cf., above footnote to Die Krisis (1936). It was also rumoured that his former pupil and Nazi Party member, Martin Heidegger, informed Husserl that he was discharged, but it was actually the former rector.\[30]\nApparently Husserl and Heidegger had moved apart during the 1920s, which became clearer after 1928 when Husserl retired and Heidegger succeeded to his University chair. In the summer of 1929 Husserl had studied
carefully selected writings of Heidegger, coming to the conclusion that on several of their key positions they differed, e.g., Heidegger substituted Dasein ["Being-there"] for the pure ego, thus transforming phenomenology into an anthropology, a type of psychologism strongly disfavored by Husserl. Such observations of Heidegger, along with a critique of Max Scheler, were put into a lecture Husserl gave to various Kant Societies in Frankfurt, Berlin, and Halle during 1931 entitled *Phänomenologie und Anthropologie.*

In the war-time 1941 edition of Heidegger's primary work, *Being and Time* (first published in 1927), the original dedication to Husserl was removed. This was not due to a negation of the relationship between the two philosophers, however, but rather was the result of a suggested censorship by Heidegger's publisher who feared that the book might otherwise be banned by the Nazi regime. The dedication can still be found in a footnote on page 38, thanking Husserl for his guidance and generosity. Husserl, of course, had died several years earlier. In post-war editions of *Sein und Zeit* the dedication to Husserl is restored. The complex, troubled, and sundered philosophical relationship between Husserl and Heidegger has been widely discussed.

On May 4, 1933, Professor Edmund Husserl addressed the recent regime change in Germany and its consequences:

"The future alone will judge which was the true Germany in 1933, and who were the true Germans--those who subscribe to the more or less materialistic-mythical racial prejudices of the day, or those Germans pure in heart and mind, heirs to the great Germans of the past whose tradition they revere and perpetuate."[36]

After his death, Husserl's manuscripts, amounting to approximately 40,000 pages of "Gabelsberger" stenography and his complete research library, were in 1939 smuggled to Belgium by the Franciscan priest Herman Van Breda. There they were deposited at Leuven to form the *Husserl-Archives* of the Higher Institute of Philosophy.[37] Much of the material in his research manuscripts has since been published in the Husserliana critical edition series.[38]

**Development of his thought**

**Several early themes**

In his first works Husserl tries to combine mathematics, psychology and philosophy with a main goal to provide a sound foundation for mathematics. He analyzes the psychological process needed to obtain the concept of number and then tries to build up a systematical theory on this analysis. To achieve this he uses several methods and concepts taken from his teachers. From Weierstrass he derives the idea that we generate the concept of number by counting a certain collection of objects.

From Brentano and Stumpf he takes over the distinction between proper and improper presenting. In an example Husserl explains this in the following way: if you are standing in front of a house, you have a proper, direct presentation of that house, but if you are looking for it and ask for directions, then these directions (e.g. the house on the corner of this and that street) are an indirect, improper presentation. In other words, you can have a proper presentation of an object if it is actually present, and an improper (or symbolic as he also calls it) if you only can indicate that object through signs, symbols, etc. Husserl's *Logical Investigations* (1900–1901) is considered the starting point for the formal theory of wholes and their parts known as mereology.[39]

Another important element that Husserl took over from Brentano is intentionality, the notion that the main characteristic of consciousness is that it is always intentional. While often simplistically summarised as "aboutness" or the relationship between mental acts and the external world, Brentano defined it as the main characteristic of *mental phenomena,* by which they could be distinguished from *physical phenomena.* Every mental phenomenon, every psychological act, has a content, is directed at an object (the *intentional object*). Every belief, desire, etc. has an object that it is about: the believed, the wanted. Brentano used the expression "intentional inexistence" to indicate the status of the objects of thought in the mind. The property of being intentional, of having an intentional object, was the key feature to distinguish mental phenomena and physical phenomena, because physical phenomena lack intentionality altogether.
The elaboration of phenomenology

Some years after the 1900-1901 publication of his main work, the Logische Untersuchungen (Logical Investigations), Husserl made some key conceptual elaborations which led him to assert that in order to study the structure of consciousness, one would have to distinguish between the act of consciousness and the phenomena at which it is directed (the objects as intended). Knowledge of essences would only be possible by "bracketing" all assumptions about the existence of an external world. This procedure he called epoché. These new concepts prompted the publication of the Ideen (Ideas) in 1913, in which they were at first incorporated, and a plan for a second edition of the Logische Untersuchungen.

From the Ideen onward, Husserl concentrated on the ideal, essential structures of consciousness. The metaphysical problem of establishing the material reality of what we perceive was of little interest to Husserl in spite of his being a transcendental idealist. Husserl proposed that the world of objects and ways in which we direct ourselves toward and perceive those objects is normally conceived of in what he called the "natural standpoint", which is characterized by a belief that objects materially exist and exhibit properties that we see as emanating from them. Husserl proposed a radical new phenomenological way of looking at objects by examining how we, in our many ways of being intentionally directed toward them, actually "constitute" them (to be distinguished from materially creating objects or objects merely being figments of the imagination); in the Phenomenological standpoint, the object ceases to be something simply "external" and ceases to be seen as providing indicators about what it is, and becomes a grouping of perceptual and functional aspects that imply one another under the idea of a particular object or "type". The notion of objects as real is not expelled by phenomenology, but "bracketed" as a way in which we regard objects instead of a feature that inheres in an object's essence founded in the relation between the object and the perceiver. In order to better understand the world of appearances and objects, phenomenology attempts to identify the invariant features of how objects are perceived and pushes attributions of reality into their role as an attribution about the things we perceive (or an assumption underlying how we perceive objects).

In a later period, Husserl began to wrestle with the complicated issues of intersubjectivity, specifically, how communication about an object can be assumed to refer to the same ideal entity (Cartesian Meditations, Meditation V). Husserl tries new methods of bringing his readers to understand the importance of phenomenology to scientific inquiry (and specifically to psychology) and what it means to "bracket" the natural attitude. The Crisis of the European Sciences is Husserl's unfinished work that deals most directly with these issues. In it, Husserl for the first time attempts a historical overview of the development of Western philosophy and science, emphasizing the challenges presented by their increasingly (one-sidedly) empirical and naturalistic orientation. Husserl declares that mental and spiritual reality possess their own reality independent of any physical basis and that a science of the mind ('Geisteswissenschaft') must be established on as scientific a foundation as the natural sciences have managed:

"It is my conviction that intentional phenomenology has for the first time made spirit as spirit the field of systematic scientific experience, thus effecting a total transformation of the task of knowledge."

Thought

Husserl's thought is revolutionary in several ways, most notably in the distinction between 'natural' and 'phenomenological' modes of understanding. In the former, sense-perception in correspondence with the material realm constitutes the known reality, and understanding is premised on the accuracy of the perception and the objective knowability of what is called the 'real world'. Phenomenological understanding strives to be rigorously 'presuppositionless' by means of what Husserl calls a 'phenomenological reduction'. This reduction is not conditioned but rather transcendental: in Husserl's terms, pure consciousness of absolute Being. In Husserl's work, consciousness of any given thing calls for discerning its meaning as an 'intentional object'. Such an object does not simply strike the senses, to be interpreted or misinterpreted by mental reason; it has already been selected and grasped, grasping being an etymological connotation, of percipere, the root of 'perceive.'
Meaning and object

From *Logical Investigations* (1900/1901) to *Experience and Judgment* (published in 1939), Husserl expressed clearly the difference between meaning and object. He identified several different kinds of names. For example, there are names that have the role of properties that uniquely identify an object. Each of these names expresses a meaning and designates the same object. Examples of this are "the victor in Jena" and "the loser in Waterloo", or "the equilateral triangle" and "the equiangular triangle"; in both cases, both names express different meanings, but designate the same object. There are names which have no meaning, but have the role of designating an object: "Aristotle", "Socrates", and so on. Finally, there are names which designate a variety of objects. These are called "universal names"; their meaning is a "concept" and refers to a series of objects (the extension of the concept). The way we know sensible objects is called "sensible intuition".

Husserl also identifies a series of "formal words" which are necessary to form sentences and have no sensible correlates. Examples of formal words are "a", "the", "more than", "over", "under", "two", "group", and so on. Every sentence must contain formal words to designate what Husserl calls "formal categories". There are two kinds of categories: meaning categories and formal-ontological categories. Meaning categories relate judgments; they include forms of conjunction, disjunction, forms of plural, among others. Formal-ontological categories relate objects and include notions such as set, cardinal number, ordinal number, part and whole, relation, and so on. The way we know these categories is through a faculty of understanding called "categorial intuition".

Through sensible intuition our consciousness constitutes what Husserl calls a "situation of affairs" (*Sachlage*). It is a passive constitution where objects themselves are presented to us. To this situation of affairs, through categorial intuition, we are able to constitute a "state of affairs" (*Sachverhalt*). One situation of affairs through objective acts of consciousness (acts of constituting categorially) can serve as the basis for constituting multiple states of affairs. For example, suppose $a$ and $b$ are two sensible objects in a certain situation of affairs. We can use it as basis to say, "$a < b$" and "$b > a$", two judgments which designate the same state of affairs. For Husserl a sentence has a proposition or judgment as its meaning, and refers to a state of affairs which has a situation of affairs as a reference base.

Philosophy of logic and mathematics

Husserl believed that *truth-in-itself* has as ontological correlate *being-in-itself*, just as meaning categories have formal-ontological categories as correlates. Logic is a formal theory of judgment, that studies the formal *a priori* relations among judgments using meaning categories. Mathematics, on the other hand, is formal ontology; it studies all the possible forms of being (of objects). Hence for both logic and mathematics, the different formal categories are the objects of study, not the sensible objects themselves. The problem with the psychological approach to mathematics and logic is that it fails to account for the fact that this approach is about formal categories, and not simply about abstractions from sensibility alone. The reason why we do not deal with sensible objects in mathematics is because of another faculty of understanding called "categorial abstraction." Through this faculty we are able to get rid of sensible components of judgments, and just focus on formal categories themselves.

Thanks to "eidetic intuition" (or "essential intuition"), we are able to grasp the possibility, impossibility, necessity and contingency among concepts and among formal categories. Categorial intuition, along with categorial abstraction and eidetic intuition, are the basis for logical and mathematical knowledge.

Husserl criticized the logicians of his day for not focusing on the relation between subjective processes that give us objective knowledge of pure logic. All subjective activities of consciousness need an ideal correlate, and objective logic (constituted noematically) as it is constituted by consciousness needs a noetic correlate (the subjective activities of consciousness).

Husserl stated that logic has three strata, each further away from consciousness and psychology than those that precede it.
• The first stratum is what Husserl called a "morphology of meanings" concerning *a priori* ways to relate judgments to make them meaningful. In this stratum we elaborate a "pure grammar" or a logical syntax, and he would call its rules "laws to prevent non-sense", which would be similar to what logic calls today "formation rules". Mathematics, as logic's ontological correlate, also has a similar stratum, a "morphology of formal-ontological categories".

• The second stratum would be called by Husserl "logic of consequence" or the "logic of non-contradiction" which explores all possible forms of true judgments. He includes here syllogistic classic logic, propositional logic and that of predicates. This is a semantic stratum, and the rules of this stratum would be the "laws to avoid counter-sense" or "laws to prevent contradiction". They are very similar to today's logic "transformation rules". Mathematics also has a similar stratum which is based among others on pure theory of pluralities, and a pure theory of numbers. They provide a science of the conditions of possibility of any theory whatsoever. Husserl also talked about what he called "logic of truth" which consists of the formal laws of possible truth and its modalities, and precedes the third logical third stratum.

• The third stratum is metalogical, what he called a "theory of all possible forms of theories." It explores all possible theories in an *a priori* fashion, rather than the possibility of theory in general. We could establish theories of possible relations between pure forms of theories, investigate these logical relations and the deductions from such general connection. The logician is free to see the extension of this deductive, theoretical sphere of pure logic.

The ontological correlate to the third stratum is the "theory of manifolds". In formal ontology, it is a free investigation where a mathematician can assign several meanings to several symbols, and all their possible valid deductions in a general and indeterminate manner. It is, properly speaking, the most universal mathematics of all. Through the posit of certain indeterminate objects (formal-ontological categories) as well as any combination of mathematical axioms, mathematicians can explore the apodeictic connections between them, as long as consistency is preserved.

According to Husserl, this view of logic and mathematics accounted for the objectivity of a series of mathematical developments of his time, such as *n*-dimensional manifolds (both Euclidean and non-Euclidean), Hermann Grassmann's theory of extensions, William Rowan Hamilton's Hamiltonians, Sophus Lie's theory of transformation groups, and Cantor's set theory.

Jacob Klein was one student of Husserl who pursued this line of inquiry, seeking to "desedimentize" mathematics and the mathematical sciences.\[46\]

**Husserl and psychologism**

**Philosophy of arithmetic and Frege**

After obtaining his PhD in mathematics, Husserl began analyzing the foundations of mathematics from a psychological point of view. In his professorial doctoral dissertation, *On the Concept of Number* (1886) and in his *Philosophy of Arithmetic* (1891), Husserl sought, by employing Brentano's descriptive psychology, to define the natural numbers in a way that advanced the methods and techniques of Karl Weierstrass, Richard Dedekind, Georg Cantor, Gottlob Frege, and other contemporary mathematicians. Later, in the first volume of his *Logical Investigations*, the *Prolegomena of Pure Logic*, Husserl, while attacking the psychologistic point of view in logic and mathematics, also appears to reject much of his early work, although the forms of psychologism analysed and refuted in the *Prolegomena* did not apply directly to his *Philosophy of Arithmetic*. Some scholars question whether Frege's negative review of the *Philosophy of Arithmetic* helped turn Husserl towards Platonism, but he had already discovered the work of Bernhard Bolzano independently around 1890/91 and explicitly mentioned Bernard Bolzano, Gottfried Leibniz and Hermann Lotze as inspirations for his newer position.
Husserl's review of Ernst Schröder, published before Frege's landmark 1892 article, clearly distinguishes sense from reference; thus Husserl's notions of noema and object also arose independently. Likewise, in his criticism of Frege in the *Philosophy of Arithmetic*, Husserl remarks on the distinction between the content and the extension of a concept. Moreover, the distinction between the subjective mental act, namely the content of a concept, and the (external) object, was developed independently by Brentano and his school, and may have surfaced as early as Brentano's 1870's lectures on logic.

Scholars such as J. N. Mohanty, Claire Ortiz Hill, and Guillermo E. Rosado Haddock, among others, have argued that Husserl's so-called change from psychologism to Platonism came about independently of Frege's review. For example, the review falsely accuses Husserl of subjectivizing everything, so that no objectivity is possible, and falsely attributes to him a notion of abstraction whereby objects disappear until we are left with numbers as mere ghosts. Contrary to what Frege states, in Husserl's *Philosophy of Arithmetic* we already find two different kinds of representations: subjective and objective. Moreover, objectivity is clearly defined in that work. Frege's attack seems to be directed at certain foundational doctrines then current in Weierstrass's Berlin School, of which Husserl and Cantor cannot be said to be orthodox representatives.

Furthermore, various sources indicate that Husserl changed his mind about psychologism as early as 1890, a year before he published the *Philosophy of Arithmetic*. Husserl stated that by the time he published that book, he had already changed his mind—that he had doubts about psychologism from the very outset. He attributed this change of mind to his reading of Leibniz, Bolzano, Lotze, and David Hume. Husserl makes no mention of Frege as a decisive factor in this change. In his *Logical Investigations*, Husserl mentions Frege only twice, once in a footnote to point out that he had retracted three pages of his criticism of Frege's *The Foundations of Arithmetic*, and again to question Frege's use of the word *Bedeutung* to designate "reference" rather than "meaning" (sense).

In a letter dated May 24, 1891, Frege thanked Husserl for sending him a copy of the *Philosophy of Arithmetic* and Husserl's review of Ernst Schröder's *Vorlesungen über die Algebra der Logik*. In the same letter, Frege used the review of Schröder's book to analyze Husserl's notion of the sense of reference of concept words. Hence Frege recognized, as early as 1891, that Husserl distinguished between sense and reference. Consequently, Frege and Husserl independently elaborated a theory of sense and reference before 1891.

Commentators argue that Husserl's notion of noema has nothing to do with Frege's notion of sense, because noemata are necessarily fused with noeses which are the conscious activities of consciousness. Noemata have three different levels:

- The substratum, which is never presented to the consciousness, and is the support of all the properties of the object;
- The noematic senses, which are the different ways the objects are presented to us;
- The modalities of being (possible, doubtful, existent, non-existent, absurd, and so on).

Consequently, in intentional activities, even non-existent objects can be constituted, and form part of the whole noema. Frege, however, did not conceive of objects as forming parts of senses: If a proper name denotes a non-existent object, it does not have a reference, hence concepts with no objects have no truth value in arguments. Moreover, Husserl did not maintain that predicates of sentences designate concepts. According to Frege the reference of a sentence is a truth value; for Husserl it is a "state of affairs." Frege's notion of "sense" is unrelated to Husserl's noema, while the latter's notions of "meaning" and "object" differ from those of Frege.

In detail, Husserl's conception of logic and mathematics differs from that of Frege, who held that arithmetic could be derived from logic. For Husserl this is not the case: mathematics (with the exception of geometry) is the ontological correlate of logic, and while both fields are related, neither one is strictly reducible to the other.
Husserl's criticism of psychology

Reacting against authors such as J. S. Mill, Christoph von Sigwart and his own former teacher Brentano, Husserl criticised their psychologism in mathematics and logic, i.e., their conception of these abstract and a priori sciences as having an essentially empirical foundation and a prescriptive or descriptive nature. According to psychologism, logic would not be an autonomous discipline, but a branch of psychology, either proposing a prescriptive and practical "art” of correct judgement (as Brentano and some of his more orthodox students did) or a description of the factual processes of human thought. Husserl pointed out that the failure of anti-psychologists to defeat psychologism was a result of being unable to distinguish between the foundational, theoretical side of logic, and the applied, practical side. Pure logic does not deal at all with "thoughts” or “judgings” as mental episodes but about a priori laws and conditions for any theory and any judgments whatsoever, conceived as propositions in themselves.

"Here 'Judgement’ has the same meaning as ‘proposition’, understood, not as a grammatical, but as an ideal unity of meaning. This is the case with all the distinctions of acts or forms of judgement, which provide the foundations for the laws of pure logic. Categorial, hypothetical, disjunctive, existential judgements, and however else we may call them, in pure logic are not names for classes of judgements, but for ideal forms of propositions.”

Since "truth-in-itself” has "being-in-itself” as ontological correlate, and since psychologists reduce truth (and hence logic) to empirical psychology, the inevitable consequence is scepticism. Psychologists have also not been successful in showing how from induction or psychological processes we can justify the absolute certainty of logical principles, such as the principles of identity and non-contradiction. It is therefore futile to base certain logical laws and principles on uncertain processes of the mind.

This confusion made by psychologism (and related disciplines such as biologism and anthropologism) can be due to three specific prejudices:

1. The first prejudice is the supposition that logic is somehow normative in nature. Husserl argues that logic is theoretical, i.e., that logic itself proposes a priori laws which are themselves the basis of the normative side of logic. Since mathematics is related to logic, he cites an example from mathematics: If we have a formula like ",(a + b)(a – b) = a² – b²” it does not tell us how to think mathematically. It just expresses a truth. A proposition that says: "The product of the sum and the difference of a and b should give us the difference of the squares of a and b” does express a normative proposition, but this normative statement is based on the theoretical statement ",(a + b)(a – b) = a² – b²”.

2. For psychologists, the acts of judging, reasoning, deriving, and so on, are all psychological processes. Therefore, it is the role of psychology to provide the foundation of these processes. Husserl states that this effort made by psychologists is a "metábasis eis állo génos" (Gr. μετάβασις εἰς ἄλλο γένος, "a transgression to another field"). It is a metábasis because psychology cannot possibly provide any foundations for a priori laws which themselves are the basis for all the ways we should think correctly. Psychologists have the problem of confusing intentional activities with the object of these activities. It is important to distinguish between the act of judging and the judgment itself, the act of counting and the number itself, and so on. Counting five objects is undeniably a psychological process, but the number 5 is not.

3. Judgments can be true or not true. Psychologists argue that judgments are true because they become "evidently" true to us. This evidence, a psychological process that "guarantees” truth, is indeed a psychological process. Husserl responds by saying that truth itself as well as logical laws always remain valid regardless of psychological "evidence” that they are true. No psychological process can explain the a priori objectivity of these logical truths.

From this criticism to psychologism, the distinction between psychological acts and their intentional objects, and the difference between the normative side of logic and the theoretical side, derives from a platonist conception of logic. This means that we should regard logical and mathematical laws as being independent of the human mind, and also as an autonomy of meanings. It is essentially the difference between the real (everything subject to time) and the ideal or irreal (everything that is atemporal), such as logical truths, mathematical entities, mathematical truths and meanings in general.
Influence

David Carr of Yale University commented in 1970 on Husserl's following: "It is well known that Husserl was always disappointed at the tendency of his students to go their own way, to embark upon fundamental revisions of phenomenology rather than engage in the communal task" as originally intended by the radical new science. Notwithstanding, he did attract philosophers to phenomenology.

Martin Heidegger is the best known of Husserl's students, the one whom Husserl chose as his successor at Freiburg. Heidegger's magnum opus Being and Time was dedicated to Husserl. They shared their thoughts and worked alongside each other for over a decade at the University of Freiburg, Heidegger being Husserl's assistant during 1920-1923. Heidegger's early work followed his teacher, but with time he began to develop new insights distinctively variant. Husserl became increasingly critical of Heidegger's work, especially in 1929, and included pointed criticism of Heidegger in lectures he gave during 1931. Heidegger, while acknowledging his debt to Husserl, followed a political position offensive and harmful to Husserl after the Nazis came to power in 1933, Husserl being of Jewish origin and Heidegger infamously being then a Nazi proponent. Academic discussion of Husserl and Heidegger is extensive.

At Göttingen in 1913 Adolf Reinach (1884–1917) "was now Husserl's right hand. He was above all the mediator between Husserl and the students, for he understood extremely well how to deal with other persons, whereas Husserl was pretty much helpless in this respect." He was an original editor of Husserl's new journal, Jahrbuch; one of his works (giving a phenomenological analysis of the law of obligations) appeared in its first issue. Reinach was widely admired and a remarkable teacher. Husserl, in his 1917 obituary, wrote, "He wanted to draw only from the deepest sources, he wanted to produce only work of enduring value. And through his wise restrain he succeeded in this." Edith Stein was Husserl's student at Göttingen while she wrote her On the Problem of Empathy (1916). She then became his assistant at Freiburg 1916-1918. She later adapted her phenomenology to the modern school of Thomas Aquinas.

Ludwig Landgrebe became assistant to Husserl in 1923. From 1939 he collaborated with Eugen Fink at the Husserl-Archives in Leuven. In 1954 he became leader of the Husserl-Archives. Landgrebe is known as one of Husserl's closest associates, but also for his independent views relating to history, religion and politics as seen from the viewpoints of existentialist philosophy and metaphysics.

Eugen Fink was a close associate of Husserl during the 1920s and 1930s. He wrote the _Sixth Cartesian Meditation_ which Husserl said was the truest expression and continuation of his own work. Fink delivered the eulogy for Husserl in 1938.

Roman Ingarden, an early student of Husserl at Freiburg, corresponded with Husserl into the mid-1930s. Ingarden did not accept, however, the later transcendental idealism of Husserl which he thought would lead to relativism. Ingarden has written his work in German and Polish. In his Spór o istnienie świata (Ger: "Der Streit um die Existenz der Welt", Eng: "Dispute about existence of the world") he created his own realistic position, which also helped to
spread phenomenology in Poland.

Max Scheler met Husserl in Halle in 1901 and found in his phenomenology a methodological breakthrough for his own philosophy. Scheler, who was at Göttingen when Husserl taught there, was one of the original few editors of the journal *Jahrbuch für Philosophie und Phänomenologische Forschung* (1913). Scheler's work *Formalism in Ethics and Nonformal Ethics of Value* appeared in the new journal (1913 and 1916) and drew acclaim. The personal relationship between the two men, however, became strained, due to Scheler's legal troubles, and Scheler returned to Munich. Although Scheler later criticised Husserl's idealistic logical approach and proposed instead a "phenomenology of love", he states that he remained "deeply indebted" to Husserl throughout his work.

Nicolai Hartmann was once thought to be at the center of phenomenology, but perhaps no longer. In 1921 the prestige of Hartmann the Neo-Kantian, who was Professor of Philosophy at Marburg, was added to the Movement; he "publicly declared his solidarity with the actual work of *die Phänomenologie.*" Yet Hartmann's connections were with Max Scheler and the Munich circle; Husserl himself evidently did not consider him as a phenomenologist. His philosophy, however, is said to include an innovative use of the method.

Emmanuel Levinas in 1929 gave a presentation at one of Husserl's last seminars in Freiburg. Also that year he wrote on Husserl's *Ideen* (1913) a long review published by a French journal. With Gabrielle Peiffer, Levinas translated into French Husserl's *Méditations cartesiennes* (1931). He was at first impressed with Heidegger and began a book on him, but broke off the project when Heidegger became involved with the Nazis. After the war he wrote on Jewish spirituality; most of his family had been murdered by the Nazis in Lithuania. Levinas then began to write works that would become widely known and admired.

Jean-Paul Sartre was also largely influenced by Husserl, although he later came to disagree with key points in his analyses. Sartre rejected Husserl's transcendental interpretations begun in his *Ideen* (1913) and instead followed Heidegger's ontology.

Maurice Merleau-Ponty's *Phenomenology of Perception* is influenced by Edmund Husserl's work on perception, intersubjectivity, intentionality, and temporality, including Husserl's theory of retention and protention. Merleau-Ponty's description of 'motor intentionality' and sexuality, for example, retain the important structure of the noetic-noematic correlation of Ideas I, yet further concretize what it means for Husserl when consciousness particularizes itself into modes of intuition. Merleau-Ponty's most clearly Husserlian work is, perhaps, "the Philosopher and His Shadow." Depending on the interpretation of Husserl's accounts of eidoletic intuition, given in Husserl's *Phenomenological Psychology* and *Experience and Judgment,* it may be that Merleau-Ponty did not accept the "eidoletic reduction" nor the "pure essence" said to result. Merleau-Ponty was the first student to study at the Husserl-archives in Leuven.

Gabriel Marcel explicitly rejected existentialism, due to Sartre, but not phenomenology, which has enjoyed a wide following among French Catholics. He appreciated Husserl, Scheler, and (but with apprehension) Heidegger. His expressions like "ontology of sensability" when referring to the body, indicate influence by phenomenological thought.

Kurt Gödel is known to have read *Cartesian Meditations.* He expressed very strong appreciation for Husserl's work, especially with regard to "bracketing" or epoché.

Hermann Weyl's interest in intuitionistic logic and impredicativity appears to have resulted from his reading of Husserl. He was introduced to Husserl's work through his wife, Helene Joseph, herself a student of Husserl at Göttingen.

Rudolf Carnap was also influenced by Husserl, not only concerning Husserl's notion of essential insight that Carnap used in his *Der Raum,* but also his notion of "formation rules" and "transformation rules" is founded on Husserl's philosophy of logic.

Karol Wojtyła, who would later become Pope John-Paul II was influenced by Husserl. Phenomenology appears in a work co-authored by him, *The Acting Person* (1969). Originally published in Polish, it was written in
collaboration with the Polish phenomenologist Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka. It combines phenomenological work with Thomistic Ethics.

Paul Ricœur has translated many works of Husserl into French and has also written many of his own studies of the philosopher. Among other works, Ricœur employed phenomenology in his *Freud & Philosophy* (1965).

Jacques Derrida wrote several critical studies of Husserl early in his academic career. These included his dissertation, *The Problem of Genesis in Husserl's Philosophy*, and also his introduction to *The Origin of Geometry*. Derrida continued to make reference to Husserl in works such as *Of Grammatology*.

Stanislaw Leśniewski and Kazimierz Ajdukiewicz were inspired by Husserl's formal analysis of language. Accordingly, they employed phenomenology in the development of categorial grammar.

Ortega y Gasset visited Husserl at Freiburg in 1934. He credited phenomenology for having 'liberated him' from a narrow neo-Kantian thought. While perhaps not a phenomenologist himself, he introduced the philosophy to Iberia and Latin America.

Wilfrid Sellars, an influential figure in the so-called "Pittsburgh School" (Robert Brandom, John McDowell) had been a student of Marvin Farber, a pupil of Husserl, and was influenced by phenomenology through him:

> Marvin Farber led me through my first careful reading of the *Critique of Pure Reason* and introduced me to Husserl. His combination of utter respect for the structure of Husserl's thought with the equally firm conviction that this structure could be given a naturalistic interpretation was undoubtedly a key influence on my own subsequent philosophical strategy.

Hans Blumenberg received his postdoctoral qualification in 1950, with a dissertation on 'Ontological distance', an inquiry into the crisis of Husserl's phenomenology.

The influence of the Husserlian phenomenological tradition in the 21st century extends beyond the confines of the European and North American legacies. It has already started to impact (indirectly) scholarship in Eastern and Oriental thought, including research on the impetus of philosophical thinking in the history of ideas in Islam.

**Reference notes**

5. Kockelmans, "Biographical Note" per Edmund Husserl, 17-20, at 17-18, in his edited *Phenomenology* (Doubleday Anchor 1967). "Husserl's 'Philosophie der Arithmetik is further discussed here below."
7. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy: Husserl (http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/husserl/) What the exact impact this criticism by Frege may have had on Husserl's subsequent positions is the subject of debate. See below herein the section "Husserl and the Critique of Psychology" and the subsection "Phenomenology of Logic and Mathematics".

[10] Husserl, *Ideen einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen Philosophie* (1913), translated as *Ideas. General Introduction to Pure Phenomenology* (New York: Macmillan 1931, reprint Collier), with "Author's Preface to the English Edition" at 5-22. Therein, Husserl in 1931 refers to "Transcendental Subjectivity" being "a new field of experience" opened as a result of practicing phenomenological reduction, and giving rise to an *a priori* science not empirically based but somewhat similar to mathematics. By such practice the individual becomes the "transcendental Ego", although Husserl acknowledges the problem of solipsism. Later he emphasizes "the necessary stressing of the difference between transcendental and psychological subjectivity, the repeated declaration that transcendental phenomenology is not in any sense psychology..." but rather (in contrast to naturalistic psychology) by the phenomenological reduction "the life of the soul is made intelligible in its most intimate and originally intuitional essence" and whereby "objects of the most varied grades right up to the level of the objective world are there for the Ego..." *Ibid.* at 5-7, 11-12, 18.


[18] In the 1962 translation *Being and Time* by Macquarrie and Robinson, Heidegger states: "Dedicated to Edmund Husserl in friendship and admiration. Todaunberg in Baden, Black Forest, 8 April 1926".


[22] Husserl, *Die Krise der europäischen Wissenschaften un die transzendentele Phänomenologie* (Belgrade 1936). "As a Jew who was denied any public platform in Germany, Husserl had to publish, as he had lectured, outside his own country," *Philosophia in Belgrade* began its publication. David Carr, "Translator's Introduction" xv-xliii, at xvii, to Edmund Husserl, *The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology* (Northwestern University 1970).


[34] Husserl is mentioned by Bernard Stiegler in the 2004 film *The Ister*.


[39] This assumption led Husserl to an idealistic position (which he originally had tried to overcome or avoid). On Husserl's phenomenalological idealism see Hans Köchler, Die Subjekt-Objekt-Dialektik in der transzendentalen Phänomenologie. Das Seinsproblem zwischen Idealismus und Realismus. (Monographien zur philosophischen Forschung, Vol. 112.) Meisenheim a. G.: Anton Hain, 1974.

[40] Crisis of European Humanity, Pt. II, 1935


[48] Husserl-chronik, p. 25-26


[54] Heidegger was at Marburg 1923-1925.

[55] See above subsection "Heidegger and the Nazi era".

[56] The multivalent, including the "horrifying", aspects of Heidegger in a parallel context are recounted in Peter Eli Gordon, Rosensweig and Heidegger: Between Judaism and German Philosophy (University of California 2003) at 13-14 (Heidegger and Rosensweig's early "kinship" with him). "In 1929, however, one could still read Heidegger's philosophy without being drawn into a controversy concerning its relationship to National Socialism, anti-semitism, and the like. The German philosophical world as a whole still cloaked itself in a mantle of relative innocence." Gordon (2003) at 303-304. "Rosensweig's work represents the culmination of what is often called the German Jewish Tradition." Gordon, "Preface" (2003) at xix.


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• 1887. Über den Begriff der Zahl. Psychologische Analysen.
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• 1913. Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen Philosophie. Erstes Buch: Allgemeine Einführung in die reine Phänomenologie (Ideas: General Introduction to Pure Phenomenology)
• 1925. Erste Philosophie. Erster Teil: Kritische Ideengeschichte (First Philosophy Vol 1: Critical History of Ideas)
• 1928. Vorlesungen zur Phänomenologie des inneren Zeitbewusstseins.
• 1929. Formale und transzendentale Logik. Versuch einer Kritik der logischen Vernunft (Formal and Transcendental Logic)
• 1931. Méditations cartésiennes (Cartesian Meditations)
• 1936. Die Krise der europäischen Wissenschaften und die transzendentale Phänomenologie: Eine Einleitung in die phänomenologische Philosophie (The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology: An Introduction to Phenomenological Philosophy)
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• 1952. Ideen II: Phänomenologische Untersuchungen zur Konstitution.
• 1952. Ideen III: Die Phänomenologie und die Fundamente der Wissenschaften.

In English

Edmund Husserl


**Anthologies:**

**Secondary literature**

External links

Husserl archives
• Husserl-Archives (http://www.husserl.uni-koeln.de/) at the University of Cologne.
• Husserl-Archives Freiburg (http://www.husserlarchiv.uni-freiburg.de/husserl.html).
• Husserl Archives at the New School (http://www.newschool.edu/gf/phil/husserl/) (New York).
• Archives Husserl de Paris (http://www.umr8547.ens.fr/fonds-d'Archives.html), at the École normale supérieure, Paris.
• Husserl Archives at Duquesne University, Pittsburgh (http://www.library.duq.edu/silverman/collections.htm).

Other links
• Edmund Husserl (http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/husserl) entry by Christian Beyer in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
• Phenomenology (http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/phenomenology) entry by David Woodruff Smith in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
• Barry Smith, Papers on Edmund Husserl (http://ontology.buffalo.edu/smith/articles/husserl.html)
• The Husserl Page by Bob Sandmeyer (http://www.husserlpage.com/) Includes a number of online texts in German and English.
• Husserl.net (http://www.husserl.net), open content project.
  • "Edmund Husserl: Formal Ontology and Transcendental Logic. (http://www.ontology.co/husserl.htm)" Resource guide on Husserl's logic and formal ontology, with annotated bibliography.
Phenomenological sociology

Phenomenological sociology is the study of the formal structures of concrete social existence as made available in and through the analytical description of acts of intentional consciousness. The object of such an analysis is the meaningful lived world of everyday life: the Lebenswelt, or "Life-world". The task of phenomenological sociology, like that of every other phenomenological investigation, is to account for, or describe, the formal structures of this object of investigation in terms of subjectivity, as an object-constituted-in-and-for-consciousness. That which makes such a description different from the "naive" subjective descriptions of the man in the street, or those of the traditional social scientist, both operating in the natural attitude of everyday life, is the utiliation of phenomenological methods.

The leading exponent of Phenomenological Sociology was Alfred Schütz(1899–1959). Schütz sought to provide a critical philosophical foundation for Max Weber's interpretive sociology / verstehende soziologie by applying methods and insights derived from the phenomenological philosophy of Edmund Husserl(1859–1938) to the study of the social world. Wikipedia:Please clarify It is the building of this bridge between Husserlian phenomenology and Weberian sociology that serves as the starting point for contemporary phenomenological sociology. This does not mean, of course, that all versions of phenomenological sociology must be based on Weberian themes. In point of fact, there is some historical evidence [Dilthey's influence on Weber re: the former's theory of Weltanschauung, and Husserl's influence on Dilthey re: the former's theory of meaning] that would support the argument that elements of Weberian sociology are themselves based on certain phenomenological themes; especially in regard to the theory of the intended meaning of an act, and ideas regarding theory and concept formation.

While Husserl's work was directed at establishing the formal structures of intentional consciousness, Schütz's work was directed at establishing the formal structures of what he termed the Life-world. Husserl's work was conducted as a transcendental phenomenology of consciousness. Schütz's work was conducted as a mundane phenomenology of the social world. Wikipedia:Please clarify The difference in their respective projects rests at the level of analysis, the objects taken as a topic of study, and the type of phenomenological reduction that is employed for the purposes of analysis.

Ultimately these two distinct phenomenological projects should be seen as complementary, with the structures of the latter dependent on the structures of the former. That is, valid phenomenological descriptions of the formal structures of the Life-world should be wholly consistent with the descriptions of the formal structures of intentional consciousness. It is from the latter that the former derives its validity, verifiability, and truth value. This is in keeping with Husserl's conception of phenomenology as "First Philosophy", the foundation, or ground, for both philosophy and all of the sciences.

General thesis of the natural attitude

The general thesis of the natural attitude is the ideational foundation for the fact-world of our straightforward, common sense social experience. It unites the world of individual objects into a unified world of meaning, which we assume is shared by any and all who share our culture (Schütz:1962) It forms the underpinning for our thoughts and actions. It is the projected assumption, or belief, in a naturally occurring social world that is both factually objective in its existential status, and unquestioned in its "natural" appearance; social objects [persons, language, institutions, etc.] have the same existential "thing" status as objects occurring in nature [rocks, trees, and animals, etc.].
Although it is often referred to as the "General Thesis of the Natural Attitude", it is not a thesis in the formal sense of the term, but a non-thematic assumption, or belief, that underlies our sense of the objectivity and facticity of the world, and the objects appearing in this world. The facticity of this world of common sense is both unquestioned and virtually "unquestionable"; it is sanctionable as to its status as that which "is", and that which "everyone", or, at least, "any reasonable person", agrees to be the case with regard to the factual character of the world.

As far as traditional social science is concerned, this taken-for-granted world of social facts is the starting and end point for any and all investigations of the social world. It provides the raw, observable, taken-for-granted "data" upon which the findings of the social sciences are idealized, conceptualized, and offered up for analysis and discourse. Within traditional social science, this "data" is formulated into a second order world of abstractions and idealizations constituted in accordance with these sciences' pre-determined interpretive schemes (Husserl:1989).

Schutz's phenomenological descriptions are made from within the phenomenological attitude, after the phenomenological reduction [epoche], which serves to suspend this assumption, or belief, and reveal the phenomena occurring within the natural attitude as objects-for-consciousness.

**Phenomenological reduction**

Martin Heidegger aptly characterizes Husserl's phenomenological research project as, "...the analytic description of intentionality in its a priori" (Heidegger:1992); as it is the phenomenon of intentionality which provides the mode of access for conducting any and all phenomenological investigations, and the ultimate ground or foundation guaranteeing any findings resulting from any such inquiry. In recognizing consciousness as having the formal structure of intentionality, as always having consciousness of an intended object, Husserlian phenomenology has located the access point to a radical new form of scientific description.

Methodologically, access to this field is obtained through the phenomenological reduction. While there is some controversy as to the official name, number, and levels of the reduction, this internal argument among the philosophers need not concern us. For the purposes of a mundane phenomenology of the social world, we, as phenomenological social scientists, engage in a mundane phenomenological reduction called the epoche. The hallmark of this form of the reduction is what it reveals about its field of inquiry: a mundane phenomenology of the social world defines its phenomenal field as the intersubjective region of mundane consciousness as appearing from within the natural attitude.

The phenomenological reduction as applied to a mundane analysis of the social world consists of the bracketing [equivalents: methodical disregard, putting out of play, suspension] of the thesis of the natural attitude. This bracketing is nothing more than a bracketing of the existential belief in the existence of the objective world; the existential status of the world itself is not called into question. The result of this bracketing is that our attention is shifted from the objects in the world as they occur in nature, to the objects in the world as they appear for consciousness - as phenomenon for intentional consciousness. Our descriptions of objects in the world are now transformed from the naïve descriptions of objects as occurring in nature, to phenomenological descriptions of objects as appearing for consciousness. In short, for the purpose of a mundane phenomenological analysis within the natural attitude, the epoche transforms objects as occurring in nature into: objects-for-subjectivity, objects-for-consciousness, objects-as-intended.

Keep in mind that for positivism, the meaning of an object is, by definition, "objective". That is, the meaning of the object is a property of the object itself, is independent of any particular observer, and "the same" for any and all observers regardless of their orientation or perspective. For phenomenology, an object is always intended, and constituted, as meaningful by a particular intending subject from a particular orientation and from a particular perspectival viewing point. In addition, phenomenologically speaking, the meaning of the object cannot be separated from its phenomenality, or materiality, and cannot be constituted qua meaningful object without the meaning bestowing act of intending on the part of a constituting subject.
For a phenomenology undertaken within the natural attitude, meaning does not inherently accrue to an object as a thing-in-itself, is not an "add-on" to the object [a label], and is not separable from the object as constituted by the intending subject in the act of meaning constitution. For phenomenology, the meaning and the object [in its "materiality"] are co-constituted in the intending of the object by the subject - phenomenologically speaking there are only meaningful objects. There is no such thing as a neutrally valued object, or a meaningless object, and the notion of an object as "nonsense" is itself a meaningful determination - as the existentialists would say, we are condemned to meaning.

Note that because we are born into an already existing social world that is already pre-interpreted and meaningful as an intersubjectively available "entity", any proposal that the subject is creating the object, or creating the meaning of the object as an individual achievement in a particular situation is a misrepresentation of what is actually taking place. Within the Natural Attitude of Everyday Life, the subject's role in the constitution of meaningful objects is better understood as a reading off, or interpretation, of the meaning from the object-as-intended. This reading off, or interpretation, of the object's meaning is an intersubjective achievement of the intending subject that takes place within the intersubjective realm of the natural attitude.

References

Phenomenology (psychology)

Phenomenology is an approach to psychological subject matter that has its roots in the philosophical work of Edmund Husserl. Early phenomenologists such as Husserl, Jean-Paul Sartre, and Maurice Merleau-Ponty conducted philosophical investigations of consciousness in the early 20th century. Their critiques of psychologism and positivism later influenced at least two main fields of contemporary psychology: the phenomenological psychological approach of the Duquesne School (The Descriptive Phenomenological Method in Psychology), including Amedeo Giorgi and Frederick Wertz; and the experimental approaches associated with Francisco Varela, Shaun Gallagher, Evan Thompson, and others (embodied mind thesis). Other names associated with the movement include Jonathan Smith (Interpretative Phenomenological Analysis), Steinar Kvale, and Wolfgang Köhler. Phenomenological psychologists have also figured prominently in the history of the humanistic psychology movement.

The experiencing subject can be considered to be the person or self, for purposes of convenience. In phenomenological philosophy (and in particular in the work of Husserl, Heidegger, and Merleau-Ponty), "experience" is a considerably more complex concept than it is usually taken to be in everyday use. Instead, experience (or being, or existence itself) is an "in-relation-to" phenomenon, and it is defined by qualities of directedness, embodiment, and worldliness, which are evoked by the term "Being-in-the-World".

The quality or nature of a given experience is often referred to by the term qualia, whose archetypical exemplar is "redness". For example, we might ask, "Is my experience of redness the same as yours?" While it is difficult to answer such a question in any concrete way, the concept of intersubjectivity is often used as a mechanism for understanding how it is that humans are able to empathise with one another's experiences, and indeed to engage in meaningful communication about them. The phenomenological formulation of Being-in-the-World, where person and world are mutually constitutive, is central here.
Difficulties in considering subjective phenomena

The philosophical psychology prevalent before the end of the 19th century relied heavily on introspection. The speculations concerning the mind based on those observations were criticized by the pioneering advocates of a more scientific approach to psychology, such as William James and the behaviorists Edward Thorndike, Clark Hull, John B. Watson, and B. F. Skinner. However, not everyone agrees that introspection is intrinsically problematic, such as Francisco Varela, who has trained experimental participants in the structured "introspection" of phenomenological reduction.\[4\]

In the early 1970's, Amedeo Giorgi applied phenomenological theory to his development of the Descriptive Phenomenological Method in Psychology in order to overcome certain problems he perceived, from his work in psychophysics, with approaching subjective phenomena from the traditional hypothetical-deductive framework of the natural sciences. Giorgi hoped to use what he had learned from his natural science background to develop a rigorous qualitative research method. Giorgi has thus described his overall project as such: "[Phenomenological psychology] is nothing like natural sciences... because its [dealing with] human experiences and human phenomena. [However] I want to be sure that our criteria is this: that every natural scientist will have to respect our method. I'm not just trying to satisfy clinicians, or therapists, or humanists, I'm trying to satisfy the most severe criterion—natural scientists... because I anticipate that some day, when qualitative research develops and gets strong, the natural science people are going to criticize it. And I want to be able to stand up and say, 'Go ahead, criticize it—but you won't find any flaws here'."\[5\]

Philosophers have long confronted the problem of "qualia". Few philosophers believe that it is possible to be sure that one person's experience of the "redness" of an object is the same as another person's, even if both persons had effectively identical genetic and experiential histories.\[citation needed\] In principle, the same difficulty arises in feelings (the subjective experience of emotion), in the experience of effort, and especially in the "meaning" of concepts.\[citation needed\] As a result, many qualitative psychologists have claimed phenomenological inquiry to be essentially a matter of "meaning-making" and thus a question to be addressed by interpretive approaches.\[3\]\[6\]

Psychotherapy and the phenomenology of emotion

Carl Rogers' person-centered psychotherapy theory is based directly on the "phenomenal field" personality theory of Combs and Snygg.\[7\]\[8\] That theory in turn was grounded in phenomenological thinking.\[9\] Rogers attempts to put a therapist in closer contact with a person by listening to the person's report of their recent subjective experiences, especially emotions of which the person is not fully aware. For example, in relationships the problem at hand is often not based around what actually happened but, instead, based around the perceptions and feelings of each individual in the relationship. The phenomenal field focuses on "how one feels right now".

References

**Intersubjectivity**

*Intersubjectivity* is a key term used in philosophy, psychology, sociology, and anthropology to conceptualize the psychological relation between people. It is usually used in contrast to solipsistic individual experience, emphasizing our inherently social being.

**Definition**

The term has been defined in at least three ways.\(^1\)

1. First, in its weakest sense intersubjectivity refers to agreement. There is *intersubjectivity* between people if they agree on a given set of meanings or a definition of the situation. For example, Thomas Scheff defines intersubjectivity as "the sharing of subjective states by two or more individuals."\(^2\)

2. Second, and more subtly intersubjectivity refers to the "common-sense,” shared meanings constructed by people in their interactions with each other and used as an everyday resource to interpret the meaning of elements of social and cultural life. If people share common sense, then they share a definition of the situation.\(^3\)

3. Third, the term has been used to refer to shared (or partially shared) divergences of meaning. Self-presentation, lying, practical jokes, and social emotions, for example, all entail not a shared definition of the situation, but partially shared divergences of meaning. Someone who is telling a lie is engaged in an intersubjective act because they are working with two different definitions of the situation. Lying is thus genuinely inter-subjective (in the sense of operating between two subjective definitions of reality).

Intersubjectivity emphasizes that shared cognition and consensus is essential in the shaping of our ideas and relations. Language, quintessentially, is viewed as communal rather than private. Therefore, it is problematic to view the individual as partaking in a private world, one which has a meaning defined apart from any other subjects. But in our shared divergence from a commonly understood experience, these private worlds of semi-solipsism naturally emerge.

Intersubjectivity can also be understood as the process of psychological energy moving between two or more subjects. In a room where someone is lying on their deathbed, for example, the room can appear to be enveloped in a shroud of gloom for other people interacting with the dying person. The psychological weight of one subject comes to bear on the minds of others depending on how they react to it, thereby creating an intersubjective experience that, without multiple consciousnesses interacting with each other, would be otherwise strictly solitary. Love is a prime example of intersubjectivity that implies a shared feeling of care and affection, among others.

**In psychoanalysis**

Intersubjectivity is an important concept in modern schools of psychoanalysis, where it has found application to the theory of the interrelations between analyst and analysand. Adopting an intersubjective perspective in psychoanalysis means, above all, to give up what Robert Stolorow and George E. Atwood define as "the myth of isolated mind."\(^4\) In Stolorow, Atwood, and Orange's "intersubjective-systems theory," "intersubjective" refers not to the sharing of subjective states but to the constitution of psychological systems or fields in the interplay of differently organized experiential worlds. In their view, emotional experience always takes form within such intersubjective systems.

Among the early authors who explored this conception in psychoanalysis, in an explicit or implicit way, were Heinz Kohut, Robert Stolorow, George E. Atwood, Jessica Benjamin in the United States and Silvia Montefoschi in Italy. Since the late 1980s, a direction in psychoanalysis often referred to as relational psychoanalysis or just relational theory has developed. A central person figure in the theory is Daniel Stern.\(^5\) Empirically, the intersubjective school is inspired by research on the non-verbal communication of infants, young children, and their parents.\(^6\)\(^7\) A central question is how relational issues are communicated at a very fast pace in a non-verbal fashion. Scholars also stress
the importance of real relationships between two equivalent partners. The journal Psychoanalytic Dialogues is devoted to relational psychoanalysis.

**In philosophy**

Intersubjectivity is a major topic in philosophy. The duality of self and other has long been contemplated by philosophers, and what it means to have an intersubjective experience, and what sort of lessons can be drawn from them. Ethics, for example, deals with how one should act and what one owes in an intersubjective experience where there is an identifiable other.

**Phenomenology**

In phenomenology, intersubjectivity performs many functions. It allows empathy, which in phenomenology involves experiencing another person as a subject rather than just as an object among objects. In so doing, one experiences oneself as seen by the Other, and the world in general as a shared world instead of one only available to oneself. Early studies on the phenomenology of intersubjectivity were done by Edmund Husserl, the founder of phenomenology. His student, Edith Stein, extended the concept and its basis in empathy in her 1917 doctoral dissertation *On the Problem of Empathy* (*Zum Problem der Einfühlung*).

Intersubjectivity also helps in the constitution of objectivity: in the experience of the world as available not only to oneself, but also to the Other, there is a bridge between the personal and the shared, the self and the Others.

**In Psychology**

Studies of dialogue and dialogism have revealed how language is deeply intersubjective. When we speak, we always address our interlocutors, taking their perspective, and orienting to what we think they think (or more usually don’t think). Within this tradition of research it has been argued that the structure of individual signs or symbols, the basis of language, are intersubjective and that the psychological process of self-reflection entails intersubjectivity. Recent research on mirror neurons provides evidence for the deeply intersubjective basis of human psychology, and arguably much of the literature on empathy and theory of mind relate directly to intersubjectivity.

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Further reading

In psychoanalysis


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External links

- Critique of intersubjectivity (http://home7.swipnet.se/~w-73784/intersubj.htm) Article by Mats Winther
- Edmund Husserl: Empathy, intersubjectivity and lifeworld (http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/husserl/EmpIntLif), Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
Alfred Schütz

**Outline**

- Theory
- History
- Positivism
- Antipositivism
- Functionalism
- Conflict theories
- Middle-range
- Mathematical
- Critical theory
- Socialization
- Structure and agency

**Research methods**

- Quantitative
- Qualitative
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- Ethnographic
- Network-analytic

**Topics**

- Anomie
- Cities
- Class

**Sociology**

### Alfred Schütz

**Born**  
April 13, 1899  
Vienna, Austria-Hungary

**Died**  
May 20, 1959 (aged 60)  
New York City, New York

**Institutions**  
The New School

**Alma mater**  
The University of Vienna

**Known for**  
Social phenomenology

**Influences**  
Ludwig von Mises, Henri Bergson, William James, Edmund Husserl, Max Weber

**Influenced**  
Peter Ludwig Berger, Thomas Luckmann, Harold Garfinkel, David Sudnow, Dan Zahavi
Alfred Schütz (13 April 1899 – 20 May 1959) was an Austrian social scientist, whose work bridged sociological and phenomenological traditions to form a social phenomenology, and who is "gradually achieving recognition as one of the foremost philosophers of social science of the [twentieth] century".[1] Schütz "attempted to relate the thought of Edmund Husserl to the social world and the social sciences. His Phenomenology of the Social World supplied philosophical foundations for Max Weber's sociology and for economics."[2]

**Biography**

Schütz was born in Vienna, Austria into an upper-middle class family as an only child. He studied law and business at the University of Vienna where he received his degree in law. He worked as an international lawyer for Reitler and Company, and moved to the United States in 1939, where he became a member of the faculty of The New School. He taught sociology and philosophy as well as serving as chair of the Philosophy department. Schütz died in New York City at the age of 60.[3] His primary focuses were concentrated on phenomenology, social science methodology and the philosophy of Edmund Husserl, William James and others.

Schütz is unique as a scholar of the social sciences in that he pursued a career as a lawyer for an Austrian banking firm for almost his entire life, teaching part-time at the New School for Social Research in New York and producing
key papers in phenomenological sociology that fill three volumes (published by Nijhoff, The Hague).

**Work**

Schütz’s principal task was to create a philosophical foundation for the social sciences. He was strongly influenced by Ludwig von Mises, Henri Bergson, William James, and Edmund Husserl. Contrary to common belief, George Herbert Mead - whose ‘concern with the analysis of meaning in social interaction paralleled that of Schütz, although it had been arrived at by a completely different road’ was of little importance for Schütz, who was very critical of his behavioristic approach. Although Schütz was never a student of Husserl, he, together with a colleague, Felix Kaufmann, studied Husserl’s work intensively in seeking a basis for interpretive sociology derived from the work of Max Weber. This work and its continuation resulted in 1932 in his first book, *Der sinnhafte Aufbau der sozialen Welt* (literally, *The meaningful construction of the social world*, but published in English as *The phenomenology of the social world*). The publication brought him to the attention of Husserl, whom he ‘frequently thereafter visited’; but ‘although he corresponded with Husserl until the latter’s death [in 1938], he was unable for personal reasons to accept the offer to become his assistant’ at Freiburg University.

Schütz’s main concerns were with the way in which people grasp the consciousness of others while they live within their own stream of consciousness. He talked much about intersubjectivity but in a larger sense. He used it to mean a concern with the social world, specifically the social nature of knowledge. A great deal of his work deals with the "life world". Within this, people create social reality as well as they are constrained by the preexisting factors and structures that are in place both socially and culturally. He was very focused on the "dialectical relationship between the way people construct social reality and the obdurate social and cultural reality that they inherit from those who preceded them in the social world".

Schütz’s writings had a lasting impact on sociology, both on phenomenological approaches to sociology (especially through the work of Thomas Luckmann and Peter L. Berger) and in ethnomethodology through the writings of Harold Garfinkel. Luckmann was heavily influenced by Schütz’s work. Luckmann, a student of Schutz (along with Peter L. Berger), ultimately finished Schütz’s work on the Structures of the Lifeworld after Schutz died by filling out his unfinished notes. Berger and Luckmann went on to use Schütz’s work to further understand human culture and reality.

**Phenomenology**

Phenomenology originated with Edmund Husserl. Schütz became friends with Husserl and soon after began working on this concept. Phenomenology is the study of things as they appear (phenomena). It is also often said to be descriptive rather than explanatory: a central task of phenomenology is to provide a clear, undistorted description of the ways things appear.

**The Lifeworld**

In this world of everyday life, "people both create social reality and are constrained by the preexisting social and cultural structures created by their predecessors." Within this world, relationships between the social and natural world are what come into doubt. There is this existence of meaning which comes into play yet most people simply accept the world how it is and never second guess the concept or problem of meaning. Schütz delves even more into specific relationships such as the difference between intimate face-to-face relationships and distant and impersonal relationships.
The four divisions of the lifeworld

'Schütz is, according to Natanson, "phenomenology's spokesman of the Lebenswelt"...the mundane lifeworld,'[11] which he divided into four distinct subworlds in what has been called 'the crux of Schütz's theoretical contribution. He believes that our social experience makes up a vast world...distinguish[d] between directly experienced social reality and a social reality lying beyond the horizon of direct experience'.[12] The former consisted of the Umwelt of what Schütz termed "consociates" or "fellow-men" - of the man who 'shares with me a community of space and a community of time'.[13]

By contrast, 'those who I am not directly perceiving fall into three classes. First comes the world of my contemporaries (Mitwelt), then the world of my predecessors (Vorwelt), and finally the world of my successors (Folgewelt).[12] The last two represent the past and the future, whereas one's contemporaries share a community of time, if not space, and 'are distinguished from the other two by the fact that it is in principle possible for them to become my consociates'.[12]

Schütz was interested in mapping 'the transition from direct to indirect experience...as two poles between which stretches a continuous series of experiences',[14] as well as in what he called the progressive anonymisation of the Mitwelt: a 'scale of increasing anonymity. There is, for instance, my absent friend, his brother whom he has described to me, the professor whose books I have read, the postal clerk, the Canadian Parliament, abstract entities like Canada herself, the rules of English grammar, or the basic principles of jurisprudence'.[15] For Schütz, 'the further out we go into the world of contemporaries, the more anonymous its inhabitants become', ending with the most anonymous of all - 'artifacts of any kind which bear witness to the subjective meaning-context of some unknown person',[16] but nothing more.

In his later writings, Schütz explored the way that 'in social situations of everyday life relations pertaining to all these dimensions are frequently intertwined...in various degrees of anonymity'.[17] Thus for instance, 'if in a face-to-face relationship with a friend I discuss a magazine article dealing with the attitude of the President and Congress toward...China...I am in a relationship not only with the perhaps anonymous contemporary writer of the article but also with the contemporary individual or collective actors on the social scene designated by the terms "President", "Congress", "China"'.[18]

Biographies


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Lifeworld

Lifeworld (German Lebenswelt) may be conceived as a universe of what is self-evident or given,[1] a world that subjects may experience together.[2] For Husserl, the lifeworld is the fundament for all epistemological enquiries. The concept has its origin in biology and cultural Protestantism.[3][4]

The lifeworld concept is used in philosophy and in some social sciences, particularly sociology. The concept emphasizes a state of affairs in which the world is experienced, the world is lived (German erlebt). The lifeworld is a pre-epistemological stepping stone for phenomenological analysis in the Husserlian tradition.

The phenomenological concept of lifeworld

Edmund Husserl introduced the concept of the lifeworld in his Crisis of European Sciences (1936):

In whatever way we may be conscious of the world as universal horizon, as coherent universe of existing objects, we, each "I-the-man" and all of us together, belong to the world as living with one another in the world; and the world is our world, valid for our consciousness as existing precisely through this 'living together.' We, as living in wakeful world-consciousness, are constantly active on the basis of our passive having of the world... Obviously this is true not only for me, the individual ego; rather we, in living together, have the world pre-given in this together, belong, the world as world for all, pre-given with this ontic meaning... The we-subjectivity... [is] constantly functioning.[5]

This collective inter-subjective pool of perceiving, Husserl explains, is both universally present and, for humanity's purposes, capable of arriving at 'objective truth,' or at least as close to objectivity as possible.[6] The 'lifeworld' is a grand theatre of objects variously arranged in space and time relative to perceiving subjects, is already-always there, and is the "ground" for all shared human experience.[7] Husserl's formulation of the lifeworld was also influenced by Wilhelm Dilthey's "life-nexus" (German Lebenszusammenhang) and Martin Heidegger's Being-in-the-world[citation needed] (German In-der-Welt-Sein). The concept was further developed by students of Husserl such as Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Jan Patočka, and Alfred Schütz. The lifeworld can be thought of as the horizon of all our experiences, in the sense that it is that background on which all things appear as themselves and meaningful. The lifeworld cannot, however, be understood in a purely static manner; it isn't an unchangeable background, but rather a dynamic horizon in which we live, and which "lives with us" in the sense that nothing can appear in our lifeworld except as lived.

The concept represented a turning point in Husserl's phenomenology from the tradition of Descartes and Kant. Up until then, Husserl had been focused on finding, elucidating, and explaining an absolute foundation of philosophy in consciousness, without any presuppositions except what can be found through the reflective analysis of consciousness and what is immediately present to it. Originally, all judgments of the real were to be "bracketed" or suspended, and then analyzed to bring to light the role of consciousness in constituting or constructing them. With the concept of the lifeworld, however, Husserl embarked on a different path, which recognizes that, even at its deepest level, consciousness is already embedded in and operating in a world of meanings and pre-judgements that are socially, culturally, and historically constituted. Phenomenology thereby became the study not just of the pure consciousness and meanings of a transcendental ego, as in Husserl's earlier work, but of consciousness and meaning in context. The lifeworld is one of the more complicated concepts in phenomenology, mainly because of its status as both personal and intersubjective.

Even if a person's historicity is intimately tied up with his lifeworld, and each person thus has a lifeworld, this doesn't necessarily mean that the lifeworld is a purely individual phenomenon. In keeping with the phenomenological notion of intersubjectivity, the lifeworld can be intersubjective even though each individual necessarily carries his own "personal" lifeworld ("homeworld"); meaning is intersubjectively accessible, and can be communicated (shared by one's "homecomrades"). However, a homeworld is also always limited by an alienworld.
The internal "meanings" of this alienworld can be communicated, but can never be apprehended as alien; the alien can only be appropriated or assimilated into the lifeworld, and only understood on the background of the lifeworld.

The sociological concept of lifeworld

The Husserlian elucidation of lifeworld provided a starting point for the phenomenological sociology of Alfred Schütz, who tried to synthesize Husserl's phenomenology of consciousness, meaning, and the life-world with Max Weber's sociology and its focus on subjectively meaningful action. Jürgen Habermas has further developed the concept of the lifeworld in his social theory. For Habermas, the lifeworld is more or less the "background" environment of competences, practices, and attitudes representable in terms of one's cognitive horizon. Compared to Husserl with his focus on consciousness, however, Habermas, whose social theory is grounded in communication, focuses on the lifeworld as consisting of socially and culturally sedimented linguistic meanings. It is the lived realm of informal, culturally-grounded understandings and mutual accommodations. Rationalization and colonization of the lifeworld by the instrumental rationality of bureaucracies and market-forces is a primary concern of Habermas's two-volume Theory of Communicative Action.

For Habermas, communicative action is governed by practical rationality – ideas of social importance are mediated through the process of linguistic communication according to the rules of practical rationality. By contrast, technical rationality governs systems of instrumentality, like industries, or on a larger scale, the capitalist economy or the democratic political government. Ideas of instrumental importance to a system are mediated according to the rules of that system (the most obvious example is the capitalist economy's use of currency). Self-deception, and thus systematically distorted communication, is possible only when the lifeworld has been 'colonized' by instrumental rationality, so some social norm comes into existence and enjoys legitimate power even though it is not justifiable. This occurs when means of mediating instrumental ideas gains communicative power – as when someone pays a group of people to stay quiet during a public debate, or if financial or administrative resources are used to advertise some social viewpoint. When people take the resulting consensus as normatively relevant, the lifeworld has been colonized and communication has been systematically distorted. The 'colonization' metaphor is used because the use of steering media to arrive at social consensus is not native to the lifeworld—the decision-making processes of the systems world must encroach on the lifeworld in a way that is in a sense imperialistic:

"When stripped of their ideological veils, the imperatives of autonomous subsystems make their way into the lifeworld from the outside—like colonial masters coming into a tribal society—and force a process of assimilation upon it. The diffused perspectives of the local culture cannot be sufficiently coordinated to permit the play of the metropolis and the world market to be grasped from the periphery. [8]"

The fragmentation of consciousness associated with the two Marxist concepts of alienation and false consciousness illustrate why, in Habermas' perspective, they are merely special cases of the more general phenomenon of lifeworld colonization.

Social coordination and systemic regulation occur by means of shared practices, beliefs, values, and structures of communicative interaction, which may be institutionally based. We are inevitably lifeworldly, such that individuals and interactions draw from custom and cultural traditions to construct identities, define situations, coordinate action, and create social solidarity. Ideally this occurs by communicatively coming to understanding (German Verstehen), but it also occurs through pragmatic negotiations (compare: Seidman, 1997:197).

The lifeworld is related to further concepts such as Pierre Bourdieu's notion of habitus and to the sociological notion of everyday life.
The epistemological concept of lifeworld

In the course of recent constructivist discourses a discussion about the lifeworld term took place as well. Björn Kraus' systemic-constructivist version of the lifeworld term considers its phenomenological roots (Husserl and Schütz), but expands it within the range of epistemological constructivist theory building. Therefore is Kraus' basic assumption that cognitive development depends on two determining factors. On the one hand side a person's own reality is her subjective construct. On the other hand side, this construct — in spite of all subjectivity — is not random: Since a person is still linked to her environment, her own reality is influenced by the conditions of this environment (German Grundsätzliche Doppelbindung menschlicher Strukturentwicklung). Building up on this point of view, a separation of individual perception and the social and material environmental conditions is made possible. Kraus accordingly picks up the lifeworld term, adds the term „life conditions“ (German Lebenslage) and opposes the two terms to each other.

By this means, lifeworld describes a person's subjectively experienced world, whereas life conditions describe the person's actual circumstances in life. Accordingly, it could be said that a person's lifeworld is built depending on their particular life conditions. More precisely, the life conditions include the material and immaterial living circumstances as for example employment situation, availability of material resources, housing conditions, social environment (friends, foes, acquaintances, relatives, etc.) as well as the persons physical condition (fat/thin, tall/small, female/male, healthy/sick, etc.). The lifeworld, in contrast, describes the subjective perception of these conditions.

Kraus uses the epistemological distinction between subjective reality and objective reality. Thus, a person's lifeworld correlates with the person's life conditions in the same way than subjective reality correlates with objective reality. The one is the insurmountable, subjective construct built depending on the other one's conditions. This contrasting comparison provides a conceptual specification, enabling in the first step the distinction between a subjectively experienced world and its material and social conditions and allowing in the second step to focus on these conditions' relevance for the subjective construction of reality.

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[1] The given (http://www.iep.utm.edu/e/epis-per.htm) further explained
[2] Intersubjectivity#Definition
[3] In: a German fin-de-siècle movement, which questioned the church hierarchy and sought to combine protestant and scientific beliefs (Treitel, 2000)
Further reading


Ethnomethodology
Ethnomethodology is an approach to sociological inquiry introduced by the American sociologist Harold Garfinkel. Ethnomethodology's research interest is the study of the everyday methods that people use for the production of social order (Garfinkel:2002). Ethnomethodology's goal is to document the methods and practices through which society's members make sense of their world.\[1\]

**Definition**

This particular approach in sociology is closely related to applications and approaches employed by researchers of ethnology, ethnobotany, ethnophysiology, and ethnomusicology. According to Garfinkel, ethnomethodology is an appropriate term for the study of, “a member's knowledge of his ordinary affairs, of his own organized enterprises, where that knowledge is treated by us [as researchers] as part of the same setting that makes it orderable.”\[2\] According to Anne Rawls [editor of Garfinkel's Nachlass] ethno+method+ology means the study of members' methods for producing recognizable social order/s\[3\]
Example

Investigating the conduct of jury members, an ethnomethodologist would seek to describe the common sense methods through which members of a jury produce themselves in a jury room as jurors: methods for establishing matters of fact; methods for developing evidence chains; methods for determining the reliability of witness testimony; methods for establishing the hierarchy of speakers in the jury room; methods for determining the guilt or innocence of defendants, etc. (see Garfinkel:1967). Such methods, taken individually, in combination, or collectively, depending on the scope of the investigation, would serve to constitute the social order of being a juror for the participants, and researcher(s), in that specific social setting [see below: "Some leading policies...": "Social Orders"]). For the ethnomethodologist, participants bring order to social settings - make them orderable - through the sense making activities of their shared methods and practices as witnessably enacted in those settings.

In this way, ethnomethodology points to a broad and multi-faceted area of inquiry. John Heritage writes, "In it's open-ended reference to [the study of] any kind of sense-making procedure, the term represents a signpost to a domain of uncharted dimensions rather than a staking out of a clearly delineated territory."[4]

Origins of ethnomethodology

Theoretical concerns, influences and resources used in the development of ethnomethodology include: traditional sociological concerns, especially the Parsonian [Talcott Parsons], "Problem of Order"; traditional sociological theory and methods, primarily Parsons, Emile Durkheim, and Max Weber; Aron Gurwitsch's phenomenological field theory of consciousness / Gestalt Psychology; the Transcendental Phenomenology of Edmund Husserl; Alfred Schutz's Phenomenology of the Natural Attitude; Maurice Merleau-Ponty's phenomenology of embodiment, Martin Heidegger's phenomenology of being / Existential Phenomenology; and Ludwig Wittgenstein's investigations regarding ordinary language use (Heritage: 1986; Garfinkel: 2002).

Anne Rawls provides a brief developmental history of Garfinkel, and ethnomethodology, in "Ethnomethodology's Program" (Rawls/Garfinkel: 2002).

Theory and methods

One of the most perplexing problems for those new to ethnomethodology is the discovery that it lacks both a formally stated theory and a formal methodology. As serious as these problems might appear on the face of it, neither has prevented ethnomethodologists from doing ethnomethodological studies, and generating a substantial literature of "findings", [5]

John Heritage has noted the, "off-stage role of theory", in ethnomethodological writings, and the concern that there is nowhere in the ethnomethodological corpus a systematic theoretical statement that would serve as a touchstone for ethnomethodological inquiries. [6]

Instead, as in the case of, Studies in Ethnomethodology (1967), we are given oblique theoretical references to: Wittgenstein [Ordinary Language Philosophy]; Husserl [Transcendental Phenomenology]; Gurwitsch [Phenomenology/Gestalt Theory]; the works of the social phenomenologist Alfred Schutz [Phenomenology of the Natural Attitude]; and an assortment of traditional social theorists generally appearing as antipodes and/or sounding boards for ethnomethodological ideas.

Likewise in, Ethnomethodology's Program (2002), we again find a multiplicity of theoretical references, including the usual suspects from Studies, and introducing among others [Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty, etc.], a key theoretical statement by Emile Durkheim regarding the objectivity of social facts, and a key insight into ethnomethodology's way of doing theory.

This statement by Durkheim, although not a fully worked out theory or directive in its original form, or conceived as an aphorism for that matter, becomes, in the hands of Garfinkel, a theoretical directive - an "aphorism" - regarding both the object of ethnomethodological studies, and the focus of ethnomethodological description. For this
interpretation, Garfinkel "appropriates" Durkheim's statement, "misreads" it ethnomethodologically (2002:112:fn#36 / see below: "Some leading policies...": "Misreading [A text]"), and transforms its meaning through its "respecification" into an ethnomethodologically useful directive for ethnomethodological studies.

Durkheim's statement: "...our basic principle, that of the objective reality of social facts. It is...upon this principle that in the end everything rests, and everything comes back to it" (Durkheim:1895:45 - as cited from Rawls/Garfinkel:2002:2:fn#2).


"Misreading" Durkheim's statement in the context of, as juxtaposed to, or read against, the fundamental assumption of ethnomethodological studies [see below: "Some leading policies..."], produces an ethnomethodological "respecification" of Durkheim's statement [a rationale w/a strictly textual reading is also offered (Rawls/Garfinkel:2002:19-22; Garfinkel:2002:118-119:fn#46)].

Garfinkel writes: "Ethnomethodology's fundamental phenomenon and it's standing technical preoccupation in its studies is to find, collect, specify, and make instructably observable the local endogenous production and natural accountability of immortal familiar society's most ordinary organizational things in the world, and to provide for them both and simultaneously, as objects, and procedurally, as alternate methods" (Garfinkel:2002:124).

"Durkheim's aphorism", now ethnomethodologically respecified, directs us to account for this, "objective reality of social facts" (Durkheim), these, "organizational things in the world" (Garfinkel), as, social "objects", and their, in situ "methods" of production; that is, in terms of their factual status as, "organizational things in the world", and simultaneously, as methodic achievements by real individuals in actual social settings.

This, in a nutshell, becomes the central tenet of ethnomethodology's research program: "working out Durkheim's aphorism" (2002:118-119:fn#46). Rawls states: "According to Garfinkel, the result of Ethnomethodological studies is the fulfillment of Durkheim's promise that the objective reality of social facts is sociology's fundamental principle" (Rawls/Garfinkel:2002:9). As such, ethnomethodology's programmatic directive becomes, "...to restore Sociology to the pursuit of Durkheim's aphorism, through an insistence on the concreteness of things [as opposed to theoretical and conceptual constructionism (see Garfinkel:2002:50-52)], and on the claim that the concreteness of things necessarily depends on, and is produced in and through, complex mutually recognizable practices enacted by participants in social scenes" (Rawls/Garfinkel:2002:2).

Such a reading serves to locate ethnomethodology firmly in the sociological tradition, if not de facto serving to appropriate that tradition [despite periodic declarations to the contrary], and serves as an example of ethnomethodological theorizing, but it does not in itself, or combined with any or all of the other references, constitute a unified theoretical statement in any traditional sense.

The larger point here is that the authors and theoretical references cited in Garfinkel's work do not themselves serve as a rigorous theoretical underpinning for ethnomethodology, in whole or in part. Ethnomethodology is not Durkheimian, although it shares some of the interests of Durkheim; it is not a form of phenomenology, although it borrows from Husserl and Schutz's studies of the Lifeworld [Lebenswelt]; it is not a form of Gestalt theory, although it describes social orders as having Gestalt-like properties; and, it is not a version of Wittgenstein's Ordinary Language Analysis, although it makes use of Wittgenstein's understanding of rule-use, etc.

Instead, these borrowings are only fragmentary references to theoretical works from which ethnomethodology has "appropriated", "misread", and/or, "respecified", the theoretical ideas of others for the expressed purposes of doing ethnomethodological investigations.

In terms of the question of ethnomethodological methods, it is the position of Anne Rawls, speaking for Garfinkel, that ethnomethodology is itself not a method. That is, it does not have a set of formal research methods or procedures. Instead, the position taken is that ethnomethodologists have conducted their studies in a variety of
ways, and that the point of these investigations is, "...to discover the things that persons in particular situations do, the methods they use, to create the patterned orderliness of social life".

As Rawls states: "Ethnomethodology...is not a methodology, but rather a study of methodology" (Rawls/Garfinkel:2002:122:fn.#3). That is, it does not have a formal methodology, but is the study of, "member's methods", the methods of others (Garfinkel:2002:72-73). Michael Lynch has also noted that: "Leading figures in the field have repeatedly emphasized that there is no obligatory set of methods [employed by ethnomethodologists], and no prohibition against using any research procedure whatsoever, if it is adequate to the particular phenomena under study" (Lynch:1988; see Garfinkel:2002:175-176, Wieder/Garfinkel:1992:175-206).

Again, as perplexing as this position might seem to a traditional social scientist, such a proposition is consistent with ethnomethodology's understanding of "member's methods", and has philosophical standing when looked at in terms of certain lines of philosophical thought regarding the philosophy of science (Polyani:1974; Kuhn:1996; Feyerabend:1975/2010), and the study of the actual practices of scientific procedure (Lynch:1993).

Some leading policies, methods and definitions

- **The Fundamental Assumption of Ethnomethodological Studies.** As characterized by Anne Rawls, speaking for Garfinkel: "If one assumes, as Garfinkel does, that the meaningful, patterned, and orderly character of everyday life is something that people must work to achieve, then one must also assume that they have some methods for doing so". That is, "...members of society must have some shared methods that they use to mutually construct the meaningful orderliness of social situations" (Rawls/Garfinkel: 2002:6).

- **Ethnomethodology is an Empirical Enterprise.** Rawls states: "Ethnomethodology is a thoroughly empirical enterprise devoted to the discovery of social order and intelligibility [sense making] as witnessable collective achievements." "The keystone of the [Ethnomethodological] argument is that local [social] orders exist; that these orders are witnessable in the scenes in which they are produced; and that the possibility of [their] intelligibility is based on the actual existence and detailed enactment of these orders" (Rawls:2000:146).

- **Ethnomethodological Indifference.** This is the policy of deliberate agnosticism, or indifference, towards the dictates, prejudices, methods and practices of sociological analysis as traditionally conceived (examples: theories of "deviance", analysis of behavior as rule governed, role theory, institutional (de)formations, theories of social stratification, etc.). Dictates and prejudices which serve to pre-structure traditional social scientific investigations independently of the subject matter taken as a topic of study, or the investigatory setting being subjected to scrutiny. The policy of ethnomethodological indifference is specifically not to be conceived of as indifference to the problem of social order taken as a group [member's] concern.

- **First Time Through.** This is the practice of attempting to describe any social activity, regardless of its routine or mundane appearance, as if it were happening for the very first time. This is in an effort to expose how the observer of the activity assembles, or constitutes, the activity for the purposes of formulating any particular description. The point of such an exercise is to make available and underline the complexities of sociological analysis and description, particularly the indexical and reflexive properties of the actors', or observer's, own descriptions of what is taking place in any given situation. Such an activity will also reveal the observer's inescapable reliance on the hermeneutic circle as the defining "methodology" of social understanding for both lay persons and social scientists.

- **Breaching Experiment.** A method for revealing, or exposing, the common work that is performed by members of particular social groups in maintaining a clearly recognizable and shared social order. For example, driving the wrong way down a busy one-way street can reveal myriads of useful insights into the patterned social practices, and moral order, of the community of road users. The point of such an exercise is to demonstrate that gaining insight into the work involved in maintaining any given social order can often best be revealed by breaching that social order and observing the results of that breach - especially those activities related to the reassembly of that social order, and the normalization of that social setting.
• **Member’s Methods.** [Coming Soon].

• **Sacks’ Gloss.** A question about an aspect of the social order that recommends, as a method of answering it, that the researcher should seek out members of society who, in their daily lives, are responsible for the maintenance of that aspect of the social order. This is in opposition to the idea that such questions are best answered by a sociologist. Sacks' original question concerned objects in public places and how it was possible to see that such objects did or did not belong to somebody. He found his answer in the activities of police officers who had to decide whether cars were abandoned (see Garfinkel:2002:186-187).

• **Durkheim’s Aphorism.** Durkheim famously recommended: "...our basic principle, that of the objectivity of social facts" (Durkheim:1895/1982:S.45 - as cited in Garfinkel/Rawls:2002:2:fn#2). This is usually taken to mean that we should assume the objectivity of social facts as a principle of study (thus providing the basis of sociology as a science). Garfinkel's alternative reading of Durkheim is that we should treat the objectivity of social facts as an achievement of society's members, and make the achievement process itself the focus of study. An ethnomethodological respecification of Durkheim's statement via a "misreading" [see below] of his quote appears above. There is also a textual link/rationale provided in the literature (Rawls/Garfinkel:2002:ppgs.19-22). Both links involve a leap of faith on the part of the reader; that is, we don't believe that one method for this interpretation is necessarily better than the other, or that one form of justification for such an interpretation outweighs its competitor.

• **Accounts.** Accounts are the ways members signify, describe or explain the properties of a specific social situation. They can consist of both verbal and non-verbal objectifications. They are always both indexical to the situation in which they occur [see below], and, simultaneously reflexive - they serve to constitute that situation. An account can consist of something as simple as a wink of the eye, a material object evidencing a state of affairs [documents, etc.], or something as complex as a story detailing the boundaries of the universe.

• **Indexicality.** The concept of Indexicality is a key core concept for Ethnomethodology. Garfinkel states that it was derived from the concept of indexical expressions appearing in ordinary language philosophy (1967), wherein a statement is considered to be indexical as it is dependent for its sense upon the context in which it is embedded (Bar-Hillel:1954:359-379). The phenomenon is acknowledged in various forms of analytical philosophy, and sociological theory and methods, but is considered to be both limited in scope and remedied through specification [operationalization]. In ethnomethodology, the phenomenon is universalized to all forms of language and behavior, and is deemed to be beyond remedy for the purposes of establishing a scientific description and explanation of social behavior.[15][16] The consequence of the degree of contextual dependence for a "segment" of talk or behavior can range from the problem of establishing a "working consensus" regarding the description of a phrase, concept or behavior, to the end-game of social scientific description itself. Note that any serious development of the concept must eventually assume a theory of meaning as its foundation [see Gurwitsch:1985]. Without such a foundational underpinning, both the traditional social scientist and the ethnomethodologist are relegated to merely telling stories around the campfire.[17]

• **Misreading [A text].** Misreading a text, or fragments of a text, does not denote making an erroneous reading of a text in whole or in part. As Garfinkel states, it means to denote an, "alternate reading", of a text or fragment of a text. As such, the original and its misreading do not, "...translate point to point", but, "...instead, they go together" (Garfinkel:2002:112:fn#36). No criteria are offered for the translation of an original text and its misreading - the outcome of such translations are in Garfinkel's term: "incommensurable" (Garfinkel:2002:112:fn#36). The misreading of texts or fragments of texts is a standard feature of ethnomethodology's way of doing theory, especially in regards to topics in phenomenology.

• **Reflexivity.** Despite the fact that many sociologists use "reflexivity" as a synonym for "self-reflection," the way the term is used in ethnomethodology is different: it is meant "to describe the acausal and non-mentalistic determination of meaningful action-in-context."[18] (See also reflexivity (social theory).)
• **Documentary Method of Interpretation.** The Documentary Method is the method of understanding utilized by everyone engaged in trying to make sense of their social world - this includes the ethnomethodologist. Garfinkel recovered the concept from the work of Karl Mannheim and repeatedly demonstrates the use of the method in the case studies appearing in his central text, Studies in Ethnomethodology (1967). Mannheim defined the term as a search for an identical homologous pattern of meaning underlying a variety of totally different realizations of that meaning. Garfinkel states that the documentary method of interpretation consists of treating an actual appearance as the "document of", "as pointing to", as "standing on behalf of", a presupposed underlying pattern. These "documents" serve to constitute the underlying pattern, but are themselves interpreted on the basis of what is already known about that underlying pattern. This seeming paradox is quite familiar to hermeneuticians who understand this phenomenon as a version of the hemeneutic circle. This phenomenon is also subject to analysis from the perspective of Gestalt theory [part/whole relationships], and the phenomenological theory of perception.

• **Social Orders.** Theoretically speaking, the object of ethnomethodological research is social order taken as a group members’ concern. Methodologically, social order is made available for description in any specific social setting as an accounting of specific social orders: the sensible coherencies of accounts that order a specific social setting for the participants relative to a specific social project to be realized in that setting. Social orders themselves are made available for both participants and researchers through phenomena of order: the actual accounting of the partial [adumbrated] appearances of these sensibly coherent social orders. These appearances [parts, adumbrates] of social orders are embodied in specific accounts, and employed in a particular social setting by the members of the particular group of individuals party to that setting. Specific social orders have the same formal properties as identified by A. Gurwitsch in his discussion of the constituent features of perceptual noema, and, by extension, the same relationships of meaning described in his account of Gestalt Contextures (see Gurwitsch:1964:228-279/2010). As such, it is little wonder that Garfinkel states: "you can't do anything unless you do read his texts" (Garfinkel:2002:167).

• **Ethnomethodology's Field of Investigation.** For ethnomethodology the topic of study is the social practices of real people in real settings, and the methods by which these people produce and maintain a shared sense of social order.

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**Ethnomethodology and traditional sociology**

Core differences between traditional sociology and ethnomethodology are:

1. While traditional sociology usually offers an analysis of society which takes the facticity [factual character, objectivity] of the social order for granted, ethnomethodology is concerned with the procedures [practices, methods] by which that social order is produced, and shared.

2. While traditional sociology usually provides descriptions of social settings which compete with the actual descriptions offered by the individuals who are party to those settings, ethnomethodology seeks to describe the actual procedures [practices, methods] these individuals use in their actual descriptions of those settings.

3. While Structural Functionalist research programs methodically impose pre-existing analytical schemata on their fields of study; Symbolic Interactionist programs assume the facticity of the symbols being interpreted by actors party to social scenes; and various forms of Social Constructionism assume the objective character of the building blocks that make up their descriptions of social structures, and then work retrospectively to account for these social constructions in terms of a formal, predetermined conceptual apparatus; Ethnomethodology specifically avoids engaging with these types of taken-for-granted programmatic assumptions and descriptive resources in its descriptions of social scenes.

In contrast to traditional sociological forms of inquiry, it is a hallmark of the Ethnomethodological perspective that it does not make theoretical or methodological appeals to: outside assumptions regarding the structure of an actor or actors' characterization of social reality; refer to the subjective states of an individual or groups of individuals;
attribute conceptual projections such as, "value states", "sentiments", "goal orientations", "mini-max economic theories of behavior", etc., to any actor or group of actors; or posit a specific "normative order" as a transcendental feature of social scenes, etc.

For the Ethnomethodologist, the methodic realization of social scenes takes place within the actual setting under scrutiny, and is structured by the participants in that setting through the reflexive accounting of that setting's features. The job of the Ethnomethodologist is to describe the methodic character of these activities, not account for them in a way that transcends that which is made available in and through the actual accounting practices of the individual's party to those settings.

In 1967, Garfinkel states: Ethnomethodology's, "...central recommendation is that the activities whereby members produce and manage settings of organized everyday affairs are identical with member's procedures for making those settings 'account-able' "(1967:1).

Over thirty-five years later, Garfinkel states: "Phenomena of order are identical with [the] procedures for their endogenous production and accountability" (2002:72).

Although the language has changed, the message remains the same: social orders are identical with the procedures [practices, methods] members of a particular social group employ to produce and manage a particular setting of organized everyday affairs. These social orders are endogenous [generated from within the particular setting], and made available for study through the demonstrable [objectified, recognizable, embodied] accounting practices of the group members party to that particular setting.

These characters of particularity and embeddedness of the: social order, procedures [practices, methods], activities, accounts, and person's party to such settings are essential features of the ethnomethodological perspective, and clearly differentiate it from traditional sociological forms.

**Ethnomethodology and phenomenology**

Even though ethnomethodology has been characterized as having a "phenomenological sensibility", and reliable commentators have acknowledged that, "there is a strong influence of phenomenology on ethnomethodology..." (Maynard/Kardash:sociologyencyclopedia.com:1484), orthodox adherents to the discipline - those who follow the teachings of Garfinkel - know better than to represent it as a branch, or form, of phenomenology, or phenomenological sociology.

The confusion between the two disciplines stems, in part, from the practices of some ethnomethodologists [including Garfinkel], who sift through phenomenological texts, recovering phenomenological concepts and findings relevant to their interests, and then transpose these concepts and findings to topics in the study of social order. Such interpretive transpositions do not make the ethnomethodologist a phenomenologist, or ethnomethodology a form of phenomenology.

To further muddy the waters, some phenomenological sociologists seize upon ethnomethodological findings as examples of applied phenomenology; this even when the results of these ethnomethodological investigations clearly do not make use of phenomenological methods, or formulate their findings in the language of phenomenology. So called phenomenological analyses of social structures that do not have prima facie reference to any of the structures of intentional consciousness should raise questions as to the phenomenological status of such analyses.

Another way of convincing yourself of the difference between these two disciplines is to read, Studies in Ethnomethodology (1967), and try to find any reference to: a subject [other than experimental], consciousness, intentionality, or phenomenological methodology, etc. There are no such references. A phenomenological analysis should reflect phenomenological methods. This text clearly does not.

In, Ethnomethodology's Program (2002), Garfinkel speaks of phenomenological texts and findings as being, "appropriated", and intentionally, "misread" (2002:112:fn#36), for the purposes of exploring topics in the study of social order (2002:176-179; 255-258). These appropriations and methodical "misread[ings]" of phenomenological
texts and findings are clearly made for the purposes of furthering ethnomethodological analyses (2002:177), and should not be mistaken for logical extensions of these phenomenological texts and findings (2002:112:fn.#36).

Lastly, there is no claim in any of Garfinkel's work that ethnomethodology is a form of phenomenology, or phenomenological sociology. To state that ethnomethodology has a, "phenomenological sensibility", or that, "there is a strong influence of phenomenology on ethnomethodology", is not the equivalent of describing ethnomethodology as a form of phenomenology (see Garfinkel/Liberman:2007:3-7).

This having been said, one should also note that even though ethnomethodology is not a form of phenomenology, the reading and understanding of phenomenological texts, and developing the capability of seeing phenomenologically is essential to the actual doing of ethnomethodological studies. As Garfinkel states in regard to the work of the phenomenologist Aron Gurwitsch, especially his, "Field of Consciousness" (1964/2010: ethnomethodology's phenomenological urtext): 'you can't do anything unless you do read his texts" (Garfinkel:2002:167).

Ethnomethodology (EM) and conversation analysis (CA)

The relationship between EM and CA has always been somewhat contentious in terms of boundaries. The clearest single statement appearing in the literature, from an orthodox EM perspective, appears in Rawls' formulation spanning pages 40–41 of, Ethnomethodology's Program [Rawls/Garfinkel:2002].

Unpacking Rawls' statement, we can note two essential distinctions:

[1] In as much as the study of social orders is, "inexorably intertwined", with the constitutive features of talk about those social orders, EM is committed to an interest in both conversational talk, and the role this talk plays in the constitution of that order; think indexicality / reflexivity here and the essential embeddedness of talk in a specific social order, and the role of the reflexivity of accounts in the constitution of that order. It is in this sense that Rawls states that, "Conversational Analysis is not separate from Ethnomethodology" [2002:41]. Such a position is wholly consistent with the orthodox EM literature, and posts as nothing new to any orthodox ethnomethodologist - one who follows the teachings of Garfinkel.

[2] On the other hand, where the study of conversational talk is divorced from its situated context, and de-linked from its reflexive character in terms of constituting a specific social order - that is, as it takes on the character of a purely "technical method", and, "formal analytic enterprise in its own right" [2002:41] - it is not a form of ethnomethodology understood in any orthodox sense. The "danger" of misunderstanding here, as Rawls notes, is that CA in this sense, becomes just another formal analytic enterprise, like any other formal method which brings an analytical toolbox of preconceptions, formal definitions, and operational procedures to the situation/setting under study. It might further be noted that when such analytical concepts are generated from within one setting, and conceptually applied (generalized) to another, the (re)application represents a violation of the orthodox EM position regarding the ethnomethodological description of a given social order, as it ignores the essential/fundamental EM principle of the embeddedness of talk in a specifically situated social order.

In general, we can say the following: [1] Both EM and CA are independent forms of investigation; [2] There is no necessary connection between EM and CA studies in terms of principles or methods; [3] EM and CA studies may overlap in terms of interests and projects; [4] CA studies must adhere to the foundational tenants of EM studies in order to be considered properly ethnomethodological; [5] EM studies may utilize CA methods, as anecdotal descriptions, as substantive findings (when in conformity with foundational EM principles), or as supplemental findings germane to the in situ findings of a particular EM study; and, [6] Both disciplines can function very well without the other, but in as much as their interests coincide in any given instance, both can profit from the understanding of the others investigational methods and findings.
Varieties of ethnomethodology

According to George Psathas, five types of ethnomethodological study can be identified (Psathas:1995:139-155). These may be characterised as:

1. *The organization of practical actions and practical reasoning*. Including the earliest studies, such as those in Garfinkel's seminal *Studies in Ethnomethodology*.

2. *The organization of talk-in-interaction*. More recently known as conversation analysis, Harvey Sacks established this approach in collaboration with his colleagues Emanuel Schegloff and Gail Jefferson.

3. *Talk-in-interaction within institutional or organizational settings*. While early studies focused on talk abstracted from the context in which it was produced (usually using tape recordings of telephone conversations) this approach seeks to identify interactional structures that are specific to particular settings.

4. *The study of work*. 'Work' is used here to refer to any social activity. The analytic interest is in how that work is accomplished within the setting in which it is performed.

5. *The haecceity of work*. Just what makes an activity what it is? e.g. what makes a test a test, a competition a competition, or a definition a definition?

Further discussion of the varieties and diversity of ethnomethodological investigations can be found in Maynard & Clayman. Article is available online.


Notes


References


External links

- Ethno/CA News (http://www.paultenhave.nl/EMCA.htm) A primary source for ethnomethodology and conversation analysis information and resources.
- AIEMCA.net (http://aiemca.net/) The Australian Institute for Conversation Analysis and Ethnomethodology.
Harold Garfinkel (October 29, 1917 – April 21, 2011) was a sociologist, ethnomethodologist, and a Professor Emeritus at the University of California, Los Angeles. He is known for establishing and developing ethnomethodology as a field of inquiry in sociology. He published multiple books throughout his lifetime and is well known for his book, *Studies in Ethnomethodology*, which was published in 1967.

**Biography**

Harold Garfinkel born in Newark, New Jersey on October 29, 1917 and was raised there throughout his childhood.\(^{[1]}\) His father, a furniture dealer, had hoped his son would follow him into the family business.\(^{[2]}\) Although he did help his father out with the family business, Garfinkel decided to also attend college and study accounting at the University of Newark.\(^{[3]}\) At the University of Newark, courses were mainly taught by Columbia graduate students, who brought more theoretical experiences to the classroom.\(^{[4]}\) This theoretical approach guided Garfinkel later on in his theories he formed.\(^{[5]}\) In the summer following graduation, Garfinkel worked as a volunteer at a Quaker work camp in Cornelia, Georgia. This was an eye-opening experience for Garfinkel. He worked there with students with a wide variety of interests and backgrounds, and this experience influenced his decision to later take up sociology as a career.\(^{[6]}\) While volunteering in Georgia, Garfinkel learned about the sociology program at the University of North Carolina.\(^{[7]}\) This program specifically focused on public work projects like one Garfinkel was working on.\(^{[8]}\) Garfinkel wrote his master's thesis on interracial homicide and completed his Masters in 1942 at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill.\(^{[9]}\) With the onset of World War II, he was drafted into the Army Air Corps and served as a trainer at a base in Florida. As the war effort wound down he was transferred to Gulfport, Mississippi. There he met Arlene Steinbach who was to become his wife and lifelong partner.

After the war, Garfinkel went to study at Harvard and met Talcott Parsons at the newly-formed Department of Social Relations at Harvard University.\(^{[10]}\) Parsons studied and emphasized abstract categories and generalizations, where
Garfinkel focused on detailed description.\(^{[11]}\) While still a student at Harvard, Garfinkel was invited by the sociologist Wilbert Ellis Moore to work on the Organizational Behavior Project at Princeton University. Garfinkel taught at Princeton University for two years.\(^{[12]}\) This brought him in contact with some of the most prominent scholars of the day in the behavioral, informational, and social sciences including: Gregory Bateson, Kenneth Burke, Paul Lazarsfeld, Frederick Mosteller, Philip Selznick, Herbert A. Simon, and John von Neumann.\(^{[13]}\) Garfinkel's dissertation, "The Perception of the Other: A Study in Social Order," was completed in 1952.

After receiving his doctorate from Harvard, Garfinkel worked at Ohio State studying leadership on airplanes and submarines.\(^{[14]}\) Garfinkel also worked on the American Jury Project for which he did fieldwork in Arizona. Garfinkel was asked to talk at a 1954 American Sociological Association meeting and created the term "ethnomethodology."\(^{[15]}\) In 1954 he joined the sociology faculty at the University of California, Los Angeles. During the period 1963-64 he served as a Research Fellow at the Center for the Scientific Study of Suicide.\(^{[16]}\) Garfinkel spent the '75-'76 school year at the Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences and, in 1979-1980, was a visiting fellow at Oxford University. In 1995 he was awarded the Cooley-Mead Award from the American Sociological Association for his contributions to the field.\(^{[17]}\) He received an honorary doctorate from the University of Nottingham in 1996. He officially retired from UCLA in 1987, though continued as an emeritus professor until his death on April 21, 2011 in Los Angeles, California.

**Garfinkel's Thought**

**Influences**

Garfinkel was very intrigued by Parson's study of social order.\(^{[18]}\) Parsons sought to offer a solution to the problem of social order (i.e., How do we account for the order that we witness in society?) and, in so doing, provide a disciplinary foundation for research in sociology. Drawing on the work of earlier social theorists (Marshall, Pareto, Durkheim, Weber), Parsons postulated that all social action could be understood in terms of an "action frame" consisting of a fixed number of elements (an agent, a goal or intended end, the circumstances within which the act occurs, and its "normative orientation").\(^{[19]}\) Agents make choices among possible ends, alternative means to these ends, and the normative constraints that might be seen as operative. They conduct themselves, according to Parsons, in a fashion "analogous to the scientist whose knowledge is the principal determinant of his action."\(^{[20]}\) Order, by this view, is not imposed from above, but rather arises from rational choices made by the actor. Parsons sought to develop a theoretical framework for understanding how social order is accomplished through these choices.

Ethnomethodology was not designed to supplant the kind of formal analysis recommended by Parsons. Garfinkel stipulated that the two programs are "different and unavoidably related."\(^{[21]}\) Both seek to give accounts of social life, but ask different kinds of questions and formulate quite different sorts of claims. Sociologists operating within the formal program endeavor to produce objective (that is to say, non-indexical) claims similar in scope and to those made in the natural sciences. To do so, they must employ theoretical constructs that pre-define the shape of the social world. Unlike Parsons, and other social theorists before and since, Garfinkel's goal was not to articulate yet another explanatory system. He expressed an "indifference" to all forms of sociological theorizing.\(^{[22]}\) Instead of viewing social practice through a theoretical lens, Garfinkel sought to explore the social world directly and describe its autochthonous workings in elaborate detail. Durkheim famously stated, "[t]he objective reality of social facts is sociology's fundamental principle."\(^{[23]}\) Garfinkel substituted 'phenomenon' for 'principle', signaling a different approach to sociological inquiry.\(^{[24]}\) The task of sociology, as he envisions it, is to conduct investigations into just how Durkheim's social facts are brought into being. The result is an "alternate, asymmetric and incommensurable" program of sociological inquiry.\(^{[25]}\)

While Garfinkel was studying at Harvard, he also became acquainted with a number of European scholars who had recently immigrated to the U.S. These would include Aron Gurwitsch, Felix Kaufmann, and Alfred Schütz, who introduced the young sociologist to newly-emerging ideas in social theory, psychology and phenomenology.
Alfred Schütz, like Parsons, was concerned with establishing a sound foundation for research in the social sciences. He took issue, however, with the Parsonsian assumption that actors in society always behave rationally. Schütz made a distinction between reasoning in the 'natural attitude' and scientific reasoning. The reasoning of scientists builds upon everyday commonsense, but, in addition, employs a "postulate of rationality." This imposes special requirements on their claims and conclusions (e.g., application of rules of formal logic, standards of conceptual clarity, compatibility with established scientific 'facts'). This has two important implications for research in the social sciences. First, it is inappropriate for sociologists to use scientific reasoning as a lens for viewing human action in daily life, as Parsons had proposed, since they are distinct kinds of rationality. On the other hand, the traditionally assumed discontinuity between the claims of science and commonsense understandings is dissolved since scientific observations employ both forms of rationality. This raises a flag for researchers in the social sciences, since these disciplines are fundamentally engaged in the study of the shared understandings that underlie the day-to-day functioning of society. How can we make detached, objective claims about everyday reasoning, if our conceptual apparatus is hopelessly contaminated with commonsense categories and rationalities?

The Roots of Ethnomethodology

Garfinkel's concept of Ethnomethodology started with his attempt at analyzing a jury discussion after a Chicago case in 1945. Garfinkel was attempting to understand the way jurors knew how to act as jurors. After attempting to understand the jurors actions, Garfinkel created the term "ethnomethodology" as a way to describe how people use different methods in order to understand the society they live in. Garfinkel noticed through his study of Ethnomethodology that the methods people use to understand the society they live in are very much fixed in people's natural attitudes.

Rationality

Accepting Schütz's critique of the Parsonian program, Garfinkel sought to find another way of addressing the Problem of Social Order. He wrote, "Members to an organized arrangement are continually engaged in having to decide, recognize, persuade, or make evident the rational, i.e., the coherent, or consistent, or chosen, or planful, or effective, or methodical, or knowledgeable character of [their activities]." On first inspection, this might not seem very different from Parsons' proposal. Their views on rationality, however, are not compatible. For Garfinkel, society's character is not dictated by an imposed standard of rationality, either scientific or otherwise.

To Garfinkel, rationality is itself produced as a local accomplishment in, and as, the very ways that society's members craft their moment-to-moment interaction. He writes:

> Instead of the properties of rationality being treated as a methodological principle for interpreting activity, they are to be treated only as empirically problematical material. They would have the status of data and would have to be accounted for in the same way that the more familiar properties of conduct are accounted for.

Social order arises in the very ways that participants conduct themselves together. The sense of a situation arises from their interactions. Garfinkel writes, "any social setting [can] be viewed as self-organizing with respect to the intelligible character of its own appearances as either representations of or as evidences-of-a-social-order." The orderliness of social life, therefore, is produced through the moment-to-moment work of society's members and ethnomethodology's task is to explicate just how this work is done.

In his chapter, "Rational Behaviors" in his book, *Studies in Ethnomethodology, 1967*, Garfinkel discusses how there are various meanings of the term "rationality" in relation to the way people behave. Garfinkel mentions Schutz' paper on the issues of rationality and his various meanings of the term rationality. Garfinkel discusses each of these "rationalities" and the "behaviors" that result. The rationalities listed in Garfinkel's chapter are listed below.

1. Categorizing and Comparing
2. Tolerable error
3. Search for "means"
4. Analysis of alternatives and consequences
5. Strategy
6. Concern for timing
7. Predictability
8. Rules of procedure
9. Choice
10. Grounds of
Garfinkel notes that oftentimes, rationality refers to "the person's feelings that accompany his conduct, e.g. "affective neutrality," "unemotional," "detached," "disinterested," and "impersonal." For the theoretical tasks of this paper, however, the fact that a person may attend his environment with such feelings is uninteresting. It is of interest, however, that a person uses his feelings about his environment to recommend the sensible character of the thing he is talking about or the warrant of a finding."[37]

**Reflexivity**

Garfinkel regarded indexical expressions as key phenomena. Words like here, now, and me shift their meaning depending on when and where they are used. Philosophers and linguists refer to such terms as indexicals because they point into (index) the situational context in which they are produced. One of Garfinkel's contributions was to note that such expressions go beyond "here", "now," etc. and encompass any and all utterances that members of society produce. As Garfinkel specified, "The demonstrably rational properties of indexical expressions and indexical actions [are] an ongoing achievement of the organized activities of everyday life."[38] The pervasiveness of indexical expressions and their member-ordered properties mean that all forms of action provide for their own understandability through the methods by which they are produced.[39] That is, action has the property of reflexivity whereby such action is made meaningful in the light of the very situation within which it is produced.

The contextual setting, however, should not be seen as a passive backdrop for the action. Reflexivity means that members shape action in relation to context while the context itself is constantly being redefined through action.[40] The initial insight into the importance of reflexivity occurred during the study of juror's deliberations, wherein what jurors had decided was used by them to reflexively organize the plausibility of what they were deciding. Other investigations revealed that parties did not always know what they meant by their own formulations; rather, verbal formulations of the local order of an event were used to collect the very meanings that gave them their coherent sense. Garfinkel declared that the issue of how practical actions are tied to their context lies at the heart of ethnomethodological inquiry. Using professional coffee tasting as an illustration here, taste descriptors do not merely describe but also direct the tasting of a cup of coffee; hence, a descriptor is not merely the causal result of what is tasted, as in:

\[ \text{coffee} \Rightarrow \text{taste descriptor} \]

Nor is it an imperialism of a methodology:

\[ \text{taste descriptor} \Rightarrow \text{coffee} \]

Rather, the description and what it describes are mutually determinative:

\[ \text{taste descriptor} \Leftrightarrow \text{coffee} \]

The descriptors operate reflexively by finding in the coffee what they mean, and each is used to make the other more explicit. Much the same may be said about rules-in-games or the use of accounts in ordinary action.[41] This reflexivity of accounts is ubiquitous, and its sense has nearly nothing to do with how the term "reflexivity" is used in analytic philosophy, in "reflexive ethnographies" that endeavor to expose the influence of the researcher in organizing the ethnography, or the way many social scientists use "reflexivity" as a synonym for "self-reflection." For ethnomethodology reflexivity is an actual, unavoidable feature of everyone's daily life.
Service Lines

Garfinkel has frequently illustrated ethnomethodological analysis by means of the illustration of service lines.  

Everyone knows what it is like to stand in a line. Queues are a part of our everyday social life; they are something within which we all participate as we carry out our everyday affairs. We recognize when someone is waiting in a line and, when we are "doing" being a member of a line, we have ways of showing it. In other words, lines may seem impromptu and routine, but they exhibit an internal, member-produced embodied structure. A line is "witnessably a produced social object;" it is, in Durkheimian terms, a "social fact." Participants' actions as "seeably" what they are (such as occupying a position in a queue) depend upon practices that the participant engages in relation to others' practices in the proximate vicinity. To recognize someone as in a line, or to be seen as "in line" ourselves requires attention to bodily movement and bodily placement in relation to others and to the physical environment that those movements also constitute. This is another sense that we consider the action to be indexical—it is made meaningful in the ways in which it is tied to the situation and the practices of members who produce it. The ethnomethodologist's task becomes one of analyzing how members' ongoing conduct is a constituent aspect of this or that course of action. Such analysis can be applied to any sort of social matter (e.g., being female, following instructions, performing a proof, participating in a conversation). These topics are representative of the kinds of inquiry that ethnomethodology was intended to undertake.

Breaching Experiments

According to George Ritzer, Breaching experiments are experiments where "social reality is violated in order to shed light on the methods by which people construct social reality." In Garfinkel's work, Garfinkel encouraged his students to attempt breaching experiments in order to provide examples of basic ethnomethodology. According to Garfinkel, these experiments are important because they help us understand "the socially standardized and standardizing, 'seen but unnoticed,' expected, background features of everyday scenes." He highlights many of these experiments in his books. The following is an example of one of Garfinkel's breaching experiments from his book, Studies in Ethnomethodology.

Case 3: "On Friday night my husband and I were watching television. My husband remarked that he was tired. I asked, 'How are you tired? Physically, mentally, or just bored?'

S: I don't know, I guess physically, mainly.
E: You mean that your muscles ache or your bones?
S: I guess so. Don't be so technical. (After more watching)
S: All these old movies have the same kind of old iron bedstead in them.
E: What do you mean? Do you mean all old movies, or some of them, or just the ones you have seen?
S: What's the matter with you? You know what I mean.
E: I wish you would be more specific.
S: you know what I mean! Drop dead!"

Influence on later research

A substantial corpus of empirical work has developed exploring the issues raised by Garfinkel's writings. Directly inspired by Garfinkel, Harvey Sacks undertook to investigate the sequential organization of conversational interaction. This program, pioneered with colleagues Gail Jefferson and Emanuel Schegloff, has produced a large and flourishing research literature. A second, smaller literature has grown out of another of Sacks' interests having to do with social categorization practices.
Sociologist Emanuel A. Schegloff used the concept of ethnomethodology to study telephone conversations and how these they influence social interaction.\textsuperscript{50} Gail Jefferson used ethnomethodology to study laughter and how people know when it is appropriate to laugh in conversation.\textsuperscript{51} John Heritage and David Greatbach studied rhetoric of political speeches and their relation to the amount of applause the speaker receives, whereas Steven Clayman studied how booing in an audience is generated.\textsuperscript{52} Philip Manning and George Ray studied shyness in an ethnomethodological way.\textsuperscript{53} Ethnomethodologists such as Button, Anderson, Hughes, Sharrock, Angela Garcia, Whalen and Zimmerman all study ethnomethodology within institutions.\textsuperscript{54} Early on, Garfinkel issued a call for ethnomethodologically-informed investigations into the nature of work.\textsuperscript{55} This led to a wide variety of studies focusing on different occupations and professions including, laboratory science,\textsuperscript{56} law,\textsuperscript{57}\textsuperscript{58} police work,\textsuperscript{59} medicine,\textsuperscript{60} jazz improvisation,\textsuperscript{61} education,\textsuperscript{62}\textsuperscript{63} mathematics,\textsuperscript{64} philosophy,\textsuperscript{65} and others.

Lucy Suchman, an anthropologist, did an ethnomethodologically-informed analysis of learning to use a copy machine.\textsuperscript{66} It came to serve as an important critique of theories of planning in Artificial Intelligence.

Selected publications

The bulk of Garfinkel's original writings came in the form of scholarly articles and technical reports most of which were subsequently republished as book chapters. To appreciate the sequential development of Garfinkel's thought, however, it is important to understand when these pieces were actually written. Although published in 2006, \textit{Seeing Sociologically}\textsuperscript{67} was actually written as an annotated version of a draft dissertation proposal two years after arriving at Harvard. \textit{Toward a Sociological Theory of Information}\textsuperscript{68} was also written while Garfinkel was a student and was based on a 1952 report prepared in conjunction with the Organizational Behavior Project at Princeton. Some of Garfinkel's early papers on ethnomethodology were republished as \textit{Studies in Ethnomethodology}.\textsuperscript{69} This publication is well known by many sociologists. Garfinkel subsequently published an edited anthology showcasing selected examples of ethnomethodologically-informed work.\textsuperscript{70} Later still, a mix of previously published papers and some new writing was released as \textit{Ethnomethodology's Program: Working Out Durkheim's Aphorism}.\textsuperscript{71} This latter collection, in conjunction with the \textit{Studies}, represent the definitive exposition of the ethnomethodological approach. Garfinkel had planned to publish a companion piece to \textit{Ethnomethodology's Program}, which was tentatively entitled, "Workplace and Documentary Diversity of Ethnomethodological Studies of Work and Sciences by Ethnomethodology's Authors: What did we do? What did we learn?". This project was never completed, but some preliminary notes were published in \textit{Human Studies}.\textsuperscript{72}

Notes

[27] Schütz, 1943, p. 147
[34] Garfinkel, 1967, p. 33
[38] Garfinkel, 1967, p. 34
Harold Garfinkel


External links

- UCLA Department of Sociology (http://www.sscnet.ucla.edu/soc/faculty.php?lid=1308&display_one=1)
- Obituary in the Guardian (http://www.guardian.co.uk/education/2011/jul/13/harold-garfinkel-obituary)

Conversation analysis

Conversation analysis (commonly abbreviated as CA) is an approach to the study of social interaction, embracing both verbal and non-verbal conduct, in situations of everyday life. As its name implies, CA began with a focus on casual conversation, but its methods were subsequently adapted to embrace more task- and institution-centered interactions, such as those occurring in doctors' offices, courts, law enforcement, helplines, educational settings, and the mass media. As a consequence, the term 'conversation analysis' has become something of a misnomer, but it has continued as a term for a distinctive and successful approach to the analysis of social interaction.

Inspired by Harold Garfinkel's ethnomethodology[1] and Erving Goffman's conception of the interaction order,[2] CA was developed in the late 1960s and early 1970s principally by the sociologist Harvey Sacks and his close associates Emanuel Schegloff and Gail Jefferson.[3] Today CA is an established method used in sociology, anthropology, linguistics, speech-communication and psychology. It is particularly influential in interactional sociolinguistics, discourse analysis and discursive psychology. It is distinct from discourse analysis in focus and method. (i) Its focus is squarely on processes involved in social interaction and does not include written texts or larger sociocultural phenomena (for example, 'discourses' in the Foucauldian sense). (ii) Its method, following Garfinkel and Goffman's initiatives, is aimed at determining the methods and resources that the interactional participants use and rely on to produce interactional contributions and make sense of the contributions of others. Thus CA is neither designed for, nor aimed at, examining the production of interaction from a perspective that is external to the participants' own reasoning and understanding about their circumstances and communication. Rather the aim is to model the resources and methods by which those understandings are produced.
CA analysis

As in all research, conversational analysis begins by setting up a research problem. The data collected for CA is in the form of video or audio recorded conversations. The data is collected without researchers' involvement, often simply by adding a video camera to the room where the conversation takes place (e.g. medical doctors consultation with a patient). From the audio or video recording the researchers construct a detailed transcription (ideally with no details left out). After transcription, the researchers perform inductive data-driven analysis aiming to find recurring patterns of interaction. Based on the analysis, the researchers develop a rule or model to explain the occurrence of the patterns.

Basic structures

Turn-taking organization

In the absence of formal agendas, the set of practices through which turns are allocated in conversation has been the subject of study in its own right. The turn-taking model for conversation was arrived at inductively through empirical investigation of field recordings of conversations and fitted to the observationally derived facts as that in conversation, participants are constrained to issue their utterances in allocated turns, and enlist various mechanisms to obtain them. Initial interest was in very simple forms that take place in two-party conversations where sentence completion, or pause, might be enough to allocate the next turn to the co-present party in the manner that has been discussed under the rubric of 'adjacency pairs'.

In multi-party conversations the mechanisms were found to be more complicated where 'current speaker selects next' is a possibility, and how frequently individual utterances are tailored for their turn 'sequential implicativeness'. The possibility of obtaining not only the next turn, but a series of turns (required for example in telling a joke or story) is documented in analyses of announcements and story prefaces. A certain economy in conversation could be located in the process whereby turns are allocated. That economy was directed at the 'turn commodity', but also in myriad other instances for example person identifiers and locators where minimal forms are utilized in an economic fashion.

Other collections of turn allocation mechanisms include use of 'repeats', the elision of lexical forms, the use of temporal regulators in turns including chuckles, 'uhm', 'yuh know', and 'right', the use of speech particles like 'uh', and 'oh', and other specifically short-syllabic devices that are consonant-prefaced like 'tih'.

According to CA, the turn-taking system consists of two distinct components: the allocational mechanism which is responsible for distributing a turn (in any case), and the lexical components that parties utilize in filling that turn while remaining concurrently sequentially implicative to deal with the contingency in the process that will result in a subsequent turn allocation.\[4\]
Turn constructional component
The turn constructional component describes basic units out of which turns are fashioned. These basic units are known as turn constructional units or TCUs. Unit types include: lexical, clausal, phrasal, and sentential.

Turn allocational component
The turn allocational component describes how participants organize their interaction by distributing turns to speakers.

Sequence organization
This focuses on how actions are ordered in conversation.

Adjacency pairs
Talk tends to occur in responsive pairs; however, the pairs may be split over a sequence of turns.

Pre-sequences
A pair of turns may be understood as preliminary to the main course of action. For example, "Guess what!"/"What?" as preliminary to an announcement of some sort, or "What are you doing?"/"Nothing" as preliminary to an invitation or a request.

Preference organization
CA may reveal structural (i.e. practice-underwritten) preferences in conversation for some types of actions (within sequences of action) over other actions. For example, responsive actions which agree with, or accept, positions taken by a first action tend to be performed more straightforwardly and faster than actions that disagree with, or decline, those positions (Pomerantz 1984; Davidson 1984). One consequence of this is that agreement and acceptance are promoted over their alternatives, and are more likely to be the outcome of the sequence. Pre-sequences are also a component of preference organization and contribute to this outcome (Schegloff 2007).

Repair
Repair organization describes how parties in conversation deal with problems in speaking, hearing, or understanding. Repair segments are classified by who initiates repair (self or other), by who resolves the problem (self or other), and by how it unfolds within a turn or a sequence of turns. The organisation of repair is also a self-righting mechanism in social interaction (Schegloff, Jefferson, and Sacks 1977). Participants in conversation seek to correct the trouble source by initiating self repair and a preference for self repair, the speaker of the trouble source, over other repair (Schegloff, Jefferson, and Sacks 1977). Self repair initiations can be placed in three locations in relation to the trouble source, in a first turn, a transition space or in a third turn (Schegloff, Jefferson, and Sacks 1977). Self initiators of repair in the same turn use different non-lexical speech perturbations, including: cut-offs, sound stretches and "uh's" (Schegloff, Jefferson, and Sacks 1977).
Action formation
This focuses on the description of the practices by which turns at talk are composed and positioned so as to realize
one or another actions.

Contrasts to other theories
In contrast to the research inspired by Noam Chomsky, which is based on a distinction between competence and
performance and dismisses the particulars of actual speech as a degraded form of idealized competence,
Conversation Analysis studies naturally-occurring talk and shows that spoken interaction is systematically orderly in
all its facets (cf. Sacks in Atkinson and Heritage 1984: 21-27). In contrast to the theory developed by John Gumperz,
CA maintains it is possible to analyze talk-in-interaction by examining its recordings alone (audio for telephone,
video for copresent interaction). CA researchers do not believe that the researcher needs to consult with the talk
participants or members of their speech community.

Application in other fields
In recent years, CA has been employed by researchers in other fields, such as feminism and feminist linguistics, or
used in complement with other theories, such as Membership Categorization Analysis (MCA). Elizabeth Stokoe
argues that ethnomethodology's egalitarian creed reflects the egalitarian ethos in feminism. Traditional feminist
concerns can be explored from an ethnomethodological standpoint, since oppression is not a once and for all
phenomenon but the processes involved in defining social reality produces and reproduces oppression daily. Thus,
the gendered properties of social life, routinely taken-for-granted as natural and trans-situational, are best understood
as situated accomplishments of local interactions. MCA was influenced by the work on Harvey Sacks and his work
on Membership Categorization Device (MCD). Sacks argues that 'members' categories comprise part of the central
machinery of organization and developed the notion of MCD to explain how categories can be hearably linked
together by native speakers of a culture. His example that is taken from a children's storybook (The baby cried. The
mommy picked it up.) shows how "mommy" is interpreted as the mother of the baby by speakers of the same culture.
In light of this, categories are inference rich – a great deal of knowledge members of a society have about the society
is stored in terms of these categories. Stokoe further contends that members’ practical categorizations form part of
ethnomethodology's description of the ongoing production and realization of 'facts' about social life and including
members’ gendered reality analysis, thus making CA compatible with feminist studies.

Subject index of conversation analysis literature
The following is a list of important phenomena identified in the conversation analysis literature, followed by a brief
definition and citations to articles that examine the named phenomenon either empirically or theoretically. Articles in
which the term for the phenomenon is coined or which present the canonical treatment of the phenomenon are in
bold, those that are otherwise centrally concerned with the phenomenon are in italics, and the rest are articles that
otherwise aim to make a significant contribution to an understanding of the phenomenon.

This list is incomplete; you can help by expanding it.

TURN-TAKING
A process by which interactants allocate the right or obligation to participate in an interactional activity.
(Sacks, Schegloff, & Jefferson, 1974)

REPAIR
The mechanisms through which certain "troubles" in interaction are dealt with. (Schegloff, Jefferson, &
Sacks 1977)

PREFERENCE ORGANIZATION
The ways through which different types of social actions ('preferred' vs. 'dispreferred') are carried out sequentially. (Pomerantz 1978, Pomerantz 1984)

Notes


References


External links
• An Introduction to Conversation Analysis (http://www-staff.lboro.ac.uk/~ssca1/sitemenu.htm) (by Discourse and Rhetoric Group, Loughborough University)
• Online bibliography of pre-1990 CA literature (http://www.emca.net/bib-comp.html)
• Online bibliography of post-1989 CA literature (http://www.paultenhave.nl/bib90's.htm)
• Online clearinghouse for the CA community (http://www.paultenhave.nl/EMCA.htm)

Noema

Noema (plural: noemata) derives from the Greek word νόημα meaning thought or what is thought about. Edmund Husserl used noema as a technical term in phenomenology to stand for the object or content of a thought, judgment, or perception, but its precise meaning in his work has remained a matter of controversy.

Husserl's Noema

In Ideas: General Introduction to Pure Phenomenology (1913), Husserl introduced the terms "noema" and "noesis" to designate correlated elements of the structure of any intentional act - for example, an act of perceiving, or judging, or remembering (see Intentionality):

"Corresponding to all points to the manifold data of the real (reelle) noetic content, there is a variety of data displayable in really pure (wirklicher reiner) intuition, and in a correlative 'noematic content,' or briefly 'noema' - terms which we shall henceforth be continually using."[2]

Every intentional act has noetic content (or a noesis - from the Greek nous, "mind"). This noetic content, to which the noema corresponds, is that which gives meaning or sense to an intentional act. Every act also has a noema, which is the object of the act - that which is meant by it.[4] In other words, every intentional act has an "I-pole (or noesis)" and an "object-pole (or noema)."[5] Husserl also refers to the noema as the Sinn or sense (meaning) of the act, and sometimes appears to use the terms interchangeably. Nevertheless, the Sinn does not represent what Husserl calls the "full noema": Sinn belongs to the noema, but the full noema is the object of the act as meant in the act, the perceived object as perceived, the judged object as judged, and so on.[6]

In other words, the noema seems to be whatever is intended by acts of perception or judgement in general, whether it be "a material object, a picture, a word, a mathematical entity, another person" precisely as being perceived, judged or otherwise thought about.[7]

Interpreting Husserl

In fact, commentators have been unable to achieve consensus on exactly what a noema is. In a recent survey, David Woodruff Smith distinguished four different schools of thought. On one view, to say that the noema is the intentional object of an act of consciousness is to mean that it quite literally is an object. Husserl's student Roman Ingarden, for example, held that both ordinary objects, like chairs and trees, and intentional objects, like a chair precisely as it appears to me, or even a fictional tree, actually exist, but have different "modes" of existence.[8]
An alternative view, developed primarily by Aron Gurwitsch, emphasizes the noema of perceptual experience. Most ordinary objects can be perceived in different ways and from different perspectives (consider looking at a tree from several different positions). For Gurwitsch, what is perceived in each such act is a noema, and the object itself – the tree, say – is to be understood as the collection or system of noemata associated with it. This view has similarities with phenomenalism.\[9\]

Sokolowski, alternatively, holds that a noema is just the actual object of perception or judgment itself, considered phenomenologically. In other words, the noema of the judgment that "this chair is uncomfortable" is neither an entity (the chair considered as uncomfortable) which exists in addition to the chair itself (but with a different mode of existence) – the Ingarden view; but nor is the noema of such a judgment identified with a particular tactile perception of the chair – which along with other perceptions constitutes the chair as such – the Gurwitsch view. For Sokolowski, the noema is not a separate entity at all, but the chair itself as in this instance perceived or judged. This seems consistent with Husserl’s emphasis on the noema as the "perceived as such…remembered as such…judged as such…"\[10\]

An analytic philosopher, Dagfinn Føllesdal, in an influential 1969 paper,\[11\] proposed a Fregean interpretation of the noema, which has been developed extensively by Ronald McIntyre and David Woodruff Smith.\[12\] This school of thought agrees that the noema is not a separate entity, but rather than identifying it with the actual object of the act, phenomenologically understood, this view suggests that it is a mediating component of the act (of perceiving, judging, etc) itself. It is what gives the act the sense it has.\[13\] Indeed, Føllesdal and his followers suggest that the noema is a generalized version of Freges's account of linguistic meaning, and in particular of his concept of sense (Sinn). Just as Frege held that a linguistic expression picks out its reference by means of its sense, so Husserl believed that conscious acts generally – not merely acts of meaning but also acts of perception, judgment, etc. – are intentionally directed toward objects by means of their noemata. On this view, the noema is not an object, but an abstract component of certain types of acts.\[14\]

Sokolowski has continued to reject this approach, arguing that "(t)o equate sense and noema would be to equate propositional and phenomenological reflection. It would take philosophy simply as the critical reflection on our meanings or senses; it would equate philosophy with linguistic analysis."\[15\] Robert C. Solomon attempted to reconcile the perception-based interpretation of the Gurwitsch school with the Fregean interpretation of noema as sense, suggesting that while "its has now become virtually axiomatic among phenomenologists that the Sinne [senses] of experience stand independent of the Bedeutungen [meanings] of linguistic expressions. It has become all but axiomatic among analytic philosophers that there is no meaning apart from language. It is the concept of the noema that provides the link between them. The noema embodies both the changing phases of experience and the organizing sense of our experience. But these two ‘components’ are not separable, for all experience requires meaning, not as an after-the-fact luxury in reflective judgements but in order for it to be experience of anything."\[16\]

Other uses

Noema is in the OED, which has shown its use for more than three centuries. It first was used in English in the field of rhetoric to denote "a figure of speech whereby something stated obscurely is nevertheless intended to be understood or worked out." In other words, a noema in rhetoric is obscure speech or speech that only yields meaning upon detailed reflection.

Peacham’s 1577 Garden of Eloquence\[17\] used it this way,

"Noema, when we doe signify some thing so privily that the hearers must be fayne to seeke out the meaning by long consideration."
References


Nous
This article is about the concept of nous or intellect in philosophy. See also Intelligence (disambiguation) and Intellect (disambiguation).

Nous (British: ˌnaʊs/,[1] US: ˈnuːs/), sometimes equated to intellect or intelligence, is a philosophical term for the faculty of the human mind which is described in classical philosophy as necessary for understanding what is true or real, similar in meaning to intuition. It is also often described as a form of perception which works within the mind ("the mind's eye"), rather than only through the physical senses.[2] The three commonly used philosophical terms are from Greek, νοῦς or νόος, and Latin intellectus and intelligentia respectively.

In philosophy, common English translations include "understanding" and "mind"; or sometimes "reason" and "thought".[3][4] To describe the activity of this faculty, apart from verbs based on "understanding", the verb "intellection" is sometimes used in philosophical contexts, and the Greek words noësis and noein are sometimes also used. In colloquial British English, nous denotes "common sense", which is close to the original everyday meaning it had in Ancient Greece.

Apart from referring to a faculty of the human mind, this philosophical concept has often been extended to describe the source of order in nature itself.
Nous

**Introduction: nous in philosophy**

The basic meaning of "nous" or "intellect" is "understanding", but several sources or types of "understandings" are often distinguished from each other:

- Sense perception is a source of feelings, impressions, or raw data about things, but it needs to be interpreted in order to be converted into real understanding.
- Reason is a source of new understandings but it is built by putting together and distinguishing other things already understood.

Philosophical discussion of *nous* has therefore centred around the origin of the most basic understandings which allow people to make sense of what they see, hear, taste or feel, and which also allow them to start reasoning. These basic understandings are often felt to at least include such things as understandings of geometrical and logical basics, and also an ability to generalize properly into correct categories or universals, setting definitions. This mental step between perception and reasoning has sometimes been discussed as an aspect of perception or an aspect of reasoning, as will be seen below.

The question then also arose of whether there can really be any source of such basic understanding other than the accumulation of perceptions. Somehow the human mind sets definitions in a consistent way, because people perceive the same things and can discuss them. So the argument goes, as will be shown below, that people must be born with some innate potential to understand the same things the same ways. And in addition to this it has also been argued that this possibility must require help of a spiritual and divine type. The question of where understanding comes from, is therefore related to the question of what knowledge is, and how things can and should be defined or classified.

Another important philosophical discussion concerning *nous* stemming from these, involves not only human thinking, but the nature of the cosmos itself. As mentioned above, some philosophers proposed that the human mind must have an ability to understand which is divine, and independent of normal sense experience and physics. This ordering of the individual human mind, it is then argued, must be somehow derived from a cosmic mind which orders nature just like the human mind orders its understanding of nature. This was claimed from an early time, by Greek philosophers such as Anaxagoras. By this type of account, it came to be argued that the human understanding (*nous*) somehow stems from this cosmic *nous*, which is however not just a recipient of order, but a creator of it. Such explanations were influential in the development of medieval accounts of God, the immortality of the soul, and even the motions of the stars, in Europe, North Africa and the Middle East, amongst both eclectic philosophers and authors representing all the major faiths of their times.

This diagram shows the medieval understanding of spheres of the cosmos, derived from Aristotle, and as per the standard explanation by Ptolemy. It came to be understood that at least the outermost sphere (marked "Primũ Mobile") has its own intellect, intelligence or *nous* - a cosmic equivalent to the human mind.
Pre-Socratic usage

In early Greek uses, Homer used *nous* to signify mental activities of both mortals and immortals, for example what they really have on their mind as opposed to what they say aloud. It was one of several words related to thought, thinking, and perceiving with the mind. Amongst pre-Socratic philosophers it became increasingly distinguished as a source of knowledge and reasoning and opposed to mere sense perception, or thinking influenced by the body such as emotion. For example Heraclitus complained that “much learning does not teach *nous*”.[1]

Among some Greek authors a faculty of intelligence, a "higher mind", came to be considered to be a property of the cosmos as a whole.

The work of Parmenides of Elea set the scene for Greek philosophy to come and the concept of *nous* was central to his radical proposals. He claimed that reality as the senses perceive it is not a world of truth at all, because sense perception is so unreliable, and what is perceived is so uncertain and changeable. Instead he argued for a dualism wherein *nous* and related words (the verb for thinking which describes its mental perceiving activity, *noein*, and the unchanging and eternal objects of this perception *noēta*) describe a form of perception which is not physical, but intellectual only, distinct from sense perception and the objects of sense perception. These eternal immaterial objects which people perceive in their mind are the equivalent of the forms or ideas, in the later philosophy of Plato and Aristotle.

Anaxagoras of Clazomenae, born about 500 BC, is the first person who is definitely known to have explained the concept of a *nous* (mind), which arranged all other things in the cosmos in their proper order, started them in a rotating motion, and continuing to control them to some extent, having an especially strong connection with living things. (However Aristotle reports an earlier philosopher from Clezomenae named of Hermotimus who had taken a similar position.[6] Amongst Pre-Socratic philosophers before Anaxagoras, other philosophers had proposed a similar ordering human-like principle causing life and the rotation of the heavens. For example Empedocles, like Hesiod much earlier, described cosmic order and living things as caused by a cosmic version of love,[7] and Pythagoras and Heraclitus, attributed the cosmos with "reason" (*logos*).[8]

According to Anaxagoras the cosmos is made of infinitely divisible matter, every bit of which can inherently become anything, except Mind (*nous*), which is also matter, but which can only be found separated from this general mixture, or else mixed in to living things, or in other words in the Greek terminology of the time, things with a soul (*psuchē*).[9] Anaxagoras wrote:

All other things partake in a portion of everything, while *nous* is infinite and self-rulled, and is mixed with nothing, but is alone, itself by itself. For if it were not by itself, but were mixed with anything else, it would partake in all things if it were mixed with any; for in everything there is a portion of everything, as has been said by me in what goes before, and the things mixed with it would hinder it, so that it would have power over nothing in the same way that it has now being alone by itself. For it is the thinnest of all things and the purest, and it has all knowledge about everything and the greatest strength; and *nous* has power over all things, both greater and smaller, that have soul [*psuchē*].[10]
Concerning cosmology, Anaxagoras, like some Greek philosophers already before him, believed the cosmos was revolving, and had formed into its visible order as a result of such revolving causing a separating and mixing of different types of elements. *Nous*, in his system, originally caused this revolving motion to start, but it does not necessarily continue to play a role once the mechanical motion has started. His description was in other words (shockingly for the time) corporeal or mechanical, with the moon made of earth, the sun and stars made of red hot metal (beliefs Socrates was later accused of holding during his trial) and *nous* itself being a physical fine type of matter which also gathered and concentrated with the development of the cosmos. This *nous* (mind) is not incorporeal; it is the thinnest of all things. The distinction between *nous* and other things nevertheless causes his scheme to sometimes be described as a peculiar kind of dualism.[9]

Anaxagoras’ concept of *nous* was distinct from later platonic and neoplatonic cosmologies in many ways, which were also influenced by Eleatic, Pythagorean and other pre Socratic ideas, as well as the Socratics themselves.

In ancient Indian Philosophy also, a "higher mind", came to be considered to be a property of the cosmos as a whole.[11]

**Socratic philosophy**

**Xenophon**

Xenophon, the less famous of the two students of Socrates whose written accounts of him have survived, recorded that he taught his students a kind of teleological justification of piety and respect for divine order in nature. This has been described as an "intelligent design" argument for the existence of God, in which nature has its own *nous*. For example in his *Memorabilia* 1.4.8 he describes Socrates asking a friend sceptical of religion "Are you, then, of the opinion that intelligence (*nous*) alone exists nowhere and that you by some good chance seized hold of it, while - as you think - those surpassingly large and infinitely numerous things [all the earth and water] are in such orderly condition through some senselessness?" and later in the same discussion he compares the *nous* which directs each person's body, to the good sense (*phronēsis*) of the god which is in everything, arranging things to its pleasure. (1.4.17).[12] Plato describes Socrates making the same argument in his *Philebus* 28d, using the same words *nous* and *phronēsis*.[13]

**Plato**

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Plato from *The School of Athens* by Raphael, 1509

- Early life
- Works
- Platonism
- Epistemology
- Idealism / Realism
- Demiurge
- Theory of Forms
- Form of the Good
- Third man argument
Plato used the word *nous* in many ways which were not unusual in the everyday Greek of the time, and often simply meant "good sense". On the other hand, in some of his dialogues it is described by key characters in a higher sense, which was apparently already common. In his *Philebus* 28c he has Socrates say that "all philosophers agree—whereby they really exalt themselves—that mind (*nous*) is king of heaven and earth. Perhaps they are right." and later states that the ensuing discussion "confirms the utterances of those who declared of old that mind (*nous*) always rules the universe".

In his *Cratylus*, Plato gives the etymology of Athena's name, the goddess of wisdom, from *Atheonóa* (Ἀθεονόα) from god's (*theos*) mind (*nous*). In his *Phaedo*, Plato's teacher Socrates is made to say just before dying that his discovery of Anaxagoras' concept of a cosmic *nous* as the cause of the order of things, was an important turning point for him. But he also expressed disagreement with Anaxagoras' understanding of the implications of his own doctrine, because of Anaxagoras' materialist understanding of causation. Socrates said that Anaxagoras would "give voice and air and hearing and countless other things of the sort as causes for our talking with each other, and should fail to mention the real causes, which are, that the Athenians decided that it was best to condemn me". On the other hand Socrates seems to suggest that he also failed to develop a fully satisfactory teleological and dualistic understanding of a mind of nature, whose aims represent the good things which all parts of nature aim at.

Concerning the *nous* of individuals, the source of understanding, in opposition to Anaxagoras Plato is also widely understood to have accepted ideas from Parmenides which affect his explanation of *nous*. Like Parmenides, Plato argued that relying on sense perception can never lead to true knowledge, only opinion. Instead, Plato's more philosophical characters argue that *nous* must somehow perceive truth directly in the ways gods and daimons perceive. What our mind sees directly in order to really understand things must not be the constantly changing material things, but unchanging entities that exist in a different way, the so-called "forms" or "ideas". However he knew that contemporary philosophers often argued (as in modern science) that *nous* and perception are just two aspects of one physical activity, and that perception is the source of knowledge and understanding (not the other way around).

Just exactly how Plato believed that the *nous* of people lets them come to understand things in any way which improves upon sense perception is a subject of long running discussion and debate. On the one hand, in the *Republic* Plato's Socrates, in the so-called "metaphor of the sun", and "allegory of the cave" sections describe people as being able to see more clearly because of something from outside themselves, something like when sun shines, helping...
eyesight. This illumination of the intellect shines from the Form of the Good. On the other hand, in the *Meno* for example, Plato’s Socrates explains the theory of *anamnesis* whereby people are born with ideas already in their soul, which they somehow remember from previous lives. Both theories were to be highly influential.

As in Xenophon, and apparently based upon Socrates, Plato frequently describes the soul in a political way, with ruling parts, and parts which are by nature meant to be ruled. *Nous* is associated with the rational (*logistikon*) part of the individual human soul, which by nature should rule. In his *Republic*, in the so-called “analogy of the divided line”, it has a special function within this rational part. Plato tended to treat *nous* as the only immortal part of the soul.

Concerning the cosmos, in the *Timaeus*, the title character also tells a likely story in which *nous* is responsible for the creative work of the demiurge or maker who brought rational order to our universe. This craftsman imitated what he perceived in the world of eternal Forms. In the *Philebus* Socrates argues that *nous* in individual humans must share in a cosmic *nous*, in the same way that human bodies are made up of small parts of the elements found in the rest of the universe. And this *nous* must be in the *genos* of being a cause of all particular things as particular things.\[17\]

**Aristotle**

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Aristotle

Part of the series on: *Corpus Aristotelicum*

- Logic (*Organon*):
  - Categories – Prior Analytics
  - Posterior Analytics
  - On Interpretation – Topics
  - Sophistical Refutations
- Physics or Natural philosophy:
  - Physics – On the Heavens
  - On Generation and Corruption
  - Meteorology – On the Soul
  - History of Animals
- Metaphysics:
  - Metaphysics
- Ethics and Politics:
  - Nicomachean Ethics
  - Eudemian Ethics – Magna Moralia
- On Virtues and Vices
Like Plato, Aristotle saw the *nous* or intellect of an individual as an intuitive understanding, distinguished from sense perception. Like Plato, Aristotle linked *nous* to *logos* (reason) as uniquely human, but he also distinguished *nous* from *logos*, thereby distinguishing the faculty for setting definitions from the faculty which uses them to reason with. In his *Nicomachean Ethics*, Book VI Aristotle divides the soul (*psuchē*) into two parts, one which has reason and one which does not, but then divides the part which has reason into the reasoning (*logistikos*) part itself which is lower, and the higher "knowing" (*epistēmonikos*) part which contemplates general principles (*archai*). *Nous*, he states, is the source of the first principles or sources (*archai*) of definitions, and it develops naturally as people get older. This he explains after first comparing the four other truth revealing capacities of soul: technical know how (*technē*), logically deduced knowledge (*epistēmē*, sometimes translated as "scientific knowledge"), practical wisdom (*phronēsis*), and lastly theoretical wisdom (*sophia*), which is defined by Aristotle as the combination of *nous* and *epistēmē*. All of these others apart from *nous* involve reason (*logos*).

And intellect [*nous*] is directed at what is ultimate on both sides, since it is intellect and not reason [*logos*] that is directed at both the first terms [*horoi*] and the ultimate particulars, on the one side at the changeless first terms in demonstrations, and on the other side, in thinking about action, at the other sort of premise, the variable particular; for these particulars are the sources [*archai*] from which one discerns that for the sake of which an action is, since the universals are derived from the particulars. Hence intellect is both a beginning and an end, since the demonstrations that are derived from these particulars are also about these. And of these one must have perception, and this perception is intellect.

Aristotle's philosophical works continue many of the same Socratic themes as his teacher Plato. Amongst the new proposals he made was a way of explaining causality, and *nous* is an important part of his explanation. As mentioned above, Plato criticized Anaxagoras' materialism, or understanding that the intellect of nature only set the cosmos in motion, but is no longer seen as the cause of physical events. Aristotle explained that the changes of things can be described in terms of four causes at the same time. Two of these four causes are similar to the materialist understanding: each thing has a material which causes it to be how it is, and some other thing which set in motion or initiated some process of change. But at the same time according to Aristotle each thing is also caused by the natural forms they are tending to become, and the natural ends or aims, which somehow exist in nature as causes, even in cases where human plans and aims are not involved. These latter two causes, are concepts no longer used in modern science, encompassing the continuing effect of the ordering principle of nature itself. Aristotle's special description of causality is especially apparent in the natural development of living things. It leads to a method whereby Aristotle analyzes causation and motion in terms of the potentialities and actualities of all things, whereby all matter possesses various possibilities or potentialities of form and end, and these possibilities become more fully real as their potential forms become actual or active reality (something they will do on their own, by nature, unless stopped because of other natural things happening). For example a stone has in its nature the potentiality of falling to the earth and it will do so, and actualize this natural tendency, if nothing is in the way.

Aristotle analyzed thinking in the same way. For him, the possibility of understanding rests on the relationship of intellect and sense perception. Aristotle's remarks on the concept of what came to be called the "active intellect" and "passive intellect" (along with various other terms) are amongst "the most intensely studied sentences in the history of philosophy". The terms are derived from a single passage in Aristotle's *De Anima*, Book III. Following is the translation of one of those passages with some key Greek words shown in square brackets.
...since in nature one thing is the material [hulē] for each kind [genos] (this is what is in potency all the particular things of that kind) but it is something else that is the causal and productive thing by which all of them are formed, as is the case with an art in relation to its material, it is necessary in the soul [psuchē] too that these distinct aspects be present;

the one sort is intellect [nous] by becoming all things, the other sort by forming all things, in the way an active condition [hexis] like light too makes the colors that are in potency be at work as colors [to phōs poiei ta dunamei onta chrōmata energeiai chrōmata].

This sort of intellect [which is like light in the way it makes potential things work as what they are] is separate, as well as being without attributes and unmixed, since it is by its thinghood a being-at-work [energeia], for what acts is always distinguished in stature above what is acted upon, as a governing source is above the material it works on.

Knowledge [epistēmē], in its being-at-work, is the same as the thing it knows, and while knowledge in potency comes first in time in any one knower, in the whole of things it does not take precedence even in time.

This does not mean that at one time it thinks but at another time it does not think, but when separated it is just exactly what it is, and this alone is deathless and everlasting (though we have no memory, because this sort of intellect is not acted upon, while the sort that is acted upon is destructible), and without this nothing thinks.

The passage tries to explain "how the human intellect passes from its original state, in which it does not think, to a subsequent state, in which it does" according to his distinction between potentiality and actuality. Aristotle says that the passive intellect receives the intelligible forms of things, but that the active intellect is required to make the potential knowledge into actual knowledge, in the same way that light makes potential colors into actual colors. As Davidson remarks:

Just what Aristotle meant by potential intellect and active intellect - terms not even explicit in the De anima and at best implied - and just how he understood the interaction between them remains moot.

Students of the history of philosophy continue to debate Aristotle's intent, particularly the question whether he considered the active intellect to be an aspect of the human soul or an entity existing independently of man.

The passage is often read together with Metaphysics, Book XII, ch.7-10, where Aristotle makes nous as an actuality a central subject within a discussion of the cause of being and the cosmos. In that book, Aristotle equates active nous, when people think and their nous becomes what they think about, with the "unmoved mover" of the universe, and God: "For the actuality of thought (nous) is life, and God is that actuality; and the essential actuality of God is life most good and eternal."[22] Alexander of Aphrodisias, for example, equated this active intellect which is God with the one explained in De Anima, while Themistius thought they could not be simply equated. (See below.)

Like Plato before him, Aristotle believes Anaxagoras' cosmic nous implies and requires the cosmos to have intentions or ends: "Anaxagoras makes the Good a principle as causing motion; for Mind (nous) moves things, but moves them for some end, and therefore there must be some other Good—unless it is as we say; for on our view the art of medicine is in a sense health."

In the philosophy of Aristotle the soul (psyche) of a body is what makes it alive, and is its actualized form; thus, every living thing, including plant life, has a soul. The mind or intellect (nous) can be described variously as a power, faculty, part, or aspect of the human soul. It should be noted that for Aristotle soul and intellect are not the same. He did not rule out the possibility that intellect might survive without the rest of the soul, as in Plato, but plants have a 'nutritive' soul without a nous. In his Generation of Animals Aristotle specifically says that while other parts of the soul come from the parents, physically, the nous, must come from outside, into the body, because it is divine or godly, and it has nothing in common with the energeia of the body. This was yet another passage which
Alexander of Aphrodisias would link to those mentioned above from _De Anima_ and the _Metaphysics_ in order to understand Aristotle's intentions.

**Post Aristotelian classical theories**

Until the early modern era, much of the discussion which has survived today concerning _nous_ or intellect, in Europe, Africa and the Middle East, concerned how to correctly interpret Aristotle and Plato. However, at least during the classical period, materialist philosophies, more similar to modern science, such as Epicureanism, were still relatively common also. The Epicureans believed that the bodily senses themselves were not the cause of error, but the interpretations can be. The term _prolepsis_ was used by Epicureans to describe the way the mind forms general concepts from sense perceptions.

To the Stoics, more like Heraclitus than Anaxagoras, order in the cosmos comes from an entity called logos, the cosmic reason. But as in Anaxagoras this cosmic reason, like human reason but higher, is connected to the reason of individual humans. The Stoics however, did not invoke incorporeal causation, but attempted to explain physics and human thinking in terms of matter and forces. As in Aristotelianism, they explained the interpretation of sense data requiring the mind to be stamped or formed with ideas. However, they did not propose any in-born or acquired equivalent of the "active intellect" in order to explain how people could know understand things. _Nous_ for them is soul "somehow disposed" (pôs echen), the soul being somehow disposed _pneuma_, which is fire or air or a mixture. As in Plato, they treated _nous_ as the ruling part of the soul.\(^1\)

Plutarch criticized the Stoic idea of _nous_ being corporeal, and agreed with Plato that the soul is more divine than the body while _nous_ (mind) is more divine than the soul.\(^1\) The mix of soul and body produces pleasure and pain; the conjunction of mind and soul produces reason which is the cause or the source of virtue and vice. (From: "On the Face in the Moon")\(^{25}\)

Albinus was one of the earliest authors to equate Aristotle's _nous_ as prime mover of the Universe, with Plato's Form of the Good.\(^1\)

**Alexander of Aphrodisias**

Alexander of Aphrodisias was a Peripatetic (Aristotelian) and his _On the Soul_ (referred to as _De anima_ in its traditional Latin title), explained that by his interpretation of Aristotle, potential intellect in man, that which has no nature but receives on from the active intellect, is material, and also called the "material intellect" (_nous hulikos_) and it is inseparable from the body, being "only a disposition" of it.\(^{26}\) He argued strongly against the doctrine of immortality. On the other hand, he identified the active intellect (_nous poietikos_), through whose agency the potential intellect in man becomes actual, not with anything from within people, but with the divine creator itself. In the early Renaissance his doctrine of the soul's mortality was adopted by Pietro Pomponazzi against the Thomists and the Averroists. For him, the only possible human immortality is an immortality of a detached human thought, more specifically when the _nous_ has as the object of its thought the active intellect itself, or another incorporeal intelligible form.\(^{27}\)

Alexander was also responsible for influencing the development of several more technical terms concerning the intellect, which became very influential amongst the great Islamic philosophers, Al-Farabi, Avicenna, and Averroes.

- The intellect _in habitu_ is a stage in which the human intellect has taken possession of a repertoire of thoughts, and so is potentially able to think those thoughts, but is not yet thinking these thoughts.
- The intellect _from outside_ which became the "acquired intellect" in Islamic philosophy, describes the incorporeal active intellect which comes from outside man, and becomes an object thought, making the material intellect actual and active. This term may have come from a particularly expressive translation of Alexander into Arabic. Plotinus also used such a term.\(^{28}\) In any case, in Al-Farabi and Avicenna, the term took on a new meaning, distinguishing it from the active intellect in any simple sense - an ultimate stage of the human intellect where the a kind of close relationship (a "conjunction") is made between a person's active intellect and the transcendental
Nous itself.

Themistius

Themistius, another influential commentator on this matter, understood Aristotle differently, stating that the passive or material intellect does "not employ a bodily organ for its activity, is wholly unmixed with the body, impassive, and separate [from matter]."[29] This means the human potential intellect, and not only the active intellect, is an incorporeal substance, or a disposition of incorporeal substance. For Themistius, the human soul becomes immortal "as soon as the active intellect intertwines with it at the outset of human thought".[27]

This understanding of the intellect was also very influential for Al-Farabi, Avicenna, and Averroes, and "virtually all Islamic and Jewish philosophers".[30] On the other hand concerning the active intellect, like Alexander and Plotinus, he saw this as a transcendent being existing above and outside man. Differently from Alexander, he did not equate this being with the first cause of the Universe itself, but something lower.[31] However he equated it with Plato's Idea of the Good.[32]

Plotinus and neoplatonism

Of the later Greek and Roman writers Plotinus, the initiator of neoplatonism, is particularly significant. Like Alexander of Aphrodisias and Themistius, he saw himself as a commentator explaining the doctrines of Plato and Aristotle. But in his *Enneads* he went further than those authors, often working from passages which had been presented more tentatively, possibly inspired partly by earlier authors such as the neopythagorean Numenius of Apamea. Neoplatonism provided a major inspiration to discussion concerning the intellect in late classical and medieval philosophy, theology and cosmology.

In neoplatonism there exists several levels or hypostases of being, including the natural and visible world as a lower part.

- The Monad or "the One" sometimes also described as "the Good", based on the concept as it is found in Plato. This is the *dunamis* or possibility of existence. It causes the other levels by emanation.
- The *Nous* (usually translated as "Intellect", or "Intelligence" in this context, or sometimes "mind" or "reason") is described as God, or more precisely an image of God, often referred to as the *Demiurge*. It thinks its own contents, which are thoughts, equated to the Platonic ideas or forms (*eide*). The thinking of this Intellect is the highest *activity* of life. The actualization (*energeia*) of this thinking is the being of the forms. This Intellect is the first principle or foundation of existence. The One is prior to it, but not in the sense that a normal cause is prior to an effect, but instead Intellect is called an emanation of the One. The One is the possibility of this foundation of existence.
- Soul (*psuchē*). The soul is also an *energeia*: it acts upon or actualizes its own thoughts and creates "a separate, material cosmos that is the living image of the spiritual or noetic Cosmos contained as a unified thought within the Intelligence". So it is the soul which perceives things in nature physically, which it understands to be reality. Soul in Plotinus plays a role similar to the potential intellect in Aristotelian terminology.[1]
- Lowest is matter.

This was based largely upon Plotinus' reading of Plato, but also incorporated many Aristotelian concepts, including the Unmoved Mover as *energeia*. They also incorporated a theory of *anamnesis*, or knowledge coming from the past lives of our immortal souls, like that found in some of Plato's dialogues.

Later Platonists distinguished a hierarchy of three separate manifestations of *nous*, like Numenius of Apamea had.[34] Notable later neoplatonists include Porphyry and Proclus.
Medieval *nous* in religion

Greek philosophy had an influence on the major religions which defined the Middle Ages, and one aspect of this was the concept of *nous*.

Gnosticism

Gnosticism was a late classical movement which incorporated ideas inspired by neoplatonism and neopythagoreanism, but which was more a syncretic religious movement than an accepted philosophical movement.
Nous

Valentinus

In the Valentinian system, Nous is the first male Aeon. Together with his conjugate female Aeon, Aletheia (truth), he emanates from the Propator Bythos and his coeternal Ennoia or Sige; and these four form the primordial Tetrads. Like the other male Aeons he is sometimes regarded as androgynous, including in himself the female Aeon who is paired with him. He is the Only Begotten; and is styled the Father, the Beginning of all, inasmuch as from him are derived immediately or mediately the remaining Aeons who complete the Ogdoad (eight), thence the Decad (ten), and thence the Dodecad (twenty); in all thirty, Aeons constituting the Pleroma. He alone is capable of knowing the Propator; but when he desired to impart like knowledge to the other Aeons, was withheld from so doing by Sige.

When Sophia (wisdom), youngest Aeon of the thirty, was brought into peril by her yearning after this knowledge, Nous was foremost of the Aeons in interceding for her. From him, or through him from the Propator, Horos was sent to restore her. After her restoration, Nous, according to the providence of the Propator, produced another pair, Christ and the Holy Spirit, “in order to give fixity and steadfastness (eis pēxin kai stērigmon) to the Pleroma.” For this Christ teaches the Aeons to be content to know that the Propator is in himself incomprehensible, and can be perceived only through the Only Begotten (Nous).[35]

Basilides

A similar conception of Nous appears in the later teaching of the Basilidean School, according to which he is the first begotten of the Unbegotten Father, and himself the parent of Logos, from whom emanate successively Phronesis, Sophia, and Dunamis. But in this teaching Nous is identified with Christ, is named Jesus, is sent to save those that believe, and returns to Him who sent him, after a passion which is apparent only.—Simon the Cyrenian being substituted for him on the cross.[36] It is probable, however, that Nous had a place in the original system of Basilides himself; for his Ogdoad, “the great Archon of the universe, the ineffable”[37] is apparently made up of the five members named by Irenaeus (as above), together with two whom we find in Clement,[38] Dikaiosyne and Eirene,—added to the originating Father.

Simon Magus

The antecedent of these systems is that of Simon,[39] of whose six “roots” emanating from the Unbegotten Fire, Nous is first. The correspondence of these "roots" with the first six Aeons which Valentinus derives from Bythos, is noted by Hippolytus.[40] Simon says in his Apophasis Megalē,[41]

> There are two offshoots of the entire ages, having neither beginning nor end.... Of these the one appears from above, the great power, the Nous of the universe, administering all things, male; the other from beneath, the great Epinoia, female, bringing forth all things.

To Nous and Epinoia correspond Heaven and Earth, in the list given by Simon of the six material counterparts of his six emanations. The identity of this list with the six material objects alleged by Herodotus[42] to be worshipped by the Persians, together with the supreme place given by Simon to Fire as the primordial power, leads us to look to Persia for the origin of these systems in one aspect. In another, they connect themselves with the teaching of Pythagoras and of Plato.
**Gospel of Mary**

According to the *Gospel of Mary*, Jesus himself articulates the essence of *Nous*:

"There where is the *Nous*, lies the treasure." Then I said to him: "Lord, when someone meets you in a Moment of Vision, is it through the soul [*psuchē*] that they see, or is it through the spirit [*pneuma*]?” The Teacher answered: "It is neither through the soul nor the spirit, but the *Nous* between the two which sees the vision..."

—*The Gospel of Mary*, p. 10

**Medieval Islamic philosophy**

During the middle ages, philosophy itself was in many places seen as opposed to the prevailing monotheistic religions, Islam, Christianity and Judaism. The strongest philosophical tradition for some centuries was amongst Islamic philosophers, who later came to strongly influence the late medieval philosophers of western Christendom, and the Jewish diaspora in the Mediterranean area. While there were earlier Muslim philosophers such as Al Kindi, chronologically the three most influential concerning the intellect were Al Farabi, Avicenna, and finally Averroes, a westerner who lived in Spain and was highly influential in the late middle ages amongst Jewish and Christian philosophers.

**Al Farabi**

The exact precedents of Al Farabi's influential philosophical scheme, in which *Nous* (Arabic *'aql*) plays an important role, are no longer perfectly clear because of the great loss of texts in the middle ages which he would have had access to. He was apparently innovative in at least some points. He was clearly influenced by the same late classical world as neoplatonism, neopythagoreanism, but exactly how is less clear. Plotinus, Themistius and Alexander of Aphrodisias are generally accepted to have been influences. However while these three all placed the active intellect "at or near the top of the hierarchy of being", Al Farabi was clear in making it the lowest ranking in a series of distinct transcendental intelligences. He is the first known person to have done this in a clear way.[43] He was also the first philosopher known to have assumed the existence of a causal hierarchy of celestial spheres, and the incorporeal intelligences parallel to those spheres.[44] Al Farabi also fitted an explanation of prophecy into this scheme, in two levels. According to Davidson (p. 59):

The lower of the two levels, labeled specifically as "prophecy" (*nubuwwa*), is enjoyed by men who have not yet perfected their intellect, whereas the higher, which Alfarabi sometimes specifically names "revelation" (*w-ḥ-y*), comes exclusively to those who stand at the stage of acquired intellect.

This happens in the imagination (Arabic *mutakhayyila*; Greek *phantasia*), a faculty of the mind already described by Aristotle, which Al Farabi described as serving the rational part of the soul (Arabic *'aql*; Greek *Nous*). This faculty of imagination stores sense perceptions (*maḥsūsāt*), disassembles or recombines them, creates figurative or symbolic images (*muḥākāt*) of them which then appear in dreams, visualizes present and predicted events in a way different from conscious deliberation (*rawiyya*). This is under the influence, according to Al Farabi, of the active intellect. Theoretical truth can only be received by this faculty in a figurative or symbolic form, because the imagination is a physical capability and can not receive theoretical information in a proper abstract form. This rarely comes in a waking state, but more often in dreams. The lower type of philosophy is the best possible for the imaginative faculty, but the higher type of prophecy requires not only a receptive imagination, but also the condition of an "acquired intellect", where the human *Nous* is in "conjunction" with the active intellect in the sense of God. Such a prophet is also a philosopher. When a philosopher-prophet has the necessary leadership qualities, he becomes philosopher-king.[45]
Avicenna

In terms of cosmology, according to Davidson (p. 82) "Avicenna's universe has a structure virtually identical with the structure of Al Farabi's" but there are differences in details. As in Al Farabi, there are several levels of intellect, intelligence or nous, each of the higher ones being associated with a celestial sphere. Avicenna however details three different types of effect which each of these higher intellects has, each "thinks" both the necessary existence and the possible being of the intelligence one level higher. And each "emanates" downwards the body and soul of its own celestial sphere, and also the intellect at the next lowest level. The active intellect, as in Al Farabi, is the last in the chain. Avicenna sees active intellect as the cause not only of intelligible thought and the forms in the "sublunar" world we people live, but also the matter. (In other words, three effects.)\[46]\[46]

Concerning the workings of the human soul, Avicenna, like Al Farabi, sees the "material intellect" or potential intellect as something that is not material. He believed the soul was incorporeal, and the potential intellect was a disposition of it which was in the soul from birth. As in Al Farabi there are two further stages of potential for thinking, which are not yet actual thinking, first the mind acquires the most basic intelligible thoughts which we can not think in any other way, such as "the whole is greater than the part", then comes a second level of derivative intelligible thoughts which could be thought.\[46]\[46] Concerning the actualization of thought, Avicenna applies the term "to two different things, to actual human thought, irrespective of the intellectual progress a man has made, and to actual thought when human intellectual development is complete", as in Al Farabi.\[47]\[47]

When reasoning in the sense of deriving conclusions from syllogisms, Avicenna says people are using a physical "cognitive" faculty (mujakkira, fikra) of the soul, which can err. The human cogitative faculty is the same as the "compositive imaginative faculty (mutakhayyila) in reference to the animal soul."\[48]\[48] But some people can use "insight" to avoid this step and derive conclusions directly by conjoining with the active intellect.\[49]\[49]

Once a thought has been learned in a soul, the physical faculties of sense perception and imagination become unnecessary, and as a person acquires more thoughts, their soul becomes less connected to their body.\[50]\[50] For Avicenna, differently to the normal Aristotelian position, all of the soul is by nature immortal. But the level of intellectual development does affect the type of afterlife that the soul can have. Only a soul which has reached the highest type of conjunction with the active intellect can form a perfect conjunction with it after the death of the body, and this is a supreme eudaimonia. Lesser intellectual achievement means a less happy or even painful afterlife.\[51]\[51]

Concerning prophecy, Avicenna identifies a broader range of possibilities which fit into this model, which is still similar to that of Al Farabi.\[52]\[52]

Averroes

Averroes came to be regarded even in Europe as "the Commentator" to "the Philosopher", Aristotle, and his study of the questions surrounding the nous were very influential amongst Jewish and Christian philosophers, with some aspects being quite controversial. According to Herbert Davidson, Averroes' doctrine concerning nous can be divided into two periods. In the first, neoplatonic emanationism, not found in the original works of Aristotle, was combined with a naturalistic explanation of the human material intellect. "It also insists on the material intellect's having an active intellect as a direct object of thought and conjoining with the active intellect, notions never expressed in the Aristotelian canon." It was this presentation which Jewish philosophers such as Moses Narboni and Gersonides understood to be Averroes'. In the later model of the universe, which was transmitted to Christian philosophers, Averroes 'dismisses emanationism and explains the generation of living beings in the sublunar world naturalistically, all in the name of a more genuine Aristotelianism. Yet it abandons the earlier naturalistic conception of the human material intellect and transforms the material intellect into something wholly un-Aristotelian, a single transcendent entity serving all mankind. It nominally salvages human conjunction with the active intellect, but in words that have little content."\[53]\[53]

This position, that humankind shares one active intellect, was taken up by Parisian philosophers such as Siger of Brabant, but also widely rejected by philosophers such as Albertus Magnus, Thomas Aquinas, Ramon Lull, and
Duns Scotus. Despite being widely considered heretical, the position was later defended by many more European philosophers including John of Jandun, who was the primary link bringing this doctrine from Paris to Bologna. After him this position continued to be defended and also rejected by various writers in northern Italy. In the 16th century it finally became a less common position after the renewal of an "Alexandrian" position based on that of Alexander of Aphrodisias, associated with Pietro Pomponazzi.\[54\]

**Christianity**

The Christian New Testament makes mention of the *nous* or *noos* in Romans 7:23\[55\], 12:2\[56\], 1 Corinthians 14:14\[57\], 14:19\[58\], Ephesians 4:17\[59\], 4:23\[60\], 2 Thessalonians 2:2\[61\], and Revelation 17:9\[62\]. In the writings of the Christian fathers a sound or pure *nous* is considered essential to the cultivation of wisdom.\[63\]

**Philosophers influencing western Nous**

While philosophical works were not commonly read or taught in the early middle ages in most of Europe, the works of authors like Boethius and Augustine of Hippo formed an important exception. Both were influenced by neoplatonism, and were amongst the older works that were still known in the time of the Carolingian Renaissance, and the beginnings of Scholasticism.

In his early years Augustine was heavily influenced by Manichaeism and afterward by the Neo-Platonism of Plotinus.\[7\] After his conversion to Christianity and baptism (387), he developed his own approach to philosophy and theology, accommodating a variety of methods and different perspectives.\[64\]

Augustine used neoplatonism selectively. He used both the neoplatonic *Nous*, and the Platonic Form of the Good (or "The Idea of the Good") as equivalent terms for the Christian God, or at least for one particular aspect of God. For example, God, *nous*, can act directly upon matter, and not only through souls, and concerning the souls through which it works upon the world experienced by humanity, some are treated as angels.\[7\]

Scholasticism becomes more clearly defined much later, as the peculiar native type of philosophy in medieval catholic Europe. In this period, Aristotle became "the Philosopher", and scholastic philosophers, like their Jewish and Muslim contemporaries, studied the concept of the *intellectus* on the basis not only of Aristotle, but also late classical interpreters like Augustine and Boethius. A European tradition of new and direct interpretations of Aristotle developed which was eventually strong enough to argue with partial success against some of the interpretations of Aristotle from the Islamic world, most notably Averroes' doctrine of their being one "active intellect" for all humanity. Notable "Catholic" (as opposed to Averroist) Aristotelians included Albertus Magnus and Thomas Aquinas, the founder Thomism, which exists to this day in various forms. Concerning the *nous*, Thomism agrees with those Aristotelians who insist that the intellect is immaterial and separate from any bodily organs, but as per Christian doctrine, the whole of the human soul is immortal, not only the intellect.

**Eastern Orthodox**

The human *nous* in Eastern Orthodox Christianity is the "eye of the heart or soul" or the "mind of the heart".\[65\]\[66\][67][68]\ The soul of man, is created by God in His image, man's soul is intelligent and noetic. Saint Thalassios wrote that God created beings "with a capacity to receive the Spirit and to attain knowledge of Himself; He has brought into existence the senses and sensory perception to serve such beings". Eastern Orthodox Christians hold that God did this by creating mankind with intelligence and noetic faculties.\[69\]

Human reasoning is not enough: there will always remain an "irrational residue" which escapes analysis and which can not be expressed in concepts: it is this unknowable depth of things, that which constitutes their true, indefinable essence that also reflects the origin of things in God. In Eastern Christianity it is by faith or intuitive truth that this component of an object’s existence is grasped.\[70\] Though God through his energies draws us to him, his essence remains inaccessible.\[70\] The operation of faith being the means of free will by which mankind faces the future or unknown, these noetic operations contained in the concept of insight or noesis.\[71\] Faith (*pistis*) is therefore
sometimes used interchangeably with *noesis* in Eastern Christianity.

Angels have intelligence and *nous*, whereas men have reason, both *logos* and *dianoia*, *nous* and sensory perception. This follows the idea that man is a microcosm and an expression of the whole creation or macrocosmos. The human *nous* was darkened after the Fall of Man (which was the result of the rebellion of reason against the *nous*),[72] but after the purification (healing or correction) of the *nous* (achieved through ascetic practices like hesychasm), the human *nous* (the "eye of the heart") will see God's uncreated Light (and feel God's uncreated love and beauty, at which point the nous will start the unceasing prayer of the heart) and become illuminated, allowing the person to become an orthodox theologian.[65][73][74]

In this belief, the soul is created in the image of God. Since God is Trinitarian, Mankind is *Nous*, reason, both *logos* and *dianoia*, and Spirit. The same is held true of the soul (or heart): it has *nous*, word and spirit. To understand this better first an understanding of Saint Gregory Palamas's teaching that man is a representation of the trinitarian mystery should be addressed. This holds that God is not meant in the sense that the Trinity should be understood anthropomorphically, but man is to be understood in a triune way. Or, that the Trinitarian God is not to be interpreted from the point of view of individual man, but man is interpreted on the basis of the Trinitarian God. And this interpretation is revelatory not merely psychological and human. This means that it is only when a person is within the revelation, as all the saints lived, that he can grasp this understanding completely (see *theoria*). The second presupposition is that mankind has and is composed of *nous*, word and spirit like the trinitarian mode of being. Man's *nous*, word and spirit are not hypostases or individual existences or realities, but activities or energies of the soul - whereas in the case with God or the Persons of the Holy Trinity, each are indeed hypostases. So these three components of each individual man are "inseparable from one another' but they do not have a personal character" when in speaking of the being or ontology that is mankind. The *nous* as the eye of the soul, which some Fathers also call the heart, is the center of man and is where true (spiritual) knowledge is validated. This is seen as true knowledge which is "implanted in the *nous* as always co-existing with it".[75]

**Early modern philosophy**

The so-called "early modern" philosophers of western Europe in the 17th and 18th centuries established arguments which led to the establishment of modern science as a methodical approach to improve the welfare of humanity by learning to control nature. As such, speculation about metaphysics, which can not be used for anything practical, and which can never be confirmed against the reality we experience, started to be deliberately avoided, especially according to the so-called "empiricist" arguments of philosophers such as Bacon, Hobbes, Locke and Hume. The Latin motto "nihil in intellectu nisi prius fuerit in sensu" (nothing in the intellect without first being in the senses) has been described as the "guiding principle of empiricism" in the *Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy*.[1] (This was in fact an old Aristotelian doctrine, which they took up, but as discussed above Aristotelians still believed that the senses on their own were not enough to explain the mind.)

These philosophers explain the intellect as something developed from experience of sensations, being interpreted by the brain in a physical way, and nothing else, which means that absolute knowledge is impossible. For Bacon, Hobbes and Locke, who wrote in both English and Latin, "intellectus" was translated as "understanding".[76] Far from seeing it as secure way to perceive the truth about reality, Bacon, for example, actually named the *intellectus* in his *Novum Organum*, and the prooemium to his *Great Instauration*, as a major source of wrong conclusions, because it is biased in many ways, for example towards over-generalizing. For this reason, modern science should be methodical, in order not to be misled by the weak human intellect. He felt that lesser known Greek philosophers such as Democritus "who did not suppose a mind or reason in the frame of things", have been arrogantly dismissed because of Aristotelianism leading to a situation in his time wherein "the search of the physical causes hath been neglected, and passed in silence".[77] The intellect or understanding was the subject of Locke's *Essay Concerning Human Understanding*. [78]
These philosophers also tended not to emphasize the distinction between reason and intellect, describing the peculiar universal or abstract definitions of human understanding as being man-made and resulting from reason itself. Hume even questioned the distinctness or peculiarity of human understanding and reason, compared to other types of associative or imaginative thinking found in some other animals. In modern science during this time, Newton is sometimes described as more empiricist compared to Leibniz.

On the other hand, into modern times some philosophers have continued to propose that the human mind has an in-born (“a priori”) ability to know the truth conclusively, and these philosophers have needed to argue that the human mind has direct and intuitive ideas about nature, and this means it can not be limited entirely to what can be known from sense perception. Amongst the early modern philosophers, some such as Descartes, Spinoza, Leibniz, and Kant, tend to be distinguished from the empiricists as rationalists, and to some extent at least some of them are called idealists, and their writings on the intellect or understanding present various doubts about empiricism, and in some cases they argued for positions which appear more similar to those of medieval and classical philosophers.

The first in this series of modern rationalists, Descartes, is credited with defining a "mind-body problem" which is a major subject of discussion for university philosophy courses. According to the presentation his 2nd Meditation, the human mind and body are different in kind, and while Descartes agrees with Hobbes for example that the human body works like a clockwork mechanism, and its workings include memory and imagination, the real human is the thinking being, a soul, which is not part of that mechanism. Descartes explicitly refused to divide this soul into its traditional parts such as intellect and reason, saying that these things were indivisible aspects of the soul. Descartes was therefore a dualist, but very much in opposition to traditional Aristotelian dualism. In his 6th Meditation he deliberately uses traditional terms and states that his active faculty of giving ideas to his thought must be corporeal, because the things perceived are clearly external to his own thinking and corporeal, while his passive faculty must be incorporeal (unless God is deliberately deceiving us, and then in this case the active faculty would be from God). This is the opposite of the traditional explanation found for example in Alexander of Aphrodisias and discussed above, for whom the passive intellect is material, while the active intellect is not. One result is that in many Aristotelian conceptions of the nous, for example that of Thomas Aquinas, the senses are still a source of all the intellect's conceptions. However, with the strict separation of mind and body proposed by Descartes, it becomes possible to propose that there can be thought about objects never perceived with the body's senses, such as a thousand sided geometrical figure. Gassendi objected to this distinction between the imagination and the intellect in Descartes. Hobbes also objected, and according to his own philosophical approach asserted that the "triangle in the mind comes from the triangle we have seen" and "essence in so far as it is distinguished from existence is nothing else than a union of names by means of the verb is". Descartes, in his reply to this objection insisted that this traditional distinction between essence and existence is "known to all".

His contemporary Blaise Pascal, criticised him in similar words to those used by Plato's Socrates concerning Anaxagoras, discussed above, saying that "I cannot forgive Descartes; in all his philosophy, Descartes did his best to dispense with God. But Descartes could not avoid prodding God to set the world in motion with a snap of his lordly fingers; after that, he had no more use for God." Descartes argued that when the intellect does a job of helping people interpret what they perceive, not with the help of an intellect which enters from outside, but because each human mind comes into being with innate God-given ideas, more similar then, to Plato's theory of anamnesis, only not requiring reincarnation. Apart from such examples as the geometrical definition of a triangle, another example is the idea of God, according to the 3rd Meditation. Error, according to the 4th Meditation, comes about because people make judgments about things which are not in the intellect or understanding. This is possible because the human will, being free, is not limited like the human intellect.

Spinoza, though considered a Cartesian and a rationalist, rejected Cartesian dualism and idealism. In his "pantheistic" approach, explained for example in his Ethics, God is the same as nature, the human intellect is just the same as the human will. The divine intellect of nature is quite different from human intellect, because it is finite, but
Spinoza does accept that the human intellect is a part of the infinite divine intellect.

Leibniz, in comparison to the guiding principle of the empiricists described above, added some words ""nihil in intellectu nisi prius fuerit in sensu, nisi intellectus ipsi" (nothing in the intellect without first being in the senses except the intellect itself). Despite being at the forefront of modern science, and modernist philosophy, in his writings he still referred to the active and passive intellect, a divine intellect, and the immortality of the active intellect.

Berkeley, partly in reaction to Locke, also attempted to reintroduce an "immaterialism" into early modern philosophy (later referred to as "subjective idealism" by others). He argued that individuals can only know sensations and ideas of objects, not abstractions such as "matter", and that ideas depend on perceiving minds for their very existence. This belief later became immortalized in the dictum, "esse est percipi" ("to be is to be perceived"). As in classical and medieval philosophy, Berkeley believed understanding had to be explained by divine intervention, and that all our ideas are put in our mind by God.

Hume accepted some of Berkeley's corrections of Locke, but in answer insisted, as had Bacon and Hobbes, that absolute knowledge is not possible, and that all attempts to show how it could be possible have logical problems. Hume's writings remain highly influential on all philosophy afterwards, and are for example considered by Kant to have shaken him from an intellectual slumber.

Kant, a turning point in modern philosophy, agreed with some classical philosophers and Leibniz that the intellect itself, although it needed sensory experience for understanding to begin, needs something else in order to make sense of the incoming sense information. In his formulation the intellect (Verstand) has "a priori" or innate principles which it has before thinking even starts. Kant represents the starting point of German idealism and a new phase of modernity, while empiricist philosophy has also continued beyond Hume to the present day.

More recent modern philosophy and science

One of the results of the early modern philosophy has been the increasing creation of specialist fields of science, in areas that were once considered part of philosophy, and infant cognitive development and perception now tend to be discussed now more within the sciences of psychology and neuroscience than in philosophy.

Modern mainstream thinking on the mind is not dualist, and sees anything innate in the mind as being a result of genetic and developmental factors which allow the mind to develop. Overall it accepts far less innate "knowledge" (or clear pre-dispositions to particular types of knowledge) than most of the classical and medieval theories derived from philosophers such as Plato, Aristotle, Plotinus and Al Farabi.

Apart from discussions about the history of philosophical discussion on this subject, contemporary philosophical discussion concerning this point has continued concerning what the ethical implications are of the different alternatives still considered likely.

References

[7] Chapter X.
[9] Chapter XII.
[11] So, for example, in the Sankhya philosophy, the faculty of higher intellect (buddhi) is equated with the cosmic principle of differentiation of the world-soul (hiranyagarbha) from the formless and unmanifest Brahman. This outer principle that is equated with buddhi is called mahat (see Wikipedia entry on Sankhya).

[12] The translation quoted is from Amy Bonnette.


[25] Lucus Curtius online text: On the Face in the Moon par. 28 (http://penelope.uchicago.edu/Thayer/E/Roman/Texts/Plutarch/Moralia/The_Face_in_the_Moon/D.html#28)

[26] De anima 84, cited in Davidson, page 9, who translated the quoted words.

[27] Davidson p.43


[29] Translation and citation by Davidson again, from Themistius' paraphrase of Aristotle's De Anima.


[32] Davidson p.18

[33] See and . The direct quote above comes from Moore.

[34] Encyclopedia of The Study in Philosophy (1969), Vol. 5, article on subject "Nous", article author: G.B. Kerferd


[36] Iren. I. xxiv. 4; Theod. H. E. i. 4.

[37] Hipp. vi. 25.

[38] Clement of Alexandria, Strom. iv. 25.


[40] Hipp. vi. 20.


[42] Herodotus, i.

[43] Davidson pp.12-14. One possible inspiration mentioned in a commentary of Aristotle's De Anima attributed to John Philoponus is a philosopher named Marinus, who was probably a student of Proclus. He in any case designated the active intellect to be angelic or daimonic, rather than the creator itself.

[44] Davidson p.18 and p.45, which states "Within the translunar region, Aristotle recognized no causal relationship in what we may call the vertical plane; he did not recognize a causality that runs down through the series of incorporeal movers. And in the horizontal plane, that is, from each intelligence to the corresponding sphere, he recognized causality only in respect to motion, not in respect to existence."


[46] Davidson ch. 4.

[47] Davidson p.86


[49] Davidson pp.102

[50] Davidson p.104


[52] Davidson p.123.

[53] Davidson p.356
Nous

[54] Davidson ch.7
[63] See, for example, the many references to nous and the necessity of its purification in the writings of the Philokalia
[65] Neptic Monasticism (http://www.greekorthodoxchurch.org/neptic_monasticism.html)
[67] "Before embarking on this study, the reader is asked to absorb a few Greek terms for which there is no English word that would not be imprecise or misleading. Chief among these is NOUS, which refers to the 'eye of the heart' and is often translated as mind or intellect. Here we keep the Greek word NOUS throughout. The adjective related to it is NOETIC (noeros)." Orthodox Psychotherapy Section The Knowledge of God according to St. Gregory Palamas (http://www.pelagia.org/htm/b02.en.orthodoxPsychotherapy.06.htm#2k) by Metropolitan Hierotheos Vlachos published by Birth of Theotokos Monastery, Greece (January 1, 2005) ISBN 978-960-7070-27-2
[69] G.E.H. Sherrard, Philip; Ware, Kallistos (Timothy). The Philokalia, Vol. 4. Pg432 Nous the highest facility in man, through which - provided it is purified - he knows God or the inner essences or principles (q.v.) of created things by means of direct apprehension or spiritual perception. Unlike the dianoia or reason (q.v.), from which it must be carefully distinguished, the intellect does not function by formulating abstract concepts and then arguing on this basis to a conclusion reached through deductive reasoning, but it understands divine truth by means of immediate experience, intuition or 'simple cognition' (the term used by St Isaac the Syrian). The intellect dwells in the 'depths of the soul'; it constitutes the innermost aspect of the heart (St Diadochos, 79, 88: in our translation, vol. i, pp. 280, 287). The intellect is the organ of contemplation (q.v.), the 'eye of the heart' (Makarian Homilies).
[72] "THE ILLNESS AND CURE OF THE SOUL" (http://www.pelagia.org/htm/b05.en.the_illness_and_cure_of_the_soul.02.htm#Fall) Metropolitan Hierotheos of Nafpaktos
[76] Bacon Advancement of Learning II.VII.7 (http://www.archive.org/stream/advancementoflearning00bacouoft#page/90/mode/2up/search/ democritus)
[77] and also see De Homine X.

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External links

- Aristotle's Psychology (http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/aristotle-psychology/) from the *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*

**Intersubjective verifiability**

**Intersubjective verifiability** is the capacity of a concept to be readily and accurately communicated between different individuals ("intersubjectively"), and to be reproduced under varying circumstances for the purposes of verification. It is a core principle of empirical, scientific investigation.[1][2][3]

Although there are areas of belief that do not consistently employ intersubjective verifiability (e.g., many religious claims), intersubjective verifiability is a near-universal way of arbitrating truth claims used by people everywhere. In its basic form, it can be found in colloquial expressions, e.g., "I'm from Missouri. Show me!" or "Seeing is believing." The scientific principle of replication of findings by investigators other than those that first reported the phenomenon is simply a more highly structured form of the universal principle of intersubjective verifiability.

**Subjective experience**

Each individual is a subject, and must subjectively experience the physical world. Each subject has a different perspective and point of view on various aspects of the world. However, by sharing their comparable experiences intersubjectively, individuals may gain an increasingly accurate understanding of the world. In this way, many different subjective experiences can come together to form intersubjective ones that are less likely to be prone to individual bias or gaps in knowledge.

While specific internal experiences are not intersubjectively verifiable, the existence of thematic patterns of internal experience can be intersubjectively verified. For example, whether or not people are telling what they believe to be the truth when they make claims can only be known by the claimants. However, we can intersubjectively verify that people almost universally experience discomfort (hunger) when they haven't had enough to eat. We generally have only a crude ability to compare (measure) internal experiences.

**Congruence and incongruence**

When an external, public phenomenon is experienced and carefully described (in words or measurements) by one individual, other individuals can see if their experiences of the phenomenon "fit" the description. If they do, a sense of congruence between one subject and another occurs. This is the basis for a definition of what is true that is agreed upon by the involved parties. If the description does not fit the experience of one or more of the parties involved, incongruence occurs instead.

Incongruent contradictions between the experience and descriptions of different individuals can be caused by a number of factors. One common source of incongruence is the inconsistent use of language in the descriptions people use, such as the same words being used differently. Such semantic problems require more careful development and use of language.

Incongruence also arises from a failure to describe the phenomena well. In these cases, further development of the description, model, or theory used to refer to the phenomena is required.
A third form of incongruence arises when the descriptions do not conform to consensual (i.e., intersubjectively verifiable) experience, such as when the descriptions are faulty, incorrect, wrong, or inaccurate, and need to be replaced by more accurate descriptions, models, or theories.

**Intersubjective verifiability versus belief based on faith**

The contradiction between the truths derived from intersubjective verification and beliefs based on faith or authority (e.g., many religious beliefs) forms the basis for the conflict between religion and science.\[4\] There have been attempts to bring the two into congruence, and the modern, cutting edge of science, especially in physics, seems to many observers to lend itself to a melding of religious experience and intersubjective verification of beliefs. Some scientists have described religious worldviews—generally of a mystical nature—consistent with their understanding of science:

- There are two ways to live your life. One is as though nothing is a miracle. The other is as though everything is a miracle . . .
- Science without religion is lame, religion without science is blind . . .
- The religion of the future will be a cosmic religion. The religion which is based on experience, which refuses dogmatism . . .
- There remains something subtle, intangible and inexplicable. Veneration for this force beyond anything that we can comprehend is my religion. (Albert Einstein)

Other scientists, who are committed to basing belief on intersubjective verification, have called for or predicted the development of a religion consistent with science.

- A religion old or new, that stressed the magnificence of the universe as revealed by modern science, might be able to draw forth reserves of reverence and awe hardly tapped by the conventional faiths. Sooner or later, such a religion will emerge. (Carl Sagan, Pale Blue Dot)
- The evolutionary epic is probably the best myth we will ever have ... The true evolutionary epic, retold as poetry, is as intrinsically ennobling as any religious epic. (Edward O. Wilson)

Responding to this apparent overlap between cutting edge science and mystical experience, in recent years, there have been overt efforts to formulate religious belief systems that are built on truth claims based upon intersubjective verifiability, e.g. Anthroposophy, Yoism\[5\].

**Notes and references**


[5] [http://www.yoism.org](http://www.yoism.org)
See Also

- Objectivity (philosophy)
- Objectivity (science)
- Subjectivity
- Epistemology
- Phenomenology
- Scientific method
- Ineffability

Existential phenomenology

Existential phenomenology is a philosophical current inspired by Martin Heidegger's 1927 work *Sein und Zeit* (Being and Time) and influenced by the existential work of Søren Kierkegaard and the phenomenological work of Edmund Husserl.

In contrast with his former mentor Husserl, Heidegger put ontology before epistemology and thought that phenomenology would have to be based on an observation and analysis of *Dasein* ("being-there"), human being, investigating the fundamental ontology of the *Lebenswelt* (Lifeworld - Husserl's term) underlying all so-called regional ontologies of the special sciences. In contrast with the philosopher Kierkegaard, Heidegger wanted to explore the problem of *Dasein* existentially (existenzial), rather than existentielly (existenziell) because Heidegger argued Kierkegaard had already described the latter with "penetrating fashion". [citation needed]

Development of existential phenomenology

Besides Heidegger, other existential phenomenologists were Hannah Arendt, Emmanuel Levinas, Gabriel Marcel, Jean-Paul Sartre, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, and Samuel Todes.

Other disciplines

Existential phenomenology extends also to other disciplines. For example, Leo Steinberg's essay "The Philosophical Brothel" describes Picasso's *Les Demoiselles d'Avignon* in a perspective that is existential-phenomenological.
# Martin Heidegger

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Martin Heidegger</th>
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| **Born**         | September 26, 1889  
Meßkirch, Baden,  
German Empire |
| **Died**         | 26 May 1976 (aged 86)  
Freiburg im Breisgau, Baden-Württemberg,  
West Germany |
| **Residence**    | Germany |
| **Nationality**  | German |
| **Era**          | 20th-century philosophy |
| **Region**       | Western philosophy |
| **School**       | Phenomenology  
Hermeneutics  
Existentialism |
| **Main interests** | Ontology · Metaphysics  
Art · Greek philosophy  
Technology · Language  
Poetry · Thinking |
| **Notable ideas** | *Dasein* · *Gestell*  
Ontological difference (*Ontologische Differenz*) · *Ekstase*  
Hermeneutic circle  
Fundamental ontology  
Heideggerian terminology |

## Philosophy

### Philosphers

* Aestheticians  
* Epistemologists  
* Ethicists  
* Logicians  
* Metaphysicians  
* Social and political philosophers

### Traditions

* Analytic  
* Continental  
* Eastern  
* Islamic  
* Platonie  
* Scholastic

### Periods
Martin Heidegger (German: [ˈmaʁtɨn ˈhaɪdɐɡɐ]; September 26, 1889 – May 26, 1976) was a German philosopher known for his existential and phenomenological explorations of the "question of Being".[1]

His best known book, Being and Time, is considered one of the most important philosophical works of the 20th century.[2] In it and later works, Heidegger maintained that our way of questioning defines our nature. But philosophy, Western Civilization's chief way of questioning, had in the process of philosophizing lost sight of the being it sought. Finding ourselves "always already" fallen in a world of presuppositions, we lose touch with what being was before its truth became "muddled".[3] As a solution to this condition, Heidegger advocated a return to the practical being in the world, allowing it to reveal, or "unconceal" itself as concealment.[4]

Writing extensively on Nietzsche in his later career, and offering a "phenomenological critique of Kant" in his Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics, Heidegger is known for his post-Kantian philosophy. Heidegger's influence has been far reaching, from philosophy to theology, deconstructionism, literary theory, architecture, and artificial intelligence.[5]

Heidegger is a controversial figure, largely for his affiliation with Nazism, for which he neither apologized nor expressed regret,[6] except in private when he called it "the biggest stupidity of his life" (die größte Dummheit seines Lebens).[7] The so-called Heidegger controversy raises general questions about the relation between Heidegger's thought and his connection to National Socialism.
Overview

Heidegger claimed that Western philosophy since Plato has misunderstood what it means for something "to be", tending to approach this question in terms of a being, rather than asking about Being itself. In other words, Heidegger believed all investigations of being have historically focused on particular entities and their properties, or have treated Being itself as an entity, or substance, with properties. A more authentic analysis of Being would, for Heidegger, investigate "that on the basis of which beings are already understood," or that which underlies all particular entities and allows them to show up as entities in the first place (see world disclosure). But since philosophers and scientists have overlooked the more basic, pre-theoretical ways of being from which their theories derive, and since they have incorrectly applied those theories universally, they have confused our understanding of being and human existence. To avoid these deep-rooted misconceptions, Heidegger believed philosophical inquiry must be conducted in a new way, through a process of retracing the steps of the history of philosophy.

Heidegger argued that this misunderstanding, beginning with Plato, has left its traces in every stage of Western thought. All that we understand, from the way we speak to our notions of "common sense", is susceptible to error, to fundamental mistakes about the nature of being. These mistakes filter into the terms through which being is articulated in the history of philosophy—such as reality, logic, God, consciousness, and presence. In his later philosophy, Heidegger argues that this profoundly affects the way in which human beings relate to modern technology.

The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy states that his writing is 'notoriously difficult', possibly because his thinking was 'original' and clearly on obscure and innovative topics. Heidegger accepted this charge, stating 'Making itself intelligible is suicide for philosophy', and suggesting that intelligibility is what he is critically trying to examine.

Heidegger's work has strongly influenced philosophy, aesthetics of literature, and the humanities. Within philosophy it played a crucial role in the development of existentialism, hermeneutics, deconstructionism, postmodernism, and continental philosophy in general. Well-known philosophers such as Karl Jaspers, Leo Strauss, Ahmad Fardid, Hans-Georg Gadamer, Jean-Paul Sartre, Emmanuel Lévinas, Hannah Arendt, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Michel Foucault, Richard Rorty, William E. Connolly, and Jacques Derrida have all analyzed Heidegger's work.

Heidegger supported National Socialism in 1933 and was a member of the Nazi Party until May 1945. His defenders, notably Hannah Arendt, see this support as arguably a personal "error" (a word which Arendt placed in quotation marks when referring to Heidegger's Nazi-era politics). Defenders think this error was irrelevant to Heidegger's philosophy. Critics, such as Emmanuel Levinas and Karl Löwith, and Theodor Adorno claim that Heidegger's support for National Socialism revealed flaws inherent in his thought.

Biography

Early years
Heidegger was born in rural Meßkirch, Germany. Raised a Roman Catholic, he was the son of the sexton of the village church, Friedrich Heidegger, and his wife Johanna, née Kempf. In their faith, his parents adhered to the First Vatican Council of 1870, which was observed mainly by the poorer class of Meßkirch. The religious controversy between the wealthy Altkatholiken and the working class led to the temporary use of a converted barn for the Roman Catholics. At the festive reunion of the congregation in 1895, the Old Catholic sexton handed the key to six-year-old Martin.[citation needed]

Heidegger's family could not afford to send him to university, so he entered a Jesuit seminary, though he was turned away within weeks because of the health requirement and what the director and doctor of the seminary described as a psychosomatic heart condition.[16] Heidegger later left Catholicism, describing it as incompatible with his philosophy. After studying theology at the University of Freiburg from 1909 to 1911, he switched to philosophy, in part again because of his heart condition.

Heidegger completed his doctoral thesis on psychologism in 1914 influenced by Neo-Thomism and Neo-Kantianism,[17] and in 1916 finished his venia legendi with a thesis on Duns Scotus influenced by Heinrich Rickert and Edmund Husserl.[18] In the two years following, he worked first as an unsalaried Privatdozent, then served as a soldier during the final year of World War I, working behind a desk and never leaving Germany. After the war, he served as a salaried senior assistant to Edmund Husserl at the University of Freiburg in the Black Forest from 1919 until 1923.

Marburg

In 1923, Heidegger was elected to an extraordinary Professorship in Philosophy at the University of Marburg. His colleagues there included Rudolf Bultmann, Nicolai Hartmann, and Paul Natorp. Heidegger's students at Marburg included Hans-Georg Gadamer, Hannah Arendt, Karl Löwith, Gerhard Krüger, Leo Strauss, Jacob Klein, Günther (Stern) Anders, and Hans Jonas. Through a confrontation with Aristotle he began to develop in his lectures the main theme of his philosophy: the question of the sense of being. He extended the concept of subject to the dimension of history and concrete existence, which he found prefigured in such Christian thinkers as Saint Paul, Augustine of Hippo, Luther, and Kierkegaard. He also read the works of Dilthey, Husserl, and Max Scheler.[19]

Freiburg

In 1927, Heidegger published his main work Sein und Zeit (Being and Time). When Husserl retired as Professor of Philosophy in 1928, Heidegger accepted Freiburg's election to be his successor, in spite of a counter-offer by Marburg. Heidegger remained at Freiburg im Breisgau for the rest of his life, declining a number of later offers, including one from Humboldt University of Berlin. His students at Freiburg included Hannah Arendt, Günther Anders, Hans Jonas, Karl Löwith, Charles Malik, Herbert Marcuse, and Ernst Nolte.[20] Emmanuel Levinas attended his lecture courses during his stay in Freiburg in 1928.[21]

Heidegger was elected rector of the University on April 21, 1933, and joined the National Socialist German Workers' (Nazi) Party on May 1.[22] In his inaugural address as rector on May 27 he expressed his support to a German revolution, and in an article and a speech to the students from the same year he even supported Adolf Hitler.[23] However, he resigned the rectorate in April 1934, but remained a member of the Nazi party until 1945, even though Julian Young asserts that the Nazis eventually prevented him from publishing.[24]
Post-war

In late 1946, as France engaged in *épuration légale*, the French military authorities determined that Heidegger should be forbidden from teaching or participating in any university activities because of his association with the Nazi Party.[25] The denazification procedures against Heidegger continued until March 1949, when he was finally pronounced a "Mitläufer" (literally, mit=with, Läufer=runner, i.e. "one who runs along with", but the equivalent meaning in English is closer to "bandwagon effect" or "herd instinct", standing for the notion that people often do and believe things merely because many other people do and believe the same things) of National Socialism, and no punitive measures against him were proposed. This opened the way for his readmission to teaching at Freiburg University in the winter semester of 1950–51.[26] He was granted emeritus status and then taught regularly from 1951 until 1958, and by invitation until 1967.

Personal life

Heidegger married Elfride Petri on March 21, 1917, in a Catholic ceremony officiated by his friend Engelbert Krebs, and a week later in a Protestant ceremony in the presence of her parents. Their first son Jörg was born in 1919. According to published correspondence between the spouses,[27] Hermann (born 1920) is the son of Elfride and Friedel Caesar.

Martin Heidegger had extramarital affairs with Hannah Arendt and Elisabeth Blochmann, both students of his. Arendt was Jewish, and Blochmann had one Jewish parent, making them subject to severe persecution by the Nazi authorities. He helped Blochmann emigrate from Germany prior to World War II, and resumed contact with both of them after the war.[28]

Heidegger spent much time at his vacation home at Todtnauberg, on the edge of the Black Forest. He considered the seclusion provided by the forest to be the best environment in which to engage in philosophical thought.[29]

A few months before his death, he met with Bernhard Welte, a Catholic priest. We do not know the exact nature of the conversation, but we do know it included talk of Heidegger's relationship to the Catholic Church.[30] Heidegger died on May 26, 1976, and was buried in the Meßkirch cemetery, beside his parents and brother.

Philosophy

**Being, time, and Dasein**

Heidegger’s philosophy is founded on the attempt to conjoin what he considers two fundamental insights: the first is his observation that, in the course of over 2,000 years of history, philosophy has attended to all the beings that can be found in the world (including the "world" itself), but has forgotten to ask what "Being" itself is. This is Heidegger's "question of Being," and it is Heidegger's fundamental concern throughout his work. One crucial source of this insight was Heidegger's reading of Franz Brentano's treatise on Aristotle's manifold uses of the word "being," a work which provoked Heidegger to ask what kind of unity underlies this multiplicity of uses. Heidegger opens his *magnum opus*, *Being
and Time, with a citation from Plato's *Sophist* indicating that Western philosophy has neglected "Being" because it was considered obvious, rather than as worthy of question. Heidegger's intuition about the question of Being is thus a historical argument, which in his later work becomes his concern with the "history of Being," that is, the history of the forgetting of Being, which according to Heidegger requires that philosophy retrace its footsteps through a productive "destruction" of the history of philosophy.

The second intuition animating Heidegger's philosophy derives from the influence of Edmund Husserl, a philosopher largely uninterested in questions of philosophical history. Rather, Husserl argued that all that philosophy could and should be is a description of experience (hence the phenomenological slogan, "to the things themselves"). But for Heidegger, this meant understanding that experience is always already situated in a world and in ways of being. Thus Husserl's understanding that all consciousness is "intentional" (in the sense that it is always intended toward something, and is always "about" something) is transformed in Heidegger's philosophy, becoming the thought that all experience is grounded in "care."

This is the basis of Heidegger's "existential analytic", as he develops it in *Being and Time*. Heidegger argues that to describe experience properly entails finding the being for whom such a description might matter. Heidegger thus conducts his description of experience with reference to "Dasein," the being for whom being is a question.

In *Being and Time*, Heidegger criticized the abstract and metaphysical character of traditional ways of grasping human existence as rational animal, person, man, soul, spirit, or subject. Dasein, then, is not intended as a way of conducting a philosophical anthropology, but is rather understood by Heidegger to be the condition of possibility for anything like a philosophical anthropology. Dasein, according to Heidegger, is care. In the course of his existential analytic, Heidegger argues that Dasein, who finds itself thrown into the world amidst things and with others, is thrown into its possibilities, including the possibility and inevitability of one's own mortality. The need for Dasein to assume these possibilities, that is, the need to be responsible for one's own existence, is the basis of Heidegger's notions of authenticity and resoluteness—that is, of those specific possibilities for Dasein which depend on escaping the "vulgar" temporality of calculation and of public life.

The marriage of these two observations depends on the fact that each of them is essentially concerned with time. That Dasein is thrown into an already existing world and thus into its mortal possibilities does not only mean that Dasein is an essentially temporal being; it also implies that the description of Dasein can only be carried out in terms inherited from the Western tradition itself. For Heidegger, unlike for Husserl, philosophical terminology could not be divorced from the history of the use of that terminology, and thus genuine philosophy could not avoid confronting questions of language and meaning. The existential analytic of *Being and Time* was thus always only a first step in Heidegger's philosophy, to be followed by the "dismantling" (Destruktion) of the history of philosophy, that is, a transformation of its language and meaning, that would have made of the existential analytic only a kind of "limit case" (in the sense in which special relativity is a limit case of general relativity).

That Heidegger did not write this second part of *Being and Time*, and that the existential analytic was left behind in the course of Heidegger's subsequent writings on the history of being, might be interpreted as a failure to conjugate his account of individual experience with his account of the vicissitudes of the collective human adventure that he understands the Western philosophical tradition to be. And this would in turn raise the question of whether this failure is due to a flaw in Heidegger's account of temporality, that is, of whether Heidegger was correct to oppose vulgar and authentic time. There are also recent critiques in this regard that were directed at Heidegger's focus on time instead of primarily thinking about being in relation to place and space.
**Being and Time**

*Being and Time* (German title: *Sein und Zeit*), published in 1927, is Heidegger's first academic book. He had been under pressure to publish in order to qualify for Husserl's chair at the University of Freiburg and the success of this work ensured his appointment to the post.

It investigates the question of Being by asking about the being for whom Being is a question. Heidegger names this being *Dasein* (see above), and the book pursues its investigation through themes such as mortality, care, anxiety, temporality, and historicity. It was Heidegger's original intention to write a second half of the book, consisting of a "Destruktion" of the history of philosophy—that is, the transformation of philosophy by re-tracing its history—but he never completed this project.

*Being and Time* influenced many thinkers, including such existentialist thinkers as Jean-Paul Sartre (although Heidegger distanced himself from existentialism—see below).

**Later works: The Turn**

Heidegger's later works, after the Second World War, seem to many commentators (e.g. William J. Richardson[36]) to at least reflect a shift of focus, if not indeed a major change in his philosophical outlook. One way this has been understood is as a shift from "doing" to "dwelling". However, others feel that this is to overstate the difference. For example, in 2011 Mark Wrathall[37] argued that Heidegger pursued and refined the central notion of unconcealment throughout his life as a philosopher. Its importance and continuity in his thinking, Wrathall states, shows that he did not have a 'turn'. A reviewer of Wrathall's book stated: "An ontology of unconcealment ... means a description and analysis of the broad contexts in which entities show up as meaningful to us, as well as the conditions under which such contexts, or worlds, emerge and fade."

Heidegger focuses less on the way in which the structures of being are revealed in everyday behavior, and more on the way in which behavior itself depends on a prior "openness to being." The essence of being human is the maintenance of this openness. Heidegger contrasts this openness to the "will to power" of the modern human subject, which is one way of forgetting this originary openness.

Heidegger understands the commencement of the history of Western philosophy as a brief period of authentic openness to being, during the time of the pre-Socratics, especially Anaximander, Heraclitus, and Parmenides. This was followed, according to Heidegger, by a long period increasingly dominated by the forgetting of this initial openness, a period which commences with Plato, and which occurs in different ways throughout Western history.

Two recurring themes of Heidegger's later writings are poetry and technology. Heidegger sees poetry and technology as two contrasting ways of "revealing." Poetry reveals being in the way in which, if it is genuine poetry, it commences something new. Technology, on the other hand, when it gets going, inaugurates the world of the dichotomous subject and object, which modern philosophy commencing with Descartes also reveals. But with modern technology a new stage of revealing is reached, in which the subject-object distinction is overcome even in the "material" world of technology. The essence of modern technology is the conversion of the whole universe of
beings into an undifferentiated "standing reserve" (Bestand) of energy available for any use to which humans choose to put it. Heidegger described the essence of modern technology as Gestell, or "enframing." Heidegger does not unequivocally condemn technology: while he acknowledges that modern technology contains grave dangers, Heidegger nevertheless also argues that it may constitute a chance for human beings to enter a new epoch in their relation to being. Despite this, some commentators have insisted that an agrarian nostalgia permeates his later work.


**Heidegger and the ground of History**

Heidegger believed the Western world to be on a trajectory headed for total war, and on the brink of profound nihilism (the rejection of all religious and moral principles), which would be the purest and highest revelation of Being itself, offering a horrifying crossroads of either salvation or the end of metaphysics and modernity, rendering the West: a wasteland populated by tool-using brutes, characterized by an unprecedented ignorance and barbarism in which everything is permitted. He thought the latter possibility would degenerate mankind generally into: scientists, workers and brutes; living under the last mantel of one of three ideologies: Americanism, Marxism or Nazism (which he deemed metaphysically identical; as avatars of subjectivity and institutionalized nihilism) and an unfettered totalitarian world technology. Supposedly, this epoch would be ironically celebrated, as the most enlightened and glorious in human history. He envisaged this abyss, to be the greatest event in the West's history; because it enables Humanity to comprehend Being more profoundly and primordially than the Pre-Socratics.

**Influences**

**St. Augustine of Hippo**

Recent scholarship has shown that Heidegger was substantially influenced by St. Augustine of Hippo and that Martin Heidegger's Being and Time would not have been possible without the influence of Augustine's thought. Augustine's Confessions was particularly influential in shaping Heidegger's thought.

**Aristotle and the Greeks**

Heidegger was influenced at an early age by Aristotle, mediated through Catholic theology, medieval philosophy, and Franz Brentano. Aristotle's ethical, logical, and metaphysical works were crucial to the development of his thought in the crucial period of the 1920s. Although he later worked less on Aristotle, Heidegger recommended postponing reading Nietzsche, and to "first study Aristotle for ten to fifteen years." In reading Aristotle, Heidegger increasingly contested the traditional Latin translation and scholastic interpretation of his thought. Particularly important (not least for its influence upon others, both in their interpretation of Aristotle and in rehabilitating a neo-Aristotelian "practical philosophy") was his radical reinterpretation of Book Six of Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics and several books of the Metaphysics. Both informed the argument of Being and Time. Heidegger's thought is original in being an authentic retrieval of the past, a repetition of the possibilities handed down by the tradition.

The idea of asking about being may be traced back via Aristotle to Parmenides. Heidegger claimed to have revived the question of being, the question having been largely forgotten by the metaphysical tradition extending from Plato
to Descartes, a forgetfulness extending to the Age of Enlightenment and then to modern science and technology. In pursuit of the retrieval of this question, Heidegger spent considerable time reflecting on ancient Greek thought, in particular on Plato, Parmenides, Heraclitus, and Anaximander, as well as on the tragic playwright Sophocles [54].

**Dilthey**

Heidegger's very early project of developing a "hermeneutics of factual life" and his hermeneutical transformation of phenomenology was influenced in part by his reading of the works of Wilhelm Dilthey. [citation needed]

Of the influence of Dilthey, Hans-Georg Gadamer writes the following: "As far as Dilthey is concerned, we all know today what I have known for a long time: namely that it is a mistake to conclude on the basis of the citation in Being and Time that Dilthey was especially influential in the development of Heidegger's thinking in the mid-1920s. This dating of the influence is much too late." He adds that by the fall of 1923 it was plain that Heidegger felt "the clear superiority of Count Yorck over the famous scholar, Dilthey." Gadamer nevertheless makes clear that Dilthey's influence was important in helping the youthful Heidegger "in distancing himself from the systematic ideal of Neo-Kantianism, as Heidegger acknowledges in Being and Time."[55] Based on Heidegger's earliest lecture courses, in which Heidegger already engages Dilthey's thought prior to the period Gadamer mentions as "too late", scholars as diverse as Theodore Kisiel and David Farrell Krell have argued for the importance of Diltheyan concepts and strategies in the formation of Heidegger's thought.[56]

Even though Gadamer's interpretation of Heidegger has been questioned, there is little doubt that Heidegger seized upon Dilthey's concept of hermeneutics. Heidegger's novel ideas about ontology required a *gestalt* formation, not merely a series of logical arguments, in order to demonstrate his fundamentally new paradigm of thinking, and the hermeneutic circle offered a new and powerful tool for the articulation and realization of these ideas. [citation needed]

**Husserl**

There is disagreement over the degree of influence that Husserl had on Heidegger's philosophical development, just as there is disagreement about the degree to which Heidegger's philosophy is grounded in phenomenology. These disagreements centre around how much of Husserlian phenomenology is contested by Heidegger, and how much this phenomenology in fact informs Heidegger's own understanding.

On the relation between the two figures, Gadamer wrote: "When asked about phenomenology, Husserl was quite right to answer as he used to in the period directly after World War I: 'Phenomenology, that is me and Heidegger'." Nevertheless, Gadamer noted that Heidegger was no patient collaborator with Husserl, and that Heidegger's "rash ascent to the top, the incomparable fascination he aroused, and his stormy temperament surely must have made Husserl, the patient one, as suspicious of Heidegger as he always had been of Max Scheler's volcanic fire."[57]

Robert J. Dostal understood the importance of Husserl to be profound:

Heidegger himself, who is supposed to have broken with Husserl, bases his hermeneutics on an account of time that not only parallels Husserl's account in many ways but seems to have been arrived at through the same phenomenological method as was used by Husserl.... The differences between Husserl and Heidegger are significant, but if we do not see how much it is the case that Husserlian phenomenology provides the framework for Heidegger's approach, we will not be able to appreciate the exact nature of Heidegger's project in Being and Time or why he let it unfinished.[58]

Daniel O. Dahlstrom saw Heidegger's presentation of his work as a departure from Husserl as unfairly misrepresenting Husserl's own work. Dahlstrom concluded his consideration of the relation between Heidegger and Husserl as follows:

Heidegger's silence about the stark similarities between his account of temporality and Husserl's investigation of internal time-consciousness contributes to a *misrepresentation* of Husserl's account of intentionality. Contrary to the criticisms Heidegger advances in his lectures, intentionality (and, by implication, the meaning of 'to be') in the final analysis is not construed by Husserl as sheer presence (be
it the presence of a fact or object, act or event). Yet for all its "dangerous closeness" to what Heidegger understands by temporality, Husserl's account of internal time-consciousness does differ fundamentally.
In Husserl's account the structure of protentions is accorded neither the finitude nor the primacy that Heidegger claims are central to the original future of ecstatic-horizontal temporality.[59]

Kierkegaard

Heideggerians regarded Søren Kierkegaard as, by far, the greatest philosophical contributor to Heidegger's own existentialist concepts.[60] Heidegger's concepts of anxiety (Angst) and mortality draw on Kierkegaard and are indebted to the way in which the latter lays out the importance of our subjective relation to truth, our existence in the face of death, the temporality of existence, and the importance of passionate affirmation of one's individual being-in-the-world.

Hölderlin and Nietzsche

Friedrich Hölderlin and Friedrich Nietzsche were both important influences on Heidegger, and many of his lecture courses were devoted to one or the other, especially in the 1930s and 1940s. The lectures on Nietzsche focused on fragments posthumously published under the title The Will to Power, rather than on Nietzsche's published works. Heidegger read The Will to Power as the culminating expression of Western metaphysics, and the lectures are a kind of dialogue between the two thinkers.

This is also the case for the lecture courses devoted to the poetry of Friedrich Hölderlin, which became an increasingly central focus of Heidegger's work and thought. Heidegger grants to Hölderlin a singular place within the history of being and the history of Germany, as a herald whose thought is yet to be "heard" in Germany or the West. Many of Heidegger's works from the 1930s onwards include meditations on lines from Hölderlin's poetry, and several of the lecture courses are devoted to the reading of a single poem (see, for example, Hölderlin's Hymn "The Ister").

Heidegger and Eastern thought

Some writers on Heidegger's work see possibilities within it for dialogue with traditions of thought outside of Western philosophy, particularly East Asian thinking. Despite perceived differences between Eastern and Western philosophy, some of Heidegger's later work, particularly "A Dialogue on Language between a Japanese and an Inquirer", does show an interest in initiating such a dialogue.[61] Heidegger himself had contact with a number of leading Japanese intellectuals, including members of the Kyoto School, notably Hajime Tanabe and Kuki Shūzō. It has also been claimed that a number of elements within Heidegger's thought bear a close parallel to Eastern philosophical ideas, particularly Zen Buddhism and Taoism. Paul Hsao records Chang Chung-Yuan saying that "Heidegger is the only Western Philosopher who not only intellectually understands but has intuitively grasped Taoist thought."[citation needed] Some authors see great influence of Japanese scholars in Heidegger's work, although this influence is not acknowledged by the author.[62]

Islam

Research has been done on the relationships between Western philosophy and the history of ideas in Islam. Some of these scholars interested in Arabic philosophical medieval sources are influenced by Heidegger's work, including recent studies by Nader El-Bizri.[63] It is claimed the works of counter-enlightenment philosophers such as Heidegger, along with Friedrich Nietzsche and Joseph de Maistre, influenced Iran's Shia Islamists, notably Ali Shariati. This included the construction of the ideological foundations of the Iranian Revolution and modern political Islam.[64][65]
The Heidegger controversy

The rectorate

Adolf Hitler was sworn in as Chancellor of Germany on January 30, 1933. Heidegger was elected rector of the University of Freiburg on April 21, 1933, and assumed the position the following day. On May 1 he joined the Nazi Party.

Heidegger delivered his inaugural address, the Rektoratsrede, on "Die Selbstbehauptung der Deutschen Universität" ("The Self-assertion of the German University") on May 27.

His tenure as rector was fraught with difficulties from the outset. Some National Socialist education officials viewed him as a rival, while others saw his efforts as comical. Some of Heidegger's fellow National Socialists also ridiculed his philosophical writings as gibberish. He finally offered his resignation on April 23, 1934, and it was accepted on April 27. Heidegger remained a member of both the academic faculty and of the Nazi Party until the end of the war. [citation needed]

Philosophical historian Hans Sluga wrote:

"Though as rector he prevented students from displaying an anti-Semitic poster at the entrance to the university and from holding a book burning, he kept in close contact with the Nazi student leaders and clearly signaled to them his sympathy with their activism."[66]

In 1945 Heidegger wrote of his term as rector, giving the writing to his son Hermann; it was published in 1983:

"The rectorate was an attempt to see something in the movement that had come to power, beyond all its failings and crudeness, that was much more far-reaching and that could perhaps one day bring a concentration on the Germans' Western historical essence. It will in no way be denied that at the time I believed in such possibilities and for that reason renounced the actual vocation of thinking in favor of being effective in an official capacity. In no way will what was caused by my own inadequacy in office be played down. But these points of view do not capture what is essential and what moved me to accept the rectorate."[67]

Treatment of Husserl

Beginning in 1917, German-Jewish philosopher Edmund Husserl championed Heidegger's work, and helped him secure the retiring Husserl's chair in Philosophy at the University of Freiburg.[68]

On April 6, 1933, the Reichskommissar of Baden Province, Robert Wagner, suspended all Jewish government employees, including present and retired faculty at the University of Freiburg. Heidegger's predecessor as Rector formally notified Husserl of his "enforced leave of absence" on April 14, 1933.

Heidegger became Rector of the University of Freiburg on April 22, 1933. The following week the national Reich law of April 28, 1933, replaced Reichskommissar Wagner's decree. The Reich law required the firing of Jewish professors from German universities, including those, such as Husserl, who had converted to Christianity. The termination of the retired professor Husserl's academic privileges thus did not involve any specific action on Heidegger's part.[69]

Heidegger had by then broken off contact with Husserl, other than through intermediaries. Heidegger later claimed that his relationship with Husserl had already become strained after Husserl publicly "settled accounts" with Heidegger and Max Scheler in the early 1930s.[70]
Heidegger did not attend his former mentor's cremation in 1938. In 1941, under pressure from publisher Max Niemeyer, Heidegger agreed to remove the dedication to Husserl from Being and Time (restored in post-war editions).\[71\]

Heidegger's behavior towards Husserl has evoked controversy. Hannah Arendt initially suggested that Heidegger's behavior precipitated Husserl's death. She called Heidegger a "potential murderer." However, she later recanted her accusation.\[72\]

**Post-rectorate period**

After the failure of Heidegger's rectorship, he withdrew from most political activity, without canceling his membership in the NSDAP (Nazi Party). Nevertheless, references to National Socialism continued to appear in his work.

The most controversial such reference occurred during a 1935 lecture which was published in 1953 as part of the book Introduction to Metaphysics. In the published version, Heidegger refers to the "inner truth and greatness" of the National Socialist movement (die innere Wahrheit und Größe dieser Bewegung), but he then adds a qualifying statement in parentheses: "namely, the confrontation of planetary technology and modern humanity" (nämlich die Begegnung der planetarisch bestimmten Technik und des neuzeitlichen Menschen). However, it subsequently transpired that this qualification had not been made during the original lecture, although Heidegger claimed that it had been. This has led scholars to argue that Heidegger still supported the Nazi party in 1935 but that he did not want to admit this after the war, and so he attempted to silently correct his earlier statement.\[73\]

In private notes written in 1939, Heidegger took a strongly critical view of Hitler's ideology,\[74\] however in public lectures he seems to have continued to make ambiguous comments which, if they expressed criticism of the regime, did so only in the context of praising its ideals. For instance, in a 1942 lecture, published posthumously, Heidegger said of recent German classics scholarship: "In the majority of 'research results,' the Greeks appear as pure National Socialists. This overenthusiasm on the part of academics seems not even to notice that with such "results" it does National Socialism and its historical uniqueness no service at all, not that it needs this anyhow."\[75\]

An important witness to Heidegger's continued allegiance to National Socialism during the post-rectorship period is his former student Karl Löwith, who met Heidegger in 1936 while Heidegger was visiting Rome. In an account set down in 1940 (though not intended for publication), Löwith recalled that Heidegger wore a swastika pin to their meeting, though Heidegger knew that Löwith was Jewish. Löwith also recalled that Heidegger "left no doubt about his faith in Hitler", and stated that his support for National Socialism was in agreement with the essence of his philosophy.\[76\]

**Post-war period**

After the end of World War II, Heidegger was summoned to appear at a denazification hearing. Heidegger's former lover Hannah Arendt spoke on his behalf at this hearing, while Jaspers spoke against him. The result of the hearings was that Heidegger was forbidden to teach between 1945 and 1951. One consequence of this teaching ban was that Heidegger began to engage far more in the French philosophical scene.\[77\]

In his postwar thinking, Heidegger distanced himself from Nazism, but his critical comments about Nazism seem "scandalous" to some since they tend to equate the Nazi war atrocities with other inhumane practices related to rationalisation and industrialisation, including the treatment of animals by factory farming. For instance in a lecture delivered at Bremen in 1949, Heidegger said: "Agriculture is now a motorized food industry, the same thing in its essence as the production of corpses in the gas chambers and the extermination camps, the same thing as blockades and the reduction of countries to famine, the same thing as the manufacture of hydrogen bombs."\[78\]

In 1967 Heidegger met with the Jewish poet Paul Celan, a concentration camp survivor. Celan visited Heidegger at his country retreat and wrote an enigmatic poem about the meeting, which some interpret as Celan's wish for Heidegger to apologize for his behavior during the Nazi era.\[79\]
Der Spiegel interview

On September 23, 1966, Heidegger was interviewed by Rudolf Augstein and Georg Wolff for Der Spiegel magazine, in which he agreed to discuss his political past provided that the interview be published posthumously (it was published on May 31, 1976). In the interview, Heidegger defended his entanglement with National Socialism in two ways: first, he argued that there was no alternative, saying that he was trying to save the university (and science in general) from being politicized and thus had to compromise with the Nazi administration. Second, he admitted that he saw an “awakening” ("Aufbruch") which might help to find a "new national and social approach,” but said that he changed his mind about this in 1934, largely prompted by the violence of the Night of the Long Knives.

In his interview Heidegger defended as double-speak his 1935 lecture describing the "inner truth and greatness of this movement." He affirmed that Nazi informants who observed his lectures would understand that by "movement" he meant National Socialism. However, Heidegger asserted that his dedicated students would know this statement was no eulogy for the NSDAP. Rather, he meant it as he expressed it in the parenthetical clarification later added to Introduction to Metaphysics (1953), namely, "the confrontation of planetary technology and modern humanity."

The Löwith account from 1936 has been cited to contradict the account given in the Der Spiegel interview in two ways: that there he did not make any decisive break with National Socialism in 1934, and that Heidegger was willing to entertain more profound relations between his philosophy and political involvement. The Der Spiegel interviewers did not bring up Heidegger's 1949 quotation comparing the industrialization of agriculture to the extermination camps. In fact, the interviewers were not in possession of much of the evidence now known for Heidegger's Nazi sympathies.

Academic Genealogy

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Notable teachers</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Edmund Husserl</td>
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<td>• Nicolai Hartmann</td>
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<td>• Heinrich Rickert</td>
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</tbody>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Notable students</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Hannah Arendt</td>
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<td>• Hans-Georg Gadamer</td>
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<td>• Hans Jonas</td>
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<td>• Kuki Shūzō</td>
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<td>• Karl Löwith</td>
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<td>• Herbert Marcuse</td>
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<td>• Leo Strauss</td>
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<td>• Jan Patočka</td>
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<td>• Xavier Zubiri</td>
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<td>• Karl Rahner</td>
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<td>• Emmanuel Levinas</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
Influence and reception in France

Heidegger was one of the most influential philosophers of the 20th century, and his ideas have penetrated into many areas, but in France there is a very long and particular history of reading and interpreting his work.\[citation needed\]

Existentialism and pre-war influence

Heidegger's influence on French philosophy began in the 1930s, when Being and Time, "What is Metaphysics?" and other Heideggerian texts were read by Jean-Paul Sartre and other existentialists, as well as by thinkers such as Emmanuel Levinas, Alexandre Kojève and Georges Bataille.\[82\] Because Heidegger's discussion of ontology (the study of being) is rooted in an analysis of the mode of existence of individual human beings (Da-sein, or there-being), his work has often been associated with existentialism. The influence of Heidegger on Sartre's Being and Nothingness is marked, but Heidegger felt that Sartre had misread his work, as he argued in later texts such as the "Letter on 'Humanism'." In that text, intended for a French audience, Heidegger explained this misreading in the following terms:

Sartre's key proposition about the priority of existentia over essentia [that is, Sartre's statement that "existence precedes essence"] does, however, justify using the name "existentialism" as an appropriate title for a philosophy of this sort. But the basic tenet of "existentialism" has nothing at all in common with the statement from Being and Time [that "the 'essence' of Dasein lies in its existence"]—apart from the fact that in Being and Time no statement about the relation of essentia and existentia can yet be expressed, since there it is still a question of preparing something precursory.\[83\]

"Letter on 'Humanism'" is often seen as a direct response to Sartre's 1945 lecture "Existentialism is a Humanism." Aside from merely disputing readings of his own work, however, in "Letter on 'Humanism,'" Heidegger asserts that "Every humanism is either grounded in a metaphysics or is itself made to be the ground of one." Heidegger's largest issue with Sartre's existential humanism is that, while it does make a humanistic 'move' in privileging existence over essence, "the reversal of a metaphysical statement remains a metaphysical statement." From this point onward in his thought, Heidegger attempted to think beyond metaphysics to a place where the articulation of the fundamental questions of ontology were fundamentally possible: only from this point can we restore (that is, re-give [redonner]) any possible meaning to the word "humanism".

Post-war forays into France

After the war, Heidegger was banned from university teaching for a period on account of his activities as Rector of Freiburg University. He developed a number of contacts in France, where his work continued to be taught, and a number of French students visited him at Todtnauberg (see, for example, Jean-François Lyotard's brief account in Heidegger and "the Jews", which discusses a Franco-German conference held in Freiburg in 1947, one step toward bringing together French and German students). Heidegger subsequently made several visits to France, and made efforts to keep abreast of developments in French philosophy by way of correspondence with Jean Beaufret, an early French translator of Heidegger, and with Lucien Braun.

Derrida and deconstruction

Deconstruction came to Heidegger's attention in 1967 by way of Lucien Braun's recommendation of Jacques Derrida's work (Hans-Georg Gadamer was present at an initial discussion and indicated to Heidegger that Derrida's work came to his attention by way of an assistant). Heidegger expressed interest in meeting Derrida personally after the latter sent him some of his work. There was discussion of a meeting in 1972, but this failed to take place.\[citation needed\] Heidegger's interest in Derrida is said by Braun to have been considerable (as is evident in two letters, of September 29, 1967 and May 16, 1972, from Heidegger to Braun). Braun also brought to Heidegger's attention the work of Michel Foucault. Foucault's relation to Heidegger is a matter of considerable difficulty; Foucault acknowledged Heidegger as a philosopher whom he read but never wrote about. (For more on this see Penser à
Strasbourg, Jacques Derrida, et al., which includes reproductions of both letters and an account by Braun, "À mi-chemin entre Heidegger et Derrida").

Jacques Derrida made emphatic efforts to displace the understanding of Heidegger's work that had been prevalent in France from the period of the ban against Heidegger teaching in German universities, which amounted to an almost wholesale rejection of the influence of Jean-Paul Sartre and existentialist terms. In Derrida's view, deconstruction is a tradition inherited via Heidegger (the French term "déconstruction" is a term coined to translate Heidegger's use of the words "Destruktion"—literally "destruction"—and "Abbau"—more literally "de-building"). According to Derrida, Sartre's interpretation of Dasein and other key Heideggerian concerns is overly psychologistic, anthropocentric, and misses the historicality central to Dasein in Being and Time. Because of Derrida's vehement attempts to "rescue" Heidegger from his existentialist interpreters (and also from Heidegger's "orthodox" followers), Derrida has at times been represented as a "French Heidegger", to the extent that he, his colleagues, and his former students are made to go proxy for Heidegger's worst (political) mistakes, despite ample evidence that the reception of Heidegger's work by later practitioners of deconstruction is anything but doctrinaire.

The Farías debate

Derrida, Lacoue-Labarthe, and Jean-François Lyotard, among others, all engaged in debate and disagreement about the relation between Heidegger's philosophy and his Nazi politics. These debates included the question of whether it was possible to do without Heidegger's philosophy, a position which Derrida in particular rejected. Forums where these debates took place include the proceedings of the first conference dedicated to Derrida's work, published as "Les Fins de l'homme à partir du travail de Jacques Derrida: colloque de Cerisy, 23 juillet-2 août 1980", Derrida's "Feu la cendre/cio' che resta del fuoco", and the studies on Paul Celan by Lacoue-Labarthe and Derrida which shortly preceded the detailed studies of Heidegger's politics published in and after 1987.

When in 1987 Víctor Farías published his book Heidegger et le nazisme, this debate was taken up by many others, some of whom were inclined to disparage so-called "deconstructionists" for their association with Heidegger's philosophy. Derrida and others not only continued to defend the importance of reading Heidegger, but attacked Farías on the grounds of poor scholarship and for what they saw as the sensationalism of his approach. Not all scholars agreed with this negative assessment: Richard Rorty, for example, declared that "[Farías'] book includes more concrete information relevant to Heidegger's relations with the Nazis than anything else available, and it is an excellent antidote to the evasive apologetics that are still being published."[84]

Bernard Stiegler

More recently, Heidegger's thought has considerably influenced the work of the French philosopher Bernard Stiegler. This is evident even from the title of Stiegler's multi-volume magnum opus, La technique et le temps (volume one translated into English as Techics and Time, 1: The Fault of Epimeetheus). Stiegler offers an original reading of Heidegger, arguing that there can be no access to "originary temporality" other than via material, that is, technical, supports, and that Heidegger recognised this in the form of his account of world historicality, yet in the end suppressed that fact. Stiegler understands the existential analytic of Being and Time as an account of psychic individuation, and his later "history of being" as an account of collective individuation. He understands many of the problems of Heidegger's philosophy and politics as the consequence of Heidegger's inability to integrate the two.
Giorgio Agamben
Heidegger has been very influential on the work of Italian philosopher Giorgio Agamben. Agamben attended seminars in France led by Heidegger in the late 1960s.\[86\]

Criticism
Heidegger's influence upon 20th century continental philosophy is unquestioned and has produced a variety of critical responses.

Early criticisms
The content of *Being and Time*, according to Husserl, claimed to deal with ontology, but from Husserl's perspective only did so in the first few pages of the book. Having nothing further to contribute to an ontology independent of human existence, Heidegger changed the topic to *Dasein*. Whereas Heidegger argued that the question of human existence is central to the pursuit of the question of being, Husserl criticized this as reducing phenomenology to "philosophical anthropology" and offering an abstract and incorrect portrait of the human being.\[87\]


Left-Hegelianism and critical theory
Hegel-influenced Marxist thinkers, especially György Lukács and the Frankfurt School, associated the style and content of Heidegger's thought with German irrationalism and criticized its political implications.

Initially members of the Frankfurt School were positively disposed to Heidegger, becoming more critical at the beginning of the 1930s. Heidegger's student Herbert Marcuse became associated with the Frankfurt School. Initially striving for a synthesis between Hegelian Marxism and Heidegger's phenomenology, Marcuse later rejected Heidegger's thought for its "false concreteness" and "revolutionary conservativism." Theodor Adorno wrote an extended critique of the ideological character of Heidegger's early and later use of language in the *Jargon of Authenticity*. Contemporary social theorists associated with the Frankfurt School have remained largely critical of Heidegger's works and influence. In particular, Jürgen Habermas admonishes the influence of Heidegger on recent French philosophy in his polemic against "postmodernism" in *The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity* (1985). However, recent work by philosopher and critical theorist Nikolas Kompridis tries to show that Heidegger's insights into world disclosure are badly misunderstood and mishandled by Habermas, and are of vital importance for critical theory, offering an important way of renewing that tradition.\[88\][89]
Reception by Analytic and Anglo-American philosophy

Criticism of Heidegger's philosophy has also come from analytic philosophy, beginning with logical positivism. In "The Elimination of Metaphysics Through Logical Analysis of Language" (1932), Rudolf Carnap accused Heidegger of offering an "illusory" ontology, criticizing him for committing the fallacy of reification and for wrongly dismissing the logical treatment of language which, according to Carnap, can only lead to writing "nonsensical pseudo-propositions."

A strong critic of Heidegger's philosophy was the British logical positivist A. J. Ayer. In Ayer's view, Heidegger proposed vast, overarching theories regarding existence, which are completely unverifiable through empirical demonstration and logical analysis. For Ayer, this sort of philosophy was a poisonous strain in modern thought. He considered Heidegger to be the worst example of such philosophy, which Ayer believed to be entirely useless.

Bertrand Russell commented, expressing the sentiments of many mid-20th-century analytic philosophers, that:

Highly eccentric in its terminology, his philosophy is extremely obscure. One cannot help suspecting that language is here running riot. An interesting point in his speculations is the insistence that nothingness is something positive. As with much else in Existentialism, this is a psychological observation made to pass for logic. [90]

Roger Scruton stated that: "His major work Being and Time is formidably difficult—unless it is utter nonsense, in which case it is laughably easy. I am not sure how to judge it, and have read no commentator who even begins to make sense of it." [91]

The analytic tradition values clarity of expression. Heidegger, however, has on occasion appeared to take an opposing view, stating for example that 'those in the crossing must in the end know what is mistaken by all urging for intelligibility: that every thinking of being, all philosophy, can never be confirmed by 'facts,' i.e., by beings. Making itself intelligible is suicide for philosophy. Those who idolize 'facts' never notice that their idols only shine in a borrowed light. They are also meant not to notice this; for thereupon they would have to be at a loss and therefore useless. But idolizers and idols are used wherever gods are in flight and so announce their nearness." [10]

Apart from the charge of obscurantism, other analytic philosophers considered the actual content of Heidegger's work to be either faulty and meaningless, vapid or uninteresting.

Not all analytic philosophers, however, have been as hostile. Gilbert Ryle wrote a critical yet positive review of Being and Time. Ludwig Wittgenstein made a remark recorded by Friedrich Waismann: "To be sure, I can imagine what Heidegger means by being and anxiety" [92] which has been construed by some commentators [93] as sympathetic to Heidegger's philosophical approach. These positive and negative analytic evaluations have been collected in Michael Murray (ed.), Heidegger and Modern Philosophy: Critical Essays (Yale University Press, 1978). Heidegger's reputation within English-language philosophy has slightly improved in philosophical terms in some part through the efforts of Hubert Dreyfus, Richard Rorty, and a recent generation of analytically oriented phenomenology scholars. Pragmatist Rorty claimed that Heidegger's approach to philosophy in the first half of his career has much in common with that of the latter-day Ludwig Wittgenstein. Nevertheless, Rorty asserted that what Heidegger had constructed in his writings was a myth of being rather than an account of it. [94]

Contemporary European reception

Even though Heidegger is considered by many observers to be the most influential philosopher of the 20th century in continental philosophy, aspects of his work have been criticised by those who nevertheless acknowledge this influence, such as Hans-Georg Gadamer and Jacques Derrida. Some questions raised about Heidegger's philosophy include the priority of ontology, the status of animals, the nature of the religious, Heidegger's supposed neglect of ethics (Emmanuel Levinas), the body (Maurice Merleau-Ponty), or sexual difference (Luce Irigaray).

Emmanuel Levinas was deeply influenced by Heidegger yet became one of his fiercest critics, contrasting the infinity of the good beyond being with the immanence and totality of ontology. Levinas also condemned Heidegger's
involvement with National Socialism, stating "One can forgive many Germans, but there are some Germans it is difficult to forgive. It is difficult to forgive Heidegger."[95]

**Cinema**

- **Being in the World**[96] draws on Heidegger's work to explore what it means to be human in a technological age. A number of Heidegger scholars are interviewed, including Hubert Dreyfus, Mark Wrathall, Albert Borgmann, John Haugeland, and Taylor Carman.
- **The Ister** (2004) is a film based on Heidegger's 1942 lecture course on Friedrich Hölderlin, and features Jean-Luc Nancy, Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe, Bernard Stiegler, and Hans-Jürgen Syberberg.[97]
- The 2006 experimental short *Die Entnazifizierung des MH* by James T. Hong imagines Heidegger's denazification proceedings.[98]
- In the 1981 film *My Dinner with Andre*, Heidegger's theory of "experiencing one's being to the fullest is like experiencing the decay of that being towards one's death, as a part of your experience" is quoted by the actor Wallace Shawn, who plays himself.

**Bibliography**

**Gesamtausgabe**

Heidegger's collected works are published by Vittorio Klostermann.[99] The *Gesamtausgabe* was begun during Heidegger's lifetime. He defined the order of publication and dictated that the principle of editing should be "ways not works." Publication has not yet been completed.

The contents are listed here: Heidegger Gesamtausgabe.

**Selected works**

A complete list of English translations of Heidegger's work is available here.[100]
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Work</th>
<th>Notes</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1950</td>
<td>Holzwege, Gesamtausgabe Volume 5. This collection includes &quot;Der Ursprung des Kunstwerkes&quot; (1935–1936)</td>
<td>Off the Beaten Track. This collection includes &quot;The Origin of the Work of Art&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1959</td>
<td>Gelassenheit, in Gesamtausgabe Volume 16</td>
<td>Discourse On Thinking</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1959</td>
<td>Unterwegs zur Sprache, Gesamtausgabe Volume 12</td>
<td>On the Way To Language, published without the essay &quot;Die Sprache&quot; (&quot;Language&quot;) by arrangement with Heidegger</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Further reading**

**On Being and Time**
- William Blattner, *Heidegger's Temporal Idealism*
- Taylor Carman, *Heidegger's Analytic: Interpretation, Discourse, and Authenticity in "Being and Time"
- Hubert Dreyfus, *Being-in-the-World: A Commentary on Heidegger's Being and Time, Division I*
- Michael Gelven, *A Commentary on Heidegger's Being and Time, Revised Edition*
- E.F. Kaelin, "Heidegger's Being & Time: A Reading for Readers"
- Magda King, *A Guide to Heidegger's Being and Time*
- Theodore Kisiel, *The Genesis of Heidegger's Being and Time*
- Stephen Mulhall, *Heidegger and Being and Time*
- James Luchte, *Heidegger's Early Philosophy: The Phenomenology of Ecstatic Temporality*
- Mark Wrathall, *How to Read Heidegger*

**Biographies**
- Víctor Farías, *Heidegger and Nazism*, ed. by Joseph Margolis and Tom Rockmore
- Hugo Ott, *Martin Heidegger: A Political Life*
- Rüdiger Safranski, *Martin Heidegger: Between Good and Evil*
- John van Buren, *The Young Heidegger: Rumor of the Hidden King*
Politics and National Socialism

- Pierre Bourdieu, *The Political Ontology of Martin Heidegger*
- Miguel de Beistegui, *Heidegger and the Political: Dystopias*
- Jacques Derrida, *Of Spirit: Heidegger and the Question*
- Dominique Janicaud, *The Shadow of That Thought*
- Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe, “Transcendence Ends in Politics”, in *Typography: Mimesis, Philosophy, Politics*
- Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe, *Heidegger, Art, and Politics: The Fiction of the Political*
- Karl Löwith, *Martin Heidegger and European Nihilism*
- Karl Löwith Heidegger's Existentialism [101]
- Jean-François Lyotard, *Heidegger and "the jews"
- Günther Neske & Emil Kettering (eds.), *Martin Heidegger and National Socialism: Questions and Answers*
- Political Texts – Rectoral Addresses [102]
- Tom Rockmore and Joseph Margolis (ed.), *The Heidegger Case*
- Daniel Ross, *Heidegger and the Question of the Political* [103]
- Hans Sluga, *Heidegger's Crisis: Philosophy and Politics in Nazi Germany*
- Iain Thomson, *Heidegger on Ontotheology: Technology and the Politics of Education*
- Dana Villa, *Arendt and Heidegger: the Fate of the Political*
- Julian Young, *Heidegger philosophy Nazism*

Other secondary literature

- Robert Bernasconi, *Heidegger in Question: The Art of Existing*
- Walter A. Brogan, *Heidegger and Aristotle: The Twofoldness of Being*
- Steven Galt Crowell, *Husserl, Heidegger, and the Space of Meaning: Paths toward Transcendental Phenomenology*
- Jacques Derrida, "*Ousia and Gramme*: Note on a Note from *Being and Time*", in *Margins of Philosophy*
- Paul Edwards, *Heidegger's Confusions*
• Christopher Fynsk, *Heidegger: Thought and Historicity*
• Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe, *Poetry as Experience*
• Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe, *Heidegger and the Politics of Poetry*
• S. J. McGrath, *Heidegger. A (Very) Critical Introduction*
• William McNeill, *The Time of Life: Heidegger and Ethos*
• Jean-Luc Nancy, "The Decision of Existence", in *The Birth to Presence*
• Herman Philipse, *Heidegger's Philosophy of Being: A Critical Interpretation*
• Richard Pollt, *Heidegger: An Introduction*
• François Raffoul, *Heidegger and the Subject*
• François Raffoul & David Pettigrew (ed), *Heidegger and Practical Philosophy*
• William J. Richardson, *Heidegger: Through Phenomenology to Thought*.
• John Sallis, *Echoes: After Heidegger*
• John Sallis (ed), *Reading Heidegger: Commemorations*, including articles by Robert Bernasconi, Jacques Derrida, Rodolphe Gasché, and John Sallis, among others.
• Reiner Schürmann, *Heidegger on Being and Acting: From Principles to Anarchy*
• Tony See, *Community without Identity: The Ontology and Politics of Heidegger*
• Adam Sharr, *Heidegger's Hut*
• Bernard Stiegler, *Technics and Time, 1: The Fault of Epimetheus*
• Andrzej Warminski, *Readings in Interpretation: Hölderlin, Hegel, Heidegger*
• Julian Young, *Heidegger's Philosophy of Art*
• Julian Young, *Heidegger's Later Philosophy*

**Reception in France**

• Ethan Kleinberg, *Generation Existential: Heidegger's Philosophy in France, 1927–1961*
Influence on Japanese philosophy


Influence on Asian philosophy


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[4] Ibid., 60.
[5] Dreyfus, Hubert. "Why Heideggerian AI Failed and how Fixing it would Require making it more Heideggerian".
[6] For critical readings of the interview (published in 1966 as "Only a God Can Save Us", Der Spiegel), see the "Special Feature on Heidegger and Nazism" in *Critical Inquiry* 15:2 (Winter 1989), particularly the contributions by Jürgen Habermas and Blanchot The issue includes partial translations of Derrida’s *Of Spirit* and Lacoue-Labarthe’s *Of Spirit and Heidegger, Art, and Politics: the Fiction of the Political*.
[18] Note, however, that it was discovered later that one of the two main sources used by Heidegger was not by Scotus, but by Thomas of Erfurt. Thus Heidegger’s 1916 doctoral thesis, *Die Kategorien- und Bedeutungslehre des Duns Scotus*, should have been entitled, *Die Kategorienlehre des Duns Scotus und die Bedeutungslehre des Thomas von Erfurt*. Source: Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/erfurt/)
[31] For a study on Heidegger's reading of the Sophist and his less central interest in Plato's Timaeus and its conception of space qua khôra: see: Nader El-Bizri, "On Kai khôra: Situating Heidegger between the Sophist and the Timaeus", Studia Phaenomenologica, Vol. IV, Issue 1–2 (2004), pp. 73–98. This study is also closely connected with an investigation of Heidegger's later reflections on 'dwelling' as set in: Nader El-Bizri, 'Being at Home Among Things: Heidegger's Reflections on Dwelling', Environment, Space, Place 3 (2011), pp. 47-71. Refer also to other aspects of this research under the section of 'Heidegger and Eastern Thought' in the main body of the text above.
[32] In everyday German, 'Dasein' means 'existence.' It is composed of "Da" (here/there) and "sein" (being). Dasein is transformed in Heidegger's usage from its everyday meaning to refer, rather, to that being that is there in its world, that is, the being for whom being matters. In later publications Heidegger writes the term in hyphenated form as Da-sein, thus emphasizing the distance from the word's ordinary usage.
[33] Jacques Derrida describes this in the following terms: "We can see then that Dasein, though not man, is nevertheless nothing other than man." Jacques Derrida, "The Ends of Man", Margins of Philosophy (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982), p. 127.
[38] http://ndpr.nd.edu/review.cfm?id=24212
[52] Heidegger's hidden sources: East Asian influences on his work By Reinhard May, Graham Parkes

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3. Seyla Benhabib, The Personal is the Political (http://www.bostonreview.net/BR24.5/benhabib.html#5) (October/November 1999 issue of Boston Review.)


8. Martin Heidegger, Mindfulness (Continuum, 2006), section 47.


32. http://www.klostermann.de/philo/phi_hei.htm

33. http://think.hyperjeff.net/Heidegger


External links

General information

- German Heidegger Society (http://www.heidegger-gesellschaft.de/) (German)
- Der Spiegel Interview (http://lacan.com/heidespie.html)
- Timeline of German Philosophers (http://www.weple.org/timeline.html#ids=14631,12007,12598,700,10671,9518,37304,95184,&title=8 German Philosophers)
- Human, all too human: a BBC film of his early life, with a focus on his political involvement (http://www.filmsdocumentary.com/design-for-living-martin-heidegger)

Works by Heidegger

- English translations of Heidegger's works (http://think.hyperjeff.net/Heidegger)
- Heidegger works on archive.org (http://www.archive.org/search.php?query=creator:"Martin Heidegger")
- Some volumes of Gesamtausgabe (Klostermann) in German (http://rutracker.org/forum/viewtopic.php?t=2947365)
Being and Time (German: Sein und Zeit, 1927) is a book by the German philosopher Martin Heidegger. Although written quickly, and despite the fact that Heidegger never completed the project outlined in the introduction, it remains his most important work and has profoundly influenced 20th-century philosophy, particularly existentialism, hermeneutics and deconstruction.

Heidegger's original project

Being and Time was originally intended to consist of two major parts, each part consisting of three divisions. Heidegger was forced to prepare the book for publication when he had completed only the first two divisions of part one. The remaining divisions planned for Being and Time (particularly the divisions on time and being, Kant, and Aristotle) were never published, although in many respects they are addressed in one form or another in Heidegger’s other works. In terms of structure, Being and Time remains as it was when it first appeared in print; it consists of the lengthy two-part introduction, followed by Division One, the "Preparatory Fundamental Analysis of Dasein,” and Division Two, ”Dasein and Temporality."
Introductory summary

Being

On the first page of *Being and Time*, Heidegger describes the project in the following way: "our aim in the following treatise is to work out the question of the sense of being and to do so concretely." Heidegger claims that traditional ontology has prejudicially overlooked this question, dismissing it as overly general, undefinable, or obvious. Instead Heidegger proposes to understand being itself, as distinguished from any specific entities (beings). Heidegger claims that "Being' is not something like a being." Being, Heidegger claims, is "what determines beings as beings, that in terms of which beings are already understood." Heidegger is seeking to identify the criteria or conditions by which any specific entity can show up at all (see world disclosure).

If we grasp Being, we will clarify the meaning of being, or "sense" of being ("Sinn des Seins"), where by "sense" Heidegger means that "in terms of which something becomes intelligible as something." According to Heidegger, as this sense of being precedes any notions of how or in what manner any particular being or beings exist, it is pre-conceptual, non-propositional, and hence pre-scientific. Thus, in Heidegger's view, fundamental ontology would be an explanation of the understanding preceding any other way of knowing, such as the use of logic, theory, specific ontology or act of reflective thought. At the same time, there is no access to being other than via beings themselves—hence pursuing the question of being inevitably means asking about a being with regard to its being. Heidegger argues that a true understanding of being (Seinsverständnis) can only proceed by referring to particular beings, and that the best method of pursuing being must inevitably, he says, involve a kind of hermeneutic circle, that is (as he explains in his critique of prior work in the field of hermeneutics), it must rely upon repetitive yet progressive acts of interpretation. "The methodological sense of phenomenological description is interpretation;"

Dasein

Thus the question Heidegger asks in the introduction to *Being and Time* is: what is the being that will give access to the question of the meaning of Being? Heidegger's answer is that it can only be that being for whom the question of Being is important, the being for whom Being matters. As this answer already indicates, the being for whom Being is a question is not a what, but a who. Heidegger calls this being Dasein (an ordinary German word literally meaning "being-there"), and the method pursued in *Being and Time* consists in the attempt to delimit the characteristics of Dasein, in order thereby to approach the meaning of Being itself through an interpretation of the temporality of Dasein. Dasein is not "man," but is nothing other than "man"—it is this distinction that enables Heidegger to claim that *Being and Time* is something other than philosophical anthropology.

Heidegger's account of Dasein passes through a dissection of the experiences of Angst and mortality, and then through an analysis of the structure of "care" as such. From there he raises the problem of "authenticity," that is, the potentiality or otherwise for mortal Dasein to exist fully enough that it might actually understand being. Heidegger is clear throughout the book that nothing makes certain that Dasein is capable of this understanding.

Time

Finally, this question of the authenticity of individual Dasein cannot be separated from the "historicality" of Dasein. On the one hand, Dasein, as mortal, is "stretched along" between birth and death, and thrown into its world, that is, thrown into its possibilities, possibilities which Dasein is charged with the task of assuming. On the other hand, Dasein's access to this world and these possibilities is always via a history and a tradition—this is the question of "world historicality," and among its consequences is Heidegger's argument that Dasein's potential for authenticity lies in the possibility of choosing a "hero."

Thus, more generally, the outcome of the progression of Heidegger's argument is the thought that the being of Dasein is time. Nevertheless, Heidegger concludes his work with a set of enigmatic questions foreshadowing the necessity of a destruction (that is, a transformation) of the history of philosophy in relation to temporality—these
were the questions to be taken up in the never completed continuation of his project:

The existential and ontological constitution of the totality of Dasein is grounded in temporality. Accordingly, a primordial mode of temporalizing of ecstatic temporality itself must make the ecstatic project of being in general possible. How is this mode of temporalizing of temporality to be interpreted? Is there a way leading from primordial time to the meaning of being? Does time itself reveal itself as the horizon of being?^{13}

**Phenomenology in Heidegger and Husserl**

Although Heidegger describes his method in *Being and Time* as phenomenological, the question of its relation to the phenomenology of Edmund Husserl is complex. The fact that Heidegger believes that ontology includes an irreducible hermeneutic (interpretative) aspect, for example, might be thought to run counter to Husserl's claim that phenomenological description is capable of a form of scientific positivity. On the other hand, however, several aspects of the approach and method of *Being and Time* seem to relate more directly to Husserl's work.

The central Husserlian concept of the directedness of all thought—intentionality—for example, while scarcely mentioned in *Being and Time*, has been identified by some with Heidegger's central notion of "Sorge" (Cura, care or concern). However, for Heidegger, theoretical knowledge represents only one kind of intentional behaviour, and he asserts that it is grounded in more fundamental modes of behaviour and forms of practical engagement with the surrounding world. Whereas a theoretical understanding of things grasps them according to "presence," for example, this may conceal that our first experience of a being may be in terms of its being "ready-to-hand." Thus, for instance, when someone reaches for a tool such as a hammer, their understanding of what a hammer *is* is not determined by a theoretical understanding of its presence, but by the fact that it is something we need at the moment we wish to do hammering. Only a *later* understanding might come to contemplate a hammer *as* an object.

**Hermeneutics**

The total understanding of being results from an explication of the implicit knowledge of being that inheres in *Dasein*. Philosophy thus becomes a form of interpretation, but since there is no external reference point outside being from which to begin this interpretation, the question becomes to know in which way to proceed with this interpretation. This is the problem of the "hermeneutic circle," and the necessity for the interpretation of the meaning of being to proceed in stages: this is why Heidegger's technique in *Being and Time* is sometimes referred to as hermeneutical phenomenology.

This interpretative aspect of Heidegger's project had a profound influence on the hermeneutic approach of his student Hans-Georg Gadamer.

**Destruction of metaphysics**

As part of his ontological project, Heidegger undertakes a reinterpretation of previous Western philosophy. He wants to explain why and how theoretical knowledge came to seem like the most fundamental relation to being. This explanation takes the form of a destructuring (*Destruktion*) of the philosophical tradition, an interpretative strategy that reveals the fundamental experience of being at the base of previous philosophies that had become entrenched and hidden within the theoretical attitude of the metaphysics of presence. This *Destruktion* is not simply a negative operation but rather a positive transformation, or recovery.

In *Being and Time* Heidegger briefly undertakes a destructuring of the philosophy of Descartes, but the second volume, which was intended to be a *Destruktion* of Western philosophy in all its stages, was never written. In later works Heidegger uses this approach to interpret the philosophies of Aristotle, Kant, Hegel, and Plato, among others. This aspect of Heidegger's work exerted a profound influence on Jacques Derrida, although there are also important differences between Heidegger's *Destruktion* and Derrida's deconstruction.
Translations

So far, there are complete translations of *Sein und Zeit* in 23 languages: Bulgarian, Chinese, Croatian, Czech, Danish, Dutch, English, Finnish, French, Gaelic\[citation needed\], Georgian, Greek, Hungarian, Italian, Japanese, Korean, Norwegian, Persian, Polish, Portuguese, Romanian, Russian, Slovenian, Spanish, Swahili, Swedish, and Turkish. An Arabic translation is in preparation.

Related work

*Being and Time* is the towering achievement of Heidegger's early career, but there are other important works from this period:

- The publication in 1992 of the early lecture course, *Platon: Sophistes (Plato's Sophist, 1924)*, made clear the way in which Heidegger's reading of Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics* was crucial to the formulation of the thought expressed in *Being and Time*.
- The lecture course, *Prolegomena zur Geschichte des Zeitbegriffs (History of the Concept of Time: Prolegomena, 1925)*, was something like an early version of *Being and Time*.
- The lecture courses immediately following the publication of *Being and Time*, such as *Die Grundprobleme der Phänomenologie (The Basic Problems of Phenomenology, 1927)*, and *Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik (Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics, 1929)*, elaborated some elements of the destruction of metaphysics which Heidegger intended to pursue in the unwritten second part of *Being and Time*.

Although Heidegger never completed the project outlined in *Being and Time*, later works explicitly addressed the themes and concepts of *Being and Time*. Most important among the works which do so are the following:

- Heidegger's inaugural lecture upon his return to Freiburg, "Was ist Metaphysik?" ("What Is Metaphysics?", 1929), was an important and influential clarification of what Heidegger meant by being, non-being, and nothingness.
- *Einführung in die Metaphysik (An Introduction to Metaphysics)*, a lecture course delivered in 1935, is identified by Heidegger, in his preface to the seventh German edition of *Being and Time*, as relevant to the concerns which the second half of the book would have addressed.
- *Beiträge zur Philosophie (Vom Ereignis) (Contributions to Philosophy [From Enowning], composed 1936–38, published 1989)*, perhaps Heidegger's most sustained attempt at reckoning with the legacy of *Being and Time*.
- "Zeit und Sein" ("Time and Being"), a lecture delivered at the University of Freiburg on January 31, 1962. This was Heidegger's most direct confrontation with *Being and Time*. It was followed by a seminar on the lecture, which took place at Todtnauberg on September 11–13, 1962, a summary of which was written by Alfred Guzzoni. Both the lecture and the summary of the seminar are included in *Zur Sache des Denkens* (1969; translated as *On Time and Being* [New York: Harper & Row, 1972]).

Influence

*Being and Time* influenced many philosophers and writers, among them Hannah Arendt, Leo Strauss, Alexandre Kojeve, Hans-Georg Gadamer, Giorgio Agamben, Jean-Paul Sartre, Emmanuel Levinas, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Alain Badiou, Herbert Marcuse, Jacques Derrida, Michel Foucault and Bernard Stiegler. More specifically, several important philosophical works were directly influenced by *Being and Time*, although in very different ways in each case. Most notable among the works influenced by *Being and Time* are the following:

- *Being and Nothingness* (1943), by Jean-Paul Sartre
- *Truth and Method* (1960), by Hans-Georg Gadamer
- *Totality and Infinity* (1961), by Emmanuel Levinas
- *Being and Event* (1988), by Alain Badiou
References

[4] In other words, being is distinguished from beings such as physical objects or even, as Heidegger explains in his discussion of the "worldhood of the World," that entire collection of things that constitutes the physical universe. To preserve Heidegger's distinction, translators usually render "Sein" as "being," the gerund of "to be", and "Seiend" (singular) and "Seiendes" (plural) as the verb-derived noun "a being" and "beings," and occasionally, perhaps preferably, as "an entity" and "entities".
[6] "...das Sein, das, was Seiendes als Seiendes bestimmt, das, woraufhin Seiendes, mag es wie immer erörtert werden, je schon verstanden ist," ibid., p. 6.
[7] In English, using the word "existence" instead of "being" might seem more natural and less confusing, but Heidegger, who stresses the importance of the origins of words, uses his understanding of grammar to assist in his investigation of "being," and he reserves the word "existence" to describe that defining type of being that Dasein (human consciousness) has.
[9] Ibid., pp. 8-9.
[10] Ibid., p. 12.

Bibliography

Primary literature

• Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, trans. by Joan Stambaugh, revised by Dennis J. Schmidt (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2010).

Secondary literature


**External links**

- *Being and time* (http://books.google.com/books?id=S57m5gW0L-MC) preview at Google books
Adolf Bernhard Philipp Reinach (23 December 1883 – 16 November 1917) was a German philosopher, phenomenologist (from the Munich phenomenology school) and law theorist.

**Life and works**

Adolf Reinach was born into a prominent Jewish family in Mainz, Germany, on 23 December 1883. Adolf Reinach studied at the Ostergymnasium in Mainz (where he became at first interested in Plato) and later entered the University of Munich in 1901 where he studied mainly psychology and philosophy under Theodor Lipps. In the circle of Lipps' students he came in contact with Moritz Geiger, Otto Selz, Aloys Fischer and above all Johannes Daubert. From onward 1903/4 he was increasingly busy with the works of Edmund Husserl, especially his *Logische Untersuchungen* (Logical Investigations).

In 1904, Reinach obtained his doctorate in philosophy under Lipps with his work *Über den Ursachenbegriff im geltenden Strafrecht* (On the concept of cause in penal law). In 1905, he still intended to continue his studies in Munich (where in the meanwhile he had also befriended Alexander Pfänder), to obtain a degree in law, but then decided to go to study with Husserl in Göttingen. In that period more students of Lipps (captained by Daubert) had decided to abandon Munich and to head for Göttingen, inspired by Husserl's works (which is referred to as the Munich invasion of Göttingen).

Later in 1905 Reinach returned to Munich to complete his studies in law and then continued in 1906-1907 in Tübingen. He attended several lectures and seminars on penal law by the legal theorist Ernst Beling, by which he was quite impressed and to which he owes a great deal of inspiration of his later works. In the summer of 1907 he took the First State Examination in Law, but also went later to Göttingen to attend discussion circles with Husserl.

With the support of Husserl, Reinach was able to obtain habilitation for university teaching at Göttingen in 1909. From his lectures and research, we can see that at the time he was influenced also by Anton Marty and Johannes Daubert, besides obviously and greatly by Husserl. On his turn Reinach appears to have inspired several young phenomenologists (like Wilhelm Schapp, Dietrich von Hildebrand, Alexandre Koyré and Edith Stein) with his lectures. Besides giving an introduction to phenomenology, he lectured i.a. on Plato and Immanuel Kant.

In this period, Husserl embarked on a thorough revision of his main work, the *Logical Investigations*, and asked Reinach's assistance in this endeavour. Moreover, in 1912 Reinach, together with Moritz Geiger and Alexander Pfänder founded the famous *Jahrbuch für Philosophie und phänomenologische Forschung*, with Husserl as main editor.
Besides his work in the area of phenomenology and philosophy in general, Reinach is credited for the development of a forerunner to the theory of speech acts by Austin and Searle: *Die apriorischen Grundlagen des bürgerlichen Rechtes* (The A Priori Foundations of Civil Law) is a systematic treatment of social acts as performative utterances and *a priori* foundations of civil law. Reinach's work was based mostly on Husserl's analysis of meaning in the *Logical Investigations*, but also on Daubert's criticism of it. Alexander Pfänder (1870–1941) had also been doing research on commands, promises and the like in the same period.

After Husserl's publication of the *Ideen* (Ideas) in 1913, many phenomenologists took a critical stance towards his new theories and the current of Munich phenomenology came effectively into being, as Reinach, Daubert and others chose to remain closer to Husserl's earlier work, the *Logical investigations*. Instead of following Husserl into idealism and transcendental phenomenology, the Munich group remained a realist current.

Reinach was converted to Lutheranism along with his wife[2][3]

At the outbreak of World War I Reinach volunteered to join the army. After many battles and having received the Iron Cross, Reinach fell outside Diksmuide in Flanders on 16 November 1917.

### List of main works

- "Die obersten Regeln der Vernunftschlüsse bei Kant" in *Kant Studien* 16: 214-233 1911.
  - Also as a special edition (Sonderdruck), Verlag von Max Niemeyer, Halle a. d. S. (pp. 1–163), 1913.

References


Bibliography


External links

• Adolf Reinach on State of Affairs and the Theory of Negative Judgement (http://www.ontology.co/reinacha.htm)
Alexander Pfänder

**Alexander Pfänder** (7 February 1870, in Iserlohn – 18 March 1941, in Munich) was a German philosopher and phenomenologist. He was born in Iserlohn and spent his entire academic career in Munich, where he was a student of Theodor Lipps and one of the founding members of the Munich circle of phenomenologists. As a professor Pfänder was also influential in conveying and promoting a version of phenomenology that differed from Edmund Husserl's "transcendental" orientation. His early phenomenological analysis of willing (1900) in fact predated Husserl's breakthrough in phenomenology (*Logical Investigations*, vol. II (1901)). In spite of his talents as a writer and a teacher, Pfänder did not come into prominence as did Heidegger with *Being and Time* (1927) and has consequently been overshadowed by subsequent developments out of Heideggerian and Husserlian orientations. Nevertheless, his detailed analyses of various phenomena, such as willing and attitudes (*Gesinnungen*), have been undeservedly ignored. Moreover, his development of the concept of an "understanding psychology" also merits attention, which has not received its due to its treatment in a work with an unfashionable title (*The Soul of Man* (1933)).

**Works**

- *Phänomenologie des Wollens: Eine psychologische Analyse* (1900)
- *Die Seele des Menschen* (1933).

**External links**

- Pfänder, Alexander (1871–1941) [1], *Encyclopedia of Philosophy*

**References**

Max Scheler

Born Max Ferdinand Scheler
August 22, 1874
Munich

Died May 19, 1928 (aged 53)
Frankfurt am Main

Era 20th-century philosophy

Region Continental Philosophy

School Phenomenology

Main interests History of ideas, Value theory, Ethics, Philosophical anthropology, Consciousness studies, Cultural criticism, Sociology, Religion

Notable ideas Value rankings, emotional intuition, value-based ethics, ressentiment

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Max Ferdinand Scheler[1] (August 22, 1874 – May 19, 1928) was a German philosopher known for his work in phenomenology, ethics, and philosophical anthropology. Scheler developed further the philosophical method of the founder of phenomenology, Edmund Husserl, and was called by José Ortega y Gasset "the first man of the philosophical paradise." After his death in 1928, Heidegger affirmed, with Ortega y Gasset, that all philosophers of the century were indebted to Scheler and praised him as "the strongest philosophical force in modern Germany, nay, in contemporary Europe and in contemporary philosophy as such."[2] In 1954, Karol Wojtyła, later Pope John Paul II, defended his doctoral thesis on "An Evaluation of the Possibility of Constructing a Christian Ethics on the Basis of the System of Max Scheler."
Life and career

From Munich to Cologne (1874-1919)

Max Scheler was born in Munich, Germany, August 22, 1874, to a Lutheran father and an Orthodox Jewish mother. As an adolescent, he turned to Catholicism, likely because of its conception of love, although he became increasingly non-committal around 1921. After 1921 he disassociated himself in public from Catholicism and the Judeo-Christian God,[3][4] committing himself with philosophical anthropology.

Scheler studied medicine in Munich and Berlin, both philosophy and sociology under Wilhelm Dilthey and Georg Simmel in 1895. He received his doctorate in 1897 and his associate professorship (habilitation thesis) in 1899 at the University of Jena, where his advisor was Rudolf Eucken, and where he became Privatdozent in 1901. Throughout his life, Scheler entertained a strong interest in the philosophy of American pragmatism (Eucken corresponded with William James).

He taught at Jena from 1900 to 1906. From 1907 to 1910, he taught at the University of Munich, where his study of Edmund Husserl's phenomenology deepened. Scheler had first met Husserl at the Halle in 1902. At Munich, Husserl's own teacher Franz Brentano was still lecturing, and Scheler joined the Phenomenological Circle in Munich, centred around M. Beck, Th. Conrad, J. Daubert, M. Geiger, Dietrich von Hildebrand, Theodor Lipps, and Alexander Pfänder. Scheler was never a student of Husserl's and overall, their relationship remained strained. Scheler, in later years, was rather critical of the "master's" Logical Investigations (1900/01) and Ideas I (1913), and he also was to harbour reservations about Being and Time by Martin Heidegger. Due to personal matters he was caught up in the conflict between the predominantly Catholic university and the local socialist media, which led to the loss of his Munich teaching position in 1910. From 1910 to 1911, Scheler briefly lectured at the Philosophical Society of Göttingen, where he made and renewed acquaintances with Theodore Conrad, Hedwig Conrad-Martius (an ontologist and Conrad's wife), Moritz Geiger, Jean Hering, Roman Ingarden, Dietrich von Hildebrand, Husserl, Alexandre Koyré, and Adolf Reinach. Edith Stein was one of his students, impressed by him "way beyond philosophy".[citation needed]. Thereafter, he moved to Berlin as an unattached writer and grew close to Walther Rathenau and Werner Sombart.

Scheler has exercised a notable influence on Catholic circles to this day, including his student Stein and Pope John Paul II who wrote his Habilitation and many articles on Scheler's philosophy. Along with other Munich phenomenologists such as Reinach, Pfänder and Geiger, he co-founded in 1912 the famous Jahrbuch für Philosophie und phänomenologische Forschung, with Husserl as main editor.

While his first marriage, to Amalie von Dewitz,[5][6] had ended in divorce, Scheler married Märit Furtwängler in 1912, who was the sister of the noted conductor Wilhelm Furtwängler. During World War I (1914–1918), Scheler was initially drafted but later discharged because of astigmatia of the eyes. He was passionately devoted to the defence of both war and Germany's cause during the conflict. His conversion to Catholicism dates to this period.[citation needed]

In 1919 he became professor of philosophy and sociology at the University of Cologne. He stayed there until 1928. Early that year, he accepted a new position at the University of Frankfurt. He looked forward to meeting here Ernst Cassirer, Karl Mannheim, Rudolph Otto and Richard Wilhelm, sometimes referred to in his writings. In 1927 at a conference in Darmstadt, near Frankfurt, arranged by Hermann Keyserling, Scheler delivered a lengthy lecture, entitled 'Man's Particular Place' (Die Sonderstellung des Menschen), published later in much abbreviated form as Die Stellung des Menschen im Kosmos [literally: 'Man's Position in the Cosmos']. His well known oratorical style and delivery captivated his audience for about four hours.
Later life (1920-1928)

Toward the end of his life, many invitations were extended to him, among them those from China, India, Japan, Russia, and the United States. However, on the advice of his physician, he had to cancel reservations already made with Star Line.

At the time Scheler increasingly focused on political development. He met the Russian emigrant-philosopher Nikolai Berdyaev in Berlin in 1923. Scheler was the only scholar of rank of the then German intelligentsia who gave warning in public speeches delivered as early as 1927 of the dangers of the growing National Socialist movement and Marxism. 'Politics and Morals', 'The Idea of Eternal Peace and Pacifism' were subjects of talks he delivered in Berlin in 1927. His analyses of capitalism revealed it to be a calculating, globally growing 'mind-set', rather than an economic system. While economic capitalism may have had some roots in ascetic Calvinism (cf. Max Weber), its very mind-set, however, is argued by Scheler to have had its origin in modern, subconscious angst as expressed in increasing needs for financial and other securities, for protection and personal safeguards as well as for rational manageability of all entities. However, the subordination of the value of the individual person to this mind-set was sufficient reason for Max Scheler to denounce it and to outline and predict a whole new era of culture and values, which he called 'The World-Era of Adjustment'.

Scheler also advocated an international university to be set up in Switzerland and was at that time supportive of programs such as 'continuing education' and of what he seems to have been the first to call a 'United States of Europe'. He deplored the gap existing in Germany between power and mind, a gap which he regarded as the very source of an impending dictatorship and the greatest obstacle to the establishment of German democracy. Five years after his death, the Nazi dictatorship (1933–1945) suppressed Scheler's work.

Philosophical Contributions

Love and the "Phenomenological Attitude"

When the editors of Geisteswissenschaften invited Scheler (about 1913/14) to write on the then developing philosophical method of phenomenology, Scheler indicated a reservation concerning the task because he could only report his own viewpoint on phenomenology and there was no "phenomenological school" defined by universally accepted theses. There was only a circle of philosophers bound by a "common bearing and attitude toward philosophical problems."[7] Scheler never agreed with Husserl that phenomenology is a method in the strict sense, but rather "an attitude of spiritual seeing...something which otherwise remains hidden..."[7] Calling phenomenology a method fails to take seriously the phenomenological domain of original experience: the givenness of phenomenological facts (essences or values as a priori) "before they have been fixed by logic;"[7] and prior to assuming a set of criteria or symbols, as is the case in the empirical and human sciences as well as other (modern) philosophies which tailor their methods to those of the sciences.

Rather, that which is given in phenomenology "is given only in the seeing and experiencing act itself." The essences are never given to an 'outside' observer with no direct contact with the thing itself. Phenomenology is an engagement of phenomena, while simultaneously a waiting for its self-givenness; it is not a methodical procedure of observation as if its object is stationary. Thus, the particular attitude (Geisteshaltung, lit. "disposition of the spirit" or "spiritual posture") of the philosopher is crucial for the disclosure, or seeing, of phenomenological facts. This attitude is fundamentally a moral one, where the strength of philosophical inquiry rests upon the basis of love. Scheler describes the essence of philosophical thinking as "a love-determined movement of the inmost personal self of a finite being toward participation in the essential reality of all possibles."[8]

The movement and act of love is important for philosophy for two reasons: (1) If philosophy, as Scheler describes it, hearkening back to the Platonic tradition, is a participation in a "primal essence of all essences" (Urwesen), it follows that for this participation to be achieved one must incorporate within oneself the content or essential characteristic of the primal essence.[9] For Scheler, such a primal essence is most characterized according to love, thus the way to
achieve the most direct and intimate participation is precisely to share in the movement of love. It is important to mention, however, that this primal essence is not an objectifiable entity whose possible correlate is knowledge; thus, even if philosophy is always concerned with knowing, as Scheler would concur, nevertheless, reason itself is not the proper participative faculty by which the greatest level of knowing is achieved. Only when reason and logic have behind them the movement of love and the proper moral preconditions can one achieve philosophical knowledge.\[10\]

(2) Love is likewise important insofar as its essence is the condition for the possibility of the givenness of value-objects and especially the givenness of an object in terms of its highest possible value. Love is the movement which "brings about the continuous emergence of ever-higher value in the object--just as if it was streaming out from the object of its own accord, without any sort of exertion...on the part of the lover. ...true love open our spiritual eyes to ever-higher values in the object loved."\[11\] Hatred, on the other hand, is the closing off of oneself or closing ones eyes to the world of values. It is in the latter context that value-inversions or devaluations become prevalent, and are sometimes solidified as proper in societies. Furthermore, by calling love a movement, Scheler hopes to dispel the interpretation that love and hate are only reactions to felt values rather than the very ground for the possibility of value-givenness (or value-concealment). Scheler writes, "Love and hate are acts in which the value-realm accessible to the feelings of a being...is either extended or narrowed."\[12\] Love and hate are to be distinguished from sensible and even psychical feelings; they are, instead, characterized by an intentional function (one always loves or hates something) and therefore must belong to the same anthropological sphere as theoretical consciousness and the acts of willing and thinking. Scheler, therefore calls love and hate, "spiritual feelings," and are the basis for an "emotive a priori" insofar as values, through love, are given in the same manner as are essences, through cognition. In short, love is a value-cognition, and insofar as it is determinative of the way in which a philosopher approaches the world, it is also indicative of a phenomenological attitude.

**Material Value-Ethics**

A fundamental aspect of Scheler's phenomenology is the extension of the realm of the a priori to include not only formal propositions, but material ones as well. Kant's identification of the a priori with the formal was a "fundamental error" which is the basis of his ethical formalism. Furthermore, Kant erroneously identified the realm of the non-formal (material) with sensible or empirical content. The heart of Scheler's criticism of Kant is within his theory of values. Values are given a priori, and are "feelable" phenomena. The intentional feeling of love discloses values insofar as love opens a person evermore to beings-of-value (Wertsein).

Additionally, values are not formal realities; they do not exist somewhere apart from the world and their bearers, and they only exist with a value-bearer, as a value-being. They are, therefore, part of the realm of a material a priori. Nevertheless, values can vary with respect to their bearers without there ever occurring an alteration in the object as bearer. E.g., the value of a specific work of art or specific religious articles may vary according to differences of culture and religion. However, this variation of values with respect to their bearers by no means amounts to the relativity of values as such, but only with respect to the particular value-bearer. As such, the values of culture are always spiritual irrespective of the objects that may bear this value, and values of the holy still remain the highest values regardless of their bearers. According to Scheler, the disclosure of the value-being of an object precedes representation. The axiological reality of values is given prior to knowing, but, upon being felt through value-feeling, can be known (as to their essential interconnections). Values and their corresponding disvalues are ranked according to their essential interconnections as follows:

1. Values of the holy vs. disvalues of the unholy
2. Values of the spirit (truth, beauty, vs. disvalues of their opposites)
3. Values of life and the noble vs. disvalues of the vulgar
4. Values of pleasure vs. disvalues of pain
5. Values of utility vs. disvalues of the useless.\[13\]

Further essential interconnections apply with respect to a value's (disvalue's) existence or non-existence:
• The existence of a positive value is itself a positive value.
• The existence of a negative value (disvalue) is itself a negative value.
• The non-existence of a positive value is itself a negative value.
• The non-existence of a negative value is itself a positive value.\[14\]

And with respect to values of good and evil:
• Good is the value that is attached to the realization of a positive value in the sphere of willing.
• Evil is the value that is attached to the realization of a negative value in the sphere of willing.
• Good is the value that is attached to the realization of a higher value in the sphere of willing.
• Evil is the value that is attached to the realization of a lower value [at the expense of a higher one] in the sphere of willing.\[14\]

Goodness, however, is not simply "attached" to an act of willing, but originates ultimately within the disposition (Gesinnung) or "basic moral tenor" of the acting person. Accordingly:
• The criterion of 'good' consists in the agreement of a value intended, in the realization, with the value preferred, or in its disagreement with the value rejected.
• The criterion of 'evil' consists in the disagreement of a value intended, in the realization, with the value preferred, or in its agreement with the value rejected.\[14\]

One may note that most of the older ethical systems (Kantian formalism, theonomic ethics, nietzscheanism, hedonism, consequentialism, and platonism, for example) fall into axiological error by emphasizing one value-rank to the exclusion of the others. A novel aspect of Scheler's ethics is the importance of the "kairos" or call of the hour. Moral rules cannot guide the person to make ethical choices in difficult, existential life-choices. For Scheler, the very capacity to obey rules is rooted in the basic moral tenor of the person.

A disorder "of the heart" occurs whenever a person prefers a value of a lower rank to a higher rank, or a disvalue to a value.

The term Wertsein or value-being is used by Scheler in many contexts, but his untimely death prevented him from working out an axiological ontology. Another unique and controversial element of Scheler's axiology is the notion of the emotive a priori: values can only be felt, just as color can only be seen. Reason cannot think values; the mind can only order categories of value after lived experience has happened. For Scheler, the person is the locus of value-experience, a timeless act-being that acts into time. Scheler's appropriation of a value-based metaphysics renders his phenomenology quite different from the phenomenology of consciousness (Husserl, Sartre) or the existential analysis of the being-in-the-world of Dasein (Heidegger). Scheler's concept of the "lived body" was appropriated in the early work of Maurice Merleau-Ponty.

Max Scheler extended the phenomenological method to include a reduction of the scientific method too, thus questioning the idea of Husserl that phenomenological philosophy should be pursued as a rigorous science. Natural and scientific attitudes (Einstellung) are both phenomenologically counterpositive and hence must be sublated in the advancement of the real phenomenological reduction which, in the eyes of Scheler, has more the shapes of an allround ascesis (Askese) rather than a mere logical procedure of suspending the existential judgments. The Wesenschau, according to Scheler, is an act of blowing up the Sosein limits of Sein A into the essential-ontological domain of Sein B, in short, an ontological participation of Sosenheiten, seeing the things as such (cf. the Buddhist concept of tathata, and the Christian theological quidditas).
Man and History (1924)

Scheler planned to publish his major work in Anthropology in 1929, but the completion of such project was interrupted by Scheler's premature death in 1928. Some fragments of such work have been published in Nachlass.\[15\] In 1924, *Man and History (Mensch und Geschichte)*, Scheler gave some preliminary statements on the range and goal of philosophical anthropology.\[16\]

In this book, Scheler argues for a tabula rasa of all the inherited prejudices from the three main traditions that have formulated an idea of man: religion, philosophy and science.\[17\][18] Scheler argues that it is not enough to just reject such traditions, as did Nietzsche with the Judeo-Christian religion by saying that "God is dead"; these traditions have impregnated all parts of our culture, and therefore still determine a great deal of the way of thinking even of those that don't believe in the Christian God.\[19\] To really get freedom from such traditions is necessary to study and deconstruct (Husserl's term *Abbau*) them.

Scheler says that philosophical anthropology must address the totality of man, while it must be informed by the specialized sciences like biology, psychology, sociology.

**Works**

- *Zur Phänomenologie und Theorie der Sympathiegefühle und von Liebe und Hass*, 1913
- *Der Genius des Kriegs und der Deutsche Krieg*, 1915
- *Der Formalismus in der Ethik und die materiale Wertethik*, 1913 - 1916
- *Krieg und Aufbau*, 1916
- *Die Ursachen des Deutschenthasses*, 1917
- *Vom Umsturz der Werte*, 1919
- *Neuer Versuch der Grundlegung eines ethischen Personalismus*, 1921
- *Vom Ewigen im Menschen*, 1921
- *Probleme der Religion. Zur religiösen Erneuerung*, 1921
- *Wesen und Formen der Sympathie*, 1923 (neu aufgelegt als Titel von 1913: Zur Phänomenologie ...)
- *Schriften zur Soziologie und Weltanschauungslehre*, 3 Bände, 1923/1924
- *Die Wissensformen und die Gesellschaft*, 1926
- *Der Mensch im Zeitalter des Ausgleichs*, 1927
- *Die Stellung des Menschen im Kosmos*, 1928
- *Philosophische Weltanschauung*, 1929
- *Logik I. (Fragment, Korrekturbögen).* Amsterdam 1975

**Major works (English translations)**


**Secondary references**

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[1] (http://books.google.ca/books?id=OBmZwEACAAJ&dq=Max+Ferdinand+Scheler&hl=en)
[10] Max Scheler, On the Eternal in Man, "The Essence of Philosophy and the Moral Preconditions of Philosophical Knowledge" trans. Bernard Noble (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1960), 77. Scheler criticizes Plato and Aristotle on precisely this point. He writes, "Since...their philosophy defined the primal essence as an objectifiable entity and therefore a possible correlate of knowledge, they had also to regard knowledge as the definitive, ultimate participation in reality which man might attain... Accordingly they could not but see the highest and most perfect form of human being in the philosophos, the 'wise one.'" On the Eternal in Man, 77.
[13] Max Scheler, Formalism in Ethics and Non-Formal Ethics of Values, trans. M. Frings and R. Funk (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1973), 104-110. There has been confusion concerning whether Scheler ranks pleasure (the agreeable) as higher than utility or vice versa. The confusion started with Manfred Frings' interpretation that lists utility as a higher value than "sensible values" such as comfort and discomfort. (Cf. Frings, The Mind of Max Scheler, 29-30.) It seems Frings derives this interpretation from Scheler's stratification of feelings which has sensible feelings as the "lowest" type. However, Scheler's list of the rank of values in the Formalism is consistent with his stratification of feeling insofar as there Scheler does not even list utility values as their own place in the rank, that is utility is not a "self-value," but a "consecutive value" founded upon the self-value, agreeable. "...the 'useful' is a consecutive value with regard to the self-value of the agreeable" (104). Scheler's book, Ressentiment, however provides an even clearer statement that Frings is mistaken in his interpretation of Scheler's value-rank. Here, again, he notes that what is called useful is only derived from pleasure as the "basic value." But of course, "basic" does not mean "lowest." Scheler's meaning is clear: "It is true that enjoyment can and should be subordinated to higher values, such as vital values, spiritual values of culture, 'sacredness.' But subordinating it to utility is an absurdity, for this is a subordination of the end to the means. Nevertheless it has become a rule of modern morality that useful work is better than the enjoyment of pleasure. ... Here again, the propelling motive of the hard-working modern utilitarian is resentment against a superior capacity and art of enjoyment." Cf. Scheler, Ressentiment, trans. Lewis Coser et al. (Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 2003), 108. In short, to state that values of utility are higher than values of pleasure is a value-inversion consequent of the capitalist mind-set which is precisely what Scheler is combating.
[15] Six volumes of his posthumous works (Nachlass), so far not translated from German, make up volumes 10-15 of the 15 volume Collected Works (Gesammelte Werke) edited by Maria Scheler and Manfred S. Frings as listed in http://www.maxscheler.com/scheler4.shtml#4-CollectedWorks
[19] chapter 1
External links

- Prof. Frings' Max Scheler Website (www.maxscheler.com) (http://www.maxscheler.com)
- Photos of Max Scheler at web site of Center for Advanced Research in Phenomenology (http://www.phenomenologycenter.org/gallery2.htm)
- Max-Scheler-Gesellschaft (Max Scheler Society) - German-language website (http://www.max-scheler.de)
- A Visit to Max Scheler's Grave in Köln (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9-QrnEBzxaA) on YouTube
- *Deutsches Leben der Gegenwart* at Project Gutenberg (German)
Roman Witold Ingarden (February 5, 1893 – June 14, 1970) was a Polish philosopher who worked in phenomenology, ontology and aesthetics.

Before World War II, Ingarden published his works mainly in the German language. During the war, he switched to Polish, and as a result his major works in ontology went largely unnoticed by the wider world philosophical community.

**Biography**

Ingarden was born in Kraków, Austria-Hungary, on February 5, 1893. He first studied mathematics and philosophy in Lwów under Kazimierz Twardowski, then moved to Göttingen to study philosophy under Edmund Husserl. He was considered by Husserl to be one of his best students and accompanied Husserl to Freiburg, where in 1918 Ingarden submitted his doctoral dissertation with Husserl as director.¹

Ingarden then returned to Poland, where he spent his academic career after obtaining his doctorate. For a long period he had to support himself by secondary-school teaching. In 1925 he submitted his Habilitationschrift, *Essentiale Fragen*, to Kazimierz Twardowski at Lwów University (now Lviv in Ukraine). This thesis was noticed by the English-speaking philosophical community. In 1933 the University promoted him to professor. He became well known for his work on *The Literary Work of Art*.¹
World War II closed Lwów University and halted his academic career in 1941-1944. Ingarden secretly taught orphaned children mathematics and philosophy. After his house was bombed, he continued work on his book, *The Controversy over the Existence of the World*.[1]

Ingarden became a professor at Nicolaus Copernicus University in Toruń in 1945 shortly after the war, but was banned in 1946 because of the Communist government. He then moved to the Jagiellonian University in Kraków, where he was offered a position. In 1949, however, he was banned from teaching due to his alleged idealism, supposedly being an "enemy of materialism". In 1957 he was reappointed at the Jagiellonian University after the ban was lifted, and so he went on to teach, write and publish. Ingarden died on June 14, 1970 as a result of a cerebral hemorrhage.[1]

**Works**

Ingarden was a realist phenomenologist, and thus did not accept Husserl's transcendental idealism. His training was phenomenological, nonetheless his work as a whole was directed rather towards ontology. That is why[2] Ingarden is one of the most renowned phenomenological ontologists, as he strove to describe the ontological structure and state of being of various objects based on the essential features of any experience that could provide such knowledge.

The best known works of Ingarden, and the only ones known to most English-speaking readers, concern aesthetics and literature. The exclusive focus on Ingarden's work in aesthetics is to some extent unfortunate and misleading about his overall philosophical standpoint.

**Main works in German**

- *Intuition und Intellekt bei Henri Bergson*, Halle: Max Niemeyer, 1921
- *Essentiale Fragen. Ein Beitrag zum Problem des Wesens*, Halle: Max Niemeyer, 1925
- *Das literarische Kunstwerk. Eine Untersuchung aus dem Grenzgebiet der Ontologie, Logik und Literaturwissenschaft*, Halle: Max Niemeyer, 1931
- *Über die kausale Struktur der realen Welt. Der Streit um die Existenz der Welt, Band III*, Tübingen: Max Niemeyer, 1974

**Main works in Polish**

- *Nektóre założenia idealizmu Berkeley'a [Some of the Tenets of Berkeley's Idealism]*, Lwów, 1931
- *Szkice z filozofii literatury* (Sketches on the Philosophy of Literature), Vol. 1, Spółdzielnia wydawnicza "Polonista," Łódź, 1947
- *Elementy dzieła muzycznego* (The Elements of Musical Works), Sprawozdania Towarzystwa Naukowego w Toruniu, Vol. IX, 1955, Nos. 1-4, pp. 82-84
Main works translated into English

- *Letter to Husserl about the VI [Logical] Investigation and 'Idealism' In Tymieniecka*, 1976
- *Selected Papers in Aesthetics*, Ed. by Peter J. McCormick, München: Philosophia Verlag, 1985

Suggested readings

- A new and complete biography of Roman Ingarden written by prof. Adam Węgrzecki (Cracow University of Economics) and M.A. Raphael Kur (Jagiellonian University) will be launched in 2013.

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External links

- The Roman Ingarden Philosophical Research Centre (http://www.roman-ingarden.phils.uj.edu.pl/ang/index.php)
- Roman Ingarden (http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/ingarden/), by Amie Thomasson, at the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
- Polish Philosophy Page: Roman Ingarden (http://segr-did2.fmag.unict.it/~polphil/PolPhil/Ingard/Ingard.html)
- Theory and History of Ontology: Roman Ingarden: Ontology as a Science on the Possible Ways of Existence (http://www.ontology.co/ingardenr.htm)
- Annotated bibliography of and about Ingarden (http://www.ontology.co/biblio/ingarden-biblio.htm)
- "Roman Ingarden's Objectivity vs. Subjectivity as a problem of Translatability" (https://helda.helsinki.fi/bitstream/handle/10138/24790/Roman_Ingarden.pdf?sequence=2), by Gabriel Pareyon
Nicolai Hartmann

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Born</th>
<th>February 20, 1882</th>
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<td>Died</td>
<td>October 9, 1950 (aged 68)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Göttingen, West Germany</td>
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<td>Era</td>
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Nicolai Hartmann (Latvian: Nikolajs Hartmanis; 20 February 1882 – 9 October 1950) was a Baltic German philosopher.

Biography

Hartmann was born of German descent in Riga, which was then the capital of the Russian province of Livonia, and which is now in Latvia. He studied Medicine at the University of Tartu (then Jurjev), then Philosophy in St. Petersburg and at the University of Marburg in Germany, where he took his Ph.D. and Habilitation. He was professor of philosophy in Marburg (1922–25), Cologne (1925–31), Berlin (1931–45) and Göttingen (1945–50), where he died. Originally a Marburg neo-Kantian, studying under Hermann Cohen and Paul Natorp, Hartmann developed his own philosophy which has been described as a variety of existentialism or critical realism. Among Hartmann's many students were Boris Pasternak, Hans-Georg Gadamer, Emil Cioran, Jakob Klein, Delfim Santos and Max Wehrli. He is the modern discoverer of emergence — originally called by him categorial novum. His encyclopedic work is basically forgotten today, although famous during his lifetime. His early work in the philosophy of biology has been cited in modern discussions of genomics and cloning, and his views on consciousness and free will are currently in vogue among contributors to the Journal of Consciousness Studies.

Levels of reality

Hartmann's levels of reality are: (1) the inorganic level (German: anorganische Schicht), (2) the organic level (organische Schicht), (3) the psychical/emotional level (seelische Schicht) and (4) the intellectual/cultural level (geistige Schicht). In the Structure of the Real World (Der Aufbau der realen Welt), Hartmann postulates four laws that apply to the levels of reality.

1. The law of recurrence: Lower categories recur in the higher levels as a subsaspect of higher categories, but never vice versa.
2. The law of modification: The categorial elements modify in their recurrence in the higher levels (they are shaped by the characteristics of the higher levels).
3. The law of the novum: The higher category is composed of a diversity of lower elements, but it is a specific novum that is not included in the lower levels.
4. The law of distance between levels: Since the different levels do not develop continuously but in leaps, they can be clearly distinguished.
Quotation

The tragedy of man is that of somebody who is starving and sitting at a richly laden table but does not reach out with his hand, because he cannot see what is right in front of him. For the real world has inexhaustible splendour, the real life is full of meaning and abundance, where we grasp it, it is full of miracles and glory.[1]

Works in German

Books:

- 1912, Philosophische Grundfragen der Biologie, Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, Göttingen.
- 1923, Die Philosophie des deutschen Idealismus 1: Fichte, Schelling und die Romantik, de Gruyter, Berlin.
- 1931, Zum Problem der Realitätsgegebenheit, Pan-Verlagsgesellschaft, Berlin.
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- 1949, Einführung in die Philosophie, Luise Hanckel Verlag, Hannover.
- 1942, Systematische Philosophie, Kohlhammer, Stuttgart & Berlin.
- 1943, Neue Wege der Ontologie, Kohlhammer, Stuttgart.
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- 1955, Der philosophische Gedanke und seine Geschichte, Zeitlichkeit und Substantialität, Sinngebung und Sinnerfüllung, de Gruyter, Berlin.
- 1955, Kleinere Schriften ; *Bd. 1* Abhandlungen zur systematischen Philosophie, de Gruyter, Berlin.
- 1958, Kleinere Schriften ; *Bd. 3* Vom Neukantianismus zur Ontologie, de Gruyter, Berlin.

Articles:


**Translations in English**


**Works about N. Hartmann**

**Books:**

• 1952, H. Heimsoeth and others, *N. Hartmann, der Denker und seine Werk*.
• 1959, H. Hulsmann, *Die Methode in der Philosophie N. Hartmanns*.
• 1962, K. Kanthack, *N. Hartmann und das Ende der Ontologie*.
• 1965, I. Wirth, *Realismus und Apriorismus in N. Hartmanns Erkenntnistheorie*.
• 1965, J. B. Forsche, "Zur Philosophie Nicolai Hartmann".
• 1971, E. Hammer-Kraft, *Freiheit und Dependenz im Schichtdenken Nicolai Hartmanns*.
• 1987, Dong-Hyun Son, *Die Seinsweise des objektivierten Geistes: Eine Untersuchung im Anschluss an Nicolai Hartmanns Problematik des "geistigen Seins"*, Peter Lang
• 1996, João Maurício Adeodato, *Filosofia do direito: uma crítica à verdade na ética e na ciência* (através de um exame da ontologia de Nicolai Hartmann), São Paulo, Saraiva.


• 2001, *Axiomathes* (Springer), 12:3-4, special issue on N. Hartmann (Includes papers by Albertazzi, Cicovacki, Da Re, Johansson, Peruzzi, Poli, Tegtmeier, van der Schaar, Wildgen)


• 2011, Roberto Poli, Carlo Scognamiglio and Frederic Tremblay (eds.), *The Philosophy of Nicolai Hartmann*, Berlin, Walter de Gruyter.


Articles:


• 1953, Jacob Taubes, "The Development of the Ontological Question in Recent German Philosophy," *Review of Metaphysics*, vol. 6, pp. 651-664.


• 1960, Helen James, "Nicolai Hartmann's Study of Human Personality," *New Scholasticism*, vol. 34, pp. 204-233.


Dietrich von Hildebrand (October 12, 1889 - January 26, 1977) was a German Catholic philosopher and theologian who was called (informally) by Pope Pius XII "the 20th Century Doctor of the Church." [1] Pope John Paul II greatly admired the work of von Hildebrand, remarking once to von Hildebrand's widow, Alice von Hildebrand, "Your husband is one of the great ethicists of the twentieth century." Pope Emeritus Benedict XVI has a particular admiration and regard for Dietrich von Hildebrand, whom he already knew as a young priest in Munich. In fact, as young Fr. Ratzinger, he even served as an assistant pastor in the church of St. Georg in Munich, which von Hildebrand frequented in the 1950s and 1960s. It was also in St. Georg that Dietrich and Alice von Hildebrand were married. The degree of Pope Benedict's esteem is expressed in one of his statements about von Hildebrand, "When the intellectual history of the Catholic Church in the twentieth century is written, the name of Dietrich von Hildebrand will be most prominent among the figures of our time." Von Hildebrand was a vocal critic of the changes in the church brought by the Second Vatican Council. He especially resented the new liturgy. Of it he said "Truly, if one of the devils in C.S. Lewis' The Screwtape Letters had been entrusted with the ruin of the liturgy, he could not have done it better."[2]

Biography

Born and raised in Florence, in the Kingdom of Italy, he grew up in a German household, the son of the noted sculptor Adolf von Hildebrand and Irene Schäuffelen, who lived in a former Minim friary. He received all his early education from private tutors. Although raised in a home without any religion, von Hildebrand developed a deep belief in Jesus at a very young age.[3]

von Hildebrand was sent to Munich at the age of 15 to do his Abitur, enrolling at the University of Munich two years later. There he entered a circle of students who first followed the philosopher Theodor Lipps, but they soon were swayed by the teachings of Edmund Husserl. Through this circle, he came to know Max Scheler. Through his writings, von Hildebrand would later convert to Catholicism in 1914. In 1909, he attended the University of Göttingen, where he completed his doctorate in philosophy under Husserl and Adolf Reinach, whom he later
Dietrich von Hildebrand

credited with shaping his own philosophical system.\[1\]

In 1913, von Hildebrand went to Rome, to attend the First Communion of one of his sisters, in a ceremony held in the Catacombs of Callixtus. The following year, he and his wife, Margaret Denck, were received into the Catholic Church. Upon the outbreak of World War I, he was drafted into service as a physician's assistant in Munich, serving as a kind of surgical nurse.\[1\]

The publication of von Hildebrand's first book, *Die Idee der Sittlichen Handlung*, happened in 1916, and two years later, after the war had ended, he was given a teaching position at the University of Munich, eventually gaining an assistant professorship in 1924. By that time, he had published another work, in 1921, *Sittlichkeit und Ethische Werterkenntniss*.\[1\]

von Hildebrand was a vocal opponent of Adolf Hitler and Nazism, fleeing from Germany, first to Italy, and then to Vienna, Austria, in 1933 upon Hitler's rise to power. There with the support of Austrian Chancellor Engelbert Dollfuss he founded and edited an anti-Nazi weekly paper, *Der Christliche Ständestaat* (The Christian Corporate State). For this, he was sentenced to death in absentia by the Nazis.

When Hitler annexed Austria in 1938, von Hildebrand was once again forced to flee. He spent eleven months in Switzerland, near Fribourg. He then moved to Fiac in France, near Toulouse, where he taught at the Catholic University of Toulouse. When the Nazis invaded France in 1940, he went into hiding, until after many hardships, and the heroic assistance of Frenchmen, including Edmond Michelet, he was able to escape with his wife, son (Franz von Hildebrand), and daughter-in-law to Portugal. From there, they traveled by ship to Brazil and then to New York in 1940. There he taught philosophy at the Jesuit Fordham University on Rose Hill, the Bronx, New York.

Von Hildebrand retired from teaching in 1960 and spent the remaining years of his life writing. He was the author of dozens of books, both in German and English. He was a founder of Una Voce America. He died on January 26, 1977 after a long struggle with a heart condition. He had married Margaret Denck (died 1957) in 1912, and then, in 1959, Alice von Hildebrand (born 1923), also a philosopher and theologian.


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* Fundamental Moral Attitudes (Longmans, 1950)
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* The New Tower of Babel (P. J. Kenedy, 1953)
* Ethics (Franciscan Herald Press, 1953)
* True Morality and Its Counterfeits, with Alice M. Jourdain (McKay, 1955)
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• *Not as the World Gives; St. Francis' Message to Laymen Today* (Franciscan Herald Press, 1963)
• *The art of living*, with Alice von Hildebrand (Franciscan Herald Press, 1965)
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• *Morality and Situation Ethics*, (Franciscan Herald Press, 1966)
• *The encyclical Humanae vitae, a sign of contradiction; an essay on birth control and Catholic conscience*, (Franciscan Herald Press, 1969)
• *Love, Marriage, and the Catholic Conscience: Understanding the Church's Teachings on Birth Control*
• *The Trojan Horse in the City of God: The Catholic Crisis Explained* (Franciscan Herald Press, 1967)
• *Celibacy and the crisis of faith*, (Franciscan Herald Press, 1971)
• *What is Philosophy?* (Franciscan Herald Press, 1973)
• *The Devastated Vineyard* (1973)
• *Jaws of Death: Gate of Heaven* (1976)
• *The Heart: an Analysis of Human and Divine Affectivity*, (Franciscan Herald Press, 1977)
• *Making Christ's Peace a Part of Your Life*
• *Humility: Wellspring of Virtue*
• *The Nature of Love* (St. Augustine's Press, 2010)

**External links**

• Dietrich von Hildebrand Legacy Project (http://www.hildebrandlegacy.org/)
• Dietrich von Hildebrand Institute (http://www.romanforum.org/)
• The International Academy of Philosophy (http://www.iap.li/)
• Autobiography on CatholicAuthors.com (http://catholicauthors.com/vonhildebrand.html)
Munich Phenomenology

Munich Phenomenology, refers to the group of philosophers, psychologists and phenomenologists that studied and worked in Munich at the beginning of the twentieth century, when Edmund Husserl published his masterwork, the Logical Investigations and began the phenomenological movement. Their views are grouped under the name "Phenomenology of essences".

At that time some of the students of Theodor Lipps, who were organised in the Psychologische Verein ("Psychological Association"), notably Adolf Reinach, Johannes Daubert and Alexander Pfänder, were inspired by Husserl's work and took it as a guideline for doing philosophy. Around 1905 many students of Lipps (captained by Daubert) decided to abandon Munich and to head for Göttingen, to study with Husserl (this is also referred to as the Munich invasion of Göttingen).

Notably, in 1912 the Munich phenomenologists Reinach, Pfänder, Max Scheler and Moritz Geiger founded the famous Jahrbuch für Philosophie und phänomenologische Forschung, with Husserl as main editor.

After Husserl's publication of the Ideen (Ideas) in 1913, many phenomenologists took a critical stance towards his new theories. Many members of the Munich group distanced itself from his transcendental phenomenology and preferred the earlier realist phenomenology of the first edition of the Logical Investigations.

The Munich Phenomenologists

- Adolf Reinach
- Johannes Daubert
- Alexander Pfänder
- Moritz Geiger

Other members of the Munich Circle

- August Gallinger
- Aloys Fisher
- Theodor Conrad (husband of Hedwig Conrad-Martius)
- Dietrich von Hildebrand
- Wilhelm Schapp

Sources

- H. Kuhn, E. Avé-Lallemant, R. Gladiator (Eds.), Die Münchener Phänomenologie Phaenomenologica 65, 1976

External links

- Center for Advanced Research in Phenomenology [2]

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Phenomenology of essences

In disagreement with Theodor Lipps's psychologism, some of his students in Munich joined with some of Husserl's from Göttingen to form a new branch called Phenomenology of essences, or Munich phenomenology. Taking new directions from *Logische Untersuchungen* and supported by Edmund Husserl, they proposed a return to intuition.
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