Social Anarchism or Lifestyle Anarchism

An Unbridgeable Chasm

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Part 1

For some two centuries, anarchism — a very ecumenical body of anti-authoritarian ideas — developed in the tension between two basically contradictory tendencies: a personalistic commitment to individual autonomy and a collectivist commitment to social freedom. These tendencies have by no means been reconciled in the history of libertarian thought. Indeed, for much of the last century, they simply coexisted within anarchism as a minimalist credo of opposition to the State rather than as a maximalist credo that articulated the kind of new society that had to be created in its place.

Which is not to say that various schools of anarchism did not advocate very specific forms of social organization, albeit often markedly at variance with one another. Essentially, however, anarchism as a whole advanced what Isaiah Berlin has called 'negative freedom,' that is to say, a formal 'freedom from,' rather than a substantive 'freedom to.' Indeed, anarchism often celebrated its commitment to negative freedom as evidence of its own pluralism, ideological tolerance, or creativity — or even, as more than one recent postmodernist celebrant has argued, its incoherence.

Anarchism's failure to resolve this tension, to articulate the relationship of the individual to the collective, and to enunciate the historical circumstances that would make possible a stateless anarchic society produced problems in anarchist thought that remain unresolved to this day. Pierre Joseph Proudhon, more than many anarchists of his day, attempted to formulate a fairly concrete image of a libertarian society. Based on contracts, essentially between small producers, cooperatives, and communes, Proudhon's vision was redolent of the provincial craft world into which he was born. But his attempt to meld a patroniste, often patriarchal notion of liberty with contractual social arrangements was lacking in depth. The craftsman, cooperative, and commune, relating to one another on bourgeois contractual terms of equity or justice rather than on the communist terms of ability and needs, reflected the artisan's bias for personal autonomy, leaving any moral commitment to a collective undefined beyond the good intentions of its members.

Indeed, Proudhon's famous declaration that 'whoever puts his hand on me to govern me is an usurper and a tyrant; I declare him my enemy' strongly tilts toward a personalistic, negative freedom that overshadows his opposition to oppressive social institutions and the vision of an anarchist society that he projected. His statement easily blends into William Godwin's distinctly individualistic declaration: 'There is but one power to which I can yield a heartfelt obedience, the decision of my own understanding, the dictates of my own conscience.' Godwin's appeal to the 'authority' of his own understanding and conscience, like Proudhon's condemnation of the 'hand' that threatens to restrict his liberty, gave anarchism an immensely individualistic thrust.

Compelling as such declarations may be — and in the United States they have won considerable admiration from the so-called libertarian (more accurately, proprietarian) right, with its avowals of 'free' enterprise — they reveal an anarchism very much at odds with itself. By contrast, Michael Bakunin and Peter Kropotkin held essentially collectivist views — in Kropotkin's case, explicitly communist ones. Bakunin emphatically prioritized the social over the individual. Society, he writes,

> antedates and at the same time survives every human individual, being in this respect like Nature itself. It is eternal like Nature, or rather, having been born upon our earth, it will last as long as the earth. A radical revolt against society would therefore be just as impossible for man as a revolt against Nature, human society being nothing else but the last great manifestation or creation of Nature upon this earth. And an

> individual who would want to rebel against society … would place himself beyond the pale of real existence.[1]

Bakunin often expressed his opposition to the individualistic trend in liberalism and anarchism with considerable polemical emphasis. Although society is 'indebted to individuals,' he wrote in a relatively mild statement, the formation of the individual is social:

> even the most wretched individual of our present society could not exist and develop without the cumulative social efforts of countless generations. Thus the individual, his freedom and reason, are the products of society, and not vice versa: society is not the product of individuals comprising it; and the higher, the more fully the individual is developed, the greater his freedom — and the more he is the product of society, the more does he receive from society and the greater his debt to it.[2]

Kropotkin, for his part, retained this collectivistic emphasis with remarkable consistency. In what was probably his most widely read work, his Encyclopaedia Britannica essay on 'Anarchism,' Kropotkin distinctly located the economic conceptions of anarchism on the 'left-wing' of 'all socialisms,' calling for the radical abolition of private property and the State in 'the spirit of local and personal initiative, and of free federation from the simple to the compound, in lieu of the present hierarchy from the center to the periphery.' Kropotkin's works on ethics, in fact, include a sustained critique of liberalistic attempts to counterpose the individual to society, indeed to subordinate society to the individual or ego. He placed himself squarely in the socialist tradition. His anarchocommunism, predicated on advances in technology and increased productivity, became a prevailing libertarian ideology in the 1890s, steadily elbowing out collectivist notions of distribution based on equity. Anarchists, 'in common with most socialists,' Kropotkin emphasized, recognized the need for 'periods of accelerated evolution which are called revolutions,' ultimately yielding a society based on federations of 'every township or commune of the local groups of producers and consumers.[3]

With the emergence of anarchosyndicalism and anarcho-communism in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, the need to resolve the tension between the individualist and the collectivist tendencies essentially became moot. Anarcho-individualism was largely marginalized by mass socialistic workers' movements, of which most anarchists considered themselves the left wing. In an era of stormy social upheaval, marked by the rise of a mass working-class movement that culminated in the 1930s and the Spanish Revolution, anarchosyndicalists and anarchocommunists, no less than Marxists, considered anarcho-individualism to be petty-bourgeois exotica. They often attacked it quite directly as a middle-class indulgence, rooted far more in liberalism than in anarchism.

The period hardly allowed individualists, in the name of their 'uniqueness,' to ignore the need for energetic revolutionary forms of organization with coherent and compelling programs. Far from indulging in Max Stirner's metaphysics of the ego and its 'uniqueness,' anarchist activists required a basic theoretical, discursive, and programmatically oriented literature, a need that

[1] *The Political Philosophy of Bakunin*, G. P. Maximoff editor (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1953), p.144.

[2] *Political Philosophy of Bakunin*, p.158.

[3] Peter Kropotkin, 'Anarchism,' the Encyclopaedia Britannica article, in *Kropotkin's Revolutionary Pamphlets*, ed. Roger N. Baldwin (New York: Dover Publications, 1970), pp.285–87.

was filled by, among others, Kropotkin's *The Conquest of Bread* (London, 1913), Diego Abad de Santillán's *El organismo económico de la revolución* (Barcelona, 1936), and G. P. Maximoff's *The Political Philosophy of Bakunin* (English publication in 1953, three years after Maximoff's death; the date of original compilation, not provided in the English translation, may have been years, even decades earlier). No Stirnerite 'Union of Egoists,' to my knowledge, ever rose to prominence — even assuming such a union could be established and survive the 'uniqueness' of its egocentric participants.

Individualist Anarchism and Reaction

To be sure, ideological individualism did not fade away altogether during this period of sweeping social unrest. A sizable reservoir of individualist anarchists, especially in the Anglo-American world, were nourished by the ideas of John Locke and John Stuart Mill, as well as Stirner himself. Home-grown individualists with varying degrees of commitment to libertarian views littered the anarchist horizon. In practice, anarcho-individualism attracted precisely individuals, from Benjamin Tucker in the United States, an adherent of a quaint version of free competition, to Federica Montseny in Spain, who often honored her Stirnerite beliefs in the breach. Despite their avowals of an anarchocommunist ideology, Nietzscheans like Emma Goldman remained cheek to jowl in spirit with individualists.

Hardly any anarcho-individualists exercised an influence on the emerging working class. They expressed their opposition in uniquely personal forms, especially in fiery tracts, outrageous behavior, and aberrant lifestyles in the cultural ghettos of *fin de siècle* New York, Paris, and London. As a credo, individualist anarchism remained largely a bohemian lifestyle, most conspicuous in its demands for sexual freedom ('free love') and enamored of innovations in art, behavior, and clothing.

It was in times of severe social repression and deadening social quiescence that individualist anarchists came to the foreground of libertarian activity — and then primarily as terrorists. In France, Spain, and the United States, individualistic anarchists committed acts of terrorism that gave anarchism its reputation as a violently sinister conspiracy. Those who became terrorists were less often libertarian socialists or communists than desperate men and women who used weapons and explosives to protest the injustices and philistinism of their time, putatively in the name of 'propaganda of the deed.' Most often, however, individualist anarchism expressed itself in culturally defiant behavior. It came to prominence in anarchism precisely to the degree that anarchists lost their connection with a viable public sphere.

Today's reactionary social context greatly explains the emergence of a phenomenon in Euro-American anarchism that cannot be ignored: the spread of individualist anarchism. In a time when even respectable forms of socialism are in pell-mell retreat from principles that might in any way be construed as radical, issues of lifestyle are once again supplanting social action and revolutionary politics in anarchism. In the traditionally individualist-liberal United States and Britain, the 1990s are awash in self-styled anarchists who — their flamboyant radical rhetoric aside — are cultivating a latter-day anarcho-individualism that I will call lifestyle anarchism. Its preoccupations with the ego and its uniqueness and its polymorphous concepts of resistance are steadily eroding the socialistic character of the libertarian tradition. No less than Marxism and other socialisms, anarchism can be profoundly influenced by the bourgeois environment it professes to oppose, with the result that the growing 'inwardness' and narcissism of the yuppie generation have left their mark upon many avowed radicals. Ad hoc adventurism, personal bravura, an aversion to theory oddly akin to the antirational biases of postmodernism, celebrations of theoretical incoherence (pluralism), a basically apolitical and anti-organizational commitment

to imagination, desire, and ecstasy, and an intensely self-oriented enchantment of everyday life, reflect the toll that social reaction has taken on Euro-American anarchism over the past two decades.

During the 1970s, writes Katinka Matson, the compiler of a compendium of techniques for personal psychological development, there occurred 'a remarkable change in the way we perceive ourselves in the world. The 1960s,' she continues, 'saw a preoccupation with political activism, Vietnam, ecology, be-ins, communes, drugs, etc.' Today we are turning inward: we are looking for personal definition, personal improvement, personal achievement, and personal enlightenment.[1] Matson's noxious little bestiary, compiled for *Psychology Today* magazine, covers every technique from acupuncture to the *I Ching*, from est to zone therapy. In retrospect, she might well have included lifestyle anarchism in her compendium of inward-looking soporifics, most of which foster ideas of individual autonomy rather than social freedom. Psychotherapy in all its mutations cultivates an inwardly directed 'self' that seeks autonomy in a quiescent psychological condition of emotional self-sufficiency — not the socially involved self denoted by freedom. In lifestyle anarchism as in psychotherapy, the ego is counterposed to the collective; the self, to society; the personal, to the communal.

The ego — more precisely, its incarnation in various lifestyles — has become an *idée fixe* for many post-1960s anarchists, who are losing contact with the need for an organized, collectivistic, programmatic opposition to the existing social order. Invertebrate 'protests,' directionless escapades, self-assertions, and a very personal 'recolonization' of everyday life parallel the psychotherapeutic, New Age, self-oriented lifestyles of bored baby boomers and members of Generation X. Today, what passes for anarchism in America and increasingly in Europe is little more than an introspective personalism that denigrates responsible social commitment; an encounter group variously renamed a 'collective' or an 'affinity group'; a state of mind that arrogantly derides structure, organization, and public involvement; and a playground for juvenile antics.

Consciously or not, many lifestyle anarchists articulate Michel Foucault's approach of 'personal insurrection' rather than social revolution, premised as it is on an ambiguous and cosmic critique of power as such rather than on a demand for the institutionalized empowerment of the oppressed in popular assemblies, councils, and/or confederations. To the extent that this trend rules out the real possibility of social revolution — either as an 'impossibility' or as an 'imaginary' — it vitiates socialistic or communistic anarchism in a fundamental sense. Indeed, Foucault fosters a perspective that 'resistance is never in a position of exteriority in relation to power… Hence there is no single [read: universal] locus of great Refusal, no soul of revolt, source of all rebellions, or pure law of the revolutionary.' Caught as we all are in the ubiquitous embrace of a power so cosmic that, Foucault's overstatements and equivocations aside, resistance becomes entirely polymorphous, we drift futilely between the 'solitary' and the 'rampant.'[2] His meandering ideas come down to the notion that resistance must necessarily be a guerrilla war that is always present — and that is inevitably defeated.

Lifestyle, like individualist, anarchism bears a disdain for theory, with mystical, and primitivistic filiations that are generally too vague, intuitional, and even antirational to analyze directly.

[1] Katinka Matson, 'Preface,' *The Psychology Today Omnibook of Personal Development* (New York: William Morrow & Co., 1977), n.p.

[2] Michel Foucault, *The History of Sexuality*, vol. 1, translated by Robert Hurley (New York: Vintage Books, 1990), pp.95–96. Heavenly will be the day when one can get straightforward formulations from Foucault, interpretations of whose views are often contradictory.

They are more properly symptoms than causes of the general drift toward a sanctification of the self as a refuge from the existing social malaise. Nonetheless, largely personalistic anarchisms still have certain muddy theoretical premises that lend themselves to critical examination.

Their ideological pedigree is basically liberal, grounded in the myth of the fully autonomous individual whose claims to self-sovereignty are validated by axiomatic 'natural rights,' 'intrinsic worth,' or, on a more sophisticated level, an intuited Kantian transcendental ego that is generative of all knowable reality. These traditional views surface in Max Stirner's 'I' or ego, which shares with existentialism a tendency to absorb all of reality into itself, as if the universe turned on the choices of the self-oriented individual.

More recent works on lifestyle anarchism generally sidestep Stirner's sovereign, all-encompassing 'I,' albeit retaining its egocentric emphasis, and tend toward existentialism, recycled Situationism, Buddhism, Taoism, antirationalism, and primitivism — or, quite ecumenically, all of them in various permutations. Their commonalities, as we shall see, are redolent of a prelapsarian return to an original, often diffuse, and even petulantly infantile ego that ostensibly precedes history, civilization, and a sophisticated technology — possibly language itself — and they have nourished more than one reactionary political ideology over the past century.

Part 2

Autonomy or Freedom?

Without falling into the trap of social constructionism that sees every category as a product of a given social order, we are obliged to ask for a definition of the 'free individual.' How does individuality come into being, and under what circumstances is it free?

When lifestyle anarchists call for autonomy rather than freedom, they thereby forfeit the rich social connotations of freedom. Indeed, today's steady anarchist drumbeat for autonomy rather than social freedom cannot be dismissed as accidental, particularly in Anglo-American varieties of libertarian thought, where the notion of autonomy more closely corresponds to personal liberty. Its roots lie in the Roman imperial tradition of libertas, wherein the untrammeled ego is 'free' to own his personal property — and to gratify his personal lusts. Today, the individual endowed with 'sovereign rights' is seen by many lifestyle anarchists as antithetical not only to the State but to society as such. Strictly defined, the Greek word autonomia means 'independence,' connoting a self-managing ego, independent of any clientage or reliance on others for its maintenance. To my knowledge, it was not widely used by the Greek philosophers; indeed, it is not even mentioned in F. E. Peters's *historical lexicon of Greek Philosophical Terms.* Autonomy, like liberty, refers to the man (or woman) who Plato would have ironically called the 'master of himself,' a condition 'when the better principle of the human soul controls the worse.' Even for Plato, the attempt to achieve autonomy through mastery of oneself constituted a paradox, 'for the master is also the servant and the servant the master, and in all these modes of speaking the same person is predicated' (Republic, book 4, 431). Characteristically, Paul Goodman, an essentially individualistic anarchist, maintained that 'for me, the chief principle of anarchism is not freedom but autonomy, the ability to initiate a task and do it one's own way' — a view worthy of an aesthete but not of a social revolutionary.[1]

While autonomy is associated with the presumably self-sovereign individual, freedom dialectically interweaves the individual with the collective. The word freedom has its analogue in the Greek eleutheria and derives from the German Freiheit, a term that still retains a gemeinsch'ftliche or communal ancestry in Teutonic tribal life and law. When applied to the individual, freedom thus preserves a social or collective interpretation of that individual's origins and development as a self. In 'freedom,' individual selfhood does not stand opposed to or apart from the collective but is significantly formed — and in a rational society, would be realized — by his or her own social existence. Freedom thus does not subsume the individual's liberty but denotes its actualization.

The confusion between autonomy and freedom is all too evident in L. Susan Brown's *The Politics of Individualism* (POI), a recent attempt to articulate and elaborate a basically individualist anarchism, yet retain some filiations with anarcho'communism.[2] If lifestyle anarchism needs an

[1] Paul Goodman, 'Politics Within Limits,' in *Crazy Hope and Finite Experience: Final Essays of Paul Goodman*, ed. Taylor Stoehr (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1994), p.56.

[2] L. Susan Brown, *The Politics of Individualism* (Montreal: Black Rose Books, 1993). Brown's hazy commitment to anarchocommunism seems to derive more from a visceral preference than from her analysis.

academic pedigree, it will find it in her attempt to meld Bakunin and Kropotkin with John Stuart Mill. Alas, herein lies a problem that is more than academic. Brown's work exhibits the extent to which concepts of personal autonomy stand at odds with concepts of social freedom. In essence, like Goodman she interprets anarchism as a philosophy not of social freedom but of personal autonomy. She then offers a notion of 'existential individualism' that she contrasts sharply both with 'instrumental individualism' (or C. B. Macpherson's 'possessive [bourgeois] individualism') and with 'collectivism' — leavened with extensive quotations from Emma Goldman, who was by no means the ablest thinker in the libertarian pantheon.

Brown's 'existential individualism' shares liberalism's 'commitment to individual autonomy and self-determination,' she writes (POI, p.2). 'While much of anarchist theory has been viewed as communist by anarchists and non-anarchists alike,' she observes, 'what distinguishes anarchism from other communist philosophies is anarchism's uncompromising and relentless celebration of individual self-determination and autonomy. To be an anarchist — whether communist, individualist, mutualist, syndicalist, or feminist — is to affirm a commitment to the primacy of individual freedom' (POI, p.2) — and here she uses the word freedom in the sense of autonomy. Although anarchism's 'critique of private property and advocacy of free communal economic relations' (POI, p.2) move Brown's anarchism beyond liberalism, it nonetheless upholds individual rights over — and against — those of the collective.

'What distinguishes [existential individualism] from the collectivist point of view,' Brown goes on, 'is that individualists' — anarchists no less than liberals — 'believe in the existence of an internally motivated and authentic free will, while most collectivists understand the human individual as shaped externally by others — the individual for them is 'constructed' by the collective' (POI, p.12, emphasis added). Essentially, Brown dismisses collectivism — not just state socialism, but collectivism as such — with the liberal canard that a collectivist society entails the subordination of the individual to the group. Her extraordinary suggestion that 'most collectivists' have regarded individual people as 'simply human flotsam and jetsam swept along in the current of history' (POI, p.12) is a case in point. Stalin certainly held this view, and so did many Bolsheviks, with their hypostasization of social forces over individual desires and intentions. But collectivists as such? Are we to ignore the generous traditions of collectivism that sought a rational, democratic, and harmonious society — the visions of William Morris, say, or Gustav Landauer? What about Robert Owen, the Fourierists, democratic and libertarian socialists, Social Democrats of an earlier era, even Karl Marx and Peter Kropotkin? I am not sure that 'most collectivists,' even those who are anarchists, would accept the crude determinism that Brown attributes to Marx's social interpretations. By creating straw 'collectivists' who are hard-line mechanists, Brown rhetorically counterposes a mysteriously and autogenetically constituted individual, on the one hand, with an omnipresent, presumably oppressive, even totalitarian collective, on the other. Brown, in effect, overstates the contrast between 'existential individualism' and the beliefs of 'most collectivists' — to the point where her arguments seem misguided at best or disingenuous at worst.

It is elementary that, Jean-Jacques Rousseau's ringing opening to the Social Contract notwithstanding, people are definitely not 'born free,' let alone autonomous. Indeed, quite to the contrary, they are born very unfree, highly dependent, and conspicuously heteronomous. What freedom, independence, and autonomy people have in a given historical period is the product of long social traditions and, yes, a collective development — which is not to deny that individuals play an important role in that development, indeed are ultimately obliged to do so if they wish to be free.

Brown's argument leads to a surprisingly simplistic conclusion. 'It is not the group that gives shape to the individual,' we are told, 'but rather individuals who give form and content to the group. A group is a collection of individuals, no more and no less; it has no life or consciousness of its own' (POI, p.12, emphasis added). Not only does this incredible formulation closely resemble Margaret Thatcher's notorious statement that there is no such thing as a society but only individuals; it attests to a positivistic, indeed naive social myopia in which the universal is wholly separated from the concrete. Aristotle, one would have thought, resolved this problem when he chided Plato for creating a realm of ineffable 'forms' that existed apart from their tangible and imperfect 'copies.'

It remains true that individuals never form mere 'collections' — except perhaps in cyberspace; quite to the contrary, even when they seem atomized and hermetic, they are immensely defined by the relationships they establish or are obliged to establish with each other, by virtue of their very real existence as social beings. The idea that a collective — and by extrapolation, society — is merely a 'collection of individuals, no more and no less' represents an 'insight' into the nature of human consociation that is hardly liberal but, today particularly, potentially reactionary.

By insistently identifying collectivism with an implacable social determinism, Brown herself creates an abstract 'individual,' one that is not even existential in the strictly conventional sense of the word. Minimally, human existence presupposes the social and material conditions necessary for the maintenance of life, sanity, intelligence, and discourse; and the affective qualities Brown regards as essential for her voluntaristic form of communism: care, concern, and sharing. Lacking the rich articulation of social relationships in which people are embedded from birth through maturity to old age, a 'collection of individuals' such as Brown posits would be, to put it bluntly, not a society at all. It would be literally a 'collection' in Thatcher's sense of free-booting, self-seeking, egoistic monads. Presumably complete unto themselves, they are, by dialectical inversion, immensely de-individuated for want of any aim beyond the satisfaction of their own needs and pleasures — which are often socially engineered today in any case.

Acknowledging that individuals are self-motivated and possess free will does not require us to reject collectivism, given that they are also capable of developing an awareness of the social conditions under which these eminently human potentialities are exercised. The attainment of freedom rests partly on biological facts, as anyone who has raised a child knows; partly, on social facts, as anyone who lives in a community knows; and contrary to social constructionists, partly on the interaction of environment and inborn personal proclivities, as any thinking person knows. Individuality did not spring into being ab novo. Like the idea of freedom, it has a long social and psychological history.

Left to his or her own self, the individual loses the indispensable social moorings that make for what an anarchist might be expected to prize in individuality: reflective powers, which derive in great part from discourse; the emotional equipment that nourishes rage against unfreedom; the sociality that motivates the desire for radical change; and the sense of responsibility that engenders social action.

Indeed, Brown's thesis has disturbing implications for social action. If individual 'autonomy' overrides any commitment to a 'collectivity,' there is no basis whatever for social institutionalization, decision-making, or even administrative coordination. Each individual, self-contained in his or her 'autonomy,' is free to do whatever he or she wants — presumably, following the old liberal formula, if it does not impede the 'autonomy' of others. Even democratic decision-making is jettisoned as authoritarian. 'Democratic rule is still rule,' Brown warns. 'While it allows for

more individual participation in government than monarchy or totalitarian dictatorship, it still inherently involves the repression of the wills of some people. This is obviously at odds with the existential individual, who must maintain the integrity of will in order to be existentially free' (POI, p.53). Indeed, so transcendentally sacrosanct is the autonomous individual will, in Brown's eyes, that she approvingly quotes Peter Marshall's claim that, according to anarchist principles, 'the majority has no more right to dictate to the minority, even a minority of one, than the minority to the majority' (POI, p.140, emphasis added).

Denigrating rational, discursive, and direct-democratic procedures for collective decision-making as 'dictating' and 'ruling' awards a minority of one sovereign ego the right to abort the decision of a majority. But the fact remains that a free society will either be democratic, or it will not be achieved at all. In the very existential situation, if you please, of an anarchist society — a direct libertarian democracy — decisions would most certainly be made following open discussion. Thereafter the outvoted minority — even a minority of one — would have every opportunity to present countervailing arguments to try to change that decision. Decision-making by consensus, on the other hand, precludes ongoing dissensus — the all-important process of continual dialogue, disagreement, challenge, and counter'challenge, without which social as well as individual creativity would be impossible.

If anything, functioning on the basis of consensus assures that important decision-making will be either manipulated by a minority or collapse completely. And the decisions that are made will embody the lowest common denominator of views and constitute the least creative level of agreement. I speak, here, from painful, years-long experience with the use of consensus in the Clamshell Alliance of the 1970s. Just at the moment when this quasi-anarchic antinuclear-power movement was at the peak of its struggle, with thousands of activists, it was destroyed through the manipulation of the consensus process by a minority. The 'tyranny of structurelessness' that consensus decision-making produced permitted a well-organized few to control the unwieldy, deinstitutionalized, and largely disorganized many within the movement.

Nor, amidst the hue and cry for consensus, was it possible for dissensus to exist and creatively stimulate discussion, fostering a creative development of ideas that could yield new and ever-expanding perspectives. In any community, dissensus — and dissident individuals — prevent the community from stagnating. Pejorative words like dictate and rule properly refer to the silencing of dissenters, not to the exercise of democracy; ironically, it is the consensual 'general will' that could well, in Rousseau's memorable phrase from the Social Contract, 'force men to be free.'

Far from being existential in any earthy sense of the word, Brown's 'existential individualism' deals with the individual ahistorically. She rarefies the individual as a transcendental category, much as, in the 1970s, Robert K. Wolff paraded Kantian concepts of the individual in his dubious Defense of Anarchism. The social factors that interact with the individual to make him or her a truly willful and creative being are subsumed under transcendental moral abstractions that, given a purely intellectual life of their own, 'exist' outside of history and praxis.

Alternating between moral transcendentalism and simplistic positivism in her approach to the individual's relationship with the collective, Brown's exposition fits together as clumsily as creationism with evolution. The rich dialectic and the ample history that shows how the individual was largely formed by and interacted with a social development is nearly absent from her work. Atomistic and narrowly analytic in many of her views, yet abstractly moral and even transcendental in her interpretations, Brown provides an excellent setting for a notion of autonomy that is antipodal to social freedom. With the 'existential individual' on one side, and a society

that consists of a ‘collection of individuals’ and nothing more on the other, the chasm between autonomy and freedom becomes unbridgeable.

Part 3

Anarchism as Chaos

Whatever Brown's own preferences may be, her book both reflects and provides the premises for the shift among Euro-American anarchists away from social anarchism and toward individualist or lifestyle anarchism. Indeed, lifestyle anarchism today is finding its principal expression in spray-can graffiti, post-modernist nihilism, antirationalism, neoprimitivism, anti-technologism, neo-Situationist 'cultural terrorism,' mysticism, and a 'practice' of staging Foucauldian 'personal insurrections.'

These trendy posturings, nearly all of which follow current yuppie fashions, are individualistic in the important sense that they are antithetical to the development of serious organizations, a radical politics, a committed social movement, theoretical coherence, and programmatic relevance. More oriented toward achieving one's own 'self-realization' than achieving basic social change, this trend among lifestyle anarchists is particularly noxious in that its 'turning inward,' as Katinka Matson called it, claims to be a politics — albeit one that resembles R. D. Laing's 'politics of experience.' The black flag, which revolutionary social anarchists raised in insurrectionary struggles in Ukraine and Spain, now becomes a fashionable sarong for the delectation of chic petty bourgeois.

One of the most unsavory examples of lifestyle anarchism is Hakim Bey's (aka Peter Lamborn Wilson's) *T.A.Z.: The Temporary Autonomous Zone, Ontological Anarchism, Poetic Terrorism,* a jewel in the New Autonomy Series (no accidental word choice here), published by the heavily postmodernist Semiotext(e)/Autonomedia group in Brooklyn.[1] Amid paeans to 'Chaos,' 'Amour Fou,' 'Wild Children,' 'Paganism,' 'Art Sabotage,' 'Pirate Utopias,' 'Black Magic as Revolutionary Action,' 'Crime,' and 'Sorcery,' not to speak of commendations of 'Marxism-Stirnerism,' the call for autonomy is taken to lengths so absurd as to seemingly parody a self-absorbed and self-absorbing ideology.

T.A.Z. presents itself as a state of mind, an ardently antirational and anticivilizational mood, in which disorganization is conceived as an art form and graffiti supplants programs. The Bey (his pseudonym is the Turkish word for 'chief' or 'prince') minces no words about his disdain for social revolution: 'Why bother to confront a 'power' which has lost all meaning and become sheer Simulation? Such confrontations will only result in dangerous and ugly spasms of violence' (TAZ, p.128). Power in quotation marks? A mere 'Simulation'? If what is happening in Bosnia with firepower is a mere 'simulation,' we are living in a very safe and comfortable world indeed! The reader uneasy about the steadily multiplying social pathologies of modern life may be comforted by the Bey's Olympian thought that 'realism demands not only that we give up waiting for 'the Revolution,' but also that we give up wanting it' (TAZ, p.101). Does this passage beckon

[1] Hakim Bey, *T.A.Z.: The Temporary Autonomous Zone, Ontological Anarchism, Poetic Terrorism* (Brooklyn, NY: Autonomedia, 1985, 1991). Bey's individualism might easily resemble that of the late Fredy Perlman and his anticivilizational acolytes and primitivists in Detroit's Fifth Estate, except that T.A.Z. rather confusedly calls for 'a psychic paleolithism based on High-Tech' (p.44).

us to enjoy the serenity of Nirvana? Or a new Baudrillardian 'Simulation'? Or perhaps a new Castoriadian 'imaginary'?

Having eliminated the classical revolutionary aim of transforming society, the Bey patronizingly mocks those who once risked all for it: 'The democrat, the socialist, the rational ideology … are deaf to the music & lack all sense of rhythm' (TAZ, p.66). Really? Have the Bey and his acolytes themselves mastered the verses and music of the Marseillaise and danced ecstatically to the rhythms of Gliere's *Russian Sailor's Dance*? There is a wearisome arrogance in the Bey's dismissal of the rich culture that was created by revolutionaries over the past centuries, indeed by ordinary working people in the pre-rock-'n'-roll, pre-Woodstock era.

Verily, let anyone who enters the dreamworld of the Bey give up all nonsense about social commitment. 'A democratic dream? a socialist dream? Impossible,' intones the Bey with overbearing certainty. 'In dream we are never ruled except by love or sorcery' (TAZ, p.64). Thus are the dreams of a new world evoked by centuries of idealists in great revolutions magisterially reduced by the Bey to the wisdom of his febrile dream world.

As to an anarchism that is 'all cobwebby with Ethical Humanism, Free Thought, Muscular Atheism, & crude Fundamentalist Cartesian Logic' (TAZ, p.52) — forget it! Not only does the Bey, with one fell swoop, dispose of the Enlightenment tradition in which anarchism, socialism, and the revolutionary movement were once rooted, he mixes apples like 'Fundamentalist Cartesian Logic' with oranges like 'Free Thought,' and 'Muscular Humanism' as though they were interchangeable or necessarily presuppose each other.

Although the Bey himself never hesitates to issue Olympian pronouncements and deliver petulant polemics, he has no patience with 'the squabbling ideologues of anarchism & libertarianism' (TAZ, p.46). Proclaiming that 'Anarchy knows no dogmas' (TAZ, p.52), the Bey nonetheless immerses his readers in a harsh dogma if there ever was one: 'Anarchism ultimately implies anarchy — & anarchy is chaos' (TAZ, p.64). So saith the Lord: 'I Am That I Am' — and Moses quaked before the pronouncement!

Indeed, in a fit of manic narcissism, the Bey ordains that it is the all-possessive self, the towering 'I,' the Big 'me' that is sovereign: 'each of us [is] the ruler of our own flesh, our own creations — and as much of everything else as we can grab & hold.' For the Bey, anarchists and kings — and beys — become indistinguishable, inasmuch as all are autarchs:

Our actions are justified by fiat & our relations are shaped by treaties with other autarchs. We make the law for our own domains & the chains of law have been broken. At present perhaps we survive as mere Pretenders — but even so we may seize a few instants, a few square feet of reality over which to impose our absolute will, our royaume. L'etat, c'est moi… If we are bound by any ethics or morality, it must be one which we ourselves have imagined. (TAZ, p.67)

L'état, c'est moi? Along with beys, I can think of at least two people in this century who did enjoy these sweeping prerogatives: Joseph Stalin and Adolf Hitler. Most of the rest of us mortals, rich and poor alike, share, as Anatole France once put it, the prohibition to sleep under the bridges of the Seine. Indeed, if Friedrich Engels's 'On Authority,' with its defense of hierarchy, represents a bourgeois form of socialism, T.A.Z. and its offshoots represent a bourgeois form of anarchism. 'There is no becoming,' the Bey tells us, 'no revolution, no struggle, no path; [if] already you're the monarch of your own skin — your inviolable freedom awaits to be completed only by the love of other monarchs: a politics of dream, urgent as the blueness of sky' — words that could be inscribed on the New York Stock Exchange as a credo for egotism and social indifference (TAZ, p.4).

Certainly, this view will not repel the boutiques of capitalist 'culture' any more than long hair, beards, and jeans have repelled the entrepreneurial world of haute fashion. Unfortunately, far too many people in this world — no 'simulations' or 'dreams' — do not own even their own skins, as prisoners in chain gangs and jails can attest in the most concrete of terms. No one has ever floated out of the earthly realm of misery on 'a politics of dreams' except the privileged petty bourgeois, who may find the Bey's manifestoes amenable particularly in moments of boredom.

For the Bey, in fact, even classical revolutionary insurrections offer little more than a personal high, redolent of Foucault's 'limit experiences.' 'An uprising is like a 'peak experience," he assures us (TAZ, p.100). Historically, 'some anarchists .. took part in all sorts of uprisings and revolutions, even communist & socialist ones,' but that was 'because they found in the moment of insurrection itself the kind of freedom they sought. Thus while utopianism has so far always failed, the individualist or existentialist anarchists have succeeded inasmuch as they have attained (however briefly) the realization of their will to power in war' (TAZ, p.88). The Austrian workers' uprising of February 1934 and the Spanish Civil War of 1936, I can attest, were more than orgiastic 'moments of insurrection' but were bitter struggles carried on with desperate earnestness and magnificent 'lan, all aesthetic epiphanies notwithstanding.

Insurrection nonetheless becomes for the Bey little more than a psychedelic 'trip,' while the Nietzschean Overman, of whom the Bey approves, is a 'free spirit' who would 'disdain wasting time on agitation for reform, on protest, on visionary dreams, on all kinds of 'revolutionary martyrdom." Presumably dreams are okay as long as they are not 'visionary' (read: socially committed); rather, the Bey would 'drink wine' and have a 'private epiphany' (TAZ, p.88), which suggests little more than mental masturbation, freed to be sure from the constraints of Cartesian logic.

It should not surprise us to learn that the Bey favors the ideas of Max Stirner, who 'commits no metaphysics, yet bestows on the Unique [i.e, the Ego] a certain absoluteness' (TAZ, p.68). To be sure, the Bey finds that there is a 'missing ingredient in Stirner': 'a working concept of nonordinary consciousness' (TAZ, p.68). Apparently Stirner is too much the rationalist for the Bey. 'The orient, the occult, the tribal cultures possess techniques which can be 'appropriated' in true anarchist fashion… We need a practical kind of 'mystical anarchism' … a democratization of shamanism, intoxicated & serene' (TAZ, p.63). Hence the Bey summons his disciples to become 'sorcerers' and suggests that they use the 'Black Malay Djinn Curse.'

What, finally, is a 'temporary autonomous zone'? 'The TAZ is like an uprising which does not engage directly with the State, a guerrilla operation which liberates an area (of land, of time, of imagination) and then dissolves itself, to re-form elsewhere/elsewhen, before the State can crush it' (TAZ, p.101). In a TAZ we can 'realize many of our true Desires, even if only for a season, a brief Pirate Utopia, a warped free-zone in the old Space/Time continuum)' (TAZ, p.62). 'Potential TAZs' include 'the sixties-style 'tribal gathering,' the forest conclave of eco-saboteurs, the idyllic Beltane of the neopagans, anarchist conferences, and gay faery circles,' not to speak of 'nightclubs, banquets,' and 'old-time libertarian picnics' — no less! (TAZ, p.100). Having been a member of the Libertarian League in the 1960s, I would love to see the Bey and his disciples surface at an 'old-time libertarian picnic'!

So transient, so evanescent, so ineffable is a TAZ in contrast to the formidably stable State and bourgeoisie that 'as soon as the TAZ is named … it must vanish, it will vanish … only to spring up again somewhere else' (TAZ, p.101). A TAZ, in effect, is not a revolt but precisely a simulation, an insurrection as lived in the imagination of a juvenile brain, a safe retreat into unreality. Indeed, declaims the Bey: 'We recommend [the TAZ] because it can provide the quality of enhancement

without necessarily [!] leading to violence & martyrdom' (TAZ, p.101). More precisely, like an Andy Warhol 'happening,' a TAZ is a passing event, a momentary orgasm, a fleeting expression of the 'will to power' that is, in fact, conspicuously powerless in its capacity to leave any imprint on the individual's personality, subjectivity, and even self-formation, still less on shaping events and reality.

Given the evanescent quality of a TAZ, the Bey's disciples can enjoy the fleeting privilege of living a 'nomadic existence,' for 'homelessness can in a sense be a virtue, an adventure' (TAZ, p.130). Alas, homelessness can be an 'adventure' when one has a comfortable home to return to, while nomadism is the distinct luxury of those who can afford to live without earning their livelihood. Most of the 'nomadic' hoboes I recall so vividly from the Great Depression era suffered desperate lives of hunger, disease, and indignity and usually died prematurely — as they still do, today, in the streets of urban America. The few gypsy-types who seemed to enjoy the 'life of the road' were idiosyncratic at best and tragically neurotic at worst. Nor can I ignore another 'insurrection' that the Bey advances: notably, 'voluntary illiteracy' (TAZ, p.129). Although he advances this as a revolt against the educational system, its more desirable effect might be to render the Bey's various ex cathedra injunctions inaccessible to his readers.

Perhaps no better description can be given of T.A.Z.'s message than the one that appeared in *Whole Earth Review*, whose reviewer emphasizes that the Bey's pamphlet is 'quickly becom[ing] the countercultural bible of the 1990s … While many of Bey's concepts share an affinity with the doctrines of anarchism,' the Review reassures its yuppie clientele that he pointedly departs from the usual rhetoric about overthrowing the government. Instead, he prefers the mercurial nature of 'uprisings,' which he believes provide 'moments of intensity [that can] give shape and meaning to the entirety of life.' These pockets of freedom, or temporary autonomous zones, enable the individual to elude the schematic grids of Big Government and to occasionally live within realms where he or she can briefly experience total freedom. (emphasis added)[2]

There is an untranslatable Yiddish word for all of this: nebbich! During the 1960s, the affinity group Up Against the Wall Motherfuckers spread similar confusion, disorganization, and 'cultural terrorism,' only to disappear from the political scene soon thereafter. Indeed, some of its members entered the commercial, professional, and middle-class world they had formerly professed to despise. Nor is such behavior uniquely American. As one French 'veteran' of May-June 1968 cynically put it: 'We had our fun in '68, and now it's time to grow up.' The same deadening cycle, with circled A's, was repeated during a highly individualistic youth revolt in Zurich in 1984, only to end in the creation of Needle Park, a notorious cocaine and crack hangout established by the city's officials to allow addicted young people to destroy themselves legally.

The bourgeoisie has nothing whatever to fear from such lifestyle declamations. With its aversion for institutions, mass-based organizations, its largely subcultural orientation, its moral decadence, its celebration of transience, and its rejection of programs, this kind of narcissistic anarchism is socially innocuous, often merely a safety valve for discontent toward the prevailing social order. With the Bey, lifestyle anarchism takes flight from all meaningful social activism and a steadfast commitment to lasting and creative projects by dissolving itself into kicks, post-modernist nihilism, and a dizzying Nietzschean sense of elitist superiority.

The price that anarchism will pay if it permits this swill to displace the libertarian ideals of an earlier period could be enormous. The Bey's egocentric anarchism, with its post-modernist

[2] 'T.A.Z.,' *The Whole Earth Review* (Spring 1994), p.61.

withdrawal into individualistic ‘autonomy,’ Foucauldian ‘limit experiences,’ and neo-Situationist ‘ecstasy,’ threatens to render the very word anarchism politically and socially harmless — a mere fad for the titillation of the petty bourgeois of all ages.

Mystical and Irrationalist Anarchism

The Bey's T.A.Z. hardly stands alone in its appeal to sorcery, even mysticism. Given their prelapsarian mentality, many lifestyle anarchists readily take to antirationalism in its most atavistic forms. Consider 'The Appeal of Anarchy,' which occupies the entire back page of a recent issue of Fifth Estate (Summer 1989). 'Anarchy,' we read, recognizes 'the imminence of total liberation [nothing less!] and as a sign of your freedom, be naked in your rites.' Engage in 'dancing, singing, laughing, feasting, playing,' we are enjoined — and could anyone short of a mummified prig argue against these Rabelaisian delights?

But unfortunately, there is a hitch. Rabelais's *Abbey of Thélème*, which Fifth Estate seems to emulate, was replete with servants, cooks, grooms, and artisans, without whose hard labor the self-indulgent aristocrats of his distinctly upper-class utopia would have starved and huddled naked in the otherwise cold halls of the Abbey. To be sure, the Fifth Estate's 'Appeal of Anarchy' may well have in mind a materially simpler version of the *Abbey of Thélème*, and its 'feasting' may refer more to tofu and rice than to stuffed partridges and tasty truffles. But still — without major technological advances to free people from toil, even to get tofu and rice on the table, how could a society based on this version of anarchy hope to 'abolish all authority,' 'share all things in common,' feast, and run naked, dancing and singing?

This question is particularly relevant for the Fifth Estate group. What is arresting in the periodical is the primitivistic, prerational, antitechnological, and anticivilizational cult that lies at the core of its articles. Thus Fifth Estate's 'Appeal' invites anarchists to 'cast the magic circle, enter the trance of ecstasy, revel in sorcery which dispels all power' — precisely the magical techniques that shamans (who at least one of its writers celebrates) in tribal society, not to speak of priests in more developed societies, have used for ages to elevate their status as hierarchs and against which reason long had to battle to free the human mind from its own self-created mystifications. 'Dispel all power'? Again, there is a touch of Foucault here that as always denies the need for establishing distinctly empowered self-managing institutions against the very real power of capitalist and hierarchical institutions — indeed, for the actualization of a society in which desire and ecstasy can find genuine fulfillment in a truly libertarian communism.

Fifth Estate's beguilingly 'ecstatic' paean to 'anarchy,' so bereft of social content — all its rhetorical flourishes aside — could easily appear as a poster on the walls of a chic boutique, or on the back of a greeting card. Friends who recently visited New York City advise me, in fact, that a restaurant with linen-covered tables, fairly expensive menus, and a yuppie clientele on St. Mark's Place in the Lower East Side — a battleground of the 1960s — is named Anarchy. This feedlot for the city's petty bourgeoisie sports a print of the famous Italian mural *The Fourth Estate*, which shows insurrectionary *fin de siècle* workers militantly marching against an undepicted boss or possibly a police station. Lifestyle anarchism, it would seem, can easily become a choice consumer delicacy. The restaurant, I am told, also has security guards, presumably to keep out the local canaille who figure in the mural.

Safe, privatistic, hedonistic, and even cozy, lifestyle anarchism may easily provide the ready verbiage to spice up the pedestrian bourgeois lifeways of timid Rabelaisians. Like the 'Situationist art' that MIT displayed for the delectation of the avant-garde petty bourgeoisie several years ago, it offers little more than a terribly 'wicked' anarchist image — dare I say, a simulacrum — like those that flourish all along the Pacific Rim of America and points eastward. The Ecstasy Industry, for its part, is doing only too well under contemporary capitalism and could easily absorb the techniques of lifestyle anarchists to enhance a marketably naughty image. The counterculture that once shocked the petty bourgeoisie with its long hair, beards, dress, sexual freedom, and art has long since been upstaged by bourgeois entrepreneurs whose boutiques, cafés, clubs, and even nudist camps are doing a flourishing business, as witness the many steamy advertisements for new 'ecstasies' in the Village Voice and similar periodicals.

Actually, Fifth Estate's blatantly antirationalistic sentiments have very troubling implications. Its visceral celebration of imagination, ecstasy, and 'primality' patently impugns not only rationalistic efficiency but reason as such. The cover of the Fall/Winter 1993 issue bears Francisco Goya's famously misunderstood Capriccio no. 43, 'Il sueno de la razon produce monstros' ('The sleep of reason produces monsters'). Goya's sleeping figure is shown slumped over his desk before an Apple computer. Fifth Estate's English translation of Goya's inscription reads, 'The dream of reason produces monsters,' implying that monsters are a product of reason itself. In point of fact, Goya avowedly meant, as his own notes indicate, that the monsters in the engraving are produced by the sleep, not the dream, of reason. As he wrote in his own commentary: 'Imagination, deserted by reason, begets impossible monsters. United with reason, she is the mother of all arts, and the source of their wonders.'[1] By deprecating reason, this on-again, off-again anarchist periodical enters into collusion with some of the most dismal aspects of today's neo-Heideggerian reaction.

[1] Cited by Jose Lopez-Rey, *Goya's Capriccios: Beauty, Reason and Caricature*, vol. 1 (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1953), pp.80–81.

Part 4

Against Technology and Civilization

Even more troubling are the writings of George Bradford (aka David Watson), one of the major theorists at Fifth Estate, on the horrors of technology — apparently technology as such. Technology, it would seem, determines social relations rather than the opposite, a notion that more closely approximates vulgar Marxism than, say, social ecology. 'Technology is not an isolated project, or even an accumulation of technical knowledge,' Bradford tells us in 'Stopping the Industrial Hydra' (SIH), that is determined by a somehow separate and more fundamental sphere of 'social relations.' Mass technics have become, in the words of Langdon Winner, 'structures whose conditions of operation demand the restructuring of their environments,' and thus of the very social relations that brought them about. Mass technics — a product of earlier forms and archaic hierarchies — have now outgrown the conditions that engendered them, taking on an autonomous life… They furnish, or have become, a kind of total environment and social system, both in their general and individual, subjective aspects… In such a mechanized pyramid … instrumental and social relations are one and the same.[1]

This facile body of notions comfortably bypasses the capitalist relations that blatantly determine how technology will be used and focuses on what technology is presumed to be. By relegating social relations to something less than fundamental — instead of emphasizing the all-important productive process where technology is used — Bradford imparts to machines and 'mass technics' a mystical autonomy that, like the Stalinist hypostasization of technology, has served extremely reactionary ends. The idea that technology has a life of its own is deeply rooted in the conservative German romanticism of the last century and in the writings of Martin Heidegger and Friedrich Georg Jünger, which fed into National Socialist ideology, however much the Nazis honored their antitechnological ideology in the breach.

Viewed in terms of the contemporary ideology of our own times, this ideological baggage is typified by the claim, so common today, that newly developed automated machinery variously costs people their jobs or intensifies their exploitation — both of which are indubitable facts but are anchored precisely in social relations of capitalist exploitation, not in technological advances per se. Stated bluntly: 'downsizing' today is not being done by machines but by avaricious bourgeois who use machines to replace labor or exploit it more intensively. Indeed, the very machines that the bourgeois employs to reduce 'labor costs' could, in a rational society, free human beings from mindless toil for more creative and personally rewarding activities.

There is no evidence that Bradford is familiar with Heidegger or Jünger; rather, he seems to draw his inspiration from Langdon Winner and Jacques Ellul, the latter of whom Bradford quotes approvingly: 'It is the technological coherence that now makes up the social coherence… Technology is in itself not only a means, but a universe of means — in the original sense of Universum: both exclusive and total' (quoted in SIH, p.10).

[1] George Bradford, 'Stopping the Industrial Hydra: Revolution Against the Megamachine,' *The Fifth Estate*, vol. 24, no. 3 (Winter 1990), p.10.

In *The Technological Society*, his best-known book, Ellul advanced the dour thesis that the world and our ways of thinking about it are patterned on tools and machines (la technique). Lacking any social explanation of how this 'technological society' came about, Ellul's book concluded by offering no hope, still less any approach for redeeming humanity from its total absorption by la technique. Indeed, even a humanism that seeks to harness technology to meet human needs is reduced, in his view, into a 'pious hope with no chance whatsoever of influencing technological evolution.'[2] And rightly so, if so deterministic a worldview is followed to its logical conclusion.

Happily, however, Bradford provides us with a solution: 'to begin immediately to dismantle the machine altogether' (SIH, p.10). And he brooks no compromise with civilization but essentially repeats all the quasi-mystical, anticivilizational, and antitechnological clich's that appear in certain New Age environmental cults. Modern civilization, he tells us, is 'a matrix of forces,' including 'commodity relations, mass communications, urbanization and mass technics, along with … interlocking, rival nuclear-cybernetic states,' all of which converge into a 'global megamachine' (SIH, p.20). 'Commodity relations,' he notes in his essay 'Civilization in Bulk' (CIB), are merely part of this 'matrix of forces,' in which civilization is 'a machine' that has been a 'labor camp from its origins,' a 'rigid pyramid of crusting hierarchies,' 'a grid expanding the territory of the inorganic,' and 'a linear progression from Prometheus' theft of fire to the International Monetary Fund.'[3] Accordingly, Bradford reproves Monica Sjöö and Barbara Mor's inane book, *The Great Cosmic Mother: Rediscovering the Religion of the Earth* — not for its atavistic and regressive theism, but because the authors put the word civilization in quotation marks — a practice that 'reflects the tendency of this fascinating [!] book to posit an alternative or reverse perspective on civilization rather than to challenge its terms altogether' (CIB, footnote 23). Presumably, it is Prometheus who is to be reproved, not these two Earth Mothers, whose tract on chthonic deities, for all its compromises with civilization, is 'fascinating.'

No reference to the megamachine would be complete, to be sure, without quoting from Lewis Mumford's lament on its social effects. Indeed, it is worth noting that such comments have normally misconstrued Mumford's intentions. Mumford was not an antitechnologist, as Bradford and others would have us believe; nor was he in any sense of the word a mystic who would have found Bradford's anticivilizational primitivism to his taste. On this score, I can speak from direct personal knowledge of Mumford's views, when we conversed at some length as participants in a conference at the University of Pennsylvania around 1972.

But one need only turn to his writings, such as Technics and Civilization (TAC), from which Bradford himself quotes, to see that Mumford is at pains to favorably describe 'mechanical instruments' as 'potentially a vehicle of rational human purposes.'[4] Repeatedly reminding his reader that machines come from human beings, Mumford emphasizes that the machine is 'the projection of one particular side of the human personality' (TAC, p.317). Indeed, one of its most important functions has been to dispel the impact of superstition on the human mind. Thus:

> In the past, the irrational and demonic aspects of life had invaded spheres where they did not belong. It was a step in advance to discover that bacteria, not brownies, were responsible for curdling milk, and that an air-cooled motor was more effective than

[2] Jacques Ellul, *The Technological Society* (New York: Vintage Books, 1964), p.430.

[3] Bradford, 'Civilization in Bulk, *Fifth Estate* (Spring 1991), p.12.

[4] Lewis Mumford, *Technics and Civilization* (New York and Burlingame: Harcourt Brace & World, 1963), p.301. All page numbers herein refer to this edition.

> a witch's broomstick for rapid long distance transportation… Science and technics stiffened our morale: by their very austerities and abnegations they … cast contempt on childish fears, childish guesses, equally childish assertions. (TAC, p.324)

This major theme in Mumford's writings has been blatantly neglected by the primitivists in our midst — notably, his belief that the machine has made the 'paramount contribution' of fostering 'the technique of cooperative thought and action.' Nor did Mumford hesitate to praise 'the esthetic excellence of the machine form … above all, perhaps, the more objective personality that has come into existence through a more sensitive and understanding intercourse with these new social instruments and through their deliberate cultural assimilation' (TAC, p.324). Indeed, 'the technique of creating a neutral world of fact as distinguished from the raw data of immediate experience was the great general contribution of modern analytic science' (TAC, p.361).

Far from sharing Bradford's explicit primitivism, Mumford sharply criticized those who reject the machine absolutely, and he regarded the 'return to the absolute primitive' as a 'neurotic adaptation' to the megamachine itself (TAC, p.302), indeed a catastrophe. 'More disastrous than any mere physical destruction of machines by the barbarian is his threat to turn off or divert the human motive power,' he observed in the sharpest of terms, 'discouraging the cooperative processes of thought and the disinterested research which are responsible for our major technical achievements' (TAC, p.302). And he enjoined: 'We must abandon our futile and lamentable dodges for resisting the machine by stultifying relapses into savagery' (TAC, p.319).

Nor do his later works reveal any evidence that he relented in this view. Ironically, he contemptuously designated the Living Theater's performances and visions of the 'Outlaw Territory' of motorcycle gangs as 'Barbarism,' and he deprecated Woodstock as the 'Mass Mobilization of Youth,' from which the 'present mass-minded, over-regimented, depersonalized culture has nothing to fear.'

Mumford, for his own part, favored neither the megamachine nor primitivism (the 'organic') but rather the sophistication of technology along democratic and humanly scaled lines. 'Our capacity to go beyond the machine [to a new synthesis] rests upon our power to assimilate the machine,' he observed in Technics and Civilization. 'Until we have absorbed the lessons of objectivity, impersonality, neutrality, the lessons of the mechanical realm, we cannot go further in our development toward the more richly organic, the more profoundly human' (TAC, p.363, emphasis added).

Denouncing technology and civilization as inherently oppressive of humanity in fact serves to veil the specific social relations that privilege exploiters over the exploited and hierarchs over their subordinates. More than any oppressive society in the past, capitalism conceals its exploitation of humanity under a disguise of 'fetishes,' to use Marx's terminology in Capital, above all, the 'fetishism of commodities,' which has been variously — and superficially — embroidered by the Situa'tion'ists into 'spectacles' and by Baudrillard into 'simulacra.' Just as the bourgeoisie's acquisition of surplus value is hidden by a contractual exchange of wages for labor power that is only ostensibly equal, so the fetishization of the commodity and its movements conceals the sovereignty of capitalism's economic and social relations.

There is an important, indeed crucial, point to be made, here. Such concealment shields from public purview the causal role of capitalist competition in producing the crises of our times. To these mystifications, antitechnologists and anticivilizationists add the myth of technology and civilization as inherently oppressive, and they thus obscure the social relationships unique to

capitalism — notably the use of things (commodities, exchange values, objects — employ what terms you choose) to mediate social relations and produce the techno-urban landscape of our time. Just as the substitution of the phrase 'industrial society' for capitalism obscures the specific and primary role of capital and commodity relationships in forming modern society, so the substitution of a techno-urban culture for social relations, in which Bradford overtly engages, conceals the primary role of the market and competition in forming modern culture.

Lifestyle anarchism, largely because it is concerned with a 'style' rather than a society, glosses over capitalist accumulation, with its roots in the competitive marketplace, as the source of ecological devastation, and gazes as if transfixed at the alleged break of humanity's 'sacred' or 'ecstatic' unity with 'Nature' and at the 'disenchantment of the world' by science, materialism, and 'logocentricity.'

Thus, instead of disclosing the sources of present-day social and personal pathologies, antitechnologism allows us to speciously replace capitalism with technology, which basically facilitates capital accumulation and the exploitation of labor, as the underlying cause of growth and of ecological destruction. Civilization, embodied in the city as a cultural center, is divested of its rational dimensions, as if the city were an unabated cancer rather than the potential sphere for universalizing human intercourse, in marked contrast to the parochial limitations of tribal and village life. The basic social relationships of capitalist exploitation and domination are overshadowed by metaphysical generalizations about the ego and la technique, blurring public insight into the basic causes of social and ecological crises — commodity relations that spawn the corporate brokers of power, industry, and wealth.

Which is not to deny that many technologies are inherently domineering and ecologically dangerous, or to assert that civilization has been an unmitigated blessing. Nuclear reactors, huge dams, highly centralized industrial complexes, the factory system, and the arms industry — like bureaucracy, urban blight, and contemporary media — have been pernicious almost from their inception. But the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries did not require the steam engine, mass manufacture, or, for that matter, giant cities and far-reaching bureaucracies, to deforest huge areas of North America and virtually obliterate its aboriginal peoples, or erode the soil of entire regions. To the contrary, even before railroads reached out to all parts of the land, much of this devastation had already been wrought using simple axes, black-powder muskets, horse-driven wagons, and moldboard plows.

It was these simple technologies that bourgeois enterprise — the barbarous dimensions of civilization of the last century — used to carve much of the Ohio River valley into speculative real estate. In the South, plantation owners needed slave 'hands' in great part because the machinery to plant and pick cotton did not exist; indeed, American tenant farming has disappeared over the past two generations largely because new machinery was introduced to replace the labor of 'freed' black sharecroppers. In the nineteenth century peasants from semifeudal Europe, following river and canal routes, poured into the American wilderness and, with eminently unecological methods, began to produce the grains that eventually propelled American capitalism to economic hegemony in the world.

Bluntly put: it was capitalism — the commodity relationship expanded to its full historical proportions — that produced the explosive environmental crisis of modern times, beginning with early cottage-made commodities that were carried over the entire world in sailing vessels, powered by wind rather than engines. Apart from the textile villages and towns of Britain, where mass manufacture made its historic breakthrough, the machines that meet with the greatest op-

probrium these days were created long after capitalism gained ascendancy in many parts of Europe and North America.

Despite the current swing of the pendulum from a glorification of European civilization to its wholesale denigration, however, we would do well to remember the significance of the rise of modern secularism, scientific knowledge, universalism, reason, and technologies that potentially offer the hope of a rational and emancipatory dispensation of social affairs, indeed, for the full realization of desire and ecstasy without the many servants and artisans who pandered to the appetites of their aristocratic 'betters' in Rabelais's *Abbey of Thélème*. Ironically, the anti-civilizational anarchists who denounce civilization today are among those who enjoy its cultural fruits and make expansive, highly individualistic professions of liberty, with no sense of the painstaking developments in European history that made them possible. Kropotkin, for one, significantly emphasized 'the progress of modern technics, which wonderfully simplifies the production of all the necessaries of life.'[5] To those who lack a sense of historical contextuality, arrogant hindsight comes cheaply.

[5] Kropotkin, 'Anarchism,' *Revolutionary Pamphlets*, p.285.

Part 5

Mystifying the Primitive

The corollary of antitechnologism and anticivilizationism is primitivism, an edenic glorification of prehistory and the desire to somehow return to its putative innocence. Lifestyle anarchists like Bradford draw their inspiration from aboriginal peoples and myths of an edenic prehistory. Primal peoples, he says, 'refused technology' — they 'minimized the relative weight of instrumental or practical techniques and expanded the importance of … ecstatic techniques.' This was because aboriginal peoples, with their animistic beliefs, were saturated by a 'love' of animal life and wilderness — for them, 'animals, plants, and natural objects' were 'persons, even kin' (CIB, p.11).

Accordingly, Bradford objects to the 'official' view that designates the lifeways of prehistoric foraging cultures as 'terrible, brutish and nomadic, a bloody struggle for existence.' Rather, he apotheosizes 'the primal world' as what Marshall Sahlins called 'the original affluent society,' affluent because its needs are few, all its desires are easily met. Its tool kit is elegant and lightweight, its outlook linguistically complex and conceptually profound yet simple and accessible to all. Its culture is expansive and ecstatic. It is propertyless and communal, egalitarian and cooperative… It is anarchic… free of work … It is a dancing society, a singing society, a celebrating society, a dreaming society. (CIB, p.10)

Inhabitants of the 'primal world,' according to Bradford, lived in harmony with the natural world and enjoyed all the benefits of affluence, including much leisure time. Primal society, he emphasizes, was 'free of work' since hunting and gathering required much less effort than people today put in with the eight-hour day. He does compassionately concede that primal society was 'capable of experiencing occasional hunger.' This 'hunger,' however, was really symbolic and self-inflicted, you see, because primal peoples 'sometimes [chose] hunger to enhance interrelatedness, to play, or to see visions' (CIB, p.10).

It would take a full-sized essay in itself to unscramble, let alone refute, this absurd balderdash, in which a few truths are either mixed with or coated in sheer fantasy. Bradford bases his account, we are told, on 'greater access to the views of primal people and their native descendants' by 'a more critical … anthropology' (CIB, p.10). In fact, much of his 'critical anthropology' appears to derive from ideas propounded at the 'Man the Hunter' symposium, convened in April 1966 at the University of Chicago.[1] Although most of the papers contributed to this symposium were immensely valuable, a number of them conformed to the naive mystification of 'primitivity' that was percolating through the 1960s counterculture — and that lingers on to this day. The hippie culture, which influenced quite a few anthropologists of the time, averred that hunting-gathering peoples today had been bypassed by the social and economic forces at work in the rest of the world and still lived in a pristine state, as isolated remnants of Neolithic and Paleolithic lifeways. Further, as hunter-gatherers, their lives were notably healthy and peaceful, living then as now on an ample natural largess.

[1] The conference papers were published in Richard B. Lee and Irven DeVore, eds., *Man the Hunter* (Chicago: Aldine Publishing Co., 1968).

Thus, Richard B. Lee, coeditor of the collection of conference papers, estimated that the caloric intake of 'primitive' peoples was quite high and their food supply abundant, making for a kind of virginal 'affluence' in which people needed to forage only a few hours each day. 'Life in the state of nature is not necessarily nasty, brutish, and short,' wrote Lee. The habitat of the !Kung Bushmen of the Kalahari Desert, for example, 'is abundant in naturally occurring foods.' The Bushmen of the Dobe area, who, Lee wrote, were still on the verge of entry into the Neolithic, live well today on wild plants and meat, in spite of the fact that they are confined to the least productive portion of the range in which Bushmen peoples were formerly found. It is likely that an even more substantial subsistence base would have been characteristic of these hunters and gatherers in the past, when they had the pick of African habitats to choose from.[2]

Not quite! — as we shall see shortly.

It is all too common for those who swoon over 'primal life' to lump together many millennia of prehistory, as if significantly different hominid and human species lived in one kind of social organization. The word prehistory is highly ambiguous. Inasmuch as the human genus included several different species, we can hardly equate the 'outlook' of Aurignacian and Magdalenian foragers (Homo sapiens sapiens) some 30,000 years ago, with that of Homo sapiens neanderthalensis or Homo erectus, whose tool kits, artistic abilities, and capacities for speech were strikingly different.

Another concern is the extent to which prehistoric hunter-gatherers or foragers at various times lived in nonhierarchical societies. If the burials at Sungir (in present Eastern Europe) some 25,000 years ago allow for any speculation (and there are no Paleolithic people around to tell us about their lives), the extraordinarily rich collection of jewelry, lances, ivory spears, and beaded clothing at the gravesites of two adolescents suggest the existence of high-status family lines long before human beings settled down to food cultivation. Most cultures in the Paleolithic were probably relatively egalitarian, but hierarchy seems to have existed even in the late Paleolithic, with marked variations in degree, type, and scope of domination that cannot be subsumed under rhetorical paeans to Paleolithic egalitarianism.

A further concern that arises is the variation — in early cases, the absence — of communicative ability in different epochs. Inasmuch as a written language did not appear until well into historical times, the languages even of early Homo sapiens sapiens were hardly 'conceptually profound.' The pictographs, glyphs, and, above all, memorized material upon which 'primal' peoples relied for knowledge of the past have obvious cultural limitations. Without a written literature that records the cumulative wisdom of generations, historical memory, let alone 'conceptually profound' thoughts, are difficult to retain; rather, they are lost over time or woefully distorted. Least of all is orally transmitted history subject to demanding critique but instead easily becomes a tool for elite 'seers' and shamans who, far from being 'protopoets,' as Bradford calls them, seem to have used their 'knowledge' to serve their own social interests.[3]

Which brings us, inevitably, to John Zerzan, the anti-civilizational primitivist *par excellence*. For Zerzan, one of the steady hands at *Anarchy: A Journal of Desire Armed*, the absence of speech, language, and writing is a positive boon. Another denizen of the 'Man the Hunter' time warp, Zerzan maintains in his book Future Primitive (FP) that 'life before domestication/agriculture

[2] 'What Hunters Do for a Living, or, How to Make Out in Scarce Resources,' in Lee and Devore, *Man the Hunter*, p.43.

[3] See particularly Paul Radin's *The World of Primitive Man* (New York: Grove Press, 1953), pp.139–150.

was in fact largely one of a leisure, intimacy with nature, sensual wisdom, sexual equality, and health'[4] — with the difference that Zerzan's vision of 'primality' more closely approximates four-legged animality. In fact, in Zerzanian paleoanthropology, the anatomical distinctions between Homo sapiens, on the one hand, and Homo habilis, Homo erectus, and the 'much-maligned' Neanderthals, on the other, are dubious; all early Homo species, in his view, were possessed of the mental and physical capacities of Homo sapiens and furthermore lived in primal bliss for more than two million years.

If these hominids were as intelligent as modern humans, we may be naively tempted to ask, why did they not innovate technological change? 'It strikes me as very plausible,' Zerzan brightly conjectures, 'that intelligence, informed by the success and satisfaction of a gatherer-hunter existence, is the very reason for the pronounced absence of 'progress.' Division of labor, domestication, symbolic culture — these were evidently [!] refused until very recently.' The Homo species 'long chose nature over culture,' and by culture here Zerzan means 'the manipulation of basic symbolic forms' (emphasis added) — an alienating encumbrance. Indeed, he continues, 'reified time, language (written, certainly, and probably spoken language for all or most of this period), number, and art had no place, despite an intelligence fully capable of them' (FP, pp.23, 24).

In short, hominids were capable of symbols, speech, and writing but deliberately rejected them, since they could understand one another and their environment instinctively, without recourse to them. Thus Zerzan eagerly agrees with an anthropologist who meditates that 'San/Bushman communion with nature' reached 'a level of experience that 'could almost be called mystical. For instance, they seemed to know what it actually felt like to be an elephant, a lion, an antelope" even a baobab tree (FP, pp.33–34).

The conscious 'decision' to refuse language, sophisticated tools, temporality, and a division of labor (presumably they tried and grunted, 'Bah!') was made, we are told, by Homo habilis, who, I should note, had roughly half the brain size of modern humans and probably lacked the anatomical capacity for syllabic speech. Yet we have it on Zerzan's sovereign authority that habilis (and possibly even Australopithecus afarensis, who may have been around some 'two million years ago') possessed 'an intelligence fully capable' — no less! — of these functions but refused to use them. In Zerzanian paleoanthropology, early hominids or humans could adopt or reject vital cultural traits like speech with sublime wisdom, the way monks take vows of silence.

But once the vow of silence was broken, everything went wrong! For reasons known only to God and Zerzan.

The emergence of symbolic culture, with its inherent will to manipulate and control, soon opened the door to the domestication of nature. After two million years of human life within the bounds of nature, in balance with other wild species, agriculture changed our lifestyle, our way of adapting, in an unprecedented way. Never before has such a radical change occurred in a species so utterly and so swiftly… Self-domestication through language, ritual, and art inspired the taming of plants and animals that followed. (FP, pp.27–28, emphasis added)

There is a certain splendor in this claptrap that is truly arresting. Significantly different epochs, hominid and/or human species, and ecological and technological situations are all swept up together into a shared life 'within the bounds of nature.' Zerzan's simplification of the highly com-

[4] John Zerzan, *Future Primitive and Other Essays* (Brooklyn, NY: Autonomedia, 1994), p.16. The reader who has faith in Zerzan's research may try looking for important sources like 'Cohen (1974)' and 'Clark (1979)' (cited on pages 24 and 29, respectively) in his bibliography — they and others are entirely absent.

plex dialectic between humans and nonhuman nature reveals a mentality so reductionist and simplistic that one is obliged to stand before it in awe.

To be sure, there is very much we can learn from preliterate cultures — organic societies, as I call them in *The Ecology of Freedom* — particularly about the mutability of what is commonly called 'human nature.' Their spirit of in-group cooperation and, in the best of cases, egalitarian outlook are not only admirable — and socially necessary in view of the precarious world in which they lived — but provide compelling evidence of the malleability of human behavior in contrast to the myth that competition and greed are innate human attributes. Indeed, their practices of usufruct and the inequality of equals are of great relevance to an ecological society.

But that 'primal' or prehistoric peoples 'revered' nonhuman nature is at best specious and at worst completely disingenuous. In the absence of 'nonnatural' environments such as villages, towns, and cities, the very notion of 'Nature' as distinguished from habitat had yet to be conceptualized — a truly alienating experience, in Zerzan's view. Nor is it likely that our remote ancestors viewed the natural world in a manner any less instrumental than did people in historical cultures. With due regard for their own material interests — their survival and well-being — prehistoric peoples seem to have hunted down as much game as they could, and if they imaginatively peopled the animal world with anthropomorphic attributes, as they surely did, it would have been to communicate with it with an end toward manipulating it, not simply toward revering it.

Thus, with very instrumental ends in mind, they conjured 'talking' animals, animal 'tribes' (often patterned on their own social structures), and responsive animal 'spirits.' Understandably, given their limited knowledge, they believed in the reality of dreams, where humans might fly and animals might talk — in an inexplicable, often frightening dream world that they took for reality. To control game animals, to use a habitat for survival purposes, to deal with the vicissitudes of weather and the like, prehistoric peoples had to personify these phenomena and 'talk' to them, whether directly, ritualistically, or metaphorically.

In fact, prehistoric peoples seem to have intervened into their environment as resolutely as they could. As soon as Homo erectus or later human species learned to use fire, for example, they seem to have put it to work burning off forests, probably stampeding game animals over cliffs or into natural enclosures where they could be easily slaughtered. The 'reverence for life' of prehistoric peoples thus reflected a highly pragmatic concern for enhancing and controlling the food supply, not a love for animals, forests, mountains (which they may very well have feared as the lofty home of deities both demonic and benign).[5]

Nor does the 'love of nature' that Bradford attributes to 'primal society' accurately depict foraging peoples today, who often deal rather harshly with work and game animals; the Ituri forest Pygmies, for example, tormented ensnared game quite sadistically, and Eskimos commonly maltreated their huskies.[6] As for Native Americans before European contact, they vastly altered

[5] The literature on these aspects of prehistoric life is very large. Anthony Legge and Peter A. Rowly's 'Gazelle Killing in Stone Age Syria,' *Scientific American*, vol. 257 (Aug. 1987), pp.88–95, shows that migrating animals could have been slaughtered with devastating effectiveness by the use of corrals. The classical study of the pragmatic aspects of animism is Bronislaw Malinowski's *Myth, Science and Religion* (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1954). Manipulative anthropomorphization is evident in many accounts of transmigrations from the human to nonhuman realm claimed by shamans, as in the myths of the Makuna reported by Kaj'rhem, 'Dance of the Water People,' *Natural History* (Jan. 1992).

[6] On the pygmies, see Colin M. Turnbull, *The Forest People: A Study of the Pygmies of the Congo* (New York: Clarion/Simon and Schuster, 1961), pp.101–102. On the Eskimos, see Gontran de Montaigne Poncins's *Kabloona: A*

much of the continent by using fire to clear lands for horticulture and for better visibility in hunting, to the extent that the 'paradise' encountered by Europeans was 'clearly humanized.'[7]

Unavoidably, many Indian tribes seem to have exhausted local food animals and had to migrate to new territories to gain the material means of life. It would be surprising indeed if they did not engage in warfare to displace the original occupants. Their remote ancestors may well have pushed some of the great North American mammals of the last ice age (notably mammoths, mastodons, longhorn bison, horses, and camels) to extinction. Thickly accumulated bones of bison are still discernible in sites that suggest mass killings and 'assembly-line' butchering in a number of American arroyos.[8]

Nor, among those peoples who did have agriculture, was land use necessarily ecologically benign. Around Lake Pátzcuaro in the central Mexican highlands, before the Spanish conquest, 'prehistoric land use was not conservationist in practice,' writes Karl W. Butzer, but caused high rates of soil erosion. Indeed, aboriginal farming practices 'could be as damaging as any pre-industrial land-use in the Old World.'[9] Other studies have shown that forest overclearing and the failure of subsistence agriculture undermined Mayan society and contributed to its collapse.[10]

We will never have any way of knowing whether the lifeways of today's foraging cultures accurately mirror those of our ancestral past. Not only did modern aboriginal cultures develop over thousands of years, but they were significantly altered by the diffusion of countless traits from other cultures before they were studied by Western researchers. Indeed, as Clifford Geertz has observed rather acidly, there is little if anything pristine about the aboriginal cultures that modern primitivists associate with early humanity. 'The realization, grudging and belated, that [the pristine primality of existing aborigines] is not so, not even with the Pygmies, not even with the Eskimos,' Geertz observes, 'and that these people are in fact products of larger-scale processes of social change which have made them and continue to make them what they are — has come as something of a shock that has induced a virtual crisis in the field [of ethnog-

White Man in the Arctic Among the Eskimos (New York: Reynal & Hitchcock, 1941), pp.208–9, as well as in many other works on traditional Eskimo culture.

[7] That many grasslands throughout the world were produced by fire, probably dating back to Homo erectus, is a hypothesis scattered throughout the anthropological literature. An excellent study is Stephen J. Pyne's *Fire in America* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1982). See also William M. Denevan, in *Annals of the American Association of Geographers* (Sept. 1992), cited in William K. Stevens, 'An Eden in Ancient America? Not Really,' *The New York Times* (March 30, 1993), p. C1.

[8] On the hotly debated issue of 'overkill' see *Pleistocene Extinctions: The Search for a Cause*, ed. P.S. Martin and H.E. Wright, Jr. The arguments around whether climatic factors and/or human 'overkilling' led to massive extinctions of some thirty-five genera of Pleistocene mammals are too complex to be dealt with here. See Paul S. Martin, 'Prehistoric Overkill,' in *Pleistocene Extinctions: The Search for a Cause*, ed. P. S. Martin and H. E. Wright, Jr. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1967). I have explored some of the arguments in my introduction to the 1991 revised edition of *The Ecology of Freedom* (Montreal: Black Rose Books). The evidence is still under debate. Mastodons, who were once regarded as environmentally restricted animals, are now known to have been ecologically more flexible and might have been killed off by Paleoindian hunters, possibly with far less compunction than romantic environmentalists would like to believe. I do not contend that hunting alone pushed these large mammals to extermination — a considerable amount of killing would have been enough. A summary of arroyo drives of bison can be found in Brian Fagan, 'Bison Hunters of the Northern Plains,' *Archaeology* (May-June 1994), p.38.

[9] Karl W. Butzer, 'No Eden in the New World,' *Nature*, vol. 82 (March 4, 1993), pp.15–17.

[10] T. Patrick Cuthbert, 'The Collapse of Classic Maya Civilization,' in *The Collapse of Ancient States and Civilizations*, ed. Norman Yoffee and George L. Cowgill (Tucson, Ariz.: University of Arizona Press, 1988); and Joseph A. Tainter, *The Collapse of Complex Societies* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), esp. chapter 5.

raphy].'[11] Scores of 'primal' peoples, like the forests they inhabited, were no more 'virginal' at European contact than were the Lakota Indians at the time of the American Civil War, Dancing With Wolves to the contrary notwithstanding. Many of the much-touted 'primal' belief-systems of existing aborigines are clearly traceable to Christian influences. Black Elk, for example, was a zealous Catholic,[12] while the late-nineteenth-century Ghost Dance of the Paiute and Lakota was profoundly influenced by Christian evangelical millennarianism.

In serious anthropological research, the notion of an 'ecstatic,' pristine hunter has not survived the thirty years that have passed since the 'Man the Hunter' symposium. Most of the 'affluent hunter' societies cited by devotees of the myth of 'primitive affluence' literally devolved — probably very much against their desires — from horticultural social systems. The San people of the Kalahari are now known to have been gardeners before they were driven into the desert. Several hundred years ago, according to Edwin Wilmsen, San-speaking peoples were herding and farming, not to speak of trading with neighboring agricultural chiefdoms in a network that extended to the Indian Ocean. By the year 1000, excavations have shown, their area, Dobe, was populated by people who made ceramics, worked with iron, and herded cattle, exporting them to Europe by the 1840s together with massive amounts of ivory — much of it from elephants hunted by the San people themselves, who doubtless conducted this slaughter of their pachyderm 'brothers' with the great sensitivity that Zerzan attributes to them. The marginal foraging lifeways of the San that so entranced observers in the 1960s were actually the result of economic changes in the late nineteenth century, while 'the remoteness imagined by outside observers … was not indigenous but was created by the collapse of mercantile capital.'[13]

Thus, 'the current status of San-speaking peoples on the rural fringe of African economies,' Wilmsen notes, can be accounted for only in terms of the social policies and economies of the colonial era and its aftermath. Their appearance as foragers is a function of their relegation to an underclass in the playing out of historical processes that began before the current millennium and culminated in the early decades of this century.[14]

The Yuqu' of the Amazon, too, could easily have epitomized the pristine foraging society extolled in the 1960s. Unstudied by Europeans until the 1950s, this people had a tool kit that consisted of little more than a boar claw and bow-and-arrows: 'In addition to being unable to produce fire,' writes Allyn M. Stearman, who studied them, 'they had no watercraft, no domestic animals (not even the dog), no stone, no ritual specialists, and only a rudimentary cosmology. They lived out their lives as nomads, wandering the forests of lowland Bolivia in search of game and other foods provided by their foraging skills.'[15] They grew no crops at all and were unfamiliar with the use of the hook and line for fishing.

Yet far from being egalitarian, the Yuqu' maintained the institution of hereditary slavery, dividing their society into a privileged elite stratum and a scorned laboring slave group. This feature is now regarded as a vestige of former horticultural lifeways. The Yuqu', it appears, were descended

[11] Clifford Geertz, 'Life on the Edge,' *The New York Review of Books*, April 7, 1994, p.3.

[12] As William Powers observes, the book *Black Elk Speaks* was published in 1932. There is no trace of Black Elk's Christian life in it.' For a thorough debunking of the current fascination with the Black Elk story, see William Powers, 'When Black Elk Speaks, Everybody Listens,' *Social Text*, vol. 8, no. 2 (1991), pp.43–56.

[13] Edwin N. Wilmsen, *Land Filled With Flies* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1989), p.127.

[14] Wilmsen, *Land Filled with Flies*, p.3.

[15] Allyn Maclean Stearman, *Yuqu': Forest Nomads in a Changing World* (Fort Worth and Chicago: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1989), p.23.

from a slave-holding pre-Columbian society, and 'over time, they experienced deculturation, losing much of their cultural heritage as it became necessary to remain mobile and live off the land. But while many elements of their culture may have been lost, others were not. Slavery, evidently, was one of these.'[16]

Not only has the myth of the 'pristine' forager been shattered, but Richard Lee's own data on the caloric intake of 'affluent' foragers have been significantly challenged by Wilmsen and his associates.[17] !Kung people had average lifespans of about thirty years. Infant mortality was high, and according to Wilmsen (pace Bradford!), the people were subject to disease and hunger during lean seasons. (Lee himself has revised his views on this score since the 1960s.)

Correspondingly, the lives of our early ancestors were most certainly anything but blissful. In fact, life for them was actually quite harsh, generally short, and materially very demanding. Anatomical assays of their longevity show that about half died in childhood or before the age of twenty, and few lived beyond their fiftieth year. They were more likely scavengers than hunter-gatherers and were probably prey for leopards and hyenas.[18]

To members of their own bands, tribes, or clans, prehistoric and later foraging peoples were normally cooperative and peaceful; but toward members of other bands, tribes, or clans, they were often warlike, even sometimes genocidal in their efforts to dispossess them and appropriate their land. That most blissed-out of ancestral humans (if we are to believe the primitivists), Homo erectus, has left behind a bleak record of interhuman slaughter, according to data summarized by Paul Janssens.[19] It has been suggested that many individuals in China and Java were killed by volcanic eruptions, but the latter explanations loses a good deal of plausibility in the light of the remains of forty individuals whose mortally injured heads were decapitated — 'hardly the action of a volcano,' Corinne Shear Wood observes dryly.[20] As to modern foragers, the conflicts between Native American tribes are too numerous to cite at any great length — as witness the Anasazi and their neighbors in the Southwest, the tribes that were to finally make up the Iroquois Confederacy (the Confederacy itself was a matter of survival if they were not to all but exterminate one another), and the unrelenting conflict between Mohawks and Hurons, which led to the near extermination and flight of remanent Huron communities.

If the 'desires' of prehistoric peoples 'were easily met,' as Bradford alleges, it was precisely because their material conditions of life — and hence their desires — were very simple indeed. Such might be expected of any life-form that largely adapts rather than innovates, that conforms to its pregiven habitat rather than alters it to make that habitat conform with its own wants. To be sure, early peoples had a marvelous understanding of the habitat in which they lived; they were, after all, highly intelligent and imaginative beings. Yet their 'ecstatic' culture was unavoidably riddled not only by joy and 'singing … celebrating … dreaming,' but by superstition and easily 'manipulable fears.'

Neither our remote ancestors nor existing aborigines could have survived if they held the 'enchanted' Disneyland ideas imputed to them by present-day primitivists. Certainly, Europeans offered aboriginal peoples no magnificent social dispensation. Quite to the contrary: imperialists

[16] Stearman, *Yuqu'*, pp.80–81.

[17] Wilmsen, *Land Filled with Flies*, pp.235–39 and 303–15.

[18] See, for example, Robert J. Blumenschine and John A. Cavallo, 'Scavenging and Human Evolution,' *Scientific American* (October 1992), pp.90–96.

[19] Paul A. Janssens, *Paleopathology: Diseases and Injuries of Prehistoric Man* (London: John Baker, 1970).

[20] Wood, *Human Sickness*, p.20.

subjected native peoples to crass exploitation, outright genocide, diseases against which they had no immunity, and shameless plunder. No animistic conjurations did or could have prevented this onslaught, as at the tragedy of Wounded Knee in 1890, where the myth of ghost shirts impregnable to bullets was so painfully belied.

What is of crucial importance is that the regression to primitivism among lifestyle anarchists denies the most salient attributes of humanity as a species and the potentially emancipatory aspects of Euro-American civilization. Humans are vastly different from other animals in that they do more than merely adapt to the world around them; they innovate and create a new world, not only to discover their own powers as human beings but to make the world around them more suitable for their own development, both as individuals and as a species. Warped as this capacity is by the present irrational society, the ability to change the world is a natural endowment, the product of human biological evolution — not simply a product of technology, rationality, and civilization. That people who call themselves anarchists should advance a primitivism that verges on the animalistic, with its barely concealed message of adaptiveness and passivity, sullies centuries of revolutionary thought, ideals, and practice, indeed defames the memorable efforts of humanity to free itself from parochialism, mysticism, and superstition and change the world.

For lifestyle anarchists, particularly of the anticivilizational and primitivistic genre, history itself becomes a degrading monolith that swallows up all distinctions, mediations, phases of development, and social specificities. Capitalism and its contradictions are reduced to epiphenomena of an all-devouring civilization and its technological 'imperatives' that lack nuance and differentiation. History, insofar as we conceive it as the unfolding of humanity's rational component — its developing potentiality for freedom, self-consciousness, and cooperation — is a complex account of the cultivation of human sensibilities, institutions, intellectuality, and knowledge, or what was once called 'the education of humanity.' To deal with history as a steady 'Fall' from an animalistic 'authenticity,' as Zerzan, Bradford, and their compatriots do in varying degrees in a fashion very similar to that of Martin Heidegger, is to ignore the expanding ideals of freedom, individuality, and self-consciousness that have marked epochs of human development — not to speak of the widening scope of the revolutionary struggles to achieve these ends.

Anticivilizational lifestyle anarchism is merely one aspect of the social regression that marks the closing decades of the twentieth century. Just as capitalism threatens to unravel natural history by bringing it back to a simpler, less differentiated geological and zoological era, so anticivilizational lifestyle anarchism is complicit with capitalism in bringing the human spirit and its history back to a less developed, less determinate, pre-lapsarian world — the supposedly 'innocent' pretechnological and precivilizatory society that existed before humanity's 'fall from grace.' Like the Lotus Eaters in *Homer's Odyssey*, humans are 'authentic' when they live in an eternal present, without past or future — untroubled by memory or ideation, free of tradition, and unchallenged by becoming.

Ironically, the world idealized by primitivists would actually preclude the radical individualism celebrated by the individualist heirs of Max Stirner. Although contemporary 'primal' communities have produced strongly etched individuals, the power of custom and the high degree of group solidarity impelled by demanding conditions allow little leeway for expansively individualistic behavior, of the kind demanded by Stirnerite anarchists who celebrate the supremacy of the ego. Today, dabbling in primitivism is precisely the privilege of affluent urbanites who can afford to toy with fantasies denied not only to the hungry and poor and to the 'nomads' who by necessity inhabit urban streets but to the overworked employed. Modern working women with children

could hardly do without washing machines to relieve them, however minimally, from their daily domestic labors — before going to work to earn what is often the greater part of their households' income. Ironically, even the collective that produces Fifth Estate found it could not do without a computer and was 'forced' to purchase one — issuing the disingenuous disclaimer, 'We hate it!'[21] Denouncing an advanced technology while using it to generate antitechnological literature is not only disingenuous but has sanctimonious dimensions: Such 'hatred' of computers seems more like the belch of the privileged, who, having overstuffed themselves with delicacies, extol the virtues of poverty during Sunday prayers.

[21] E. B. Maple, 'The Fifth Estate Enters the 20th Century. We Get a Computer and Hate It!' *The Fifth Estate*, vol. 28, no. 2 (Summer 1993), pp.6–7.

Part 6

Evaluating Lifestyle Anarchism

What stands out most compellingly in today's lifestyle anarchism is its appetite for immediacy rather than reflection, for a naive one-to-one relationship between mind and reality. Not only does this immediacy immunize libertarian thinking from demands for nuanced and mediated reflection; it precludes rational analysis and, for that matter, rationality itself. Consigning humanity to the nontemporal, nonspatial, and nonhistorical — a 'primal' notion of temporality based on the 'eternal' cycles of 'Nature' — it thereby divests mind of its creative uniqueness and its freedom to intervene into the natural world.

From the standpoint of primitivist lifestyle anarchism, human beings are at their best when they adapt to nonhuman nature rather than intervene in it, or when, disencumbered of reason, technology, civilization, and even speech, they live in placid 'harmony' with existing reality, perhaps endowed with 'natural rights,' in a visceral and essentially mindless 'ecstatic' condition. T.A.Z., Fifth Estate, Anarchy: A Journal of Desire Armed, and lumpen 'zines' like Michael William's *Stirnerite Demolition Derby* — all focus on an unmediated, ahistorical, and anticivilizatory 'primality' from which we have 'fallen,' a state of perfection and 'authenticity' in which we were guided variously by the 'bounds of nature,' 'natural law,' or our devouring egos. History and civilization consist of nothing but a descent into the inauthenticity of 'industrial society.'

As I have already suggested, this mythos of a 'falling from authenticity' has its roots in reactionary romanticism, most recently in the philosophy of Martin Heidegger, whose völkisch 'spiritualism,' latent in *Being and Time*, later emerged in his explicitly fascist works. This view now feeds on the quietistic mysticism that abounds in the antidemocratic writings of Rudolf Bahro, with its barely disguised appeal for 'salvation' by a 'Green Adolf,' and in the apolitical quest for ecological spiritualism and 'self-fulfillment' propounded by deep ecologists.

In the end, the individual ego becomes the supreme temple of reality, excluding history and becoming, democracy and responsibility. Indeed, lived contact with society as such is rendered tenuous by a narcissism so all-embracing that it shrivels consociation to an infantilized ego that is little more than a bundle of shrieking demands and claims for its own satisfactions. Civilization merely obstructs the ecstatic self-realization of this ego's desires, reified as the ultimate fulfillment of emancipation, as though ecstasy and desire were not products of cultivation and historical development, but merely innate impulses that appear ab novo in a desocialized world.

Like the petty-bourgeois Stirnerite ego, primitivist lifestyle anarchism allows no room for social institutions, political organizations, and radical programs, still less a public sphere, which all the writers we have examined automatically identify with statecraft. The sporadic, the unsystematic, the incoherent, the discontinuous, and the intuitive supplant the consistent, purposive, organized, and rational, indeed any form of sustained and focused activity apart from publishing a 'zine' or pamphlet — or burning a garbage can. Imagination is counterposed to reason and desire to theoretical coherence, as though the two were in radical contradiction to each other. Goya's admonition that imagination without reason produces monsters is altered to leave the impression that imagination flourishes on an unmediated experience with an unnuanced 'one-

ness.' Thus is social nature essentially dissolved into biological nature; innovative humanity, into adaptive animality; temporality, into precivilizatory eternality; history, into an archaic cyclicity.

A bourgeois reality whose economic harshness grows starker and crasser with every passing day is shrewdly mutated by lifestyle anarchism into constellations of self-indulgence, inchoateness, indiscipline, and incoherence. In the 1960s, the Situationists, in the name of a 'theory of the spectacle,' in fact produced a reified spectacle of the theory, but they at least offered organizational correctives, such as workers' councils, that gave their aestheticism some ballast. Lifestyle anarchism, by assailing organization, programmatic commitment, and serious social analysis, apes the worst aspects of Situationist aestheticism without adhering to the project of building a movement. As the detritus of the 1960s, it wanders aimlessly within the bounds of the ego (renamed by Zerzan the 'bounds of nature') and makes a virtue of bohemian incoherence.

What is most troubling is that the self-indulgent aesthetic vagaries of lifestyle anarchism significantly erode the socialist core of a left-libertarian ideology that once could claim social relevance and weight precisely for its uncompromising commitment to emancipation — not outside of history, in the realm of the subjective, but within history, in the realm of the objective. The great cry of the First International — which anarcho-syndicalism and anarchocommunism retained after Marx and his supporters abandoned it — was the demand: 'No rights without duties, no duties without rights.' For generations, this slogan adorned the mastheads of what we must now retrospectively call social anarchist periodicals. Today, it stands radically at odds with the basically egocentric demand for 'desire armed,' and with Taoist contemplation and Buddhist nirvanas. Where social anarchism called upon people to rise in revolution and seek the reconstruction of society, the irate petty bourgeois who populate the subcultural world of lifestyle anarchism call for episodic rebellion and the satisfaction of their 'desiring machines,' to use the phraseology of Deleuze and Guattari.

The steady retreat from the historic commitment of classical anarchism to social struggle (without which self-realization and the fulfillment of desire in all its dimensions, not merely the instinctive, cannot be achieved) is inevitably accompanied by a disastrous mystification of experience and reality. The ego, identified almost fetishistically as the locus of emancipation, turns out to be identical to the 'sovereign individual' of laissez-faire individualism. Detached from its social moorings, it achieves not autonomy but the heteronomous 'selfhood' of petty-bourgeois enterprise.

Indeed, far from being free, the ego in its sovereign selfhood is bound hand and foot to the seemingly anonymous laws of the marketplace — the laws of competition and exploitation — which render the myth of individual freedom into another fetish concealing the implacable laws of capital accumulation. Lifestyle anarchism, in effect, turns out to be an additional mystifying bourgeois deception. Its acolytes are no more 'autonomous' than the movements of the stock market, than price fluctuations and the mundane facts of bourgeois commerce. All claims to autonomy notwithstanding, this middle-class 'rebel,' with or without a brick in hand, is entirely captive to the subterranean market forces that occupy all the allegedly 'free' terrains of modern social life, from food cooperatives to rural communes.

Capitalism swirls around us — not only materially but culturally. As John Zerzan so memorably put it to a puzzled interviewer who asked about the television set in the home of this foe of technology: 'Like all other people, I have to be narcotized.'[1]

That lifestyle anarchism itself is a 'narcotizing' self-deception can best be seen in Max Stirner's *The Ego and His Own*, where the ego's claim to 'uniqueness' in the temple of the sacrosanct 'self' far outranks John Stuart Mill's liberal pieties. Indeed, with Stirner, egoism becomes a matter of epistemology. Cutting through the maze of contradictions and woefully incomplete statements that fill *The Ego and His Own*, one finds Stirner's 'unique' ego to be a myth because its roots lie in its seeming 'other' — society itself. Indeed: 'Truth cannot step forward as you do,' Stirner addresses the egoist, 'cannot move, change, develop; truth awaits and recruits everything from you, and itself is only through you; for it exists only — in your head.'[2] The Stirnerite egoist, in effect, bids farewell to objective reality, to the facticity of the social, and thereby to fundamental social change and all ethical criteria and ideals beyond personal satisfaction amidst the hidden demons of the bourgeois marketplace. This absence of mediation subverts the very existence of the concrete, not to speak of the authority of the Stirnerite ego itself — a claim so all-encompassing as to exclude the social roots of the self and its formation in history.

Nietzsche, quite independently of Stirner, carried this view of truth to its logical conclusion by erasing the facticity and reality of truth as such: 'What, then, is truth?' he asked. 'A mobile army of metaphors, metonyms, and anthropomorphisms — in short, a sum of human relations, which have been enhanced, transposed, and embellished poetically and rhetorically.'[3] With more forthrightness than Stirner, Nietzsche contended that facts are simply interpretations; indeed, he asked, 'is it necessary to posit an interpreter behind the interpretations?' Apparently not, for 'even this is invention, hypothesis.'[4] Following Nietzsche's unrelenting logic, we are left with a self that not only essentially creates it own reality but also must justify its own existence as more than a mere interpretation. Such egoism thus annihilates the ego itself, which vanishes into the mist of Stirner's own unstated premises.

Similarly divested of history, society, and facticity beyond its own 'metaphors,' lifestyle anarchism lives in an asocial domain in which the ego, with its cryptic desires, must evaporate into logical abstractions. But reducing the ego to intuitive immediacy — anchoring it in mere animality, in the 'bounds of nature,' or in 'natural law' — would amount to ignoring the fact that the ego is the product of an ever-formative history, indeed, a history that, if it is to consist of more than mere episodes, must avail itself of reason as a guide to standards of progress and regress, necessity and freedom, good and evil, and — yes! — civilization and barbarism. Indeed, an anarchism that seeks to avoid the shoals of sheer solipsism on the one hand and the loss of the 'self' as a mere 'interpretation' one the other must become explicitly socialist or collectivist. That is to say, it must be a social anarchism that seeks freedom through structure and mutual responsibility, not through a vaporous, nomadic ego that eschews the preconditions for social life.

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[1] Quoted in *The New York Times*, May 7, 1995. Less sanctimonious people than Zerzan have tried to escape the hold of television and take their pleasures with decent music, radio plays, books, and the like. They just don't buy them!

[2] Max Stirner, *The Ego and His Own*, ed. James J. Martin, trans. Steven T. Byington (New York: Libertarian Book Club, 1963), part 2, chap.4, sec. C, 'My Self-Engagement,' p.352, emphasis added.

[3] Friedrich Nietzsche, 'On Truth and Lie in an Extra-Moral Sense' (1873; fragment), in *The Portable Nietzsche*, edited and translated by Walter Kaufmann (New York: Viking Portable Library, 1959), pp.46–47.

[4] Friedrich Nietzsche, fragment 481 (1883–1888), *The Will to Power*, trans. Walter Kaufmann and R. J. Hollingdale (New York: Random House, 1967), p.267.

Stated bluntly: Between the socialist pedigree of anarcho-syndicalism and anarchocommunism (which have never denied the importance of self-realization and the fulfillment of desire), and the basically liberal, individualistic pedigree of lifestyle anarchism (which fosters social ineffectuality, if not outright social negation), there exits a divide that cannot be bridged unless we completely disregard the profoundly different goals, methods, and underlying philosophy that distinguish them. Stirner's own project, in fact, emerged in a debate with the socialism of Wilhelm Weitling and Moses Hess, where he invoked egoism precisely to counterpose to socialism. 'Personal insurrection rather than general revolution was [Stirner's] message,' James J. Martin admiringly observes[5] — a counterposition that lives on today in lifestyle anarchism and its yuppie filiations, as distinguished from social anarchism with its roots in historicism, the social matrix of individuality, and its commitment to a rational society.

The very incongruity of these essentially mixed messages, which coexist on every page of the lifestyle 'zines,' reflects the feverish voice of the squirming petty bourgeois. If anarchism loses its socialist core and collectivist goal, if it drifts off into aestheticism, ecstasy, and desire, and, incongruously, into Taoist quietism and Buddhist self-effacement as a substitute for a libertarian program, politics, and organization, it will come to represent not social regeneration and a revolutionary vision but social decay and a petulant egoistic rebellion. Worse, it will feed the wave of mysticism that is already sweeping affluent members of the generation now in their teens and twenties. Lifestyle anarchism's exaltation of ecstasy, certainly laudable in a radical social matrix but here unabashedly intermingled with 'sorcery,' is producing a dreamlike absorption with spirits, ghosts, and Jungian archetypes rather than a rational and dialectical awareness of the world.

Characteristically, the cover of a recent issue of Alternative Press Review (Fall 1994), a widely read American feral anarchist periodical, is adorned with a three-headed Buddhist deity in serene nirvanic repose, against a presumably cosmic background of swirling galaxies and New Age paraphernalia — an image that could easily join Fifth Estate's 'Anarchy' poster in a New Age boutique. Inside the cover, a graphic cries out: 'Life Can Be Magic When We Start to Break Free' (the A in Magic is circled) — to which one is obliged to ask: How? With what? The magazine itself contains a deep ecology essay by Glenn Parton (drawn from David Foreman's periodical Wild Earth) titled: 'The Wild Self: Why I Am a Primitivist,' extolling 'primitive peoples' whose 'way of life fits into the pre-given natural world,' lamenting the Neolithic revolution, and identifying our 'primary task' as being to "unbuild' our civilization, and restore wilderness.' The magazine's artwork celebrates vulgarity — human skulls and images of ruins are very much in evidence. Its lengthiest contribution, 'Decadence,' reprinted from Black Eye, melds the romantic with the lumpen, exultantly concluding: 'It's time for a real Roman holiday, so bring on the barbarians!'

Alas, the barbarians are already here — and the 'Roman holiday' in today's American cities flourishes on crack, thuggery, insensitivity, stupidity, primitivism, anticivilizationism, antirationalism, and a sizable dose of 'anarchy' conceived as chaos. Lifestyle anarchism must be seen in the present social context not only of demoralized black ghettoes and reactionary white suburbs but even of Indian reservations, those ostensible centers of 'primality,' in which gangs of Indian youths now shoot at one another, drug dealing is rampant, and 'gang graffiti greets visitors even at the sacred Window Rock monument,' as Seth Mydans reports in The New York Times (March 3, 1995).

[5] James J. Martin, editor's introduction to Stirner, *Ego and His Own*, p. xviii.

Thus, a widespread cultural decay has followed the degeneration of the 1960s New Left into postmodernism and of its counter-culture into New Age spiritualism. For timid lifestyle anarchists, Halloween artwork and incendiary articles push hope and an understanding of reality into the ever-receding distance. Torn by the lures of 'cultural terrorism' and Buddhist ashrams, lifestyle anarchists in fact find themselves in a crossfire between the barbarians at the top of society in Wall Street and the City, and those at its bottom, in the dismal urban ghettoes of Euro-America. Alas, the conflict in which they find themselves, for all their celebrations of lumpen lifeways (to which corporate barbarians are no strangers these days) has less to do with the need to create a free society than with a brutal war over who is to share in the in the available spoils from the sale of drugs, human bodies, exorbitant loans — and let us not forget junk bonds and international currencies.

A return to mere animality — or shall we call it 'decivilization'? — is a return not to freedom but to instinct, to the domain of 'authenticity' that is guided more by genes than by brains. Nothing could be further from the ideals of freedom spelled out in ever-expansive forms by the great revolutions of the past. And nothing could be more unrelenting in its sheer obedience to biochemical imperatives such as DNA or more in contrast to the creativity, ethics, and mutuality opened by culture and struggles for a rational civilization. There is no freedom in 'wildness' if, by sheer ferality, we mean the dictates of inborn behavioral patterns that shape mere animality. To malign civilization without due recognition of its enormous potentialities for self-conscious freedom — a freedom conferred by reason as well as emotion, by insight as well as desire, by prose as well as poetry — is to retreat back into the shadowy world of brutishness, when thought was dim and intellectuation was only an evolutionary promise.

Toward a Democratic Communalism

My picture of lifestyle anarchism is far from complete; the personalistic thrust of this ideological clay allows it to be molded in many forms provided that words like imagination, sacred, intuitive, ecstasy, and primal embellish its surface.

Social anarchism, in my view, is made of fundamentally different stuff, heir to the Enlightenment tradition, with due regard to that tradition's limits and incompleteness. Depending upon how it defines reason, social anarchism celebrates the thinking human mind without in any way denying passion, ecstasy, imagination, play, and art. Yet rather than reify them into hazy categories, it tries to incorporate them into everyday life. It is committed to rationality while opposing the rationalization of experience; to technology, while opposing the 'megamachine'; to social institutionalization, while opposing class rule and hierarchy; to a genuine politics based on the confederal coordination of municipalities or communes by the people in direct face-to-face democracy, while opposing parliamentarism and the state.

This 'Commune of communes,' to use a traditional slogan of earlier revolutions, can be appropriately designated as Communalism. Opponents of democracy as 'rule' to the contrary notwithstanding, it describes the democratic dimension of anarchism as a majoritarian administration of the public sphere. Accordingly, Communalism seeks freedom rather than autonomy in the sense that I have counterposed them. It sharply breaks with the psycho-personal Stirnerite, liberal, and bohemian ego as a self-contained sovereign by asserting that individuality does not emerge ab novo, dressed at birth in 'natural rights,' but sees individuality in great part as the ever-changing work of historical and social development, a process of self-formation that can be neither petrified by biologism nor arrested by temporally limited dogmas.

The sovereign, self-sufficient 'individual' has always been a precarious basis upon which to anchor a left libertarian outlook. As Max Horkheimer once observed, 'individuality is impaired when each man decides to fend for himself… The absolutely isolated individual has always been an illusion. The most esteemed personal qualities, such as independence, will to freedom, sympathy, and the sense of justice, are social as well as individual virtues. The fully developed individual is the consummation of a fully developed society.'[1]

If a left-libertarian vision of a future society is not to disappear in a bohemian and lumpen demimonde, it must offer a resolution to social problems, not flit arrogantly from slogan to slogan, shielding itself from rationality with bad poetry and vulgar graphics. Democracy is not antithetical to anarchism; nor are majority rule and nonconsensual decisions incommensurable with a libertarian society.

That no society can exist without institutional structures is transparently clear to anyone who has not been stupefied by Stirner and his kind. By denying institutions and democracy, lifestyle anarchism insulates itself from social reality, so that it can fume all the more with futile rage, thereby remaining a subcultural caper for gullible youth and bored consumers of black garments

[1] Max Horkheimer, *The Eclipse of Reason* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1947), p.135.

and ecstasy posters. To argue that democracy and anarchism are incompatible because any impediment to the wishes of even 'a minority of one' constitutes a violation of personal autonomy is to advocate not a free society but Brown's 'collection of individuals' — in short, a herd. No longer would 'imagination' come to 'power.' Power, which always exists, will belong either to the collective in a face-to-face and clearly institutionalized democracy, or to the egos of a few oligarchs who will produce a 'tyranny of structurelessness.'

Not unjustifiably, Kropotkin, in his Encyclopaedia Britannica article, regarded the Stirnerite ego as elitist and deprecated it as hierarchical. Approvingly, he cited V. Basch's criticism of Stirner's individual anarchism as a form of elitism, maintaining 'that the aim of all superior civilization is, not to permit all members of the community to develop in a normal way, but to permit certain better endowed individuals 'fully to develop,' even at the cost of the happiness and the very existence of the mass of mankind.' In anarchism, this produces, in effect, a regression toward the most common individualism, advocated by all the would-be superior minorities to which indeed man owes in his history precisely the State and the rest, which these individualists combat. Their individualism goes so far as to end in a negation of their own starting-point — to say nothing of the impossibility of the individual to attain a really full development in the conditions of oppression of the masses by the 'beautiful aristocracies.'[2] In its amoralism, this elitism easily lends itself to the unfreedom of the 'masses' by ultimately placing them in the custody of the 'unique ones,' a logic that may yield a leadership principle characteristic of fascist ideology.[3]

In the United States and much of Europe, precisely at a time when mass disillusionment with the state has reached unprecedented proportions, anarchism is in retreat. Dissatisfaction with government as such runs high on both sides of the Atlantic — and seldom in recent memory has there been a more compelling popular sentiment for a new politics, even a new social dispensation that can give to people a sense of direction that allows for security and ethical meaning. If the failure of anarchism to address this situation can be attributed to any single source, the insularity of lifestyle anarchism and its individualistic underpinnings must be singled out for aborting the entry of a potential left-libertarian movement into an ever-contracting public sphere.

To its credit, anarchosyndicalism in its heyday tried to engage in a living practice and create an organized movement — so alien to lifestyle anarchism — within the working class. Its major problems lay not in its desire for structure and involvement, for program and social mobilization, but in the waning of the working class as a revolutionary subject, particularly after the Spanish Revolution. To say that anarchism lacked a politics, however, conceived in its original Greek meaning as the self-management of the community — the historic 'Commune of communes' — is to repudiate a historic and transformative practice that seeks to radicalize the democracy inherent in any republic and to create a municipalist confederal power to countervail the state.

The most creative feature of traditional anarchism is its commitment to four basic tenets: a confederation of decentralized municipalities; an unwavering opposition to statism; a belief in direct democracy; and a vision of a libertarian communist society. The most important issue that left-libertarianism — libertarian socialism no less than anarchism — faces today is: What will it do with these four powerful tenets? How will we give them social form and content? In what ways and by what means will we render them relevant to our time and bring them to the service of an organized popular movement for empowerment and freedom?

[2] Kropotkin, 'Anarchism,' *Revolutionary Pamphlets*, pp.287, 293.

[3] Kropotkin, 'Anarchism,' *Revolutionary Pamphlets*, pp.292–93.

Anarchism must not be dissipated in self-indulgent behavior like that of the primitivistic Adamites of the sixteenth century, who 'wandered through the woods naked, singing and dancing,' as Kenneth Rexroth contemptuously observed, spending 'their time in a continuous sexual orgy' until they were hunted down by Jan Zizka and exterminated — much to the relief of a disgusted peasantry, whose lands they had plundered.[4] It must not retreat into the primitivistic demimonde of the John Zerzans and George Bradfords. I would be the last to contend that anarchists should not live their anarchism as much as possible on a day-to-day basis — personally as well as socially, aesthetically as well as pragmatically. But they should not live an anarchism that diminishes, indeed effaces the most important features that have distinguished anarchism, as a movement, practice, and program, from statist socialism. Anarchism today must resolutely retain its character as a social movement — a programmatic as well as activist social movement — a movement that melds its embattled vision of a libertarian communist society with its forthright critique of capitalism, unobscured by names like 'industrial society.'

In short, social anarchism must resolutely affirm its differences with lifestyle anarchism. If a social anarchist movement cannot translate its fourfold tenets — municipal confederalism, opposition to statism, direct democracy, and ultimately libertarian communism — into a lived practice in a new public sphere; if these tenets languish like its memories of past struggles in ceremonial pronouncements and meetings; worse still, if they are subverted by the 'libertarian' Ecstasy Industry and by quietistic Asian theisms, then its revolutionary socialistic core will have to be restored under a new name.

Certainly, it is already no longer possible, in my view, to call oneself an anarchist without adding a qualifying adjective to distinguish oneself from lifestyle anarchists. Minimally, social anarchism is radically at odds with anarchism focused on lifestyle, neo-Situationist paeans to ecstasy, and the sovereignty of the ever-shriveling petty-bourgeois ego. The two diverge completely in their defining principles — socialism or individualism. Between a committed revolutionary body of ideas and practice, on the one hand, and a vagrant yearning for privatistic ecstasy and self-realization on the other, there can be no commonality. Mere opposition to the state may well unite fascistic lumpens with Stirnerite lumpens, a phenomenon that is not without its historical precedents.

June 1, 1995

I would like to thank my colleague and companion, Janet Biehl, for her invaluable assistance in researching material for and editing this essay.

[4] Kenneth Rexroth, *Communalism* (New York: Seabury Press, 1974), p.89.

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Murray Bookchin
Social Anarchism or Lifestyle Anarchism
An Unbridgeable Chasm
1995

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Why "Social" Anarchism?

Connor Owens

February 25, 2016

You may have wondered why I keep referring to *social* anarchism rather than just anarchism when I talk about the subject. Social anarchism is in fact what most who understand anarchism are referring to when they talk about "anarchism" without another word in front of or after it.

It is an ethical-political traditional which (contrary to popular belief) does not seek chaos or disorder, but the "flattening" of social, political, and economic power relations: dissolving hierarchical authority into *horizontal power*, so that people are able to govern themselves as free equals rather than having to take orders from centralised institutions of control and subordination. So, as a process, if focuses on the continual empowerment of the disempowered, inclusion of the excluded, and the decentralisation of power and authority.

It seeks (in the long term) a directly-democratic and non-hierarchical society characterised by:

- Individual autonomy
- Voluntary association.
- A ethos of communal individuality rather than either rugged individualism or smothering collectivism, balancing the personal and social instincts.
- The dissolution of all forms of oppressive social hierarchy and domination: racism, sexism, queerphobia, ableism, and the domination of nature.
- A cooperative economy of the commons premised on workplace self-management; beyond the profit motive, market capitalism, and central planning by the state.
- And the decentralisation of government into voluntary confederations of a directly-democratic, self-governing communities.

As a tradition, social anarchism first emerged out of the wider socialist movement in the 1860s, with most of its foundational traits being developed within the First International out of the ideas of Pierre-Joseph Proudhon, only taken in a more anti-authoritarian direction by figures such as Mikhail Bakunin and James Guillaume, and later in a more communalistic direction by Peter Kropotkin, Élisée Reclus, and Emma Goldman. It has been regarded by many as a confluence of the best of (classical) liberalism and (democratic) socialism, with its economics being described as

libertarian socialism, in constrast to the authoritarian state socialism of most Marxist movements and to paternalistic social democracy as it exists on most of the liberal left. It also contrasts with the so-called "libertarianism" of the neoliberal right, a term they appropriated from social anarchists in the mid 20th century.

It is by far the majority tendency among those who describe themselves as anarchists and to many it is even considered the *only* form of anarchism, and it's followers the sole legitimate users of the label.

So if it's the primary (or even only) form of anarchism anyway, why the need for the adjective "social"?

Well, there are three reasons:

1. Specificity

There are countless ideologies which slap the prefix "anarcho-" onto themselves and whose adherents describe themselves as "anarchists": anarcho-capitalists, "post-left" anarchists, anarcho-primitivists, market anarchists, national-anarchists, anarcho-monarchists (yes, really).

Specifying a more particular tradition helps reorient things and disassociates one's ideas/practices from every silly belief-system which self-identifies with the a-word.

2. Accessibility

The word "anarchist" is quite loaded and carries with it a whole heap of stereotypes and myths. Calling yourself an anarchist to someone uninitiated with anarchist theory is likely to make them think you're insane, or perhaps just immature.

Social anarchism on the other hand is something they're at least likely to Google before dismissing you as some kind of nutter.

3. Definition

Adding the word social helps emphasise the positive features of the philosophy rather than just its oppositional aspects. The very etymology of the word anarchism means "without/against rulership". So the term anarchism by itself refers to what it's against rather than what it's for.

Social however implies communality, popular order, and the connections between individuals. So putting them together the two terms – social anarchism – denote "society without rulers" and "sociality against rulership"; implying that authentic human sociability itself is contrary to the logic of hierarchical power.

The term itself isn't even new. It first emerged in the late 19th century as a way to distinguish the anarchist mainstream from various individualist or egoist strains which promoted a kind of anti-social worldview opposed to building popular movements and in many cases content to merely live freely within the capitalist state system rather than doing anything to get rid of it.

So do try to make the term more popular if you can. There's at least a slightly better chance that more people will google it, learning what real anarchism is all about, rather than dismissing it out of hand as mindless chaos or black-clad teenagers hurling Molotov cocktails and getting smashy-smashy with shop windows.

For a world beyond hierarchy and domination; for freedom, equality, and solidarity; for Social Anarchism.

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Introduction to *The Best of Social Anarchism*

Jeff Shantz

2013

To achieve any real lasting success, movements for social change require infrastructures of resistance, processes and institutions that provide a sustaining framework for creating and maintaining the struggle. Indeed, in the absence of such support, even lively and enthusiastic mobilizations can dissipate very quickly without much impact, as the Occupy encampments of 2011 vividly illustrate. Through common struggle and the pressing realities of meeting material, cultural, and social needs and desires, communities develop such infrastructures to sustain themselves and to provide the support necessary for ongoing struggles and the inspiration of the new world they seek to make. Infrastructures of resistance include a variety of institutions, organizations and practices, such as alternative media and publishing, shared spaces like social centers, bookstores, union halls and bars, workers campgrounds and medical clinics.

The building, maintenance, and nurturing of such infrastructures is a key part of social anarchist practice. For social anarchists, thoroughgoing social change — including what might be called revolutionary change — toward anarchist social relations involves the constant extension of spheres of mutual aid and solidarity until they make up the bulk of human social activities and relationships. These are processes of rendering the state obsolete — an obvious anachronism for all to see. At the same time, the community-based infrastructures of resistance provide bases of social defense against forces of reaction.

Part of this social transformation is imaginal or ideational — it involves advances in the struggles over ideas. In the words of *Social Anarchism*'s dedicated editor Howard Ehrlich, it requires the development of "anarchist transfer cultures," the perspectives and practices by which we sustain the move beyond state capitalism to anarchist social relations, building them as we go. Ehrlich describes anarchist transfer cultures in these terms:

"A transfer culture is that agglomeration of ideas and practices that guide people in making the trip from the society here to the society there in the future…As part of the accepted wisdom of that transfer culture we understand that we may never achieve anything that goes beyond the culture itself. It may be, in fact, that it is the very nature of anarchy that we shall always be building the new society within whatever society we find ourselves."[1]

The journal *Social Anarchism* has long been a key resource in developing and nurturing this culture. It has played an important part in sustaining ideas and practices of anarchy against the

[1] Ehrlich, Howard J. "Introduction to Reinventing Anarchist Tactics." *Reinventing Anarchy, Again.* Ed. H. J. Ehrlich. Edinburgh: AK Press, 1996: 329–330.

dominance of archic ideologies. Art and literature, as well as economic and political analysis, have always found a home side by side in the journal's pages.

Unlike many movement publications of the last few decades, it has done so through thick and thin, high and low, surviving and even thriving both when movements have enjoyed an upsurge, as after the anti-WTO protests in Seattle in 1999, and during periods of demobilization or stalled growth, as during the early 1990s. With the renewal of anarchist movements in the twenty-first century, *Social Anarchism* continues to provide one of the most important forums of anarchist discussion and debate. Few journals can make this claim. As someone who has spent years working in anarchist free schools and infoshops, as well as community and workplace organizing, I can attest to the ongoing relevance of *Social Anarchism* and its significance as a resource for anarchism over decades. For much of the 1990s *Social Anarchism* was a primary intellectual resource, even the resource for those seeking thoughtful and incisive analysis of a range of social issues, theories and practices of social change. Many free school classes right up to the present have made use of articles from *Social Anarchism* as key readings and starting points for discussion. Combining theoretical depth with consistent accessibility and respectful exchange of ideas, *Social Anarchism* has made and continues to make a crucial contribution to anarchist ideas as well as offering a real venue for learning about anarchism. It is, quite simply, essential reading.

Social Anarchism has always displayed the strongest principles of anarchism in action. It has maintained and supported a commitment to honest and sincere engagement. Avoiding the sectarianism and exclusivity that mar perhaps too many radical and movement-based publications, *Social Anarchism* has always remained open to new and alternative ideas, and critical interchange with opposing viewpoints and perspectives. Thus in this collection the reader will see principled debates and discussions with ideas that are often posed as being outside the realm of social anarchism, and which are even hostile toward it. A few of the perspectives encountered in this collection include individualist, Randian objectivism, neo-primitivism, anti-civilization, and, well, sociology (I say as a sociologist).

Social Anarchism exemplifies the sometimes forgotten basis of critique. Critique is not about dismissal or ridicule of opposing views. Rather it is about indentifying and maintaining that which is useful and insightful, while moving beyond that which is inaccurate and ineffective in analysis. *Social Anarchism* always "gets this."

In truth, anarchism has always been social anarchism. Social concerns and commitments are the foundation of anarchist movements. This is so whether one talks about Peter Kropotkin and mutual aid or Emma Goldman's notion of individuality, the works of anarcho-syndicalists and anarchist unionism, or the active anarchy of Colin Ward. Even the prefigurative anarchism of infoshops and free schools or the countercultural approaches to communal living or food production, often derided as lifestylist, are social in character.

The history of anarchism is marked by the proliferation of significant journals. These publications provide venues for debate and discussion on a range of issues — social, political, economic, and cultural. Over time and space — particularly during lower periods of social struggle — these works have served to connect people and sustain movements while introducing new people to anarchism. *Social Anarchism* takes its place alongside the other great journals of anarchist history, such as Mother Earth in the early twentieth century, mid-century's *Anarchy*, and *Freedom*.

That *Social Anarchism* has survived and thrived over decades is a testament to the will and tenacity of its editors and to the continued relevance of its varied contributions. Producing

and distributing a high quality thoughtful and informative anarchist journal over the course of decades is no small feat. As an editor of another decent social anarchist journal that had a good run but inevitably lost steam, the much lamented *Kick it Over*, which we put together out of Toronto for many issues, I can attest to the challenges and difficulties facing such projects. *Social Anarchism* continues to be an inspiration. Fueling capacities to understand and change social relations in the here-and-now of everyday life while firing the imagination to envision a better future, it remains a vital resource and a darn good read.

The Best of Social Anarchism is in many ways the best of contemporary anarchism.

Jeff Shantz

Surrey, B.C (Coast Salish Territory) / December, 2012.

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Jeff Shantz
Introduction to *The Best of Social Anarchism*
2013

Social Anarchism Journal

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Social-Anarchism and Parallel Economic Computation

Emmi Bevensee

June 22nd, 2020

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Note: I've tried to minimize the math and computation theory to make this more generally readable but where it gets more complex I just wrote (math paragraph) before the paragraph and you can read or skip it and still understand the piece.

I'll open with a potentially contentious take. Most of the decentralized and left-leaning economics ideologies such as p2p, social ecology, Game-b, parecon, more modern post-work anarchisms, the co-op movement, etc. are just, to varying degrees, deviations or evolutions of social-anarchism (itself built in many ways upon various Indigenous economic practices). As such, I will focus on social anarchism as the hub of many spokes of related ideologies.

The two main difficulties any social-anarchist project will face in trying to fairly and efficiently allocate goods are getting reliable data about supply and demand, and then solving for distribution of scarce resources with rivalrous preferences especially at higher scales of complexity. Whatever local social safety nets can be decentrally planned through dual-power and the like should be. Robust social safety nets should be planned up to the limits of what we can coordinate. Beyond that however, there must be other scalable methods for economic coordination. These methods must utilize accurate value signals and feedback mechanisms to solve for rivalrous conditions in a way that utilizes people's local knowledge. This is true whether these methods use a medium of exchange like currency or not. Determining how much we can plan is part of the essence of the debate between not just the Austrians and the communists, but also between the social anarchists and the market anarchists (of whatever sub-affinities) as well as any other economics. Figuring this out to the best of our ability helps us to radically expand the areas of coordination beyond the market and cash nexus, without sacrificing overall efficiency.

Desire Is Personal and Contextual

> Marx had drawn a nightmare picture of what happened to human life under capitalism, when everything was produced only in order to be exchanged; when true qualities and uses dropped away, and the human power of making and doing itself became only an object to be traded. Then the makers and the things made turned alike into commodities, and the motion of society turned into a kind of zombie dance, a grim cavorting whirl in which objects and people blurred together till the objects were half alive and the people were half dead. Stock-market prices acted back upon the world as if they were independent powers, requiring factories to be opened or closed, real human beings to work or rest, hurry or dawdle; and they, having given the transfusion that made the stock prices come alive, felt their flesh go cold and impersonal on them, mere mechanisms for chunking out the man-hours. Living money and dying humans, metal as tender as skin and skin as hard as metal, taking hands, and dancing round, and round, and round, with no way ever of stopping; the quickened and the deadened, whirling on. … And what would be the alternative? The consciously arranged alternative? A dance of another nature, Emil presumed. A dance to the music of use, where every step fulfilled some real need, did some tangible good, and no matter how fast the dancers spun, they moved easily, because they moved to a human measure, intelligible to all, chosen by all.
>
> – *Red Plenty by Francis Spufford*

Central-economic planning is as horrifyingly and disastrously intractable as it is politically prone to authoritarianism.[1] This is true even without the assumptions of many market-fetishizing, bourgeoisie Austrian capitalists a la Ludwig von Mises Institute. These types often fail to account for the numerous obvious implications of their critiques on their own proposals such as within massive corporate firms and or the noise caused by absurd economic inequality.[2] And yet, Marx and his successors were right about how fundamentally alienating the capitalist market form is, but just like the Austrians, he didn't consider how equally true that was of a centrally planned economy (or really any massive centralized scheme for knowledge/coordination problems).

These tensions create a desire for something deeply human that accounts for the needs of all persons while simultaneously maximizing efficiency and minimizing negative externalities. To these ends many aspirational activists and theorists have proposed (if not always by name) some version of anarcho-communism as a means of decentralizing both the hard math of coordination as well as the political problems of authoritarian-centralization. These proposals have merit worth exploring even as they break down in other fundamental ways.

Within Marxist thought, the Labor Theory of Value is the alternative to the later conceived Subjective Theory of Value as a means of returning our focus to the experience of the laborer and away from the alienation of exchange and commodity based society.[3] Or more specifically, Marx was concerned with the way that labor is commodified under capitalism and through the cash nexus as more and more of our lives are consumed by it. This makes sense when we consider things like how much work sucks, especially under capitalism. But Marx realized the many fundamental coordination problems this created in developing a new economic model and so plugged in the concept of "use value" as sort of a hand-waving solution.

The problem is that use-value is essentially another term for subjective value.[4] In earnestly asking a lot of communists about this over the years and trying to read what I can, the best response I've gotten had to do with the way in which, at the level of a small neighborhood, you generally know who most needs a new house amongst your neighbors. Unfortunately for this person, that interpretation disproves central economic planning.

Does the Tsar of Economic Planning personally know everyone's needs in every neighborhood with the subtlety of a neighbor? Of course not! Much less could any centralized authority (even of just the neighborhood) understand your more complicated desires. In the worst case scenario, the community votes on whether you actually care sufficiently about the things you care about. Accurate neighborhood reporting of such complex preferences runs into the many knowledge and revealed versus stated preference problems labored upon by the Austrians and emphasized

[1] More on this in the resources at the start of this MES but it's worth saying that although many of the Austrian economists made fascist apologetics clear and made absurd conclusions even by their own arguments, it is worth reading broadly on the calculation debate because unfortunately even questionable characters make important points sometimes.

[2] Kevin Carson's Organization Theory or Desktop Regulatory State look at this but also this article on how corporations are centrally planned economies

The History of an Idea: Or How an Argument Against the Workability of Authoritarian Socialism became an Argument against Authoritarian Capitalism, Roderick T. Long

The Crooked Timber piece of which this article is something of a niche extension.

[3] Kevin Carson attempts to transcend this divide with ideas like subjective disutility of labor in Studies in a Mutualist Political Economy whether he does so is left as an exercise to the reader (sorry, math joke).

[4] Excepting those who believe in an objective intrinsic metaphysical use-value for any object, which if that's you… ahhhhhh.

in need for "discovery" (more on this in a later section). But this admission does not necessarily disprove anarcho-communism or parecon in and of itself.

Scaling up Our Preferences Is Complex

When we move from the level of a nation-state to a small neighborhood as in many social-anarchist proposals, we push the knowledge problem several steps closer to the individual and cut down on the number of variables. This does make the problem more tractable. Central economic planning of an absurdly over-simplified and relatively small economy with linear programming (or even non-linear machine learning on a quantum computer) may take thousands of years even with an order of magnitude greater computational power than Moore's law says we'll have in the next 100 years (and never mind that Moore's Law is running out).

(math paragraph) While non-linear machine learning intuitively makes more sense than linear programming and Cockshott's reactionary conservative socialism ever will, it's actually less, not more tractable. Linear and convex programming are in set P while economic planning is often considered at least NP and machine learning is generally more resource intensive than either LP or convex programming. Even if Cantor's diagonal doesn't hold (which it might) and we do not need a set of all possible products and prices (and weather, sickness, geography, etc local knowledge) as $\mathbf{X}$ and y in our neural network, it can still be infeasible in the next few millennia (assuming Moore's "Law" holds), if not Turing incomputable on its face.

(math paragraph) You also need an unambiguous objective function like in linear programming. Profit and prices work well for this (even if not for things like… environmental sustainability) but since you would not have access to this in communist utopia you could use shadow prices. But again, this runs into intractability of setting the accurate and dynamic prices for an entire economy. It's a bit tautological as well because that's likely the goal of the neural network. To avoid this you could set the objective function as what Kantorivich calls the "given assortment" of goods. An important bit to this is that just setting the biases as the relative desired proportions of every product in the economy is itself intractable as a pre-step to running the network.

Frankly, which is worse, having a central planner vote on how much porn you consume relative to figs, or having all of the demos make decisions about 10 billion items for you? Both should seem deeply unsettling.

The closer we can get to the individual as a source of planning, the more optimizable the problem becomes. So at a small scale or when dealing with fairly simple questions, planning is surmountable: a parent may be able to allocate resources with feedback mechanisms and an acknowledgement of scarcity to their household with relatively minimal dissatisfaction (though maybe some toddler screaming). A matriarchal Iroquois longhouse system can allocate subsistence food and building supplies at the level of a small village. A socialist government could probably keep well-stocked food banks in every major neighborhood and provide pretty decent public transportation. But the complexity of the problem scales exponentially with the number of people and variables we add, especially if our goal is to replace monetary exchange altogether.

We see similar exponential complexity in an economy in which individuals have more choice, both in terms of consumption and in terms of production, as each new choice must then be weighed against all others. Ten-thousand more people or choices takes not 10,000 more bits of computation, but instead 100 million more because the preferences of each new agent or choice

has to be weighed against all others. As such we believe that even with an assumption of massive increases in computational power, we may still not be able to substantially expand the reach of central-economic planning (much less of the democratic systems that would need to accompany them). This is why Stalinist economics tended to reduce complexity in every possible way, including just by limiting the choices available to consumers.[5] This is also why left-communists like Rosa Luxembourg critiqued Lenin's repression of democratic and locally accountable labor unions.

Communes Only Partially Simplify the Problem

Much of the mathematical and political hardships of centrally planned economies comes from the fact of not being able to save time by solving different parts of the problem at the same time instead of one after another (parallelization of processing). So doesn't the commune, to some extent, do this in at least a metaphorical way to how an idealized vision of "free markets" would? Well, yes and no.

Yes, insofar that anything we can do to simplify the problem is good and this parallelism is indeed faster. A commune can work similarly to a firm in localizing decision-making to make the problem more tractable. Limit the number of variables. Limit the number of constraints. Maximize the amount of acceptable noise. However, we should keep in mind that noise in economic planning is things like people dying from not getting vaccines or unnecessary negative externalities we allow for in proportion to demand for goods (such as pollution). Such simplification of course occurs under capitalism and its consequences have been studiously critiqued by Marxists and anarchists. The problem isn't that people are necessarily bad, but rather that the mechanisms used to make economic decisions are simply not flexible enough to accommodate all concerns and as such *the only way the system can thrive* is through violently simplifying the problem.[6]

With the risks understood, any form of simplification of the problems helps to solve them in some given constraints such as time. But should a given village or mesh of villages decide that they want something beyond subsistence economies and the constraints of their local geography and human resources, then you start to run into all the same complexity problems again.

(math paragraph) Without getting too far into the math weeds, we might be tempted to break the intractable economic planning problem into the parallel processors in order to simplify them. However, this depends fundamentally on their independence. So we could assume independence and hope for a reasonable outcome a la Naive Bayes (remember, inefficiency = death and suffering in economic planning) or we could try to find areas that were independent enough as to warrant a sub-sectioning in order to use parallel computing making the communes into something like a how a GPU computer works. This parallelization would probably be something like geography or independent demand goods. The basic idea that the commune could act as these subsections gets quickly dicey though. In the simplest example, this is because they often require the SAME goods from different places and so aren't actually neatly partitioned. We could then assume that with

[5] Obviously at least some degree of degrowth is necessary and not all consumer choice is necessary or sustainable. However, leaving that reduction of complexity to a centralized body is a dangerous choice and also stifles a range of forms of innovation in the margins.

[6] Though it nearly goes without saying, for more on this read "Seeing Like a State" by James C. Scott. In it he shows the various tradeoffs and risks inherent to simplified "legibility" schemes without dismissing the value of quantification or standardization altogether.

the added constraint of distance from producer to final consumer added to our horrifying puzzle, that these similar products are actually different products based on their location of origin. This increases the scale of the problem in a necessary way but spells trouble for our friendly commune. Namely, again what happens when you need a product that comes from outside of your locale? Or what happens when 100,000 communes need 10 million products from each other and that preference matrix changes every second? Very quickly you can see the likely NP-hard complexity knowledge problem of resource coordination begin to congeal again.

We Are Selfish and Selfless

The problems at the individual scale of performing resource distribution repeat themselves fractally as you move further and further away. The same way you can't wish away all selfishness, you can't wish away ingroup preference at increasing scales. They are issues in the problem space even if people are simultaneously selfless and selfish. Because these issues are in the problem space itself, the best we can hope for is to have better incentives for people to be cooperative. Cooperation and competition work together in many respects even as they are different.

Even in a context of relative equality and mutual respect between all parties, you still have the thorny question of deciding upon the best course of action. Trying to remove the market here does not eliminate competition, but rather obscures it and makes it more insidious. Even if people are acting in an altruistic manner, there still exists questions around the distribution of scarce resources that are hidden behind democratic arguments over ill-defined needs. Because deliberation without currency makes it difficult to signal demand with any fidelity, individuals, communes and federations are incentivized to drift in the direction of stockpiling resources simply because accurate evaluation is extremely difficult. This problem is commonly referred to as a 'revealed preference' problem in the sense that what we say or think we want, and what we're willing to put skin in the game to prioritize are generally not exactly the same things. Accurate reporting of revealed preference without some way of having skin in the game for your choices would require some sort of elaborate brain-scanning surveillance of the vast contingencies of every thought in someone's skull. Probably not a desirable or near-term feasible solution. The revealed preference problem is especially difficult when we're dealing with abstract preferences such as feelings. As these inaccurate stated preferences scale, they lead to a range of perverse incentives and inefficiencies.

In the most benign case this means that large scale anarchist projects see cost overruns and inefficiencies similar to what we have today. In the most dystopian case it means unpopular individuals are unable to get basic necessities like medication, food or shelter from their commune. Just as corporations reward the most cutthroat and manipulative, collective resource allocation can become more tightly coupled with informal social capital as the popular charismatic comrade's' needs get more easily heard than the awkward and shy loner who has not mastered or otherwise opposes in-group social positioning.

The same goes for a commune trying to communicate to the next direct democratic federation level up, a state-like legible snapshot of the preference vectors of their territory. But again, even within the commune each person who petitions the collective for a medication must express the depth of their desire with words and hope that the representatives can and do communicate that need effectively to the federation coordinating committee.

All of this disastrously slow coordination and forced pleading happening at the scale of the world, is… well, terrifying and sad. It's also a subtle recreation of the competition that is so awful in capitalism and markets. Competition then, whether in the commune or at the level of the individual, serves two masters: it serves greed/in-group preference and meta-level coordination of revealed preferences. Finding the balance of these trade-offs is the great problem of economics.

Exchange Can Support Resistance

All of what I'm saying can be empirically verified when we look at how revolutionary societies actually organized themselves. The Zapatistas, Rojava, and the CNT-FAI all introduced or utilized officially and unofficially sanctioned currencies to lubricate allocation in parallel to their more social-anarchist structures. Even Gelderloos, a stridently anti-market anarchist, acknowledges this need in Anarchy Works (p.76):

> Anarchist economic models range from hunter-gatherer communities and agricultural communes to industrial complexes in which planning is carried out by syndicates and distribution is arranged through quotas or a limited form of currency.

Similarly, many people opposing colonization and feudal peasants have introduced their own illegal rebel currencies in order to resist the attempts at legibility of an encroaching state and their mandatory royal currency.[7] The following Māori currency was seemingly part of several initiatives to form Indigenous financial solidarity and collective banks to resist Pākehā (colonizer) settlements. The author states:

> It should be noted that Maungatautari was a major centre of Maori [sic] settlement, and had long been sought by Europeans eager to farm its land. The land was purchased in 1873 but settlement was delayed until 1881, due to Maori opposition, and even then trouble had continued. Maori initiative at Maungatautari [the collective banking system and currency printing] was unlikely to be well received by the Pakeha [sic] press…
>
> And whereas the Maori people so banking have been grievously wronged in their dealings with these Europeans, who have largely profited thereby; And whereas our hearts being greatly grieved at this robbery of our people: Be it known, therefore, that we the chiefs of the tribes aforementioned, in Council assembled, have decided to start a bank for the use of the Maori people.

The author then goes on to describe how profits from the collective bank were used to support a mission to Europe to renegotiate the 'the Treaty of Waitangi [the founding document of Aotearoa New Zealand] — that old subject so dear to the heart of every Māori orator'. Efforts to create Māori collective banks or utilize modified cryptocurrencies for sovereignty and decolonization work continue to this day despite the complexities and obstacles they may entail.

[7] See this interesting exchange between William Gillis and Peter Gelderloos for more complexity on this debate. (The Tangled Paths Of State Formation And Resistance and Defying Power: Different Views on How Best to Understand the Evolution of the State)

Acknowledging the experiences of those who have struggled against authority means opening up a new layer of both complexity and simplification in achieving the socialist intention of equal access to the necessities and delights of life for all persons.

Embrace the Difficulty of Mutual-Aid

If the goal is to make economic planning solvable in order to maximally provide for everyone's needs, then it should be the subsidiary goal of every radical society to determine exactly what and how much can be acceptably optimized for with planning and for how many people at any given moment. Then use that as a constraint on top of whatever hair-brained algorithm and democratic process we try to implement. Everything above or beyond those numbers would then need to be determined by some form of fully distributed process of value signal feedback loops analogous to the way that markets are supposed to work.[8] That is the calculus of how much of a safety net a community can plan for and what they need accurate signals for in order to allocate at scale. Designing with an eye towards solving this core set of problems means not handwaving things like: problems of revealed versus stated preferences, scarcity of material inputs, contextual scales of preferences, and coordination/knowledge problems in collective decision making. We should build as many free stores as is humanly possible but without suicidally relying on them to provide for every need of a society.[9]

The anarcho-communist commune may, at least theoretically, provide some basis for a more complexly networked hybrid mutualist society even if in and of itself it is incapable of transcending the problem-space issues of economic coordination at scale. Ultimately, moving the locus even further to the individual makes the problems maximally tractable, but that need not preclude various forms of interdependency and community planning. We can use the tools and wisdom contained within the wide range of social-anarchisms, even while transcending the failed ideological dogmas that many followers are obstructed by.

Expanding the range of both high and low tech social coordination mechanisms in conjunction with community directed and controlled value signals systems, we can put forth a distinctly futuristic and yet historically grounded neo-mutualism of sorts. Through a combination of honest reckoning, experimentation, and technical innovation we can create a truly futuristic economic mesh that leverages the strengths and insights of a wide array of economic philosophies and practices. After all, each individual's wisdom, preferences, and needs are what ultimately lies at the heart of any economic system worth living in.

[8] The Value Flows project (being now implemented on Holochain) is an interesting example of a project that acknowledges the need for value signals while trying simultaneously to create an economic vocabulary that recognizes the many ways we interact with each other and the web of their externalities.

[9] Okay, maybe you've been to a punk house. Maybe you live in a punk house. You know that ratty falling apart cardboard free box of exclusively black clothing with sweat-stains and holes? Imagine you rely on a bigger version it for all of your basic human needs every day and if it doesn't have what you want, there are no other options except for hoping someone 'gifts' it to you (but you also can't communicate directly that you want it or it will kill the gift altruism). : (Free boxes and free stores are unambiguously good but dangerously incomplete as complete solutions go.

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Emmi Bevensee
Social-Anarchism and Parallel Economic Computation
June 22nd, 2020

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Social Anarchism and Organisation

Anarchist Federation of Rio de Janeiro



2008

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The first Congress of the FARJ was held with the principal objective of deepening our reflections on the question of organisation and formalising them into a programme. This debate has been happening within our organisation since 2003. We have produced theoretical materials, established our thinking, learned from the successes and mistakes of our political practice it was becoming increasingly necessary to further the debate and to formalise it, spreading this knowledge both internally and externally. The document "Social Anarchism and Organisation" formalises our positions after all these reflections. More than a purely theoretical document, it reflects the conclusions realised after five years of practical application of anarchism in the social struggles of our people. The document is divided into 16 parts. It has already been published in Portuguese in a book co-published between Faísca and the FARJ.

Document approved at the 1st Congress, held on 30th and 31st of August 2008

The first Congress of the Anarchist Federation of Rio de Janeiro pays tribute to its comrades:

Juan Perez Bouzas (1899-1958)

> Featured anarchist cobbler of Galician origin that, with unusual talent and determination, highlighted the necessity of the deepening of the struggle. In 2008 we remember the fiftieth anniversary of his death (05/09/1958).

Ideal Peres (1925-1995)

> That, with sensibility and ample vision of the political horizon, guaranteed the maintenance of the social axis of anarchism and the connection of generations of militants.

Plínio Augusto Coêlho (1956-)

> Tireless in giving substance to our dreams, connecting them to the long thread that binds us to those who preceded us in the quiet or turbulent act of revolution.

> *If you remained isolated, if each one of you were obliged to act on their own, you would be powerless without a doubt; but getting together and organising your forces – no matter how weak they are at first – only for joint action, guided by common ideas and attitudes, and by working together for a common goal, you will become invincible.*
>
> **Mikhail Bakunin**

Translator's Introduction

This document, first published in Portuguese under the title *Anarquismo Social e Organização* and adopted at the first Congress of the *Federação Anarquista do Rio de Janeiro* in August 2008, seeks to map out the FARJ's theoretical conception of an organised, class struggle anarchism and, "More than a purely theoretical document, [...] reflects the conclusions realised after five years of practical application of anarchism in the social struggles of our people".

In it the FARJ traces its historical and organisational roots through the militant histories of *Carioca*[1] anarchists such as Ideal Peres, who struggled to keep the flame of anarchism alight during the dark days of dictatorship, to militants such as his father, Juan Perez Bouzas, Galician immigrant anarchist who participated decisively in the Battle of Sé in 1934, "when the anarchists rejected the *Integralistas*[2] under bursts of machine gun fire".

In what is perhaps one of the most comprehensive elaborations on the Latin American concept of *especifista* anarchism now available in English, *Social Anarchism and Organisation* traces and outlines the theoretical and practical influences on the FARJ's conception of anarchist organisation and its strategy for social transformation. It advocates a conception of anarchism that divides anarchist activity into two levels of activity – the social (social or 'mass' movement) and political (specific anarchist organisation) – arguing that this *dual-organisationalist* approach to anarchist organisation is consistent with, and can by traced back to the ideas and practices of Bakunin himself in the Alliance of Socialist Democracy. The FARJ traces this common political lineage back to Bakunin through the experiences of the *Federación Anarquista Uruguaya* (FAU) and those of the 1918 *Aliança Anarquista* and 1919 *Partido Comunista* (libertarian in content); through the experience of the *Magonistas* during the Mexican Revolution and the radical phases of the *Partido Liberal Mexicano* (PLM); through the experiences of the *Federación Anarquista Iberica* (FAI) and *Friends of Durruti* group during the Spanish Revolution, and those of the authors of the *Organisational Platform of the Libertarian Communists* (Platform); to those of Errico Malatesta in his conception of the anarchist party.

Drawing from the experience of the loss of what it terms the "social vector of anarchism" (anarchism's social influence) at the *end of the glorious period of anarchism* , the FARJ advocates the need for a specific anarchist organisation – tightly organised, comprising highly committed militants sharing high levels of theoretical and strategic unity – that, through participating in and supporting popular movements and struggles against exploitation and domination, seeks to influence these movements with anarchist principles and in a revolutionary and libertarian direction. The final objective thereof being the recapturing of the social vector of anarchism as a necessary step towards the introduction of libertarian socialism by means of social revolution.

In seeking to increase the social influence of anarchism the FARJ reasserts the need for anarchism to come increasingly into contact with the *exploited classes* , thus identifying the class

[1] Someone who comes from Rio de Janeiro

[2] Brazilian fascist movement

struggle as the most important and fertile terrain in which to attempt to spread anarchist principles and practices. For these to take root, however, it is essential for organised anarchists to carry out permanent and consistent propaganda, organisational and educational work within the movements and organisations of the exploited class and – critically for the FARJ – to always act in a manner consistent with what it terms a "militant ethic". *Social Anarchism and Organisation* outlines the FARJ's conception of the various tasks of the specific anarchist organisation, as well as its structure, processes for attracting new members and its orientation towards social movements – all according to the logic of *concentric circles*.

In formulating strategic answers to the questions, "where are we?", "where do we want to go?" and "how do we think we can leave where we are and arrive at where we want to be?", *Social Anarchism and Organisation* articulates the FARJ's understanding of social classes under "the society of exploitation and domination" – capitalism and state – as well as its final objectives – social revolution and libertarian socialism – and how these may look. In so doing it explains the FARJ's conception of "the popular organisation" which – uniting social movements struggling for freedom and accumulating the experiences and gains made in the daily class struggle – would, rather than representing the simple sum of the forces of isolated social movements, constitute a far greater social force that, at the moment in which it becomes greater than that of the state and capital, should make a decisive break with the current system and, using violence as a necessary response to the violence of the state and capital, initiate the transition to libertarian socialism by means of social revolution. Since initial publication of this document, however, the FARJ has taken to using the term "popular power" as a substitute for "the popular organisation", and has further developed its understanding of this concept so central to *especifismo*.

In the more than three years since adoption of this document the FARJ has undergone a number of theoretical developments, such as: deepening its conception of class based on the category of "domination", while considering economic class as one kind of domination; new research and understanding of the history of Brazilian anarchism in the decades of the 1940s and 1950s; theory and method of analysis and the deepening of some topics on anarchist organisation. There have also been some practical developments, including the development of "social work" with the following movements: Grassroots Unemployed Workers Movement (MTD-Pela Base), Landless Movement (MST), Popular Councils Movement (Movimento Conselhos Populares) and participation in the creation of a "Popular Organisation" tendency. Although this document, located within a particular Latin American context, was first published and adopted over three years before this translation it remains an insightful and instructive contribution to global contemporary anarchist theory and practice; relevant to anyone committed to finding in anarchist praxis the most suitable response to the question, "how do we think we can leave where we are and arrive at where we want to be?" I hope this translation does it justice.

Jonathan Payn
Johannesburg, March 2012

The Context of the 2008 Congress and the Debate about Organisation

To theorise effectively it is essential to act.

Uruguayan Anarchist Federation (FAU)

The first Congress of the FARJ was held with the principal objective of deepening our reflections on the question of organisation and formalising them into a programme.

Since 2003 the debate around organisation has been taking place within our organisation. We had produced theoretical materials, developed our thinking, learned from the successes and mistakes of our political practice and it was becoming increasingly necessary to further the debate and to formalise it, spreading this knowledge both internally and externally.

The practical work of our two fronts – occupations and community – was absolutely central to the theoretical reflections that we made in this period. It even contributed to the creation of our third front in early 2008 – the agro-ecological front, called Anarchism and Nature.

One year ago we decided to have a debate around organisation, in necessary depth, with the aim of formalising the conclusions into a document that would be validated at the 2008 Congress. For this reason, still in 2007, we took some actions to contribute to the necessary theoretical maturity that would be essential to this path we wanted to take:

- Activation of the Political Education Secretary
- Carrying-out of Internal Education Seminars
- Development of Education Handbooks for Militants

These actions sought to give to each militant of our organisation the structure, space and necessary support so that this debate would be able to take place in the most desirable way possible. We made a great effort to read, write, debate, revisit materials already written, deepen discussions, make clarifications; in sum, to plan in the fullest we thought necessary for this debate.

However, we did not only want to provide a forum for debate. We wanted to reach more conclusive positions, or deepen the political line of the organisation. As one of the features of our organisational model is theoretical and ideological unity, we wanted to use this time for the deepening of certain theoretical and ideological questions, and ultimately arrive at concrete positions, to be defined and disseminated by the whole organisation.

In these five years we had always thought that in order to develop a political line we necessarily need to think of the mutual influence that exists between theory and practice, since we consider them inseparable. When both interact reciprocally, and in a positive way, they enhance the results of all the work of the organisation. With good theory you improve practice, with good practice

you improve theory. There is no way to conceive the anarchist organisation as with only theory and no practice, or even developing a theory and trying to completely adapt the practice to it.

From the beginning we thought it would be fundamental not to construct an organisation that, distant from struggles, writes documents and then goes into practice with the objective of adapting it to the theory. Likewise, it never appeared possible to us to conceive anarchist organisation with only practice but no theory, or even assuming as theory everything that happens in practice. We always sought a balance that, on the one hand, did not have as an objective to theorise deeply in order to begin acting and, on the other, sought to ensure that the action was in line with the theory which, in our understanding, strengthens the result of militants' efforts without unnecessary loss of energy.

In this debate, which took place in the last two years and which is formalised in this document, we desired to develop a proper theory that was not simply a repetition of other theories developed in other places and at other times. Obviously, our whole theory is imbued, from beginning to end, with other theories and of other authors that lived and acted in other contexts. It would be impossible to conceive of a consistent anarchist theory without the contribution of the classical anarchists, for example. However, we made a point of having a long reflection on these – the theories and thoughts of these authors – and whether they make sense in our context today. We seek to create proper concepts, aiming to give original character to the theory that we wanted to create, and in this endeavour we think we have been very successful as we, in our view, construct and formalise a coherent theory, articulating classical and contemporary theories, as well as our own conceptions. Nevertheless, we do not believe that this is a definitive theory. Many aspects could be improved. Lastly… the most important thing is to make it clear that we think we are taking the first steps along this path we wish to follow.

Finally, we desired to build this discussion and its formalisation in a collective manner. It is not enough for us that one or another comrade writes all the theory of the organisation and that others simply observe and follow their positions. It was because of this that we sought, throughout this period, to consider all the positions of the organisation and not just of one militant or another. This too, in our view, adds value to the text. It does not come from the head of one or other intellectual that thinks of politics detached from reality, but on the contrary is the result of five years of struggle and organisation of anarchism in permanent contact with the struggles of our time, seeking a revolutionary social transformation towards libertarian socialism. In sum, it is the result of five years of practical activity.

With the purpose of contributing one more step, of formalising theoretically that which has accumulated in our short history, we held the first Congress – which occurred in conjunction with the commemoration of five years of the FARJ – on 30 and 31 August 2008. The main reflections of which are recorded below.

Ethics, commitment, freedom!

Social Anarchism, Class Struggle and Centre-Periphery Relations

> [...] because anarchism is an ideology which refuses to create new central systems with new peripheral areas.
>
> **Rudolf de Jong**

Anarchism is, for us, an ideology; this being a set of ideas, motivations, aspirations, values, a structure or system of concepts that has a direct connection with action – that which we call political practice. Ideology requires the formulation of final objectives (long term, future perspectives), the interpretation of the reality in which we live and a more or less approximate prognosis about the transformation of this reality. From this analysis ideology is not a set of abstract values and ideas, dissociated from practice with a purely reflective character, but rather a system of concepts that exist in the way in which it is conceived together with practice and returns to it. Thus, ideology requires voluntary and conscious action with the objective of imprinting the desire for social transformation on society.

We understand anarchism as an ideology that provides orientation for action to replace capitalism, the state and its institutions with libertarian socialism – a system based on self-management and federalism – without any scientific or prophetic pretensions.

Like other ideologies, anarchism has a history and specific context. It does not arise from intellectuals or thinkers detached from practice, who pursued only abstract reflection. Anarchism has a history which developed within the great class struggles of the nineteenth century, when it was theorised by Proudhon and took shape in the midst of the International Workers Association (IWA), with the work of Bakunin, Guillaume, Reclus and others who advocated revolutionary socialism in opposition to reformist, legalist or statist socialism. This tendency of the IWA was later known as "federalist" or "anti-authoritarian" and found its continuity in the militancy of Kropotkin, Malatesta and others.

Thus it was within the IWA that anarchism took shape, "in the direct struggle of the workers against capitalism, from the needs of the workers, from their aspirations to freedom and equality that lived, particularly, in the masses of workers in the most heroic times"[1]. The work of theorising anarchism was done by thinkers and workers who were directly involved in social struggles and who helped to formalise and disseminate the sentiment that was latent in what they called the "mass movement". Thus Over the years anarchism developed theoretically and practically. One the one hand it contributed in a unique way to episodes of social transformation, maintaining its ideological character such as, for example, in the Mexican Revolution, the

[1] Dielo Trouda "Plataforma organizativa por una Unión General de Anarquistas". Translation to Spanish, revised and corrected by Frank Mintz. We use quotes from this translation made directly from the Russian, as the versions available to us in Portuguese and Spanish, both translated from the French, have several differences from the Russian

Russian Revolution, the Spanish Revolution or even in Brazilian episodes, like the General Strike of 1917 and the Insurrection of 1918. On the other hand in certain contexts anarchism assumed certain characteristics that retreated from the ideological character, transforming it into an abstract concept which became merely a form of critical observation of society. Over the years this model of anarchism assumed its own identity, finding references in history and at the same time losing its character of the struggle for social transformation. This was more strikingly evident in the second half of the twentieth century. Thought of from this perspective anarchism ceases to be a tool of the exploited in their struggle for emancipation and functions as a hobby, a curiosity, a theme for intellectual debate, an academic niche, an identity, a group of friends, etc. For us, this view seriously threatens the very meaning of anarchism.

This disastrous influence on anarchism was noted and criticised by various anarchists from Malatesta, when he polemicised with the individualists that were against organisation,[2] to Luigi Fabbri, who made his critique of the bourgeois influences on anarchism already in the early twentieth century[3], up to Murray Bookchin who, in the mid-1990s, noted this phenomenon and tried to warn:

> Unless I am very wrong – and I hope to be – the social and revolutionary objectives of anarchism are suffering the attrition of reaching a point where the word anarchy becomes part of the elegant bourgeois vocabulary of the next century – disobedient, rebellious, carefree, but delightfully harmless[4].

We advocate that anarchism recaptures its original ideological character, or as we previously defined it, a "system of concepts that has a direct connection with action, [...] of political practice". Seeking to recapture this ideological character and to differentiate ourselves from other currents in the broad camp of contemporary anarchism, we advocate social anarchism and therefore corroborate the criticisms of Malatesta and Fabbri and affirm the dichotomy identified by Bookchin; that there is today a social anarchism returning to struggles with the objective of social transformation, and a lifestyle anarchism that renounces the proposal for social transformation and involvement in the social struggles of our time.

For us social anarchism is a type of anarchism that, as an ideology, seeks to be a tool of social movements and the popular organisation with the objective of overthrowing capitalism and the state and of building libertarian socialism – self-managed and federalist. To this end it promotes the organised return of anarchists to the class struggle, with the goal of recapturing what we call the social vector of anarchism. We believe that it is among the exploited classes – the main victims of capitalism – that anarchism is able to flourish. If, as Neno Vasco put it, we have to throw the seeds of anarchism on the most fertile terrain, this terrain is for us the class struggle that takes place in popular mobilisations and in social struggles. Seeking to oppose social anarchism with lifestyle anarchism, Bookchin asserted that

> social anarchism is radically at odds with an anarchism which focuses on lifestyle, the neo-situationist invocation of ecstasy and the increasingly contradictory

original. Although the title of the document here is Spanish, we are referring to the same document translated into English as "The Organisational Platform of the Libertarian Communists".

[2] Errico Malatesta, "Anarquismo y Anarquia". Excerpt from Pensiero and Volontà, May 16, 1925. In: Vernon Richar

[3] Luigi Fabbri, "Bourgeois Influences on Anarchism"

[4] Murray Bookchin, "Social Anarchism or Lifestyle Anarchism: an unbridgeable chasm".

> sovereignty of the petty bourgeois ego. The two diverge completely in their defining principles – socialism or individualism.[5]

Commenting on the title of his book Anarquismo Social (Social Anarchism) Frank Mintz, another contemporary militant and thinker emphasised: "this title should be useless, because the two terms are implicitly linked. It is likewise misleading because it suggests that there may be a non-social anarchism, outside of struggles"[6]. In this way we understand that social anarchism is necessarily implicated in the class struggle.

Within our vision of social anarchism, as "a fundamental tool for the support of daily struggles"[7], we also need to clarify our definition of class. While considering the class struggle as central and absolutely relevant in society today we understand that the Marxists, by choosing the factory worker as the unique and historic subject of the revolution, despise all other categories of the exploited classes, while also potentially revolutionary subjects. The authoritarians' conception of the working class, which is restricted only to the category of industrial workers, does not cover the reality of the relations of domination and exploitation that have occurred throughout history and even the relationships that occur in this society. Just as it does not cover the identification of revolutionary subjects of the past and present.

Starting from the need to clarify this conception of class, we include in the camp of the exploited classes – which can and should contribute to the process of social transformation by means of class struggle – other categories that have in large part received the attention of anarchists throughout history. This definition of the conception of class does not change the class struggle as the main terrain for the action of social anarchism, but offers a different way of seeing our goal: the transformation of centre-periphery relations, or more specifically, the transformation of the relations of domination of the peripheries by the centres. Based on the classification of Rudolf de Jong[8] and on our own recent history of struggle, we conceptualise all the exploited classes starting from the centre-periphery relations. Thus, taking part in this group are:

a. Cultures and societies completely estranged and distanced from the centre; not at all "integrated", and "savage" in the eyes of the centre. For example, the Indians of the Amazon.

b. Peripheral areas related to the centre and belonging to its socio-economic and political structures that attempt, at the same time, to maintain their identities. They are dominated by the centre, threatened in their existence by the economic expansion thereof. By the standards of the centre they are "backwards" and underdeveloped. For example, the indigenous communities of Mexico and the Andean countries. Other examples in this category – perhaps we should talk of a subgroup b.1 – are small farmers, skilled workers and peasants threatened in their social and economic existence by the progress of the centre and who still struggle for their independence.

[5] Ibid.

[6] Frank Mintz, Anarquismo Social. São Paulo: Imaginário/Faísca/FARJ/CATL, 2006, p. 7.

[7] FARJ. "A Propriedade é um Roubo". In: Protesta! 4. Rio de Janeiro/São Paulo: FARJ/CATL, 2007, p. 11.

[8] As the author states, this classification is not intended to exhaust the relations and there are categories that overlap. The term "area", also according to the author, refers more to a social than a geographical concept. Rudolf de Jong. "Algumas Observações sobre a Concepção Libertária de Mudança Social". In: Paulo Sérgio Pinheiro. "O Estado Autoritário e Movimentos Populares". Rio de Janeiro: Paz e Terra, 1980, pp. 305-353. The original classification is on pages 309 and 310 of the book. This text was reissued in 2008 by Faísca Publications, in co-edition with the FARJ, with

c. Economic classes or socio-economic systems that used to belong to the centre, but returned to a peripheral position after technological innovations and socio-economic developments in the centre. For example, the lumpen proletariat, precarious informal workers and the permanent army of the unemployed.

d. Social classes and groups that take part in the centre in an economic sense, but that are peripheral in a social, cultural and/ or political sense: the working classes, the proletariat in emerging industrial societies, women, blacks, homosexuals.

e. Centre-periphery relations of a political nature, whether between states or within them: colonial or imperialist relations, capital versus provincial relations etc. Such relations in the capitalist system are developed in parallel with the economic relations mentioned above – or, group e.1: neo-capitalist domination, internal colonisation and exploitation.

Accepting this classification, and being conscious of its limitations, we define the category of exploited classes as the peripheral areas that are dominated by the centre. It is important to stress that we do not consider as part of this set of exploited classes individuals who are in theory in peripheral areas, but that in practice establish relations of domination over others, thus becoming new centres. Hence the need for all the struggles of the exploited classes to have a revolutionary perspective, in order that they do not seek simply to make parts of the peripheral areas constituted into new centres.

Proceeding from this definition, there are two ways of thinking about social transformation: one, authoritarian, historically used by the heirs of Marxism (revolutionary or reformist) and another, libertarian, used by the anarchists.

Authoritarians, including some who call themselves anarchists, think of the centre as a means, and orientate their politics towards it. For them, the centre – considering this to be the state, the party, the army, the position of control – is an instrument for the emancipation of society, and "the revolution means in first place the capturing of the centre and its power structure, or the creation of a new centre"[9]. The authoritarians' very conception of class is based on the centre, when defining the industrial proletariat as a historical subject – which is described in the letter "d" in the definition cited above – and excludes and marginalises other categories of the exploited classes that are in the periphery like, for example, the peasantry.

Libertarians do not think of the centre as a means, and struggle permanently against it, building their revolutionary model and their strategy of struggle in the direction of all the peripheries – explained by the letters that go from "a" to "e" in the definition above. That is, in its activity in the class struggle anarchism considers as elements of the exploited classes traditional communities, peasants, unemployed, underemployed, homeless and other categories frequently overlooked by the authoritarians. "Thus the struggle would be taken up by someone who really [feels] the effects of the system, and therefore [needs] urgently to abolish it"[10]. Anarchists stimulate social movements in the periphery from the grassroots and seek to build a popular organisation in order to combat – in solidarity – the existing order and create a new society that would be based on equality and freedom, and in which classes would no longer make sense. In this struggle anarchists utilise the means that contain, within themselves, the germs of the future society.

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the title "A Concepção Libertária da Transformação Social Revolucionária".

[9] Ibid. p. 312

[10] FARJ. "Por um Novo Paradigma de Análise do Panorama Internacional". In: Protesta! 4!, p. 31.

> The anarchist conception of the social forces behind social change is much more general [...] than the Marxist formula. Unlike Marxism, it does not afford a specific role to the industrialised proletariat. In anarchist writings we find all kinds of workers and poor, all the oppressed, all those that somehow belong to peripheral groups or areas and are therefore potential factors in the revolutionary struggle for social change[11].

With this conception of revolutionary forces, we affirm that "everything indicates that it is in the periphery, in the 'margins', that the revolution keeps its flame alight"[12]. Therefore, our conclusion is that anarchism has to be in permanent contact with the peripheries in order to seek out its project of social transformation.

[11] Rudolf de Jong. Op. Cit. p. 324.

[12] FARJ. "Por um Novo Paradigma...". In: Protesta! 4!, p. 31.

Anarchism in Brazil: Loss and Attempted Recovery of the Social Vector

> We are combatants of a great war.
>
> All combatants mutually "understand" how to fight, assuming "commitments", without which there cannot be unity of action. Those who "understand" this with others are no longer masters of their will entirely, held by a few threads to a signed agreement.
>
> If the threads break, the agreement is broken, if "you misunderstand, desist from the common fight", you flee the struggle, you evade your comrades.
>
> **José Oiticica**

Anarchism arose in Brazil in the nineteenth century as an order-destabilising element, with some influence over the revolts of the time – as was the case with the Praieira Insurrection of 1848 – over the artistic and cultural environment as well as with the experiences of the experimental agricultural colonies at the end of the century. The Cecilia Colony (1890-1894) being the most well-known of these experiences. There are reports of strikes, workers' newspapers and the first attempts at organising centres of workers' resistance in the same century.

The emergence of what we call the "social vector of anarchism" began at the beginning of the 1890s, driven by a growth in the social insertion of anarchism in the unions, which culminated in the second decade of the twentieth century.

We call the social vector of anarchism those popular movements that have a significant anarchist influence – primarily with regard to their practical aspects – irrespective of the sectors in which they occur. These mobilisations, fruits of the class struggle, are not anarchist as they are organised around questions of specific demands. For example, in a union, the workers struggle for better salaries; in a homeless movement, they struggle for housing; in an unemployed movement, they struggle for work etc. However, they are spaces for the social insertion of anarchism that, by means of its influence, confers on the most combative and autonomous practical movements with the use of direct action and direct democracy, aiming at social transformation. The mobilisations constituted in the social vector of anarchism are made within the social movements, considered by us as preferred spaces for social work and accumulation, and not as a mass to be directed.

In Brazil, the social vector of anarchism began to develop in the late nineteenth century with the growth of the urban network and the population in the cities, and then with industrial growth which, of course, also saw the growing exploitation of workers; victims of exhausting days, unhealthy working conditions and low wages in factories that also employed child labour. With the objective of defending the working class from these conditions of practically unbearable exploitation arose several labour organisations, riots, strikes and uprisings – all of which were becoming increasingly common.

The intensification of class struggle in Brazil was occasioned by the coachmen's strike of 1900, a number of strikes in 1903 that peaked in the general strike initiated by the weavers and the uprisings that culminated in the 1904 Vacina Revolt. In 1903 the Federation of Class Associations (Federação das Associações de Classe) was founded in the state of Rio de Janeiro. It followed the revolutionary syndicalist model of the French CGT and was later transferred to the capital and named the Brazilian Regional Workers' Federation (Federação Operária Regional Brasileira - FORB) in 1906, some time after a visit by members of the Argentine Regional Workers' Federation (Federación Obrera Regional Argentina - FORA) and a solidarity campaign with Russian workers.

By 1904 we can say that anarchism was able to present itself as an ideological tool of struggle and it "was, without a doubt, revolutionary syndicalism that was responsible for the first social vector achieved by the anarchists in the large Brazilian centres"[1]. In 1905, in Sao Paulo, shoemakers, bakers, carpenters and hatters founded the Labour Federation of Sao Paulo (Federação Operária de São Paulo- FOSP) and, in 1906, came the Labour Federation of Rio de Janeiro (Federação Operária do Rio de Janeiro - FORJ), which led in 1917 to the General Union of Workers (União Geral dos Trabalhadores - UGT) and brought together the "resistance unions [i.e. militant, combative]" . In 1919 the UGT became the Federation of Workers of Rio de Janeiro (Federação dos Trabalhadores do Rio de Janeiro - FTRJ) and, in 1923, the FORJ was re-founded.

In April 1906 the Brazilian Regional Labour Congress (Congresso Operário Regional Brasileiro), later known as the First Brazilian Labour Congress (Primeiro Congresso Operário Brasileiro), took place in Rio de Janeiro receiving delegates from several Brazilian states, representing diverse categories. The Congress approved its adhesion to French revolutionary syndicalism, adopting labour neutrality, federalism, decentralisation, anti-militarism, anti-nationalism, direct action and the general strike. The Second and Third Congresses took place, respectively, in 1913 and in 1920. In 1908 the Brazilian Labour Confederation (Confederação Operária Brasileira - COB) was founded.

The choice of revolutionary syndicalism occurred through the adoption of the economic camp of mobilisation and by the interesting proposal of federalism, which permitted the autonomy of the union in the federation and of this (the federation) in the confederation. Besides this, there was an international influence from the adoption of this model in other parts of the world. The means of struggle made by the mobilisation around short-term issues serves as a "revolutionary gymnastics", which prepares the proletariat for the social revolution.

> The anarchists hoped that in concrete action, in solidarity, and in the empirical observation of the contradictions between capital and labour, evidenced in conflicts, was the great lesson to be learned by the workers. That was the guarantee, they said, of the acquisition of ideological principles, not by rhetorical preaching or manuals, deprived of sensible experience, but by the practice of revolutionary and daily action by the masses.[2]

The first decade of the twentieth century counted more than one hundred strike movements, which acted, principally, in relation to the salary question. During the years of 1917 to 1920 more than two hundred demonstrations and strikes took place between Rio de Janeiro and Sao Paulo

[1] Alexandre Samis. "Pavilhão Negro sobre Pátria Oliva". In: *História do Movimento Operário Revolucionário*. São Paulo: Imaginário, 2004, p. 179.

[2] Ibid. p. 136.

alone. This whole conjuncture of mobilisation occurred with ample influence of the anarchists, who tried to carry out their propaganda in the unions; not circumscribing these within the anarchist ideology – the unions were for the workers and not for anarchist workers – but utilising them for the propagation of their ideas.

All this expectation placed on the social revolution, which was becoming more and more real since the mid-1910s, culminated in three relevant mobilisations. Firstly, in 1917 in that which became known as the 1917 General Strike, when workers of Sao Paulo, in a large way organised around the Proletarian Defence Committee, struggled against famine, carrying out sabotage and boycotting products from the Crespi, Matarazzo and Gamba industries. Among the victories of the strike movement are the eight hour work day and wage increases won by sectors of the movement. In 1918 the mobilisations continued and, in Rio de Janeiro, the Anarchist Insurrection took place. With strikes taking place in the carioca (Rio de Janeiro) factories and Campo de São Cristóvão occupied by the workers, the insurgents wanted the seizure of government buildings and the establishment in the city of the first soviet of Rio de Janeiro. Finally, in 1919, the Civil Construction Workers Union (União dos Operários em Construção Civil - UOCC) had the greatest gain of all, winning the eight hour work day for the whole sector. Besides this, outside of Rio de Janeiro and Sao Paulo, significant mobilisations took place in other states of Brazil: Rio Grande do Sul, Paraná, Santa Catarina, Minas Gerais, Pernambuco, Alagoas, Paraíba, Bahia, Ceará, Pará and Amazonas.

There was even a large cultural movement that worked together with the union mobilisations and was very important: rationalist schools inspired by the principles of (Francisco) Ferrer y Guardia, social centres, workers theatre and other initiatives that were fundamental in forging a class culture, an object of union in times of struggle.

There was also, at this ascendent juncture of struggle, the formation of two political and ideologically anarchist organisations which sought to work with the union movement. The first of these was the Anarchist Alliance of Rio de Janeiro (Aliança Anarquista do Rio de Janeiro), founded in 1918 by the need for an anarchist organisation for working within the unions, and which was important for the 1918 insurrection. However, with the repression that occurred the Alliance was disbanded, returning to organise in the first Communist Party, of libertarian inspiration, founded in 1919. Both the Anarchist Alliance and the Communist Party grouped together members of a sector of anarchism which is called "organisationalist" and which understood as necessary the distinction between levels of action – the political level, ideologically anarchist, and the social level, of union mobilisations. These militants understood as necessary the existence of specific anarchist organisations to act together with trade unions. It is important to emphasise that, at this time, anarchists already had a preoccupation with their specific organisation.

We can say that the social vector of anarchism was on an upward curve until the beginning of the 1920s when the crisis of anarchism, parallel to unionism itself, began to develop. Culminating in the 1930s in their demobilisation and in the loss of this social vector. For us, the loss of the social vector of anarchism is the result of two contexts of crisis: one of the situation and the other of anarchism itself.

The context of the situation was marked, firstly, by the repression both of trade unionism as well as anarchism, which can be seen in the third revision of the Adolfo Gordo law of 1921, which provided for the repression and deportation of anarchists, in addition to the deportation of militants to the penal colony of Clevelândia, located in the current state of Amapá, between 1924 and 1926. Besides this, there was also an ebb of social struggles around the world and frustration

with the result of the struggles that came after the Russian Revolution of 1917. Also significant was the end of the First World War and the recovery of European factories, which returned to export (including to Brazil), reducing the workers contingent in the cities and the growth of the Communist Party, founded in 1922, which from 1924 began to most strongly dispute the unions and ally itself with the reformists, proposing electoral participation as a form of political expression. Finally, the harnessing of the unions to the state which was legalised in 1930 and 1931 by the Vargas government, culminating in 1932 when the unions were obliged, by law, to have government approval and to follow operating rules determined by the state.

The context of anarchism was marked, primarily, by the confusion between different levels of activity. For many militants unionism, which was the social vector, the medium of action that should lead to an end – expressed by the social revolution and the constitution of libertarian socialism – ended up becoming the end itself. This phenomenon was already being noticed in anarchism and was the subject of fierce debate, already in 1907 at the Amsterdam Congress, between Malatesta and Monatte. Monatte, defender of "pure syndicalism", saw great similarity between syndicalism and anarchism and argued that "syndicalism is enough in itself"[3]. Malatesta, with a diametrically opposed position, considered syndicalism "a camp particularly favourable to the spread of revolutionary propaganda and also as a point of contact between anarchists and the masses"[4]. Thus, Malatesta argued for the need for two levels of activity: one politically anarchist, and the other social, within the union, which would be the means of insertion.

The positions of Malatesta and Monatte summarise the positions of the Brazilian anarchists. On one side, a part of the anarchists defended the need for specifically anarchist organisation, which should seek social insertion in the unions. On the other, anarchists who had understood militancy within the unions as their only task, and thus "forgot to form specific groups capable of giving support to revolutionary practice"[5].

Our position in relation to the social events of the early twentieth century is aligned with that of Malatesta, which was taken up in Brazil by José Oiticica who, at the time, regarded the lack of specific anarchist organisations as the problem. In 1923 he already warned of the fact that the anarchists had been dedicating themselves completely to the activities of the unions and renouncing ideological activities, confusing unionism, which was the means of insertion, with the end they wished to achieve. For him it was essential to create "anarchist federations outside of the unions"[6], such as the Alliance of 1918 and the Party of 1919 which, despite being groups or federations of this type were, unfortunately, insufficient for the task it was necessary to realise.

> For Oiticica, as we have already partially referred to, it was important at that time to direct forces towards the formation of "closed" groups, with a definite programme of action and commitment tacitly assumed by the militants[7]. The "centralisation" of the anarchist forces in the struggle against the bourgeoisie, he continued, should not be confused with the "decentralisation" typical of libertarian organisations. He then claimed two urgent steps for the efficiency of anarchist action: "selection of

[3] Pierre Monate. "Em Defesa do Sindicalismo". In: George Woodcock. *Grandes Escritos Anarquistas*. Porto Alegre: LP&M, 1998, p. 206.

[4] Errico Malatesta. "Sindicalismo: a Crítica de um Anarquista". In: George Woodcock. Op. Cit. p. 207.

[5] Alexandre Samis. "Anarquismo, 'bolchevismo' e a crise do sindicalismo revolucionário". (Still unpublished).

[6] José Oiticica in *A Pátria*, 22 of June 1923.

[7] José Oiticica, Fabio Luz and other anarchists radicalised in Rio de Janeiro took part in a specific group of

> militants and concentration of forces". And he concluded: "Only this will give us unity of action".[8]

We believe that the lack of anarchist organisations that could lend support to the class struggle, expressed most notably at that time by the unions, was also largely responsible for the loss of the social vector of anarchism. As the ideological organisations were not sedimented, the context of the crisis of unionism eventually extended to anarchism itself. Thus, a crisis at the social level also condemned the political level, since there was no real difference between the two at the time.

For us it is normal that the social level, represented at that time by unionism, has ebbs and flows, moments of ascent and descent; and the specific anarchist organisation serves precisely to accumulate the results of struggles and, sometimes, to seek out other spaces for work, other spaces for insertion. The problem is that, without anarchist organisations, when the social level – or a sector of it – enters into crisis, the anarchists are not able to find another space for social insertion.

> Once the social vector was lost, and without specific organisations capable of sustaining an ideological struggle of longer duration, it was not possible for the anarchists to immediately find another space for insertion. […] The prestige achieved through the entrance into trade unions very probably led them to believe that the potential of the class associations was inexhaustible, even superior to the changing circumstances.[9]

Thus, the crisis in revolutionary syndicalism also took the social vector of the anarchists, who then started to "organise themselves into cultural groups and for the preservation of memory"[10].

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The FARJ claims to continue the militancy of Ideal Peres and the work that originated from his history of struggle. Ideal Peres was the son of Juan Perez Bouzas (or João Peres), a Galician immigrant, anarchist and shoemaker who played an important role in Brazilian anarchism from the end of the 1910s. He was an active militant of the Alliance of Craftsmen in Footwear (Aliança dos Artífices em Calçados) and of the Workers' Federation of Sao Paulo (Federação Operária de São Paulo - FOSP), having been active in numerous strikes, pickets and demonstrations. In the 1930s he was active in the Anticlerical League (Liga Anticlerical) and, in 1934, participated decisively in the Battle of Sé – when the anarchists rejected the *Integralistas* (fascists) under bursts of machine gun fire. The following year anarchists also participated in the formation of the National Liberator Alliance (Aliança Nacional Libertadora - ANL), a co-ordination that supported the anti-fascist struggle, combating imperialism and landlordism.

Ideal Peres was born in 1925 and began his militancy in that context of crisis, when the social vector of anarchism had already been lost. This happened in 1946 when he participated in the Libertarian Youth of Rio de Janeiro (Juventude Libertária do Rio de Janeiro); in the periodicals Ação Direta (Direct Action) and Archote (Torch); in the Anarchist Union of Rio de Janeiro (União dos Anarquistas do Rio de Janeiro); in the Anarchist Congress (Congresso Anarquistas) that took

anarchists called *Os Emancipados*.

[8] Alexandre Samis. "Anarquismo, 'bolchevismo' e a crise do sindicalismo revolucionário".

[9] Ibid.

[10] Idem. "Pavilhão Negro sobre Pátria Oliva". In: *História do Movimento Operário Revolucionário*, p. 181.

place in Brazil; and in the Union of Brazilian Libertarian Youth (União da Juventude Libertária Brasileira). Ideal Peres had relevant participation in the Professor José Oiticica Study Centre (Centro de Estudos Professor José Oiticica - CEPJO), site of a series of courses and lectures that used anarchism as a "background" and which was closed down by the dictator in 1969, when Ideal was imprisoned for a month in the former Department of Social and Political Order (Departamento de Ordem Política e Social - DOPS), first in the Galeao Air Base and then in the barracks of the Military Police on Barao de Mesquita road, torture centre of the military dictatorship.

In the 1970s, after prison, Ideal organised in his house a study group that had as its goal to bring in youth interested in anarchism and, amongst other things, to put them in touch with former militants and establish links with other anarchists in Brazil. This study group would constitute the nucleus of the Libertarian Study Circle (Círculo de Estudos Libertários - CEL), conceived by Ideal and his partner Esther Redes. The CEL functioned in Rio de Janeiro from 1985 to 1995, having close to (or even inside) it the formation of other groups like the José Oiticica Anarchist Group (Grupo Anarquista José Oiticica - GAJO), the Direct Action Anarchist Group (Grupo Anarquista Ação Direta - GAAD), the 9th of July Anarchist Student Collective (Coletivo Anarquista Estudantil 9 de Julho - CAE-9), the Mutirão group; in addition to publications such as Libera…Amore Mio (founded in 1991 and which still exists today), the magazine Utopia (1988-1992) and the journal Mutirão (1991). Besides this, the CEL promoted events, campaigns and dozens (if not hundreds) of lectures and debates.

With the death of Ideal Peres in August 1995 the CEL decided to honour him by modifying its name to the Ideal Peres Libertarian Study Circle (Círculo de Estudos Libertários Ideal Peres - CELIP). CELIP gave continuity to the work of the CEL, being responsible for aggregating militancy in Rio de Janeiro and continuing the theoretical improvement thereof. Additionally, CELIP emerged with the publication of Libera, through which it developed relationships with groups across the country and abroad. It brought forward important libertarian reflections on issues that were on the agenda in Brazil and the world at the time, and served for the spread of texts and news of various groups in the country. The lectures and debates continued attracting new militants, and the relations that some militants had with the Uruguayan Anarchist Federation (Federación Anarquista Uruguaya - FAU) ended up significantly influencing the model of anarchism that was being developed within CELIP. It was co-organiser of the State Encounter of Libertarian Students of Rio de Janeiro (ENELIB) in 1999; participated in the International Meeting of Libertarian Culture in Florianopolis in 2000; and contributed to the activities of the Institute of Libertarian Culture and Action in Sao Paulo (ICAL). It also took up the struggle of the oil industry workers, re-establishing ties between anarchists and unionists in the oil industry – ties that date back to 1992/1993, when they occupied the head-quarter buildings of Petrobras (Edifício Sede da Petrobrás - EDISE) together in the first occupation of a "public" building after the military dictatorship. In 2001 this struggle of the anarchists and oil industry workers was resumed, culminating, in 2003, in the more than 10 day encampment by anarchists and oil industry workers fighting for amnesty for comrades politically dismissed. Besides this, CELIP did a range of other activities.

In 2002 we initiated a study group in order to verify the possibility for the construction of an anarchist organisation in Rio de Janeiro, the result of which was the foundation of the FARJ on 30th of August 2003. For us, there is a direct link between the militancy of Ideal Peres, the construction of the CEL, its functioning, the change of name to CELIP and the subsequent foundation of the FARJ.

When we speak of seeking the "social vector of anarchism", we necessarily make reference to the work initiated by Ideal Peres who, even in the 1980s, started working with social movements with a view to withdrawing anarchism from the strictly cultural realm to which it had been constrained since the crisis of the 1930s.

> In the first half of the 1980s, Ideal and Esther [Redes] entered a social movement, as founders and members of the Leme Friends and Residents Association (Associação dos Moradores e Amigos do Leme - AMALEME). In the 1980s a number of federations of neighbourhood, favela (township/slum) and community associations appeared in Rio de Janeiro, and Ideal participated in AMALEME, trying to influence it to use self-management practices and to demonstrate solidarity with the poor community of Morro do Chapéu Mangueira. In 1984 Ideal is elected vice president of the association and in 1985 president. His attention to neighbourhood associations having been born in another association, ALMA (Residents Association of Lauro Muller and Surroundings), perhaps the first association to demonstrate combative and self-management impetus, which ended up influencing other associations[11].

The stimulation of Ideal Peres and the very development of militancy in Rio de Janeiro showed a practical need for social work and insertion of the anarchists, which had deepened after the contacts we had with the FAU in the mid-1990s. Through Libera and contact with other groups in Brazil we assisted the initiative of the Brazilian Anarchist Construction (CAB) in 1996, disseminating a document entitled "Struggle and Organisation," which sought to give support to the creation of organisational groups that would defend the idea of "especifista" anarchism. We can say that all especifista anarchism in Brazil has been influenced by the CAB and FAU itself, and this is no different with us.

Since then the idea of social insertion and recovery of the vector was becoming larger all the time. The history of Brazil and a more strategic observation about anarchism's own reason for being were leaving us increasingly convinced that especifismo was the form of anarchist organisation most suitable to our purposes. For us, the path to the recovery of the social vector passes, necessarily, through a specifically organised anarchism that differentiates the levels of activity and is present in the class struggle. However, unlike the early twentieth century, when the preferred terrain of class struggle was the unions, we now consider that unionism can be a means of insertion, but that there are others far more important. As previously defined there is today a very broad exploited class which permits the social work and insertion of anarchists: the unemployed, peasants, landless, homeless etc. For us, to be well-organised at the political (ideological) level will allow us to find the best path to bring back this social vector of anarchism, be it where it may.

All of our actual reflection aims to think of a strategic model of organisation that enables a recovery of the social vector, in that this points to our objective of overcoming capitalism, the state and for the establishment of libertarian socialism. What we seek, in this context, is only a station in the struggle: as we emphasised at our foundation: "Here we present the FARJ, without

[11] Felipe Corrêa. *Anarquismo Social no Rio de Janeiro: breve história da FARJ e de suas origens.* Lisboa: CEL/Cadernos d'A Batalha, 2008, p. 25.

asking for anything other than a fighting station, lest righteous and profoundly beautiful dreams die."[12]

[12] FARJ. "Manifesto de Fundação".

Society of Domination and Exploitation: Capitalism and State

> The wealth of some is made with the misery of others.
>
> **Piotr Kropotkin**

> For those who are in power, the enemy is the people.
>
> **Pierre-Joseph Proudhon**

Capitalism as a system has developed since the late Middle Ages and was established in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries in Western Europe. It constituted itself as an economic, political and social system, basing itself on the relations between two antagonistic classes. On one hand, that which is called the "bourgeoisie" and which we will treat in this text as "capitalists", holders of private ownership of the means of production,[1] who contract workers by means of wage-labour. On the other, that which is called the "proletariat",[2] and which we will treat in this text as "workers" who, possessing nothing more than their labour power, have to sell it in exchange for a wage. As we emphasised earlier, the wage-labourer – classic object of analysis in the socialist theses of the nineteenth century – for us, constitutes today only one of the categories of the exploited classes.

The aim of the capitalists is the production of goods in order to obtain profits. "The [capitalist] enterprise is not concerned with the needs of society; its sole purpose is to increase the profits of the business-owner."[3] By means of wage labour, the capitalists pay workers as little as possible and usurp from them all the surplus of their labour, which is called surplus value. This happens because, in order to increase their profits, the capitalists must have the lowest costs, or spend as little as possible. Selling their goods at the highest prices the market can pay, they remain with the difference between what they spend and what they earn – the profit. To contain costs, and thus increase profits, the capitalists have various recourses; among them to increase productivity and decrease the costs of production. There are several ways for this to be done, such as to impose a higher work rate on workers and reduce the wages paid to them.

This relationship between capitalists and workers generates social inequality, one of the great evils of the society in which we live. This has already been established by Proudhon, when he investigated the subject in the nineteenth century:

[1] The means of production constitute the means of work and of the objects of labour. The means of labour are the instruments of production, such as machinery, equipment, tools, technology; facilities, such as buildings, warehouses, offices; the sources of energy used in production, which may be electric, hydraulic, nuclear, wind; and the means of transport. The objects of labour are the elements upon which human labour occurs, such as raw materials, vegetables and animals, the land, among others.

[2] Proletariat: those who have nothing except their offspring, or, their children.

[3] Piotr Kropotkin. "As Nossas Riquezas". In: A Conquista do Pão. Lisboa: Guimarães, 1975, p. 28.

> I affirmed then that all the causes of social inequality can be reduced to three: 1) the free appropriation of collective force, 2) inequality in trade; 3) the right to profit or fortune. And, as this triple way of usurping the goods of others is, essentially, the dominion of property, I denied the legitimacy of property and proclaimed its identity as theft[4].

For us private property, as Proudhon noted, is theft since, from wage-labour it gives to the capitalist the surplus of the workers' labour. This property, "after stripping the worker by usury, kills them slowly by exhaustion"[5].

Besides being a system that creates and maintains social inequality, capitalism is based on domination and consequent exploitation. Domination exists when a person or a group of people use "the social force of others (the dominated), and consequently their time, in order to accomplish their objectives (of the dominator) – which are not the objectives of the subjugated agent"[6]. The capitalist system is characterised by the utilisation of the labour power of the worker for the enrichment of the capitalists, and is therefore a dominative and exploitative system since it "signifies the ability and right to live off the exploitation of alien labour, the right to exploit the labour of those who do not have property or capital and are therefore forced to sell their productive power to the lucky owners of both"[7].

This relationship between capital and labour playing out on the market is not the same for both sides since the capitalists go to the market in order to obtain profit, while the workers are made to do so out of a need to work, without which they run the risk of experiencing want and not having the minimum living conditions. It is an "encounter between an initiative for profit and the other from hunger, between the master and the slave"[8].

Besides this, unemployment causes that when the capitalists go to the market they encounter workers in abundance, as there is a greater supply of workers than their is a demand:

> [...] the poor neighbourhoods of the city and the villages are full of wretches, whose children cry in front of empty plates. Thus, the factory is not even finished yet and the workers are already coming to ask for work. One hundred are required and a thousand present themselves[9].

Thus, to the capitalists it fits to impose working conditions. To the workers it fits to accept them, since "they are taken for fear of finding themselves replaced by others, to sell themselves at the lowest price. [...] Once they have found themselves in a state of poverty, the worker is forced to sell their labour for almost nothing, and by selling this product for almost nothing, sinks into an ever greater misery."[10]

Being a complex system, capitalism combines several forms of production and social classes. Peasants, despite being part of a productive process that is pre-capitalist, are still subject to the competitive requirements of the capitalist market, which means the need for fundamental ele-

[4] Pierre-Joseph Proudhon. "2eme. Memoire sur la Proprieté". In: A Nova Sociedade. Porto: Rés Editorial, s/d, p. 35.
[5] Idem. O que é a Propriedade? São Paulo: Martins Fontes, 1988, p. 159.
[6] Fabio López López. Poder e Domínio: uma visão anarquista. Rio de Janeiro: Achiamé, 2001, p. 83.
[7] Mikhail Bakunin. O Sistema Capitalista. São Paulo: Faísca, 2007, p. 4.
[8] Ibid. p. 14.
[9] Piotr Kropotkin. "A Expropriação". In: A Conquista do Pão, p. 62.
[10] Mikhail Bakunin. O Sistema Capitalista, pp. 6-7.

ments for production that are sold on the capitalist market. In competition, due to productive and technological difficulties, they are at a disadvantage in relation to the big agribusiness companies. There are also those peasants who sell their labour power, who we can consider rural workers of a traditional capitalist system. Peasants, as we have already seen, are also part of the group of exploited classes.

It is even said that capitalism should not be divided into two large classes – that of the capitalists and that of the workers – but, indeed, three; there being a third class, called the "managerial class", responsible for the control of decisive aspects of capitalism and personalising another important aspect of capitalism, which is that of the hierarchical division of labour. Throughout the history of capitalism this class has been becoming increasingly part of the capitalist class, especially by the interests defended in the process of class struggle. Today, the figure of the traditional bourgeois, the proprietor, is becoming increasingly less common; the control of companies being performed by the managers and the owners increasingly being multinational groups or even shareholders that no one knows. Actually, in the large majority, the class of managers is part of the capitalist group, or what we might call the ruling class.

There are also other actors in the capitalist market, such as workers in the trade and service sectors, who distribute goods from the capitalist enterprises or perform work for them. Both sectors follow the logic of capitalism, to a greater or lesser extent, and also act within the competition of the market; very often using wage labour, sustaining the proprietors who enjoy the fruits of this unjust relationship between capital and labour and who have the intention of generating profit.

As a system that reproduces injustice capitalism separates manual and intellectual labour. This separation is the result of inheritance and also of education, since there is different education for the rich and the poor. Thus,

> [...] as long as you have two or more levels of instruction for the different layers of society, you will necessarily have classes, meaning to say, political and economic privileges for a small number of fortunates, and slavery and misery for the majority[11].

Throughout its history capitalism has evolved, becoming involved in the political structures of European countries in the late nineteenth century, leading to imperialism and reaching its current phase of expansion, which can be called economic globalisation. According to the analysis of Subcomandante Marcos, of the Zapatista Army: "It is already not an imperialist power in the classic sense of the term, one that dominates the rest of the world, but a new extra-national power."[12] In general terms, economic globalisation is characterised by an integration, on a global scale, of the processes of production, distribution and exchange. Production is carried out in several countries, goods are imported and exported in enormous quantities and over long distances.

Stimulated since the 1970s and 1980s, "globalisation" became widespread around the world, "basing itself, from the ideological, philosophical and theoretical point of view on the doctrine of neoliberalism"[13], which advocates the free market and minimal state. The basic idea is that capital procures locations with the best conditions for its reproduction. As production necessarily requires the labour power of the workers, there is a migration of the productive spheres

[11] Idem. A Instrução Integral. São Paulo: Imaginário, 2003, p. 69.

[12] Subcomandante Marcos. "Entrevista a Ignácio Ramonet". In: Marcos: la dignidad rebelde. Chile: Aún Creemos en los Sueños SA, 2001, p. 26.

[13] Ibid. p. 27.

of capitalist enterprises to countries whose "production cost" is lower, i.e. countries with weak labour/ environmental legislation, weak trade union organisation, high levels of unemployment etc. In sum, companies seek countries/ regions where exploitation can take place without state intervention, allowing them to pay what they want, such that they are not obliged to provide benefits to workers, that they (workers) can be dismissed whenever they (capitalists) wish and that there are always many more workers wanting to fill the vacancies, allowing for production costs to become increasingly less; precarious work is sought and encouraged. This system, if it on the one hand leaves unemployed in areas with optimal conditions, on the other allows for the blackmail that causes precarity to be accepted and threatens the organisation of workers who are increasingly more controlled and pushed to the periphery, as described by Chomsky:

> The concepts of "efficiency" and "healthy economy", favourites of the rich and privileged, have nothing to offer the growing sectors of the population that are not profitable and that are pushed into poverty and despair. If they cannot be confined to the slums, they will have to be controlled in any other way[14].

Neoliberalism – which stimulates the free flow of capital, but not the free movement of people nor the comparison of working conditions – calls into question the whole condition of "welfare" which was imposed on states during large mobilisations that marked the world in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Capitalism has been seeking new spaces, expanding itself both internally as well as externally, creating new capitalist enterprises through privatisation and fostering false needs by means such as advertising, which do not correspond to the real demands of society. "Neoliberal doctrines, independent of what you think of them, debilitate education and health, increase social inequality and reduce labour's share in the distribution of income."[15]

Contemporary capitalism is also responsible for the major ecological crisis devastating the world today. Motivated by the logic of profit, private enterprises are responsible for transferring the entire hierarchy of classes to the relationship between people and the environment. Pollution, deforestation, global warming, destruction of rare species and imbalances in the food chains are just some of the consequences of this relationship.

> The hierarchies, classes, property systems and political institutions that emerged with social domination were transferred, conceptually, to the relationship between humanity and nature. This was also increasingly seen as a mere resource, an object, a raw material to be exploited as ruthlessly as slaves on a plantation[16].

Brazil, being well integrated into this globalised logic for reason of policies adopted by its past governments, shares the global consequences of this new phase of capitalism.

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[14] Noam Chomsky. O Lucro ou as Pessoas. Rio de Janeiro: Bertrand Brasil, 2002, p. 136.

[15] Ibid. p. 36.

[16] Murray Bookchin. "Um Manifesto Ecológico: o poder de destruir, o poder de criar". In: Letra Livre 31. Rio de Janeiro: Achiamé, 2001, p. 8.

We consider the state the set of political powers of a nation, that takes shape by means of "political, legislative, judicial, military and financial institutions etc."[17]; and, in this way, the state is broader than the government. The state, since its inception in antiquity, passing through the Egypt of the pharaohs and the military-slave state of Rome, has always been an instrument for perpetuating inequality and a liberty-exterminating element, whatever the existing mode of production. This dominating institution has, in the course of history, know periods of greater or lesser strength, requiring attention to specific time and place. The state as we observe it today (the modern state) has its origins in the sixteenth century.

In the Middle Ages, with the aim of destroying the civilisation of the cities, the modern barbarians ended up making into slaves all those who once organised themselves based on free initiative and free understanding. The whole of society was levelled based on submission to the landlord, declaring that the church and state were to be the only links between individuals, that only these institutions would have the right to defend commercial, industrial and artistic interests etc. The state was constituted by means of domination, to speak on behalf of society, since it was judged to be society itself.

The state has been characterised by a "double game" of promising the rich to protect them from the poor, and promising the poor to protect them from the rich. Gradually the towns, victims of authority that were dying bit-by-bit were given to the state, which also developed its role as conqueror, moving on to wage wars against other states, seeking to expand itself and conquer new territories. The effect of the state over the cities and urban regions was disastrous. The state's role in the urban areas in the period of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries was;

> to annihilate the independence of the cities, to rob the rich guilds[18] of the merchants and artists, to centralise external trade in their hands and ruin it, to seize the entire internal administration of the guilds and submit interior trade, as well as the manufacturing of all things, even in their most minute detail, to a cloud of functionaries, killing, in this way, industry and the arts; taking possession of the local militias and of the entire municipal administration; crushing, through taxes, the weak to the benefit of the rich, and ruining the countries with wars.[19]

After the Industrial Revolution arose the so-called "social question", which obliged states to develop assistance plans in order to minimise the impacts of capital on labour. In the late nineteenth century arose, as an alternative to liberalism, a more interventionist conception of the state which, if on the one hand sought to create policies of "social welfare", on the other implemented methods to contain the advancement of socialist initiatives, already quite strong at the time.

Today the state has two fundamental objectives: the first of them, ensuring the conditions for the production and reproduction of capitalism; and the second, to ensure its legitimacy and control. For this reason the state today is a strong supporting pillar of capitalism.

The state extrapolates the political ambit and functions as an economic agent of capitalism, working to prevent or minimise the role of its crises or of the falls in its profit rates. This can happen in several ways: by granting loans to central sectors of the economy, incentivising the

[17] Errico Malatesta. A Anarquia. São Paulo: Imaginário, 2001, p. 15.

[18] Corporate associations of artisans, merchants, artists that existed in the Middle Ages.

[19] Piotr Kropotkin. O Estado e seu Papel Histórico. São Paulo: Imaginário, 2000, p. 64.

development of sectors of the economy, scrapping debts, reformulating the system of import/export, subsidising products, generating revenue through the sale of products from state-owned enterprises etc. Assistance plans also have an important role as they increase the purchasing power of sectors of the population, moving and heating the capitalist economy. Also, the state creates laws aimed at guaranteeing the long-term accumulation of the capitalists and ensuring that the capitalists' thirst for profit does not put the system itself at risk.

In the course of the historical process it was noted that there is no way of sustaining a system based only on repression. The state, which sustained itself in this way for so many years, was gradually being modified, looking to guarantee the legitimacy of capitalism. A state that clearly defends the position of the capitalists could intensify class struggle and there is therefore nothing better, from the capitalists' point of view, than to give it an aspect of neutrality. Giving it the appearance of an independent – or even autonomous – organism in relation to the ruling class or to capitalism itself. Aiming always to calm the class struggle the state developed measures in favour of the exploited classes, since with better living conditions there would be less chance of radicalism. On the other hand, organised workers movements were able to impose measure on the state that would bring them benefits, even at the expense of the capitalists.

As with representative democracy, measures that improve conditions for workers always function, for the state, as an ideological tool to pass off this idea of neutrality, independence and autonomy. However, it should serve as a lesson to show that as the state has an obligation to guarantee this legitimacy, there is often space for organised workers to impose measures in their favour. It being necessary, therefore

> [...] to snatch from the government and capitalists all the improvements of the political and economic order such that they may make the conditions of struggle less difficult for us and increase the number of those who struggle consciously. It is necessary, therefore, to snatch them by means that prepare the way for the future and do not imply the recognition of the current order[20].

Nevertheless, one should bear in mind that the state, as a strong pillar of capitalism, seeks to sustain it and, if capitalism is a system of exploitation and domination, the state cannot do anything else but sustain the class relations that exist in its midst. In this way the state defends the capitalists to the detriment of the worker, who possessing only "their arms as wealth, has nothing to expect from the state; encountering in it but an organisation designed in order to impede their emancipation at whatever price"[21].

Any attempt to change the system carried out by the exploited classes is harshly repressed by the state. When ideology does not work, repression and control follow. As it has a monopoly on the use of violence in society, it always uses it to enforce the laws, and as laws were made in order that the privileges of capitalist society could be maintained, then repression and state control are always to sustain "order". That is, to maintain the privileges of capitalism and keep the ruling class in domination. At the slightest sign of the exploited classes that signifies a threat, the state brutally represses; always aiming at the continuation of the system, which has violence as one of its central pillars.

[20] Errico Malatesta. "'Idealismo' e 'Materialismo'". In: Anarquistas, Socialistas e Comunistas. São Paulo: Cortez, 1989, p. 141. Livro em processo de reedição pela editora Scherzo.

[21] Piotr Kropotkin. "A Decomposição dos Estados". In: Palavras de um Revoltado. São Paulo: Imaginário, 2005, p.

Contrary to what the authoritarian socialists believed (and still believe), the state is not a neutral organism that can work at the service of the capitalists or of the workers. If anarchists have written so much about the state it is justifiably because the critique of capitalism was consensus between libertarians and authoritarians – the divergence was around the state. The authoritarians supported the capture of the state and the dictatorship of the proletariat as an intermediate stage – which was falsely called socialism – between capitalism and communism. This "socialism" is a form of governing of the majority by the minority, "having the effect of consolidating, directly and inevitably, the political and economic privileges of the governing minority and the economic and political slavery of the popular masses"[22]. We hold that

> [...] no state, no matter how democratic their forms may be, not even the reddest political republic, popular only in the sense of the lie known under the name of representation of the people, is able to give to these what they need, that is, the free organisation of their own interests, from the bottom up, without any interference, guardianship or coercion from above, because every state, even the most republican and democratic, even pseudo-popular [...] is nothing else, in its essence, if not the governing of the masses from top to bottom with an intellectual, and therefore privileged minority saying it understands the true interests of the people, more than the people themselves[23].

The position of the libertarians, which we hold today, is that for the construction of socialism the state must be destroyed, together with capitalism, by means of the social revolution. This because "who says state necessarily says domination and, consequently, slavery; a state without slavery, declared or concealed, is inconceivable; this is why we are enemies of the state"[24]. The state thinks it understands the needs of the people better than the people themselves and supports a hierarchical form of management of society, constituting the means by which the class present in it exercises domination over the others; those that are not part of the state. Any state creates relations of domination, exploitation, violence, wars, massacres and torture under the pretext of protecting the "citizen", as well as subjugating

> the provinces and cities that comprise the state which, as natural groups, should enjoy full and complete autonomy. [These] will, on the contrary, be governed and administrated not by themselves, as befits the associated provinces and cities, but by central authority and as conquered populations[25].

In the same way as dictatorial socialism, representative democracy argues that it is possible to have change through the state. By delegating our right to do politics[26] to a class of politicians that

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[22] Mikhail Bakunin. Estatismo e Anarquia. São Paulo: Imaginário, 2003, p. 169.

[23] Ibidem. p. 47.

[24] Ibidem. p. 212.

[25] Pierre-Joseph Proudhon. "Crítica às Constituições". In : Proudhon. São Paulo: Ática, 1986, p. 87.

[26] The term "politics" used here, and which will be used many more times throughout this text, is understood as: "derived from the adjective originated from polis (Politik) which signifies all that which refers to the city, and consequently, what is urban, civil, public and even social and sociable". Norberto Bobbio et al. Dicionário de Política. Brasília: Editora UNB, 1993, p. 954. Therefore, we do not understand politics as that performed by means of repre-

enter the state in order to represent us we are giving a mandate, without any control, to someone that makes decisions for us: there is an inevitable division between the class that does politics and the classes that follow. At the outset, we can already affirm that representative democracy alienates politically, seeing as it separates the people from those who do politics on behalf of the people: councillors, deputies, senators, mayors, governors etc. The more that the politicians are responsible for politics, the less the people engage in politics and the more they remain alienated and distant from the making of decisions. This, obviously, condemns the people to a position of spectator and not that of "master of oneself", directly responsible for solving their own problems. "The emancipation of the proletariat [...]" therefore being "impossible in any state that may exist, and that the first condition of this emancipation is the destruction of all states"[27].

"Politicians" represent the hierarchy and separation between leaders and led, within and outside of their own parties. To be elected political parties must obtain numerical relevance in the vote, and for this need to elect a significant number of candidates. Politicians are then treated as a commodity to be sold on the "electoral market"; in order to grow, parties do anything – divert money, abandon programmes, make alliances with anyone etc. "Politicians" do not do politics based on popular will, but make decisions that favour the party and its own interests, going on to increasingly like the taste of power. After all, politicians and parties want to retain their positions and powers, which becomes and end in itself. Discussion of the important issues of society, which is already limited – seeing as though parliament and the state itself are pillars of capitalism and, therefore, do not allow for its roots to be modified – is not even touched upon, is never a priority; representative democracy being conservative, limiting even the little progresses that could occur. For this reason we must not delegate politics to

> people without any conviction, who turn coats between liberals and conservatives and are allowed to influence by promises, positions, flattery or panic – this small group of nonentities who, by giving or refusing their votes, decide all the questions of the country. It is they who make or shelve laws. It is they who support or drop the ministries and change the political direction[28].

This critique of the state is not linked to one or other form of state, but to all its forms. Therefore, any project of social transformation that points to the social revolution and libertarian socialism must have the end of capitalism as well as the state as an objective. Although we hold that the state is one of the strongest pillars of capitalism, we do not believe that with the end of capitalism the state would, necessarily, cease to exist.

Today we know that we should confuse ourselves neither with the context of the nineteenth century, which showed a divergence on the question of the state between socialists – and for this the great emphasis on writings on the subject – nor with the context of the Europe of that time. We know that the conditions in Brazil are specific and, if we can apply these critiques to the state today, we must know that our reality is particular and that the direction of the world economy has had profound influence over the form of state with which we live.

Finally, one thing is sure: capitalism and the state are, still today, the foundations of our society of domination and exploitation, constituting "for all the countries of the civilised world, a single

sentative democracy. "To do politics", in this case, means to effectively participate and decide on society's issues and, especially, on that which affects us. We work with the idea that there is politics outside of the electoral sphere.

[27] Mikhail Bakunin. Estatismo e Anarquia, p. 74.

[28] Piotr Kropotkin. "O Governo Representativo". In: Palavras de um Revoltado, p. 154.

universal problem"[29]. Therefore, our ideal is still "total and definitive emancipation [...] from economic exploitation and the yoke of the state"[30].

[29] Mikhail Bakunin. Estatismo e Anarquia, p. 73.
[30] Ibid.

Final Objectives: Social Revolution and Libertarian Socialism

> We carry a new world in our hearts.
>
> **Buenaventura Durruti**

> The political and social project of anarchism is a free and anti-authoritarian society that conserves freedom, equality and solidarity between all its members.
>
> **Nestor Makhno**

> But the universal revolution is the social revolution, it is the simultaneous revolution of the people of the fields and the cities.
>
> It is this that it is necessary to organise – because without preparatory organisation, the strongest elements are impotent and void.
>
> **Mikhail Bakunin**

Having drawn a brief diagnosis of the current society of domination and exploitation, we affirm two objectives that we understand as final: the social revolution[1] and libertarian socialism. The objective of the social revolution is to destroy the society of exploitation and domination. Libertarian socialism is that which gives constructive meaning to the social revolution. Together, the destruction – as a concept of negation – and the construction – as a concept of proposition – constitute the possible and effective social transformation we propose. "There is no revolution without profound and passionate destruction, salvaging and fruitful destruction, because from it, and only by it, are new worlds created and born."[2] However, destruction alone is not enough, since "no one can wish to destroy without having at least a remote idea, real or false, of the order of things that should, in their opinion, replace that which currently exists"[3].

The social revolution is one of the possible outcomes of the class struggle and consists of the violent alteration of the established social order, and is considered by us the only way to put an end to domination and exploitation. It differs from the political revolutions of the Jacobins and Leninists by supporting the alteration of the "order" not just with a political change, through the state, exchanging one directing minority for another. As we emphasised earlier the state, for us, is not a means for the emancipation of the exploited classes, nor should it be removed from the

[1] We work with the classic conception of social revolution, developed by Bakunin, which considers it a transformation of the economic, political and social aspects of society. When we distinguish it from the political revolution we seek, in the same way, a classic differentiation that treats the political revolution as a transformation that only occurs on a "political" level, through the state.

[2] Mikhail Bakunin. Statism and Anarchy, p. 52.

[3] Idem. "Protesta de la Alianza". In: Frank Mintz (org.). Bakunin: crítica y acción. Buenos Aires: Anarres, 2006, p. 33.

hands of the capitalists, through revolutionary means, by a supposed vanguard that claims to act on behalf of the proletariat. A political revolution such as the French Revolution or the Russian Revolution, which does not terminate the state in order to produce equality in its midst, becomes a bourgeois revolution and ends, "unfailingly, in a new exploitation, wiser and more hypocritical, perhaps, but that does not lessen the oppression of the proletariat by the bourgeoisie"[4].

Unlike political revolution, social revolution is accomplished by the people of the cities and countryside who bring the class struggle and its correlation of forces with capitalism and the state to the limit, by means of popular organisation. Social revolution occurs when the social force developed in the heart of the popular organisation is greater than that of capitalism and the state and, put into practice, implants structures that support self-management and federalism; wiping out private property and the state and giving rise to a society of complete freedom and equality. It is the social revolution that will bring popular emancipation, as repeatedly stated by Bakunin:

> It is precisely this old system of organisation by force that the social revolution must end, returning complete freedom to the masses, to the communes, to the associations, to individuals themselves and destroying, once and for all, the historical cause of all violence, domination and the very existence of the state [...] [The social revolution is] the abolition of all exploitation and political oppression, juridical or administrative and governmental, including the abolition of all classes by means of the economic levelling of all wealth [...].[5]

The social revolution is not a "grand night" on which the people revolt, spontaneously, and produce a new society. It is undeniable that the class struggle produces a series of uprisings or even insurrections, spontaneous events of great importance. However, if there is no intense and hard prior organisational work these episodes will pass, sometimes with gains for the exploited classes, but they will not manage to overthrow capitalism and the state, nor give body to a new society. The construction of the popular organisation will develop the spirit of struggle and organisation in the exploited classes, seeking the accumulation of social force and incorporating within it the means to struggle in accordance with the society that we wish to build. Thus, we do not understand the social revolution as simple evolution nor as an obligatory consequence of the contradictions of capitalism, but as an episode that marks the rupture and is determined by the will of the organised exploited classes.

We emphasise that in this revolutionary process it is necessary to use violence, because we do not believe that the expropriation of the capitalists or even the destruction of the state can be accomplished without the ruling class promoting violence. In fact, the system in which we live is already a system based on violence for its maintenance, and its exacerbation during revolutionary moments only justifies the use of violence on the part of revolutionaries, primarily as a response to the violence suffered in the past and present. "Violence is only justifiable when it is necessary in order to defend oneself or others against violence."[6] The ruling class will not accept the changes

[4] Idem. "Cartas a un francés". In: Frank Mintz (org.). Bakunin: crítica y acción, p. 22.

[5] Idem. "La Comuna de Paris y la Noción del Estado" and "Estatismo e Anarquía". In: Frank Mintz (org.). Bakunin: crítica y acción, pp. 22-23. There are Portuguese translations of the two texts, done by Plínio A. Coêlho. That of Estatismo e Anarquia, in the publication already cited, and that of "A Comuna de Paris e a Noção de Estado", in the publication: Mikhail Bakunin. O Princípio do Estado e Outros Ensaios. São Paulo: Hedra, 2008.

[6] Errico Malatesta. "A Violência e a Revolução". In: Anarquistas, Socialistas e Comunistas, p. 40.

imposed on it at the moment of the realisation of the social revolution. So it is necessary to know that, although we are neither promoters nor lovers of violence, it will be necessary for the blow that we intend to deliver against this whole system of domination and exploitation.

> Since revolution, by force of circumstance, is a violent act it tends to develop the spirit of violence rather than destroy it. But the revolution conducted as conceived by anarchists is the least violent possible; it seeks to stop all violence as soon as the need to oppose, by force, the material force of the government and the bourgeoisie ceases. The anarchist ideal is to have a society in which the violence factor would have completely disappeared and this ideal serves to halt, correct and destroy this spirit of violence that the revolution, as a material act, would have the tendency to develop.[7]

The violent action of the social revolution must, at the same time as the expropriation of the capitalists immediately destroy the state, giving place to self-managed and federated structures, tried and tested within the popular organisation. Therefore, the authoritarian conception of "socialism" as an interim period in which a dictatorship is established within the state is, for us, nothing but another way to continue the exploitation of the people and must be rejected absolutely, under any circumstance.

As the social revolution must not be made only by the anarchists, it is important that we be fully inserted in the processes of class struggle in order to be able to orient the revolution towards libertarian socialism. This is because the experiences of the revolutions of the twentieth century show us that if this does not happen, the authoritarians will decimate emancipatory experiences in order to occupy the state, ending the possibility of self-management and federalism, and constituting more tyrannical regimes than the previous ones. For this reason the revolution is a risk because, if the anarchists are not sufficiently inserted to be able to give it the desired direction, they will work in order that another regime of domination and exploitation be implanted. A culture of self-management and federalism should already be well developed in the class struggles so that the people, at the revolutionary moment, do not allow themselves to be oppressed by authoritarian opportunists; and this will be through class-based practices of autonomy, combativeness, direct action and direct democracy. The more these values exist in the popular organisation, the less will be the possibility for constituting new tyrannies.

As much as we reject completely the conception of Marxist "socialism", of dictatorship in the state, it is undeniable that there would be a post-revolutionary moment of adaptation towards libertarian socialism. This may still be a time of many conflicts, and so must rely on the specific anarchist organisations – which will only merge with the social organisations at a later period of the full development of libertarian socialism, when the threat of counter-revolution has passed and libertarian socialism is in full operation.

When we treat our conception of social revolution, or even when we think of a possible future society, we want to make clear that we do not seek to determine beforehand, absolutely, how the revolutionary process or even libertarian socialism will occur. We know that there is no way to predict when this transformation will take place, and therefore any reflections must always consider this aspect of strategic projection of future possibilities from the point of possibilities,

[7] Idem. "Uma Vez Mais Sobre Anarquismo e Comunismo". In: Anarquistas Socialistas e Comunistas, p. 70.

of references, and not of absolute certainties. The characteristics of the revolutionary process depend on when and where it occurs.

Thus, the reflections explicit here about the social revolution, and especially about libertarian socialism should not be understood as formulas or predictions of what will necessarily happen. We work with the possibilities that come with our theoretical expectations. However, if on the one hand we do not want to be too assertive, on the other we think discussions about the future society and the possible functioning of libertarian socialism are important. On this point, we believe that practical revolutionary experiences have much to teach us.

To advocate libertarian socialism as a proposed future society implies, for us, relating two inseparable concepts when it comes to a political project. On the one hand socialism, a system based on social, political and economic equality, and on the other hand, freedom. For us, "socialism without freedom is slavery and brutality"[8], a system that degenerates into authoritarian regimes, as we have known well throughout the twentieth century. At the same time, "freedom without socialism is privilege, injustice"[9], a way of continuing domination and exploitation in a society of class and authoritarian hierarchies. Therefore, a project for a future society that promotes equality and freedom can only be, for us, libertarian socialism, which takes shape in the practices of self-management and federalism.

Despite being terms that have arisen at different times[10], self-management and federalism are today necessarily linked and should be understood as complementary concepts. Self-management is a form of management, a model of organisation in which decisions are made by the workers themselves, to the extent by which they are affected by them either in their workplaces or the communities where they live. Federalism is a method of linking self-managed structures, enabling decision-making on a large scale. Contemporary interpretations of self-management and federalism separate the first as the economic and the second as the political system of libertarian socialism. We do not understand the separation between the economic and the political in this way when it comes to self-management and federalism.

The self-managed and federalist society of libertarian socialism has as one of its goals the alienation and ending of the relations of domination and exploitation of labour. The critique of work today, including by libertarians, is for us a critique of work within capitalism and not a critique of work as such. Under libertarian socialism free labour should be a means of liberation for workers who, through self-management, will bring back to themselves the wealth that they have been usurped of by capitalist private ownership. Thus, the socialisation of labour, of the products of labour, the means of production, the forms, rhythms and tempos of work would contribute to the creation of a model of work as the "intelligent action of men in society with the preconceived end of personal satisfaction"[11]. In the new society all those that are able to would need to work, there no longer being unemployment, and the work would be able to be performed in accordance with personal ability and disposition. People will no longer be obliged to accept

[8] Mikhail Bakunin. Federalismo, Socialismo e Antiteologismo. São Paulo: Cortez, 1988, p. 38.

[9] Ibidem.

[10] The term "federalism" has been used by anarchists since Proudhon, who formalised his theories about the subject in Do Princípio Federativo of 1863, and other books. Federalism marked the libertarian socialists of the twentieth century, primarily those that acted in the IWA. Do not confuse this libertarian federalism with statist federalism. The term "self-management" arose only a century later, in the 1960s to substitute others like self-government, self-administration, autonomy etc. Today, the two have different meanings, possessing a complementary meaning in economy and politics.

[11] Pierre-Joseph Proudhon. De la création de l'ordre dans l'humanité. In: A Nova Sociedade, p. 26.

anything under threat of experiencing want and not attaining their minimum living conditions. Children, the elderly and those unable to work will be assured a dignified life without depravation, all their needs being met. For the most tedious tasks or those perceived as unpleasant, in some cases, there could be rotations or alternations. Even in the case of the carrying out of production, where the co-ordination of some specialists is needed, rotations in function and a commitment to the training of other workers with similar skills will also be necessary for more complex tasks.

Under libertarian socialism, it will no longer be possible to have power or higher remuneration by reason of being the owner of one or more means of production. This is because private property would have been abolished, giving place to the collective ownership of the means of production, which can be thought of in two ways: 1.) no one would effectively be the owner and the means of production belong to the collectivity as a whole, or 2.) all the members of the collectivity will be owners of a portion of the means of production, in exactly the same proportions as the others. "The means of production being the collective work of humanity, they have to go back to the human collectivity from which they came."[12] In a system of collective ownership; rights, responsibilities, wages and wealth no longer have a relation with private property and the old class relations, based on private property, must also disappear. Libertarian socialism is, therefore, a classless society. The ruling class will no longer exist and the whole system of inequality, domination and exploitation will have disappeared.

In the cities there are different types of workers. Firstly, there are those that perform activities with simple tools, with almost no division of labour in which production can be performed, often, by just one worker. For this type of worker collective work is not a necessity, but it is desirable since it saves time and labour, besides helping a worker to enhance themselves with the skills of others. Then, there are other workers who perform their activities collectively, with relatively simple tools and machines in small companies or factories. Finally, a third category of workers of large companies and industries in which the division of labour is enormous, structured to produce on a large scale with high technology and large capital investments. For the latter two categories collective work is absolutely necessary due to the nature of the work itself, since all the technology, machinery and tooling must be collective. Thus,

> every workshop, every factory will therefore organise itself into an association of workers, which will be free for them to organise in the way they see fit, provided individual rights are guaranteed and that the principles of equality and justice are put into practice. […] Wherever an industry needs complex equipment and collective labour, ownership should also be collective.[13]

In the country there could be two situations: that of peasants that have worked on large properties that must be collectivised in the same way as the large companies and factories; and that of peasants that would prefer to have their own slice of the land and cultivate it themselves. In this mixed economy,

> […] the main purpose of the revolution was achieved: the land has become the property of those that work it and peasants no longer work for the profit of an exploiter

[12] Piotr Kropotkin. "As Nossas Riquezas". In: A Conquista do Pão, p. 30.

[13] James Guillaume. "Ideas on Social Organization". In: Daniel Guérin. No Gods, No Masters. San Francisco: AK Press, 1998, p. 213.

> that lives from their suffering. With this great victory obtained the rest is of secondary importance. The peasants can, if they choose, divide the land into individual parcels and give a portion to each family. Or they could instead institute common ownership and the co-operative cultivation of the land.[14]

It is important to mention that we do not consider state ownership as collective. For us, collective ownership is self-managed by the people, and not managed by the state which, when it centralises ownership – as in the case of the USSR, for example – does nothing more than become a state employer that continues to exploit workers. But in the case of the persistence of the individual property of the peasants, of those that work the land themselves, it would be more appropriate to understand this situation not as property, but as possession. Thus, property would always be collective, and possession individual. Possession because the value of the land would be in its use, and not trade. And relations with this would be guided by the needs of the producer and no longer that of the market. Such a situation alters everything, so it is necessary to establish a new category.

There is still a fundamental question that should complement the end of private ownership on the path to equality, and that is the end of inheritance with the goal of preventing any kind of accumulation that has consequences on the starting point early on in one's life. So, true equality is a goal, since

> while inheritance exists there will be hereditary economic inequality; not the natural inequality of individuals but the artificial inequality of classes, and this will always be necessarily translated into the hereditary inequality of development and of the culture of the *intelligencia*, and will continue to be the source of the consecration of all political and social inequalities.[15]

The economy of libertarian socialism is conducted by workers and consumers. The workers create the social product and the consumers enjoy it. In these two functions, mediated by distribution, the people are responsible for economic and political life, having to decide what to produce, and the consumers what to consume. The local structures of libertarian socialism in which workers and consumers organise themselves are the workers' and consumers' councils.

Councils are social bodies, vehicles through which the people express their political and economic preferences and exercise self-management and federalism. In them daily political and economic activities are decided and carried out.

Each workplace will be able to be managed by a workers' council in which all workers have the same rights, the same responsibilities and decide its management equally, since there is no hierarchy. If necessary smaller councils could be formed by staff, teams, small divisions or even larger councils for big divisions, work locations or industries. In these councils the workers and others involved in the production process make all the decisions.

Consumers can organise themselves into consumers' councils that occur within the communities. Thus individuals are organised in families, these into block and then neighbourhood committees, and so on. These councils would be responsible for pointing out to the producers what

[14] Ibidem. p. 210.

[15] Mikhail Bakunin. Federalismo, Socialismo e Antiteologismo, p. 37.

they would like to consume, as we believe that it is need that must guide production, and not vice versa.

The workers' council organises production and the consumers' council organises consumption. Obviously, this explanation aims to be instructive on the reality and problems that are likely to mobilise the future self-managed society; but, once in this new context, the consumers will also be the workers themselves, and the task of the councils will therefore occur more easily, since profit will no longer be the imperative in the relations of production.

Under libertarian socialism the workers' councils might still not have eliminated the separation between manual and intellectual work, and this should be done as soon as possible. The argument which holds that both manual and intellectual work are important, and that, therefore, they should be equally recognised and rewarded is not true. Many tasks, primarily those involving manual labour are completely unpleasant, harsh and alienating, and it is not fair that some workers are fully occupied with them, while others are dedicated to performing enjoyable, pleasurable, stimulating and intellectual tasks. If this happens then certainly the class system will be rebuilt, no longer based on private property, but on a class of intellectuals that will command, and another of manual workers that will execute the commands.

Seeking to end this separation the workers' councils could have a balanced set of tasks for each worker, which would be equivalent for all. Thus, each worker will be responsible for some pleasant and stimulating tasks, that involve intellectual work, and other harsher and more alienating tasks, that involve manual labour. This does not mean that everyone will be doing everything at the same time, but that everyone performs a set of tasks that, when compared, have the same level of intellectual and manual labour. In practice this process would function, for example, with a worker in a school that performs the task of a teacher for some of the time, but also that of the cleaner. Or someone that works in industrial research part of the time, and the rest of the time helping with the manual labour of production. Another person could work the whole time in a job that involves some manual and intellectual activities.

Obviously the scheme is simplified, but the idea is that all the workers of each council have the same level of manual and intellectual work, according to a ratio of time devoted to the execution of tasks and the level of these tasks (manual and intellectual labour). It is important that the councils also have between them equivalent levels of manual and intellectual work, so that a worker from one council has a balanced set of tasks similar to that of another. If eventually there are only manual tasks in a given council, then the worker must work in more than one council.

That is, both internally as well as between the councils one should seek an equivalent level of manual and intellectual labour in the set performed by each worker, which may have one, two or many other tasks. This would obviously mean a decline in productivity, but we shall see later how other elements of the future society would compensate for this.

> The goal is not to eliminate the division of labour, but to ensure that people should take responsibility for a sensible sequence of tasks for which, most of the time, they have been properly trained and that no one enjoys constant benefits, in terms of effects of the training for their work. [...] Everyone has a set of tasks that together make up their job, so that the full implication of the entire set of tasks is, on average,

[16] Michael Albert. PARECON. London: Verso, 2003, pp. 104-106. For a discussion on complex balanced tasks see this book pp. 103-111.

> like all the implications for the enabling of all other works. [...] Every worker has a job. Every job has many tasks. The tasks are adjusted to the workers and vice versa.[16]

The goal in libertarian socialist remuneration is that it be guided by the communist principle "from each according to their ability, to each according to their need". However, we understand that to implement this principle libertarian socialism should already be in full function, with production in abundance. Until this is possible, remuneration can be done according to work, or effort – this being understood as personal sacrifice for the collective benefit. Remuneration by labour or effort would mean that everyone that has a balanced set of tasks would receive the same and could choose how to spend it. Some would prefer to acquire a thing or two, others would prefer to invest in leisure, free time, less stressful work etc. A model that is closer to the classic collectivism advocated by the federalists who worked in the IWA of the nineteenth century.

For us, therefore, it would be a case of functioning collectivism, using the maxim "from each according to their ability, to each according to their labour", and, at the moment in which it becomes possible apply the communist principle, giving "to each according to their need". In fact this "becomes a secondary issue, since the question of property has been resolved and there are no longer capitalists that appropriate the labour of the masses"[17].

The market would be abolished and in its place put the self-managed planning system, with pricing being done between the workers' and consumers' councils, along with their federations and associations which would facilitate this interaction. This planning model differs from the authoritarian form where states plan the economies in the "socialist" countries. It would enable the workers and consumers themselves to decide completely on distribution, wiping out the problem of competition.

For all this to work we believe the role played by technology to be fundamental. Unlike some libertarian tendencies which believe that technology contains in itself the germ of domination, we believe that without it there is no possibility for the development of libertarian socialism. With the advent of technology and it being used in favour of labour, not capital, there would surely be a gain in productivity and consequently a significant reduction in the labour time of people, who could use this time for other activities. These technologies could also be regarded as "the marvellous application of science in production, [...] whose mission it is to emancipate the worker, relieving human labour [and constituting] a progress of which civilised man is justly proud"[18]. Obviously, we understand that there are good and bad technologies and that, therefore, society

> need not reject advanced technologies on a large scale, but shift them, really necessitating further development of technology [in agreement] with ecological principles, which will contribute to a new harmonisation of society and the natural world.[19]

This concern with using technology that is in accordance with the environment should be considered in all spheres of the future society, meeting the demands of a social ecology.

To defend this ecological consciousness does not mean that human beings would be constrained by a system of natural laws, since man is part of nature and as such should not be

[17] James Guillaume. Op. Cit. p. 211.

[18] Mikhail Bakunin. Federalismo, Socialismo e Antiteologismo, p. 18.

[19] Murray Bookchin. "Um Manifesto Ecológico: o poder de destruir, o poder de criar". In: Letra Livre 31, p. 8.

subjected to it. Obviously we also do not hold that the relationship of domination between human beings and nature should continue. On the contrary, it must cease as soon as possible and give way to an egalitarian relationship between humans and nature.

Ecological consciousness should be developed from the time of struggles that precede the revolutionary rupture and in the future society itself, based on the relations of mutual aid theorised by Kropotkin. This development could have as a principle reference the premise that we, human beings, are an integral part of nature "which becomes consciousness of itself", as Reclus put it.

Human beings differ from other natural elements and other species by establishing social relations with everything surrounding them, because they possess the capacity to think about themselves, to make theories about reality, and with these aptitudes have managed to drastically modify the environmental setting that is their surroundings. In this way the capitalist system, by the very reason of its existence, means that the capitalists exploit natural resources in a way in which these cannot regenerate themselves at their natural rate. In the future society this will no longer be able to happen. The development of human beings brought about by libertarian socialism should stress the importance of the relations of mutual aid between species and nature.

It is worth emphasising that our ecological proposals differ radically from "conservationism" and "primitivism". From the former, because this means the maintenance of class society and the complete commodification of nature. From the latter, because we consider the "anti-civilisation" proposal a complete absurdity, seeking a romantic return to a distant past or, even worse, a kind of suicide of all humanity and a negation of all our contributions to the maintenance and well-being of nature.

We believe that a society that completely respects the principles of social ecology will only be possible at the moment in which capitalism and the state give way to libertarian socialism. Therefore, with libertarian socialism we hope to harmonise society and the environment again, considering that "if we were not capable of founding an ecological society it is, besides the disastrous consequences that would result therefrom, our moral legitimacy that would be at stake"[20].

With the use of technology in favour of workers and its development; with the end of capitalist exploitation and the fruits of labour going completely to the workers; with full employment in place workers will have more time that could be spent in three ways. First, with the natural loss of productivity that the balanced set of tasks will cause, seeing that it will "de-specialise" labour a bit. Second, with political decisions, which will demand time for discussions and deliberations that would have to be made in the self-managed workplace and community. Finally, with the remaining time – and we think that with these changes time off will be much greater than that of today – everyone will be able to choose what to do: rest, leisure, education, culture etc.

Decisions under self-management do not have to obey a specific model. The workers' and consumers' councils can choose the best application of direct democracy, horizontal discussions and deliberations being fundamental, with the clear exposition of ideas and the discussion of questions presented. Clearly, consensus should not be used in the majority of decisions, since it is very inefficient – especially if we think about decisions on a large scale – besides giving a lot of power to isolated agents that could block consensus or have a lot of impact on a decision in which they are a minority. Questions can be decided on by vote, after due debate, it being variable as to whether who wins is who has 50% +1 of the votes, or if who wins is who has 2/3

[20] Idem. Sociobiologia ou Ecologia Social? Rio de Janeiro: Achiamé, s/d, p. 71.

of the votes, and so on. We must bear in mind that the decision-making process is a means and not an end in itself and, therefore, we also have to concern ourselves with agility in this process.

In the decision-making process self-management and federalism imply direct democracy with the participation of everyone, collective decisions, delegation with imperative mandate, rotation and recallability of functions, access to information and equal decision-making power. Both worker and consumer councils would use self-management as a form of management and decision-making, both in the workplaces and in the communities. Federalism would link both labour as well as the communities, allowing for decisions to be made on a large scale. "Federation, from the Latin foedus, genitive foederis, means pact, contract, treaty, convention, alliance"[21], in which those that are organised "are equally bound to one another for one or more particular objective, the burden of which falls specifically and exclusively on the delegates of the federation"[22].

The linkages within federalism would permit decision-making on a large scale, from the smallest instances of self-management to the most extensive. In the work environment federalism would link units, small divisions, large divisions, workplaces or even entire industries. In the communities federalism would link families, neighbours, blocks, neighbourhoods, cities, regions or even countries. These linkages would be performed by delegates that would articulate and discuss the positions deliberated in the councils. Delegates that would have imperative mandates, that is, they would represent the collective positions of the councils and not their own positions, as occurs under representative democracy. In addition, the delegates' mandates would not be fixed and would be revocable at any time. Since "the federalist system is the opposite of hierarchy or administrative and governmental centralism"[23], we believe that it would be responsible for the structure that would replace the state and through which, together with the self-managed councils, politics would take place under libertarian socialism. The councils, as voluntary associations,

> would take on an even greater extent in order to replace the state and all its functions. They would represent an interwoven network, composed of an infinite variety of groups and federations of all sizes and levels, local, regional, national and international, temporary or more-or-less permanent – for all possible purposes: production, consumption and exchange, communications, sanitation, education, mutual protection, defence of the region and so on; and, on the other hand, for the satisfaction of a number of increasingly scientific, artistic, literary and social needs.[24]

In this way the state and representative democracy would depart and self-management and federalism would take their place; and politics would take its proper place, which is in the midst of the people, there no longer being the separation between those that do politics and those that don't – since under libertarian socialism it would be the members of society themselves that would realise politics on a daily basis.

Consciousness should accompany the pace of growth of struggles and be stimulated by pedagogic processes whenever possible. Besides not believing that in order to make the revolution all

[21] Pierre-Joseph Proudhon. Do Princípio Federativo. São Paulo: Imaginário, 2001, p. 90.
[22] Ibidem.
[23] Ibidem. p. 91.
[24] Piotr Kropotkin. "Anarchism". In: The Encyclopaedia Britannica.

the people must be educated we recognise that, at the moment of the social revolution, the higher the level of consciousness of the people, the better. Increasingly, society should develop its culture in a libertarian direction and this should not only happen at the moment of the social revolution and after it; but already at the moment of struggle, of the construction and the development of the popular organisation. It is undeniable that ideology, already transformed into the culture that capitalism has introduced into popular imagination, will have to be undone bit-by-bit and this will occur through a long process of popular education. Positions such as racial and gender prejudice, patriarchy, individualism etc. will have to be combated as much as possible, both in the processes of struggle as well as at the moment of social revolution or even afterwards. Under libertarian socialism we understand that self-management and federalism will have to contribute to this process in practice. Besides this, one should invest heavily in educational and cultural activities for the whole of society, stimulating "teaching [that] should be equal in all ways for everyone; and consequently must be integral"[25], providing theoretical and practical knowledge for children and adults of both sexes.

Thus, we believe that the system of domination and exploitation of the state and capitalism will have been ended – no longer will anyone accumulate power thanks to the social force obtained by the exploitation of other people – and the new system will support itself on the pillars of social, political and economic equality and freedom. An equality that will occur with the establishment of collective ownership, self-managed councils, balanced sets of tasks, equal pay, self-managed planning, collective decisions, and the constant struggle against prejudice and discrimination. Freedom both in relation to the system of domination and exploitation, as well as in relation to what we wish to attain. A freedom that will be collective, considering each one free to the extent that all others are free; "freedom that consists of the full development of all material, intellectual and moral potential that is found in a state of latent faculty in everyone"[26]. Libertarian socialism will bring a luxury ignored by everyone: "the luxury of humanity, the happiness of the full development and freedom of each one in the equality of all"[27].

[25] Mikhail Bakunin. A Instrução Integral, p. 78.

[26] Idem. "A Comuna de Paris e a Noção de Estado". In: O Princípio do Estado e Outros Ensaios, pp. 114-115.

[27] Idem. "Moral Revolucionária". In: Conceito de Liberdade. Porto: Rés Editorial, s/d, p. 203.

Organisation and Social Force

> [...] ten, twenty or thirty men, understanding well, being well-organised and who know where they are going, will easily carry one hundred, two hundred or even more.
>
> **Mikhail Bakunin**

Previously we dealt with that which we understand as the organisation of capitalism and the state, seeking to map out "where we are"; and the organisation of libertarian socialism, trying to specify "where we want to reach". To complete the discussion on organisation it will be necessary to expand a bit on social movements and the popular organisation, as well as on the specific anarchist organisation; two different levels of action that will seek to answer [the question], "how do we think we can leave where we are and arrive where we want to be", completing indispensable elements for our permanent strategy. As Malatesta nicely summarised, "[...] organisation in general as the principle and condition of social life, today, and in the future society; organisation of the anarchist party and organisation of popular forces"[1].

For us, the social transformation we want to take place passes, necessarily, through the construction of the popular organisation, through the progressive increase in its social force until the moment at which it would be possible to overthrow capitalism and the state with social revolution and open the way to libertarian socialism. Furthermore, we argue that the popular organisation must be accompanied by a parallel development of the specific anarchist organisation, which should influence it, giving to it the desired character. Going forward we will have further discussions on each of these and on the interaction between one another. At the moment, what is essential is for us to assume that there is no way of thinking about this necessary transformation without organisation and the progressive growth of social force.

We understand today's society as the result of a relationship of forces, or even a permanent conflict – which takes the form of class struggle – between capitalism, the state and other diverse political forces; and that the former are strengthened, that is, manage to have a greater social force than the latter and, thus, establish power. In this sense capitalism and the state exert oppression over other political forces that constitute resistance to them.

This resistance can occur in different ways, some constituting greater or smaller political forces, and others not constituting political forces. "Resistance can be passive (when the agent has no action against the power that represses them) or active (when the power suffers retaliations on the part of the subjugated); isolated (it has an individual character) or articulated (collective force)"[2]. Passive resistance does not constitute a political force and isolated resistance possesses little social force. Therefore, in order to attain our objectives we advocate active and articulated

[1] Errico Malatesta. "A Organização I". In: Escritos Revolucionários. São Paulo, Imaginário, 2000, p. 49. For Malatesta anarchist party is the same thing as the specific anarchist organisation.

[2] Fabio López López. Poder e Domínio: uma visão anarquista, p. 75.

resistance which seeks in organisation the permanent increase of social force. For the construction of this resistance it is necessary to align with those that are in agreement with our proposal for social transformation.

> If we want to move forward, if we want to do something more than that which permanently isolates each one of us, we must know with which particular comrades we can be in agreement, and with which we disagree. This is especially necessary when we speak of action, of movement, of methods with which it is necessary to work with many hands in order to be able to obtain some results that go in our direction[3].

What we can today call "order" or status-quo is the organisation of capitalism and the state, which may or may not consider other political forces that provide a threat. To be disorganised, poorly organised or isolated means not to constitute an adequate resistance to capitalism and the state and, consequently, not managing to significantly increase the social force of the organisation that must have as an objective to replace them with libertarian socialism. We can say that "whoever doesn't organise themselves, who doesn't seek the co-operation of others and does not offer theirs under conditions of reciprocity and solidarity, puts themselves necessarily in a state of inferiority and remains an unconscious gear in the social mechanism that others operate in their way, and to their advantage"[4]. Disorganisation, poor organisation and isolation, in fact, end up supporting capitalism and the state – seeing as though they do not allow for the construction of the necessary social force. By not taking part, in an appropriate manner, in the relation of force or the permanent conflict of society you end up reproducing "order". Thus, "if we do not seek well articulated organisation and association we will end up not managing to exercise any influence in struggles, and consequently in today's society"[5]. Thus,

> those that do not have the means or sufficiently developed consciousness to organise themselves freely with those who have interests and sentiments in common, suffer the organisation built by other individuals, generally constituted into a ruling class or group in order to exploit, for their own benefit, the labour of others. And the age-old oppression of the masses by a small number of privileged people has always been the consequence of the inability of most individuals to put themselves in agreement and organise themselves with other workers for the production, enjoyment and eventual defence against those that want to exploit and oppress them. [...] To remain isolated, each one acting or wanting to act on their own, without understanding with others, without preparation, without uniting the weak forces of individuals into a powerful bunch means to condemn oneself to impotence, wasting one's own energy on small acts without efficiency and rapidly losing faith in the objective and falling into complete inaction[6].

[3] Luigi Fabbri. "A Organização Anarquista". In: Anarco-Comunismo Italiano. São Paulo, Luta Libertária, s/d, p. 109.

[4] Errico Malatesta. "A Organização das Massas Operárias Contra o Governo e os Patrões". In: Escritos Revolucionários, p. 39.

[5] FARJ. "A Propriedade é um Roubo". In: Protesta! 4, p. 7.

[6] Errico Malatesta. "La Organización". Exert from Pensiero e Volontà, 16 of May, 1925. In: Vernon Richards. Op. Cit. pp. 83-85.

Disorganisation and poor organisation are reproduced on the social level – of social movements, in which one should build and develop the popular organisation – with the difficulty of accumulating social force, causing the natural spontaneity of this level not to manage to carry out the set of desired social transformations. At the political level – of anarchism, in which one should develop the specific anarchist organisation – with the difficulty of influencing the social level to have adequate ways and means. Isolation and individualism causes that neither the political nor social levels exist in a desirable manner, articulating neither the popular nor anarchist organisation. Besides this disorganisation, poor organisation and isolation are hindering factors for the establishment of libertarian socialism, as we believe that it can only be built with a lot of organisation.

Organisation means the co-ordination of forces, or "association with a common objective and with the necessary ways and means to achieve this objective"[7]. In this way, we must think of ways and means for the popular organisation such that it can overthrow capitalism and the state, and, by means of the social revolution build libertarian socialism – its objective. At the same time, we must think of ways and means for the specific anarchist organisation such that this can build the popular organisation and influence it, giving to it the desired character and arriving at libertarian socialism by means of the social revolution – its objective. Next we discuss in more detail these two levels of organisation. Firstly we we will discuss the social level, in which social movements operate and in which we must seek to build the popular organisation. Then the political level and the development of the specific anarchist organisation.

When we speak about social force it is important for us to define what we understand by this term. We believe that every individual, as the social agent that they are, naturally possesses a social force that is the energy that can be applied in order to achieve their objectives. This force varies from one person to another and even in the same person over a period of time. To achieve their objectives, individuals frequently make use of instruments that can increase their social force. Many things can be used to increase social force, such as: weapons, information, training, adequate techniques, resource optimisation, persuasion, machines etc. However, the most important instrument for this is organisation; which can happen in an authoritarian way, by means of domination, or in a libertarian way, by means of free association.

In an authoritarian organisation the social force of diverse agents (for example in the state with an army, or in a company with salaried labour) is alienated, putting them in a position of domination in relation to the organisation (in these cases the state and the boss), and causing them to contribute to an alien objective, different to their own. This is exactly how the social force of the current system is constituted today, that is, by means of the alienation of diverse agents that contribute to the goals of capitalism, which are not the same as theirs. In a libertarian organisation it is free association, or anti-authoritarian organisation, that produces the increase of social force – it always being associated with other instruments.

Organisation that takes the form of free association is indispensable to our project of social transformation because, when individuals work together, their social force is not simply the sum of individual forces, but much more than this. We look at the example of Proudhon in order to explain the matter. "Two hundred workers set the obelisk of Luxor on its base in a few hours; do you suppose that one man could have accomplished the same task in two hundred days?[8].

[7] Idem. "A Organização I". In: Escritos Revolucionários, p. 51.

[8] Pierre-Joseph Proudhon. "1ere. Memoire sur la Proprieté". In: A Nova Sociedade, p. 35.

Certainly not, because there is an "immense strength that results from the union and harmony of workers, of the convergence and concurrence of their efforts"[9]. In the example above the organisation of the workers gave them a collective force, enabling a greater result than the simple sum of individual results. Thus, we can conclude that to be able to carry out our project of social transformation association is fundamental because it is through it, and only through it, that we will be able to accumulate the social force necessary to overthrow capitalism and the state.

However, for the necessary permanent gain in social force that must occur in this anti-authoritarian form of organisation, both at the level of popular organisation as well as at the level of the anarchist organisation, we recognise to be fundamental

> [...] a certain discipline, not automatic, but voluntary and reflected, being perfectly in accord with the freedom of individuals, was and will be necessary whenever many individuals, freely united, undertake a collective job or action. This discipline is no more than the voluntary and reflected agreement of all individual efforts towards a common end. At the moment of action, in the midst of struggle, roles are divided naturally according to the aptitudes of each one, appreciated and judged by the whole collective: some direct and order, others execute orders. But no function is petrified, neither is it fixed nor irrevocably linked to any person. Levels and hierarchical promotion do not exist, such that the commander of yesterday may be the subordinate of today. No one is elevated above the others, or, if they are elevated, it is only to fall in the next instant, as waves in the sea, always returning to a healthy level of equality[10].

Obviously this discipline must not "follow the authoritarian model, both in the oppression of members [...] as well as by way [of] charges, that [...] should also consider respect and ethics. [...] It is a great concern for us to differentiate the self-discipline that we promote here from military discipline, exploitative and oppressive in essence and that, from our point of view, does not follow different paths to other authoritarianisms that we know well"[11]. In order to differentiate the discipline much preached by the authoritarians from the discipline that we advocate, we choose to use the term self-discipline, affirming that "self-discipline is the motor of the self-managed organisation"[12]; it being for us, together with commitment and responsibility, indispensable for the construction of an anti-authoritarian organisation that aims to increase its social force. This self-discipline, in our view, is less in the popular organisation and greater in the specific anarchist organisation, varying according to the context. In periods of greater social turbulence the need for this self-discipline increases. In times of ebb, it can be smaller.

For us, as we have emphasised, the objective of the popular organisation as a form of active and articulated resistance is, progressively increasingly its social force, "to overthrow capitalism and the state and, by means of the social revolution, to build libertarian socialism". This increase of social force can be achieved with various instruments, but primarily the organisation of the exploited classes with the greatest number of people possible and a good level of organisation – which necessarily implies self-discipline, commitment and responsibility. Moreover, as we have

[9] Ibid.

[10] Mikhail Bakunin. "Táctica e Disciplina do Partido Revolucionário". In: Conceito de Liberdade, pp. 198-199.

[11] FARJ. "Reflexões Sobre o Comprometimento, a Responsabilidade e a Autodisciplina".

[12] Ibid.

also already defined, the objective of the specific anarchist organisation is “to build the popular organisation and influence it, giving to it the desired character, and to arrive at libertarian socialism by means of the social revolution”. For this the specific organisation must constitute itself as an organisation of active anarchist minority with a high level of self-discipline, commitment and responsibility. Conceived in this way, “organisation, far from creating authority, is the only remedy against it and the only means by which each one of us becomes accustomed to taking an active and conscious part in the collective work”[13].

[13] Errico Malatesta. ”A Organização II”. In: Escritos Revolucionários, p. 59.

Social Movements and the Popular Organisation

> It is the people themselves, the hungry, the dispossessed that have to abolish misery.
>
> **Ricardo Flores Magón**

> To organise the people's forces in order to realise the [social] revolution, is the only end for those who sincerely desire freedom.
>
> **Mikhail Bakunin**

> To favour popular organisations of all kinds is the logical consequence of our fundamental ideas and, thus, should be an integral part of our programme.
>
> **Errico Malatesta**

We have mentioned the popular organisation and our expectations in relation to it a few times before. We have already defined that its objective is "to overthrow capitalism and the state, and, by means of the social revolution, to build libertarian socialism", and by this we understand it as true protagonist in the process of social transformation. We also mentioned that the level at which social movements develop and in which we must seek to build and increase the social force of the popular organisation is what we call the social level. At this point we aim to discuss social movements, their desired characteristics and methods of action, as well as how they can contribute to the construction of the development of the popular organisation.

In dealing with this social level we must think of the possibilities of the people, who must be the grand agent of the social change we propose. It is undeniable that there is a latent social force in the exploited classes, but we understand that it is only through organisation that this force can leave the camp of possibilities and become a real social force. The question arises, then, as follows:

> It is true that there is [in the people] a great elementary force, a force that without any doubt is superior to [that of] the government, and to [that of] the ruling classes taken together; but without organisation an elementary force is not a real force. It is this indisputable advantage of organised force over the elementary force of the people on which is based the force of the state. Thus, the problem is not knowing whether they [the people] can rise up, but whether they are capable of building an organisation that gives them the means to arrive at a victorious end – not by a fortuitous victory, but a prolonged and final triumph.[1]

[1] Mikhail Bakunin. "Needs of the Organisation." In: Concept of Freedom, p.136.

Starting with organisation and its practical application in the field this force grows exponentially, offering a real chance to combat capitalism and the state. This because "we have with us justice, rights, but our strength is still not enough"[2]. As we said earlier, it will be the permanent increase of the social force of the organisation of the exploited classes that will be able to provide the desired social transformation.

For the construction of an organisation that gives us the means to reach the desired ends – social revolution and libertarian socialism – consolidating the victory, we advocate a model for the creation and development of what we call the popular organisation.

Firstly, we justify organisation conforming to what we have previously defined; it being the "co-ordination of forces or 'association with a common objective and with the necessary ways and means to achieve this objective'". We have also already said that organisation multiplies the social force of the people and it is only through it that we can offer an opposition capable of overthrowing capitalism and the state. This model of organisation that we assert is fruit of the free association of members of the exploited classes.

> By association they [the workers] instruct themselves, mutually inform one another and put an end, by their own efforts, to this fatal ignorance that is one of the principal causes of their slavery. By association they learn to help oneself, to know oneself, to help one another, and eventually to create a more formidable force than that of all the bourgeois capitalists and of all the political powers together.[3]

In second place, we justify this organisation as being popular, giving it a combative class struggle characteristic. In other words, the whole category of the exploited classes must be mobilised in this model of organisation, as defined above. The involvement of all the sectors that suffer in the harshest way the impacts of capitalism is, therefore, a priority. When the organisation has a class character this stimulates and empowers the class struggle. In this way the popular organisation is built from the bottom up, from the "periphery to the centre", and outside of the power centres of the current system.

The popular organisation is built by means of the will of the people's struggle. Thus it is not the fruit of a spontaneous movement, even while knowing that many expressions of the class struggle arise spontaneously. It is also necessary because we do not believe – differently to that which many socialists argued in the nineteenth century – that capitalist society is headed towards its own end, or that socialism is the result of a natural evolution of capitalism. It seems quite clear to us that we must think of an organisational model as a tool of struggle, for otherwise capitalism and the state will not cease to exist.

We understand the popular organisation as the result of a process of convergence of diverse social organisations and different grassroots movements, which are fruit of the class struggle. For this reason we believe that we should favour all kinds of organisations and movements of this type, understanding this support as the consequence of our most fundamental ideas. These organisations and movements were called "mass movements" in the past, but the authoritarian side of socialism ended up giving to the term "masses" the connotation of "mass of pawns", of a movement without consequence that should be directed and guided by a vanguard, which would

[2] Idem. The Dual Strike of Geneva. Sao Paulo: Imaninário/ Faísca, 2007, p. 94.

[3] Ibid. p. 90.

be organised in a verticalised party. That is, the authoritarians treated the mass movements from a hierarchical perspective, seeking to dominate them.

We consider social and popular participation in the process of social transformation essential. Mass movements can be called social organisations, popular movements, but also social movements – a term we will use going forward.

A social movement is an association of people and/ or of entities that have common interests in the defence or promotion of determined objectives before society. These movements can be in the most different places in society and have the most different banners of struggle, that show the needs of those around the movement, a common cause. As we have seen today's society provides the largest portion of society with a situation of suffering and of deprivation and this often serves as a factor of association, which gives body to the organisations that defend the interests of the people.

> Through the organisations founded for the defence of their interests workers acquire consciousness of the oppression in which they find themselves, and from the antagonism that divides them from the bosses [or from the ruling class] start to desire a better life, habituating themselves to collective struggle and solidarity and being able to win those improvements that are compatible with the persistence of the state and capitalist regime.[4]

Social movements are fruit of a tripod comprised of necessity, will and organisation. This tripod motivates the creation of diverse social movements around the world; and this is no different in Brazil. Here there are landless, homeless, unemployed and community movements, and movements for affordable and quality transport. There are movements of recyclable waste collectors, the indigenous, students, human rights, labour, feminists, blacks, gays, of popular councils, artistic, cultural, environmental, among others. These movements have in common the fact that they arose out of the domination and exploitation of the society in which we live; many of them being fruit of the class struggle.

However, there are not a lot of social movements that seek to build the popular organisation or even to combat capitalism and the state. Many of them are imbued with the characteristics and values of capitalist society and, more than that, often propagate these characteristics and values. The majority of these movements, which we could call reformist, believe that there is a solution to their questions under capitalism. That is, the end for a large part of these movements is the attainment of short term gains, within capitalism, and nothing more. Besides this, in the majority of cases, social movements are not properly articulated between themselves and each carry out their own struggle, without articulation between them. Therefore, they do not even point to the start of the construction of the popular organisation. This shows that although there are a number of social movements, the fact is that their characteristics and ways of acting are not, in large part, in accordance with that which we think to be appropriate. The means that are being chosen do not lead to the ends advocated by us.

The social movements that we defend, and which we think are contributing to our political project, share certain characteristics and ways of doing things.

[4] Errico Malatesta. "Los Anarquistas y los Movimientos Obreroa". Excerpt from Il Risveglio 1-15 out. 1927. In: Vernon Richards. Op. Cit. p. 111.

They are the strongest possible, with good organisation and the greatest number of people being focused on the struggle that they have decided as priority. So, a movement of the landless should encompass all those that are willing to struggle for land, a movement of the homeless must embrace all those that are willing to struggle for housing and so on. Thus, we believe that social movements should not fit and lock themselves within an ideology, whatever it may be. We do not believe in anarchist, Marxist or social-democratic social movements, or those of any other specific ideology. Therefore, people from the most diverse ideologies must "fit" in the social movements that we are prepared to create or develop. For us, an anarchist social movement, or one of any other ideology, would only tend to split the class of the exploited, or even those that are interested in struggling for a particular cause. That is, the force that must drive the creation and the development of social movements is necessity, and not ideology. So "no philosophical or political theory must enter as an essential basis, and as an official condition required in the programme [...]. But this does not imply that all political and philosophical issues [...] cannot and should not be freely discussed."[5]

Although we believe that social movements should not [be made to] fit within anarchism, we think that anarchism must, as far as possible, be spread within social movements. Going forward we will discuss how this should be done and with what objective. For now, suffice it to say that the social movements which we advocate are not and should not be anarchist, but, rather, are fertile ground for anarchism.

Similarly do we think of the question of religion. Although at the political level we have anti-clerical positions, we think that at the social level one should not insist on this issue, preventing members of the exploited classes that have religious beliefs from struggling. Many people in the exploited classes hold religious beliefs and it is possible to work with this question within the movements, without impeding these people from struggling. There are many progressive religious groups in the social movements, which are part of the broad camp of the left and with which there is a possibility to work. Social movements "must seek a common basis, a series of simple principles on which all workers, whatever may be [their political and religious choices], being at least serious workers, that is, severely exploited and suffered men, are and must be in agreement"[6].

Another important characteristic of social movements is autonomy, which occurs primarily in relation to the state, political parties, bureaucratic unions, the church, among others. Social movements have to make decisions and act on their own, dealing with their own affairs independent of organisms that exercise, or seek to exercise, domination over them. Therefore, those who want to lead, to order or to cause such that the social movements serve their own goals should not have influence over them, since they do not struggle for the collective good of the movements, but use the maxim that serving yourself is the best way to serve others.

Social movements should not be linked to politicians or to any sector of the state because we know that when they come wanting to help, in the vast majority of cases they are looking for a "base" for their party-political interests, or seeking to calm movements, establishing their

[5] Mikhail Bakunin. "Unity and Programme of the Revolutionary Forces ...".In: Conceito de Liberdade, p. 163.

[6] Idem. "La Política de la Internacional" In: Frank Mintz (ed.). Bakunin: crítica y acción, P. 85. Despite being a fierce critic of clerical issues, Bakunin argued that even religious workers should join the labour movement. We think, like him, that religion should not divide social movements. On Bakunin's critique of God and religion see: Mikhail Bakunin. God and the State. Sao Paulo: Imaginário, 2000, and Mikhail Bakunin. Federalism, Socialism and Anti-theologism.

dialogues with institutions of the state. Knowing well the authoritarian conception of parties we know that their interest is always to harness social movements, be they reformist or revolutionary parties. Firstly, they participate in elections and see social movements as a source of votes. Secondly, they seek a "mass movement" that serves as a base for the vanguard that they wish to be. In this case, political parties want to lead and direct the social movements, thinking themselves superior to them and judging [themselves] to be the enlightened that will bring consciousness to the exploited classes. Often their members are intellectuals that want to know, better than the people themselves, what is best for them. Other organisations that seek to control, such as churches and bureaucratic unions also do not help social movements.

> All these people should be removed from social movements because they do not defend the interests of the social movements, but their own interests. The social movement does not need bosses, leaders or people who want to use it. The social movement needs people who want to support it and struggle with it, but not struggle for it, in its place. It is a place that is legitimised by the need for survival and by the dignity that causes that promote true solidarity possess.[7]

What social movements need is people that want to support them, regardless of their class origins, because they consider their struggle just. There is no problem with people that support social movements not being in exactly the same conditions as the other militants. Thus, we consider it just that employed people support the struggle of unemployed workers, that people who have housing support the struggle of the homeless, and so on. Even people who come from the middle classes can and even should, if they are ethical people, approximate themselves to the most exploited sectors of the people and offer their support. This solidarity should always be well-received, since it is important for the social movements. An ethical duty, as Kropotkin put it, to incite the members of the middle classes to struggle alongside the people. He said:

> [...] All you that possess knowledge, talents, if you have heart, come, you and your companions, put them at the service of those most in need. And know that if you were to come, not as masters, but as comrades in struggle; not in order to govern, but to inspire yourselves in a new midst; less to teach than to conceive the aspirations of the masses, guessing and formulating them, and then working, tirelessly, continually, [...] to make them come into life – know that then, and only then, will you have lived a complete life.[8]

This candidature of support for social movements should be subject to the attitudes of those who intend to act in this situation. Both the supporters, as well as the militants that are organisationally legitimate must demonstrate that they are much more willing to listen than to speak. They must become aware of the situation and of the circumstances of those that form the social movements and struggle shoulder-to-shoulder, to grow with them and not to define in an authoritarian and vertical manner their ways and forms. In this case, the supporter or militant will see that the most relevant thing will be to contrast their ideology with the reality of the group and not to try to reduce the social movement to their ideological certainties.

[7] Universidade Popular. Capitalismo, Anticapitalism e Organização Popular. Rio de Janeiro: UP / MTD-RJ (in press).

[8] Peter Kropotkin. "Aos Jovens" In: Palavras de um Revoltado, p. 67.

Furthermore, when we talk of autonomy we must keep in mind that autonomy, for us, does not mean the absence of ideological struggle or even a lack of organisation. When you encourage "non-ideology", frequent spontaneity; when you renounce the project and the revolutionary programme – often calling this autonomy – you open spaces and leave open terrain for the ruling class, the bureaucrats and the authoritarians that will occupy these spaces.

Another important feature of social movements is their combativeness. By claiming that they must be combative we wish to say that social movements must establish their conquests by imposing their social force, and not depend on favours or good deeds from any sectors of society, including the state. Combativeness is also characterised by a posture of defence of class struggle outside the state. As we understand the state as a strong supporting pillar for capitalism, we do not believe that social movements are able to exercise their politics inside it without this signifying a way of legitimising capitalism. The approaches that states take towards social movements are always a way to co-opt them, to make a certain "social pact" aimed at calming the spirits of the class struggle with the objective of ensuring the legitimacy of the system. Independent of whether social movements are more or less violent, the fact is that they should always remain combative, confronting capitalism and the state itself.

We also support direct action as a form of political action as opposed to representative democracy. Social movements should not seek to trust in politicians who operate within the state to represent their interests. We know that the machinery of the representative system transforms all who enter it, not allowing – even with the well-intentioned – that elected politicians perform actions on behalf of the exploited classes. Even the "left" politicians confuse means with ends and they confuse, more than clarify, social movements; not being, therefore, the most correct means for their emancipation. Direct action happens when the social movement itself,

> in constant reaction against the current environment expects nothing of men, of powers or of forces external to it, but [...] creates its own conditions of struggle and draws from itself its means of action. [...] Therefore, direct action is the clear and pure concretisation of the spirit of revolt: it materialises the class struggle, which it causes to pass from the field of theory and abstraction to the field of practice and realisation. As a result, direct action is the class struggle lived in the day-to-day, it is the permanent assault against capitalism.[9]

In this way social movements do not entrust their action to politicians but perform it on their own accord, putting into practice the motto of the IWA that "the emancipation of the workers will be the task of the workers themselves." The struggle for this emancipation must be done strategically, making direct action more or less violent conforming to the demands of circumstance. When it needs to be violent it must always be understood as a response, as self-defence in relation to the system of domination and exploitation in which we live.

Direct action is a way of social movements doing politics as

> we affirm that politics, in the sense that we advocate it, does not have a partisan meaning but the sense of management of what is public, for everyone. Politics that is made by the people, properly organised, effectively deciding on everything that concerns them. The politics we advocate is that which stands today as a struggle of

[9] Emile Pouget. L'Action Directe.

> the workers, organised from the bottom up, against the exploitation and oppression of which we are victims. It is in social mobilisation that we see some prospect of significant political change in society.[10]

In this case, social movements do not fight in order to have power in the state or in their institutional structures of power. They are always organised outside the state, advocating the return of political power to the people. Thus, we believe that the problem is not who occupies the state, but the state itself.

And it is only in this way that we understand the concept of popular [people's] power advocated by other groups and organisations. If by popular power we understand the growing social force of the organisations of the exploited classes, which are embedded in an ongoing dispute with capitalism and the state, then we agree. However, there are those who defend popular power as the support of vanguards detached from the base, hierarchy, authoritarian parties, claims to the state and bureaucracies of various kinds. When popular power signifies this second model, then we are in complete disagreement.

In addition to direct action as a way of doing politics, social movements – in the way in which we understand them – have a necessity, in the event that they propose themselves as agents of significant social transformation, to use direct democracy as a method of decision-making. Direct democracy takes place in social movements when all those who are involved in them participate effectively in the process of decision-making. By using this method decisions are made in an egalitarian way (all have the same voice and the same voting power) in horizontal assemblies, where the issues are discussed and deliberated. There are not people or groups that discuss and deliberate the issues outside of the assemblies; there is no hierarchy or bosses who order and others who obey.

Direct democracy exercised in this way can be compared to the functioning of libertarian socialism as explained earlier. In other words, social movements are co-ordinated internally by the principles of self-management and are joined, in cases of necessity, through federalism. It is important to note that, acting in this way, we are incorporating into our means of struggle positions held for the purposes we want to achieve, confirming the maxim that "the ends are in the means." Even the leaders and assumed functions are temporary, rotating and recallable.

In this model of social movement there is a necessity for militant conduct with ethics and responsibility. Ethics, which guides correct militant conduct, is grounded on principles that are opposed to capitalism and the state and which supports co-operation, solidarity and mutual aid. It also guides militant behaviour which operates without harming others, which encourages support, not allowing postures aimed at division or unfair infighting. Responsibility, a principle that opposes the values of capitalism, encourages the militant of the social movements to have initiative, that they assume responsibilities and fulfil them – this will prevent that a few are overloaded with many tasks – that they have attitudes consistent with the fighting spirit and that they contribute in the best way to the social movements.

Solidarity and mutual aid are also principles that should be encouraged in social movements. In opposition to the individualism of capitalism the unity of the exploited classes, in order to combat capitalism and the state, should be encouraged. On leaving isolation and seeking to associate oneself, to join with other people who want to build a more just and egalitarian world,

[10] FARJ. "A Política não é para os Políticos" In: Libera 136. Rio de Janeiro, 2006.

people build class solidarity. This occurs through the association of one person with another to form a social movement, or even of one social movement to another in pursuit of building the popular organisation and the overcoming of capitalism and the state. In this case the limits of the state should not be recognised as social movements should show solidarity by class interests, not national interests. When they are guided by the interests of class, social movements are internationalist.

Also, social movements constitute a preferred space for the development of culture and popular education. It is culture, as a way of being and living of the exploited classes, which will give body to popular education. All who are mobilised develop their learning and new forms, manifestations, languages and experiences translate the spirit of struggle. As there is no complete knowledge it is the process of exchange between the militants which allows for this education, in which there is no teacher and student; all are teachers and students. Everyone learns and everyone teaches. In this way occurs the construction of an education that respects people's culture and empowers militants through dialogues, debates, exchanges of experiences. In this process it is possible to compare the values of capitalism that are transmitted every day by the media, schools and other means of reproduction.

Moreover, the very "revolutionary gymnasium" provided by the experiences of struggle, at the same time as it will bring short-term gains will be responsible for assisting in this educational process, contributing with the practical experiences of seeking freedom through freedom itself.

The short-term gains, so-called reforms, when conquered by social movements will serve as ways to lessen the suffering of those who struggle and at the same time will teach the lessons of organisation and struggle. We understand, therefore, that "we will take or conquer eventual reforms in the same spirit as that which starts to take from the enemy bit-by-bit the ground he occupies, to advance ever more"[11]. And we believe that in struggling for reforms, social movements do not become reformists – those who understand the reforms as an end. Even with the struggle for reforms they can sustain a revolutionary practice and be against reformism, since "if we are against reformism, it is not because partial improvements do not interest us, but because we believe that reformism is not only an obstacle to the revolution, but even to the reforms "[12].

This statement leaves room for another key feature that we believe fundamental in social movements: revolutionary long-term perspective. In this case the idea is that social movements, besides having their specific banners (land, housing, work, etc.) may have as objectives the revolution and the construction of a new society. We understand the struggles of the short- and medium-term are complementary to this long-term perspective and not exclusive. With a long-term perspective movements have a greater ability for conquest, seeing as though the more distant the objectives, the greater the conquests – the first conquests not being the end of the struggle. Many social movements that do not have a long-term perspective, on having their demands met (land for the landless, homes for the homeless, work for the unemployed etc..) think that this is the end of the line. For us this is only the first step, and even if achieved, should stimulate other struggles and mobilisations around other problems that affect our society. It is this perspective that also provides a critical view of social movements in relation to capitalism and the state, leaving them alert to attempts at class conciliation and co-optation. This perspective also encourages solidarity and mutual aid, as the exploited classes no longer see themselves as fragmented, but

[11] Errico Malatesta. "Anarquismo e Reforma" In: Anarquistas, Socialistas e Comunistas, P. 146.
[12] Idem. "Quanto Pior Estiver, Melhor Será" In: Anarquistas, Socialistas e Comunistas, P. 67.

as part of a whole that struggles for a new society. Thus, social movements defend a long-term perspective that is revolutionary,

> in the sense that it wants to replace a society founded on inequality, on the exploitation of the vast majority of men by an oppressive minority, on privilege, on idleness, and on an authority protective of all these beautiful things with a society founded on equal justice for all and the freedom of all. [...] It wants, in short, an economic, political and social organisation in which every human being, without prejudice to their natural and individual peculiarities, finds equal opportunity to develop themselves, to educate themselves, to think, to work, to act and to enjoy life as a man.[13]

Another important point which must be mentioned is the fact that social movements have often been the result of spontaneous actions and mobilisations of the exploited classes. This fact is natural for us and we understand that we will always have to live with it. In extreme situations sectors of the population will revolt or be mobilised for different reasons: to denounce an injustice, to respond to an attack from the system, to get something to eat, a place to live etc. If on the one hand we advocate organisation we believe, on the other, that we should always support these moments of spontaneous popular mobilisation. Organisational objectives must be pursued in the midst of struggle. We must not, therefore, question spontaneity when it so happens, but rather, involved in the struggles, try to catalyse the forces in order to reach the necessary degree of organisation. The interaction of this dynamic of social movements, which naturally contains a high degree of spontaneity, with varying social contexts (repression, legislation, changes in the political forces at work etc.) will naturally cause social movements to have ebbs and flows. There will be times when the circumstances provide a reality of more radicalised and permanent struggle. In others they will provide contexts difficult for articulation, discouragement, fear, etc. That is, it is natural that there are contexts of ebbs and flows.

> At certain times, which are generally the precursors of great historical events, of the great triumphs of humanity, everything seems to advance at an accelerated pace, everything breathes strength: minds, hearts, will, everything goes in unison, everything seems to go to the conquest of new horizons. So it is established throughout society, like an electric current that unites the most distant individuals in the same sentiment and the most disparate minds in a common thought that imprints the same will on all. [...] But there are other gloomy times, desperate and fatal, where everything breathes decadence, prostration and death, and which manifest a true eclipse of the public and private conscience. It is the ebbs that always follow the major historical catastrophes.[14]

We consider it our duty to properly evaluate the context and act in the appropriate manner. In times when the context points to a flux we must attack, acting with full force and providing all the necessary organisation. In times when the context points to an ebb we must know how to live with the problems, "keeping the flame alight", and wait for the right time to re-mobilise.

Finally, our view is that we must break the isolation of individuals, creating and encouraging the development of social movements with the characteristics here stated. This is a first step in our

[13] Mikhail Bakunin. A Dupla Greve de Genebra, pp. 92-93.

[14] Idem. "Algumas Condições da Revolução." In: Conceito de Liberdade, pp.128-129.

permanent strategy. After this, in a second step, we understand as necessary the joining of various social movements for the constitution of what we call throughout text the popular organisation, this being the confluence of social movements in a constant struggle against capitalism and the state.

Seeking to permanently increase the radicalisation and social force of the popular organisation, we understand it to be possible to reach the social revolution and thus constitute libertarian socialism. In this process of social transformation we believe that the exploited classes have an indispensable role, "this mass, [...] without the strong help of which the triumph of the revolution will never be possible"[15].

[15] Idem. "Educação Militante". In: Conceito de Liberdade, p. 147.

The Specific Anarchist Organisation: The Anarchist Organisation

> If [the revolutionary] lacks the guiding idea of their action, they will not be anything other than a ship without a compass.
>
> **Ricardo Flores Magón**

> An anarchist organisation must be based, in my opinion, on full autonomy, on full independence, and, therefore, on the full responsibility of individuals and groups; free agreement between those who believe it to be useful to unite in order to co-operate with a common end; a moral duty to keep to the commitments accepted and not to do anything that contradicts the accepted programme.
>
> **Errico Malatesta**

In this text we have sometimes discussed the specific anarchist organisation and our expectations in relation to it. As we have earlier defined, its objective is "to build the popular organisation and influence it, giving it the desired character, and to reach libertarian socialism by means of the social revolution". Further, we understand this as the political level of activity.

The specific anarchist organisation is the grouping of anarchist individuals who, through their own will and free agreement, work together with well-defined objectives. For this it uses forms and means in order that these objectives are achieved, or that, at least, it proceeds towards them. Thus, we can consider the anarchist organisation as "[...] the set of individuals who have a common objective and strive to achieve it; it is natural that they understand each other, join their forces, share the work and take all measures suitable for this task "[1]. Through the anarchist organisation anarchists articulate themselves at the political and ideological level, in order to put into practice revolutionary politics and to devise the means – the way of working – that should point to the final objectives: social revolution and libertarian socialism. This political practice, which seeks the final objectives, should be carried out

> creating an organisation that can fulfil the tasks of anarchism, not only in times of preparing the social revolution, but also afterwards. Such an organisation must unite all the revolutionary forces of anarchism and immediately concern itself with the preparation of the masses for the social revolution and with the struggle for the realisation of the anarchist society.[2]

This organisation is founded on fraternal agreements, both for its internal functioning as for its external action – without having relations of domination, exploitation or alienation in its midst –

[1] Errico Malatesta. "Organisation II." In: Escritos Revolucionários, p. 55.

[2] Nestor Makhno. "Our Organisation". In: Anarchy and Organisation. St. Paul, Libertarian Struggle, s / d, p. 31.

which constitute a libertarian organisation. The function of the specific anarchist organisation is to co-ordinate, converge and permanently increase the social force of anarchist militant activities, providing a tool for solid and consistent struggle, which is a fundamental means for the pursuit of the final objectives. Therefore,

> [...] it is necessary to unite and to organise: first to discuss, then to gather the means for the revolution, and finally, to form an organic whole that, armed with its means and strengthened by its union can, when the historical moment is sounded, sweep all the aberrations and all the tyrannies of the world away [...]. The organisation is a means to differentiate yourself, of detailing a programme of ideas and established methods, a type of uniting banner to embark in combat knowing those with whom you can count and having become aware of the force at one's disposal.[3]

To constitute this tool of solid and consistent combat, it is essential that the anarchist organisation has well-determined strategic-tactical and political lines – which occur through theoretical and ideological unity, and the unity of strategy and tactics. This organisation of well-defined lines joins the anarchists at the political and ideological level, and develops their political practice at the social level – which characterises an organisation of active minority, seeing as though the social level is always much larger than the political level. This political practice takes shape when the anarchist organisation of active minority performs social work in the midst of the class struggle, seeking social insertion which takes shape from the moment that the anarchist organisation manages to influence the social movements with which it works. Properly organised as an active minority, the anarchists constitute a much larger social force in the realisation of social work and have a greater chance of having social insertion. Besides social work and insertion, the specific anarchist organisation performs other activities: the production and reproduction of theory, anarchist propaganda, political education, conception and implementation of strategy, political and social relations and resource management. So we can say that the activities of the specific anarchist organisation are:

- Social Work and Insertion
- Production and Reproduction of Theory
- Anarchist Propaganda
- Political Education
- Conception and Implementation of Strategy
- Social and Political Relations

Resource Management

These activities can be performed in a more or less public way, always taking into account the social context in which it [the organisation] operates. We say more or less public because we believe that "one should do publicly what it is agreed that everyone should know, and secretly that which it is agreed should be hidden"[4]. In times of less repression the anarchist organisation operates publicly, performing the greatest propaganda possible and trying to attract the largest number of people. In times of increased repression, if, "for example, a government forbids us to

[3] Luigi Fabbri. "A Organização Anarquista". In: Anarco-Communismo Italiano, pp. 107, 110-111.

[4] Errico Malatesta. "La Propaganda Anarquista." Excerpted from Pensiero e Voluntà, January 19, 1925. In: Vernon Richards. Op. p. 171.

speak, to print, to meet, to associate, and we do not have the strength to rebel openly, we would try to speak, to print, to meet and to associate clandestinely "[5].

In this work, which varies according to the social context, the specific anarchist organisation must always defend the interests of the exploited classes, because we understand it as a political expression of these interests. For us, the ideas of anarchism

> [...] are nothing if not the purest and most faithful expression of popular instincts. If they do not correspond with these instincts they are false; and, to the extent that they are false, will be rejected by the people. But if these ideas are an honest expression of the instincts, if they represent the true thought of the people, they will quickly penetrate the spirit of the revolting multitudes; and as long as these ideas encounter the way of the popular spirit, will advance quickly to their full realisation.[6]

The specific anarchist organisation, understood as a political expression of the interests of the exploited classes, does not act on their behalf and never places itself above them. It does not replace the organisation of the exploited classes, but gives anarchists the chance to put themselves at their service.

In this political practice of placing itself at the service of the exploited classes the anarchist organisation is guided by a Charter of Principles. The principles are the ethical propositions and notions, both non-negotiable, that guide all political practice, providing models for anarchist action. "The assumption of consistency with these principles is what determines ideological authenticity pertaining to anarchism."[7] In our case, the Charter of Principles of 2003[8] defines nine principles: freedom, ethics and values, federalism, self-management, internationalism, direct action, class struggle, political practice and social insertion, and mutual aid.

In first place we assert the principle of *freedom*, affirming that "the struggle for freedom precedes anarchy." Like Bakunin thought, we hold that "individual freedom [...] can only find its ultimate expression in collective freedom", and we reject, therefore, the individualist proposals of anarchism. The pursuit of libertarian socialism is thus the incessant struggle for freedom. Another principle absolutely central for us is that of *ethics* and *values* which causes us to base all of our practice on the anarchist ethic, which is a "non-negotiable militant commitment." Through ethics, among other things, we advocate the consistency between means and ends and mutual respect.

We assert *federalism* and *self-management* as principles of non-hierarchical and decentralised organisation, sustained by mutual aid and free association, assuming the premise of the IWA that everyone has rights and duties. Beyond this, it is these principles that will guide the management of the future society at all levels: economic, political and social management, performed by the workers themselves. Emphasising the need for struggles to be self-managed we affirm that "even if living with the current outdated system, [self-management] gives potential to the transformations that point towards an egalitarian society."

By asserting *internationalism* we highlight the international character of struggles and the need for us to associate ourselves by class affinities and not those of nationality. The exploited of

[5] Ibid. p. 172.

[6] Mikhail Bakunin. "Mobilização do Proletariado." In: Conceito de Liberdade, p. 134.

[7] FARJ. "Carta de Princípios."

[8] Ibid. The quotation marks in the next seven paragraphs refer to this document.

one country must see in the exploited of another a companion of the struggle, and not an enemy. Internationalism is opposed to nationalism and the exaltation of the state, as they represent a sense of superiority over other countries and peoples, and reinforce ethnocentrism and prejudice – the first steps towards xenophobia. Everyone, regardless of their nationality, is equal and should be free.

Direct action is posited as a principle founded on horizontalism and encourages the protagonism of workers, opposing representative democracy which, as we have already stated, alienates politically. Direct action puts the people in front of their own decisions and actions, "linking workers and the oppressed to the centre of political action."

In addition, we choose to base ourselves on *class struggle*, defining ourselves as a workers organisation of workers that defend the exploited, and fight for the extinction of class society and for the creation of a society in which slaves and masters no longer exist. Therefore, we recognise and give precedence to the class struggle. For us, there is a central need to combat the evils of capitalism head on, and for this it is essential to fight alongside the exploited, where the consequences of class society become more clear and evident.

The principle of *political practice* and *social insertion* reinforces the idea that it is only with the exploited classes that anarchism is able to flourish. Therefore, the anarchist organisation should seek to relate to all forms of popular struggle, regardless of where they may be taking place. We affirm that the interaction of the anarchist organisation with any manifestation "in the social, cultural, peasant, trade union, student, community, environmental camps etc., as long as inserted into the context of struggles for freedom," contemplates the concretisation of this principle.

As the last principle in the Charter *mutual aid* encourages solidarity in struggle, encouraging the maintenance of fraternal relations with all who truly work for a just and egalitarian world. It encourages effective solidarity among the exploited.

At the moment in which it performs social work the specific anarchist organisation seeks to influence the social movements in a constructive way, with proposals and, at the same time, keep away from them the negative influence of individuals and groups who – instead of defending the interests of the people, encouraging them to be the protagonists of their own emancipation – use them to achieve other objectives. We know that politicians, parties, unions and also other authoritarian organisations and individuals – like the church, drug trafficking etc. – constitute obstacles to the construction of the popular organisation since they penetrate social movements, in the vast majority of cases, seeking to take advantage of the number of people present there to: find support in elections, constitute the base for authoritarian power projects, get money, conquer faiths, open new markets and so on. Authoritarian organisations and individuals do not want to support social movements, but use them to achieve their (the authoritarian organisations' and individuals') own objectives, which are not consistent with the objectives of the militants of the social movements – that is, the authoritarians seek to establish a relationship of domination over the social movements.

Any anarchist who has organised or even seen how working in social movements works knows that, if there is not a consistent organisation, capable of giving the necessary strength to the anarchists in the ongoing dispute over political space, the authoritarians become hegemonic and the work of the anarchists is completely lost. The anarchists, by not constituting the necessary social force, offer two possibilities: either they will be used by the authoritarians as workhorses (aka "sleeves") in carrying out their authoritarian power projects, or they will simply be removed. In the first case we speak of anarchists that are not specifically organised and go in the wake of

events. When they are not organised, they do not exert the necessary influence to have even a little social force. While they do not interfere much they are allowed in the social movements. In the second case we speak of isolated anarchists who begin to exert some influence, or, in authoritarian understanding, they begin to interfere. In this case they are expelled, removed or vilified. They are literally "bowled over" by the authoritarians. Without the necessary organisation they cannot maintain themselves in the social movements and much less exert the desired influence.

This happens because when there is not a proper organisation of anarchists, it is possible to establish authoritarian, or less libertarian organisations. In addressing the permanent dispute over political space we are not saying that anarchists should fight for the leadership, supervision, or any position of privilege in the social movements. We talk, on the contrary, of the internal struggle that takes place when we want to influence social movements to use libertarian practices.

We believe that there is never a political vacuum, anywhere. Therefore, from the moment we cause our positions to prevail it necessarily means a decrease in the influence of the authoritarians and vice versa. For example, on seeing that some anarchists are struggling for a movement to use direct action and direct democracy, politicians and party devices will be against it, and unless there is a strong organisation of anarchists, with social insertion and the ability to fight for these positions, the authoritarian positions will have greater chances to prosper. When we are properly organised as anarchists we will not lag behind events, but manage to mark our positions and exert our influence in the social movements, going on to have true insertion. It is through the specific anarchist organisation that we can manage to be properly organised for the work we want to perform in the most varying social movements.

> The anarchist organisation should be the continuation of our efforts and our propaganda; it must be the libertarian adviser that guides us in our everyday combat action. We can base ourselves on its programme to spread our action in other camps, in all the special organisations of particular struggles into which we can penetrate and take our activity and action: for example, in the trade unions, in anti-militarist societies, in anti-religious and anti-clerical groupings etc. Our special organisation can serve equally as a ground for anarchist concentration (not centralised!), as a field of agreement, of understanding and of the most complete solidarity as possible between us. The more we are united, the smaller will be the danger that we be dragged into incoherence, or that we turn from our impetus for struggle to battles and skirmishes where others who are not at all in agreement with us could tie our hands.[9]

Thus, the anarchist organisation, besides being responsible for its political practice in different camps serves to increase the social force of the anarchists within them. Among the various forces present in these spaces anarchists should stand out and bring to fruition their positions.

This political practice in different camps requires that the anarchist organisation divides itself into fronts, which are the internal groups that carry out social work. Generally, organisations that work with this methodology suggests that three basic fronts are developed: trade union, community and student. Differently, we believe that the fronts should be divided, not according to these pre-stipulated spaces of insertion, but based on the practical work of the organisation.

[9] Luigi Fabbri. "A Organização Anarquista". In: Anarco-Communismo Italiano, p. 116.

In our understanding there should not be an obligation to develop work in these three fronts and, in addition, there may be other interesting spaces that demand dedicated fronts.

Each organisation should seek spaces more conducive to the development of its social work, and from this practical necessity form its fronts. Thus, if there is work in the student sector, there may be a student front. If there is union work, there may be a trade union front. However, if other work is developed, for example, with rural movements or with urban movements etc., the fronts should follow this division. That is, instead of having only one community front that works with rural and urban social movements, you could create a front of rural movements and another front of urban movements. In this sense, we support a model of dynamic fronts that account for the internal division of the specific anarchist organisation for the practical realisation of social work in the best way possible.

The fronts are responsible, in their respective area of work, for the creation and development of social movements as well as for ensuring that anarchists occupy political space – space that is in permanent dispute – and to exercise due influence in these movements.

In the case of our organisation we initiated social work divided into two fronts. The "community front," which combines the work of management of the Fabio Luz Social Library (Biblioteca Social Fábio Luz - BSFL), of the Centre of Social Culture of Rio de Janeiro (Centro de Cultura Social - CCS-RJ) and its community work, the Marques da Costa Centre for Research (Núcleo de Pesquisa Marques da Costa - NPMC) and of the Ideal Peres Libertarian Study Circle (Círculo de Estudos Libertários Ideal Peres - CELIP). The other was the "occupations front", which was involved with urban occupations and the Internationalist Front of the Homeless (Frente Internacionalista dos Sem-Teto - FIST). With the change in the situation we left FIST, continuing to work with occupations and have gone on to bring together a few occupiers, and many other unemployed in the Movement of Unemployed Workers (Movimento dos Trabalhadores Desempregados - MTD). This movement took on great importance in this front. In this way the "occupations front" was renamed "urban social movements front." Likewise, because we deemed it necessary, we constituted a third front: the "agro-ecological front" (Anarchism and Nature) from practical work in rural social movements, of ecology and agriculture, which began to be developed by the organisation. In this way, we hold that the fronts are adapted to the practical context of work. We illustrate how this works in practice.




Diagram 1

Diagram 1

SAO being the specific anarchist organisation (divided into fronts A, B and C) and SM the social movements, the SAO is divided internally into the fronts which act, each one, in a determined SM or SM sector. In this case, assuming that the SAO works with three SM, or with three SM sectors, it divides itself for the work in three fronts. Front A works with SMA or with sector A of a determined SM. Front B works with SMB or with sector B of a determined SM, and so on. Giving practical examples: the SAO can be divided into a syndicalist front (A), a community front (B) and a student front (C), and each one of them will act in a SM. Front A will act in the union, front B in the community and C in the student movement. In our case, our SAO is today divided into three fronts: urban social movements (A), community (B) and agro-ecology (Anarchism and Nature) (C). Each of these works in one or more social movements. Front A in the homeless movement and in the MTD, front B in the community movement and front C in the rural movements of ecology and agriculture.

Besides this internal division into fronts, which functions for social work, the specific anarchist organisations uses, both for its internal and external functioning, the logic of what we call "concentric circles" – strongly inspired by the Bakuninist organisational model. The main reason that we adopt this logic of functioning is because, for us, the anarchist organisation needs to preserve different instances of action. These different instances should strengthen its work while at the same time allowing it to bring together prepared militants with a high level of commitment and approximating people sympathetic to the theory or practice of the organisation – who could be more or less prepared and more or less committed. In short, the concentric circles seek to resolve an important paradox: the anarchist organisation needs to be closed enough to have prepared, committed and politically aligned militants, and open enough to draw in new militants.

A large part of the problems that occur in anarchist organisations are caused by them not functioning according to the logic of concentric circles and by not implementing these two instances of action. Should a person who says they are an anarchist and is interested in the work of the organisation be in the organisation, despite not knowing the political line in depth? Should a laymen interested in anarchist ideas be in the organisation? How do you relate to "libertarians" – in the broadest sense of the term – who do not consider themselves anarchists? Should they be in the organisation? And the older members who have already done important work but now want to be close, but not to engage in the permanent activities of the organisation? And those that can only rarely dedicate time for activism? There are many questions. Other problems occur because there are doubts about the implementation of social work. Must the organisation present itself as an anarchist organisation in the social movements? In its social work can it form alliances with other individuals, groups and organisations that are not anarchist? In such a case, what are the common points to advocate? How do you carry out social work in a field with people from different ideologies and maintain an anarchist identity? How do you ensure that anarchism does not lose its identity when in contact with social movements? On this point there are also many questions.

The concentric circles are intended to provide a clear place for each of the militants and sympathisers of the organisation. In addition, they seek to facilitate and strengthen the social work of the anarchist organisation, and finally, establish a channel for the capture of new militants.

In practice the logic of concentric circles is established as follows. Inside the specific anarchist organisation there are only anarchists that, to a greater or lesser extent, are able to elaborate,

reproduce and apply the political line of the organisation internally, in the fronts and in public activity. Also, to a greater or lesser extent, militants should be able to assist in the elaboration of the strategic-tactical line of the organisation, as well as having full capacity to reproduce and apply it. Militants assume internal functions in the organisation – be they executive, deliberative or extraordinary – as well as external functions with regards to social work. The functions assumed by the militants within the organisation adhere to self-management and federalism, or to horizontal decisions where all the militants have the same power of voice and of vote and where, in specific cases, there is delegation with imperative mandates. The functions to be performed by the delegates must be very well defined so that they "cannot act on behalf of the association unless the members thereof have explicitly authorised them [to do so]; they should execute only what the members have decided and not dictate the way forward to the association"[10]. Moreover, the functions should be rotated in order to empower everyone and avoid crystallised positions or functions.

The specific anarchist organisation could have only one circle of militants, all of them being in the same instance, or it could have more than one circle – the criteria being collectively defined. For example, this may be the time that a person has been in the organisation or their ability to elaborate the political or tactical-strategic lines. Thus, the newer militants or those with a lesser ability to elaborate the lines may be in a more external (distant) circle, with the more experienced militants with a greater ability for elaborating the lines in another more internal (closer) one. There is not a hierarchy between the circles, but the idea is that the more "inside", or the closer the militant, the better are they able to formulate, understand, reproduce and apply the lines of the organisation. The more "inside" the militant, the greater is their level of commitment and activity. The more a militant offers the organisation, the more is demanded of them by it. It is the militants who decide on their level of commitment and they do or do not participate in the instances of deliberation based on this choice. Thus, the militants decide how much they want to commit and the more they commit, the more they will decide. The less they commit, the less they will decide.

This does not mean that the position of the more committed is of more value than that of the less committed. It means that they participate in different decision-making bodies. For example, those more committed participate with voice and vote in the Congresses, which define the political and strategic lines of the organisation; the less committed do not participate in the Congresses, or only participate as observers, and participate in the monthly assemblies where the tactics and practical applications of the lines are defined.

Thus, inside the specific anarchist organisation you may have one or more circles, which should always be defined by the level of commitment of the militants. In the case of more than one level this must be clear to everyone, and the criteria to change a level must be available to all militants. It is, therefore, the militant who chooses where they want to be.

The next circle, more external and distant from the core of the anarchist organisation, is no longer part of the organisation but has a fundamental importance: the level of supporters. This body, or instance, seeks to group together all people who have ideological affinities with the anarchist organisation. Supporters are responsible for assisting the organisation in its practical work, such as the publishing of pamphlets, periodicals or books; the dissemination of propaganda material; helping in the work of producing theory or of contextual analysis; in the organisation

[10] Ibid. p. 124.

of practical activities for social work: community activities, help in training work, logistical activities, help in organising work, etc. This instance of support is where people who have affinities with the anarchist organisation and its work have contact with other militants, are able to deepen their knowledge of the political line of the organisation, better get to know its activities and deepen their vision of anarchism, etc.

Therefore, the category of support has an important role to help the anarchist organisation put into practice its activities, seeking to bring those interested closer to it. This approximation has as a future objective that some of these supporters will become militants of the organisation. The specific anarchist organisation draws in the greatest possible number of supporters and, through practical work, identifies those interested in joining the organisation and who have an appropriate profile for membership. The proposal for entry into the organisation may be made by the militants of the organisation to the supporter and vice-versa. Although each militant chooses their level of commitment to the organisation and where they want to be, the objective of the anarchist organisation is always to have the greatest number of militants in the more internal circles, with a greater level of commitment.

Let us give a practical example: lets suppose that an organisation has deliberated to work internally with two levels of commitment – or two circles. When the militants are new they enter at the level of ”militant” and, when they have been there six months and are prepared and committed militants, move on to the level of ”full militant”. Let us suppose that this organisation has also resolved to have a level of supporters. The objective of the organisation will be to draw in the greatest possible number of supporters, based on the affinity of each one with the organisation, transferring them to the level of militant and, after six months – once prepared – to the level of full militant. We illustrate how this can work in practice.




Diagram 2

Diagram 2

SU being the level of supporters, M of militants and FM of full militants, the objective is the flow indicated by the red arrow – to go from SU to M and from M to FM. Those who are interested can follow this flow, and those who are not can stay where they feel better. For example, if a person wants to give sporadic support, and no more than that, they may want to always stay at SU. The issue here is that all a person's will to work should be utilised by the organisation. This is not because a person has little time, or because they prefer to help at a time when it must be rejected, but because inside a specific anarchist organisation there must be room for all those who wish to contribute. "Accomplishments are the criteria for selection that never fail. The aptitude and efficiency of the militants are, fundamentally, measures for the enthusiasm and the application with which they perform their tasks".[11]

The logic of concentric circles requires that each militant and the organisation itself have very well defined rights and duties for each level of commitment. This is because it is not just for someone to make decisions about something with which they will not comply. A supporter who frequents activities once a month and makes sporadic contributions, for example, cannot decide on rules or activities that must be met or carried out daily, as they would be deciding something much more for the other militants than for themselves.

It is a very common practice in libertarian groups that people who make sporadic contributions decide on issues which end up being committed to or carried out by the more permanent members. It is very easy for a militant who appears from time to time to want to set the political line of the organisation, for example, since it is not they who will have to follow this line most of the time.

These are disproportionate forms of decision-making in which one ends up deciding something which others enact. In the model of concentric circles we seek a system of rights and duties in which everyone makes decisions about that which they could and should be committed to afterwards. In this way it is normal for supporters to decide only on that in which they will be involved. In the same way it is normal for militants of the organisation to decide on that which they will carry out. Thus we make decisions and their commitments proportionally and this implies that the organisation has clear criteria for entry, clearly defining who does and does not take part in it, and at what level of commitment the militants are.

An important criteria for entry is that all of the militants who enter the organisation must agree with its political line. For this the anarchist organisation must have theoretical material that expresses this line – in less depth for those who are not yet members of the organisation and in more depth for those who are. When someone is interested in the work of the anarchist organisation, showing interest in approximation, you should make this person a supporter and give them the necessary guidance. As a supporter, knowing the political line in a little more depth and having an affinity for the practical work of the organisation, the person may show interest in joining the organisation or the organisation can express its interest in the supporter becoming a militant. In both cases the supporter should receive permanent guidance from the anarchist organisation, giving to them theoretical material that will deepen their political line. One or more militants who know this line well will discuss doubts, debate and make clarifications with them. Having secured the agreement of the supporter with the political line of the organisation, and

[11] Juan Mechoso. Acción Directa Anarquista: una historia de FAU. Montevideo: Recortes, s / d, p. 199. The quotations marks of the Mechoso book refer to documents of the Uruguayan Anarchist Federation (FAU).

with agreement from both parties, the militant is integrated into the organisation. It is important that in the initial period every new militant has the guidance of another older one, who will orient and prepare them for work. In any event, the anarchist organisation always has to concern itself with the training and guidance of the supporters and militants so that this may allow them to change their level of commitment, if they so desire.

This same logic of concentric circles works in social work. Through it the anarchist organisation is articulated to perform social work in the most appropriate and effective way. As we have seen, the anarchist organisation is divided internally into fronts for the performance of practical work. For this there are organisations that prefer to establish direct relations with the social movements, and there are others that prefer to present themselves through an intermediary social organisation, which we could call a grouping of tendency.

> Participation in the grouping of tendency implies acceptance of a set of definitions that can be shared by comrades of diverse ideological origins, but which share certain indispensable exclusions (to the reformists, for example) if seeking a minimum level of real operational coherence. (…) The groupings of tendency, co-ordinated with each other and rooted in the most combative of the people (…) are a higher level than the latter [the level of the masses].[12]

The grouping of tendency puts itself between the social movements and the specific anarchist organisation, bringing together militants of distinct ideologies that have affinity in relation to certain practical questions.

As we have emphasised, there are anarchist organisations that prefer to present themselves directly in the social movements, without the need for the groupings of tendency, and others preferring to present themselves by means of these. In both cases there are positive and negative points and each organisation must determine the best way to act. As the views that we advocate in the social movements are much more practical than theoretical, it may be interesting to work with a grouping of tendency, incorporating people who agree with some or all of the positions that we advocate in the social movements (force, class struggle, autonomy, combativeness, direct action, direct democracy and revolutionary perspective) and that will help us to augment the social force in defence of these positions.

In the same way as in the diagram above, the idea is that the specific anarchist organisation seeks insertion in this intermediate level (grouping of tendency) and through it presents itself, conducting its work in social movements in search of social insertion. Again we illustrate how this works in practice.

[12] Ibid. pp. 190, 192.




Diagram 3

Diagram 3

SAO being the specific anarchist organisation, GT the grouping of tendency and SM the social movement, there are two flows.

The first – that of the influence of the SAO – seeks to go through the GT and from there to the SM. Let us look at a few practical examples. The anarchist organisation that desires to act in a union may form a grouping of tendency with other activists from the union movement who defend some specific banners (revolutionary perspective, direct action, etc.) and by means of this tendency may influence the union movement, or the union in which it acts. Or the anarchist organisation may choose to work with the landless movement and, for this, brings people who defend similar positions (autonomy, direct democracy, etc.) in the social movement together in a grouping of tendency. By means of this grouping of tendency the specific anarchist organisation acts within the landless movement and, in this way, seeks to influence it.

This form of organisation aims to solve a very common problem that we find in activism. For example, when we know very dedicated activists; revolutionaries that advocate self-management, autonomy, grassroots democracy, direct democracy, etc. and with whom we do not act because they are not anarchists. These activists could work with the anarchists in the groupings of tendency and defend their positions in the social movements together.

The second arrow in the diagram shows the objective of the flow of militants. That is, in this scheme of work the goal is to bring people in the social movements that have practical affinity with the anarchists into the groupings of tendency and, from there, bring those that have ideological affinity closer to the anarchist organisation. In the same way as in the previous diagram, if a militant has great practical affinity with the anarchists, but is not an anarchist, they must be a member of the grouping of tendency and will be fundamental to the performance of social work. If they have ideological affinities they may be closer to or even join the organisation.

The objective of the anarchist organisation is not to turn all activists into anarchists, but to learn to work with each of these activists in the most appropriate way. While having mutual interests the militants may change their positions in the circles (from the social movement to the grouping of tendency or from the grouping of tendency to the anarchist organisation). Without these mutual interests, however, each one acts where they think it more pertinent.

The decision-making process used in the anarchist organisation is an attempt at consensus, using the vote when consensus is not possible. Unlike some libertarian groups and organisations we believe that consensus should not be mandatory. As we mentioned earlier, besides consensus being a very inefficient form of decision-making, becoming unfeasible the more the number of people involved in the decisions increases, it offers the serious problem of giving great power to isolated agents. In an organisation of 20 militants one could block consensus, or even if 19 were in favour of one position and one another, you would have to have a "middle ground" that would consider, in a very disproportionate way, the only dissenter. To give proper efficiency to the decision-making process and not to give too much power to isolated agents, we chose this model of an attempt at consensus, and when this is not possible, the vote. "If it were in the very bosom of the organisation that the disagreement arose, that the division between majority and minority appeared around minor issues, over practical modalities or over special cases [...], then it may occur more or less easily that the minority are inclined to do as the majority."[13] In the case of voting all the militants of the organisation, even those who are outvoted, have an obligation

[13] Luigi Fabbri. "A Organização Anarquista". In: Anarco-Communismo Italiano, p. 121.

to follow the winning position. This decision-making process is used to establish theoretical and ideological unity and also for strategic and tactical unity. We will return to these later. At this point it is enough to emphasise that for the struggle we want to pursue, we must put an end to dispersion and disorganisation and "the way to overcome this is to create an organisation that [... is based] on the basis of specific theoretical and tactical positions, and that leads us to a firm understanding of how these should be applied in practice"[14].

It is important to add, too, that the militants must use common sense at the time of decisions by vote. They should carefully observe the positions of militants who are closest to the issues that are being voted on, as these positions are more important than those who are not close, even though they have the same weight in voting. When voting occurs it can be easy for militants not involved in the issue being voted on to determine what others will have to do. Such situations demand caution and those in which all the members that would carry out what was deliberated on lose the vote, and are obliged to apply what was resolved by others, should be avoided.

Also in relation to decisions, at the time in which they are being taken "there must be a lot of space for all discussions and all points of view must be analysed carefully"[15]. After deliberation, "responsibilities [are divided], the members being formally responsible for their execution," since "the organisation does nothing by itself." Then "all the activities that are deliberated and which are the responsibility of the organisation will have, in one way or another, to be executed by its members" and, for this execution, there is the "need to divide the activities between militants, always looking for a model that distributes these activities well and to avoid the concentration of tasks on the more active or capable members". "From the moment in which a militant assumes one or more tasks for the organisation, he has an obligation to perform them and a great responsibility to the group [...]. It is the relationship of commitment that the militant assumes with the organisation."

Furthermore, we believe it to be relevant and reaffirm, once again, that "self-discipline is the engine of the self-managed organisation" and this also applies to the specific anarchist organisation. Thus, "each one that assumes a responsibility must have sufficient discipline to execute it. Likewise, when the organisation determines a line to follow or something to accomplish, it is individual discipline that will cause what is collectively resolved to be realised." We note:

> we also ask for discipline, because, without understanding, without co-ordinating the efforts of each one to a common and simultaneous action, victory is not physically possible. But discipline should not be a servile discipline, a blind devotion to leaders, an obedience to the one who always says not to interfere. Revolutionary discipline is consistent with the ideas accepted, fidelity to commitments assumed, it is to feel obliged to share the work and the risks with struggle comrades.[16]

"We believe that in order for our struggle to bear promising fruit it is fundamental that each of the militants of the organisation have a high degree of commitment, responsibility and self-discipline."[17] "It is will and militant commitment that will cause us to go, day after day, towards

[14] Dielo Trouda. "El Problem de la Organización y la Síntesis notional".

[15] FARJ. "Reflections on the commitment ...". The unidentified quotes in this and the next paragraph refers to this article.

[16] Errico Malatesta. "Action and Discipline." In: Anarchists, Socialists and Communists, P. 24.

[17] FARJ. "Reflections on the commitment ..."

the development of the organisation's activities such that we can overcome the obstacles and pave the way for our long-term objectives."[18] Finally, we should know that "responsibility and organisational discipline should not horrify: they are travel companions of the practice of social anarchism"[19].

This position introduces a relation of co-responsibility between the militants and the organisation, it being that the anarchist organisation "will be responsible for the revolutionary and political activity of each member, the same way as each member will be responsible for the revolutionary and political activity"[20] of the anarchist organisation.

[18] Ibid.

[19] Nestor Makhno. "On Revolutionary Discipline." In: Organisation and Anarchy, p. 34.

[20] Dielo Trouda. "Organisational Platform of the General Union of Anarchists."

The Specific Anarchist Organisation: Social Work and Insertion

Social work and insertion are the most important activities of the specific anarchist organisation.

As we have already dealt with, we live in a society that puts the ruling class and the exploited classes on opposing sides. Let us also remember that our struggle is for the establishment of a classless society – libertarian socialism. And that the way to reach this new society, in our opinion, is through the struggle of social movements, their conformation into the popular organisation and through the social revolution. To this end, this whole process must take place within the exploited classes, which are the true protagonists of the social transformation that we advocate.

Thus, if the struggle of anarchism points towards the final objectives of social revolution and libertarian socialism, and if we understand the exploited classes to be the protagonists of the transformation towards these goals, there is no other way for anarchism but to seek a way to interact with these classes. For this reason,

> anarchism can no longer continue trapped within the confines of marginal thought and claimed only by a few small groups, in their isolated actions. Its natural influence on the mentality of human groups in struggle is more than evident. For this influence to be consciously assimilated, it should now be in possession of new means and start the path of social practices now.[1]

In the class struggle the exploited classes are always in conflict with the ruling class. This conflict can manifest itself in a more or less spontaneous, or more or less organised way. The fact is that the contradictions of capitalism generate a series of manifestations of the exploited classes and we consider this to be the best terrain to plant the seeds of anarchism. Neno Vasco, speaking of the seed sower, used a metaphor to say that anarchists should plant their seeds in the most fertile terrain. As we have already emphasised, for us, this terrain is the camp of the class struggle.

Since we intend to plant our seeds within the class struggle, and because we understand the exploited classes to be the protagonists of the process of social transformation, we assume that for anarchism to reach its final objectives the exploited classes are essential. When we explain this point of view we are not idolising these classes or even assuming that everything they do is always right, but we are emphasising that their participation in the process of social transformation is absolutely central. Therefore, we anarchists, "must always be with the people"[2].

[1] Nestor Makhno. "Our Organisation". In: Organisation and Anarchy, p. 32.

[2] Errico Malatesta. "Programa Anarquista." In: Escritos Revolucionários, p. 23.

The way in which the specific anarchist organisation seeks interaction with the exploited classes is through what we call social work. Social work is the activity that the anarchist organisation performs in the midst of class struggle, causing anarchism to interact with the exploited classes. Social work gives to the political level of anarchism a social level, a body without which anarchism is sterile. Through social work anarchism is able to realise its function of being a motor for the struggles of our time. The social work of the anarchist organisation occurs in two ways: 1.) With the ongoing work with existing social movements and 2.) With the creation of new social movements.

Since our founding we have considered social movements to be the preferred terrain for our activity, as put in our Charter of Principles when we affirm: "the FARJ proposes to work – immediately and without inter-mediation – in the direction of intervening in the diverse realities that make up the universe of social movements"[3]. As we have discussed above, we understand the social movements as a result of "a tripod made up by necessity, will and organisation." Thus, organised anarchists must seek to stimulate the desire and organisation for a movement that is based primarily on the needs of the exploited classes. These, in most cases, are demobilised by "not having the sense of their rights, nor faith in their strength; and as they do not have this feeling, nor this faith, [...] remain, for centuries, powerless slaves"[4]. In this process of mobilisation we have to encourage this sense and this faith. From then, the question of need becomes central because it is through this that mobilisation occurs. Few are those who are willing to fight for an idea that will only bring long-term results. Therefore, to mobilise the people we must, before anything else, deal with the concrete issues and problems that afflict and are close to them. To earn their trust and adherence

> [...] We have to start talking to them, not about the general evils of the whole international proletariat, nor the general causes which give birth to it, but their particular misfortunes, daily and private. It is necessary to speak to them about their profession and the conditions of their work, precisely in the locality in which they dwell; of the duration and the vast extent of their daily work, the inadequacy of their salary, the wickedness of their boss, the scarcity of food and their inability to properly nurture and educate their family. And proposing to them the means to combat their misfortunes and to improve their position, there is no need to talk too soon about general and revolutionary objectives. [...] Firstly, it is only necessary to offer them objectives the usefulness of which their natural common sense and everyday experience cannot ignore, nor repel.[5]

In the same way, in the process of mobilisation you can pose the question of people not having jobs, of not having a place to live etc.. Therefore, the role of anarchist organisation is to explain necessities and to mobilise around them. Be it in the creation of social movements or working with existing movements the central idea is always to mobilise around necessity.

Social movements are the instances in which mobilisation of the exploited classes takes places and, therefore, it is these movements that cause them to have a political practice. Their political practice is developed through "any activity that has as its object the relationship [of confronta-

[3] FARJ. "Carta de Princípios."

[4] Mikhail Bakunin. "Some Conditions of the Revolution." In: Conceito de Liberdade, p. 127.

[5] Idem. "Militant Education." In: Conceito de Liberdade, pp. 145-146.

tion] of the exploited and oppressed with the bodies of political power; the state, government and their various expressions"[6] besides other supporting bodies of the capitalist system. Political practice seeks to put the people in combat against the forces of the system that oppresses them and, therefore, incites the facing-off of these forces, "the defence and expansion of public and individual freedoms, the capacity for proposals that correspond to the general interest of the population or partial aspects of it." Political practice can also be "insurrection as an instance of violent questioning of a situation we want to change [... and also] the proposals which, taking in the popular demands facing the bodies of power, can present solutions to general and specific questions and require those bodies to be able to adopt them and make them valid for the whole of society".

Through their political practice social movements must impose all their conquests on the forces of capitalism and the state. The people themselves must demand, enforce and realise all the improvements, conquests and freedoms desired as is felt necessary, by means of organisation and will. These demands must be permanent and increase progressively, each time demanding more and seeking the full emancipation of the exploited classes.

> Whatever the practical results of the struggle for immediate improvements may be, their main usefulness lies in the struggle itself. Is it through it that workers learn to defend their class interests, that they understand that the employers and governments have opposing interests to theirs, and that they cannot improve their conditions, much less emancipate themselves, if not by joining together and making themselves stronger. [...] If they can get what they want they will live better. They will earn more, work less, have more time and energy to reflect on the things that interest them; and they will suddenly feel more needs and desires. If they were not successful, they will be impelled to study the causes of their failure and to recognise the need for greater unity, increased energy; they will understand, finally, that in order to win, securely and definitely, it is necessary to destroy capitalism.[7]

The political practice of social movements translated into the struggle for short-term gains brings the pedagogical sense of increased consciousness to the militants, in the event of victories or even defeats.

The political practice of the specific anarchist organisation works the same way. We stated earlier that we understand anarchism as an ideology and, in this case, "a set of ideas, motivations, aspirations, values, a structure or system of concepts which have a direct connection with action – which we call political practice." Social work is the principal part of the political practice of the anarchist organisation that, in this case, interacts with the exploited classes organised into social movements, withdrawing anarchism from small circles and widely supplanting its ideas within the class struggle.

Besides this, for us, more than simply interacting with social movements the social work of the specific anarchist organisation must seek to influence them in practice, causing them to have certain operating characteristics. We call the process of influencing social movements through anarchist practice social insertion. Thus, the anarchist organisation has social work when it cre-

[6] FAU. "Declaración de Principios." The quotes in this paragraph are from this same document.

[7] Errico Malatesta. "Programa Anarquista." In: Escritos Revolucionários, p. 18.

ates or develops work with social movements, and social insertion when it manages to influence movements with anarchist practices.

Social insertion is not intended to "ideologise" social movements, turning them into anarchist social movements. By contrast, it seeks to give them certain determined characteristics so that they can proceed towards the construction and development of the popular organisation, and point towards the social revolution and libertarian socialism. It seeks to make social movements go as far as possible.

> We do not want "to wait for the masses to become anarchists" in order to make the revolution; even more than we are convinced that they will never become (anarchists) if initially we do not overthrow, with violence, the institutions that keep them in slavery. As we need the concurrence of the masses to build a sufficient material force, and to achieve our specific objective which is the radical change of the social organism through the direct action of the masses, we must get close to them, accept them as they are and, as part the masses, make them go as far as possible. This for we want, of course, to actually work to realise, in practice, our ideals and not to be content in preaching in the desert, for the simple satisfaction of our intellectual pride.[8]

We recall that we have advocated the position that it is ideology that should be within social movements, and not social movements that should be within ideology. The specific anarchist organisation interacts with social movements seeking to influence them to have the most libertarian and egalitarian forms possible.[9] Although we treat anarchism and social movements as different levels of activity, we believe that there is a relationship of mutual influence between the two. This complementary and dialectic relationship causes anarchism to influence social movements, and social movements to influence anarchism. When we deal with social insertion we are talking about the influence of anarchism within social movements. In this respect, despite sustaining a separation between the political (the anarchist organisation) and social (social movements) levels, we do not believe that there should be hierarchy or domination of the political level over the social level. We also do not believe that the political level struggles for the social level or in front of it, but with it – this being an ethical relationship. In its activity as an active minority the specific anarchist organisation struggles with the exploited classes and not for or in front of them, seeing as though "we do not want to emancipate the people, we want the people to emancipate themselves"[10]. We will discuss further on, in a little more detail, this relationship between the specific anarchist organisation and social movements.

When dealing with social insertion as the influence that the specific anarchist organisation exerts on the social movements, we understand that it is important to elaborate a little more on what we mean by "influence." To influence, for us, means to cause changes in a person or a group of people through persuasion, advice, examples, guidelines, insights and practices. First of all we believe that in society itself there are, at any given time, a multiplicity of influences

[8] Idem. "The Purpose of the Revolution." In: Anarchists, Socialists and Communists, P. 55.

[9] In "Em Torno de Nosso Anarquismo," Malatesta stresses: "To provoke, in as much as possible, the movement, participating in it with all our forces, by giving it a more egalitarian and libertarian character, that is; to support all progressive forces; to defend what is better when you cannot obtain the maximum, but always keeping very clear our anarchist character. " [Emphasis added] See Escritos Revolucionários, p. 80.

[10] Errico Malatesta. "The Organisation of the working masses ...". In: Escritos Revolucionários, p. 40.

between the different agents who influence and are influenced. We can even say that "to renounce exerting influence over others means renouncing social action, or even the expression of one's own thoughts and feelings, which is [...] tending towards in-existence"[11]. Even from an anti-authoritarian perspective, this influence is inevitable and healthy.

> In nature as in human society, which in itself is nothing other than nature, every human being is subject to the supreme condition of intervening in the most positive way in the lives of others – intervening in as powerful a manner as the specific nature of each individual permits. To reject this reciprocal influence means to conjure death in the full sense of the word. And when we ask for freedom for the masses we do not intend to have abolished the natural influence exerted on them by any individual or group of individuals.[12]

In practical work that influence must occur from the characteristics we seek to give social movements. Previously, when dealing with social movements and the popular organisation, we discussed these features in greater detail. So we are not concerned at this point with detailing them all again. We will only point out, once more and briefly, what the characteristics that we must sustain in the social movements are. They are: force, class struggle, combativeness, autonomy, direct action, direct democracy and revolutionary perspective.

Social movements must be strong, without falling inside an ideology, since imposing the cause of anarchism on social movements "would not be anything but a complete absence of thought, of objective and of common conduct, and [...] would lead, necessarily, to a common impotence "[13]. They should be class struggle in orientation and have a class line, which means to seek broad participation of the exploited classes and support the class struggle; they should be combative, establishing their conquests through the imposition of their social force; they should be autonomous in relation to the state, political parties, bureaucratic trade unions, the church, among other bureaucratic and/ or authoritarian bodies, taking their decisions and acting on their own.

In addition, they must use direct action as a form of political action, in opposition to representative democracy. "Fundamentally it comes to giving priority to the protagonism of the popular organisations, fighting for the least possible mediation and ensuring that the necessary mediation does not result in the emergence of separate decision-making centres separated from those concerned"[14]. Social movements must also use direct democracy as a method of decision-making, which takes place in horizontal assemblies in which all the militants decide effectively, in an egalitarian way. Direct democracy does not give space to "any kind of privilege, whether economic, social or political, [... and constitutes] an institutional framework where the recallability of the members is immediately secured and where, therefore, there is no room for the habitual political irresponsibility that characterises representative democracy"[15]. Finally, revolutionary perspective, which "should be introduced and developed in it [the social movement] by the con-

[11] Mikhail Bakunin. "Liberty and Equality." In: G. P. Maximoff (ed.). Writings of Political Philosophy Vol. II. Madrid: Alianza Editorial, 1990, p. 9.

[12] Ibid.

[13] Idem. "Tactics and Revolutionary Party Discipline." In: Conceito de Liberdade, p. 192.

[14] FAU. "Declaración de Principios."

[15] Ibid.

stant work of revolutionaries who work outside and within its bosom, but which cannot be the natural and normal manifestation of its function"[16].

The social insertion of the specific anarchist organisation in social movements that occurs through influence should point, in a second instance, towards the connection of struggles and the creation of the popular organisation, seeking permanently to increase their social force.

To carry out social work and insertion the anarchist organisation should pay attention to some questions.

Mobilisation must take place mainly through practice, since it is in the midst of struggle that the people notice that they can win more and more. Much more than talking, we must teach by doing, by example, which is "better than the verbal explanations that [the worker] receives from his comrades; quickly recognising all things by his own personal experience now inseparable and united with that of the other members"[17]. It is very relevant for us to consider that the process of mobilisation and influence passes, beyond the objective aspects of the struggle, through the subjective aspects. Our practice has shown that in order to mobilise and influence social movements it is very important to use not only the rational and objectives aspects, but also emotional and subjective aspects, these being the affective bonds and friendships or relationships that are naturally built within struggles. It is also important to identify people in the neighbourhoods, communities, movements, trade unions etc. that have influence over others (local leaders oriented to the grassroots and legitimised by them) and focus efforts on them. These people are very important to assist in grassroots mobilisation, to give potential to anarchist influence, or even to integrate into the groupings of tendency. Done in this way, the mobilisation ends up functioning as a kind of "conversion", it being important to note that

> [...] you can only convert those who feel the need to be converted, those who already have in their instincts or in the miseries of their position, either exterior or interior, all that they want to give them; you will never convert those who do not feel the need for any change, not even those who, wishing to leave a position in which they are discontent, are impelled, by the nature of their moral, intellectual and social habits, to seek a position in a world that is not of your ideas.[18]

In this process of mobilisation the specific anarchist organisation should always, no matter what, act ethically, trying not to want to establish relations of hierarchy or domination with the social movements; to tell the truth and never deceive the people, and always support solidarity and mutual aid in relation to other militants. Likewise, it should have a propositive posture, seeking to build movements and cause them to march forward and not just be presenting critical positions.

Even when the positions of the anarchist organisation are not the majority they must be shown, making clear the views it advocates. When in contact with hierarchical movements the anarchist organisation should always keep in mind that what interests it is always the grassroots of the social movements. Therefore, for any type of work, the organisation should always approach not the leaders and those who hold the power structures of social movements, but the rank-and-file

[16] Errico Malatesta. "Los Movimientos Obrero y los Anarchists." Excerpt from New Umanità, April 6, 1922. In: Vernon Richards. Op. p. 114.

[17] Mikhail Bakunin. "Militant Education." In: Conceito de Liberdade, p. 146.

[18] Ibid. "Workers, Peasants, and Intellectuals Bourgeois." In: Conceito de Liberdade, p. 110.

activists, who are generally oppressed by the leadership and form the periphery and not the centre of the movements.

Another issue that must be observed is that the militants of the specific anarchist organisation must be very familiar with the environment in which they are working, maintaining a constant presence in the social movements in which they propose to carry out social work. The knowledge of the "terrain" on which one operates is critical to knowing what the political forces at play are, who the potential allies are, who the opponents are, where the strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats are. Constant presence is important in order for the anarchist militants to be fully integrated with other activists from the social movements, such that they have recognition, legitimacy, are listened to, are wanted, are welcome people.

In a strategic framework we can understand that the specific anarchist organisation must carry out social work, since "as anarchists and workers, we must incite and encourage them [the workers] to struggle, and to struggle with them"[19]. Inciting and encouraging the people, we must seek social insertion and ensure that the social movements work in the most libertarian and egalitarian ways possible. With social insertion in social movements we must connect struggles and build the popular organisation. Thus will we be able to stimulate the permanent increase of social force and prepare the exploited classes for the social revolution, because "our goal is to prepare the people, morally and materially, for this necessary expropriation; it is to try and revive the attempt, as many times as revolutionary agitation gives us the opportunity to do so, until the final victory"[20], with the establishment of libertarian socialism. We can say, then, that the function of the specific anarchist organisation in its social work and insertion is to be the "engine of social struggles. An engine that neither replaces nor represents them"[21]. We think it possible to construct this motor "participating militantly in the day-to-day of the struggles of popular movements in activity, at first, in Brazil, in Latin America and especially in Rio de Janeiro."[22]

[19] Errico Malatesta. "Programa Anarquista." In: Escritos Revolucionários, p. 18.
[20] Ibid. p. 17.
[21] FAU. "Declaración de Principios."
[22] FARJ. "Carta de Princípios."

The Specific Anarchist Organisation: Production and Reproduction of Theory

Another important activity of the specific anarchist organisation is the production and reproduction of theory. We understand theory as "[a] set of concepts coherently articulated between themselves [...], an instrument, a tool, [that] serves to do a job, that serves to produce the knowledge that we need to produce"[1]. Theory is fundamental both for the conception of strategy, as well as for the propaganda that the organisation performs. Strategy seeks to increase the efficiency of work of the anarchist organisation while propaganda is very important in the sense of promoting anarchist ideas.

Thus, we understand this set of coherently articulated concepts – theory – as an indispensable tool for practice, in order to perform a specific job. Therefore, "if it does not serve us to produce new knowledge useful for political practice, theory is useless"[2].

On being produced within the specific anarchist organisation, theory formalises concepts in order to make the organisation: 1.) understand the reality in which it is acting, 2.) deal with making a prognosis of the objectives of the process of social transformation and 3.) define the actions that will be taken in order to put this process into practice. We call this scheme strategy, and will discuss it below in more detail.

In seeking to understand the reality in which one operates theory arranges information and data, formalises the understanding of the historical moment in which we operate and the definition of the social, political and economic characteristics. That is, it performs a complete diagnosis of the reality in which the specific anarchist organisation operates. In this case it is important, beyond general reading, to think regionally where one acts; as if this is not done you run the risk of applying methodology that is incorrect for the process of social transformation (the "importing" of ready-made theories from other times and other contexts). However, for us theory does not end there. It is through it that the anarchist organisation makes a prognosis of the objectives that the social transformation intends to imprint on the capitalist system. The conception of libertarian socialism and the revolutionary process of transformation can only be thought of, today, from a theoretical perspective, since in practice we are not living in a revolutionary time.

Thus, theory organises the concepts that define the transformation to the future society as well as that society itself, which are the final objectives of the specific anarchist organisation. Theory also defines how the anarchist organisation should act within the reality in which it finds itself in order to reach its final objectives. In this way, all the reflection that we do today about the complete process of social transformation that we intend to imprint on society is a theoretical reflection, since, despite being put into practice it does not happen completely, but partially, with the development of the steps concerning the beginning of the process. Other steps are reserved for the future and, today, can also only be thought of in a theoretical way.

[1] FAU. Huerta Grande: a Importância da Teoria.

[2] Ibid.

Theory is also very important in the process of propaganda, since to promote anarchist ideas it is necessary to articulate concepts coherently. Besides propaganda taking place – more broadly – in practice, theory also has a very relevant role therein. When theory is used for propaganda it formalises the past with the study and reproduction of anarchist theories, which have as an objective to deepen the ideological level and make anarchist ideology more known. It can also take place in relation to the present and the future with the theoretical spread of materials that explain our critiques of the present society, our conception of the future society and of the process of social transformation. It is also important that the production of theory aims to update obsolete ideological aspects or seeks to adapt ideology to specific and particular realities. This whole process of theoretical propaganda is fundamental to gather people around our cause. The more theory is produced and distributed, the easier will be the penetration of anarchism throughout society.

We understand that theory is fundamental to practice. When we work with correct and well-articulated concepts, the practice is much more efficient. "If there is no clear and concrete [theoretical] line, there is no effective political practice"[3] and the political will of the organisation runs a serious risk of being diluted.

Besides this, we do not believe that in order to act the anarchist organisation needs, before anything else, to have a deep and developed theory. In fact, there are organisations that believe that the big problem of anarchism is in the resolution, almost mathematically, of anarchist theory. For us, although we defend with emphasis that theory is very important for an efficient practice, we do not believe that theory produced without concrete and prolonged contact with practice can bear any promising fruit. The theory promoted by intellectuals removed from struggle or with little social work – intellectuals who think they have understood theory more than anyone else and have found definitive answers to the theoretical questions – is of little use, since it is in practice that we verify whether the theory serves for anything; practice that necessarily contributes to the theory. We do not believe, like many of these intellectuals, that just with theory we will necessarily have an efficient practice. If this theory was not constructed with ample and permanent contact with practice, the chance of it having little use is enormous.

When we started the introduction to this text with the subheading "to theorise efficiently it is essential to act"[4] we were referring exactly to the idea that for coherent and efficient theoretical production, there is no other way than to produce it, too, from practical experiences. In this case it is not always theory that determines practice. We believe that theory and practice are complementary and that from theory you practice, and from practice you theorise. If we can theorise today about our ideology it is because we are putting it to the "test" in our daily practice and verifying what works, what doesn't work, what is current and what needs to be updated. We know that, often, "in practice, the theory is other" and this applies above all to anarchism. Not everything that was produced or is produced theoretically within anarchism serves the practice we want. This also applies to aspects that are less ideological such as analysis of the conjuncture, evaluation of the political forces at play etc. that can even be interesting theories, but if they do not find coherence in practice, will not serve us for anything.

The important value that we attach to practice gives absolute importance to the process of social work and insertion. It puts anarchist ideology to the test, allowing the anarchist organisation

[3] Ibid.
[4] Ibid.

to better think of its possibilities and horizons, to be much more programmatic, to act with its feet on the ground and to get on with life as it is, and not how we would like it to be. For this reason, social work and insertion enables one to perform with better precision all the theoretical production of the anarchist organisation.

From this relation of theory and practice we understand the theoretical way of the specific anarchist organisation as a constant way to theorise, practice, evaluate the theory and, if necessary, reformulate it, theorise, practice, and so on.

Many anarchist organisations define theory only as comprehension of the reality in which they are acting. In this way they separate theory from ideology, the first being this "set of concepts coherently articulated between themselves" that would serve only for the elaboration of answers to what we call "the first question of strategy", that is, "where we are". In this sense theory would come down to seek a deeper understanding of the reality in which you operate. On this we agree. However we believe, as we have specified above, that theory also serves to answer the second and third questions of strategy, that is, "where we want to reach"; and "how do we think we can leave where we are and arrive at where we want to be".

Thus, in this strategic framework theory is not limited to the first question, but also seeks to answer the second and third questions. Moreover, this theory implicated in strategy necessarily has ideological elements and, therefore, in this case theory and ideology, despite being distinct concepts, cannot be clearly separated. Theory necessarily carries ideological aspects and ideology necessarily carries theoretical aspects. There is, therefore, a direct link between one another.

From this understanding of the relation between theory and ideology we think that the specific anarchist organisation must work with what we call ideological and theoretical unity. This unity occurs through the decision-making process of the anarchist organisation and has as an objective to determine a clear political line (theoretical and ideological) that must, necessarily, guide all the activities and actions of the organisation which, "both as a whole as well as in the details, should be in exact and constant agreement"[5] with the line defined by the organisation. We do not believe that it would be possible to work with multiple theoretical and ideological conceptions without this signifying permanent conflicts and inefficient practices. The absence of this theoretical and ideological political line leads to a lack of articulation or even to conflicting articulation in the set of concepts, the result of which is incorrect, confusing and/or inefficient practice.

With this well-defined political line everyone knows how to act and, in case of having practical problems, it is well known that the line should be revised. When the theoretical and ideological line is not well defined and there is a problem, there are difficulties in knowing what needs to be revised. It is, therefore, the clarity of this line that allows the organisation to develop theoretically.

[5] Dielo Trouda. "Organisational Platform for a General Union of Anarchists"

The Specific Anarchist Organisation: Anarchist Propaganda

The specific anarchist organisation is also dedicated to anarchist propaganda. "Propaganda is not and cannot be but the constant, tireless repetition of the principles that must be our guide in the conduct that we must follow in the various circumstances of life."[1] Thus, we understand propaganda as the dissemination of the ideas of anarchism, and, therefore, as a fundamental activity of the anarchist organisation. Its objective is to make anarchism known and to attract people to our cause. Propaganda is one of the activities of the anarchist organisation and not the only activity. It should be performed constantly and in an organised manner.

"The organisation's propaganda must be done uninterruptedly, just as the propaganda of all the other postulates of the anarchist ideal".[2] To have strength propaganda needs to be performed constantly. Propaganda that is done once in a while is not enough to make anarchism known and, much less, to draw people in. Therefore, the first assertion that we make is that propaganda must be continuous.

Besides this, propaganda should not be done in an isolated way, since, like all uncoordinated activity, it lacks the desired strength. As we have seen organisation – understood as the co-ordination of forces for the realisation of an objective – multiplies the results of individual work, and this also applies to propaganda. When we are organised, the result of our propaganda work – be it theoretical or practical propaganda – is multiplied, and achieves results far superior to the simple sum of individual forces. Therefore, the second assertion that we make is that propaganda must be done in an organised way, because this multiplies its results.

> Casual, isolated propaganda which is often done to calm one's own conscience or simply to alleviate passion through discussion does little or nothing. Under the conditions of inconsistency and misery in which the masses are to be found, with so many forces that oppose them, such propaganda is forgotten before its efforts can accumulate and have fertile results. The terrain is very ungrateful for seeds sown at random to germinate and take root.[3]

We argue that the specific anarchist organisation utilises any means that are at its disposal for the realisation of this constant and organised propaganda. Firstly, with respect to the theoretical, educational and/or cultural sphere with the realisation of courses, talks, debates, conferences, study groups, websites, e-mail, theatre, bulletins, newspapers, magazines, books, videos, music, libraries, public events, radio programmes, television programmes, libertarian schools etc. We

[1] Errico Malatesta. "Programa Anarquista". In: Escritos Revolucionários, p. 7.

[2] Luigi Fabbri. "A Organização Anarquista". In: Anarco-Comunismo Italiano, p. 97.

[3] Errico Malatesta. "La Propaganda Anarquista". Excerpt from L'Agitazione, 22 de setembro de 1901. In: Vernon Richards. Op. Cit. p. 172.

truly value all this propaganda and think that it is fundamental in order to attract people and ensure that they know the critiques and also the constructive proposals of anarchism. Thus, it is possible to develop anti-authoritarian values in people, to stimulate their consciousness, to make them see the exploitation and domination in a more critical way such that they look at alternatives of struggle and organisation. These people can be approached, seeking to deepen their knowledge, to involve them in discussions and also to organise them for action.

This type of propaganda, when performed on a large scale is fundamental since it functions as a social "lubricant" that slowly changes the culture in which we live and makes the introduction of anarchist ideas and practices into society easier. This massive propaganda work slowly turns the people's consciousness and causes the ideology of capitalism, which is already transmitted in the form of culture, to be more questioned and even less reproduced. As we understand consciousness as a capacity that people have to know values and ethical principles and to apply them, we believe this propaganda activity to be highly relevant for the permanent gain of consciousness.

In the first instance is to remove prejudices and capitalist culture, then, to make people come to see authoritarianism critically. Finally, to take some of these people to the struggle against authoritarianism. We understand that any process of social transformation with final objectives like those that we propose will depend on acceptance, or at least on "non-rejection" of large sectors of the population. And propaganda, in this sense theoretical, educational and/or cultural will contribute significantly to this. Thus, "the propaganda carried out by organised anarchists is also a way of manifestation in order to prepare the future society: it is a collaboration in order to construct a way to influence the environment and to modify its conditions"[4] However, we must understand the limits of this propaganda.

Propaganda with respect to this theoretical, educational and/or cultural sphere has as its principal objective to increase the level of consciousness. Therefore, it aims to transform people's ideas. And this is the reason why we see serious limits in this model of propaganda. This gain in consciousness does not mean in any way that the exploitation and domination of capitalist society will tend to decrease. It also does not mean, necessarily, that people will go on to organise themselves in order to struggle. Today, the mainstream media and even the growth of the cities, community fragmentation, among other factors, make propaganda on a massive scale very difficult and we must remember that, even when there were no such difficulties, and when anarchist propaganda was very strong – with permanently functioning cultural centres, newspapers with very high daily runs – social transformation was not guaranteed. Ultimately, we can consider that even with all the difficulties that exist for us to realise "mass" propaganda, the gain in consciousness does not necessarily mean organisation and struggle and neither the end, or even a decrease, of exploitation and domination. We could say that, in a hypothetical situation in which everyone is conscious, nevertheless, we would continue to be exploited and dominated. Therefore,

> […] neither the writers, nor the philosophers, nor their works, not even the socialist newspapers constitute socialism alive and well. The latter can only find real existence in clarified revolutionary instinct, in collective will and in organisation […] – and when this instinct, this will and this organisation are lacking, the best books in the world are nothing but empty theories and impotent dreams.[5]

[4] Luigi Fabbri. "A Organização Anarquista". In: Anarco-Comunismo Italiano, pp. 115-116.
[5] Mikhail Bakunin. "Algumas Condições da Revolução". In: Conceito de Liberdade, p. 130.

For this reason we hold that, besides the propaganda that takes place in the theoretical, educational and/or cultural sphere we must also maintain, principally, propaganda that takes place in struggle and organisation, that is, propaganda in social work, aimed at social insertion.

By taking place in the ambit of the class struggle and of social movements, the work of anarchist propaganda aims to mobilise, organise and influence social movements with anarchist practice. We remember, insistently, that the influence of movements by anarchism means seeking for them to have the characteristics that we stand for: force, class struggle perspective, combativeness, autonomy, direct action, direct democracy and revolutionary perspective. To achieve this influence the specific anarchist organisation carries out its propaganda, emphatically, through words and, primarily, by example[6].

We understand the entire process of social work and insertion that we dealt with earlier as the main propaganda work that the anarchist organisation should develop. In struggle, while active minority, the anarchists create social movements, join already existing movements and seek to influence them as much as possible – always by example – to function in the most libertarian and egalitarian way possible. This work is, therefore,

> to educate for freedom, to elevate the consciousness of their [the workers'] own strength and capacity as men habituated to obedience and passivity. It is therefore necessary to proceed in a way in which the people act for themselves, or at least believe to be doing so out of instinct and self-inspiration, even though, in reality, the thing has been suggested to them.[7]

In this way anarchist propaganda serves the whole work process of the anarchists while active minority within social movements, and in the actual creation of the popular organisation.

When we perform anarchist propaganda we must think, necessarily, about the camp most conducive to it. We understand that the best propaganda is that which we realise among the social movements that give shape to the class struggle. Thus, seeking short-term gains, working among the people organised by need, we understand it to be possible to plant the seeds of our anarchism by means of propaganda, and carry society to a revolutionary process that opens the way to libertarian socialism. It is not that other alternatives do not serve us, but this reflection on "where and for whom to perform propaganda" must always be made.

[6] In the Regulations of the Geneva Section of the Alliance of Socialist Democracy, written by Bakunin, he recommends: "You cannot become a member without having accepted, sincerely and completely, all of its principles. The older members are obliged and the recent members have to promise to do around them, when possible, the msot active propaganda, both by their example, as well as by words" [our emphasis]. See Conception of Freedom, p. 201.

[7] Errico Malatesta. "La Propaganda Anarquista". Excerpt from L'Adunata dei Refrattari, 26 de dezembro de 1931. In: Vernon Richards. Op. Cit. p. 170.

The Specific Anarchist Organisation: Political Education, Relations, and Resource Management

Finally, we will deal a bit with the other activities of the specific anarchist organisation: political education, relations and resource management

Political education is fundamental to the functioning of the anarchist organisation. At the political level, of the specific anarchist organisation, education has as its main objective to increase the knowledge and theoretical and ideological depth of the militants of the organisation. It also gives support to new militants so that the differences in the level of education between the less and more educated should be as small as possible, and so that the high level of discussion within the organisation is not adversely affected by these differences. In general terms, political education promotes the theoretical and ideological development of the organisation and ensures unity. For the supporter militants of the specific anarchist organisation, political education provides the theoretical and ideological basis for its political line to be understood.

The political education of the political level deepens historical, current and future questions in the same way that knowledge about other ideological currents and social movements does. It is promoted in various ways: by courses and training books for militants, by education seminars, by the self-education that militants do by themselves, among others.

At the social level, of social movements, the anarchist organisation also works with political education in the sense of promoting the development of theory and ideology. This education serves, in the first place, to mobilise people. Then to educate grassroots militants and give the necessary support to enable them to develop theoretically and, if possible, join the groupings of tendency. Finally, political education seeks to develop the militants that act in the grouping of tendency and, having ideological affinities, integrate them into the anarchist organisation. This political education at the social level is fundamental to politicising militants. For the social movements to have the desired characteristics and for them to point to the construction of the popular organisation, it is fundamental that the militants are politicised as much as possible, and in this political education plays a significant role.

Practically, this political education of the social level may also occur in various ways: with the deepening of historical, current and future questions and with knowledge of anarchism and of social movements; with social education books and courses; with lectures and debates; among others.

Political education has a great importance throughout the movement intended for militancy within the logic of concentric circles presented earlier, both at the political level, and the social level.

The relations of the specific anarchist organisation are also fundamental and are divided, in the same way, into the social and political levels.

At the political level, the anarchist organisation seeks to relate to organisations, groups and individuals from all locations, such that this can contribute to its practice. Relations may be more or less organic, more or less formal. Either way, it is important to have partners, and to target larger confederate organisations that bring together different anarchist organisations. At the social level, it seeks to know and relate to social movements, linking itself more or less to them, or even to have contact with other organisms such as universities, councils, foundations, NGOs, human rights and ecological organisations etc.

Resource management of the specific anarchist organisation is done through self-support projects, which take place with the fundraising of the militants themselves, of other people or even through initiatives such as co-operatives and so on and that are fundamental in order to sustain the anarchist organisation and all its activities. Although being against the logic of capitalism, while we live within it we will have to raise and manage funds for the realisation of our activities. These funds are important: for the realisation of social works (transport of militants etc.); for the purchase of books; for the printing of propaganda material (pamphlets, newspapers, books, videos etc.); for structures for the organisation (maintenance of spaces etc.); for travel and other activities.

The Specific Anarchist Organisation: Relations of the Specific Anarchist Organisation with the Social Movements

We have, until now, dealt several times with the separation between the social and political levels of action. We intend to expose, in a little more detail, what we understand by each of these levels, the strengths and weaknesses of each and, especially, the way in which we understand them to be able to relate to one another.

For us, the social level is the ambit in which social movements are developed and in which we must seek to build and increase the social force of the popular organisation. It has social movements as favoured actors, but is not reduced to them. At this level, when we deal with social movements, we emphasise that they should not fit within an ideology, but should be formed around need; a common and concrete cause. They must be organised around concrete and pragmatic questions that seek, in case of victories, to improve the living conditions of the exploited classes. Social movements can be organised to struggle around the question of land, of housing, of work, to defend workers from the bosses, to demand improvements in the community, to advocate many other issues. Within these movements must be all those interested in the struggle around these issues and who would benefit if the struggle was victorious.

As we have seen, the more these social movements are organised and have the desired characteristics (force, class struggle, combativeness, autonomy, direct action, direct democracy and revolutionary perspective), the more they will be able to construct the popular organisation and permanently increase their social force. We understand that it is only with the convergence of the various social movements in the construction of the popular organisation that we will be able to overcome capitalism and the state, and build libertarian socialism through the social revolution. That is, the social level is the most important level for the social transformation that we intend to imprint on society and, without it, any changes that you think of may not produce results other than the creation of a new class of exploiters. Therefore, the social level is the main protagonist in the process of social transformation.

Nevertheless, as we have seen some characteristics are inherent to this social level, which end up complicating this process of social transformation (social movements –> popular organisation –> social revolution –> libertarian socialism). Firstly, because the various political forces that interact with the social movements, and the social movements themselves, often cause them not to have the desired characteristics for this process of transformation to happen.

The difficulties that arise from the authoritarian forces that act in the social movements are many: there are organisations that seek to ideologise the movements, causing them to be weak; there are organisations that try to harness them, causing them to function for their own purposes (that are different to the purposes of the movements); there are movements that do not seek the involvement of the exploited classes and end up becoming a “vanguard” detached from the grass-

roots; there are movements that function only with the help of governments and capitalists; there are movements completely tied to politicians, parties, and other authoritarian groupings; there are movements that want to elect candidates and only participate politically through representative democracy; there are movements that support hierarchical relations in which the leadership decides and the grassroots only obeys; there are reformist movements; there are isolated movements that do not want to connect with others; there are movements that do not produce theory and situational analysis, among many others.

Other difficulties arise from the actual operating of social movements. As they are always organised around short-term struggles, there is a very big risk that their ultimate objective ends up being the simple victory in these struggles. When this happens, many social movements become reformist movements – that is, movements whose aim is an adjustment or achievement within the capitalist system. Most of the time these short-term struggles distance social movements from revolutionary struggle. Moreover, as these movements are in most cases formed spontaneously, there is, undeniably, an organisational difficulty to carry out any long-term struggle. "Therefore, spontaneism, the spontaneous mobilisations of the masses, repercussion of an accumulation of unsolved problems that just 'pop up', if they are not properly channelled and instrumentalised, makes it is difficult to transcend the political plane in terms of changing power relations."[1] As we have seen, social movements are still subject to variations in situation, and they are, sometimes, responsible for demobilisation. These processes of ebb are also often responsible for them to lose the accumulation and learning in struggles.

That is, if on one hand the social level should be the main protagonist of social transformation, on the other it has serious limitations for this to happen. We understand that this transformation will be the result of an addition to this social level, made by the political level.

The political level is the ambit in which the specific anarchist organisation develops. Unlike the social level, the political level is an ideological level; an anarchist level. "The problem of power, decisive in profound social transformation, can only be solved at the political level, through political struggle. And this requires a specific form of organisation: the revolutionary political organisation."[2]

This political level must, necessarily, interact with the social level as we understand that without the social level, the political level is incapable of realising the desired social transformation. Thus, the political level absolutely needs the social level which, as we have said, is the protagonist of social transformation.

> Neither an insurrection, nor a prolonged process of struggle are possible on the backs of, or distant from the masses. The spontaneous predisposition of these, which it is the function of the political organisation to channel in terms of organisation and ideological development, always has an absolutely principal role. You cannot make a revolution on the sidelines or despite the people. And even less build a new social system without the initial support of at least a substantially large sector of the people.[3]

[1] Juan Mechoso. Op. Cit. p. 194.
[2] Ibid.
[3] Ibid. p. 195.

The specific anarchist organisation aims to put into practice a revolutionary politics that conceives the means of reaching the final objectives (social revolution and libertarian socialism) with action always based on strategy. For this, it organises as active minority, co-ordinating the ideological militant activities that work as yeast for the struggles of the social level. The main activity undertaken by this political level is the social work that occurs when the political level interacts with the social level. In this contact the political level seeks to influence the social level as much as possible, causing it to function in the most libertarian and egalitarian way possible. We have seen that this can happen directly between the anarchist organisation and the social movements, or through groupings of tendency. From the moment that the political level obtains this – even partially – we say that it has social insertion. It is only through this social insertion that we understand it to be possible to build the popular organisation and, increasing its social force, reach the final objectives. Therefore, for us, as the political level needs the social level, so too does the social level need the political level.

> Hence the need for an ideological activity of explanation (and to have the elements necessary for it) that is not contradictory, but complements other levels of struggle (economic, military etc.). By ideological activity we do not mean, obviously, "educationalist" ideological preaching, which refers more-or-less exclusively to the diffusion of revolutionary "theory", even though, let us clarify, this also has its importance. Ideological activity is something more than the mere diffusion of theoretical knowledge. The facts, the actual political practice are ingredients, key elements for the integration of a level of revolutionary consciousness. [...] An essential ideological result is based on demonstrating before the people the prospect of victory, a journey of hope, of confidence in the possibility of a profound, revolutionary transformation. [...] And this "demonstrative" function [...] is the function of a politically organised minority, with an ideological level of consciousness that cannot be generated in the spontaneous practice of the masses. A level that implies the overcoming of spontaneism.[4]

Thus, we understand that the social and political levels are complimentary. This because the political level, in this process of influence that occurs when social insertion takes place, seeks to give to the social level the desired characteristics, which it often lacks – some because of the influence of authoritarian political forces, and others because of the workings of the social level itself.

In this interaction with the social level the political level should: fight in order that the movements are not ideologically driven; to avoid the negative influence of all the authoritarians, preventing them from using the social movements for their own ends; to involve the exploited classes as much as possible in the process of struggle and causing them to be the true protagonists of social transformation; to ensure that the movements do not live by the favours and aid of the ruling class, but that they impose their conquests by force; to ensure that the movements are not linked to politicians, parties and other authoritarian groupings; that they do not seek the election of representatives in the parliamentary system, but that they carry out their own politics; in order that everyone from the movements can discuss and deliberate all issues in the most democratic way possible; such that there is no hierarchy; such that the social movements use

[4] Ibid.

their short-term gains in order to build a long-term revolutionary project; such that the social movements connect and build the popular organisation; such that they assist in the elaboration and production of theory and the necessary analysis of the situation; such that spontaneity is transformed into organisation; such that, in case of ebbs, they do not lose the accumulation and learning of struggle.

The social level is characterised by strong ebbs and flows as it varies more than the political level in relation to the conjuncture. Thus, an important political level function it to ensure the continuity of ideology and the accumulation of struggles in times of ebbs (or even of flows) of the social level. This because "the [anarchist] political organisation is also the ambit in which is accumulated the experience of popular struggle, both at national and international level. An instance that prevents the dilution of knowledge that the exploited and oppressed acquire over time."[5] In times of flow of social movements the role of the specific anarchist organisation is to propel them. In times of ebbs, its role is "to keep the flame alight", or to wait and prepare for new opportunities to act.

> Anarchism does not aspire to the conquest of political power, to dictatorship. Its principal aspiration is to help the masses to take the authentic path of social revolution and the construction of socialism. But it is not enough that the masses take the path of the social revolution. It is also necessary to maintain this orientation of the revolution and its objectives: the suppression of capitalist society in the name of the society of free workers.[6]

Thus, the process of the political level influencing the social level seeks to ensure that it possesses the desired characteristics. In cases where they already exit, then the political level only accompanies; in case they do not exist, it struggles to make them exist.

When we define the political level as the specific anarchist organisation of active minority, we are seeking a meaning opposed to that of the authoritarian vanguard organisation. Authoritarians, while also proposing a distinction between the social and political levels, believe that the political level has a relationship of hierarchy and domination in relation to the social level. Thus, the hierarchy and domination from within the political level (of the authoritarian parties) is reproduced in its relations with the social level. Similarly do the authoritarians understand the reproduction of consciousness, which works with hierarchy and domination within the political level, and that in their understanding must be brought from the political level to the social level, from the "conscious" to the "unconscious". This is how the relationship of hierarchy and domination of the political level over the social level works. The relationship is not two-way, of the political to the social and vice versa, but rather a one-way relationship, of only the political to the social – that ends up being a transmission belt of the ideas of the political. The authoritarian idea, which supports the vanguard as a beam of light that intends to illuminate the path of the people, is an example of this. The social level, in darkness, would depend on the light of the political level. We know from diverse historical examples that, in this relationship in which the political level fights for the social, the political level obtains positions of privilege.

> But we anarchists cannot emancipate the people, we want the people to emancipate themselves. We do not believe in good that comes from above and is imposed by

[5] FAU. "Declaración de Principios".

[6] Dielo Trouda. "Organisational Platform for a General Union of Anarchists".

> force; we want the new mode of social life to surge from the people's belly, corresponding to the degree of development attained by man and that can progress as they progress. It is therefore important to us that all interests and all opinions find in conscious organisation the possibility of asserting themselves and influencing collective life in proportion to their importance.[7]

For any specific anarchist organisation the relationship between the social and political levels necessarily implies a serious discussion about the question of ethics. We have assumed from the beginning that: "the FARJ will respect the strong ethical principals that support it, promoting the development of a political culture based on respect for plurality of perspectives and affinity of objectives"[8].

It is through ethics, and only through these, that the anarchist organisation does not act as an authoritarian (even if revolutionary) party. The ethics of anarchism, unlike all other ideologies, holds a unique position on the relationship between the social and political levels. For this reason ethics are absolutely central to any anarchist organisation that wants to work with social movements. Unlike the vanguard organisation, the political level organised as active minority that acts with ethics doesn't have a relationship of hierarchy nor of domination in relation to the social level. For us, as we have emphasised, the social and political levels are complimentary and have a dialectical relationship. In this case, the political level complements the social level, as well as the social level complimenting the political.

Contrary to what the authoritarians propose, the ethics of horizontality that work within the specific anarchist organisation are reproduced in its relationship with social movements. When in contact with the social level the specific anarchist organisation acts with ethics and does not seek positions of privilege, it does not impose its will, does not dominate, does not deceive, does not alienate, it does not judge itself superior, it does not fight for social movements or in front of them. It struggles with social movements, not advancing even one step beyond what they intend to.

We understand that, from this ethical perspective of the political level, there is no fire that is not collectively lit; there is no going forward, illuminating the way of the people while the people themselves come behind in the dark. The objective of the active minority is, with ethics, to stimulate, to be shoulder-to-shoulder, giving solidarity when it is needed and requested. By this, unlike the vanguard, the active minority is legitimate.

> The individual application to support the social movement should be subject to the attitudes of those who intend to work in this situation. The supporter, or even legitimate organisational militant must demonstrate that they are willing to listen much more than to talk. They must become aware of the circumstances in which the natural members that make up the specific social movement in which they are acting live. As part of a whole, i.e., an organisation, they must grow with it and not define its paths and shape in an authoritarian and vertical way. It is important to remember that a collective construction process is always, and above all, a process of self-education. With time, if the proper codes of the group are followed, and only

[7] Errico Malatesta. "La Organización". Excerpt from L'Agitazione, 18 de junho de 1897. In: Vernon Richards. Op. Cit. p. 89.

[8] FARJ. "Carta de Princípios".

> then the supporter or militant will realise that the most important thing is to contrast their ideology with the reality of the group and not to try to reduce the social movement to their ideological certainties.[9]

This does not mean that we advocate a certain type of "grassroots-ism", which understands everything that the social movements advocate to be right. We know that the majority of the time these movements possess characteristics different to those we desire, and what's worse: from time to time make shifts to the right, and defend capitalist or even dictatorial positions, as was the case of fascism. Therefore, if on the one hand we do not believe that we should be in front of the social movements, we also do not believe that we should be behind them, following all their wishes. We want to be in a position of equality and, on seeing that they are distanced from the positions that we believe to be the most correct for the intended project of social transformation, we struggle internally and seek to influence them to have the characteristics already explained.

> It is not that we believe that the masses are always right, or that we want always to follow them in their changing moods. We have a programme, an ideal to make triumph, and that is why we distinguish ourselves from the mass and are party people. We want to act on it, propel it on the path that we believe to be best, but as our objective is to liberate and not to dominate, we want to habituate it to free initiative and free action.[10]

Besides this, contrary to the authoritarians, for us the social level influences and must always influence the political level. That is, the political level, by comparing its ideology with the practice of the social level will also have very important contributions that should be added to the anarchist organisation. We only believe it to be possible for the political level to conceive a consistent revolutionary strategy from the moment that it has contact with practice at the social level. Thus, we argue this two-way street between the political and the social also has a lot to contribute to the political level.

We think that this division between the social and political levels will be necessary until such time as the social revolution is consolidated and secured, with libertarian socialism in function. At this time, the political level should merge into the social level.

[9] Universidade Popular. Op. Cit.

[10] Errico Malatesta. "Enfim! O que é a 'Ditadura do Proletariado'". In: Anarquistas, Socialistas e Comunistas, p. 87.

The Specific Anarchist Organisation: The Need for Strategy, Tactics and Programme

It is essential that the specific anarchist organisation works with a strategy. We can define strategy from the formulation of answers to three questions: 1.) Where are we? 2.) Where do we want to go? 3.) How do we think we can leave where we are and arrive at where we want to be? Strategy is, then, the theoretical formulation of a diagnosis of the present situation, the conception of the situation one wants to reach and a set of actions that will aim to transform the present situation, causing it to reach the desired situation. We can also say that "we understand strategy as a set of elements, united in a systematic and coherent way that points towards great final objectives. [... and] unites the final objectives with the specific historical reality"[1].

Devising our strategy of social transformation is what we are trying to accomplish in this text. Firstly, reflecting on the first question and mapping capitalism and the state, which give body to the society of domination and exploitation, then; reflecting on the second question, trying to conceive our final objectives of social revolution and libertarian socialism. Finally, reflecting on the third question and proposing a social transformation that takes places through social movements, constituted into the popular organisation, in constant interaction with the specific anarchist organisation. All this while considering as priority the interests of the exploited classes. Thus, behind the conception of all this theoretical material is a strategic rationale. In this case strategy was used to conceive a proposal for the social transformation of the current society, seeking to channel it towards libertarian socialism – what we call permanent strategy; a very broad strategy for the realisation of our long-term goals.

Strategy can also be conceived in less broad, even restricted ways. Any action that the specific anarchist organisation, or even its militants, aims to carry out can be strategically conceived. A front of the anarchist organisation, for example, can conceive its work "responding" to the three questions above: 1.) Today we do not have insertion in the community movement of a particular neighbourhood that is growing a lot and we think that good work could be developed there. 2.) In one year we want to be able to carry out regular social work with some insertion. 3.) Therefore, we will try to approach this movement, getting to know it from closer, and start a permanent practice of social work, seeking social insertion.

Similarly a militant can, for example, make a proposal for political self-education, also responding to the three questions. 1.) I have deficiencies on a particular theoretical question that I believe is hampering my militancy. 2.) I would like to resolve this problem in six months, because I think this will open more possibilities for my militancy. 3.) I will do this, firstly, by conversing with the more experienced comrades in my organisation and asking for guidance on where I can find material on the subject, then I will read all the material and propose a debate with other com-

[1] FAU. Resoluciones Sobre el Tema Estrategia.

rades and, finally, I will formalise my ideas into a text and present it to the organisation for the comrades to give their opinions.

In short everything in the organisation, from the most complex to the most simple, can and should be done strategically.

In the specific anarchist organisation the question of strategy development is treated as follows. There should always be wide debate about strategy, including the three questions listed above. The specific anarchist organisation should seek to perform a diagnosis of the reality within which it operates, set the final long-term objectives and, most importantly, determine the different periods and cycles of struggle, each one with their respective objectives. This "macro" line (of diagnostics, medium- and long-term objectives) is called strategy, and the grand objectives (are called) the strategic objectives. Strategy, then, is detailed in a more "micro" line, or tactics, which determines the short-term objectives and the actions that are put into practice by militants or groups of militants that aim to achieve the short-term tactical objectives. Obviously, the achievement of tactical objectives should contribute to the approximation, or even to the achievement, of the strategic objectives.

When this strategic-tactical line of the organisation is established a plan of action is determined, and every militant has a well-defined function and clear objectives to be achieved. It is important to set deadlines for the accomplishment of actions, with assessments of the results at the end of each period or cycle. These assessments are done by evaluations of how the activities are proceeding, whether they are heading towards where we had imagined, if we were wrong about something. In sum: we see if we are moving towards the established objectives, or if we are distancing ourselves from them. If the former case, we correct the errors, make adjustments and proceed in the same way. If the latter, we change tactical actions and eventually the strategy, carrying out the same process again within a certain timeframe. It is this process of moving, evaluating, pursuing, re-evaluating etc. that causes the organisation to advance with strategy and to proceed correctly in the struggle. Thus,

> [...] strategy provides only general lines for a period. It is tactics that embody it in concrete, current reality translating it [the strategy] into deeds. The tactical options, as they respond to more precise, concrete and immediate problems can be more varied, more flexible. However, they cannot be in contradiction with the strategy. An adequate strategic-tactical conception has to take into account, as we have said, the actual situation and the period for which it provides.[2]

The strategy should be the same while the diagnosis of the reality in which one operates and the objectives are the same. "If the general situation experienced very important changes it would alter the conditions under which the organisation has to work and this, if it wanted to act effectively, would have to revise its strategy in order to adapt it to the new situation."[3] The objectives work in the same way. If the objectives change, for example in a post-revolutionary situation, the strategy can be modified. Hence the importance both of the comprehension of the actual situation in which we live, and also of the establishment of clear and precise objectives; essential components in the development of strategy, since "in politics there is no honest and useful

[2] Juan Mechoso. Op. Cit. p. 196.
[3] Ibid.

practice possible without a clearly defined theory and objective"[4]. The diagnosis of the present society that we intend to transform and "the end at which we wish to arrive, by will or by necessity" already [having been] established, "the great problem of life is to find the means that, according to the circumstances, leads with greater security and in the most economic way to the pre-determined end"[5].

The strategic line is formalised into a programme that guides all the actions of the organisation and its militants. "You must never renounce the revolutionary socialist programme, clearly established, both in form and in substance".[6] We understand, therefore, that

> strategy must come alive in a programme of action that establishes general guidelines for a period or stage. A programme must have its roots in the realities of the different levels of our society. Our strategy is unable to advance, to develop, if it does not have fluent contact with concrete problems that exist in the distinct situations that comprise a phase of action.[7]

That is, for the strategic line to be established and formalised into the programme contact with practice, which enables theory with knowledge, is essential. This contact will also enable the correct tactical unfolding of the strategy. The programme

> [...] constitutes the common platform for all the militants in the anarchist organisation. Without this platform, the only co-operation that you could have would be based on sentimental, vague and confused desires and would not have a real unity of perspectives.[...] The programme is not a set of secondary aspects that group (or, often, do not divide) people that think in a similar way, but a body of analysis and proposals that is only adopted by those that believe in it and who choose to spread this work and transform it into reality.[8]

Through the programme the specific anarchist organisation makes known its strategic proposal for social transformation. At the same time as it serves to guide the action of the militants of the organisation, it serves to mark the organisation's positions for other people who are not part of it, making public this set of analyses and proposals.

This set of strategy, tactics and programme gives the organisation a form of planned activities through which it is possible to obtain the best results. Planning is indispensable to any anarchist organisation.

The strategic conception of the specific anarchist organisation has, inevitably, an ideological component. Ideology

> constitutes an essential motor of political action and an inevitable component of any strategy. Every political practice assumes certain motives and a direction that is

[4] Mikhail Bakunin. "Programa Revolucionário e Programa Liberal". In: Conceito de Liberdade, p. 188.

[5] Errico Malatesta. "Los Fines y los Medios". Excerpt from L'En Dehors, 17 August 1892. In: Vernon Richards. Op. Cit. p. 69.

[6] Mikhail Bakunin. "Programa Revolucionário e Programa Liberal". In: Conceito de Liberdade, p. 188.

[7] FAU. Resoluciones Sobre el Tema Estrategia.

[8] George Fontenis. "Libertarian Communist Manifesto".

> only made clearly discernible by the extent to which it is explicit and organised as ideology.[9]

However, we must not confuse ideology and strategy. In relation to ideology strategy is much more flexible since it varies according to the social context, the current situation. Therefore, anarchist ideology may have different strategies, as each organisation operates in completely different contexts and situations. When we talk about tactics, it is an even greater truth. As the social composition of each location is different, as well as the political forces, government positions, reactionary forces etc. it is natural that in each context and conjuncture you apply different tactics to the political practice of anarchism. For example, there are places and contexts in which it is worth considering syndicalism as a space for social work, there are others in which it is not, and so on.

We stated earlier that the specific anarchist organisation should work with strategic and tactical unity, which occurs through the decision-making process described above, that seeks consensus and in cases where it is not possible opts for the vote, the majority winning. In this case all the militants of the organisation are required to follow the winning position. As with any other decision-making process, the issues are clearly posed, debated, and there is an attempt to reconcile the different points of view. This reconciliation not being possible, the organisation must summarise the main proposals and vote. Thus, the organisation decides, by consensus or by vote, the answers to the three questions of strategy. It formulates the tactical-strategic line and everyone goes in the same direction. It periodically evaluates this line, and can reformulate it.

We have stressed that all decisions are made collectively, without any kind of imposition. However, with established priorities and responsibilities each militant cannot do what they wish, by themselves. Each one has an obligation pertaining to the organisation to accomplish that which they committed to and that which was defined as a priority. Obviously, as we have emphasised, we must always try to reconcile the activities that each one likes to do with the responsibilities established by the organisation, but we do not always have to do only what we like.

The model of the specific anarchist organisation implies that the militants have to do things that they do not like very much or stop doing some of the things they like. This is to ensure that the organisation progresses with strategy. Progressing with strategy makes the anarchist organisation a coherent and effective organisation; an organisation dedicated to serious, committed militancy in which the militants do that which they have established as priority and work on the tasks that contribute in the most effective way possible to the consolidation of their strategic objectives. The relatively common practice of many anarchist groups and organisations performing different actions, to the left and to the right, while understanding that they are contributing to a common whole is not accepted. Contrary to this model, practice with strategy

> relates to not doing what one wants, nor isolatedly estimating everything that appears, nor being discouraged because the advance is not immediately visible. It deals with setting objectives and advancing towards them. Of choosing action and establishing priorities in support of these objectives. This clearly implies that there will be activities that we do not realise, events in which we are not involved. They can be important and even spectacular, but they do not count if they do not fit with

[9] Juan Mechoso. Op. Cit. p. 197.

> the proposals for the stage of our programme. In other cases we will be in absolute minority, or with major complications, in activities that are consistent with our objectives. To choose what we like most or what brings fewer complications is not correct politics.[10]

Returning to the issue of voting for the setting of strategy, it is important to state that who is deliberating is the organisation and not one individual or another. So when a strategic issue is settled by the vote, regardless of the vote of each one, all the militants of the organisation have the obligation to follow the collectively determined position. This is an important position in the model of organisation that we advocate because the collectively taken positions are not recommendations, but rather part of a strategic line that must necessarily be followed by all. For us, "organisation means co-ordination of forces with a common objective, and an obligation not to promote actions contrary to this objective"[11]. We must emphasise that the freedom to join an organisation is equal to the freedom to disconnect from one, and, in the case of an individual or minority often feeling neglected by the decisions of the majority, they have the freedom to split. It is important to emphasise that the strategic decisions, even if taken by means of a vote, are collective decisions and not individual disputes within the organisation.

In strategic terms this unity will allow for everyone in the organisation to row the boat in the same direction and can multiply the results of militant forces. Thus, everyone has a similar reading of where we are, were we want to go and how to progress from one point to another.

[10] FAU. Resoluciones Sobre el Tema Estrategia.

[11] Errico Malatesta. "A Organização II". In: Escritos Revolucionários, pp. 59-60.

Especifismo: Anarchist Organisation, Historical Perspectives and Influences

> The lack of visible organisation, normal and accepted by each one of its members makes possible the establishment of arbitrary, less libertarian organisations.
>
> **Luigi Fabbri**

Since the term '*especifismo*' arrived in Brazil in the mid-1990s there has been a series of polemics or even confusions around it. There were, and unfortunately still are people who say that *especifismo* is not anarchism; they accuse *especifista* organisations of being political parties, among other absurdities. When we identify the FARJ as a specific anarchist organisation we are seeking, more than anything else, to locate within the discussion about anarchist organisation what the positions that we espouse are.

The term *especifismo* was created by the Uruguayan Anarchist Federation (Federación Anarquista Uruguaya - FAU) and, by it, we refer to a conception of anarchist organisation that has two fundamental axes: organisation and social work/insertion. These two axes are based on the classical concepts of differentiated actuation of anarchism in the social and political levels (Bakuninist concept) and specific anarchist organisation (Malatestan concept). Therefore, the term *especifismo*, besides having been recently conceived, refers to anarchist organisational practices that have existed since the nineteenth century. In addition to these two axes, there is a series of other organisational questions that are defined within *especifismo* and that we seek to develop next. Therefore, the two main classical references of *especifismo* are Bakunin and Malatesta. This does not mean that we disregard other important theorists such as Proudhon and Kropotkin – we have used many of their theoretical references in this text – but we believe that, for the discussion on anarchist organisation, Bakunin and Malatesta have proposals more suitable for our work.

In the following paragraphs we intend to briefly resume some discussions that we've had throughout this text, and especially this last chapter, and locate them and compare them with other positions that exist within anarchism. We believe that more than affirming the positions we advocate – what we've done so far – it is fitting to realise a few fraternal critiques of other conceptions of organisation (or disorganisation) present within anarchism and, based on a few selected points, to compare our conceptions with others.

Perhaps the best contrast with the *especifista* model of organisation would be what we call the synthesis model, or synthesism. This model was theoretically formalised in two homonymous documents called 'The Anarchist Synthesis', one by Sebastièn Faure and the other by Volin. Historically and globally it was the Platform of Dielo Trouda that established this contrast. We intend to resume part of this debate about anarchist organisation although, in our view, *especifismo* is broader that Platformism – even though it [the latter] possesses a significant influence.

Synthesis advocates a model of anarchist organisation in which are all the anarchists (anarcho-communists, anarcho-syndicalists, anarcho-individualists etc.) and, therefore, it presents many

of the characteristics that we criticise below. We know that some of these characteristics are not necessarily linked to the synthesist model of organisation. However, it is undeniable that many of them are reproduced in organisations of this type, primarily through the influence of individualism, but not only this. We recognise that within synthesist organisations there are also serious militants committed to social anarchism and, therefore, we do not want the criticisms to seem generalised. Although we never question whether these organisations are anarchist (for us, they all are), they do not, in most cases, converge with our way of conceiving anarchist organisation.

First of all, when dealing in this text with the "specific anarchist organisation" from this particular perspective, we are not speaking about any anarchist organisation. There are diverse anarchist organisations that are not *especifista*. Therefore, *especifismo* implies much more than to advocate anarchist organisation.

The first difference is in the way of understanding anarchism itself. As we noted at the beginning of this text we understand anarchism as an ideology, that is, a "set of ideas, motivations, aspirations, values, a structure or system of concepts that have a direct connection with action – that which we call political practice". In this case we seek to differentiate this understanding of anarchism from another, purely abstract and theoretical, which only encourages free thinking, without necessarily conceiving a model of social transformation. Anarchism, thought of only from this model of critical observation of life, offers an aesthetic freedom and endless possibilities. However, if so conceived, it does not offer real possibilities of social transformation, since it is not put into practice, into action. It does not have the political practice that seeks the final objectives.

Especifismo advocates an anarchism that, as an ideology, seeks to conceive a model of performance that transforms the society of today into libertarian socialism by means of the social revolution. This process necessarily involves the organisation of the exploited classes into a popular organisation and demands the use of violence, understood primarily as a response to the violence of the current system. Other anarchist currents are against violence and believe that social transformation can take place in other ways.

Another difference is around the very question of organisation. For us, organisation is an absolutely central question when dealing with anarchism. Without it, we believe it to be impossible to conceive any serious political project which has the objective of arriving at the social revolution and libertarian socialism.

There are anarchist currents that support "anti-organisational" or even *spontaneist* positions, and believe that any form of organisation is authoritarian or averse to anarchism. For these currents, the formation of a desk to co-ordinate an assembly is authoritarian. Anyway, for these anarchists the struggle must take place spontaneously. The gains, if they come, must come spontaneously. The connection between struggles must be spontaneous and even capitalism and the state, if overthrown, would be done so by a spontaneous mobilisation. Perhaps, even after an eventual social revolution, things will evolve on their own, falling into place effortlessly. These anarchists believe that prior organisation is not necessary, others think that it is not even desirable.

Some anarchist individuals that defend these points of view and who are willing to do social work cannot deal with the authoritarian forces and, without the proper organisation, end up being labourers and "sleeves" for authoritarian projects or they leave frustrated because they cannot obtain spaces in social movements.

We noted earlier that we conceive of the specific anarchist organisation as an organisation of active minority. Thus, it is an organisation of anarchists that group themselves together at the political and ideological level and that carry out their main activity at the social level, which is broader, aiming to be the ferment of struggle. In the *especifista* model there is necessarily this differentiation between the political and social levels of activity.

Differently, there are anarchists who conceive of the anarchist organisation as a broad grouping that federates all those who call themselves anarchists, serving as a convergence space for the realisation of actions with complete autonomy. In anarchism, broadly speaking, this division between the social and political levels is also not accepted by all the currents, which understand the anarchist organisation in a diffuse manner, it being able to be a social movement, an organisation, an affinity group, a study group, a community, a co-operative etc.

Even the concept of anarcho-syndicalism, at various times, sought to suppress this difference between levels of activity, blending anarchist ideology with trade unionism. These and other attempts to ideologise social movements, in our understanding, weaken both the social movements – which no longer operate around concrete issues like land, housing, employment etc. – as well as anarchism itself, since it does not allow for the deepening of ideological struggles, which occur in the midst of the social movement. It also weakens, since the goal of these anarchists to turn all the militants of the social movements into anarchists is impossible, unless they significantly reduce and weaken the movements. In this way, or even on seeing that it is natural to find people of different ideologies in social movements that will never be anarchists, these anarchists get frustrated, and often shy away from struggles. As a consequence of this anarchism is often confined to itself.

The anarchist organisation of active minority is often understood, by other anarchist currents, as similar to the authoritarian vanguard organisation. As we have made sure to point out, when we conceive this separation between the social and political level we do not mean to say by this that we wish to be in front of the social movements, nor that the political level has any hierarchy or domination in relation to the social level.

There is also a difference in relation to the preferred space for the practice of anarchism. We *especifistas* believe that this space is the class struggle. Primarily because we consider that we live not only in a society, but in a class society. Regardless of how we think of the differences of these classes, it seems impossible to us to deny that domination and exploitation take place at different levels in our society and that the economic factor has a lot of influence on this. For us, anarchism was born among the people and that's where it should be, taking a clear position in favour of the exploited classes that are in permanent conflict in the class struggle. Therefore, when we talk about "where to sow the seeds of anarchism", for us it is clear that it has to be within the class struggle; in the spaces in which the contradictions of capitalism are most evident.

There are anarchists that do not support this class struggle bias of anarchism and, what is worse, there are those that accuse it of being *assistencialist*,[3] or of wanting "to apologise for the poor". Denying the class struggle, most of these anarchists believe that as the classic definition of bourgeois and proletarian classes does not take today's society into account, then one could say that classes no longer exist; or that this would be an anachronistic concept. We fundamentally disagree with these positions and believe that, regardless of how we define classes – whether

[3] In Brazilian political terminology *assistencialist* (*assistencialista*) is a term to denote someone that does things like, for example, NGOs when they distribute food to the poor. It is linked with charity.

we put more or less emphasis on the economic character etc. – it is undeniable that there are contexts and circumstances in which people suffer more from the effects of capitalism. And it is in these contexts and these circumstances that we want to prioritise our work.

When we seek to apply anarchism to the class struggle we assert what we call social work, and which we defined earlier as "the activity that the anarchist organisation performs in the midst of the class struggle, causing anarchism to interact with the exploited classes". As we also said, for us, this should be the main activity of the specific anarchist organisation. We argue that, through social work, the anarchist organisation should seek social insertion, "the process of influencing social movements through anarchist practice".

There are anarchists who do not defend this work with a view to social insertion. Part do not believe that it is a priority, and the other part, which is more complicated, believe that it is authoritarian. For anarchists who think that social work/ insertion is not a priority, it seems that other activities would be more effective in the development of anarchism – however it is often not stated. Besides, at least apparently, not having a strategic formulation what happens in practice is that these anarchists seek to work with propaganda, very restricted to publications, events and culture. As we have already emphasised, this propaganda is also central for us, but it is not enough if done without the backing of social work and insertion. With this support propaganda is much more effective. Therefore, propaganda, in *especifismo*, should be performed with these two biases: educational/ cultural and struggle with social movements.

Anarchists who do not believe that social work/ insertion are, nor should be a priority prefer to work in other mediums, far away from the class struggle, from social movements, from people of different ideologies. Some say that as members of society they already have social insertion. Often, they become sectarian, managing to get along only with their peers, and "ghettoising" anarchism. This explains the sectarianism of some anarchists, which occurs in much smaller proportion with specific organisations.

Much more complicated than the above position is the position advocated by anarchists that are against social work and insertion. These anarchists believe that as they are often not poor, as they are often not in social movements (they are not landless, for example) it is authoritarian to work with a poor community or even with social movements, since "they are from outside this reality". For them it is authoritarian for a person who has somewhere to live to support the struggle of the homeless; it is authoritarian to frequent a community movement without being from the community; it is authoritarian to support the waste-pickers' struggle if you are not one of them. For these anarchists there is only legitimacy in working with popular movements if you are a "popular", and if you are part of the reality of the movement. As these anarchists are generally not in these conditions, they do not approximate themselves to social movements nor to the class struggle. They end up making of their anarchism a "movement in itself", which is characterised by being essentially of the middle class and intellectuals, by not seeking contact with social and popular struggles, by not being in contact with people of different ideology. Indeed, this anarchism of the intellectual and middle class, when not seeking social work and insertion necessarily ends up in one of two ways. Either it abandon the proposal for social transformation, or constitute itself into a group that fights for the people, not with the people – assuming the position of vanguard and not of active minority.

Social work, for these militants, is often compared to the "entryism" of the authoritarian left – people that enter into social movements to make them work in their favour. In most cases they advocate spontaneity since "to come from outside", "to put anarchism within social movements"

is authoritarian. According to them ideas should arise spontaneously. They denounce discussion, persuasion, convincing, exchange, influence as external to social movements and, therefore, authoritarian.

We *especifistas* also radically disagree with this position against social work and insertion. As we explained, for us anarchism should not be confined to itself, nor shy away from social movements and people of different ideologies. It should serve as a tool, like yeast, as the engine of the struggle of our time. For this, anarchism, instead of hiding, should confront reality and seek to transform it. For this transformation it is useless "to preach to the converted"; we have, necessarily, to interact with non-anarchists.

Since we understand that class is not defined by origin but by the position that you advocate in the struggle, we believe that to support social movements, to assist mobilisations and organisations different to the reality in which you are included is an ethical obligation for any militant committed to the end of class society. Finally, we believe that social work brings necessary practice to anarchism, which has an immense contribution in the development of the theoretical and ideological line of the organisation. This activity is for us extremely important in our theoretical development, since it means that we theorise while having knowledge of reality and the practical application of anarchism in struggles. Groups and organisations that do not have social work tend to radicalise a discourse that does not have support in practice. When this happens, the tendency is for an ultra-radical and revolutionary discourse to exist – often accusing others of being reformists etc. – but that does not go beyond theory.

As we have seen, in *especifismo* there is ideological and theoretical unity, an alignment in relation to the theoretical and ideological aspects of anarchism. This political line is collectively constructed and everyone in the organisation is obliged to follow it. Because we consider anarchism something very broad, with very different or even contradictory positions, it appears necessary to us that, between all these positions, we must extract an ideological and theoretical line to be advocated and developed by the organisation. As we have emphasised this line must, necessarily, be linked to practice since we believe that "to theorise effectively it is essential to act".

For anarchists that do not advocate this unity the anarchist organisation could work with different ideological and theoretical lines. Each anarchist or group of anarchists may have their interpretation of anarchism and their own theory. This is motive for various conflicts and splits in organisations with this conception. As their is no agreement on initial questions the fights are frequent, as some think that anarchist should do work with social movements, others find this authoritarian and a "Marxist thing"; some think that the function of anarchism is to enhance the ego of individuals, others are radically against this, and so on. For us, there is no way to have an effective practice or even constitute an organisation without agreeing on some "initial questions". In organisations that do not work with ideological and theoretical unity there is no development in this direction, since with so many problems on the simplest questions, the most complex don't even come to be discussed. Bakunin was right when we said, "who embraces much, tightens little"[1]. It is important

> to understand that the division that exists between anarchists on this point is much deeper than is commonly believed, and that it equally implies an irreconcilable theoretical disagreement. I say this to respond to my good friends, who favouring an

[1] Mikhail Bakunin. "Programa Revolucionário e Programa Liberal". In: Conceito de Liberdade, p. 189.

> agreement at any price, claim: "We should not create problems of method! The idea is one alone and the goal is the same; we therefore remain united without being torn apart by a small disagreement over tactics". I, on the contrary, realised long ago that we are torn apart precisely because we're very close, because we are artificially close. Under the apparent veneer of the community of three or four ideas – abolition of the state, abolition of private property, revolution, anti-parliamentarianism – there is an enormous difference in the conception of each one of these theoretical statements. The difference is so great that it prevents us from taking the same path without prosecuting us and without reciprocally neutralising our work or, if we wanted to, remaining in peace without renouncing what we believe to be true. I repeat: there is not only a difference of method, but a big difference of ideas.[2]

Besides ideological and theoretical unity, *especifistas* advocate strategic and tactical unity. To act with strategy, as we have seen, implies taking into account a plan of all the practical actions performed by the organisation, seeking to verify where you are, where you want to go and how. Anarchism that works with strategic and tactical unity makes of planning and its alignment in practical application a strong organisational pillar. This because we believe that lack of strategy disperses efforts, causing many of them to be lost. We advocate a model in which a way forward is collectively discussed, and together with this path, we have established priorities and responsibilities assigned to militants. The priorities and responsibilities mean that everyone is not going to be able to do what passes through their head, whenever they want. Each one will have an obligation to the organisation to accomplish that which they undertook and that which was defined as a priority. Obviously we seek to reconcile the activities that each one likes to do with the priorities set by the organisation, but we don't always have to do only what we like to do. An *especifista* model implies that we have to do things that we don't like very much or to cease doing some things that we like a lot. This is to ensure that the organisation proceeds with strategy, with everyone rowing the boat in the same direction.

We criticise with emphasis organisations that do not work with strategy. For us it is not possible to work in an organisation in which each militant or group does what they think best, or simply that which they like to do, believing themselves to be contributing to a common whole. Generally, when anarchists of all types are grouped in an organisation, without having strategic affinities, there is no agreement on how to act. That is, it is not possible to establish a way of proceeding, and there is only one agreement: that things must keep going.

How do you conceive an organisation in which you seek to reconcile a group that believes it should act as a specific organisation in a social movement with a group that thinks that the priority should be social interaction among friends, group therapy or even the exaltation of the individual, considering work with social movements as authoritarian (or even Marxist or *assistencialist*)? There are two ways of managing these differences: either you discuss the issues, and live between fights and stress which consume a large part of the time; or you simply do not touch on the issues. Most organisations of this type opt for the second form.

> In order to establish a degree of co-ordination in action, necessary co-ordination, I believe, among people who tend toward the same goal, certain conditions are imposed:

[2] Luigi Fabbri. "A Organização Anarquista". In: Anarco-Comunismo Italiano, pp. 104-105.

> a number of rules linking each one to all, certain frequently revised pacts and agreements – if missing all this, if each one works as they please, the more serious people will find themselves in a situation where the efforts of some will be neutralised by those of others. From this will result disharmony and not the harmony and serene confidence to which we tend.[3]

Ideological and theoretical unity and strategic and tactical unity are attained through the collective decision-making process adopted by specific organisations, which is an attempt at consensus and, if this is not possible, the vote – the majority winning. As we have also emphasised, in this case the whole organisation adopts the winning decision. Differently, there are organisations that only work with consensus, often allowing one or other person to have an exacerbated influence on a decision-making process that involves a much larger number of people. Seeking consensus at any cost, and afraid of splitting, these organisations allow for one or another person to have a disproportionate weight in decisions, only in order to achieve consensus. Other times, they spend hours on discussions of little importance only to seek consensus. We have in mind that the decision-making process is a means and not an end in itself.

The obligation of everyone to follow the same path – which is a rule in *especifismo* – is a commitment that the organisation has to its strategy, because, if every time a decision taken does not please some of the militants, and this party refuses to perform the work, it will be impossible for the organisation to move forward. In the case of voting it is important to bear in mind that, at one time, some will win the vote and work on their proposal; at another time they will lose and work on the proposal of other comrades. With this form of decision-making it gives more importance to collective deliberations than to individual points of view.

There is a difference, even, on the central points that favour the specific organisation: the commitment, responsibility and self-discipline of militants within the organisation. In the *especifista* model there is a high level of this militant commitment. Thus, it is essential that the militants assume commitments before the organisation and implement them. Militant commitment imprints a link between militant and organisation, which is a mutual relationship in which the organisation is responsible for the militant, as well as the militant being responsible for the organisation. As well as the organisation owing satisfaction to the militant, the militant owes satisfaction to the organisation.

Lack of commitment, responsibility and self-discipline constitutes a major problem in many anarchist groups and organisations. It is very common for people to come together and to more-or-less participate in activities, doing only that which interests them, often participating in decisions, assuming commitments and not fulfilling them or, simply, not assuming commitments. There are lots of organisations that are compliant with this lack of militant commitment. It is undeniable that, for this reason, these organisations are "cooler" to be part of, however, they are not very effective from a militant point of view. As militancy, for us, is something necessary in the struggle for a free and egalitarian society we do not believe that it will always be "cool". If we had to choose between a more effective model of militancy and another more "cool", we would have to opt for effectiveness.

For work with militant commitment *especifismo* maintains an organisation with levels of commitment. As we have explained, we advocate the logic of concentric circles in which all militants

[3] Mikhail Bakunin. "Táctica e Disciplina do Partido Revolucionário". In: Conceito de Liberdade, pp. 197-198.

have a well-defined space in the organisation, a space which is determined by the level of commitment that the militant wants to assume. The more they want to commit themselves, the more inside the organisation they will be and the greater will be their deliberating power. Therefore, both at the political level as well as the social level there are well-defined entrance criteria, from the instances of supporter or groupings of tendency to the specific anarchist organisation. Only militants with ideological affinity with the organisation are inside the specific anarchist organisation.

Contrary to the *especifista* model, there are other organisations whose only criteria for the entrance of militants is their definition as anarchists, regardless of what conception of anarchism they have. Some people participate a bit in the organisation, others are more committed; some assume more responsibilities than others and all have the same power of deliberation. Thus, many deliberate on activities that they are not going to perform, that is, they determine what others will do. When an organisation allows for someone to deliberate something and not assume responsibilities, or that they assume responsibilities and do not meet them it allows for an authoritarianism of those who deliberate and put work on the backs of other comrades. Finally, in this other model, each one involves themselves in the way they perceive best, appearing when they think they should, and there is little emphasis on the question of militant commitment. Many, when they are questioned, claim themselves victims of authoritarianism. As we have explained, for us this model of organisation, besides overloading the more responsible militants, ends up by allowing this discrepancy of people who do not deliberate and work in the same proportion.

Therefore, we do not want to be this great "umbrella" that covers all types of anarchists. These broad (in)definitions apparently group more anarchists in the organisation, however, we believe that we should not opt for the criterion of quantity, but the quality of militants.

> There is no doubt that if we avoid properly specifying our true character the number of our adherents could become greater. [...] It is evident, on the other hand, that if we proclaim loudly our principles the number of our adherents will be less, but at least they will be serious adherents on whom we can count.[4]

A relevant difference also occurs around the issue of anarchist individualism. *Especifismo* means a complete and absolute rejection of anarchist individualism. For this reason it differs from other organisations that are willing to work with individualists. For us, there are two types of individualists in anarchism. One type, which was more common in the past, of people that prefer to work alone, but that have in mind the same project as us. In these people we only have to criticise the fact that, being disorganised, they cannot potentialise the results of their work. Another type, more in evidence today, renounces the socialist project. Based on the anarchist critique of the state they have little critique of capitalism, and no activity in the direction of socially transforming the reality in which we live. Putting themselves in the condition of simple critical observers of society, they construct an anarchism from secondary thinkers and references, simply around criticism. They don't have any societal project, much less coherent action that points towards this new society. We might ask:

> what then remains for us of anarchist individualism? The denial of class struggle, the denial of the principle of an anarchist organisation, whose purpose is the free society

[4] Idem. "Programa Revolucionário e Programa Liberal". In: Conceito de Liberdade, pp. 188-189.

> of equal workers: and even more, empty quackery encouraging workers unhappy with their existence to take part by resorting to personal solutions, supposedly open to them as liberated individuals.[5]

Thus they exacerbate the role of individual freedom, which, removed from collective freedom becomes merely an egotistical pleasure for the delight of a few who can, through their privileges within capitalism, afford it. In reality, individual freedom can only exist in collective freedom, for the slavery of others limits the freedom of each, and full individual freedom can only be realised at the moment in which, collectively, all are free. We agree with Bakunin when he said:

> I can only consider and feel myself free in the presence and in relation to other men. […] I am only truly free when all human beings around me, men and women, are equally free. The other's freedom, far from being a limitation or denial of my freedom, is, on the contrary, its necessary condition and confirmation. Only the freedom of others makes me truly free, in such a way that, the more numerous are the free men that surround me, and the more extensive and broad their freedom, the greater and deeper will become my freedom. […] My personal freedom thus confirmed by the freedom of all extends to infinity.[6]

For us it is impossible to seek individual freedom in a society like ours, in which millions do not have access to the most basic necessities of a human being. One cannot think of a purely individual anarchism as a way of positioning yourself in the world, of having a different lifestyle. For individualists, in most cases, to be an anarchist means to be an artist, a bohemian, to promote the sexual freedom of having open relationships or with more than one partner, to wear different clothes, to have a radical haircut, to behave extravagantly, to eat different foods, to define yourself personally, to fulfill yourself personally, to be against revolution (?!), to be against socialism (?!), to have a discourse without rhyme or reason – enjoying the freedom of aesthetics – in short, becoming apolitical. We disagree fundamentally with this position and believe that the influences in this direction are disastrous to anarchism, deterring serious and committed militants. Finally, we agree with Malatesta when he stressed:

> It is true we would like, all of us, to be in agreement and to unite into a single, powerful beam all the forces of anarchism. But we do not believe in the soundness of organisations made by the force of concessions and restrictions, where there is no real sympathy and agreement among members. It is better to be disunited than badly united.[7]

For us choosing the most appropriate model of anarchist organisation is crucial so that we have the most appropriate means, consistent with the ends we seek to achieve. If we advocate *especifismo*, which is a form of anarchist organisation, it is because we believe that it is today more suitable for the work we intend to perform. We understand that there are anarchists who do not agree with *especifismo*, and we do not think that they are less anarchist because of it. We only demand respect for our choice, such as we respect those who have made other choices.

[5] Dielo Trouda. "El Problema de la Organización y la Noción de Síntesis".

[6] Mikhail Bakunin. Império Knuto-Germânico. Cited in Daniel Guérin (org.). Textos Anarquistas (trechos de Ni Dieu, Ni Maître). Porto Alegre: LP&M, 2002, pp. 47-48.

[7] Errico Malatesta. "A Organização II". In: Escritos Revolucionários, p. 62.

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We now turn, briefly, to *especifismo's* historical perspective and influences. As we have seen the term *especifismo* was developed by the FAU and only arrived in Brazil in the late twentieth century. Nevertheless, this term, more than creating a new conception of anarchist organisation sought to group a series of already existing anarchist organisational conceptions, which took shape starting from the nineteenth century. The *especifismo* of the FAU asserts the influence of Bakunin and Malatesta, of the class struggle of anarcho-syndicalism, of expropriator anarchism; all this within a Latin American context. We will attempt to explain in the following paragraphs, from our own conception, how we understand the historic experience of *especifismo*: the main past experiences, in terms of anarchist organisation, which influence us today.

Especifismo's first historic reference is Bakunin, from the organisational conceptions that constituted the activity of the libertarians within the International Workers' Association (IWA), and which gave body to anarchism.

The IWA was articulated from the visits of the representatives of the French workers' associations to England, where they contacted English and exiled German union leaders – amongst the latter, Karl Marx. Politically, the composition of the IWA appeared heterogeneous: Marxists, Blanquists, republicans, trade unionists and Proudhonian federalists. The Marxists ended up by forming a majority in decision-making in the Central Committee, aligning themselves with members of other currents and taking control of that body. This situation persisted even after the substitution of the Central Committee by the General Council in the 1866 Geneva Congress. There one saw that the anarchists, be they inspired by Proudhon or followers of Bakunin, did not have any force in the central executive of the association. They were more influential through the grassroots, showing this in the congresses.

Two tendencies developed within the IWA: one centralist and one federalist. Among the authoritarian centralists stood out the communists, theoretically and politically guided by Marx, who counted on the IWA as an instrument to bring the proletariat into political power. They sought to constitute a workers' state apparatus for the transformation of capitalist society into communism through an intermediate period of re-organisation, necessarily to be undertaken under a dictatorship. Among the libertarian federalists were the anarchists, who advocated social revolution with the immediate abolition of all bodies of authority and the formation of a new society based on the free and federative organisation of workers, according to their occupations, problems and interests.

This basic divergence had been present from the beginning and was already clearly visible at the Geneva Congress, the first plenary meeting of the International. Against the authoritarians were the Proudhonian mutualists, who led the debate supported by collectivists that already belonged to the IWA before Bakunin had affiliated himself to it. In the Lausanne (1867) and Brussels (1868) Congresses collectivism had rapidly come to gain ground in relation to mutualism, and in Basel (1869) the collectivist attendance was in strong predominance among those averse to authority, and strengthened by the presence of Bakunin. In the competing camp Marx, while avoiding to make a personal commitment in the congresses, made his interventions through programmes, reports, newsletters and proposals of the Council. In Basel, Bakunin presented a proposal against the right of inheritance. Marx opposed him, but the proposal was approved.

Still in the context of the IWA Bakunin, together with other anarchist militants, formed the Alliance of Socialist Democracy, which would be accepted as a section of the IWA in 1869. We

understand the Alliance as a specific anarchist organisation (political level) that operated within the IWA (social level). The Alliance was an organisation of active minority composed of the "most secure, most dedicated, most intelligent and most energetic members, in a word, by the closest"[8]. It was formed to act secretly in order to address the issues that one could not publicly address and to act as a catalyst in the labour movement. The Alliance defined the relation between the social and political levels:

> The Alliance is the necessary complement of the International... – But the International and the Alliance, while tending towards the same final objective, pursue different goals at the same time. One has as its mission to unite the labouring masses, the millions of workers, across the differences of nations and of countries, across the borders of all states, into one immense and compact body; the other, the Alliance, has as its mission to give to the masses a truly revolutionary direction. The programmes of the one and the other, without being opposites at all, are different by the degree of their respective development. That of the International, if we take it seriously, is also in germ, but only in germ, the whole programme of the Alliance. The programme of the Alliance is the ultimate explanation of the programme of the International.[9]

The practice of the Alliance within the IWA caused the authoritarian tendency to seek to isolate and discredit the practice of the libertarians. After the Basel Congress attacks on the collectivist group intensified. In 1870 Marx directed two private communications of the General Council to the IWA sections, with severe criticisms of the Bakuninist positions. With this he prepared the climate for the London Conference of the following year, during which the Marxist group attempted to impose the doctrine of the conquest of state power, and for the Hague Congress of 1872. In this plenary, he urged for the expulsion of Bakunin from the IWA, which he obtained. By 1874 the International was defunct.

The second historical reference of *especifismo* is Malatesta, a militant who came to join the Bakuninist Alliance and who was a representative of the *organisationalist* current of anarchist communism. Following the collectivist tradition of the anarchism of Bakunin's time – which advocated, in the future society, distribution to each according to their work – was born the anarchist communist current – which has since then advocated distribution to each according to their needs. Malatesta was characterised by defending, within this current, positions against evolutionism and scientism present in a large part of the socialist movement. For Malatesta, the future would not be necessarily determined and could only be modified by will, by a voluntarist intervention in events in order to provide the desired social transformation.

Outspoken critic of individualism, Malatesta advocated an anarchism based completely on organisation, an anarchism that we could call "*organisationalist*", and that, like the anarchism of Bakunin, maintained a distinct role at the social and political level. At the political level, Malatesta developed his conception of the specific anarchist organisation, which he called the anarchist party[10]: "by anarchist party we understand all those who want to contribute to achieving anar-

[8] Mikhail Bakunin. "Educação Militante". In: Conceito de Liberdade, p. 154.

[9] Ibid. pp. 151-152.

[10] Do not confuse the term party used here with the parties that compete in elections or that seek to take the state through revolution. As we have already stressed, "anarchist party" for Malatesta is the same thing as specific anarchist organisation.

chy, and that, consequently, they need to set an objective to be achieved and a road to travel"[11]. This organisation should act in the so-called "mass movements" of the time and influence them as much as possible, and the unions were the preferred terrain chosen for anarchist activity. Malatesta clearly pointed out the differences between the political level of anarchism and the social level, the space of insertion which was constituted, at the time, by syndicalism:

> In my opinion, the labour movement is no more than a means – though there is no doubt that it is the best means we have. But I refuse to accept this means as an end [...]. Syndicalists, on the other hand, have a certain propensity to transform the means into ends and consider the parts as a whole. And, in this way, for some of us syndicalism begins to be transformed into a new doctrine that threatens the very existence of anarchism. [...] I lamented, in the past, that comrades isolated themselves from the labour movement. I lament today that, at the other extreme, many of us allow ourselves to be swallowed by the same movement. Once again, the organisation of the working class, the strike, direct action, boycott, sabotage and armed insurrection itself are only the means; anarchy is the end.[12]

Advocating an anarchism that seeks social transformation from will, Malatesta believed, as we believe today, that the specific anarchist organisation should act within the class struggle, in the midst of the social movements and, with them, reach the social revolution and libertarian socialism – which he called anarchy. For this Malatesta sought to create both specific anarchist organisations, as in the case of the Italian Anarchist Revolutionary Socialist Party and the Italian Anarchist Union; as well as organisations that acted at the social level, as in the cases of the Italian Syndical Union (USI), the Labour Alliance, and the unions in Argentina. The positions of Malatesta were widely disseminated by Luigi Fabbri, another Italian anarchist communist, who also made significant contribution to *especifismo*.

An important experience for *especifismo*, in our conception, was also that of *Magonismo* in the radical phase of the Mexican Liberal Party (PLM). Ricardo Flores Magón, its most active militant, joined the PLM in 1901 – it having been founded a year earlier. During the Porfírio Diaz dictatorship both the PLM and the journal *Regeneración* were major opponents of the regime. From the second half of the 1900s the PLM radicalised, taking a more combative discourse and creating an internal tension within the party, which removed the less radical elements. The PLM did not compete in elections and served only as a space for the political and horizontal articulation of the libertarian revolutionaries of the time – without objectives of taking the state and establishing a dictatorship – to put an end to the Diaz government, establishing libertarian communism in turn. The PLM became clandestine and organised more than 40 armed resistance groups throughout Mexico and also had indigenous members, known for their struggle for community rights and against capitalist property. After the radicalisation, Francisco Madero disagreed that peaceful means to take Diaz's power would be exhausted.

The electoral fraud of 1910 led by Diaz would initiate the explosion of the Mexican Revolution. With the arrest of Madero his opponent in the elections managed to get himself re-elected. Exiled in San Antonio, Texas, Madero drew up the San Luis Plan, calling for an armed uprising, besides declaring null the 1910 elections, rejecting the election of Diaz and instituting himself as provi-

[11] Errico Malatesta. "A Organização II". In: Escritos Revolucionários, p. 56.

[12] Idem. "Sindicalismo: a crítica de um anarquista". In: George Woodcock. Op. Cit. pp. 208; 212.

sional president. Many rebels responded to the revolutionary call; among them Emiliano Zapata, who played an important role in the organisation of the indigenous people of the Morelos region, and Pancho Villa, a former cattle thief and bank robber, long recognised by the humble of the Durango and Chihuahua regions. They were united in an anti-re-electionist front, which gave each group a relative degree of autonomy and independence. In 1911, in the midst of the revolution and with the support of the North American Industrial Worker of the World (IWW) union the anarchists, with Magón at the fore, occupied the region of Baja California, taking important cities like Mexicali. At the end of January they constituted the Socialist Republic of Baja California, the first socialist republic in the world. The *Magonistas* also had victories in cities such as Nuevo Leon, Chihuahua, Sonora, Guadalupe and Casas Grandes; spaces that would be lost after the repression occasioned by the Madero government.

The revolts organised by Zapata in Morelos and the Ayala Plan constituted themselves as instruments of the peasants' struggle for the revolution, always inspired by the slogan, "Land and Freedom", first sung by Praxédis Guerrero and spread by the *Magonistas*. Fruit of this important relationship between *Zapatistas* and *Magonistas* was Zapata's invitation for Magón to bring *Regeneración* to Morelos.

After that Mexico sank into a period of civil war and tried to establish a Convention at the end of 1914. The events that took place in sequence, like the attempted taking of Mexico City by Villa and Zapata, the convening of the Constituent Assembly by Carranza, who would later be elected president and then be assassinated; and the conflicts that followed in the country eventually ended up forming the backdrop of the decline of the revolutionary period in the country.

Another important historic reference to *especifismo* is the anarchist participation in the Russian Revolution. In early 1917 several regiments mutinied in St. Petersburg, a provisional government arose acclaimed by parliament and the soviets of 1905 were reborn. The slogan, "all power to the soviets" was evident. In the field, in southern Ukraine the peasants of Gulyai-Polye, a village that since the 1905 revolution had had strong anarchist organisation, founded the Peasants Union; which decided to fight for the social revolution independent of the government, seeking self-management of the means of production. In Petrograd it claimed workers' control in the factories and Kronstadt sailors, carrying red and black flags, marched on the city with the goal of instituting a soviet and self-managed republic. In October anarchist and Bolshevik soldiers acting in concert were able to take the Winter Palace, then came a divide between the authoritarian and libertarian revolutionary elements. The former were for seizing the state apparatus and moving towards the dictatorship of the (Bolshevik) Party, directed by an all-powerful central committee; the latter for libertarian and self-managed communism in the form of councils of soviets of workers, peasants and the people in arms.

Progressively, the Bolsheviks began to deny, suppress, impede and, finally, prohibit the spread of libertarian ideas and practices. As early as 1918 the Bolsheviks positioned themselves against the workers' control of factories, encouraging the blind discipline of workers to the party, and were gradually consolidating the prohibition of opposition to the party. They militarised labour, expelled elected leaders from the soviets, forced these [the soviets] to submit to the central power of the party and prohibited strikes.

In the struggle against the White Army the insurrectionary army of Makhno in the Ukraine allied with the Bolsheviks more than once. On defeating the White threat the Makhnovist army was attacked and persecuted by the Red Army, forcing the survivors to take refuge in other countries. It was the end of the process of self-managed socialisation in the Ukraine, repressively

reversed by the Bolsheviks in favour of statist and totalitarian forms of organisation and social control under a new ruling class. The Kronstadt sailors – who demanded that the delegates to the soviets go back to being chosen by election; freedom for anarchists and other leftist groups; that unions and peasant organisations return to being united; the release of political prisoners; the abolition of political officers; and the same food for all – were killed by the Bolsheviks.

Despite this proletarian and libertarian revolution having been usurped and dominated by the Bolsheviks, as from their seizure of the state apparatus, the anarchists sinned by omission on the matter of organisation. This reflection was formalised years later by Russian immigrants who were in Europe, in a document called the Organisational Platform of Libertarian Communists. Makhno, Arshinov and others formalised in this document their considerations on anarchist organisation, informed by the experiences of the Russian Revolution. This document brought forward important insights about the importance of the involvement of anarchists in the class struggle, the need for a violent social revolution that overthrows capitalism and the state and that establishes libertarian communism. There is also an important contribution on the question of the transition from capitalism to libertarian communism and on the defence of the revolution. The Platform advocates an anarchist organisation, at the political level, that acts in the midst of social movements, a social level, and emphasises the role of active minority of the anarchist organisation. Moreover, it makes important contributions on the model of organisation of the political level of the anarchists. For these reasons, it is an important document and has considerable influence in *especifismo*.

However, we do not believe that *especifismo* is the same thing as Platformism. As we have been trying to show throughout this text, for us, especifismo is much broader than Platformism and has its theoretical basis in the organisational conceptions of Bakunin and Malatesta. For us, the Platform both draws from these authors and brings new contributions and should therefore be considered as a contribution to *especifismo*, but not the most important contribution. Another factor to be taken into account is that the Platform was written about an experience of the military action of anarchists in the midst of a revolutionary process, and should not be removed from this context. We understand that this form of organisation, as expressed in the Platform, should not be applied in all its details in non-revolutionary situations. It is more a contribution to the discussion of anarchist military action than a document to discuss anarchist organisation in all different contexts.

As with the Russian Revolution, we also consider the Spanish Revolution of 1936 a reference. During those years a social revolution was effectively carried out. A revolution under fire that wanted to reach all sectors, from unjust economic structures to the daily life of the population; from the decrepit notions of hierarchy to the historic inequalities between men and women. And all this was the work of the anarchists.

The influences of anarchism were brought to Spain by Giuseppe Fanelli, *alliancist* and militant very close to Bakunin. Founded in 1910, the National Confederation of Labour (Confederación Nacional del Trabajo - CNT) was the greatest expression of anarcho-syndicalism in Spain and lived, until the 1920s, between moments of ebb and flow with constant repression, of which it was victim. Founded in 1927, the Iberian Anarchist Federation (Federación Anarquista Ibérica - FAI) was a clandestine organisation dedicated to revolutionary activity which, among its objectives, sought to oppose the reformist currents in the CNT. The action achieved success, and the revolutionary anarchists obtained hegemony in the CNT.

In 1936 the Popular Front (bringing together the parties of the left) was able to win at the polls. The anarchists of the CNT ended up tactically supporting the Front because this would mean the release of imprisoned comrades. With the endorsement of the CNT the victory of the Popular Front was made possible. However, the fascists did not accept the defeat. On July 18,1936, the Phalangist coup movement breaks out, among which Francisco Franco stood out. Thus began the revolutionary explosion that would throw the country into three years of civil war. In the first phase (July 1936 to early 1937) the anarchists are among the most prominent groups. The action of militants in areas such as Catalonia was exemplary. The republican structures turned into popular organisations in an intense and successful process of collectivisation. Factories were occupied and immediate social measures put into practice, such as: equal pay between men and women, free medical service, permanent salary in case of sickness, reduced working hours and increased pay. Metallurgical, timber industry, transport, food, health, media and entertainment services and rural properties were collectivised. In order to combat the fascist forces they set up militias that advanced on some fronts, especially the column headed by Buenaventura Durruti.

In the second phase (1937 to 1939) the progress of the counter-revolution was devastating. The Phalangists had massive support from Hitler and Mussolini. The resistance was poorly armed and outnumbered. The International Brigades, formed to halt the Nazi-Fascist advance, had few fighters. Furthermore there was no help from the liberal nations (France and England), which once again washed their hands. The "support" from the USSR proved to be a true "Trojan Horse". Within the struggle against fascism a parallel hunt – promoted by the Stalinists – for the anarchists and unorthodox Labour Party of Marxist Unification (POUM) was taking place. The advances made by the CNT/FAI were destroyed by those who sought to re-establish the foundations of the state (moderate sectors of the Republic, Communists and Socialists). The Communists began to gain key positions in the government. The anarchists had to give in once more to unfavourable circumstances: some members of the CNT ended up participating in the government.

In Brazil we can say that, since the *especifista* current was not in fact realised in its fullness, our ideological references relate to some initiatives of the past and others we think signatories of the same current in the country's more recent history. We understand that from the earliest years of the twentieth century anarchists linked to "organisationalism", in particular followers of Malatesta, struggled to organise a possible number of comrades with a view to forming an organisation with common strategies and tactics, based on tactical agreements and clear group understanding.

It was these who were responsible for conducting the First Congress of Brazilian Workers in 1906, through the initiatives of the most breathtaking of the national anarchism. These anarchists prepared the conditions that allowed for the full insertion of anarchists in the unions and in social life, with the formation of schools and theatre groups, besides a reasonable written production. It was also, to a large extent, the "organisationalist" current that eventually helped in the preparation of the Anarchist Insurrection of 1918, the creation of the Anarchist Alliance of Rio de Janeiro, in the formation of the Brazilian Communist Party, libertarian in feature, and in the events that distinguished the anarchists from the Bolsheviks in the 1920s.

In this first phase the names of Neno Vasco, José Oiticica, Domingos Passos, Juan Peres Bouzas, Astrojildo Pereira (until 1920) and Fábio Luz stand out. Later, after social anarchism had been in slumber for almost two decades, part of the organisationalist tradition resurfaced in the journal Ação Direta (Direct Action) and then, with the consummation of the 1964 military coup we again

lose our main force in this camp, represented by Ideal Peres and the students of the Libertarian Student Movement (Movimento Estudantil Libertário - MEL).

Finally, another Latin influence on *especifismo* that we advocate is the Uruguayan Anarchist Federation (Federación Anarquista Uruguyaya - FAU), formed in 1956 of class struggle and anarcho-syndicalist influences, of the organisational models of Bakunin and Malatesta, and of the expropriator anarchism from the Plate River region. Seeking to develop an anarchism that confronts Latino problems the FAU has, since its creation, performed work in various fronts. It participated in the trade union activities of the National Convention of Workers (CNT), which had a non-bureaucratic model with internal democracy and class struggle tendencies. Direct action associations were established within the so-called Combative Tendency. With its illegality being enacted in 1967 the FAU went underground.

Even during this period of clandestinity, with a lot of repression and the arrest of militants, the FAU managed to maintain their union activity in the CNT, in the student movement and in the struggle against the collaborationism of the Communist Party (CP). It circulated its publication *Cartas de la FAU* (Letters from the FAU). In 1968 Workers-Student Resistance (ROE) was founded, a mass organisation body which adopted a confrontational strategy, with factory occupations with student participation and trade unionists in student demonstrations. At the end of the 1960s, parallel to the mass organisation, the FAU developed the organisation of its "armed wing", the People's Revolutionary Organisation - 33 (Organización Popular Revolucionaria - 33, OPR-33), which realised a series of sabotage actions, economic expropriations, kidnappings of politicians and/ or bosses particularly hated by the people, armed support for strikes and workplace occupations etc. The FAU abandoned focalism as a paradigm of armed struggle, avoiding militarisation while possessing social insertion in the population. With the dictatorship of 1973 the FAU directed its efforts towards a general strike that paralysed the country for nearly a month. It carried out clandestine work and had several militants arrested, tortured and killed. With the political opening it re-articulated itself and developed its work on the *especifista* model which we advocate today, with three fronts of insertion: union, student, and community.

In short, our conception of the historical references of *especifismo* is not dogmatic. We have broad ideas that start with the ideas of Bakunin and the *alliancists* in the IWA, go through the conceptions of Malatesta and his practical experiences at the social and political levels, as well as the experiences of Magón and the PLM in the Mexican Revolution. We are also influenced by the experiences of the anarchists in the Russian Revolution, with emphasis on the Makhnovists in the Ukraine and the organisational reflections made by the Russians in exile, as well as the experiences of the anarchists in the Spanish Revolution around the CNT-FAI. In Brazil, we have influences from anarchist "organisationalism", highlighting the experiences of the 1918 Anarchist Alliance of Rio de Janeiro and the 1919 (libertarian) Communist Party. Finally, the influences of the FAU, both in their struggle against the dictatorship, as in their activity in fronts with unions, community and student movements. This whole set of conceptions and experiences contributes today to our conception of *especifismo*. Currently, *especifismo* is advocated by various Latin American organisations and developed in practice, even if not by this name, in other parts of the world.

Notes and Conclusion

> To work comrades! The task is great. To work, everyone!
>
> **Errico Malatesta**

The 1st Congress completely fulfilled its objectives, taking place in an atmosphere of great solidarity between militants. It provided the due space for reflections, comments, debates and conclusions. The evaluations of all the militants were very positive.

The importance of having a generation of older and more experienced militants in the organisation, who were (and are) essential so that the militant knowledge of previous generations would not be lost and for the training and mentoring of the new generation, was evidenced. The Congress paid homage to the "old guard", and also welcomed the "new guard", as it has helped to put into practice that which their elders have always advocated. The militants of the organisation who have been in the struggle since the 1970s, 1980s and 1990s stressed the importance of this moment, which points to the continuity of a militancy that, for us, begins with Juan Perez Bouzas, passes through the entire history of the struggle of Ideal Peres, through the Círculo de Estudos Libertários (CEL), which later became the Círculo de Estudos Libertários Ideal Peres (CELIP) and, in 2003, constituted the FARJ. We believe ourselves to be putting into practice the aspirations of the various personalities of this history, to which we believe we are giving due continuity.

At this point the objective is to continue on the quest for the social vector of anarchism. To put anarchism in contact with social movements, seeking the creation of the popular organisation. We are trying to do this through our three fronts.

The urban social movements front (our old occupations front) has been conducting ongoing work with urban occupations in Rio de Janeiro since 2003, giving continuity to the experiences that we had with the homeless movement in the decade of 1990. This front also encompasses, at present, the reconstruction of the Unemployed Workers' Movement (Movimento de Trabalhadores Desempregados - MTD), which struggles for work all over the country, and has existed in Rio de Janeiro since 2001. The MTD is now recuperating its strength, regrouping and uniting people from poor communities for the struggle. Besides this, this front has relations with the Landless Workers' Movement (Movimento dos Trabalhadores Rurais Sem Terra - MST), to which it offers political education courses in both Sao Paulo and Rio de Janeiro. The front is also close to and conducts activities with other entities and social movements such as the Popular Assembly - RJ (Assembléia Popular - RJ) and the Internationalist Front of the Homeless (Frente Internacionalista dos Tem-Teto - FIST).

The community front is responsible for the management of the Social-Culture Centre of Rio de Janeiro (Centro Cultura Social do Rio de Janeiro - CCS-RJ), an open social space that we maintain in the north of the city and that hosts a number of community activities in waste recycling, tutoring and entrance exam courses for the poor community of Morro dos Macacos, theatre workshops, cultural events, celebrations and meetings of various kind. This front is also responsible for the management of the Fábio Luz Social Library (Biblioteca Social Fábio Luz - BSFL), which

has existed since 2001 and around which runs the Marques da Costa Centre for Research (Núcleo de Pesquisa Marques da Costa - NPMC) which, founded in 2004, aims to produce theory for the organisation, in addition to researching the history of anarchism in Rio de Janeiro. Besides this, the community front administers CELIP, the FARJ's public space that aims to hold lectures and debates in order to draw in those newly interested in anarchism.

The agro-ecological front, called Anarchism and Nature, operates in rural social movements and groupings that work with agriculture and social ecology. It has contacts and works with the MST, La Via Campesina and spaces like the Floreal Cooperative and the Germinal Centre for Food and Health (Núcleo de Alimentação e Saúde Germinal). It conducts educational workshops in occupations, at schools and in poor communities. All this with the aim of recovering agriculture, agro-ecology, social ecology, eco-literacy and the solidarity economy. It seeks to involve workers, social movements activists and students in its activities.

To meet an important demand we headed a "transversal" project in which all fronts were inserted, called the Popular University (UP-RJ). This proposal was deployed, in fact, in an anti-capitalist popular education initiative focused on the transformation of society and having, as a tactic, political education within social movements. Other "transversal" works have also been realised with the edition of the journal Libera; the magazine Protesta! (together with the comrades from the anarchist collective Terra Livre in Sao Paulo); and books like O Anarquismo Social by Frank Mintz, O Anarquismo Hoje da União Regional Rhone-Alpes e Ricardo Flores Magón by Diego Abad de Santillán. Finally, there is the internal work of political education, relations, resource management, among others.

There is work being done, and much work to do. And really, as Malatesta once said, the task is great. Knowing that there is much to be done and knowing the greatness of our project of social transformation, far from discouraging us, has been a growing fuel that motivates us and leads us, day after day, to this so urgent task.

We hope that this brief theoretical contribution can assist in the building of a militant anarchism in various locations.

For social anarchism!
For the recovery of the social vector of anarchism!
Social revolution and libertarian socialism!

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Anarchist Federation of Rio de Janeiro
Social Anarchism and Organisation
2008

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English translation of Anarquismo Social e Organização, by the Anarchist Federation of Rio de Janeiro (Federação Anarquista do Rio de Janeiro – FARJ), Brazil, approved at the 1st FARJ Congress, held on 30th and 31st of August 2008. Jonathan Payn (trans.)

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Interview with Layla AbdelRahim on anarcho-primitivism, red anarchism and veganism

Layla AbdelRahim

Nov 17 2013

We contacted Layla AbdelRahim and asked her to answer our questions. Layla willingly responded and her answers are really comprehensive.

Who is Layla AbdelRahim? from Wikipedia: *Layla AbdelRahim is a Canadian comparatist anthropologist and author, whose works on narratives of civilization and wilderness have contributed to the fields of literary and cultural studies, animal studies, philosophy, sociology, anarcho-primitivst thought, epistemology, and critique of civilization and education. She attributes the collapse in the diversity of bio-systems and environmental degradation to monoculturalism and the civilized ontology that explains existence in terms of anthropocentric utilitarian functions.*

Her books Children's Literature, Domestication, and Social Foundation: Narratives of Civilization and Wilderness (Routledge 2013) and Wild Children – Domesticated Dreams: Civilization and the Birth of Education[4] (Fernwood 2013) make a contribution to children's literary theory and a critique of education as rooted in the civilized need for the domestication of children as resources.
AbdelRahim received her A.B. from Bryn Mawr College and a Ph.D. from the Université de Montréal, Department of Comparative Literature. Her dissertation entitled Order and the Literary Rendering of Chaos: Children's Literature as Knowledge, Culture, and Social Foundation, examines the effect of ontological premises on human self-knowledge (anthropology) and the repercussions of such knowledge on the anthropogenic destruction of the world's life systems and diversity.

More about Layla AbdelRahim: layla.miltsov.org.

Q: How did you get to Anarcho-primitivism?

A: My ethical stance vis-à-vis other living beings was formulated before I could speak. I was born in Moscow. My Russian grandparents had a small farm in the south of the Moscow region. Seeing how they loved the animals they "raised" and the forest that surrounded the tiny village made me aware of the inherent contradiction between claiming to love someone and then killing that nonhuman person for food in cold blood. I have thus resolved at the age of four not to consume the flesh of others.

My grandparents and parents' relationship to animals, wilderness, government, and technology was complex and they allowed me to explore and formulate my own position even while

influencing my experiences while growing up. For instance, my father was a Sudanese geologist who loved wilderness. Some of the happiest memories I have of my family either go back to the Russian village or to a long sojourn in a geological camp in Darfur, when the Savannah still thrived before the geologists found the uranium mine and other "natural resources". I remember my father critiquing the political and colonial predatory system that the discovery of these "resources" was going to rekindle, but even as a child without the anthropological or political vocabulary, I still knew that this critique was limited to "European colonialism" versus "Sudanese national independence", whereby the suffering of the wild animal and human tribes that lived in the area who were affected by the strife of civilisation remained unacknowledged in this narrative. I knew with all my heart though that the link between geology and mining, encroachment of civilisation and the destruction of life that I was witnessing growing up in Sudan was critical to understanding and overcoming the violence in which I grew up both on a personal and the social levels. I returned to the Darfur region less than two decades later and the life that harmoniously roamed the wilderness in the late 1960s by the early 1980s has disappeared from the Hofrat al Nihas area. There remained only sand, radiation, war, and death.

I began to articulate this link between technology, "knowledge", and civilisation as being at the heart of the problem of the devastation of life on earth when I was in my third year of civil engineering studies. The assignments to envision roads and engineer dams revealed to me how the very concept of anthropocentric architecture was at the root of the desertification that I saw crawling from the north of Africa engulfing kilometres of fragile harmony of life surviving colonialism. War, racism, sexism, and species extinctions were obviously linked, but at the time I had not formulated my critique yet. Shortly after finishing my third year, however, I quit those studies and instead joined the efforts to help victims of war and to stop desertification, war, and extinction. This led me to journalism of war and later to my studies and research in anthropology, sociology, and comparative literature, with my real-life experiences, my childhood exposure to five languages and historical accounts, as well as my ethical stance guiding my critique of the current epistemological systems and socio-economic and environmental paradigms and praxis.

Q: Do you think that AP is real? The most common answer is, that AP is utopia, or there is no way back and also that we have so many incredible (nano)technologies, that will solve all our problems in the future, not only environmental problems, but also social problems.

A: Anarcho-primitivism is a theory and critique of hierarchical and parasitic political and socio-environmental economic systems. The arguments are based on observations of how life came about and thrived in this world for billions of years. Anarcho-primitivist critiques are different and there is no monolithic body of knowledge or "party line": for instance, there are those who draw on hunter-gatherers, others on Christian anarchism of Leo Tolstoy or Jacques Ellul, yet others on vegan gathering traditions. Because these thinkers or critics of civilisation are interested in observing the principles of life, they draw from a variety of disciplines such as palaeontology, ethology, anthropology, biology, among others. One does not need to be an anarcho-primitivist in order to observe that the principles that allow for systems of life to thrive are based on diversity and wild relationships. By "wild" I mean "undomesticated" and existing for a purpose of their own, regardless of whether they came to exist by divine intervention or a geological accident and not for the purpose of exploitation in a "food chain". These systems of life thrive on viable relationships where diversity is key. Anarcho-primitivist critique compares these observations of the principles of life with the principles of civilisation and hierarchical socio-environmental and eco-

nomic systems. This comparison reveals that monoculturalism and domestication are not viable systems. I discuss these mechanisms in-depth in my work, particularly how the domestication of human children follows the same principles of simplification, death threat, monoculturalism, and consumption of life as that of nonhumans. You might be interested to read my theatre play where I explore these links between ontology, theology, and anthropology entitled Red Delicious (available on my website and as e-book on the "In the Land of the Living" website "In the Land of the Living").

Namely, the ontological basis of technology is the consumption of "resources" and slavery becomes the basis for these parasitic relationships where life, force, and effort get consumed in a one way energy flow. Basically, this establishes relationships of dependence where the enslaver depends on a "resource", whether human animals, nonhumans, or machines, to labour for the benefit of the "owner" and where the "resource" is coerced to exchange her life and wild purpose of being for the right to live and work. My book, Wild Children – Domesticated Dreams: Civilization and the Birth of Education (Fernwood, 2013) delves in-depth into the ontological, epistemological, and methodological problems of domestication.

Because, as I argue in the book, the premise in civilisation is to consume, kill, and colonise, it yields an anthropology rooted in predation: both killing and rape. Namely, civilised knowledge constructs the human as the ultimate predator and the world existing in a "natural" hierarchical "food chain" to be controlled, reproduced, and consumed. Again, observation of the principles of life reveals that hierarchical systems of subsistence are parasitic and unsustainable since, in order to thrive, life needs diversity, mutuality, and symbiosis. By constructing an anthropology rooted in consumption of labour, flesh, and life, civilisation thus yields unviable cultures of socio-environmental relationships and hence we are witnessing the anthropogenic death of the world, which is literally being devoured by civilised human animals. This is an emergency situation and we do not have the luxury to reflect on whether we can "go back" or just scamper along trying to salvage our dying bones.

Hence, the real question we are facing is not whether the observed societies of undomesticated human and nonhuman people are utopic – it is not the wild who is utopic, for wilderness has successfully thrived until now and I have lived in and with wilderness in both Russia and Sudan. The real problem is that civilisation has proven to be "utopic". For, it never delivered on its promises: it has increased fertility of monoculturalism so that today domesticated nonhuman and human animals constitute 98% of vertebrae biomass on earth whereas, before the advent of agricultural civilisation in the Fertile Crescent ten thousand years ago, 99% of vertebrae biomass consisted of wild species. It created diseases and early mortality through desertification, war, hierarchical (lack of) access to food and water, etc. It has colonised the world and devastated it (I cite research and data in my book for these numbers). Even the ocean is turning into a desert and suffocating on plastic, acid, and civilised garbage.

Therefore, to hope that technologies will deliver us from this dying hell is analogous to – even though infinitely more painful and tragic than –the joke I often hear in Eastern Europe: you cure a hangover with vodka. We all know how vodka cures and in itself, like the other legal and illegal drugs, it is a symptom of the despair into which dependence on technological predation has plunged us. The need for inebriation is our inability or unwillingness to face our truth: we chose civilisation and hence we chose death. The real question now is: can we muster the strength to make a different choice? Anarcho-primitivism does not provide solutions, but its critiques show

us where we have failed and point to a diversity of ways where we can go and how we can heal ourselves and our world.

Q: What did domestication take from us, in social terms, and consciousness? With consciousness i mean knowledge. Did domestication have a major impact on human development? Eg. It is clear that the development of non-human animals, which were domesticated, was stopped?

A: Domestication has most definitely taken away our intelligence and knowledge of how to live in the world. Education teaches us how to survive in civilisation: i.e. how to be dependent on the hierarchy of experts who take away our awareness of ourselves and the world. Instead of learning about the world through empathy and presence – "what does it feel like to be you?" – we are taught how to apply schemas and representations to understanding what those higher up in the food chain of "human resources" want us to "know". Also, by learning how to apply these schemas and formulae to real life situations without understanding the complexity of what is at stake, we forfeit our chance at enjoying a more holistic comprehension of the world and also of adaptation to new occurrences.

In the wild, human and nonhuman children learn how to assess each situation and to understand each encounter correctly, because they know that lives and decisions are interconnected and they are not always predictable. If we are not prepared to be surprised we could perish. At the same, it is not always a fearsome experience. As Kropotkin observed in his Mutual Aid: A Factor of Evolution, living in the wild is for the most part a good experience, predation being its less prominent aspect, since herbivores have historically outnumbered predators, who in turn eat less and sleep more. The aim of domestication, in contrast, is to ensure control and prediction of "assets" and "resources". Hence, its programme is antithetical to evolution, diversity, improvisation, change, and surprise. The "resources" that such a system yields are dependent on the one who controls their lives and their food. Dependent "resources" are thus rendered incapable of thriving outside of that system of coercion and threat. They have to be dumbed down and hence are lied to. They are misled, victimised, threatened, and consumed. Nonetheless, as I argue in my book, human and nonhuman animals yearn wildness and it takes them much less to go feral than the decades it takes to domesticate them into oblivion.

Q: AP criticism of education is for most people not understandable, especially for the functioning of the "modern" world. What would you (on introduction) say to these people?

A: Even for myself, this link between education and domestication was not an obvious one. In fact, my book on education came as a side effect of my research on war, in medical anthropology in Sweden, and on the connections between the construction of "otherness", the law, and the medical body in the courtroom in France – all of which led me to my doctoral dissertation on the epistemological, ontological, and anthropological understanding of narratives of civilisation and wilderness. The connection became clear when I was critiquing the foundation of civilised knowledge as based on classification and the separation of species. Namely, I realised that highlighting the differences in understanding the human as separate from the nonhuman or of life as different from nonlife constituted the epistemology that justified cruelty and that was at the root of sexism and racism. Comparing this socially constructed understanding of our humanity as predatory and alien to how noncivilised human and nonhuman people related to the world made me see how the project of education was critical for domestication, because it provided both the "knowledge" that justified oppression, colonialism of life systems by human predators,

exploitation, and consumption as well as established the methodology to reproduce this culture of subsistence and socio-environmental economics.

In other words, if you want people to kill for you, you need to ensure that they do not know the experience and the truth of the one they kill. They need to be alienated from the one they kill and this alienation and predation has to be naturalised: you construct an anthropology of humans as superior to nonhumans and "inferior" humans as nonsentient beings who do not feel pain, who exist for your consumption. Or, you construct an identity of the people you are sent to kill as different as enemy to your group, rationalise that they asked for it and instil the fear that they will kill you if you do not do it first, etc. But epistemology is not sufficient by itself, you then need to create a situation of constant lack and endangerment in order for people to internalise fear and violence. This is where the methodology of civilised pedagogies plays a critical role: human children are torn from their parents at an early age, incarcerated in same-age groups within classroom walls, where they are constantly threatened with starvation by means of low grades and future unemployment if they do not learn the abstract "knowledge" and civilised grammar of hierarchy and obedience. This pedagogy mirrors the methods used on nonhuman animal slaves: a horse is fed only when it has yielded more profit to the domesticator than what was spent on sustaining her and if she refused to work, she is killed. In this sense, the famous Russian physiologist Ivan Pavlov has not discovered anything new when he articulated his theory of the training of dogs. In my book on education, I explore other pedagogies of "unschooled" children and recount my observations of how they learn.

Q: What do you think about the traditional or red anarchists? Especially, when we speak about their neutral attitude towards technology, domestication and often also towards colonialism. (actually their attitude towards AP and its ideas is the same as the attitude of major society)

First, the term "traditional" is highly problematic, because it establishes a bias towards a specific perspective as the "majority" "norm" and thus normalises that perspective which gives it power while marginalising or establishing as "deviant" or "abnormal" other perspectives thereby disempowering their adherers. The question that such a term raises is: traditional according to whom? Noncivilised, nontechnological, acapitalist societies based on mutual aid and symbiotic socio-economic cultures of subsistence have been the norm throughout the history of the world and until the present. Uncontacted human tribes continue to exist and resist civilisation around the world to this day. So do wild nonhumans. Even those surrounded by civilisation do not give up the wilderness of their landbase easily, hence the resistance to the construction of Monte Belo dam by the Xingu indigenous peoples of Brazil or the Mi'kmaq resistance to shale gas drilling in Canada are only some of the examples of contemporary resistance to civilised violence. In fact, domestication and civilisation – along with their systems of governance – have been resisted consistently ever since agricultural sedentary cultures began colonising the gatherer and nomadic nonhuman and human animals. In other words, resistance to civilisation in a variety of forms has been the traditional practice around the world for more than ten thousand years while "red anarchism" has existed only sporadically in the European historical enclaves and other Western nation states for only a few centuries.

Second, the concept of anarchism itself is contextual. Wild societies, whose cultures of subsistence are based on symbiotic socio-environmental relationships, cannot be defined as "anarchist", because anarchism is resistance to systems of governmentality in hierarchical cultures and their methods of coercion, exploitation, and consumption that the governing systems impose. In other

words, anarchism is important for understanding the problems of governance, for articulating the critiques of domestication, and for tactical purposes of resistance and overcoming a subsistence system based on suffering, desertification, and death. These critiques arise in specific circumstances and are therefore contextual and hence often limited and biased. For instance, a wealthy white male writing a theory of anarchism and designing anarchist praxis in a 19th or 20th century white supremacist society ultimately depends on the "imperialist", racist, sexist, and speciesist "privileges" which shelter him from experiencing the reality of human or nonhuman "prey". That is why, even if there may be great value to his analysis, nonetheless, his understanding and recommendations would be biased and limited, because he would not always be cognizant of what it is like to be the prey on a daily, minute by minute basis, because epistemologically and experientially he knows the world through a predatory lens. Often then, the very science on which these men base their critiques stems from this naturalised predatory perspective from which they benefit and their epistemology works to confirm to them the "natural" aspect of predation thus veiling from them the ways in which their own existence, subsistence, and resistance depend on the victimisation of whole groups of persons designated as "prey" in their socio-economic niche.

Excellent illustration of such myopia in critique of civilisation today would be the work of Jared Diamond that continues to build on the assumption that the noncivilised and undomesticated world is based on violence and predation. In leftist anarchism this predatory perspective can be traced in such conclusions as drawn by contemporary theorists such as David Graeber. For instance, in June 2009, Graeber and I had a public discussion in the Anarchist Anthropology group on the Open Anthropology Cooperative in which he sweepingly accused anarcho-primitivists of living in their mothers' basements and telling me that he knew what the Bangladeshi farmers wanted: to grow food. First, using "mothers' basements" as an insult to dismiss a theory relies on patriarchal exploitation and degradation of women. This means, that in Graeber's eyes "masculine" anarchists who use the predatory system to advance themselves in the world without relying on "mothers" – or the feminine class that is constructed to breed and reproduce human resources – are the etalon of success; while the feminine class is belittled and kept in the background of economic success – even can be seen as "failure" in this usage. Second, this requires the ability to tune out of the arguments of one's interlocutor, in this instance, Graeber is deaf to the actual arguments of anarcho-primitivists and sweeps them under the rug because he associates them with the "loser" class – the women, the mothers. Finally, to keep the patriarchal system of (re)production of resources in tact the white male dominant class needs "Bangladeshi" and other farmers and workers to remain in their niches and to keep wanting to grow the food and (re)produce resources and technologies for the "intellectuals" on the front-lines of patriarchy. "How do you know that the Bangladeshi farmers do not want to be anarchist anthropologists instead?" I asked Graeber. But Graeber was offended by my response, because, as he explained to me later for some reason he did not expect "this" from me: I was, apparently, expected to agree with his expertise and not voice a disagreement with the leftist intellectual rationalisation of the raison d'être of Bangladeshi and other farmers, Malaysian workers in car industry, Chinese computer factory workers, et al and ad infinitum.

This explains why there is a racial and gender hierarchy in what most white people consider to be "anarchist theory". For, it is usually a small minority, namely, white men, most often from the ruling class, who have the infrastructure and the social, symbolic, and material capital that allow them to think and produce as well as to access the public sphere as a dominant voice. White women and lower white classes have to struggle much more than their white male counterparts

to be allowed into this sphere of influence and social power. The perspectives of people of colour and of nonhuman wilderness are ousted from the dominant "public" sphere. People of colour are mostly silenced in publishing and media outlets unless they respond to the needs of white supremacy or become revolutionaries in countries that have colonial dependence on the "European" (Western or Northern) metropolis and its parasitic relationship to the rest of the world. In this respect, even the "revolutionary" people of colour are used by the Wesetern "radicals", particularly the leftist anarchists, as props for their own agenda that aims at establishing the white leftists in the vanguard of politics without threatening their racialised and gendered privileges, which include access to "technologies", i.e. to the living and nonliving slaves and labour. Because of this intrinsic dependence on slave labour, these "anarchists" rely on the same schemas in their encounters with human and nonhuman animals and their use of technology and media. However, since most people around the world (more than 70% of whom are people of colour) constitute the resources of labour for white supremacy, then most of non-white perspectives tend to be critical of the "Western" socio-economic model that continues to exploit them and hence a critique of technology is more present in those discourses. However, these perspectives are kept outside the realm of influence by keeping the media and the publishing industry focusing on the production of "white" anthropocentric knowledge and dismissing non-white perspectives as a priori irrelevant, insignificant, marginal, and trivial.

I have plenty of encounters with radical, anarchist, and mainstream publishing and media that confirm this. Here is one example to illustrate how it works: at the 2007 Anarchist Bookfair in Montreal, I approached Autonomedia press based in New York. When I explained to the co-partner of the press my work and offered that should their publishing press be interested in taking a look at my manuscript, I would be happy to send it to her, she told me condescendingly that I should first inform myself about their literature. "We publish anarchist books. You should first get acquainted with what we do. We do not publish Mexican cookbooks" she informed me.

Autonomedia has published several white men who had taken Islamic names, such as Peter Lamborn Wilson known as Hakim Bey and Michael Muhammad Knight, because this symbolic action – of taking an Arabic name by a white male – appears to be radical. However, when meeting a brown woman face to face the publishers fail to understand what I was explaining about my work. In the case of Autonomedia, the publisher applied the schema of a brown woman being associated with the lower status occupation of "cook" and instinctually dismissed me as incapable of producing a critique worthy of her publishing house's attention. This association with Mexican cuisine is not only sexist however; it is also racist, because in my case, even if my last name is Arabic, the brown skin and the petite stature allowed her to not bother with figuring out the "correct" stereotype but to generalise my occupation as trivial regardless of geographical accuracy. We see that this white woman operates with the same schema with which David Graeber was operating in the example above, a formula used to belittle and dismiss as "irrelevant" the kitchen that feeds the men – especially the white men – and the white supremacist paradigm, regardless of whether these individuals involved are radical or mainstream. The production of theory and the expectation of who "knows" and who is "trustworthy" is thus a social capital that works as investment for the "traditional" voices in the hierarchy and thereby excludes the majority of the perspectives of those who actually feed the world; after all, most humans do not come from the ruling class, they are rather "ruled" and their lives in the kitchen or the field consumed. Most of them, if given the option would not want to keep the world as status quo and to keep their "professions" as is.

Since "social anarchists" or "red anarchists" find themselves higher up the food chain, it is thus easy for them to remain blind to the fact that the white supremacist system works for their benefit and that technology is important for them to keep their predatory "privileges" intact as technology allows them to live off of others, mostly nonhuman people and people of colour: the eternal question of who does the mining, the drilling, the farming, the sewing, the cooking, the cleaning, the production of technologies, energy, ad infinitum.

Furthermore, this hierarchy in itself works as a successful mechanism of oppression that is also at work in the so called "post-colonial" spaces, where the people of colour who are in positions of power over "former" colonies know that their own predatory place in the food-chain is secured if they keep supplying the white supremacist economic model. In this sense, the food-chain hierarchy also colludes in keeping the anarchist voices of non-white and nonhuman perspectives silenced and marginalised including in their own "post"colonial lands. Moreover, even for Europeans, understanding anarchist thought and traditions depends on the region, era, and the highlighted struggles articulated by those who are "leading" the resistance, which is not always representative of how the people may view their struggles. The terms "Bolshevik" and "Menshevik" during the Russian revolution are revealing: the word Bolshevik meant majority voices in the Second Party Congress split from the Mensheviks (meaning the minority) in 1903, but in fact this was the minority opinions in the larger revolutionary scale where anarchists and other factions prevailed. So, engaging with any ideas requires us to be sensitive to the individual work and the dialogue it provokes in a wild, non-traditional engagement with interpretation, understanding, and action. Again, in my book on education, I discuss in-depth how we know, understand, and interact from an anarchist perspective.

By virtue of my complex background, variegated experiences in a spectrum of socio-economic classes, and exposure to a wide range of historical narratives, revolutions, post-colonial struggles as well as having lived on five continents I am extremely sensitive to the perspectives that direct our understanding and praxis. In my own theoretical explorations, I am willing to dialogue with a wide spectrum of thinkers and scientists. I hence do not shy from citing white male thinkers such as Errico Malatesta, Petr Kropotkin, or Karl Marx, among others. But I make sure that I also include indigenous, ELF, ALF, or writers, thinkers, and revolutionaries from the whole world and listen to the nonverbal experience of nonhuman people.

However, my background is not a prerequisite for the possibility of attaining enlightenment in the experience of others. Leo Tolstoy was exemplary in this sense, because he had the capacity to empathise so completely with a character he was depicting that he could know how an old horse suffers or an ostracised by patriarchal society woman would find it impossible to go on living. Writing the story of "An Old Horse" or Anna Karenina with honesty, Tolstoy could not find any justification for civilisation, technological society, and thereby for the culture of slavery. This knowledge had dire implications for his life, actions, and relationships. Such people have existed throughout the history of civilisation. However, for real change to come, we need more people from the "privileged" classes to refuse their privileges and join the ranks of the humans and nonhumans on whom they prey. They need to understand what is it like to be forced to exist as the machine, as the prostheses of a willful domesticator, the ultimate predator – that foolish ape who has brought the world to the brink of extinction. Because, as Philip Dick tells us in Do Androids Dream of Electric Sheep, when you realise that you may be holding the last tiny spider on your palm and you weep for it with your whole body and soul, it is not the anthropocentric solidarity of "red anarchism" that will bring that spider back to life, but a heroic act of reaching

out across the borders of speciesism and diving beyond the frontiers of the ontological machine – that ultimate slave – that we can regain the paradise lost, which is wilderness and which is life.

Q: On your website i read a discussion, from which i have concluded that you're a vegan? Is it true? If you are a vegan, what do you consider the benefits of veganism? Do you know, a lot of people would ask how is AP related to veganism; people have to go back to hunting.

A: The problem with critiquing predation in terms of veganism is that such a critique then accentuates the personal preferences in consumption rather than highlighting the larger ramifications of how we construct our anthropology. It is this concern that my opening statement in the "Mythical Predator" discussion articulates: namely, whether we should continue to define ourselves in terms of our "consumption" and "preferences", which leaves the debate in the realm of predation, or whether we should revise our anthropology in terms of our environmental role as symbiotic frugivore gatherers along with other primates. Hence, even though in my own personal food choice, I have decided at the age of four not to consume the flesh of others, and it is easier to clarify in North America my food limitations in terms of veganism, I still articulate my critique in terms of the epistemological construction of humanity as evolutionary "successful" because of their predatory anthropology. Again, I discuss this more in-depth in my book on education and I am dedicating a big part in my current book project that aims at critiquing the civilised evolutionary theory. Finally, I address this point in my Question and Answer period during my October 8th lecture at the Department of Criminology, Kwantlen Polytechnic University B.C., which can accessed here: http://youtu.be/uVQujVAN6zM.

Layla addititonally send **screenshot discussions with David Graeber**: http://i.imgur.com/oTJOqBq.png.

This interview you can also download and print it, and distribute it outside the virtual space. See pdf.

On October 2013 book tour:

Interviews:

1) On Animal Voices, Vancouver by Alissa: http://animalvoices.org/2013/10/layla-abdelrahim-tribute-to-turkeys/

2) On Gorilla Radio, CFUV (University of Victoria) by Chris Cook: https://soundcloud.com/cfuv/gorilla-radio-layla-abdelrahim

3) On Doers, Makers, Thinkers CFUV (University of Victoria) by Julian: https://soundcloud.com/cfuv/doers-makers-thinkers-layla

Talks:

(1) Tuesday, 8th October, 2013, 5:30 pm.

Department of Criminology, Kwantlen Polytechic University, Surrey, B.C.

Watch video here:

http://youtu.be/uVQujVAN6zM.

Title:

Crime and Reward from an Anarcho-primitivist Perspective

Abstract:

George Zimmerman's acquittal in the shooting death of Black teenager, Trayvon Martin, this summer came as a surprise to many mostly because the civilised believe words and focus on language rather than on praxis and consequences. Namely, civilised people see the judicial system with its verbose process of trial as a system of justice and in the eyes of those involved in

Zimmerman's trial, there was "no evidence beyond reasonable doubt" that Zimmerman acted outside the confines of the American law. The question thus was not whether killing someone was wrong, the problem that was to be resolved in this system of justice was whether the killer had the right to kill.

In this lecture, Layla AbdelRahim discusses the civilized premises that construct the human animal as predatory and thus centers murder in anthropology itself and reinforces the predatory narrative. Furthermore, this predation is structured by the classificatory system of civilized epistemology that categorizes groups of living and nonliving beings, whether human or not, as "resources" and "consumers" thereby excluding whole groups and immense suffering from the public discourse on justice. And as discussed in her book, Wild Children – Domesticated Dreams: Civilization and the Birth of Education, this predatory narrative is reinforced by both the medical sector and the system of education.

(2) Tuesday, 16th

In Duncan, B.C.:

http://www.ustream.tv/recorded/39913923

Title:

Schooling as a Political Choice to Conform to the Colonising Narrative of Domestication

Abstract:

Obligatory schooling has become the global narrative that frames our understanding of how children must learn. Narratives become reality when people act according to the plot that drives these narratives. Hence, obligatory schooling, where children are taught through literacy how to know and live in the world, has become the reality for most human children on earth. Furthermore, even if the specific details of what, for instance, is taught in French schools might differ from what might be taught in Kenya, there is a unifying experience of submitting children to "discipline" and hierarchical structure of obedience through literacy from an early age. This literacy is mostly linked with today's major civilisations: European, Arab, and Chinese, the core of whose syllabus aims to domesticate human resources and instill in them a place in the hierarchy of the "food chain". In this respect, the seemingly personal choice of parents or a community to whether send their children to school or choose to educate them at home or in the community, in both cases, constitutes a political choice: one to conform to the socio-economic and political system based on consumption and exploitation or to resist this paradigm. In this talk, Layla will draw on her discussion of "unschooling" and "schooling" in her new book Wild Children – Domesticated Dreams: Civilization and the Birth of Education (Fernwood Publishing 2013) to address how successful resistance has to entail a critique of the underlying speciesist, racist, and misogynist mandate of the domesticating narrative of civilisation and the disciplining methods of the civilised institution.

(3) Friday, 18th October at 3pm.

Department of Geography, University of Victoria, B.C.

Title:

The Ship of Fools as a Place of Spectacle, Healing, and Education where the Wild are Sent to Die

Abstract:

The Medieval European allegory of the Ship of Fools was more than a metaphor or a literary ruse to critique the Church and the state. In Madness and Civilization, Michel Foucault argues that this trope was also a real socio-political tactic used to cleanse the civilised space by isolating the "mad" or the "unreasonable" from "society". For civilisation, "reason" has two constituents: raison d'être

and sanity. The sane are here defined as those existing for the purpose of domestication in a "natural" food chain hierarchy. In this sense, "society" consists of those working for the "reason" of domestication and socio-economic hierarchy, exploitation, and consumption and those who cannot or refuse to abide by the domesticator's definition of their reason for existence are either sent to sanatoriums, hospitals, or other correctional facilities to be cured or killed.

Drawing from the research conducted for her book, Wild Children – Domesticated Dreams: Civilization and the Birth of Education (2013), Layla AbdelRahim discusses schools and children's culture as spaces of such isolation and "correction": where the wild raison d'être to dream and to exist for one's own, known or unbeknownst to self purpose is extinguished and where the child is taught to exist to serve as a human resource in the chain of exploitation of nonhuman resources.

(4) Saturday, 12th October at 7pm

Spartacus Books, Vancouver, B.C.

Title:

The Ingrained Premises of Injustice in the Unknowledge Sold as Education

Abstract:

In this discussion, Layla will draw on the research conducted for her book Wild Children – Domesticated Dreams: Civilization and the Birth of Education, in which she examines the underlying premises in the construction of knowledge that the institution of education produces and proliferates. The first premise is that knowledge of others must be organised and based on "classification" of forms of life and nonlife. Hence, in monotheistic narratives, God creates groups of beings on different days and, in science, classification is the primary organising principle of knowledge. Knowing the self and the world by relating to individuals as members and representatives of an epistemological "class" fosters alienation from and ignorance of the real experiences of others and provides a system of oppression of whole groups of human and nonhuman beings. In other words, epistemological classification establishes economic classes, where some control the power and agency over the construction of "knowledge" while the others constitute "resources" to be domesticated and colonised by such knowledge and exploited as labour force and the source of pleasure and well-being for the "ruling" classes. Therefore, examining and critiquing how unknowledge about what is human or nonhuman is produced and reproduced through schooling and other cultural narratives is critical to overcoming gender, racial, and speciesist oppression.

(5) Tuesday, 15th October at 7pm. Camas Books, Victoria, B.C.:

Title:

What's in a Class? On Reproduction of Gender, Species, and Ethnicity as Categories for Labour and Consumption

Abstract:

How do we know the world? How do we relate to the world and to our knowledge of it? Today, most people around the world believe that we cannot learn how to live in the world without having gone to school and received an "education". However, what is this "education"? What is its content, its method, or its purpose?

Education is a systemic production, reproduction, and transmission of specific socio-economic constructs about humans, society, and the world. These constructs are then passed on as "knowledge", which ensures the coexistence of epistemological classes as socio-economic classes in a hierarchical paradigm. Civilised science prioritises Cartesian thinking that divorces "reason"

from “emotions” precisely because empathy with the exploited, the suffering, or the consumed will interfere with the project Civilisation.

In this conversation, Layla will discuss the underlying premises in scientific thinking about the world as a system of domestication of human and nonhuman resources for production, reproduction, consumption, and ultimately devastation.

(6) Sunday, 13th October, 2013

Purple Thistle, Vancouver, B.C.

Title:

The Insidious and Resilient Narratives of Domestication: Pitfalls to Watch for in Autonomous Learning Zones

Abstract:

What better weekend than ‘Thanksgiving’ to Join Layla AbdelRahim on her book tour for ‘Wild Children-Domesticated Dreams’, as she talks about colonization, domestication, and the challenge of not reproducing these mechanisms as we strive towards de-schooling.

Not only has the hierarchical project of domestication and civilization existed for the past ten thousand years, it has been expanding globally, engulfing more and more territories and bringing the world to a state nearing the brink of collapse of biodiversity and self-sustainability. This colonizing project has not been accepted passively. It has met strong ideological, epistemological, socio-economic, and physical resistance on both individual and social levels. Nonetheless, civilization has reached an epidemic level largely owing to its misconstruction of “knowledge” about human nature and the world. In her research, Layla AbdelRahim applies concepts from biology, anthropology, ethology, and sociology to examine the mechanisms by which socio-cultural narratives and material cultures reproduce themselves through domesticated bodies, minds, and desires. In this workshop, Layla will identify these mechanisms of perpetuating domesticated “unknowledge” and will engage a discussion on resistance to its narrative.

(7) Tuesday, 22nd October, 2013

New Moon Collective, Olympia, WA

Title:

Children at the Forefront of the War of Civilization over Colonization of Resources

Abstract:

Battling their own oppression and fighting against unjust systems for the wider public good, Anarchist and other activist parents often do not have the time to allot to rewilding their own parenting culture and thus relegate the task of child rearing to institutions or other civilized child-care. In this workshop, Layla will address the questions raised in her latest book, Wild Children – Domesticated Dreams: Civilization and the Birth of Education (Fernwood Publishing, 2013) pertaining to the real cost of parenting and child-rearing and the implications of the civilized predatory socio-environmental relationships on children, their culture, and thereby on the world.

(8) Wednesday, 23rd October, 2013

Black Coffee Coop, Seattle, WA

A talk on Wild Children – Domesticated Dreams: Civilization and the Birth of Education (Fernwood, 2013).

(9) Friday, 25th October, 2013

Red and Black Café, Portland, OR

A talk on Wild Children – Domesticated Dreams: Civilization and the Birth of Education

(Fernwood, 2013).
(10) Tuesday, 29th October, 2013.
Anabaptist Mennonite Biblical Seminary, Elkhart, Indiana
A talk on Wild Children – Domesticated Dreams: Civilization and the Birth of Education (Fernwood, 2013).
Links to events
Final on book tour
(https://www.facebook.com/events/388959827898277/
and the poster:
https://www.facebook.com/photo.php?fbid=10151663957623549&set=gm.388962751231318&type=1&theater
):

poster and event pages:

1. Tuesday 8th October, Kwantlen, Surrey B.C.
https://www.facebook.com/events/235575403266795/
2. Saturday 12th, Spartacus
https://www.facebook.com/events/522685137805658/
3. Sunday 13th, Purple Thistle
https://www.facebook.com/events/675007529178671/?ref=3&ref_newsfeed_story_type=regular
and
https://www.facebook.com/events/675007529178671/
4. Tuesday 15th, Camas, Victoria
https://www.facebook.com/events/169052663280221/
5. Wednesday 16th, Duncan Garage Room, Duncan, B.C.
http://www.duncangarageshowroom.ca/event/layla-abdelrahim/?eID=767
and
https://www.facebook.com/events/206747696164527/
6. Friday, 18th Department of Geography, University of Victoria 3pm
https://www.facebook.com/events/1422443374638779/
7. Tuesday, 22nd 6:30pm New Moon Collective, Olympia, WA
https://www.facebook.com/events/580690978658664/
8. Wednesday 23rd Black Coffee Coop, Seattle:
https://www.facebook.com/events/347668795368906/
9. Friday 25th RED & BLACK Café
https://www.facebook.com/events/178111952381696/
10. Tuesday, 29th Elkhart, IN at noon (no FB event was made).


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Social Anarchism and the Rejection of Moral Tyranny

Jesse Spafford

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SOCIAL ANARCHISM AND THE REJECTION OF MORAL TYRANNY

Outside philosophy departments, most self-identified anarchists are social anarchists who reject both the legitimacy of the state and private property. By contrast, most anarchist philosophers are of the pro-market variety. As a result, a philosopher has yet to write an analytic defense of social anarchism. Jesse Spafford fills this gap by arguing that social anarchism is a coherent philosophical position that follows from a more basic, plausible principle that constrains which moral theories are acceptable. In the process of articulating and defending social anarchism Spafford stakes out a number of bold and original positions (e.g., that people own themselves and nothing else), while providing novel solutions to some of the classic problems of political philosophy (e.g., luck egalitarianism's problem of stakes). His distinctive study offers an overarching, unified political theory while also advancing many of the more fine-grained debates that occupy political philosophers. This title is also available as Open Access on Cambridge Core.

JESSE SPAFFORD is a lecturer at Victoria University of Wellington. His work explores debates between libertarians, socialists, and anarchists over the moral status of the market and the state. He is the author of a number of articles in journals including *Philosophical Studies*, *Synthese*, and the *Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy*.

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Introduction

> We are told that the word Anarchy needs constant explanation; that whenever used in its literal sense it must be defined. Is there any other word of which this is not true? The introduction of new ideas into a man's mind is not accompanied by the use of a specially coined word, but by the adaptation of old words to broader uses.
>
> Lucy Parsons, "Anarchism"

This book aims to provide a philosophical defense of egalitarian anarchism, more popularly known as *social anarchism*. It is certainly not the first book to attempt to defend this position; numerous egalitarian anarchists across time and place have already produced something of a canon of works expounding and arguing for the ideology.[1] However, this book stands apart from these prior efforts in that it employs the tools of contemporary analytic philosophy to construct its argument. While popular defenses of anarchism generally seek to persuade through the use of rhetoric and informal argumentation, this book aspires to provide something closer to a *proof* of its thesis, with heavy reliance on logic, the precise definition of terms, and concepts developed by academic philosophers.[2]

This book will also differ from canonical anarchist texts in that it defends a moral position rather than a social arrangement. Typically, anarchist texts present social anarchism as a socialist, stateless political

[1] Some influential examples include Mikhail Bakunin (1953), Alexander Berkman (2003), Murray Bookchin (2004), Noam Chomsky (2013), Lorenzo Kom'boa Ervin (2021), Luigi Fabbri (1922), Emma Goldman (1911), Daniel Guérin (1970), Peter Kropotkin (1995), Nestor Makhno (1996), Errico Malatesta (1994), Louise Michel (1896), Ito Noe (2005), Lucy Parsons (2004), Pierre-Joseph Proudhon (1876) (though Proudhon is claimed by many anarchist traditions), Elisée Reclus (1899), Rudolf Rocker (2004), and Charlotte Wilson (2005).

[2] The downside to this approach is that it will make the book less accessible to those who do not have prior philosophical training. However, the hope is that non-philosophers with an interest in anarchism will still be able to follow the broader argument even if some of the details get a bit technical.

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system. They then attempt to explain how the system works in practice, appeal to moral principles to justify the system, propose strategies for realizing it, and address various objections that might call into question the viability or general attractiveness of the proposed system. By contrast, this book is strictly concerned with the moral principles that motivate social anarchists to endorse the abolition of the state and capitalism. Thus, when the book talks of "social anarchism" or "egalitarian anarchism," it is using these terms to refer to a specific set of moral principles (to be introduced in the subsequent chapter) as opposed to a way of structuring political institutions, society, and the economy.

In addition to the so-called canonical anarchist texts, there have been a few anarchist philosophers who have employed the tools of analytic political philosophy to either explicate or defend anarchism *qua* moral philosophy. However, this book stands apart from these prior efforts in that it *defends* an *egalitarian* anarchist position. Typically, when philosophers write about anarchism, they are primarily concerned with explicating the anarchist position rather than defending it.[3] While some do attempt to provide a sustained defense of anarchism, they generally argue for a more minimal version of the position that merely maintains that people are not obligated to obey the laws of the state.[4] Or, alternatively, they defend a more expansive *market* anarchist or *anarcho-capitalist* position that assigns each person the power to unilaterally acquire a robust set of property rights over an unlimited quantity of natural resources.[5] This posited power opens the door to a significant degree of licensed inequality, as some individuals might acquire much more property than others. Those with less would then have moral duties to respect the property rights of those with more even though doing so leaves them comparatively worse off.

Notably, this property-friendly anarchist position is not one that most self-identified anarchists would endorse. Rather, the bulk of the anarchist movement is composed of self-identified *anarcho-communists* or *social anarchists* who favor equality and reject capitalism, markets, and the private property rights on which these institutions rest. Indeed, as will be discussed subsequently, a popular opinion among these anarchists is that anarcho-capitalism – and, to a lesser extent, market anarchism – are not even genuine forms of anarchism, as they lack the egalitarian and

[3] See, for example, Alan Ritter (1980), David Miller (1984), and Paul McLaughlin (2016).
[4] Robert Paul Wolff's (1970) influential book on anarchism takes this approach. For a more recent defense, see Crispin Sartwell (2008).
[5] See Michael Huemer (2013) and Gary Chartier (2013).

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anti-capitalist commitments that are essential to anarchism. While the book will not take a stand on this question, its purpose is to propose and defend a moral position that will be much more amenable to these egalitarian anarchists.

The outline of the book is as follows. The remainder of this introduction discusses the general aims of the book and situates the book within the broader ideological landscape by explaining the relationship between its argument, the anarchist movement, and some of the defended position's philosophical rivals. Specifically, Section I.1 begins by considering the question of what it means for a moral position to be an *anarchist* position and whether the position defended by the book can be reasonably characterized as "social anarchism." Section I.2 then discusses the central aims of the book in a bit more detail, the primary two being (1) showing that social anarchism is coherent (in a sense to be described subsequently) and (2) showing that the position is independently plausible. Finally, Section I.3 argues that social anarchism will be attractive (in at least some respect) to partisans of a number of rival philosophical positions. In this way, the section aims to show that the theoretical costs of accepting the position are not as high for these partisans as it might first appear.

With this introductory groundwork in place, Chapter 1 begins the main argument of the book by introducing the five moral principles that make up the social anarchist position. Specifically, it defines social anarchism as the conjunction of the following five theses. First, there is the consent theory of legitimacy. This thesis holds that persons are obligated to obey the laws of the state only if they have consented to do so. Given that practically no one has consented in this way, this thesis entails the *philosophical anarchist* conclusion that all existing states are illegitimate, that is, they lack the power to oblige. Second, there is the Lockean proviso. This proposition places a constraint on persons' powers to convert unowned natural resources into private property. A defining commitment of *right-libertarianism*, this proviso holds that persons can acquire property rights over some bit of land or natural resource if and only if they leave "enough and as good" for others. The third anarchist thesis is the self-ownership thesis. This thesis asserts that each person has the same set of ownership rights over her body that she would have over a fully owned thing (including a permission to use her body, a claim against others using it without permission, etc.). Fourth, the anarchist position asserts that persons do not have private property rights over any external natural resources. And, finally, the social anarchist position includes an endorsement of luck egalitarianism as the moral principle regulating the

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permissible use of unowned external objects. (This will be called "the anarchist conclusion".)

Notably, the social anarchist position includes both principles that are standardly associated with libertarianism and egalitarian principles that are widely endorsed by socialist philosophers. This pairing is not without precedent; left-libertarian philosophers have influentially endorsed both varieties of principle and defended their compatibility.[6] However, it will be argued that social anarchism represents a distinctive synthesis of libertarian and egalitarian moral positions, both because of the particular theses that it posits and because of the stronger logical relation that it claims obtains between them (more on this in Section I.2).

The five anarchist theses having been introduced, Chapter 2 argues that these principles can all be derived from a single meta-principle that limits which moral theories qualify as theoretically acceptable. This posited *moral tyranny constraint* holds that a theory of duties is acceptable only if full compliance with that theory (and the demands of morality more generally) would not allow any person to unilaterally, discretionarily, and foreseeably act in a way that would leave others with less advantage – that is, whatever it is that matters morally vis-à-vis distributive justice – than they would have possessed given some other choice by the agent. The chapter then explicates the various components of the constraint, defends the constraint's plausibility, and explains how it entails three of the posited anarchist theses (with subsequent chapters arguing that these theses entail the two remaining anarchist theses). Finally, the chapter addresses three potential objections that might be raised against the moral tyranny constraint.

Chapter 3 begins the process of explicating the logical relations that obtain between the various anarchist theses. Taking the Lockean proviso as its starting point, it argues that this thesis entails two further conclusions embraced by social anarchists. First the chapter argues that, contrary to what

[6] Left-libertarians differ from right-libertarians in that, while both endorse the self-ownership thesis and affirm that people can acquire private property, left-libertarians believe that this acquisition is subject to demanding egalitarian constraints. For example, Peter Vallentyne (1998) both posits that people own themselves – a core libertarian thesis (discussed in detail in Chapter 1) – and that a society can justly tax away the full benefit that a person receives from natural resources without violating said self-ownership. Similarly, Michael Otsuka (2003) argues that one might endorse a particular version of the self-ownership thesis while still insisting that justice obtains if and only if the acquisition of private property is constrained such that each person has an equal opportunity to obtain welfare. Hillel Steiner (2000) defends a position wherein he accepts the libertarian right to self-ownership while simultaneously affirming the egalitarian position that each person is entitled to an equal share of external natural resources. And Philippe Van Parijs (2000) posits that self-ownership can be balanced with an egalitarian maximin principle that structures resource ownership in a way that maximizes the opportunities available to the worst off.

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right-libertarians typically maintain, the Lockean proviso implies that no one owns (or could reasonably come to own) any natural resources. This is because any appropriation of such resources would leave others worse off in a way that the proviso does not allow, which, in turn, implies that no such appropriation of natural resources has occurred. By contrast, the chapter argues that the proviso is *necessarily* satisfied when it comes to each agent's own body. Thus, while people do not own any external resources, they can easily come to own themselves via acts of self-appropriation.

Chapter 4 provides an alternative argument for rejecting private property. While Chapter 3 attempts to derive this conclusion from the Lockean proviso, this chapter begins with the consent theory of legitimacy as its starting premise. It then argues that property ownership is a form of legitimate authority. Thus, if one accepts a consent theory of legitimacy, one would also have to maintain that property ownership has consent as its necessary condition. However, given that no one has ever consented to the appropriation of natural resources, it follows that no one owns any such resources. The chapter concludes by considering three objections to this argument. It also discusses what the consent-based argument against private property implies vis-à-vis the self-ownership thesis.

Notably, both Chapter 3 and Chapter 4 begin with a libertarian starting premise. They, thus, put significant dialectical pressure on libertarians to reject their standard conclusion that persons have property rights over land and objects. However, Chapter 5 notes that this result underdetermines which positive position libertarians (or, strictly speaking, any property rights theorist) ought to endorse. One option is to simply concede that people lack any sort of claim rights when it comes to natural resources. The chapter labels this proposal "the *Hobbesian conclusion*" and argues that it must be rejected because it violates the moral tyranny constraint. Given the theoretical unacceptability of this option, the chapter contends that libertarians and property rights theorists should, instead, accept what it calls the *anarchist conclusion*. This thesis holds that persons *do* possess certain claims against others using unowned resources, where these claims correspond to the prescriptions of a luck egalitarian principle of distributive justice. The chapter then argues that libertarians have limited basis for rejecting the anarchist conclusion, as it is compatible with both their favored property-based theories of justice and the arguments that support such theories. Finally, it argues that libertarians' tacit presuppositions also commit them to the egalitarian aspect of the anarchist conclusion.

In short, Chapter 5 suggests that libertarians ought to accept that people have some variety of egalitarian distributive claims vis-à-vis natural

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resources (as opposed to property claims). While it does not establish that these claims should correspond to a *luck* egalitarian theory of distributive justice, this conclusion follows from Chapter 2's argument that luck egalitarianism satisfies the moral tyranny constraint in a way that strict egalitarianism does not. However, Chapter 6 points out that the dominant interpretation of luck egalitarianism fails to fully satisfy the moral tyranny constraint. To resolve this problem, it offers an alternative interpretation that both eliminates the possibility of moral tyranny and rescues luck egalitarianism from two other prominent objections that have been raised against the position. In this way, the chapter demonstrates that there is a plausible egalitarian distributive principle that follows from the moral tyranny constraint (by way of various libertarian moral theses). This result completes the book's defense of the social anarchist position, with the first six chapters having collectively shown that there is a coherent and plausible set of libertarian and egalitarian theses that all follow from the moral tyranny constraint.

Social anarchism *qua* political philosophy having been presented and defended, Chapter 7 notes that there is a significant lacuna in the posited social anarchist position. One might expect that any view described as an "anarchist" position will include an endorsement of the *political anarchist* thesis that the mere existence of a state is unjust, with some persons thereby having an obligation to abolish any existing states. However, this contention does not appear among the five social anarchist theses defended by the book. Rather, as noted previously, social anarchism includes only the endorsement of the weaker philosophical anarchist thesis that all existing states lack the power to impose obligations on their purported subjects. Chapter 7 defends this choice by arguing that political anarchism is implausible. Specifically, it contends that political anarchists must provide an analysis of statehood that entails that (a) any group that qualifies as a state is unjust in a way that its non-state counterpart is not and (b) there are existing states. It then argues that there is no plausible analysis of statehood that satisfies both of these *desiderata*. Thus, political anarchism fails by its own lights. Finally, the chapter concludes by considering and rejecting a recent argument that philosophical anarchism collapses into either political anarchism or statism.

I.1 The Boundaries of Anarchism

The book aims to defend a set of moral theses that it calls "social anarchism." However, this label raises the difficult question of what counts

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as an anarchist philosophical position. The difficulty emerges from the fact that many different people have claimed the term "anarchism" for their views despite the fact that those views differ in significant ways and, quite often, conflict with one another. For example, as noted previously, most self-identified anarchists – both past and present – are anarcho-communists or social anarchists who call for the abolition of the state, capitalism, and private property. By contrast, a small but vocal group of anarcho-capitalists argue that the state should be abolished but not capitalism. In their view, each person can rightfully acquire and exchange private property, and they call for market-based services to replace much of the activity typically carried out by states (e.g., private security companies would replace the police and military).[7] Notably, social anarchists often wish to deny the "anarchist" label to anarcho-capitalists, arguing that genuine anarchism is incompatible with an embrace of property, markets, and capitalism.[8] Obviously, anarcho-capitalists disagree. Thus, a question is raised regarding how one might resolve this dispute – and, more generally, how one is to determine whether *any* given position (e.g., the one defended in this book) is a genuine anarchist position.

As a starting point for answering this general question, it is helpful to consider some of the arguments philosophers have advanced to try to resolve the debate over whether or not anarcho-capitalism is a genuine form of anarchism. A popular strategy for denying anarcho-capitalism the "anarchist" label involves arguing that anarcho-capitalism's pro-market commitments contradict an essential anarchist thesis. For example, John Clark posits that "the essence of anarchism is ... not the theoretical opposition to the state, but the practical and theoretical struggle against domination" (1984, 70), where inequality and private property are forms of domination (120). Thus, one might appeal to the conjunction of these premises to conclude that anarcho-capitalism is not a genuine form of anarchism, as it licenses both inequality and property.[9] By contrast, Roderick Long argues against this conclusion by noting that there are many influential thinkers who are widely recognized as anarchists by social

[7] For some influential defenses of this position, see David Friedman (1989) and Michael Huemer (2013).

[8] Some examples include Alan Carter (2013, 259), Peter Sabatini (1994–1995), and Iain McKay et al. (2008). See also Barbara Goodwin (2007, 143).

[9] McKay et al. (2008) appeal to Clark in this way as part of a lengthy and detailed argument against counting anarcho-capitalism as a genuine variety of anarchism. That said, Clark does not direct his quoted comments directly against anarcho-capitalists, and other remarks of his suggest a willingness to count those who oppose the state but endorse property as genuine anarchists (1978, 19, 21).

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anarchists despite holding views that social anarchists otherwise consider disqualifying when it comes to anarcho-capitalists (2018, 287–95). Given that there is no principled basis for denying the "anarchist" label to anarcho-capitalists but not these paradigmatic anarchist thinkers, he concludes that social anarchists should accept that anarchism is a big tent that includes anarcho-capitalists.[10]

The problem with both of these argumentative strategies is that they rest on premises that a critical interlocutor could easily reject. The former argument presupposes that there is some commitment that is essential to anarchism such that any broader anarchist position must be at least compatible with this commitment or, more strongly, must follow from it. While the essentialist claim may not, itself, be terribly controversial – though anti-essentialists might reject it and contend that the various anarchist positions merely bear a "family resemblance" to one another without sharing any single property – there will inevitably be controversy over which commitment is the essential one. Is a rejection of domination the defining feature of anarchism? Why not think, instead, that anarchism's essential feature is a respect for property rights (with opposition to the state following from the fact that states necessarily violate such rights)? It is not clear how one might resolve such disagreement. Thus, the essentialist argument for the claim that anarcho-capitalists are not anarchists seems to rest on an indefensible premise.

Long's argument encounters a similar difficulty. He is right that many social anarchists have been willing to grant the "anarchist" label to thinkers who embrace positions associated with anarcho-capitalism (e.g., Benjamin Tucker and Lysander Spooner). However, suppose that someone insisted that this was a mistake. Such a rejection of Long's starting premise – namely, that social anarchists are *correct* to judge that these thinkers are anarchists – would render his argument unsound. Of course, critics can dispute the core premise of any argument, but, in this case, there is no obvious way to defend the premise in question without rendering Long's argument superfluous. Note that any argument for the proposition that the thinkers in question are genuine anarchists would seemingly have to appeal to some general account of which positions qualify as anarchist positions. However, if one had such a general account, then one could

[10] Contra Long's argument, McKay et al. (2020, section G) argue that there are important differences between anarcho-capitalists and the property-sympathetic thinkers that social anarchists recognize as anarchists. Thus, they would insist that there *is* a principled basis for uniquely denying anarcho-capitalists the "anarchist" label.

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forego Long's argument and appeal to that account directly to resolve the debate over whether anarcho-capitalism is a genuine variety of anarchism.

The foregoing discussion reveals that both of the prior arguments suffer from a common vulnerability: They each assume as their starting premise that one can uncontroversially apply the "anarchist" label to specific commitments or thinkers. However, in each case, there is no obvious supporting argument for this assumption that does not beg the question. To defend a particular application of the "anarchist" label, one must seemingly posit a general theory demarcating which ideas and/or thinkers are anarchist in character, where this theory will be just as controversial as the particular judgments that it is supposed to support. To see this, consider how one might resolve a disagreement between someone advancing one of the just-discussed arguments and an interlocutor who (a) denied that the posited commitments (or thinkers) were anarchist in character and (b) rejected any general theory of anarchism that had this implication. Given these positions, there is no obvious rejoinder available, as one seemingly needs a general theory to resolve disputes about particular commitments/thinkers but also established judgments about particular commitments/thinkers to resolve disputes about the general theory. Granted, one might accuse the interlocutor of simply not grasping the relevant conceptual truths; however, this reply is implausible given that it seems to be at least an open question whether a given commitment (or thinker) is, in fact, an anarchist position (or thinker). Thus, both arguments about the proper boundaries of anarchism appear to be ultimately inconclusive.

This result might suggest a more general form of skepticism about the book's claim that it is presenting and defending an *anarchist* political philosophy. On this skeptical view, the apparent intractability of debates over what counts as anarchism reveals that one ought to adopt a *non-factualist* understanding of these debates. Specifically, the non-factualist holds that the best explanation of this intractability is that there is simply no fact of the matter as to whether or not a given thinker/social arrangement/philosophical position is anarchist in character. Thus, the proposition that the book presents an anarchist viewpoint is neither true nor false, which is to say that it is lacking in genuine semantic content.

Alternatively, one might adopt a *quietist* view that takes debates over the boundaries of anarchism to be merely verbal rather than substantive. This variety of skepticism begins with the observation that there are millions of distinct ideological positions, where these positions are individuated based upon the particular propositions they affirm. When two people intractably

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disagree about whether one of these positions is a variety of anarchism, their disagreement results from the fact that they mean different things when they use the term "anarchism," with one person using the term to refer to a particular set of positions while the other uses it to refer to a non-identical set. For this reason, the quietist maintains that the disagreement is apparent rather than genuine, as it can be dissolved through greater verbal precision: the person who says the position is a form of anarchism is really saying that it is a form of anarchism$_1$ while the person who disagrees is denying that it is a form of anarchism.$_2$ In this way, the quietist can (i) explain why there is disagreement – namely, the disagreeing parties are using the same word to refer to different things – (ii) resolve the disagreement by showing that the two asserted claims are actually compatible, and (iii) still affirm that there is a fact of the matter when it comes to whether a given position is appropriately classified as anarchism$_1$ (or anarchism$_2$, or anarchism$_3$, etc.).

While the quietist does assign a truth value to the proposition that the book is advancing an anarchist position, her view strips this claim of any philosophical significance. Once her demand for verbal precision has been met, the truth of such a proposition becomes simply a matter of definition: if anarchism$_1$ is defined as including some position p, then it is an analytic truth that p is a form of anarchism$_1$. Thus, the book's assertion that it is defending an anarchist position would either be false or trivial depending on one's stipulated definition of "anarchism." If "anarchism" is defined such that the book's posited position is (part of) its extension, then the book's assertion is true; if "anarchism" is not defined in this way, then the claim is false. Either way, the result is uninteresting, and the assertion does not seem worth making – at least on the quietist view.

So, what, then, should one think of the book's claim that it is presenting and defending an anarchist philosophical position? Against both of the just-discussed skeptical positions, the book's contention is that this claim has both semantic content and philosophical significance. Specifically, the claim has nontrivial semantic content because it is an assertion about the relationship between philosophical ideas and a particular social movement. The task of the remainder of this section is to briefly describe this relation and this movement, beginning with the latter.

As a matter of social fact, there are many people across time and space who have called themselves anarchists. While there is likely no single belief that these people share, there is a constellation of beliefs that they will endorse at much higher rates than will people outside of this group. These beliefs include the contention that the state should be eliminated, that

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police and prisons should be abolished, that (almost) all wars are unjust, that capitalism and/or markets are morally bad forms of economic organization, that private property rights are unacceptable constraints on freedom, that resources should be distributed from each according to her ability to each according to her need, that production should be managed by trade unions and/or democratically, that centralized state planning of the economy is an unacceptable alternative, that gender norms are objectionable constraints on autonomy, that significant social changes need to be made to eliminate racist and sexist practices that prop up White supremacy and patriarchy, that borders should be open or eliminated entirely, that children have a robust set of rights and should not be subject to expansive parental authority or compulsory education, that consuming animal products is exploitative and immoral, and that humans should significantly limit their activities to preserve and restore natural ecosystems, among others. This group of people also will tend to endorse the views espoused by a particular set of thinkers (e.g., those who produced the so-called canonical texts listed in Footnote 1), champion certain causes (the efforts of the CNT/FAI and the Zapatistas, Bundism, the Rojavan revolution, etc.), and affiliate with certain institutions (antifascist groups, the Industrial Workers of the World, etc.). Call the set of self-identified anarchists who exhibit these tendencies *the anarchist movement*.

So, what is the posited relation between the anarchist movement and the egalitarian philosophical position that the book calls "social anarchism?" Obviously, it will not be the case that every member of the anarchist movement endorses social anarchism. As noted previously, self-identified anarchists regularly disagree about most questions, including the truth of each of the claims listed in the previous paragraph. Indeed, it was for this reason that the movement is specified via reference to self-identification rather than any shared set of beliefs held by its members. Given that there is limited *actual* endorsement of social anarchism by self-identified anarchists, the suggestion here is that a substantial number of anarchists *would* endorse the social anarchist position if given adequate philosophical context (e.g. they were presented with a full slate of rival views and the best arguments for and against those views). In other words, if debate and reflection would lead self-identified anarchists to ultimately converge on the social anarchist position, then the position has a claim to the "anarchist" label. Call this proposal the *social movement approach*.

As an analogy, consider a small planet that forms in a field of smaller matter scattered across space. Over time, the gravity of the planet will pull surrounding material either onto its surface or into its orbit, with the

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greatest pull being exerted on the most spatially proximate material (holding mass constant for these purposes). One might similarly think of self-identified anarchists as being located at different points in *n*-dimensional ideological space, where *n* is equal to the total number of normative philosophical propositions that a person can hold and where an anarchist's location along a particular dimension is determined by whether or not she affirms the particular normative proposition associated with that dimension. Similarly, the social anarchist position sits in this space in virtue of the propositions it affirms.[11] Finally, to claim that social anarchism is a genuinely anarchist view is to assert that it will exert an analogous sort of gravitational pull on the self-identified anarchists surrounding it, steadily pulling a large number of them into its orbit (with greatest effect on those anarchists who sit at the most proximate points in ideological space).

There are a few advantages to this proposal. First, one can endorse the social movement approach while also conceding to the quietist that there are other rival concepts that could equally be called "anarchism." While essentialists must insist that there is a pre-theoretical concept of anarchism whose necessary and sufficient conditions of application can be grasped through intuition, the social movement approach can grant that its proposed account of what qualifies as an anarchist view is merely stipulated. However, this concession does not entail that it is trivial to declare that social anarchism is an anarchist position. Rather, this claim expresses a significant and contestable thesis about the relationship between the posited philosophical position and the anarchist social movement.

The second advantage of using the anarchist label in this way is that it allows for the possibility of revisionary anarchist theories – that is, theories that are anarchist in character despite the fact that they are not endorsed by most self-identified anarchists. On the essentialist view, revisionary accounts of an ideology are rendered paradoxical, as they apply the concept of that ideology to targets that, *by the accounts' own admission*, do not meet the necessary conditions for the application of that concept. Or, to put this point another way, given that revisionary accounts deny some core tenet of the ideology in question, why claim that they are revising that ideology

[11] More precisely, it would be a cluster of points, as the egalitarian anarchist position in this context should be understood not merely as a set of propositions, but, rather, a *set of such sets S*, where a set of views *V* belongs to *S* if and only if *V* includes each of the five theses presented in Chapter 1 and no propositions incompatible with the conjunction of these theses. Each member of *S* would then occupy a point in ideological space. However, it is easier to present the analogy if egalitarian anarchism is taken to occupy a single point rather than many, so this bit of complexity is ignored in the main text.

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rather than rejecting it in favor of a rival view? The social movement approach helps to answer this question and thereby make sense of revisionary theories: When someone claims to be positing a heterodox version of some ideological position, she is claiming that proponents of the existing orthodox version would, upon adequate reflection, ultimately endorse her proposed heterodox view.[12]

I.2 The Aims of the Book

The book's position is called "social *anarchism*" because it aspires to present a philosophical position that stands in the posited relation to the anarchist movement. It is certainly not the case that most self-identified anarchists *actually* endorse the position. This is partly due to the fact that the position is stated in terms of concepts and principles that are peculiar to academic philosophy and not widely discussed by actual participants in the anarchist movement. Additionally, the position has some revisionary implications that many anarchists would refuse to endorse (these will be discussed in Chapter 7). So why think that self-identified anarchists would ultimately accept the proposed view? The convenient answer is that anarchists, like all persons interested in identifying the correct moral theory, will be attracted to the position in proportion to its general theoretical virtues. Thus, the aim of the book is to establish that social anarchism possesses these theoretical virtues, thereby simultaneously defending the position *qua* political philosophy and the position's claim to the anarchist label.

That said, the book's argument for social anarchism will appeal to a number of principles that will be particularly attractive to self-identified anarchists. Thus, anarchists will be more likely to endorse the social anarchist position after adequate philosophical reflection relative to non-anarchists. As will be discussed shortly, one aim of the book is to show that social anarchism is coherent in the sense that its five theses are connected via relations of logical entailment. Given that self-identified anarchists

[12] For example, G. A. Cohen suggests that a core socialist commitment is eliminating all unchosen disadvantage such that any social differences reflect only "difference of taste or choice" (2008, 18). He recognizes that this is a revisionary view, as it declares unjust certain economic regimes that are widely endorsed by socialists. However, in response to this observation, he states that "I acknowledge that socialists have advocated such regimes, and I have no wish, or need, to deny that those regimes can be called *socialist* . . . . What I do need to insist is that such systems contradict the fundamental principles animating socialists, when those principles are fully thought through" (23). In this way, he seemingly endorses the social movement approach to justify his revisionary account of socialism *qua* political philosophy.

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often endorse the theses that function as antecedents in these entailment relations, they will also be disposed to accept the consequent theses as well (after philosophical reflection). Thus, they will be particularly disposed to endorse the social anarchist position.

When it comes to establishing the theoretical virtues of social anarchism, the book will attempt to demonstrate that the position is both coherent and independently plausible. As a rough statement of the former virtue, a *coherent* position is one where the adoption of any additional principles beyond one's starting principle is motivated by that starting principle.[13] The virtue of coherence is particularly important for establishing the plausibility of positions that are composed of unusual combinations of normative theses, for example, social anarchism with its simultaneous endorsement of libertarian and egalitarian moral principles. To see the worry here, suppose that one embraces some libertarian principle *L*. Given this starting commitment, should one build a political philosophy that endorses not only *L* as its starting premise but also some egalitarian principle *S* (assuming that *L* and *S* are compatible)? There are two reasons one might have doubts about the wisdom of such a project, each of which can be understood as a kind of coherence worry.

First, the worry about the position's coherence can be understood as a worry about *arbitrariness*. Note that there are numerous alternative principles and combinations of principles that might be adopted as a supplement to *L*. Why, then, affirm a political philosophy that endorses the conjunction of *L* and *S* rather than one that affirms *L* and some other principle *T* – or, alternatively, *L* and *S* and *T*? Even supposing that *L* is compatible with both *S* and *T* (i.e., there is no contradiction between *L* and either of these two latter theses), the fact that these principles *can* be jointly held does not establish that they *should* be so held. By contrast, a coherent political position is one where a stronger logical relation than mere compatibility obtains between *L* and *S*, where this relation justifies the particular set of principles chosen.

Note that it is not adequate to simply provide freestanding justifications of *L* and *S*, that is, independent reasons why each respective moral principle is attractive. This is because a given principle might be compatible with many other independently plausible principles that are, themselves, incompatible. For example, it might be the case that *L* is compatible with *S* and is similarly compatible with *T*, and there is something attractive

[13] This is how Barbara Fried defines the notion when criticizing left-libertarian positions for lacking coherence (2004; 87fn50, 89).

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about both *S* and *T*; however, it also turns out that *S* and *T* contradict one another. Thus, to embrace *L* & *S* requires that one reject *L* & *T*, even though all three principles are equally plausible. Given this possibility, one might worry that a theoretical position composed of independently attractive principles bound together only by the very weak compatibility relation is theoretically objectionable due to it being unacceptably arbitrary. At the very least, one might ask of the person who endorses *L* and *S* whether she is confident that she has found the optimal combination of moral principles, or whether there might be superior combinations of compatible principles available to her.

Second (and relatedly), one might take the worry about coherence to be a worry about how the posited position would hold up in the context of a debate with those who endorse various rival positions. Specifically, consider the ideologue who endorses *L* as a core principle but rejects *S*. Given her rejection of *S*, a demonstration that *L* and *S* are compatible will do nothing to push her away from her position, as she can admit such compatibility while denying that there is any need for her to append *S* to her already-accepted principle. Of course, one might appeal to various intuitive considerations that favor the adoption of *S*, but a steadfast ideologue could simply deny that she feels the force of the presented intuition pumps.

This worry about the coherence of a conjunctive position that endorses both *L* and *S*, then, can be understood as a worry that *L* and *S* fail to adequately hang together in a way that gives the position a dialectical advantage over a position that endorses *L* but not *S*. In other words, were the conjunctive position coherent, then there would be a logical relation between *L* and *S* such that those who merely embraced *L* would be rationally compelled to accept the conjunctive position. Specifically, it would have to be the case that either *L* – when coupled with some conjunction of uncontroversial premises *U* – entails *S*, or that the most plausible grounds of *L* (i.e., the most plausible premise that, together with *U*, entails *L*) also entails *S* when conjoined with *U*. This book will argue that there are such direct relations of logical entailment that connect the libertarian and egalitarian theses that make up the social anarchist position. In this way, the book aims to establish that social anarchism is coherent in the sense described earlier, with the position thereby capturing the associated dialectical and theoretical advantages.

In addition to demonstrating that the various anarchist theses are logically connected, the book will also argue that they are independently plausible. It will do this in two ways. First, as noted in the opening section,

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it will argue that the anarchist theses follow from an independent meta-principle that constrains which moral theories are acceptable (the moral tyranny constraint). Insofar as this meta-principle is plausible, it will represent a novel reason for accepting the anarchist position that it entails. Second, the book will show that, once the anarchist theses are suitably adjusted to conform to the moral tyranny constraint, they avoid many of the serious objections that plague their unadjusted counterparts. By negating these reasons for rejecting the anarchist position – in addition to having provided the aforementioned positive reason for accepting it – the book aims to show that the all-things-considered balance of reasons favors accepting social anarchism.

In this way, the book aims to increase the metaphorical gravity of the anarchist position. By revealing the logical connections that render the position coherent, the book will help to pull in anarchists who endorse some of the social anarchist theses but not others. Additionally, by enhancing the independent plausibility of the position, the hope is to attract those whose views place them well outside of the part of ideological space primarily occupied by self-identified anarchists. In particular, the book aims to put dialectical pressure on right-libertarians, who share many of the social anarchist's philosophical intuitions and methodological commitments but reach very different conclusions when it comes to distributive justice. The book will try to show that right-libertarians are mistaken in their conclusions and should, thus, enter the social anarchist orbit.

I.3 Something for Everyone

If the argument of the book succeeds, the resulting conclusion will be of some practical use to those across the political spectrum. For anarchists, the uses of the book are more apparent, but still worth discussing. First, the philosophical position it defends (and the argument for that position) can serve as an intellectual foundation for justifying various anarchist political practices. G. A. Cohen (1994) provides a helpful discussion of this relation between theory and practice when laying out the moral principles he takes to be constitutive of socialism. It is worth quoting him at length on this point:

> An essential ingredient in the Right's breakthrough was an intellectual self-confidence that was grounded in fundamental theoretical work by academics

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> such as Milton Friedman, Friedrich Hayek, and Robert Nozick. In one instructive sense, those authors did not propose new ideas. Instead, they explored, developed, and forthrightly reaffirmed the Right's traditional principles. Those principles are not so traditional to the British *political* Right as they are to the American, but they are traditional nevertheless, in the important sense that they possess a historical depth which is associated with the conceptual and moral depth at which they are located. . . The point of theory is not to generate a comprehensive social design which the politician then seeks to implement. Things don't work that way, because implementing a design requires whole cloth, and nothing in contemporary politics is made out of whole cloth. Politics is an endless struggle, and theory serves as a weapon in that struggle, because it provides a characterization of its direction, and of its controlling purpose . . . . The theories [of Friedman, Hayek, and Nozick] are . . . uncompromisingly fundamental: they were not devised with one eye on electoral possibility. And, just for that reason, their serviceability in electoral and other political contest is very great. *Politicians and activists can press not-so-crazy right-wing proposals with conviction because they have the strength of conviction that depends upon depth of conviction, and depth comes from theory that is too fundamental to be practicable in a direct sense* . . . . The large fundamental values help to power (or block) the little changes by nourishing the justificatory rhetoric which is needed to push (or resist) change. (1994, 4–5, emphasis in the original)

In other words, while it is unlikely that anarchists will ever fully realize their envisioned utopia, there are things that can be done to nudge society in that direction. However, such political action often requires both self-sacrifice and the courage to challenge accepted norms and social expectations. Given the costs of acting on political conviction, one might reasonably want some degree of assurance that one's political views are well-grounded and not the product of mistaken reasoning, unquestioned dogma, and beguiling platitudes. This book aims to provide anarchists with such an assurance, thereby giving them the intellectual self-confidence to go forth and realize a more just world.

Additionally, the proposed position will help egalitarian anarchists to more clearly differentiate their position from rival socialist positions. Typically, the distinction between socialism and anarchism is stated in terms of tactics: While socialists and anarchists endorse a shared end – namely, a stateless, classless, socialist society – socialists want to use the state as a tool to realize that end while anarchists take the abolition of the state to be the first step to achieving that end. However, this characterization suggests that there is no serious philosophical disagreement between

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socialists and anarchists, as both groups endorse egalitarianism and reject private property. By contrast, the book suggests that even when anarchists and socialists arrive at the same moral conclusions, they reach them via very different starting premises (with anarchists beginning with premises typically endorsed by libertarians). Thus, it provides anarchists with an alternative way of articulating what is distinctive about their viewpoint.

While the book emphasizes this difference between anarchists and socialists, the latter should still find the proposed argument valuable, as it will serve as a useful tool to deploy against anti-egalitarian right-libertarians. The right-libertarian philosophical position has become one of the primary philosophical bases for criticizing egalitarian redistribution, with right-libertarians arguing that such redistribution is unjust because it violates persons' property rights. By contrast, the social anarchist position denies the existence of such property rights and insists that justice requires an egalitarian distribution of advantage. Importantly, as subsequent chapters will discuss, it argues for this conclusion by appealing strictly to premises that right-libertarians would accept. In this way, it seeks to defeat anti-egalitarian libertarianism on its own terms, thereby making the position of interest to egalitarians of all varieties. Even if such egalitarians ultimately reject the libertarian premises in question, they can treat the book as a *reductio ad absurdum* argument against right-libertarianism: It demonstrates that the right-libertarian position is composed of incompatible propositions, and, thus, right-libertarians must abandon least some of their standard commitments (with their anti-egalitarian commitments being the most promising candidates to reject).

The argument of the book will also be useful to left-libertarians, as it provides them with a solution to their coherence problem. As briefly noted earlier, left-libertarians argue that certain core libertarian commitments are compatible with the claim that justice requires an egalitarian distribution of resources. However, left-libertarianism has also come under fire from various critics who argue that the position lacks coherence. Most notably, Barbara Fried (2004, 89) argues that, although left-libertarians may have demonstrated the *compatibility* of libertarian and egalitarian principles, their embrace of the latter is not adequately *motivated by* the former (87fn50, 89).[14]

[14] Mathias Risse (2004) has raised a related worry about the coherence of left-libertarianism, while conceding that left-libertarians succeed in demonstrating the compatibility of various libertarian and egalitarian principles.

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In a joint response to Fried's objection, Peter Vallentyne, Hillel Steiner, and Michael Otsuka largely concede the charge, admitting that "left-libertarians do not all hold that the egalitarian ownership of natural resources follows from their non-egalitarian libertarian commitments," and, instead, invoke "egalitarian ownership of natural resources as an independent principle" (2005, 208). However, they argue that this concession is of little consequence, for, if "coherence requires that the justification for each of one's principles appeal to the same set of considerations ... then there is little reason to require coherence so understood" (2005, 209).

The problem with this reply is that it does not adequately appreciate the theoretical value of coherence. As discussed in the previous section, a philosophical position that lacks coherence is at risk of seeming unacceptably arbitrary. Additionally, it loses much of its dialectical force against those who hold rival views. For these reasons, one should, all else being equal, favor a theory that is coherent over one that is not. Thus, if this book succeeds in demonstrating not only the truth of the left-libertarian thesis – namely, that core libertarian principles are compatible with an egalitarian approach to distributive justice – but also that there is a coherent version of left-libertarianism (namely, social anarchism), left-libertarians would be able to sidestep Fried's criticism by adopting the social anarchist position.

Finally, although the book puts significant dialectical pressure on right-libertarians (as was just noted), they, too, might find its argument useful in at least one respect. Given that social anarchism entails a rejection of private property claims – and, thus, right-libertarian conclusions about distributive justice more generally – one might conclude that social anarchism has nothing helpful to offer right-libertarians. However, two things can be said in response to this conclusion. First, note that the anarchist position includes core libertarian moral principles such as the self-ownership thesis, with the book presenting novel arguments in defense of these principles. Thus, even if right-libertarians reject the book's egalitarian conclusions, they will still find these arguments useful. Second, if the libertarian principles in question are taken to be incompatible with egalitarianism, many philosophers and ideologues will be tempted to reject them simply in virtue of this incompatibility. By contrast, if it can be shown that these libertarian principles are not only compatible with but actually *entail* egalitarian conclusions, then this reflexive hostility might dissipate. In this way, the book could help right-libertarians get a second hearing for some of their favored principles.

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Of course, these conciliatory remarks merely aim to show that social anarchism is useful, where usefulness does not imply plausibility. In other words, if anarchism *were* a correct normative theory, some practical advantages would follow from that result. However, it still needs to be shown that the theory is, in fact, correct. This will be the task of the next seven chapters: to demonstrate that social anarchism is a plausible and attractive normative position.

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CHAPTER 1

Social Anarchism

> The anarchists are and will be thus always very few, but they are everywhere. They are what I will call the leaven which raises the bread. Already, you see them involved everywhere . . . in the Free-thought Movement, in the Socialist Party . . . the trade unions, the co-operatives, they are everywhere. . . . There are even those who are unaware of it! Because once one explains to them what is anarchism, they say: "But if it is that, I am anarchistic! I am with you!"
>
> Sébastien Faure, "The Revolutionary Forces"

> Her development, her freedom, her independence, must come from and through herself. First, by asserting herself as a personality, and not as a sex commodity. Second, by refusing the right to anyone over her body.
>
> Emma Goldman, "Woman Suffrage"

This chapter will introduce the five theses that the social anarchist philosophical position comprises. No individual thesis is entirely original to the anarchist position; rather, they have been drawn from other philosophical camps, particularly the political philosophies advanced by libertarians and egalitarian socialists. However, the principles have been adjusted in various ways so as to render them more precise and plausible. The subsequent sections will present the five anarchist principles, explain how and why they differ from their more standard formulations, and defend their plausibility. Specifically, the chapter will begin with the principles typically endorsed by libertarians (Sections 1.1–1.3) before turning to the anti-propertarian and egalitarian theses that set social anarchism apart from standard libertarianism (Sections 1.5 and 1.6). It will also devote three sections (Sections 1.4, 1.7, and 1.8) to defending the anarchist interpretation of the self-ownership thesis presented in Section 1.3. The remaining anarchist theses will then be defended in subsequent chapters of the book.

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1.1 The Consent Theory of Legitimacy

The first anarchist thesis is the *consent theory of legitimacy*, which holds that a state – or, more generally any agent – is legitimate with respect to its purported subjects if and only if they have consented to its legitimacy. This just-mentioned legitimacy relation can be understood as follows: Some person P is *legitimate* with respect to another person Q if and only if P has the Hohfeldian power to determine what obligations Q has via the issuing of edicts.[1] More specifically, P is legitimate with respect to Q if and only if Q is obligated to obey P's edicts, where "P's edicts" designates nonrigidly. Thus, if a state is legitimate with respect to Q and it enacts some law L at time t that mandates that Q ϕ, then Q is obligated to ϕ at t. By contrast, had the state instituted law M (rather than L) mandating that Q ψ, then Q would have been obligated to ψ at t rather than ϕ. Alternatively, one might say that P is legitimate with respect to Q if and only if when P issues an edict that Q must ϕ, Q is obligated to ϕ *because* P issued the edict. However, the counterfactual analysis of legitimacy is a bit clearer, so it will be favored for these purposes. The consent theory of legitimacy, then, maintains that P is legitimate with respect to Q if and only if Q has consented to being bound by P's edicts in this way (where Q consents to some state of affairs only if she intends to consent to it, is reasonably informed about what she is consenting to, can refuse consent without incurring undue costs, etc.).

There are a few things to note about this account of legitimacy. First, legitimate states possess a Hohfeldian power to impose obligations, where, going forward, the term "legitimacy" will be used to denote this power (as well as the abstract relation that obtains between a legitimate agent and her subject). Second, the notion does not discriminate between states and private individuals: Either kind of agent can possess the power in question and, thus, be legitimate vis-à-vis some person or people. One reason for not distinguishing between state legitimacy and private legitimacy is that it is surprisingly difficult to provide an analysis of statehood that can satisfactorily demarcate states from non-state actors. This point will be discussed in detail in Section 7.2. Additionally, the suggestion here is that it is the power that is of moral significance rather than the bearer of that power, where this implies that the possession of that power is subject to the same theoretical constraints irrespective of who possesses it. In other words, if there is something problematic about a state possessing legitimacy without

[1] For an explication of the Hohfeldian incidents, see Section 2.2.

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consent – as the consent theorist insists that there is – there will equally be something problematic about a private individual possessing this power without consent, as it is the mere possession of the power that must be justified by consent, not the fact that a *state* possesses this power.

Third, note that agents cannot be legitimate *tout court*; rather, they can only be legitimate *with respect to* some particular person. Thus, when one asserts that a state is legitimate with respect to a group of people, what is being asserted, strictly speaking, is that the state is legitimate with respect to each individual member of the group (unless the group qualifies as a group agent, in which case the state might be legitimate with respect to that agent). One might supplement this notion of legitimacy with a derivative scalar concept designed to capture the broader relation between the state and the aggregation of its claimed subjects. For example, to elaborate on a proposal from John Simmons (2001, 130), one might say that a state is more legitimate *on balance* than another if and only if it is legitimate with respect to a larger proportion of its claimed subjects. However, while this notion might be useful in certain evaluative contexts, it is irrelevant to the consent theory of legitimacy, as consent theory posits a necessary and sufficient condition of the more primitive legitimacy relation obtaining between two agents.

Finally, this analysis of legitimacy differs in various ways from how others have defined the term. On one popular account, a legitimate state is one that has a Hohfeldian permission to make and coercively enforce rules (Wellman 1996, 211–12; Huemer 2013, 5). By contrast, the concept is here defined as the *power* to impose obligations by making rules. It, is thus, closer to what Huemer labels "political authority," where a state possessing this property has both a permission to coerce (what he calls "legitimacy") and a right that its subjects obey its rules (2013, 5). However, note that, if one plausibly assumes that the obligations in question are coercively enforceable, a state's power to impose obligations via edicts will entail that it has a permission to coercively enforce those edicts. Additionally, if one thinks that it is permissible to coerce someone to do something only if she is obliged to do it, then a state will have the power to impose obligations by issuing edicts if and only if it has a permission to coercively enforce those edicts – that is, what Wellman and Huemer call "legitimacy" turns out to be materially equivalent to the notion of legitimacy posited here.

It is also worth contrasting the proposed notion of legitimacy with Simmons' (2001) influential definition of the term. According to Simmons, legitimacy is a "complex moral right . . . to be the exclusive imposer of binding duties on its subjects, to have its subjects comply with these duties, and to use coercion to enforce the duties" (2001, 130). This definition is a bit puzzling,

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as it seems like a category mistake to say that someone can have the right to *be* something rather than *do* something. One might interpret Simmons as suggesting that a legitimate authority has a claim against others imposing binding duties on its subjects – that is, against them exercising their power to oblige others. However, it seems more parsimonious to take Simmons to be simply asserting that if an authority has the power to oblige its subjects, then no other authority has this same power.[2] By contrast, the proposed account of legitimacy does not demand exclusivity in this way, with it being possible for multiple authorities to be legitimate with respect to the same person.[3]

[2] It is also slightly puzzling that Simmons takes legitimacy to be a right that "subjects comply with these duties," as this claim seems trivial. If P has a right that Q ϕ, then Q has a correlative duty to ϕ. Thus, to say that P has a right that Q discharge her duty to ϕ is just to say that Q has a duty to discharge her duty to ϕ. And, given that Q discharges her duty to ϕ by ϕ-ing, the proposition that P has a right that Q discharge her duty to ϕ is equivalent to the proposition that Q has a duty to ϕ. Thus, the quoted portion of Simmons' definition of legitimacy does not seem to add any content to the broader definition and should seemingly be discounted for this reason.

[3] Note that the exclusivity component of Simmons' definition is actually incompatible with the consent theory of legitimacy. So long as it is possible that a person might consent to be governed by multiple authorities, then consent theory would entail that all of these authorities would be simultaneously legitimate with respect to this person. Thus, consent theorists have reason to favor the proposed definition of legitimacy that foregoes the exclusivity component. In reply to this point, Simmons might modify the consent theory of legitimacy such that P is legitimate with respect to Q if and only if Q consents to being governed by P *and* Q has not previously consented to be governed by a different authority R. Further, to avoid charges of making *ad hoc* revisions, he could argue that this change must be made to avoid the following *reductio* argument:

1. If Q consents to being governed by P (or R), then P (or R) is legitimate with respect to Q.
2. If P (or R) is legitimate with respect to Q, then if P (or R) orders Q to ϕ (or not ϕ) then Q has a duty to ϕ (or not ϕ).
3. Q consents to being governed by P and subsequently consents to being governed by R.
4. P orders Q to ϕ and R subsequently orders P to not ϕ.
5. Duties cannot conflict: it cannot be the case that P has a duty to ϕ and a duty to not ϕ.

Together, these premises generate a contradiction; thus one of them must be rejected. Simmons might contend that the most plausible candidate for rejection is Premise 1 – that is, the consent theory of legitimacy must be revised in the way suggested previously.

There are two problems with this argument. First, many of the other premises might be equally rejected. For example, one might deny Premise 2 (i.e., revise the proposed definition of legitimacy) by holding that a legitimate authority cannot oblige Q to not ϕ if Q already has a duty to ϕ. Or perhaps the later order to not ϕ negates the previous duty to ϕ. Alternatively, one might reject Premise 5 for reasons such as those discussed by Judith Jarvis Thomson (1990, 87–93). Thus, the proposed revision of consent theory still seems *ad hoc*. Second, note that one could construct a parallel *reductio* argument where there is only a single legitimate authority P who orders Q to ϕ and then subsequently orders her to not ϕ. The fact that the resulting contradiction could not be avoided by rejecting Premise 1 of the original *reductio* suggests that it would be better to reject either Premise 2 or Premise 5 as suggested earlier, as such a rejection would avoid the contradiction generated by the parallel *reductio*. That said, the argument of this book does not depend on accepting the proposed account of legitimacy over Simmons'. For these purposes, all that matters is that consent is a necessary condition of some person having the power to oblige another via the issuing of edicts.

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In short, the proposed analysis of legitimacy does not refer to any permission to coercively enforce duties and it also does not entail that only one agent can be legitimate with respect to any particular person (contra Wellman, Huemer, and Simmons). Rather, it limits itself to the assertion that an authority is legitimate if and only if that authority possesses the power to oblige via the issuing of edicts. Thus, the consent theory of legitimacy should be understood as asserting that consent is a necessary and sufficient condition of this moral power obtaining, with the book's subsequent arguments for consent theory (presented in Sections 2.4 and 4.2) supporting this posited interpretation.

The final thing to note about the consent theory of legitimacy is that (practically) no people have actually consented to being governed, either by states or by others.[4] In other words, the necessary condition of legitimacy obtaining is (almost) never satisfied and, thus, there are no existing legitimate states or other authorities – at least, vis-à-vis the vast majority of the human population. This is not to say that there are *necessarily* no legitimate states. In fact, the consent theory of legitimacy entails that a state *would* be legitimate vis-à-vis all of its claimed subjects if, as a contingent matter of fact, they all happened to give it their consent to be governed. However, in the actual world, existing states are not legitimate with respect to practically any of their citizens; that is, they lack the power to impose obligations on their citizens by passing laws or issuing other edicts. This conclusion – a position known as *philosophical anarchism* – is a fitting implication of the anarchist position's affirmation of the consent theory of legitimacy.

1.2 The Lockean Proviso

The second component of the social anarchist position is an endorsement of a particular interpretation of what has become known as the *Lockean proviso*. As a bit of context, libertarian property rights theorists typically maintain that the world starts out unowned such that all persons have a permission to use all things. Persons then carry out acts of initial appropriation whereby they convert those resources into private property – that is, they acquire a robust set of rights and powers vis-à-vis the appropriated objects. These rights include Hohfeldian permissions to use the owned thing; claims against all others using the thing; powers to waive these

[4] The parenthetical qualifier is included because there may be some people who have given their free and informed consent to be governed (e.g., patriotic people who signed a loyalty oath of some kind).

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claims; immunities against the loss of these claims, permissions, and powers; and powers to transfer all of these listed rights to others.[5] Libertarians also uniformly hold that people can *unilaterally* carry out these acts of appropriation – that is, they do not need others' consent in order to successfully appropriate some unowned resource. That said, many libertarian theories also include a proviso limiting the extent to which any given person can appropriate.[6] Most famously, *right-libertarians* adopt a particular interpretation of Locke's contention that a person can appropriate some resource only if "there is enough and as good left in common for others" (2005, §33). Typically, they interpret Locke's proviso as a non-worsening condition: To be left with "enough and as good" is to be left no worse off than if the act of appropriation had not occurred – or, more permissively, to be no worse off than if *no* appropriation *by anyone* ever occurred (as was proposed by Nozick 1974, 181).[7] Additionally, the proviso is taken to be not only a necessary condition of appropriation occurring via some suitable act but also a sufficient condition of that act successfully appropriating the thing in question.[8] Together, these interpretations yield (a preliminary statement of) the Lockean proviso (or "the proviso" for short): A person is able to appropriate some unowned resource via some suitable action if and only if her doing so does not leave anyone worse off.[9]

Given that the proviso is a signature commitment of right-libertarianism, it may seem odd that it would be included within the social anarchist position, as right-libertarians famously reject the kind of distributive egalitarianism that will be endorsed subsequently. However, the anarchist position will incorporate this proviso for three reasons. First, the proviso's proposed non-worsening condition is independently plausible. Specifically,

[5] For a stronger statement of full ownership, see Wendt (2015, 318).

[6] Not all libertarians posit such a proviso. Some prominent examples of such *no proviso* or *radical right-libertarians* include Murray Rothbard (1998), Jan Narveson (1998), and Edward Feser (2005). Eric Mack (1995) also denies that appropriation is constrained by a proviso, but suggests that the interests of latecomers might constrain the use of acquired property.

[7] As noted in the Introduction, there is a rival *left-libertarian* school of thought that seeks to show that self-ownership and private property rights are compatible with egalitarian views about distributive justice. Specifically, it rejects the Lockean proviso in favor of an *egalitarian proviso* that holds that an act of appropriation succeeds if and only if it leaves others with enough unappropriated resources such that they could each appropriate a share of equal value.

[8] It is often maintained that Locke took his proviso to be a necessary condition of appropriation rather than a sufficient one. However, this interpretation has been disputed by Thomson (1976) and Jeremy Waldron (1979), among others.

[9] Which acts qualify as "suitable" – that is, which acts are acts of appropriation – will be discussed in Section 1.3.

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it seems plausible that, by improving someone's situation via some action – or, at least, not worsening it – one nullifies that person's grounds for complaint about that action, where such grounds for complaint are both necessary and sufficient for precluding successful appropriation. After all, if no one is affected (on net) by the successful appropriation of some resource, then how could anyone object to that appropriation occurring? Further, if no one can reasonably object, then why should a theory of property disallow such appropriation?

Second, Chapter 2 will argue that the Lockean proviso follows from a plausible meta-principle (the moral tyranny constraint) that constrains which moral theories qualify as acceptable. The aim of this book is to derive the entire anarchist position from this meta-principle; thus, the fact that the principle entails the Lockean proviso is a decisive reason for including the proviso in the anarchist position. Finally, including the proviso in the anarchist position gives the anarchist dialectical leverage against right-libertarians who similarly endorse the proviso. As noted in the Introduction, Chapters 3 and 5 will argue that a commitment to the proviso surprisingly entails that one must deny the existence of external private property and, instead, endorse the egalitarian position presented in Section 1.5. Thus, the inclusion of the proviso in the anarchist position helps to advance an argumentative strategy that aims to challenge right-libertarianism on its own terms.

Developing this argument will be the task of the remaining chapters of this book. For now, though, the aim is strictly to give the proviso determinate content by specifying its multiple ambiguous terms.[10] Some of these terms will be left underspecified such that others can fill in the details with their own preferred theories. For example, one must ultimately specify the respect in which others must not be left worse off by appropriation. The dominant position among the proviso's proponents is that welfare is the relevant metric to employ when making this assessment.[11] However, for the purposes of this book, one can remain neutral on this point and allow that there might be other ways in which a person can be left worse off beyond having her welfare diminished (for this reason, this book uses the placeholder "diminished advantage" to denote a person

[10] Daniel Attas (2003) similarly notes that many of the proviso's terms are ambiguous, and he argues at length that there is no acceptable specification of the proviso that also is satisfied vis-à-vis external resources.

[11] For some objections to the welfare specification, see Attas (2003, 358–60) and Bas van der Vossen (2021, 187–9).

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being left worse off in the relevant respect).[12] By contrast, the anarchist position *does* endorse a particular specification of the comparison point relative to which persons cannot be left worse off. Specifically, it holds that the appropriation of some resource succeeds if and only if such appropriation would not leave anyone worse off *relative to the closest possible world where the agent never existed to appropriate the resource in the first place*. For example, if person *Q* enjoys sitting on a stretch of beach every weekend but *P* appropriates that beach and thereby precludes *Q* from using it, that appropriation would violate the proviso, as it results in *Q* ending up worse off than she would have been in the world without *P* that is most similar to the actual world.

A full defense of this specification will be presented in Sections 3.3 and 3.4. For now, this section will turn to specifying exactly what it is that cannot leave others worse off. The obvious suggestion is that it is the *appropriation* of the resource that cannot leave others worse off, where appropriation is the change in normative fact that occurs when non-appropriators go from having a permission to use the resource to an obligation to refrain from using that resource. However, it will now be argued that this *natural interpretation* of the Lockean proviso is implausible because it is trivially satisfied by all possible appropriations. Note that if initial appropriation makes strictly *normative* changes to the world, altering *moral facts* about what rights people have over objects, then it is unclear how an act of appropriation could have any *causal effect* on people's advantage. Given the physical nature of causation, it is odd to suggest that changes in nonphysical moral fact could cause physical events of the kind presupposed by the natural interpretation of the proviso. Or, to put this point another way, the causal relation has events as its *relata*, where events are best understood as either spatiotemporal things or, more controversially, things that are either spatiotemporal *or* mental.[13] Given that a change in moral fact is neither a spatiotemporal event nor a mental event, it follows that initial appropriation cannot cause people to be worse off.

[12] That said, the subsequent argument of this section presupposes a specification of this currency of comparison such that the quantity of this currency possessed by persons is not actually a function of appropriation occurring. The meaning of this assertion will be clarified by the discussion presented just below. However, it is worth noting here that the subsequent argument will not be applicable if, for example, one takes a person to be left worse off if and only if she possesses fewer permissions relative to the baseline for comparison.

[13] Even the claim that events are *things* is not without controversy. For a helpful overview of the debate, see Roberto Casati and Achille Varzi (2020).

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This, in turn, implies that the proviso is trivially satisfied by any act of initial appropriation.

It might be objected that this account of causation is too stringent. Instead, one might propose the following *counterfactual account* of causation: A fact of any kind *C* causes some other fact *E* to obtain if and only if (i) *C* and *E* are sufficiently distinct (e.g., they are nonidentical and, insofar as facts have parts, neither is a part of the other) and (ii) if *C* had not obtained then *E* would not have obtained.[14] This account would make it metaphysically possible that initial appropriation causally affects others' levels of advantage, as the difference in moral fact between the appropriation world and non-appropriation world might be accompanied by a counterfactual difference in advantage. However, the proponent of this suggestion would still need to provide some argument as to why this is more than a mere possibility. Most plausibly, she might posit that human minds are sensitive to moral facts such that people form beliefs in response to those facts and then act on those beliefs.[15] This would allow her to maintain that if the moral facts had been different due to an act of appropriation not occurring, then people would have formed different beliefs, behaved differently, and thereby had a different effect on others' advantage. Thus, a counterfactual difference in advantage would obtain, thereby giving initial appropriation causal purchase in the physical world.

The problem with this argument is that, even if one accepts this unconventional account of causation, the responsiveness of minds to moral facts is limited at best. If minds were highly sensitive to moral facts, one would expect to see wide and enduring consensus about the truth of most moral propositions. However, there is persistent and widespread moral disagreement across time and region. Thus, at most, there is a highly inelastic relationship between moral beliefs and facts such that *some* people *eventually* come to have beliefs that correspond to the facts. Given the loose connection between moral fact and human action, there is no reason to think that any given act of initial appropriation will entail a counterfactual difference in advantage-affecting behavior.

[14] Condition (i) is posited so that the account will not deliver unacceptable results like the affirmation that some event caused itself. For more on the need for cause and effect to be distinct, see David Lewis (1986). To be very precise, one would also want to build in Lewis' (1973) prohibition against considering *backtracking* counterfactuals that fail to hold the past fixed when searching for the closest possible world where *C* does not obtain. The claim that facts can be causes is defended by D. H. Mellor (1995; 2004), though this does not imply that *moral* facts can be causes.

[15] For a defense of this proposition, see Michael Smith (1994) and Huemer (2016). For recent criticisms of this position, see Patrick Hassan (2019) and Jeroen Hopster (2020).

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Appropriation's lack of causal power entails that one must reject any specification of the proviso that holds that it is the appropriation itself that must not leave others worse off. Such a specification would render the Lockean proviso trivially satisfied: Even if one person exhaustively appropriated all existing resources, she would not diminish others' advantage, as the moral change would not have any causal effects whatsoever. Given that such a permissive proviso is both implausible and fails to express the idea that motivates it – namely, that, absent any proviso, certain appropriations *would* leave others worse off in a way that is theoretically problematic – some other specification is needed.

Fortunately, there is an alternative specification of the Lockean proviso that seemingly captures the motivation for building the proviso into a theory of property. This version of the proviso asserts that a person can appropriate some thing via some suitable action if and only if *full compliance with* her established claim rights would not leave others worse off than they would have been had she not existed to establish these claims (assuming that others similarly comply with the other demands of morality). Unlike the natural interpretation of the proviso, this interpretation is not trivially satisfied, as there will be cases where compliance with property claims would leave others worse off in this way. Additionally, it seems to capture the thought that motivates the proviso, namely, that there is something morally problematic about imposing costs on fully compliant people – and, thus, a moral theory should not license the imposition of such costs.[16] The natural interpretation of the proviso errs by articulating

[16] An anonymous reviewer suggests an alternative specification of the proviso that asserts that appropriation must not leave anyone worse off conditional on *expected* compliance with the established rights. However, there are three reasons for preferring the full-compliance specification proposed in the main text. First, the expected-compliance proviso would be vulnerable to the same objection raised against the standard interpretation of the proviso: It is trivially satisfied due to appropriation lacking causal power. If appropriation changes moral facts and such changes lack causal power, then appropriation will not change how people behave relative to the world where the appropriation does not occur. Thus, everyone's expected behavior in both cases will be identical, which, in turn, implies that the expected compliance proviso is always satisfied. Second, an expected-compliance proviso would have unattractive implications. For example, consider the case where the first-to-arrive person attempts to appropriate the entire planet. If later arrivals were to fully comply with her property rights, they would be left much worse off; however, suppose that, as a matter of contingent fact, these latecomers have a complete disregard for others' property rights. In this case, the expected compliance specification would entail that the act of appropriation *succeeds*, as no one would be left worse off given expected compliance. More generally, the proposed expected-compliance specification entails that some acts of appropriation succeed if and only if no one actually complies with the established rights – a result that seemingly counts against accepting such a specification of the proviso. Finally, Chapter 2 will argue that the full-compliance specification of the proviso follows from the chapter's proposed moral tyranny constraint. Given the chapter's contention that this constraint is both independently plausible and

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this thought in terms of the (nonexistent) causal effect of the obligations imposed by appropriation. However, this mistake can be corrected by simply stating the proviso in terms of the costs imposed by full compliance with those obligations.[17]

In addition to these three bits of specification, one further amendment to the standard Lockean proviso is needed to yield the complete anarchist interpretation of the proviso. So far it has been proposed that a suitable act of appropriation succeeds if and only if its established claims do not leave anyone worse off under conditions of full compliance (relative to the world where the appropriator did not exist). However, note that initial appropriation does not just establish claims but also the power to waive the established claims. This fact is significant because those committed to the proviso must seemingly also affirm that the exercise of this power must not leave others worse off under conditions of full compliance. Otherwise, the endorsement of the proviso seems arbitrary: Why would one power to change others' permissions vis-à-vis the use of natural resources (via appropriation) be subject to a non-worsening constraint but not another such power (namely, the power to waive)? In other words, if one holds that a person can appropriate some resource only if no one is left worse off as a result under conditions of full compliance, one should also hold that a person can waive her property rights only if that act similarly leaves no one worse off under conditions of full compliance.[18]

Further, note that initial appropriation is generally taken to establish *both* rights against others using the owned thing *and* the power to waive these rights – that is, appropriation is a sufficient condition of the power to waive. However, if this is correct, then any necessary condition of the power to waive must also be a necessary condition of successful appropriation (for, if p entails q and q entails r, then p entails r). Given that the

entails other attractive moral positions, a full-compliance specification of the proviso that follows from this constraint would be more likely to survive a process of reflective equilibrium than the expected-compliance specification.

[17] One could also posit an intermediate version of the proviso where the posited restriction is that each person's compliance with a property owner's acquired rights – but not necessarily full compliance by *all* persons – must not leave her (or anyone) worse off relative to the baseline for comparison. This version of the proviso would still solve the causal problem discussed previously but would not follow from the moral tyranny constraint. Additionally, it is unclear why a moral theorist should be concerned about the effects of one person's compliance but not others'. Rather, insofar as one is concerned with the effects of compliance, it is the full-compliance world that seems relevant when assessing whether or not an act of appropriation succeeds.

[18] To simplify matters a bit, this discussion will ignore the possibility of transfers leaving others worse off under conditions of full compliance. The effects of post-transfer compliance are bracketed in this way so as to avoid unnecessary complexity that does not affect the argument of the book.

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owner of some resource can possess the power to waive her rights over that resource only if no act of waiving would leave anyone worse off under conditions of full compliance, it follows that she can appropriate the thing only if no subsequent waiving of her rights would leave anyone worse off under conditions of full compliance. Thus, one must build this restriction into the Lockean proviso by restating it as follows:

> **The Lockean Proviso –** A person appropriates some unowned resource via some suitable action if and only if (a) her established claims would not leave anyone worse off under conditions of full compliance and (b) no subsequent waiving of those claims would leave others worse off under conditions of full compliance (where, in both cases, the baseline for comparison is the closest possible world where the appropriator did not exist).

This statement of the proviso is still in need of slight revision for reasons that will be discussed in Section 3.4. Thus, technically speaking, this is not the official anarchist interpretation of the Lockean proviso. However, it has the virtue of being comparatively straightforward and easy to grasp while still being quite proximate to the final version of the proviso. For this reason, it will be left to stand here as the primary statement of the proviso that is affirmed by the social anarchist position.

1.3 The Self-Ownership Thesis

The third component of the social anarchist position is a qualified endorsement of the self-ownership thesis. This signature libertarian thesis asserts that each person has the same set of rights over her own body that she would have over a fully owned thing, including a permission to use her body, a claim against others using her body, a power to waive this claim, an immunity against the loss of any of these listed rights, and a power to transfer them to others.[19] These rights are then taken to entail a number of attractive moral conclusions. For example, a claim against use implies that a person is wronged if someone harvests her organs and redistributes them to other people. It also implies that persons have correlative duties to

[19] One might think that the self is not identical to the body and, thus, that the self-ownership thesis should assert a set of rights over the former entity rather than the latter. For example, one might take the self to be nonidentical with the body because it is either merely a part of the body (e.g., the brain) or includes things outside of the body as well (e.g., the external objects that compose what has been called the "extended mind"). For these purposes, it will simply be assumed that the self is identical to the body in virtue of the close connection between one's agency and one's body. However, one might reject this assumption and thereby create a number of complications for the argument presented in Chapter 3.

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refrain from attacking or sexually assaulting self-owners. Additionally, this right to exclude others from using one's body is typically taken to imply the permissibility of abortion, as fetuses who use a pregnant person's body without consent infringe on this right (with abortion then becoming a form of permissible self-defense).[20] Proponents of the self-ownership thesis also maintain that the permissions to use one's body entail the negation of (nonconsensual) moral slavery – that is, when one person possesses the moral rights that correspond to the legal rights of slave owners (including a permission to act on the slave's body in whatever way the owner likes as well as a power to oblige the slave to act in whatever way the owner chooses) – as well as various Millian liberties such as the permission to use drugs or the permission to have consensual but socially disapproved of sex.[21]

The anarchist endorsement of the self-ownership thesis is qualified in two important ways. First, contra the standard self-ownership thesis, it does not hold that all persons possess self-ownership rights (prior to waiving or forfeiting those rights). Rather, it allows that some people might lack these rights without having ever possessed them in the first place. This is because the proposed anarchist position posits that self-ownership is not *native* in the sense that persons start out with self-ownership rights as soon as they satisfy the sufficient conditions for moral personhood. Rather, it holds that persons must *acquire* ownership of their bodies – and must do so in just the same way that they would acquire property rights over any unowned resource, namely, via acts of initial appropriation. Call these acts of *self-appropriation*.

There are two reasons for favoring the view that self-ownership is acquired rather than native. First, the latter view seems unacceptably arbitrary. As the initial definition of self-ownership (at the start of this section) suggests, proponents of the self-ownership thesis take the ownership of one's body to be of a kind with the ownership of any other object or resource. Given this similarity, it is odd to insist (as most self-ownership proponents do) that the ownership of all external things is established via acts of initial appropriation while the ownership of the body is simply a correlate of personhood. This posited difference seemingly demands explanation; however, it is not clear how property theorists can provide

[20] While practically all self-identified anarchists (and most liberals) will consider this an attractive implication of the right to exclude, not all proponents of the self-ownership thesis would consider it as such, for example, Feser (2004). There are also some complications when it comes to abortion, famously discussed by Thomson (1971).

[21] On this latter point, see Steiner (2000, 76–7) and Otsuka (2003, 2).

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such an explanation while continuing to insist that persons own themselves in the same way that they would own anything else. For this reason, it seems better to treat like things alike by maintaining that self-ownership is acquired via self-appropriation.

The second reason for favoring this approach is that it might help to resolve a worry about the kind of *moral equality* presupposed by the proponents of native self-ownership. Briefly, those who affirm the self-ownership thesis posit that each self-owner starts out with the same set of rights as all other self-owners. At the same time, these rights are denied to all nonpersons including very young children, animals, plants, rocks, photons, etc. Further, the apparent reason that these nonpersons are denied self-ownership rights is that they lack certain cognitive capacities that moral persons possess.[22] However, note that cognitive capacity is scalar, and different people will possess any given capacity to different degrees. By contrast, the self-ownership thesis assigns rights in a binary fashion: An individual either possesses the specified set of rights or she does not. As a result, the proponent of moral equality faces two related challenges. First, she must explain why self-ownership rights are not also assigned in a scalar fashion such that persons who have greater cognitive capacities possess proportionately more rights (or weightier rights). Second, she must (a) posit some specific capacity threshold that divides self-owners from nonpersons where (b) this division is nonarbitrary such that she will be able to justify why two individuals who differ only minutely in cognitive capacity – but who happen to fall on either side of the threshold – have very different rights while two individuals who differ significantly in cognitive capacity but are both above (or below) the threshold possess the same set of rights.

While there have been various attempts to address these challenges, assessing their merits would take things too far afield. Rather, the aim here is merely to show that the proponent of self-appropriation can offer a promising alternative reply to the two challenges and thereby provide a novel reason for thinking that self-owners all have the same set of rights (prior to waiving, transfer, and forfeiture). Specifically, note that the proposed theory of self-appropriation does not appeal to cognitive capacities to

[22] It may be that some other property difference that grounds the difference in rights. However, proponents of moral equality are typically skeptical that some non-capacity-based property difference can explain why persons possess rights that non-persons lack. For this reason, it is assumed that self-ownership proponents will appeal to capacity differences to explain why only some entities have self-ownership rights (with differences in *cognitive* capacity being the only plausible candidate explanation).

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explain why moral persons possess self-ownership rights while nonpersons do not. Instead, it holds that individuals possess these rights in virtue of having exercised their respective powers to appropriate resources. Thus, it sidesteps the first challenge to moral equality because the binary property of possessing self-ownership rights is now a function of another binary property, namely, the property of having performed a suitable act of self-appropriation. Similarly, it resolves the second challenge to moral equality because one can explain why two people might have very similar capacities but only one possesses self-ownership rights: The self-owner has carried out an act of self-appropriation while the other person has not.

Granted, one must still answer the question of why some people have the power to appropriate while others (very young children, cats, etc.) do not. And, given that the answer to this question must seemingly appeal to differences in cognitive capacity, one might reasonably worry that the aforementioned proposal simply passes the buck, as one must still ground a binary normative property (the possession of the power to appropriate) in a scalar property (the degree of cognitive capacity possessed). However, the suggestion here is that it is easier to meet the two previously presented challenges if the normative property in question is possessing the power to appropriate as opposed to possessing self-ownership rights. Recall that the first challenge for proponents of native self-ownership is to explain why ownership should not also be treated as scalar, with persons receiving rights in proportion to their cognitive capacities. While perhaps such an explanation can be provided, the proponent of self-appropriation has an easier response to this challenge: Unlike the possession of ownership rights, the possession of the power to appropriate simply cannot be treated in scalar fashion, as it is strictly a binary property. The reason that ownership can be treated as scalar is because it is really a bundle of distinct rights that can be disaggregated and then assigned in proportion to persons' respective cognitive capacities. By contrast, the power to appropriate is not an aggregate of more basic Hohfeldian incidents that can be unbundled and assigned in a scalar fashion. Thus, the proponent of self-appropriation does not face any analogous challenge of explaining why the possession of the power to appropriate is not proportionate to cognitive capacity.[23]

[23] One might reanimate the puzzle by positing that a person has a stronger (weaker) power to appropriate if and only if her appropriation establishes a greater (lesser) number of rights. One would then ask why people with greater cognitive capacities do not also have a proportionately stronger power to appropriate. In answer to this revised challenge, the proponent of self-appropriation can note that there are independent constraints on which ownership rights self-appropriation generates. For example, Chapter 3 will argue that self-appropriation should be

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What about the challenge of positing a nonarbitrary capacity threshold that divides those who are able to self-appropriate from those who lack this power? Here, again, the proponent of self-appropriation seems better positioned to resolve this challenge than those who contend that self-ownership is native. Specifically, she can propose a nonarbitrary threshold by appealing to her account of which acts qualify as acts of initial appropriation: A person is able to (self-)appropriate if and only if she has the requisite cognitive capacities to carry out an act of initial appropriation. For example, Carol Rose proposes that persons appropriate unowned resources by asserting that they own the resources in question (1985, 81). Thus, someone would be able to self-appropriate if and only if she both possesses the capacity to make assertions and grasps the relevant concepts of ownership such that she can meaningfully assert that she owns her own body. Such a proposal would simultaneously (a) provide a nonarbitrary threshold demarcating potential appropriators from those who are unable to appropriate, (b) plausibly entail that young children and animals are not able to appropriate, and (c) plausibly entail that practically all human adults are able to self-appropriate. Additionally, given that practically every person has, at some point, asserted that her body belongs to her, the account would entail that all persons have carried out acts of self-appropriation.[24] Thus, assuming that these acts satisfy the Lockean proviso – which, as Chapter 3 will argue, they *necessarily* do – it follows

understood as generating all and only those claims whose establishment satisfies the Lockean proviso. Additionally, one might think that the rights established by an act of appropriation correspond to the nature of the act. The subsequent paragraph will suggest that one carries out an act of appropriation when one asserts that one has ownership of the appropriated object. Given this premise, one might further maintain that the appropriator acquires the set of ownership rights that she claims to possess (within the limits set out by the Lockean proviso). If this is correct, then differences in cognitive capacity between two persons will not entail that their respective acts of appropriation generate different sets of rights. Rather, the set of rights established by appropriation is determined by facts about the nature of – and constraints on – acts of initial appropriation.

[24] There is some ambiguity here regarding exactly what one must do to appropriate some resource (in this case, the body). Strictly speaking, the proposed anarchist position is neutral on this point, and it should be taken to incorporate whatever the best account of appropriation happens to be. That said, Rose's account is presented because it both seems plausible and illustrates how near-universal self-ownership might be achieved. However, there are questions about the details of her proposal, namely, what one must assert to carry out an act of appropriation. The suggestion here is that appropriators need to merely assert that they have a right to use and exclude others from the owned thing (e.g., by posting a "no trespassing" sign or saying, "don't touch me!" in a way that implies that it would be wrong for the audience to ignore this command). This proposal seems to capture what Rose has in mind (1985, 76). More importantly, it seems to capture an important milestone in the development of children, when they go from merely expressing aversion to being touched to asserting with moral force that they should not be touched. The proposed account of self-appropriation codifies the moral significance of this developmental moment, as it declares that children become self-owners at this point.

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that practically all persons own themselves (at least, prior to waiving or transfer), even though it is at least possible that some persons never self-appropriate. In this way, the self-appropriation proponent is able to explain why persons own themselves, explain the moral equality of adult persons, explain why children and animals are excluded from the set of morally equal persons, and explain why the threshold that divides those who can self-appropriate from those who cannot is principled rather than arbitrary.[25]

In addition to making self-ownership an acquired status rather than a native one, the anarchist position further qualifies the self-ownership thesis by endorsing a more permissive interpretation of the concept of self-ownership. As noted previously, one of the core self-ownership rights is a claim against others using one's body. According to the *classical interpretation* of the concept of self-ownership, this claim against use is to be understood as a claim against *trespass* – that is, a claim against any person taking an action that makes unwanted contact with the self-owner's body.[26] By contrast, the anarchist interpretation of self-ownership limits this right to exclude by permitting bodily contact that uniquely generates supplemental benefit:

[25] Given that the proposal here is that self-ownership is acquired via initial appropriation like any other resource, one might worry that this allows for parents to appropriate the bodies of their children before the latter develop the agential capacities needed to appropriate themselves. This concern will be addressed in Section 3.5.

[26] This classical self-ownership thesis is defended by a number of prominent libertarians from across the political spectrum. For example, Nozick takes there to be a "line" that "circumscribes an area in moral space around an individual" with infringements occurring when others carry out "actions that transgress the boundary or encroach upon the circumscribed area" (1974, 57). This description of self-ownership suggests that mere trespass, that is, bodily contact, qualifies as an infringement. Similarly, Rothbard takes self-ownership to entail a right against invasion, where this includes trespass (1998, 45). That said, he elsewhere limits the notion of trespass such that it includes only *sensible* bodily contact (where this includes contact made by smoke and odors) (1982). Narveson also seems to endorse the classical self-ownership thesis when he proposes that an agent must seek the permission of self-owners if she is to permissibly "*act upon* or with" their bodies (1988, 67, emphasis added). Vallentyne, Steiner, and Otsuka are particularly explicit on this point, as they define rights against use as including rights against "all the ways that persons can physically impact upon an object, including effects that are unforeseen" (2005, 203). And Jessica Flanigan seems to take self-ownership to include a right against all bodily contact, though she is not fully explicit on this point (2019a, 30). Finally, non-libertarian proponents of the self-ownership thesis (or at least its posited claims against use) often endorse the classical understanding of self-ownership. For example, Thomson argues that each person has a claim against others making contact with her body (1990, 205–7). Similarly, Robert S. Taylor contends that self-ownership includes "the right to forbid trespass on one's own person" (2004, 68). Notably, none of these proponents of the self-ownership thesis limits the right against trespass to a right against *harmful* bodily contact, with some explicitly affirming that trespass is wrongful even when it does not harm (e.g., Thomson 1990, 209). This is to be expected given that libertarians and other self-ownership proponents typically want to give people moral *control* over what happens to their bodies rather than merely make intruders *liable for harm* done to those bodies.

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> **ASO –** Each self-owner has a right against any other person taking any action that (a) results in physical contact being made with her body and (b) does not uniquely provide anyone with supplemental benefit on net.

Predicate (b) contains a number of technical terms that are in need of explication. However, before explaining these terms and, by extension, which actions ASO forbids and which it permits, it will be helpful to, first, provide some elaboration of Predicate (a). Specifically, this predicate establishes the first necessary condition of an action infringing upon a person's self-ownership rights: The action must cause physical contact with the self-owner's body. There are a few things to note about this necessary condition. First, the action need not make bodily contact directly as one does with a punch or a kick. Rather, it might simply initiate a causal chain that ultimately results in physical contact being made with the owned body. Second, if that causal chain includes another person acting in a way that causes the contact – where an alternative action by that person would not have caused any physical contact with the self-owner's body – then the condition should be understood as not having been met. In such a case, it is the other person who infringes upon the self-owner's rights, not the original agent. Finally, the infringing agent need not intend that her action results in physical contact; rather, Condition (a) is satisfied by the mere fact that the action does result in such contact.

Predicate (b) of ASO asserts a second necessary condition of self-ownership infringement (where the joint satisfaction of both Condition (a) and Condition (b) is a sufficient condition of such infringement occurring). Specifically, it holds that an action that satisfies Condition (a) infringes upon a self-owner's rights if and only if that action does not *uniquely* provide anyone with net *supplemental benefit* – where both of the italicized terms need to be explicated if this proposition is to have clear content. With respect to the latter notion, consider an action that satisfies Condition (a) because it causes physical contact to be made with a self-owner. This action generates supplemental benefit if and only if it also benefits someone on net *excluding all of the effects caused by contact with the self-owner's body*. For example, an action might generate supplemental benefit because it causes two distinct events, one of which is contact being made with a body and the other of which independently produces benefits for some person. In such a case, the resulting benefits would be supplemental benefits, as they are caused by the agent's action but not the resulting bodily contact.

To make this proposal a bit more precise, let "*A*" stand for the world where the agent carries out some body-impacting action and "*B*" stand for any arbitrary comparison world where she does not carry out the action in

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question. Finally, let "*C*" stand for the world where the agent carries out the action but the impacted self-owner never existed (but all of the self-owner's previously imposed costs and benefits still obtained).[27] If some person *P* is *x* units better off in *A* than in *B*, then the action benefits *P* relative to *B*. One can then determine what share of that benefit is supplemental by comparing *P*'s level of advantage in *B* to her level of advantage in *C*. Specifically, if *P* is *y* units better off in *B*, that should be taken to imply that those *y* units of benefit were caused by the bodily contact with the self-owner and, thus, do not count as supplemental. One can, thus, conclude that the action generates $x - y$ units of supplemental benefit relative to *B* (i.e., it produces supplemental benefit if and only if $x > y$).

This comparison helps to clarify what it means to say that some benefit is caused by bodily contact (and is, thus, non-supplemental). Consider the case where an agent can win a race only by pushing a loiterer out of the way by opening a door. There is a sense in which the bodily contact initiated by the action *causes* the agent to benefit: Absent that contact she would not win the race, where these corresponding counterfactual differences imply that the contact causes her to win the race according to counterfactual theories of causation.[28] However, if one applies the proposed test, one sees that the bodily contact does not cause the agent to benefit in the sense of "cause" being employed here. This is because the agent acquires the same benefit in the world where she shoves the loiterer with the door as she does in the world where she opens the door and the loiterer never existed (i.e., $y = 0$). Thus, no portion of her acquired benefit is caused by the bodily contact, at least in the sense of "cause" that is being employed here; rather, the benefit is entirely supplemental. While this usage of "cause" is perhaps idiosyncratic, this is how the term should be understood in the subsequent discussion of what counts as supplemental benefit.

As we continue with the explication of Condition (b), note that this condition does not merely assert that the absence of supplemental benefit is a necessary condition of self-ownership infringement; rather, it insists that an action infringes on someone's self-ownership rights only if it does not *uniquely* generate supplemental benefit. This notion is defined as follows: An action that satisfies Condition (a) uniquely generates supplemental benefit if and only if it generates benefit for some person and there

[27] The reason for including this parenthetical will be discussed in Section 3.4.
[28] See Lewis (1973).

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


Figure 1.1 Causal chains and rights infringement.

is no alternative action available to the agent that would generate at least as much supplemental benefit for that person without satisfying Condition (a). In other words, if an action makes contact with a body and does not generate supplemental benefit, then it infringes on self-ownership rights. Similarly, if it *does* generate supplemental benefit but that benefit can be equally provided without making bodily contact, then the self-owner has a claim against the action. By contrast, if it generates supplemental benefit *and* there is no way to generate the same (or more) supplemental benefit without bodily contact, then the action in question is permitted by ASO.

This explication of ASO is summarized in Figure 1.1, which schematically illustrates whether an action infringes upon a person's self-ownership rights.

In Case 1, some action ϕ causes physical contact to be made with some self-owner's body, where this causal relationship is represented by the right-facing arrow. In this case, no supplemental benefit is generated by the agent's ϕ-ing. Thus, the action straightforwardly satisfies both Condition (a) and Condition (b) of ASO and thereby infringes upon the self-owner's right against others using her body.

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Case 2 is identical to Case 1 except, in this case, ϕ-ing also causes someone to obtain a supplemental benefit of value V, where this benefit is supplemental in virtue of the fact that it is caused by the ϕ-ing but is not caused by the contact that is made with the self-owner's body. However, in this case, the agent could provide the beneficiary with that same quantity of benefit *and* avoid bodily contact by ψ-ing instead of ϕ-ing. Given these stipulations, the agent's ϕ-ing generates supplemental benefit beyond that caused by bodily contact, but it does not *uniquely* generate this benefit. Thus, ϕ-ing still meets Conditions (a) and (b) and thereby infringes upon the self-owner's rights according to ASO.

Finally, Case 3 modifies Case 2 such that there is no longer any alternative action that can provide the beneficiary with a benefit of equal or greater value to V – that is, the quantity of supplemental benefit generated by ϕ-ing. In this case, it is stipulated that ψ is the action that provides the beneficiary with the greatest quantity of benefit relative to all actions that are not identical to ϕ. Given that this quantity is less than the quantity of supplemental benefit generated by ϕ-ing, ϕ-ing uniquely generates supplemental benefit and, thus, does not infringe upon the self-owner's rights according to ASO.

To make this more concrete, consider the case where P discovers her roommate Q asleep on the kitchen floor. Annoyed, P decides to vent her anger by pouring a glass of water on Q's head. Such an action instantiates Case 1: while P enjoys seeing Q jolted awake, this benefit is caused strictly by the bodily contact that she initiates (as her action of pouring the water would not produce this benefit in the world where Q did not exist). Thus, her action does not generate supplemental benefit and infringes on Q's self-ownership rights. Alternatively, suppose that P decides to take this opportunity to clean the kitchen by starting up her robotic vacuum. P knows that the vacuum will bump into Q's head and thereby wake her up, an outcome that P will enjoy. Additionally, P will derive satisfaction from the kitchen floor being clean. Given this latter stipulation, it follows that P derives supplemental benefit from her action beyond the benefits produced by bodily contact. However, further specification is needed to determine whether starting the vacuum *uniquely* produces this supplemental benefit. Suppose that P could get the same satisfaction by sweeping the floor while avoiding contact with Q. In that case, starting the vacuum would not uniquely produce supplemental benefit; that is, her action instantiates Case 2 and infringes on Q's rights. By contrast, if P has no alternative way of cleaning the floor – for example, because no broom is available –

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then starting the vacuum instantiates Case 3, and *Q* does not have a self-ownership right against *P* taking that action.[29]

1.4 The Advantages of Anarchist Self-Ownership

The foregoing discussion has attempted to clarify the content of ASO without providing a defense of the principle, that is, explaining *why* one ought to accept ASO over rival versions like the classical concept of self-ownership. While the primary argument for ASO will be presented in Chapter 3, this section will note some attractive implications of ASO, where the fact that ASO generates these implications is one reason to accept the principle. First, note that ASO appears to preserve most of the attractive implications of the classical self-ownership thesis. For example, it would still forbid the involuntary redistribution of kidneys or other organs to needy individuals, as such redistribution initiates bodily contact (thereby satisfying ASO's Condition (a)) without uniquely generating supplemental benefit in the sense defined previously (thereby satisfying Condition (b)). Granted, the organ recipients and their loved ones would benefit from the actions in question; however, because this benefit is caused by the contact made with self-owners' bodies, it would not qualify as *supplemental* benefit. Thus, ASO implies that involuntary organ redistribution infringes upon persons' self-ownership rights. Similarly, ASO forbids agents from slapping someone to blow off steam or drawing crude images on a sleeping person for amusement, as, again, these actions make bodily contact without generating supplemental benefit. Additionally, because fetuses make bodily contact that does not generate supplemental benefits beyond those caused by the contact itself, ASO would entail that pregnant persons have a claim against the fetus using their bodies in this way, thereby opening up the possibility that abortion is permissible.

Second, ASO is able to make sense of many – though, admittedly, not all – of the standard intuitions that people have about Trolley Problem-related cases.[30] Ethicists have now put forward a large number of these cases, but the two paradigmatic ones worth considering here are the switch

[29] One might worry that this result reveals ASO to be too permissive, as a self-owner should have a right against being hit with a vacuum in this case. This objection will be addressed in Section 1.7.

[30] The Trolley Problem was introduced by Philippa Foot (1978) and famously developed by Thomson (1985). The following discussion will avoid wading into the voluminous contemporary discussion of the subject, as the aim here is merely to show that ASO can be profitably applied to this problem. For a discussion of the problem cases alluded to by the "not all" qualifier, see Footnote 32.

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case and the footbridge case. In the *switch case*, a trolley is going to run over five people unless the agent flips a switch and redirects the trolley onto a different track where it will hit and kill one person. In this case, the standard intuition is that it is permissible to redirect the trolley.[31] By contrast, in the *footbridge case*, the only way to stop the trolley from killing five people is to push a person off a footbridge in front of the trolley, thereby making it grind to a halt. In this case, the standard intuition is that it is impermissible to push the person off the footbridge. The problem, then, is trying to explain why there might be this difference in permissibility despite the fact that both flipping the switch and shoving the person amount to killing one person to save five from dying.

The advantage of ASO is that it is able to provide such an explanation. Note that, in the switch case, the benefits that are generated by flipping the switch are all *supplemental benefits*; that is, they are caused by the action but are *not* caused by any bodily contact initiated by that action. Indeed, if the single person on the secondary track had never existed, the five people on the main track would be no worse off than if the trolley hit the person, where this counterfactual comparison reveals that the benefits they derive are supplemental. Further, flipping the switch *uniquely* generates these supplemental benefits, as there is no alternative action that would save the lives of the five people on the track. Given that flipping the switch uniquely produces supplemental benefit, the action does not satisfy ASO's Condition (b) of self-ownership infringement. By contrast, shoving the person from the footbridge does *not* generate any supplemental benefits, as all of the benefits produced are caused by the contact made with her body; absent any such contact, the trolley would not stop and the five people on the track would not survive. Thus, the shove satisfies both Condition (a) and Condition (b) of ASO and thereby qualifies as a self-ownership infringement. In this way, ASO is able to explain why flipping the switch is permissible but shoving the person is not: Only the latter action violates a person's self-ownership rights.[32]

[31] While Thomson originally endorsed this judgment (1985), she later argued that redirecting the trolley would actually be impermissible, as it is wrong to sacrifice someone else to save others if one would not be willing to sacrifice oneself in the same way (the presumption being that most people would not flip the switch if doing so would result in their own death rather than the death of the single person on the track) (2008).

[32] It should be noted that ASO does *not* support other intuitive judgments about Trolley Problem-related cases. For example, Foot (1984) suggests it would be impermissible to run over a pedestrian with a car in order to rescue five drowning people. By contrast, ASO would not assign the pedestrian a claim against this action, as driving over her with the car uniquely generates supplemental benefit.

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The third advantage of ASO is that it solves what, following Nicola Mulkeen (2019), might be called the self-ownership thesis' *pollution problem*. As noted previously, the classical interpretation of self-ownership assigns each self-owner a claim against others making nonconsensual contact with her body. The problem with this assignment is that it seemingly renders almost all activities impermissible. For example, a claim against all bodily contact would forbid people from protecting their crops with insecticide if the emitted aerosols would drift downwind and make contact with other people's lungs (Railton 2003, 190). People would also be forbidden from operating any sort of vehicle that produces particulates that land on others' skin (Sobel 2012, 35). Rights-infringing particulates would not be limited to exhaust fumes; simply kicking up dust with a car would seemingly infringe on others' self-ownership rights if the dust were to land on them (Brennan and van der Vossen 2018, 205). Even human respiration produces a form of pollution (carbon dioxide) whose contact with others might wrong them (Friedman 1989, 168). Similarly, because sound waves exert force on others' bodies, the classical interpretation of the self-ownership thesis would forbid yelling at someone (Fried 2004, 78) or driving up one's own driveway if others will hear the rumbling (Mack 2015, 196). Further, given that photons are particles, it would be impermissible to turn on a flashlight or start a fire if doing so would slightly illuminate another person's body (Zwolinski 2014, 12). Even walking into another's line of sight would seemingly wrong her, as doing so would bombard her eyes with redirected photons. Thus, the classical interpretation of the self-ownership thesis seems to implausibly entail that a huge portion of indispensable human activity is impermissible.

By contrast, ASO avoids these problematic implications by permitting actions that make bodily contact but also uniquely generate supplemental benefit. For example, when an agent operates a factory that produces particles that land on others' skin, she is also producing material goods that will benefit others – where, presumably, there is no way to produce these goods without emitting pollutants that will make bodily contact. Thus, operating the factory does not infringe upon anyone's self-ownership rights according to ASO. Similarly, while respiration inevitably bombards others' bodies with carbon dioxide molecules, it would be permissible because it

Similarly, Thomson argues that it would not be permissible to manufacture a medicine that would save five lives if its production would create a toxic by-product that kills one person (1985, 1407). Here, again, ASO would not assign the person a claim against the production of the medicine, as the production uniquely generates supplemental benefit. Together, these cases might raise the worry that ASO is too permissive. This worry will be addressed in Section 1.7.

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uniquely generates supplemental benefits for the respirator. And the same goes for actions like driving past one's neighbors, turning on lights, etc. In each of these cases, the agent's action bombards others' bodies with various small particles; however, at the same time, these actions all uniquely produce benefits that are caused by the action and not the bodily contact that it initiates.[33] Given that ASO does not count such actions as self-ownership infringements, it permits the countless indispensable, everyday activities that the classical interpretation of self-ownership forbids.[34]

Fourth, ASO is able to explain a number of other commonsense distinctions that people might be tempted to draw when assessing the permissibility of various activities. For example, one might want to draw a distinction between nudism (where people enjoy being naked for its own sake) and exhibitionism (where people reveal their bodies because they derive pleasure from being seen naked), with the former being judged permissible and the latter wrongful. ASO is able to support this distinction because it entails that sexual exhibitionism infringes on people's self-ownership rights while nudism does not. To see why this is the case, note

[33] This claim is overly general, as whether or not these actions *uniquely* generate supplemental benefits will be a contingent matter, varying from context to context. In some cases, it may turn out that there is some alternative way to realize the supplemental benefit without making bodily contact. ASO would, thus, imply that the actions in question infringe on self-owners' rights. However, given that there is an alternative way of realizing the benefits they produce, there seems to be nothing problematic about the fact that ASO forbids such actions.

[34] There have been a number of related attempts to solve the pollution problem by weakening the self-ownership thesis. Some influential proposals include those made by Nozick (1974), Rothbard (1982), Otsuka (2003), Vallentyne, Steiner, and Otsuka (2005), Richard Epstein (2009), and Mack (2015). However, these proposed solutions have been subjected to a number of criticisms such as those raised by Peter Railton (2003), David Sobel (2012; 2013), and Matt Zwolinski (2014). In light of these objections, there has been a renewed effort to revise the thesis with examples including Jason Brennan and Bas van der Vossen (2018), Ben Bryan (2019), and Mulkeen (2019). However, other libertarians have taken the problem to be insoluble, arguing that their fellow libertarians must either bite the bullet (Flanigan 2019a) or give up on the self-ownership thesis altogether (Kukathas, 2019).

While ASO is not free of problems (as discussed in Sections 1.7 and 1.8), the suggestion here is that these are relatively minor when compared to those that afflict the just mentioned theories. Additionally, ASO has the advantage of avoiding Jessica Flanigan's (2019a) objection that attempts to solve the pollution problem by revising the self-ownership thesis are ad hoc in a way that compromises the adequacy of the posited theories. Specifically, she argues that, while it is possible to amend and patch a moral theory until it delivers only intuitively acceptable results, one ought to prefer theories that have unsavory implications but instantiate other theoretical virtues like parsimony and syntactic simplicity. Setting aside the question of whether syntactic simplicity and parsimony are theoretical virtues, ASO seemingly avoids the more general charge of being ad hoc on the grounds that its endorsement follows from a prior acceptance of the Lockean proviso, as will be argued in Chapter 3. This stands in contrast to other revisions of the self-ownership thesis, which are typically posited simply to avoid the thesis' unsavory implications.

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that exhibitionists make bodily contact with others because they bombard their victims' eyeballs with photons, thereby satisfying Condition (a) of ASO. Additionally, because exhibitionists derive their enjoyment from perceiving the reaction of their victims – that is, all of the benefit produced by their action is caused by the bodily contact they initiated – their action does not generate any supplemental benefit. Given that exhibitionism also satisfies Condition (b) of ASO, it follows that it infringes upon other people's self-ownership rights. By contrast, nudists, by hypothesis, derive unique pleasure from being naked. Thus, while they also bombard others' bodies with photons, they get unique supplemental benefit from being naked and, therefore, do not satisfy Condition (b) of ASO. As a result, ASO entails that nudism does not infringe upon anyone's self-ownership rights.

ASO also supports a related distinction between speech that is merely blasphemous (e.g., printing a picture of the prophet Muhammad in a history textbook) and speech that is designed deliberately to antagonize religious believers (e.g., distributing rude caricatures of Muhammad). Both kinds of speech satisfy Condition (a), as they bombard people's bodies with photons or soundwaves. However, blasphemous speech, by hypothesis, uniquely generates some other benefit such as educating people about history. It, thus, does not violate anyone's self-ownership rights because it does not satisfy Condition (b) of ASO. By contrast, the benefits of antagonistic speech are produced by a causal chain that passes through self-owners' bodies: Like the exhibitionist, the antagonist gets her satisfaction from perceiving the reaction that her action elicits. In other words, the benefits produced by antagonistic speech are not supplemental benefits, with such speech thereby satisfying Condition (b) and, by extension, infringing on others' self-ownership rights. Admittedly, many liberal and libertarian proponents of free speech will find this result objectionable; however, for those who share the intuition that there is a moral distinction between blasphemy and provocation, this result will count in ASO's favor, as ASO provides a theoretical basis for affirming this distinction.

Finally, in addition to forbidding paradigmatic self-ownership infringements, supporting commonsense moral distinctions, and solving the pollution problem, ASO also solves a less-discussed problem with the classical self-ownership thesis, namely, that the latter fails to adequately differentiate aggressors from victims. To see why this is the case, recall that the classical interpretation of the thesis asserts that an agent wrongs a victim when she touches the victim without consent. For example, a pedestrian who punches a rapidly moving bicyclist wrongs the bicyclist by virtue of

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her having made nonconsensual contact with the bicyclist's body. The problem is that, while the classical thesis yields the favorable result that the pedestrian infringes on the bicyclist's self-ownership rights, it also entails that the bicyclist infringes on the pedestrian's self-ownership rights – at least, if one assumes that the concept of touching is analyzed in a reasonably thin way.

To see why this is the case, suppose that one holds that *P* touches *Q* if and only if *P*'s body makes physical contact with *Q*. This very thin physicalist analysis of touching entails that the pedestrian touches the bicyclist, as physical contact is made between their bodies; however, given this contact, the analysis of touching also implies that the bicyclist touches the pedestrian. Further, given that the touching relation is symmetrical on this account, the standard self-ownership thesis would deliver the seemingly incorrect result that the bicyclist infringes on the pedestrian's rights when her face makes unconsented-to contact with the pedestrian's fist.

To correct for this problem, one might insist upon a thicker analysis of touching that makes reference to not only physical contact but also various counterfactual considerations. Specifically, one might suggest that *P* touches *Q* if and only if their bodies make contact *and* a different choice by *P* would have resulted in their bodies not making such contact. This proposal is promising in that it opens up the possibility of the touching relation being asymmetrical, as it possible that only one party could have avoided physical contact by making a different choice. Additionally, one might think that this thicker account supports the intuition that it is the pedestrian (not the bicyclist) who does the touching given that no bodily contact would have occurred had the pedestrian chosen not to punch the bicyclist. However, this proposal does not, in fact, deliver the desired asymmetry, as the bicyclist could equally have chosen in a way that avoided the contact (e.g., she could have ridden in the other direction). Thus, the thicker account still yields the result that the bicyclist touches – and thereby wrongs – the pedestrian.

The general conclusion to draw from this discussion is that proponents of the self-ownership thesis cannot assume that there is some pretheoretical fact of the matter about who touches whom. Rather, they need to either provide an even thicker analysis of touching or adopt the thin analysis and modify the self-ownership thesis to limit which touchings qualify as infringements. Otherwise, they will be unable to correctly differentiate aggressors from victims. ASO represents the latter approach to solving this problem, as it restricts the set of contact-initiating acts that qualify as rights infringements in a way that allows for aggressors to be

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suitably demarcated from victims. Notably, while mere contact is a symmetrical relation, contact without supplemental benefit can be asymmetric: When two persons come into contact, that contact might be the product of one person acting in a way that generates supplemental benefit while the other's action produces no such benefit. For example, when the bicyclist makes contact with the pedestrian, this contact is the result of her carrying out an action (riding her bike somewhere) that uniquely generates supplemental benefits (getting where she is going in the most efficient way). By contrast, the pedestrian's action does not produce any supplemental benefit, as the only benefit she gets is the satisfaction caused by the physical contact . Thus, ASO entails that the pedestrian infringes on the bicyclist's self-ownership rights by punching but the bicyclist does not infringe on the pedestrian's rights by taking her trip. In this way, ASO is able to adequately differentiate aggressors from victims in a way that the classical interpretation of the self-ownership thesis cannot. This is an additional theoretical advantage for the proposed principle.[35]

This is not to say that ASO does not also have its theoretical drawbacks. For example, Sections 1.7 and 1.8 will consider (and try to ameliorate) worries that it is both too permissive and also too restrictive. However, the hope here has been to show that the anarchist interpretation of self-ownership has much to recommend it, where these advantages must be weighed against the soon-to-be-discussed theoretical disadvantages. Additionally, in Chapter 3

[35] Note that this is also a reason for favoring ASO over other proposed solutions to the pollution problem, as they tend to assume a pre-theoretical asymmetry of rights-infringing contact. For example, Nozick (1974) attempts to solve the pollution problem by proposing that self-ownership is a right against boundary crossing *without compensation*. Thus, people are permitted to drive cars, etc., so long as they compensate others for any costs imposed by physical contact. Setting aside the other merits or demerits of this proposal, note that this account assumes that, for any given act of touching, there is some pre-theoretical fact about who is crossing a boundary and whose boundary is being crossed. However, it has been argued that there is no such fact; rather, the asymmetry of rights infringements must be built into a theory of touching/infringement. Thus, Nozick's proposal is inadequate, as is any other attempt to weaken the self-ownership thesis in a way that presupposes that there are pre-theoretical asymmetrical boundary crossings rather than symmetrical touchings.

Admittedly, there are certain alternatives to ASO that might also solve both the asymmetry problem and the pollution problem. For example, a rival revision of the self-ownership thesis might make reference to intentions to determine who wrongs whom, as the pedestrian intends to make contact with the bicyclist while the bicyclist does not intend this contact. This proposal could also help to solve the pollution problem, as a person does not typically intend to make contact with others when she breathes or drives a car. Thus, these actions would be permissible on an intentions-based account of the self-ownership thesis. However, this proposal would have its own drawbacks, most notably that, unlike ASO, it does not avoid Flanigan's (2019a) objection (discussed in the previous footnote) that it is an ad hoc solution to the pollution problem. Additionally, it would not entail that pregnant persons have a right against fetuses using their bodies without consent, as fetuses do not intend to make contact with the bodies in question.

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will be argued that there is a supplemental reason for endorsing ASO beyond its attractive implications, namely, that it is the kind of self-ownership that persons can acquire in accordance with the Lockean proviso.

1.5 The Rejection of Private Property

The fourth component of the anarchist position is fairly straightforward, and, thus, requires limited exposition. Specifically, it holds that, while many people own their own bodies in virtue of having self-appropriated, there have been practically no successful appropriations of external unowned resources and nor will there be more than a handful of such appropriations in the future. In other words, practically no one has – or ever will have – any private property rights over any external thing, be it land, objects, or other natural resources.[36]

It is this conclusion that sets social anarchism apart from libertarian views, all of which posit that most things are privately – or, at the very least, collectively – owned.[37] Up to this point, the proposed anarchist theses have all been paradigmatic libertarian positions (albeit with a few heterodox adjustments having been made to them). However, no self-identified libertarians endorse the view that all natural resources are unowned. Rather, the rejection of private property is a signature commitment of socialist philosophical positions, where socialism and libertarianism are generally taken to be diametrically opposed views. One might therefore worry, that the inclusion of this thesis in the social anarchist position renders the view incoherent. The aim of Chapters 3 and 4 is to show that this is not the case and that, in fact, the anarchist denial of property rights follows from the libertarian theses presented previously.

1.6 Anarchist Claim Rights

While the anarchist holds that no one owns − or could come to own − practically any natural resources, this does not commit her to the view that

[36] The reason for including these "practically" qualifiers is that there are some very limited circumstances where a person might potentially acquire ownership rights over external objects via appropriation. For example, if scarcity were entirely eliminated, then appropriation would satisfy the Lockean proviso and thereby succeed. The proviso would be similarly satisfied if a person attempted to appropriate resources in a totally isolated location that will never be accessed by others during her lifetime. Thus, strictly speaking, the anarchist allows that there *could* be external private property; however, as a matter of contingent fact, there is practically no such property due to the necessary conditions of external appropriation going unsatisfied.

[37] For a libertarian defense of common ownership, see Billy Christmas (2020; 2021).

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persons are free to do whatever they like with these resources. Rather, she insists that a luck egalitarian principle of distributive justice determines which uses of those resources are permissible and which are forbidden. Specifically, she assigns persons *distributive claims* over unowned resources and objects, where these claims correspond to the prescriptions of a luck egalitarian principle of distributive justice. This section will introduce the luck egalitarian theory of justice and then explain what it means to say that persons have distributive claims corresponding to this theory.

To introduce the luck egalitarian theory of distributive justice, it is helpful to contrast it with what might be called a *strict egalitarian* view. According to the strict egalitarian, a distribution of resources is just if and only if everyone has equal advantage, where "advantage" refers to whatever it is that matters as far as justice is concerned.[38] For example, one might implausibly take advantage to be the total number of calories that a person has consumed, with justice obtaining if and only if every person has consumed the same number of calories. More plausibly, one might take advantage to be a quantity of money such that justice requires that all persons have equal wealth. More plausibly still, one might take "advantage" to refer to the amount of welfare that a person experiences either over some specified interval of time or over the course of her entire life. For these purposes, it will be assumed that what is to be equalized – that is, the *equilisandum* or, alternatively, the *currency of egalitarian justice* – is the quantity of welfare experienced across a lifetime. This assumption is made because it seems intuitively plausible and will simplify some of the subsequent discussion (though no derived conclusions depend on it). However, it is worth emphasizing that both strict egalitarianism and luck egalitarianism are neutral with respect to what it is that must be equalized. For this reason, the book will use the ambiguous term "advantage," thereby allowing for those with rival views about the proper currency of egalitarian justice to specify luck egalitarianism as they see fit.

In contrast to strict egalitarianism, *luck egalitarianism* does not insist that justice requires an equal distribution of advantage. Rather, luck egalitarians are willing to declare certain inequalities just if and only if those inequalities correspond to some choice for which the worse-off parties are responsible. For example, Cohen provides a representative statement of the luck egalitarian position when he asserts that "an unequal

[38] Note that not everyone uses the label "strict egalitarianism" in this way. For example, Vallentyne, Steiner, and Otsuka use the term to refer to egalitarian theories that prioritize equality over other values such as efficiency or respecting self-ownership rights (2005, 212fn20).

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distribution whose inequality cannot be vindicated by some choice or fault or desert on the part of (some of) the relevant affected agents is unfair, and therefore, *pro tanto*, unjust" (2009, 7).[39] As this statement indicates, a defining feature of luck egalitarianism is that it *holds people responsible* for making *sanctionable choices*, where a theory holds someone responsible for a choice if and only if it reduces the size of her just share (but not others') in virtue of that choice.[40] In other words, luck egalitarianism holds that, prior to human action, the distribution is just if and only if everyone possesses equal advantage; however, if people then make sanctionable choices, the distribution will be just if and only if each sanctionable chooser (and no non-sanctionable-chooser) ends up with a smaller share of advantage than she was originally assigned, where the size of this reduction is a function of her past sanctionable choices.[41] Of course, to give this statement of luck egalitarianism determinate content, two further specifications must be made. First, one must provide an account of which choices qualify as sanctionable. And, second, one must provide an account that specifies the extent to which any given sanctionable choice diminishes the size of the chooser's just share.[42] Providing such a specification will be the task of Chapter 6.

To briefly illustrate the difference between strict egalitarianism and luck egalitarianism (setting aside the just-raised question of how to best specify the latter position), consider the case of two equally well-off tennis players, *P* and *Q*, each of whom owns two tennis rackets. At their weekly game,

[39] Other representative statements of luck egalitarianism include those made by Arneson (2011a, 243), Cohen (2006, 440; 2008, 17–18; 2011, 13), Lippert-Rasmussen (2015, 1), Temkin (1993, 13), and Vallentyne (2008, 58), among many others.

[40] The notion of responsibility at issue here, then, is what has been alternately called "consequential responsibility" (Dworkin 2000, 287; Stemplowska 2009, 238; Knight and Stemplowska 2011, 13), "substantive responsibility" (Scanlon 1998, 248), and "holding people responsible" (Olsaretti 2009, 167–8). The idea is that the agent's relation to some misdeed (or morally good action) entails that she ought to be left worse off (or better off) than if she did not stand in that relation. That said, not all luck egalitarians think that justice *requires* leaving sanctionable choosers worse off in this way. Rather, they might merely hold that there is no injustice if she is left worse off, though also no injustice if her share is equal to others'. See, for example, Segall (2013, 36).

[41] In addition to the rejection of private property endorsed in Section 1.5, many socialists take luck egalitarianism to be a core socialist commitment, for example, Cohen (2008) and Roemer (2017). However, this claim is disputed by Arneson (2011a).

[42] To request such specification is to ask for what Serena Olsaretti calls a *principle of stakes* – that is, "an account of what consequences can be justifiably attached to features that are the appropriate grounds of responsibility" (2009, 167). Note that this is distinct question from asking which features are such appropriate grounds. Olsaretti focuses only on the former question and brackets the latter; by contrast, Chapter 6 will suggest that the answers to the two questions are linked, as both the grounds of responsibility and their associated stakes follow from the same theoretical constraint, namely, what Chapter 2 calls the moral tyranny constraint.

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P gets very frustrated and breaks both of her rackets by throwing them against the court surface. According to strict egalitarianism, justice requires that *Q* transfer one of her rackets to *P*, as, absent such a transfer, *P* would end up worse off than *Q* due to no longer being able to play tennis. By contrast, according to practically all plausible specifications of luck egalitarianism, *P*'s decision to destroy her rackets qualifies as a sanctionable choice. Thus, her just share would be diminished relative to what it would have been had she not chosen sanctionably, which, in turn, implies that she would not be entitled to an equalizing transfer from *Q*. Further, if she were to carry out such a transfer herself by seizing one of *Q*'s rackets, the resulting state of affairs would be unjust according to luck egalitarianism, as *P*'s level of advantage would exceed her just share (while *Q* would end up with less than her just share of advantage due to the loss of her tennis racket).

With an account of luck egalitarianism having been provided, it is now possible to explain the anarchist's contention that persons have distributive claims that *correspond* to its prescriptions. Specifically, the anarchist assigns each person a set of claims such that the luck egalitarian principle would be satisfied if all persons respected the claims of others − that is, any inequality would appropriately correspond to some sanctionable choice on the part of the worse-off individuals. Or, to put this point slightly differently, each person would have a claim against anyone else using an unowned resource in some way if and only if that use would leave her with less than her appropriate share of advantage, where her *appropriate* share is either (a) equal to the respective shares of those who have not yet chosen sanctionably if she has also not yet chosen sanctionably or (b) adjusted downward from this value if she has chosen sanctionably (where the magnitude of this adjustment is specified in Chapter 6).[43] Thus, persons would still have rights vis-à-vis external resources, just not property rights of the kind posited by both left- and right-libertarians. Call this the *anarchist conclusion*.[44]

[43] This position is perhaps unnecessarily controversial in that it presupposes that there are claims correlative of persons' duties to realize just distributions. One might equally posit that such distributive duties are non-directed in the sense that no one has a claim that these duties be discharged. However, nothing significant turns on this point, as the entire argument of the book could be restated in terms of non-directed duties.

[44] It is worth briefly noting that, unlike most libertarian theories of property, the anarchist conclusion allows for there to be something proximate to *intellectual property*. Standard natural rights theories of private property are incompatible with intellectual property because the latter places constraints on the use of fully owned things. Suppose that *P* owns both a factory and some collection of resources. Assuming she fully owns these things, then she has a permission to construct whatever it

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To expand on the contrast between anarchist distributive claims and libertarian property rights, note that the two kinds of rights differ in the following ways. First, distributive claims are not acquired in the historical fashion that characterizes property rights, that is, they are not established via initial appropriation or subsequently acquired via transfer. Rather, moral persons start out with these rights in virtue of the fact that they possess the capacities that make them the appropriate subjects of a theory of distributive justice.[45] In other words, the world comes to persons pre-populated with resource-related exclusionary claims. This stands in contrast to the standard Lockean picture wherein all persons start out with a permission to use all things until acts of appropriation establish property claims that negate some of those permissions.

Second, distributive claims do not come bundled together in the same way that property rights do (at least, according to practically all prominent theories of private property). For example, on almost all accounts of property ownership, if one has a claim against one person using some object in some way – and one has not waived or forfeited any of one's prior claims – then one also has a claim against each other person using the object in this way. Additionally, one would also have a claim against the original person (and all other persons) using the object in all other ways, that is, one would have a general claim against all others including that object in their actions irrespective of what form those actions take. By contrast, a person might have a distributive claim against one person using

is that she likes out of these resources and sell the products. However, if *Q* has a patent on some invention, that implies that *P* is prohibited from producing and selling that invention using her factory and raw materials. Thus, a contradiction is reached, with most libertarians rejecting intellectual property rather than the premise that persons fully own their property. By contrast, the anarchist conclusion allows that *Q* might have a distributive claim against *P* constructing the product. For example, *Q* might have such a claim if she has developed the socially useful invention at great personal cost and *P* producing and selling copies of that product would prevent *Q* from recouping those losses. In such a situation, *P*'s production would leave *Q* worse off despite no sanctionable choice on her part and, thus, *Q* would have a claim against *P* using the factory and resources in this way. In other words, the anarchist conclusion would entail an *egalitarian* variety of intellectual property that would be compatible with practices like patents and copyrights – though, notably, only insofar as those practices aligned with the prescriptions of luck egalitarianism. If one thinks that intellectual property is essential to economic growth and full compliance with the correct moral theory should not dramatically inhibit such growth, then this result represents a reason for favoring the anarchist conclusion over standard libertarian theories of ownership.

[45] Who qualifies as a subject of distributive justice – that is, who can be wronged by the distribution (where the potential to be wronged implies the existence of a distributive claim)? The speculative suggestion here is that the subjects of distributive justice are all and only those persons who are both capable of possessing advantage and able to demand justification from others. Such a suggestion would help establish the kind of moral equality discussed in Section 1.3. However, defending this proposal is beyond the scope of this book.

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an object but not another person using it in an identical fashion (e.g., because only the former's use would generate an unjust inequality). Similarly, she might have a claim against a person using the object in one way but not another. Thus, distributive claims are radically unbundled relative to property claims.

Additionally, property theorists uniformly take property claims to come bundled with various other Hohfeldian incidents such as powers to transfer and waive these claims as well as immunities from the loss of these claims. By contrast, while people can forfeit their distributive claims (as discussed in Chapters 2 and 6), they cannot waive them with respect to chosen persons. When *P* chooses sanctionably, she might forfeit a claim against *Q* using a resource in a way that disadvantages *P* (and advantages *Q*); however, *P* cannot simply allow *Q* or some other person *R* to use the resource, as such use might upset the just distribution. Additionally, the anarchist conclusion entails that persons lack many of the immunities from the loss of their claims that property owners possess. For example, suppose that *P* has a luck egalitarian distributive claim against *Q* using a small guest house. Given that this claim is luck egalitarian in character, it must be the case that *Q*'s use of the guest house would generate an inequality such that *P* ends up comparatively worse off relative to *Q* (assuming that neither *P* nor *Q* has chosen sanctionably in the past). However, suppose that an unforeseeable forest fire burns down *Q*'s home. Given this environmental change, it is no longer the case that *Q*'s use of the guest house would leave her better off than *P*; rather, *Q* would be left worse off if she *did not* use the guest house. Thus, *P* cannot retain her distributive claim against *Q*, as she can have a claim against some resource use only if that use would leave her with less than her appropriate share of advantage. In other words, the claims posited by the anarchist conclusion are not stable like property claims. As the guest house case demonstrates, people lack an immunity from the loss of their distributive claims, with certain unlucky events negating those claims.[46] The fact that distributive claims are unbundled from the other Hohfeldian incidents of ownership represents another

[46] Strictly speaking, the anarchist conclusion underdetermines which claims people forfeit either due to bad luck or sanctionable choice. For example, in the guest house case, *P* might have many distributive claims against *Q*, where the negation of any one of these claims would entail that *P* and *Q* end up with equal advantage under conditions of full compliance. All that the posited theory entails is that *P* must be stripped of one of these claims. Thus, to make the anarchist conclusion fully determinate, some supplemental theory would have to be provided that specifies exactly which claims are forfeited when bad luck strikes. Similarly, the anarchist conclusion holds that persons forfeit a claim to a particular quantity of advantage when they choose sanctionably. However, there are many different distributive claims whose forfeiture would realize this outcome. Here again, a

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significant difference between the anarchist conclusion and the theories of private property posited by libertarians (including left-libertarians).

Finally, having clarified the difference between the anarchist's distributive claims and libertarian private property claims, it is also worth noting how the anarchist conclusion departs from standard luck egalitarianism. The key difference here is that ownership limits the domain of things whose permissible use is regulated by the distributive principle. Standard luck egalitarianism allows that the permission to use any object can be assigned to any person, that is, the right to use *P*'s kidney might be equally assigned to either *P* or *Q* in just the same way the permission to use an apple tree might be assigned to either person. Similarly, either *P* or *Q* might have a claim against some third party making contact with *P*'s body. By contrast, the anarchist conclusion maintains that if *P* acquires self-ownership rights over her body via an act of self-appropriation, then others cannot have distributive claims over her body. Rather, they can only have distributive claims over those things that remain unowned (with the theory adjusting these claims in response to *P*'s self-appropriation such that everyone discharging their correlative duties would still produce a luck egalitarian-approved distribution).

1.7 Is Anarchist Self-Ownership Too Permissive?

Now that the anarchist conclusion has been introduced, it is possible to address a potential worry about ASO, namely, that it permits bodily contact that an extensionally adequate moral theory would forbid. While ASO has many attractive implications (as discussed in Section 1.4) and independent theoretical grounding (to be discussed in Chapter 3), it also has some admittedly unattractive implications that have led philosophers to reject similar revisions of the self-ownership thesis.[47] Consider, for example, the case where a thrill seeker decides to throw glass bottles off of the top of a twenty-story building onto the street below. While she knows that some of the bottles will seriously injure pedestrians when they shatter, she derives no enjoyment from this outcome. Rather, she tosses the glass bottles strictly for the thrill of seeing them hit the ground. Given that the thrill seeker derives unique supplemental benefit from this activity – assume she cannot get this same degree of satisfaction any other way – it

supplemental theory would be needed to determine exactly which exclusionary claims are forfeited. The subsequent argument will remain neutral regarding which theory one should prefer.

[47] See, for example, Sobel (2012, 56) and Mulkeen (2019, 662–3).

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follows that she does not infringe upon their self-ownership rights according to ASO. However, critics of ASO would contend that this result is disqualifying: any acceptable account of self-ownership will entail that the thrill seeker's bottle-throwing infringes on the pedestrians' self-ownership rights.

This objection would be a serious problem for the ASO proponent who takes self-ownership claims to be the only claims that people have against others acting in ways that affect their bodies. Such a position would implausibly entail that the pedestrians have no claim against the thrill seeker throwing bottles at them from the rooftop. However, if one accepts the anarchist position as a whole, then one has the theoretical resources to avoid this conclusion by affirming that the pedestrians *do* have such a claim. Specifically, one can appeal to the anarchist conclusion presented in the previous section to point out that, when the anarchist denies the existence of property rights, she does not thereby conclude that persons are free to do whatever they like with natural resources. Rather, persons have distributive claims against others using resources in a way that would leave them worse off absent any sanctionable choice on their part. For example, if a lumberjack chopping down a tree would block a jogger's path and thereby generate a luck-based inequality, the jogger has a distributive right against the lumberjack chopping down the tree.

By assigning people luck egalitarian distributive rights vis-à-vis objects and resources, the anarchist is able to avoid the objection that ASO entails that the pedestrians have no rights against the thrill seeker bombarding them with bottles. Contra this conclusion, the anarchist can insist that the pedestrians have *distributive claims* against the thrill seeker using the bottles in this way (even if they lack any self-ownership claims against her throwing the bottles). In short, proponents of ASO who take the set of claim rights to be coextensive with property rights (i.e., most natural rights libertarians) would be stuck with a highly implausible result if they endorsed ASO – namely, that the thrill seeker does not infringe upon the rights of the pedestrians. By contrast, anarchists who endorse ASO merely have to maintain that the thrill seeker does not infringe upon the pedestrians' *self-ownership rights*. This is a much smaller theoretical cost to bear than the extensional inadequacy of a theory that affirms that the thrill seeker does not wrong the pedestrians at all. And, given that ASO both follows from Lockean proviso (as will be argued in Chapter 3) and solves the many problems discussed in Section 1.4, it does not seem as though its potential failure to properly categorize certain wrongs warrants its rejection.

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Further, there is reason for thinking that this is not a theoretical cost at all. The claim that ASO delivers bad results presupposes that a pedestrian being hit with glass shards is properly categorized as an infringement of her self-ownership rights rather than an infringement of a distributive right. But why affirm this presupposition? The most obvious reason is that being hit with a bottle *intuitively seems* like a self-ownership-related wrong rather than merely a distributive-justice-related wrong. However, there is reason to doubt the reliability of this intuition. After all, many people would judge things like air pollution, light pollution, or noise pollution to be distributive-justice-related wrongs rather than self-ownership infringements. Given that emitting such pollution is of a kind with bottle tossing, additional argument is needed to establish that one should give up the intuition that pollution is properly categorized as an infringement of distributive rights rather than give up the intuition that bottle tossing is properly categorized as an infringement of self-ownership rights. Absent such argument, the appeal to intuition cannot support the objection that ASO miscategorizes wrongs like the thrill seeker's bottle-throwing (even prior to this theoretical cost being weighed against all of the advantages mentioned in the previous paragraph).

It must be noted that the pedestrians have a distributive claim against being hit by bottles (if and) only if the thrill seeker throwing the bottles would result in an outcome that violates the prescriptions of luck egalitarianism. If the case were reconstructed such that bottle-throwing does not leave the pedestrians any worse off than the thrill seeker (and no one has previously chosen sanctionably), then they would have no right against her throwing bottles. This is, admittedly, counterintuitive. However, this intuitive judgment may reflect the difficulty of properly imagining the case. After all, given the immense pain that would be caused by being hit with shards of glass, it might be challenging to imagine a case where the pedestrians being hit with bottle shards helps to realize an egalitarian outcome. By contrast, if one picks a case where it is easier to imagine how bombardment realizes equality – for example, a person is covered with biting insects and the only way to get them off is to toss them onto others' bodies – it seems less intuitively objectionable to say that others have no right against being bombarded.[48]

[48] It was suggested earlier that the relevant currency of egalitarian justice is *lifetime* levels of advantage. Thus, a person has a distributive claim against others impacting her body in a way that leaves her with less lifetime advantage than others absent any corresponding sanctionable choice on her part. However, an anonymous reviewer worries that, because it is difficult to know which actions will leave her worse off in this way – that is, whether any given action will cause her to live a worse life

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Finally, note that one should not conclude from the foregoing discussion that the conjunction of ASO and the anarchist conclusion implies that a self-owner has no claim against being slapped or otherwise assaulted by an agent if such an action would realize a luck egalitarian outcome by benefitting the agent. For, in such a case, the action would not generate *supplemental* benefits, as all the produced benefits are caused by the physical contact that the agent makes. Thus, the self-owner would have a claim against such actions per ASO. In other words, the only cases where a self-owner will entirely lack a claim against an action that makes contact with her body are those where the action both uniquely generates supplemental benefit *and* conforms to the prescriptions of a luck egalitarian theory of justice. While there will be some intuitively impermissible actions that meet both of these criteria – for example, the egalitarian bottle-throwing described just prior – the conjunction of ASO and the anarchist conclusion will still forbid the vast majority of intuitively unacceptable uses and abuses of self-owners' bodies.

on the whole relative to someone else – it is difficult to know which rights she has. And this, in turn, makes it difficult to assess whether her distributive claims adequately protect her from intuitively objectionable bodily contact.

Against the general epistemic worry that it is hard to determine which rights persons possess, it should be noted that practically all moral theories run into serious epistemic difficulties when it comes to determining what they prescribe in actual-world cases. Thus, this epistemic worry is a problem for moral theorizing in general rather than a specific problem with the proposed anarchist theory.

Turning to the more specific worry that one cannot assess whether ASO is too permissive without knowing which distributive claims persons possess, the suggestion here is that one can consider simplified test cases where (a) no one has chosen sanctionably in the past, (b) bodily contact generates a temporally local (in)equality, and (c) it is stipulated that persons will accumulate equal quantities of advantages across the rest of their lives. Given this latter stipulation, any temporally local (in)equality entails an (in)equality of lifetime advantage. In this way, one can still test whether the proposed distributive claims provide persons with adequate protection. For example, in the insect case, the bodily contact would cause everyone to accrue equal levels of lifetime advantage while the thrill seeker's bottle-throwing would cause the pedestrians to accrue unequal levels of lifetime advantage; thus, the pedestrians have a claim against the bottle-throwing while the bystanders do not have a claim against being bombarded with insects. Further, these results appear to be extensionally adequate, as bottle-throwing seems intuitively impermissible while brushing off biting insects seems permissible. Finally, it seems that these intuitions are best explained by the anti-luck egalitarian versus luck egalitarian consequences of the respective actions under consideration. If this is right, then one can conclude that *any* (ASO-respecting) luck egalitarianism-upholding contact will be permissible while any anti-luck egalitarian contact will be impermissible. Thus, even if one does not know which distributive claims persons have in the actual world, one can conclude that the anarchist's posited distributive claims provide extensionally adequate protection of persons' bodies.

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1.8 Is Anarchist Self-Ownership Too Restrictive?

The foregoing section has attempted to address the worry that ASO is too permissive. However, one might also worry that it is also too *restrictive* in that it problematically forbids a number of intuitively permissible actions. To see why ASO invites this objection, begin by noting that one of ASO's advantages over the classical interpretation of self-ownership is that it allows people to go about their business and pursue their independent projects. Because the classical interpretation forbids all actions that result in bodily contact, it ends up prohibiting a huge array of indispensable human activity due to the fact that most human actions generate pollution such as emitted particulates and redirected air molecules and photons that go on to make contact with others' bodies. By contrast, ASO permits these activities because they uniquely produce supplemental benefits that are not caused by bodily contact. Thus, so long as an agent has some purpose that does not crucially involve the bodies of non-consenting self-owners – that is, her action uniquely generates benefits beyond those resulting from physical contact with their bodies – the incidental contact that she makes with them will not infringe upon their self-ownership rights according to ASO.

The problem with this proposal is that there are certain cases where an agent's project *does* crucially involve the bodies of non-consenting others, but her actions seem nonetheless permissible. Specifically, note that *public performances* and *solicitations* make contact with others' bodies, where any resultant benefit is caused by the bodily contact itself (i.e., no supplemental benefit is generated). For example, when a street performer bombards passersby with sound waves, she appears to infringe on their ASO rights – at least, if it is assumed that she does not get any special enjoyment from performing in public that she could not get in a private setting. Similar remarks apply to the person who asks a stranger for the time. In these cases, neither the public performance nor the solicitation uniquely generates supplemental benefit, as any unique benefits are derived from the physical contact the performer/solicitor makes with others' bodies (e.g., a passerby enjoying the show or the solicitor being told the time). Thus, ASO implies that public performances and solicitations infringe upon self-owners' rights. However, the restrictiveness objection contends that not only are such performances and solicitations intuitively unobjectionable, they are also indispensable human activities that are essential to societal functioning. Given that ASO forbids such activities, it is unacceptably

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restrictive (even if solves the classical self-ownership thesis' pollution problem).

There are a few things that can be said in response to this objection. First, one might contest the intuitive judgment that public performances and solicitations are permissible by appealing to the rival (perhaps curmudgeonly) intuition that such solicitations are a *nuisance*, where this term implies wrongful conduct on the part of those who create the nuisance. After all, it can feel invasive when a street musician comes up and starts performing when one is trying to sit quietly in the park; similarly, catcalling and other aggressive solicitations are often perceived as wrongful incursions by those subjected to these practices. Given this intuition, the defender of ASO might maintain that it is actually a theoretical *virtue* that ASO declares these engagements to be rights infringements. Additionally, note that people often *resent* being asked out on a date by strangers, being called on the phone by telemarketers, or being trapped in a subway car with a particularly annoying busker. Here, again, the conclusion that these engagements infringe upon self-ownership rights both explains and vindicates the natural reactive attitudes that the performances elicit. Finally, at least in the case of solicitations, conscientious people often preface their solicitation with an apology, saying, for example, "Sorry to bother you, but…" before they make their request or proposal.[49] Given that an apology is apt if and only if one has wronged someone, the intuition that an apology is apt in cases of solicitation implies that the solicitor has, in fact, infringed upon a person's rights (and, presumably, her self-ownership rights).[50]

Second, one might complement this reply by suggesting that, while ASO forbids *nonconsensual* performances and solicitations, this merely entails that morally compliant performers and solicitors must seek consent before carrying out their activities. While this requirement is more restrictive than our current norms of social interaction, ASO still allows that people might permissibly carry out the acts in question without incurring serious costs,

[49] Apologies seem to be less common in the case of public performances; however, these are often prefaced with something proximate to a request for consent, for example, "If I could just get everyone's attention for a moment" where such a request seems apt if and only if the audience has a right against the performance being carried out.

[50] Note that even a morally conscientious person might solicit and apologize as opposed to refraining from soliciting in the first place, as there might be countervailing moral considerations that justify the rights infringement (i.e., that preclude the rights *infringement* from qualifying as a rights *violation*). For more on this point, see Section 7.4.

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thereby weakening the force of the restrictiveness objection. However, there is a serious problem with this reply: given that seeking consent is, *itself*, a form of solicitation, there is a regress problem where *P* permissibly solicits *Q* only if *P* has obtained *Q*'s consent to solicit, which, in turn, requires *P* asking *Q* for her consent, where this inquiry is permissible only if *P* has obtained *Q*'s consent to make this inquiry, which, in turn. . ., etc. Thus, it appears that the reply to the restrictiveness objection cannot be that ASO still allows for performances and solicitations so long as they are consensual, as the regress problem makes it impossible for performers and solicitors to obtain consent.

There are three potential responses to this problem (where one might endorse any or all of these responses). First, one might further emend ASO such that it does not give self-owners a claim against requests for consent. Unfortunately, such an emendation does not follow from the theoretical considerations that support the adoption of ASO to be discussed in Chapter 3. However, there are other justifications that one might give for permitting requests for consent depending on one's preferred theory of rights. For example, one might think that the reason for assigning persons self-ownership rights in the first place is to give them a significant degree of *control* over their lives under conditions of full compliance – that is, giving people such control is a crucial *desideratum* for a theory of rights. Assigning persons claims against bodily contact helps to satisfy this *desideratum* because such claims limit the extent to which fully compliant people can interfere with a self-owner as she directs her life. Similarly, assigning her the power to waive her claims via consent also enhances her ability to direct her life, as she can now allow desired interferences. However, one might also think that, in order to effectively direct her life, a self-owner also needs to be given the *opportunity* to consent to others' proposals. Thus, an adequate theory of rights should not assign her claims against requests for consent, as such claims would deny her this opportunity.

Second, rather than emend ASO to permit consent-seeking, one might alternatively posit an expansive theory of rights waiving. Specifically, one could hold that a self-owner waives her ASO claims not only via explicit consent but also through *hypothetical consent* – that is, her claim against some use of her body is waived if she *would* consent to this use under the appropriate conditions. There is some flexibility here in terms of how one specifies the exact conditions under which persons' rights are waived via hypothetical consent. For example, one might hold that *P*'s right against *Q* ϕ-ing is waived if and only if she (a) would consent to *Q* ϕ-ing were she

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simply asked if Q may ϕ, (b) would consent to Q ϕ-ing if she were fully informed about all the relevant consequences of Q ϕ-ing, and (c) has not demanded and will not demand that Q not ϕ.[51]

The theoretical motivation for this proposal would have to appeal to one's favored theory of why it is that consent renders actions permissible. For example, one might think that consent to an action expresses a pro-attitude toward that action, where it is actually the pro-attitude that negates the right. To support this latter point, one might appeal to an idea similar to the one posited in Section 1.2's quick justification for including the Lockean proviso in the anarchist position: a pro-attitude about an action nullifies a person's grounds for complaint about that action, where such grounds for complaint are a necessary condition of that action being a rights infringement. After all, if the person has a pro-attitude about the action occurring, how could she object to someone carrying out that action? However, if this is correct, then one might think that hypothetical consent implies the same sort of pro-attitude and, thus, negates a person's claims for the same reason that consent does. That said, this account is speculative and one may need to rebuild the proposed defense of hypothetical consent around some other account of why one is able to exercise the power to waive via acts of consent.

A second reason for endorsing a hypothetical consent view is that it seems to make sense of the rival intuitions presented previously. On the one hand, a street performance might seem permissible, as does asking someone for the time. On the other hand, telemarketing and catcalling seem impermissible. An advantage of the hypothetical consent theory of rights negation is that it can accommodate all of these intuitions without having to declare some ill-founded. Specifically, street performances and asking for the time are actions that people typically would consent to, while telemarketing and catcalling are not.[52] Thus, people waive their rights against the former but not the latter, rendering street performances

[51] These additional predicates – that is, Predicates (b) and (c) – are primarily included to help the proposed hypothetical consent theory sidestep various potential counterexamples. That said, it seems plausible that they could be independently justified by appealing to other theoretical considerations beyond the fact that they make the hypothetical consent theory more extensionally adequate.

[52] Granted not everyone would consent to some person P carrying out a street performance. However, so long as (a) there is at least one person Q who would so consent, (b) either P or Q benefits from Q hearing the performance, and (c) this benefit could not be provided in some other way that did not intrude upon other people, then P's performance uniquely generates supplemental benefit (vis-à-vis the bodily contact it makes with other people) and, thus, no one else would have a self-ownership claim against P carrying out this performance.

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and asking for the time permissible despite telemarketing and catcalling still qualifying as rights infringements. Given the explanatory power of hypothetical consent theory, there is reason to accept it as an auxiliary hypothesis supporting ASO. And, by appending this theory to the anarchist position, one can thereby avoid the objection that ASO is too restrictive, as self-owners' claims against intuitively permissible actions would typically be waived via hypothetical consent.[53]

Finally, one might solve the restrictiveness problem by proposing that, although people cannot permissibly seek consent directly from self-owners under ASO, they can establish conventions that allow self-owners to tacitly consent to being solicited and/or subjected to performances. For example, large public spaces could be designated as cooperation zones with all persons being notified that if they enter these zones, they will be taken to be consenting to solicitation and/or performance.[54] The establishment of such conventions would render ASO compatible with performances and solicitations so long as those solicitations and performances occurred when tacit consent had been given.

This proposal does raise certain questions about how people can establish conventions such that self-owners waive certain claims when their actions fall under a description specified by the convention. For example, one might ask whether anyone can establish such a convention and whether they can do so simply by declaring that some action constitutes tacit consent to some kind of treatment. In response to this question, one might note that consent is a form of communication, and communication often involves audiences declaring how they will interpret certain utterances or actions to facilitate such communication – for example, when a speaker tells an audience, "Raise your hand if you can hear me." Thus, there is no obvious reason for thinking that other people could not similarly specify which actions qualify as consent. That said, such specification will have to meet various conditions

[53] One problem with a theory of hypothetical consent is that it raises epistemic challenges for conscientious agents who want to avoid infringing upon others' self-ownership rights. Specifically, it seems more difficult to determine whether an agent *would* consent to something under the appropriate conditions than to determine if she *has* consented to something (though, if one takes genuine consent to imply that the consenting party is fully informed, it might also be challenging to determine whether genuine consent has been given). However, the problem of acting morally under conditions of uncertainty is not unique to hypothetical consent theory; indeed, it is a problem for all moral theories. For some detailed discussions of this problem as well as various proposed solutions, see Michael J. Zimmerman (2014) and Holly M. Smith (2018).

[54] There is a potential worry here that such notifications might, themselves, infringe upon self-owners' rights, as, in order to notify someone, one must make contact with her body (e.g., one must bombard her with sound waves or photons). Fortunately, this worry can be sidestepped if people are notified of the relevant conventions prior to their self-appropriation.

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if it is to succeed. For example, if a person asserts that she will take a self-owner to consent to some treatment if the latter blinks at any point in the next twenty minutes, it does not follow that the self-owner consents to the treatment when she blinks. Seemingly, this is because one person can establish a convention for consenting only if consenters have a reasonable alternative to carrying out the act that qualifies as consent according to the convention.

This proposed constraint on the establishment of conventions raises the further question of when a person can be said to have a reasonable alternative to carrying out the action deemed to be an act of consent by the convention. Simmons proposes that the alternative to carrying out the act must be "reasonable and reasonably easily performed" and cannot inflict "extremely detrimental" consequences on the consenting party (1979, 81). However, first, this proposal is underspecified, as a supplemental account must be provided to specify which performances are "reasonably" easy and which consequences are "extremely" detrimental. More importantly, it is not clear why those establishing conventions should be able to make it such that refusing consent comes with any costs at all. Much more will be said about this point in the next chapter, but, for now, the speculative suggestion is that a convention is able to determine what counts as tacit consent if and only if the refusal of consent under that convention would not leave the consenter with less than her appropriate share of advantage as determined by a luck egalitarian theory of justice. Seemingly, so long as this fairly stringent condition is met, there is nothing problematic about persons being able to determine which acts qualify as consent. This, in turn, implies that cooperation zones could be established via convention such that those who enter those zones would thereby be consenting to others' performances and solicitations. In this way, the anarchist could maintain that ASO is not unduly restrictive, as it still allows for performances and solicitations so long as the appropriate conventions have been put into place.

In sum, there is a genuine worry that ASO is too restrictive, as it forbids actions like public performances and solicitations. Further, this problem cannot be solved by appealing to the possibility of consent-seeking, as such consent-seeking is, itself, a form of solicitation. However, this section has argued that the anarchist can both plausibly contest and accommodate this objection. She can contest it by objecting to its foundational premise that there is nothing problematic about performances and solicitations (as these activities are nuisances that render resentment, apologies, and permission-seeking apt). Additionally, she can accommodate the objection

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by endorsing auxiliary theories of hypothetical and/or tacit consent that allow for people to permissibly perform and solicit under the appropriate circumstances. Thus, like the permissiveness worry, the restrictiveness objection does not seem to be a decisive reason to reject ASO, even if it reveals ASO to be not quite as extensionally adequate as the anarchist might hope.

1.9 Conclusion

This chapter has introduced – and provided a preliminary defense of – the social anarchist philosophical position. Specifically, this position endorses a heterodox combination of libertarian and egalitarian moral principles, namely, the consent theory of legitimacy, the Lockean proviso, a revised self-ownership thesis, a rejection of private property, and the anarchist conclusion's thesis that persons have luck egalitarian distributive claims over unowned objects. In particular, the chapter has focused on defending the anarchist interpretation of the self-ownership thesis, in part because it is a distinctive feature of the anarchist position and, in larger part, because extended defenses of the other anarchist theses will be presented in later chapters. Additionally, these chapters will argue that these theses, despite being drawn from rival philosophical camps, stand in relations of logical entailment with one another in a way that renders the anarchist position coherent. Further, Chapter 2 will argue that the five anarchist theses can all be derived from an independently plausible meta-principle called the moral tyranny constraint.

Before turning to this discussion, however, it is worth making a general point about how one should assess the adequacy of both ASO and the anarchist position more generally. Suppose that one does not find the arguments of Sections 1.7 and 1.8 to be persuasive. In other words, suppose that one still worries that ASO is too permissive, too restrictive, or both. In response to such misgivings, it is worth emphasizing that, whatever ASO's theoretical costs, such costs need to be weighed against its many theoretical advantages. Notably, Section 1.4 has argued that ASO delivers most of the crucial implications that makes the self-ownership attractive while also solving various philosophical puzzles and sidestepping some of the major problems that plague classical accounts of self-ownership. Additionally, Chapter 3 will argue that ASO has the added advantage of being uniquely compatible with the Lockean proviso in the sense that it enables people to easily self-appropriate and thereby become self-owners. In this way, the adoption of ASO produces a novel ground for

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the self-ownership thesis (while simultaneously avoiding charges that ASO is an ad hoc solution to the problems discussed in Section 1.4, as discussed in Footnote 34 of that section). Thus, any assessment of ASO must be holistic such that the thesis' limitations are not considered in isolation from its advantages when determining whether it should be accepted.

Further, the assessment of ASO – and the anarchist position more broadly – should not only be holistic, but also *comparative*; that is, one must ask whether there are rival positions that are more plausible on the whole once all of their respective theoretical advantages and drawbacks have been considered. For example, while some rivals to ASO might also solve the pollution problem, it is unlikely that they will capture the other four advantages discussed in Section 1.4. And they will likely come with their own set of theoretical disadvantages that must be weighed against their comparative benefits.[55] Indeed, the difficulty of positing an extensionally adequate account of self-ownership is evinced by the challenges raised in the previous two sections: In a world where people perpetually bombard one another with particulates and photons, it will may well be impossible to assign persons rights against bodily incursion in a way that (a) adequately protects them from intuitively wrongful contact and (b) avoids the unacceptable implication that many benign and indispensable human activities are impermissible. The contention here is that while ASO may not perfectly thread this needle, one will be hard-pressed to find an alternative theory that better satisfies these two imperatives.

Of course, one might give up on self-ownership altogether. However, first, Chapter 3 will argue that there is good reason for thinking that people own themselves and, second, such a rejection of the self-ownership thesis comes with its own set of serious theoretical disadvantages. For example, as was briefly noted in Section 1.6, if one abandons the self-ownership thesis in favor of an unconstrained luck egalitarian theory of distributive justice, then one must face the objection that the theory is inadequately sensitive to the difference between people's bodies and natural resources. Specifically, if one rejects the self-ownership thesis and posits that all rights are luck egalitarian distributive rights, then one would seemingly have to deny people any special claim to their own bodies – that is, the right to use *P*'s kidney might be equally assigned to either *P* or *Q*. The only constraint imposed by the theory would be that these rights must be assigned in such a way as to forbid acts that would leave one person worse off than another in the

[55] For a discussion of the problems that plague other influential attempts to solve the self-ownership thesis' pollution problem, see Zwolinski (2014).

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absence of sanctionable choice. While it may contingently turn out that this constraint entails that each person has a right against others using her body, a more likely outcome is that there will be some cases where one person is assigned a right to use another's body without her consent – a result that many will find intuitively unacceptable. By contrast, the anarchist position avoids this result with its endorsement of ASO.

In short, moral theorizing is a messy process, with complete extensional adequacy generally proving elusive. Too often, the best apparent solution to one problem gives rise to another problem, without there being any way to satisfactorily deliver one's desired results. One should therefore not expect the anarchist position to be an exception to this general rule: While the position has many theoretical virtues, it will almost certainly have some implications that its proponents will be loath to endorse. However, this chapter has tried to demonstrate that the theoretical virtues of the position are numerous while its vices are comparatively minor – where this result both provides reason for accepting the position and supports the hypothesis that it will compare favorably to any rivals that might be posited. The purpose of the remainder of the book is to provide further argumentative support for this contention.

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CHAPTER 2

The Moral Tyranny Constraint

> Tyrants: for centuries and centuries, you have sucked our blood. The tears which you have made us spill would be enough to drown you . . . . From today forward, there will not be a man who dares to make others obey him; there will not be a man who exploits the work of another man . . . . Comrades: we must complete social justice. Let us cut off the head of the hydra and take possession of all that exists for the well-being of all. Long live Land and Liberty!
>
> Ricardo Flores Magón, *Land and Liberty*

A recurrent theme in libertarian thought is that persons should not be allowed to discretionarily impose costs upon others. For example, in an influential polemic, William Sumner objects to publicly funded policing of vagrancy on the grounds that "the industrious workman going home from a hard day's work . . . is mulcted of a percentage of his day's earnings to hire a policeman to save the drunkard from himself" (1918, 480). This objection is echoed by Ludwig von Mises' complaint that social insurance for farmers entails that "if they blunder . . . the government forces the consumers, the taxpayers, and the mortgagees to foot the bill" (1998, 583). Similarly, Murray Rothbard objects to state-imposed egalitarian redistribution because "others are being forced to pay the cost" of helping the poor (1995, 53). More generally, Eric Mack argues that people must not be granted the "moral liberty to subordinate us to their purposes, that is, to impose sacrifices upon us to advance their ends" (2010, 60).[1] And Jason Brennan has recently argued that democracy is problematic because:

> [In a democracy] some people impose their decisions on others. If most voters act foolishly, they don't just hurt themselves. They hurt better-informed and more rational voters, minority voters . . . and foreigners who are unable to vote

[1] Mack takes this requirement to follow from the twin libertarian commitments of (a) taking seriously the separateness of persons and (b) affirming that one is "allowed to live one's life in one's own chosen way" (2010, 60).

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> but still are subject to or harmed by that democracy's decisions . . . . If the majority makes a capricious decision, others have to suffer the risks." (2016, 9)

The shared presumption of these claims is that there is something objectionable about a social system that allows some people to impose costs on others, either through negligence or malicious intent. The purpose of this book is to explore the consequences of taking this presumption seriously. It will contend that those who are genuinely committed to this libertarian presumption should ultimately endorse the egalitarian variety of anarchism presented in Chapter 1. This chapter will lay the groundwork for this argument by (1) providing a formal statement of the libertarian presumption, (2) explicating that statement, (3) defending its plausibility, and (4) explaining how it both entails two of the core libertarian principles introduced in Chapter 1 and supports a luck egalitarian approach to distributive justice.

2.1 The Moral Tyranny Constraint

To begin, note that the libertarian presumption is best understood as a constraint upon which moral theories count as acceptable. If it is wrong to impose costs upon others, then a moral theory that licenses such cost imposition will be extensionally inadequate. Thus, a moral theory is acceptable only if it does not license such imposition. For these purposes, this general conditional proposition will be restated a bit more narrowly so as to make it as uncontroversial as possible. With the addition of various qualifiers, the posited constraint will be able to sidestep potential counterexamples while still delivering the promised libertarian principles and egalitarian anarchist conclusion introduced in Chapter 1. Call this restatement of the libertarian presumption the *moral tyranny constraint*:

The Moral Tyranny Constraint – A theory of duties is acceptable only if full compliance with that theory would not allow any person to unilaterally, discretionarily, and foreseeably act in a way that would leave others with less advantage than they would have possessed had the agent made some other choice.

There are quite a few qualifying terms packed into this constraint, each of which will be explicated in the subsequent section. Before discussing these details, however, it is worth clarifying the constraint by describing the two ways in which it might be violated by a moral theory. First, a theory violates the constraint if an agent is able to carry out some action that (unilaterally, discretionarily, and foreseeably) worsens another's

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position and the theory does not give the latter a claim to full compensation. For example, if a theory does not give persons a claim to redress for harm-inflicting actions like assault, then it would run afoul of the constraint. In other words, the constraint is violated by a theory that permits agents to carry out a set of actions that would collectively leave others worse off. Second, a theory violates the constraint if it assigns to any person P a Hohfeldian power to oblige another person Q to do some action ϕ where Q ϕ-ing would leave Q (or some third-party) worse off – for example, if it holds that P can oblige Q to destroy Q's favorite painting. While the mere imposition of the obligation would not leave Q worse off in this case, her compliance with the imposed duties would; thus, the theory violates the moral tyranny constraint.

2.2 Explicating the Constraint

This section will explicate the moral tyranny constraint's many qualifying terms, thereby helping to clarify the constraint and give it determinate content. Specifically, there are six components of the constraint that are in need of explication. First, note that the constraint only applies to theories of duties, that is, theories that assign to every action some deontic status such that the action is declared to be either permissible, impermissible, or obligatory.[2] More precisely, the constraint and the subsequent arguments of the book presume something proximate to Hohfeld's (1913) schema of deontic incidents. According to this schema, *duties* (or, alternatively, *obligations*) are taken to entail the existence of correlative *rights* (or, alternatively, *claims*) possessed by others.[3] A *permission* to do a thing (or, alternatively, a *privilege*) is possessed by a person when no one has a claim that she not do that thing; that is, all others have a correlative *no-claim* with respect to her doing that action.[4] A person possesses a *power* when she is able to alter her own or others' incidents, where the correlative of a

[2] Permissible actions might be further divided into those that are permissible *tout court*, those that are supererogatory (Urmson 1958), and those that are suberogatory (Driver 1992). Such theories of duties contrast with *aretaic theories*, which take the primary moral judgment to be assessments of character rather than assessments of actions.

[3] As noted in Footnote 43 of Chapter 1, there may also be *non-directed duties* that do not entail a correlative claim. In other words, people who possess these duties would still be obliged to carry out certain actions, but they would not *owe* such actions to any particular person(s). For a recent critical discussion of the directedness of duties, see Rowan Cruft (2019).

[4] Some people also call permissions "liberties"; however, others such as Thomson use the term "liberty" to refer to the conjunction of a permission to do some action and a claim against all others that they not interfere with that action (1990, 53–4). Thus, the following argument will avoid using this language and will, instead, generally use the term "permission."

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power is a *liability*. For example, if one person is able to impose a duty on another, the former has a Hohfeldian power while the latter has a liability. Finally, when someone lacks a power to alter an incident, they have a *disability* vis-à-vis that incident, with the possessor of the protected incident having an *immunity* from having that incident negated.

Second, the moral tyranny constraint is stated in terms of diminishing others' *advantage*. "Advantage" here should be taken to have the same referent as the term "advantage" that appeared in Section 1.6; that is, it should be understood to not have any specific content but, rather, function as a placeholder for whatever one takes to be the relevant currency of distributive justice. For example, one might think that what matters is whether a person's welfare is diminished. Alternatively, one might think that the relevant question is whether she is left with fewer goods, where there is some objective list of goods. Or, perhaps, one must consider the output of some function that takes as its arguments a person's objective goods, her welfare, and/or some other property she possesses.[5] Because the argument of the book is compatible with any of these proposals, it will remain neutral regarding which one is best, with the term "advantage" referring to any favored currency of well-being. However, for the book's argument to be valid, the term must have a consistent referent throughout (i.e., it must refer to the same thing when it appears in the moral tyranny constraint as it does when it appears in the anarchist conclusion presented in Section 1.6).

Third, when the constraint asserts that agents must not be able to leave others worse off under conditions of full compliance – or, to introduce a bit of simplifying terminology leave others worse off$_{FC}$/with less$_{FC}$ – it is making a counterfactual claim rather than a temporal one. In other words, when asking whether P is able to act in a way that would leave Q worse off in the full-compliance world, the question is not whether there is some action ϕ that P can take such that the combination of her ϕ-ing and full compliance causes Q to have less advantage than she had before P ϕ-ed. Rather, the question is whether there is some alternative action ψ where (i) ψ-ing is incompossible with P ϕ-ing (e.g., ψ-ing might simply be identical to the omission of not ϕ-ing) and (ii) Q would have more advantage if P were to ψ under conditions of full compliance than she would if P were to ϕ under such conditions.

[5] Cohen uses the term "advantage" to refer to some combination of both welfare and resources (2011, 18). However, the term used here should not be understood to be co-referential with Cohen's notion.

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The fourth point of clarification pertains to the constraint's qualification that a theory of duties must not license a person to *unilaterally* leave others worse off/with less advantage under conditions of full compliance. The "unilaterally" qualifier should be understood as follows: P unilaterally leaves Q worse off_{FC} by ϕ-ing if and only if (a) Q is unable to avoid being left worse off_{FC} once P has ϕ-ed and (b) Q does not consent to being left worse off in this way. To illustrate, suppose that a moral theory assigns P the power to impose a conditional obligation on Q such that P can make it obligatory that if Q ϕ-s then Q ψ-s. Further, suppose that Q would have just as much advantage if she ϕ-ed as she would if she did not ϕ, but would be left worse off if she were to ψ relative to her not ψ-ing. In this case, Condition (a) is not satisfied, as Q could discharge her obligation by simply not ϕ-ing (as making the antecedent of the conditional false renders the entire conditional true) and be no worse off as a result.[6] Similarly, if P can oblige Q to ψ – but P acquires that power only if she first receives Q's consent – then Condition (b) would not be satisfied and, thus, P would not be able to unilaterally leave Q with less_{FC}.

This qualification is included because there is seemingly nothing defective about a theory that permits the imposition of costs that are voluntarily accepted. Indeed, almost all rights theorists would affirm that it is permissible to impose costs upon a person if she consents to that imposition. Granted, the proposed qualification takes an expansive view of what qualifies as voluntary, as it treats a person's response to some action as implying the voluntary acceptance of the consequences of that response. Some might think that this is too permissive and insist that the analysis of "unilaterally" ought to be broadened such that the set of unilateral costs excludes only those costs that were consented to – that is, Condition (a) ought to be removed from the proposed analysis leaving only Condition (b). However, such an adjustment would make the moral tyranny constraint more stringent than it needs to be. As will be made clear in Section 2.5, the moral tyranny constraint still entails two consequential and demanding libertarian principles even assuming the original, narrower specification of what counts as "unilateral." Thus, the proposed constraint is qualified in a way that errs on the side of modesty, avoiding controversy

[6] Note that if not ϕ-ing were more costly to Q than ϕ-ing, then P *would* be able to unilaterally leave Q worse off_{FC} by imposing the conditional obligation in question. Thus, while the moral tyranny constraint allows that P might impose conditional obligations on Q, it still imposes strict limits on which conditional obligations P can impose. Specifically, there must always be some option available to Q such that she ends up no worse off_{FC} than if the obligation had not been imposed.

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by counting more theories as acceptable rather than fewer (while still generating philosophically significant results).

Fifth, the proposition that a person *discretionarily* leaves others worse off_{FC} should be understood as asserting two things. First, it asserts that there was an alternative choice that the agent could have made that would not have resulted in the person ending up worse off_{FC}. Second, this alternative choice has to be not merely modally available in the just-mentioned sense but also *morally* available in the sense that the agent has no duty of justice to refrain from making that choice. For example, suppose that a doctor could substantially improve a patient's life by performing an invasive medical procedure to which the patient has refused consent. If the doctor chooses not to perform the procedure, she will leave the patient with worse off_{FC} than if the procedure were performed. However, there is seemingly nothing problematic about a moral theory that countenances this result – that is, that denies that the patient has any claim to compensation. This is because the doctor is simply doing what she *has* to do when she chooses not to carry out the procedure (in the normative sense of "has"). Thus, a theory only seems intuitively unacceptable when it licenses people to act in non-obligatory, $\text{cost-imposing}_{\text{FC}}$ ways.[7]

Finally, a moral theory only seems unacceptable if it countenances people *foreseeably* leaving others worse off_{FC}. For example, consider the case of a hiker who falls into an abandoned well due to the mouth being hidden by moss and leaves. A moral theory that assigns a bystander an obligation to rescue the hiker – where the rescue would be moderately costly to the bystander – does not seem obviously defective. By contrast, if the theory obliged the bystander to rescue a spelunker who decided to

[7] This case draws attention to the fact that the moral tyranny constraint *must* include the "discretionarily" qualifier lest it entail that there are conflicting duties in any case where an obligatory action does not maximize others' advantage. To see why, consider the general case where Q has a claim that P ϕ, where P ϕ-ing leaves Q with less advantage than if P did not ϕ. What happens if P ϕ-s? If the moral theory in question does not assign Q some sort of claim to compensation from P, then it would violate the moral tyranny constraint, as P's ϕ-ing would leave Q worse off_{FC} (as full compliance will not offset Q's lost advantage). Thus, Q must have a claim to compensation if P ϕ-s. But what would ground such a claim given that P is merely discharging her duty to Q by ϕ-ing? Seemingly, Q has a claim to compensation only if P's ϕ-ing infringed on some claim of Q's that P not ϕ; that is, P has both a duty to ϕ and a duty to refrain from ϕ-ing. While such a conflict of rights is not a logical contradiction, it is an undesirable thing for a theory of duties to affirm. It would therefore be a significant problem if the moral tyranny constraint entailed that there was a conflict of duties in any case where someone was obliged to act in a way that did not maximize others' advantage. Thus, the "discretionarily" qualifier must be included in the constraint to avoid this implication.

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explore the well despite knowing the risks involved, that would seem to be a clear instance of extensional inadequacy. Given that this apparent difference is best explained by the unforeseeability of the former outcome, the moral tyranny constraint must be qualified such that it only rules out theories that license people foreseeably leaving others worse off$_{FC}$.

When a moral theory meets all of the aforementioned conditions – that is, when it affirms that a person can unilaterally and discretionarily act in a way that leaves others foreseeably worse off$_{FC}$ – it seemingly institutes an unacceptable sort of moral tyranny. The hallmark of a tyrant is that she is able to impose discretionary costs on her subjects without any sort of legal restraint. Analogously, a theory that violates the moral tyranny constraint allows people to willfully diminish others' well-being without any sort of normative restraint. It is the licensing of such behavior that the libertarians cited in this chapter's opening paragraph seemingly find so objectionable. Each of their quoted complaints represents an objection to legal systems that license the imposition of costs on others, where such objections seemingly entail a correlative objection to any theory of duties that licenses cost-imposing actions. Thus, the moral tyranny constraint can be understood as giving more precise expression to this persistent libertarian complaint.

2.3 Defending the Constraint

The introduction of this chapter noted that numerous libertarians presume something proximate to the moral tyranny constraint. This section will provide an argument in defense of this libertarian presumption. Specifically, it will present three reasons for accepting the moral tyranny constraint that will appeal to both libertarians and non-libertarians alike. It thereby aims to show that the moral tyranny constraint is an attractive and independently plausible meta-principle.

First, the constraint can be seen as following from the *separateness of persons argument* that liberals advance against utilitarianism.[8] Utilitarians hold that a cost can be permissibly imposed upon one person if the imposition of that cost is a necessary and sufficient condition for providing greater benefit to another. In support of this claim, utilitarians will often present something like the following *argument from prudential choice*. They begin by noting that humans regularly impose costs upon themselves for

[8] Notably, versions of this argument have been presented by both John Rawls (1971, 26–7) and Nozick (1974, 32–4), though the two draw very different conclusions about what follows from the separateness of persons (beyond the negation of utilitarianism).

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the sake of obtaining greater benefits in the future – a practice that seems not only morally unproblematic but rationally demanded. Further, they maintain that if there is nothing problematic about a person imposing costs upon herself for greater future benefit, then there is nothing problematic about imposing costs on one person to provide greater benefit to another. Thus, utilitarians conclude that there is nothing problematic about sacrificing one person's well-being for the sake of providing greater benefit to another.[9]

The aforementioned separateness of persons argument is best understood as an objection to this argument from prudential choice. Specifically, it is an objection to the second premise of the utilitarian's argument – that is, the premise that, if it is permissible for a person to impose costs on herself for greater future benefit, then it is permissible to impose costs on one person in order to provide greater benefit to another. The fact that persons are separate rather than some unified social creature renders this inference implausible. The separateness of persons objection points out that there is a crucial disanalogy between prudential sacrifice and utilitarian sacrifice that prevents the permissibility of the former from implying the permissibility of the latter.[10]

[9] J. J. C. Smart makes this argument explicitly in reply to Rawls' (1958) suggestion that there is something unfair about imposing costs on some to maximize overall utility:

> [I]f it is rational for me to choose the pain of a visit to the dentist in order to prevent the pain of toothache, why is it not rational of me to choose pain for Jones, similar to that of my visit to the dentist, if that is the only way in which I can prevent a pain, equal to that of my toothache, for Robinson?
>
> (Smart and Williams, 1973, 37)

[10] This way of explicating the separateness of persons argument heads off a potential reply suggested by Mack (2018) in his elaboration of Nozick's version of the argument. Mack posits that the utilitarian might argue that the reason that a person can permissibly impose costs on herself for future benefits is that one ought to maximize utility. As he puts it, "we start with the unrestricted rationality of minimizing costs (or maximizing benefits); and the principle of individual choice is simply the application of that principle of social choice to the special case in which there is only one agent" (2018, §2.2). However, given the chapter's proposed interpretation of the separateness of persons argument, this reply would beg the question, as the general principle that one ought to maximize benefits irrespective of whether there is one person or many is the proposition that has to be demonstrated. Thus, it cannot be assumed as a starting premise.

An additional advantage of stating the argument in this way is that it allows the appeal to separateness of persons to qualify as a supporting argument for liberal deontological positions (as opposed to a mere restatement of those positions). A common tendency in the recent literature is to treat the proposition that persons are separate as merely an alternative way of expressing some other deontological commitment such as the thesis that persons are owed respect and, thus, cannot be treated as a mere means (Zwolinski 2008, 150–2) or the contention that persons have moral authority over their own lives that trumps moral reasons to promote the common good (Mazor 2019, 192–3). However, such an approach strips the separateness of persons argument of its dialectical force. In the debate between utilitarians and deontologists, the former assert that you ought to maximize utility even if that requires treating someone as a mere means or denying her

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Proponents of the separateness of persons argument conclude that one cannot permissibly impose costs on some people to benefit others. Admittedly, this conclusion does not strictly follow from the separateness of persons argument, as the utilitarian's conclusion might still be true even if the separateness of persons objection renders her argument from prudential choice unsound. However, one might think that the argument from prudential choice is the only plausible way of justifying something that is *prima facie* unjustified. Thus, if that argument fails due to the separateness of persons objection, then it follows that it is not permissible to sacrifice some to benefit others.

If one accepts this conclusion, then one should also endorse the moral tyranny constraint. Notably, the objection's conclusion condemns utilitarian sacrifice even given the fact that the provision of benefit is at least a plausible candidate for justifying cost imposition. By contrast, there will be many cases of discretionary cost imposition where this is no countervailing moral consideration that might justify the imposed cost. Given that utility-maximizing cost imposition is not permissible even given countervailing moral considerations, it seemingly follows from the separateness of persons argument that discretionary cost imposition (which lacks this justificatory advantage) is also impermissible.

Compare this result with the moral tyranny constraint, which holds that it is not permissible to unilaterally, foreseeably, and discretionarily impose costs_{FC} on a person. The crucial difference between this claim and the conclusion of the separateness of persons argument is that the latter condemns the imposition of actual-world discretionary costs while the former condemns the imposition of full-compliance-world discretionary costs. However, those who hold that it is impermissible to impose actual-world costs are seemingly committed to affirming that it is impermissible to impose full-compliance-world costs. To see why, consider the following case: if P ϕ-s, she leaves Q worse off; by contrast, if P ψ-s, she does not leave Q worse off but *does* leave her worse off_{FC}. Further, assume that both actions are discretionary. According to the conclusion of the separateness of persons argument, P's ϕ-ing would be impermissible because it imposes

moral authority over how her life goes; by contrast, deontologists assert that you ought not maximize utility under such circumstances. If affirming the separateness of persons merely expresses the proposition that one ought not treat persons as a means and/or individuals' moral authority trumps promoting the common good, then it merely reasserts the deontological position rather than providing a reason for favoring that position over the utilitarian one. By contrast, the proposed separateness of persons argument does provide such a reason.

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a cost on Q – where ϕ-ing imposes a cost on Q if and only if Q's loss of advantage is a direct function of P ϕ-ing. In other words, had P not ϕ-ed, then Q would not have lost advantage and *for this reason* P's ϕ-ing is impermissible.

Now, consider the world where P ψ-s and everyone complies with their moral requirements. In such a world, P's action stands in an identical counterfactual relation to Q's loss of advantage. Thus, one might conclude that P's ψ-ing is also impermissible. However, this would be a mistake, as it is actually P's ψ-ing *conjoined* with certain acts of compliance that lead to Q being worse off; absent such compliance, P ψ-ing would not leave Q worse off relative to the world where P does not ψ. In other words, the appropriate conclusion to draw is that *the conjunction of* P ψ*-ing and the acts of compliance* is impermissible. Given that P ϕ-ing is impermissible because Q's worsened position is a direct function of P ϕ-ing, the fact that Q's worsened position is also a direct function of P ψ-ing plus others' acts of compliance entails the impermissibility of that set of actions.[11] This, in turn, implies that if these other acts are all permissible, then P ψ-ing is impermissible. Further, note that the world of full compliance is, by definition, a world where all other persons act *permissibly*. Thus, it must be the case that P ψ-ing is impermissible. In other words, if one accepts the conclusion of the separateness of persons argument – that is, that it is impermissible to discretionarily leave others worse off – then one should also accept the moral tyranny constraint's implication that it is impermissible to discretionarily leave others worse off$_{FC}$.

A second reason for endorsing the moral tyranny constraint is that it is a less demanding – and, thus, less controversial – version of the popular neo-republican rejection of domination advanced by Philip Pettit (2012). Pettit contends that there is something morally objectionable about a state of affairs where one person has the ability to limit another's freedom by removing one of her options. He suggests that the presence of such

[11] One might worry that this argument departs from some of the previous discussion by putting deontic propositions in impersonal terms – that is, there is some action-including state of affairs that is obligatory/permissible – rather than in agential terms such that some agent is said to be obliged/permitted to do a thing. However, first, one could seemingly frame the entire argument of the book in impersonal terms without issue. Any inconsistency in deontic language merely reflects localized stylistic choices that aid in exposition. Alternatively, one might take there to be some way of bridging the agential-impersonal gap, for example, by holding that a person is obliged to act in some way if and only it is obligatory that the person act in that way. This presumption is proximate to what has become known as the "Meinong-Chisholm Reduction" after two early proponents of this view (namely, Alexius Meinong (1972) and Roderick M. Chisholm (1964)). However, this view is not without critics (see, e.g., Jacob Ross (2010)).

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domination undermines egalitarian relations between persons, precluding their ability to "look others in the eye without . . . fear or deference that a power of interference might inspire; [to] walk tall and assume the public status . . . of being equal" (2012, 84). Additionally, beyond this relational egalitarian concern, the objection to domination might be viewed as a natural extension of a more primitive concern with freedom, where the restriction of freedom – and, more strongly, people having the ability to restrict others' freedom – is taken to be objectionable.

To see why the moral tyranny constraint is a weaker version of the republican thesis, it will be helpful to restate the latter in deontic terms. Specifically, a Pettit-influenced republican holds that it is impermissible to realize or preserve a state of affairs where one person has the ability to remove options from another's option set. By contrast, the moral tyranny constraint limits which options it is permissible to remove. Specifically, it entails that an agent is forbidden from carrying out a conjunction of actions that would remove advantage-preserving$_{FC}$ options such that someone is left worse off$_{FC}$. For example, if (a) P ϕ-ing and then ψ-ing would leave Q worse off$_{FC}$ and (b) P ϕ-s, then the moral tyranny constraint would imply that it is impermissible for P to ψ; that is, the moral tyranny constraint implies that it is impermissible for P to remove an option from Q's option set by ψ-ing (namely, the option where Q does her most-preferred action and Q does not ψ). This makes the moral tyranny constraint weaker than the standard republican position in two respects. First, it merely forbids *option removal* rather than forbidding people from having the *capacity* to remove options (where someone lacking the capacity to remove an option entails that they will not remove that option but where the converse of this conditional is false). Second, the republican thesis is concerned with the removal of all options while the moral tyranny constraint forbids only the removal of advantage-preserving$_{FC}$ options, which are a proper subset of all options.[12] Thus, the satisfaction of the republican principle will entail the satisfaction of the moral tyranny constraint but not vice versa. Given this relation, republicans critical of domination should also accept the moral tyranny constraint both because it seems to capture some of the motivating concerns expressed in the previous paragraph and because there is no reason to reject a principle

[12] It is assumed here that changing the moral status of some option via the imposition of an obligation also counts as option removal. For example, if P obliges Q to stay out of the park after midnight, P removes an option from Q, namely, the option of going in the park after midnight while discharging her duties. In other words, options are assumed to be individuated in a fairly fine-grained fashion such that actions with different deontic statuses represent different options.

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that is fully satisfied if one's own principle is satisfied. Additionally, because the moral tyranny constraint is less stringent than the standard republican position, it is vulnerable to fewer objections (e.g., that there are cases where having a mere *capacity* to remove some arbitrary option is morally unproblematic).

Finally, one ought to accept the moral tyranny constraint because it would be the result of a process of reflective equilibrium. Most famously championed by John Rawls (1971), the practice of reflective equilibrium involves rendering one's set of normative beliefs coherent, where this set includes one's particular moral judgments, the general moral principles that support those judgments, and the theoretical *desiderata* (i.e., meta-principles) that determine which principles are acceptable. As noted in Section I.2, coherence is an important theoretical virtue of any given normative position, where genuine coherence requires that relations of logical entailment obtain between that position's various propositions. In other words, if one embraces the method of reflective equilibrium – with the associated presupposition that coherence is a theoretical virtue – then one has reason to accept moral principles that entail a large number of one's accepted particular moral judgments or moral principles. Similarly, one has reason to accept those theoretical *desiderata* that entail a large number of one's accepted general principles.

In further defense of accepting theoretical *desiderata* (or moral theories) because they entail many accepted moral theories (or particular judgments), one might draw an analogy between the virtues of normative theories and the virtues of scientific theories. Philosophers of science typically maintain that explanatory power is a virtue of scientific theories: One has more reason to accept a theory that explains a large number of observed phenomena than one that explains fewer, *ceteris paribus*.[13] Analogously, one might think that general normative principles (theoretical *desiderata*) stand in an explanatory relation to particular moral judgments (general moral principles).[14] Together, these claims would entail that one has reason to accept a moral principle (theoretical *desideratum*) in proportion to the number of accepted particular judgments (moral principles) it entails.

If this is right, then there is further reason for accepting the moral tyranny constraint, as it entails a number of influential moral principles.

[13] For a defense of this point, see Bas van Fraassen (1980, 98).

[14] For a sustained argument that normative theories are, in important ways, analogous to scientific explanations, see Jesse Spafford (2021a).

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Specifically, the next section will argue that the Lockean proviso, the consent theory of legitimacy, and luck egalitarianism's incorporation of responsibility all follow from the moral tyranny constraint.[15] It will thereby show that the moral tyranny constraint has both significant explanatory power – that is, it explains why these various principles obtain – and helps to establish the coherence of a number of attractive views. This makes the moral tyranny constraint a strong candidate theoretical *desideratum* to include in any reflective equilibrium.

In sum, there are a number of reasons for adopting the moral tyranny constraint. Two are foundationalist in the sense that the reason for accepting the constraint is that it follows from some other plausible position, for example, the separateness of persons argument or the republican critique of domination. The third is coherentist in the sense that the reason for accepting the moral tyranny constraint is that the constraint entails – and thereby helps to explain – various other attractive positions (as will be discussed in the subsequent section). Thus, irrespective of which sort of justification one favors, one has reason to endorse the moral tyranny constraint.

2.4 Three Implications of the Constraint

This section will argue that three of the positions introduced in Chapter 1 – namely, the consent theory of legitimacy, the Lockean proviso, and luck

[15] Additionally, note that the various claims advanced in the opening paragraph of this chapter also follow from the constraint. For example, von Mises (1998) can be understood as denying that social insurance for farmers is just, as that entails that farmers who make imprudent decisions are *entitled* to the transfers they receive and, thus, can leave others worse off_{FC} when they make such decisions. Similar remarks apply to Brennan's (2016) objection to democracy. If democracy were a just system of government, then hooligans who vote for dangerous policies would have a *right* that those policies be implemented. This, in turn, would imply that these hooligans could, by assembling a simple majority, leave others worse off_{FC}. In both cases, the solution is to propose a moral theory that does not license some people to impose costs_{FC} upon others. While this does not stop imprudent farmers or hooligan voters from leaving others worse off as a matter of empirical fact, it does prevent them from leaving others worse off_{FC}, which is all that the moral tyranny constraint requires (and all that should really concern those doing normative theorizing). Admittedly, it is unlikely that non-libertarians will find Brennan's or von Mises' positions attractive. For such skeptics, the fact that the moral tyranny constraint entails a rejection of democracy or social insurance will count *against* including the constraint in the ultimate reflective equilibrium. However, any coherent normative position will likely entail some unfortunate conclusions; thus, the question is whether its desirable implications outweigh the undesirable ones and how this net assessment compares to the assessment of other rival positions. The hope is that non-libertarians will find the implications discussed in the subsequent section to be more attractive (particularly the luck egalitarian implication) to the point where they might be willing to accept the moral tyranny constraint even if that means that they have to accept some of its less attractive implications as a consequence.

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egalitarianism's responsibility component – follow from the moral tyranny constraint. To begin, consider the consent theory of legitimacy's assertion that a state or person can impose obligations on others (if and) only if the latter have consented to being morally bound in this way. While there have been many arguments presented in defense of this position (see, e.g., Simmons 2001), it also follows from the moral tyranny constraint's contention that moral theories cannot license persons to unilaterally, discretionarily, and foreseeably leave others worse off$_{FC}$. Recall from Section 2.1 that one way in which a person might leave others worse off$_{FC}$ is by imposing obligations on them that would be costly to discharge. Thus, the constraint entails that any power to impose such obligations must be restricted such that the imposition cannot be carried out foreseeably, discretionarily, and unilaterally.

This result entails that the moral tyranny constraint is incompatible with any theory of legitimacy that does not have consent as its necessary condition. As noted in Section 1.1, a legitimate authority has the power to oblige others via the issuing of edicts, where this power is *content independent* in the sense that the authority can oblige others to act in some way irrespective of the properties of that act (with the possible exception of the act being morally prohibited). Thus, a legitimate authority has the power to impose obligations irrespective of whether or not the obligor would be worse off if she discharged the obligation; that is, she has the ability to leave others worse off$_{FC}$. Further, there is seemingly no way to either eliminate the discretionary character of legitimacy or make it such that legitimate authorities can impose only those obligations that do not foreseeably leave others worse off$_{FC}$. Note that the latter restriction would negate the content-independent character of legitimacy: The proposition that an agent can impose only those obligations that do not foreseeably leave obligors worse off$_{FC}$ is just the kind of content-based restriction that legitimacy lacks as a matter of definition. Similarly, limiting legitimacy such that it becomes a power to *non-discretionarily* impose costly obligations (i.e., impose such obligations only when there is no other permissible option available) strips the power of its essential character. While perhaps there may be such a power, it would only loosely resemble the power that is at issue when philosophers debate whether states are legitimate.

Given that legitimate authorities necessarily have the power to discretionarily and foreseeably impose costly obligations on others, there is only one way to make the power of legitimacy compatible with the moral tyranny constraint: Make others' consent a necessary condition for legitimacy obtaining. If consent is a necessary condition of legitimacy, then

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legitimate authorities cannot *unilaterally* impose costly obligations on others, as those others will be able to fully control whether the authority leaves them worse off$_{FC}$. By contrast, the absence of this necessary condition entails that legitimate authorities can unilaterally, foreseeably, and discretionarily leave others worse off$_{FC}$.[16] Thus, the moral tyranny constraint entails the consent theory of legitimacy.[17]

A similar argument can be given for why the Lockean proviso – or, more precisely, its posited necessary condition of initial appropriation – follows from the moral tyranny constraint.[18] Note that, much like legitimate authorities, those who appropriate natural resources and convert them into private property impose obligations on others (namely, obligations to refrain from using or making nonconsensual contact with the appropriated thing).[19] Thus, the moral tyranny constraint entails that one must posit some necessary condition of initial appropriation to preclude appropriators from unilaterally, discretionarily, and foreseeably leaving others worse off$_{FC}$ via this obligation imposition. One option is to adopt the consent theorist's approach and make consent a necessary condition of appropriation, thereby precluding appropriators from *unilaterally* leaving others worse off$_{FC}$. However, almost all proponents of initial appropriation reject this option on the grounds that it is too stringent. Given the difficulties of

[16] As noted in Section 2.2, it is possible to nonconsensually and non-unilaterally impose costly obligations on others if those obligations have the right sort of conditional structure. However, an authority whose normative power is limited to imposing such obligations cannot qualify as a *legitimate* authority, as such a restriction contradicts the content independence that is an essential characteristic of legitimacy. Only consent can render content-independent obligation imposition non-unilateral.

[17] This is a slight overstatement of what has been demonstrated. Strictly speaking, there is a stronger and weaker version of consent theory, where the former holds that consent is a necessary *and sufficient* condition of legitimacy while the latter holds that it is merely a necessary condition. The preceding argument shows only that the weak version of consent theory follows from the moral tyranny constraint. One might thereby endorse both the moral tyranny constraint and hold that even consent does not allow authorities to impose obligations on others via edict (perhaps for reasons such as those advanced by Robert Paul Wolff (1970)). However, insofar as one takes consent to be a promising ground for obligation imposition (e.g., in the case of promissory obligations), then one should take consent to be a sufficient condition of legitimacy – and, thus, accept the strong version of consent theory in light of the moral tyranny constraint's implication that consent is also a necessary condition of legitimacy. For a quick argument along these lines against Wolff's position, see Simmons (1987, 269fn2).

[18] Note that there are also stronger and weaker versions of the proviso analogous to the stronger and weaker versions of consent theory discussed in the previous footnote. And, just as was true of consent theory, the moral tyranny constraint implies only the weaker version of the proviso that makes non-worsening a necessary – but not sufficient – condition of successfully appropriating unowned resources.

[19] Much more will be said about the relationship between legitimacy and initial appropriation in Chapter 4.

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obtaining universal consent, this standard would unacceptably preclude the establishment of any private property.[20] Thus, a less controversial way to satisfy the moral tyranny constraint is to permit unilateral appropriation but hold that such appropriation cannot leave others worse off$_{FC}$ – that is, affirm Chapter 1's interpretation of the Lockean proviso.

As was noted in Section 2.2 of that chapter, the Lockean proviso is typically presented as asserting that an act of initial appropriation succeeds if and only if it does not leave anyone worse off *tout court*. However, it was argued there that this interpretation of the proviso is unacceptable because it is trivially satisfied by every act of appropriation. Thus, the section concluded that the proviso is better understood as asserting that it is *full compliance with the established claims* that must not leave others worse off (where this thesis can now be stated using the "worse off$_{FC}$" shorthand presented earlier). What is now hopefully apparent is that this adjustment makes the proviso an application of moral tyranny constraint to the appropriation of private property: The constraint insists that moral theories cannot allow persons to leave each other worse off$_{FC}$, and the proviso makes it such that the posited theory of property rights complies with this restriction.

Further, one can now see that the moral tyranny constraint also entails the final adjustment that Section 1.2 made to the Lockean proviso. The proposal there was that it is not just appropriators' established claims that must not leave others worse off$_{FC}$; rather, any potential waiving of the established claims must also not leave others worse off$_{FC}$. The justification for this adjustment appealed to a premise about arbitrariness: Given that the power to establish property claims is constrained by a non-worsening condition, it seems unacceptably arbitrary to not impose this same constraint on the power to waive these claims. However, now that the moral tyranny constraint has been introduced, the appeal to arbitrariness is no longer needed, as the constraint directly entails that people cannot have any normative power that enables them to leave others worse off$_{FC}$. Given that initial appropriation entails the existence of powers to waive the established claims, it follows that initial appropriation can succeed only if any subsequent exercise of these powers would not leave anyone worse

[20] See van der Vossen (2019, § 3) and Mack (2010). For an early and influential rejection of consent as a necessary condition of appropriation, see Locke (2005, §28). That said, Chapter 4 will raise some complications for those who want to reject consent as a necessary condition of appropriation without accepting the broader moral tyranny framework presented in this book.

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off_{FC}. In this way, the moral tyranny constraint entails the revised Lockean proviso presented in Section 1.2.[21]

So far it has been argued that two prominent libertarian theses follow from the moral tyranny constraint: the consent theory of legitimacy and the (slightly adjusted) Lockean proviso. However, there are also influential non-libertarian positions that follow from the moral tyranny constraint. Most notably, luck egalitarianism presupposes the constraint, as the primary reason for accepting the luck egalitarian position over strict egalitarianism is that the latter allows for moral tyranny in a way that the former does not. Recall from Section 1.6 that the signature feature of luck egalitarianism is its incorporation of responsibility into an otherwise strict egalitarian theory of justice. There it was noted that strict egalitarian theories are, by definition, insensitive to responsibility, demanding an equal distribution of advantage regardless of anyone's past actions. By contrast, luck egalitarians are willing to declare certain inequalities just if and only if those inequalities correspond to some sanctionable choice for which the worse-off parties are responsible. And, as it turns out, there is good reason for moderating strict egalitarianism in this way: Absent this responsibility condition, strict egalitarianism is vulnerable to a species of *reductio* argument that renders the position implausible. Consider, for example, how a principle that demands strict equality of advantage would handle the case of a spiteful person who maliciously destroys any advantage she receives. In this case, a strict egalitarian would demand that advantage continually be reallocated to this person such that her share remains as great as everyone else's – a demand that is sustained even as she destroys each bit of advantage that is transferred to her until, eventually, no one has any advantage left to transfer. This result is an apparent *reductio* of strict egalitarianism.

Other examples popularly cited by luck egalitarians can be substituted into the *reductio* to reach the same conclusion. For example, consider Cohen's Aesopian case of the ant who assiduously works all summer storing up food while a neighboring grasshopper lounges idly – a decision the grasshopper makes even while recognizing that she will end up worse off when winter comes (2008, 27–8). In this case, a strict egalitarian

[21] If the foregoing argument is correct and both the consent theory of legitimacy and the Lockean proviso follow from the moral tyranny constraint, this would reveal a little-discussed coherence in Locke's *Second Treatise on Civil Government*, which endorses both positions. Similar remarks apply to Nozick's *Anarchy, State, and Utopia*, as he defends both the Lockean proviso (1974, 178) and, in the first section of the book, something proximate to a consent theory of legitimacy, though he is not entirely consistent on this point (see Simmons 2005, 334–6).

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principle of justice would demand that the ant redistribute some of her food to the grasshopper; however, there is something seemingly unfair about the ant having to make do with less because of the grasshopper's choice not to work. Thus, insofar as justice is supposed to track fairness, a strict egalitarian principle must be rejected, as it declares an unfair outcome just.[22]

Why would redistribution in these cases be unfair? Cohen has suggested that such redistribution is a form of exploitation (e.g., of the assiduous ant), where exploitation runs contrary to egalitarianism (Cohen 2011, 8). However, as Michael Otsuka notes, it is unclear in what respect such exploitation can be *inegalitarian* given that the redistribution is equalizing by definition (Otsuka 2010, 223). Rather, Otsuka plausibly argues that what is unfair about such redistribution is that it forces some people to "pick up the tab" for the poor choices of others (2010, 229).

While Otsuka does not provide any analysis of what it means for someone to "pick up the tab" for someone else's choices, a natural way of specifying this notion is in terms of the moral tyranny constraint: A person has to pick up the tab for another's actions when the latter foreseeably, discretionarily, and unilaterally leaves her worse off$_{FC}$. Indeed, this specification explains why strict egalitarianism's prescriptions in the spiteful destroyer and lazy grasshopper cases seem intuitively unacceptable. In both cases, a strict egalitarian theory of justice licenses one party to leave others with less advantage in the counterfactual world where everyone complies with the demands of morality. Note that the spiteful destroyer and grasshopper might not, as a matter of empirical fact, leave others with less, as those others might refuse to transfer any of their advantage-producing resources. Rather, both the spiteful destroyer and the grasshopper strip others of a claim to advantage according to the strict egalitarian theory – while simultaneously acquiring a claim to that stripped advantage – such that others *would* transfer resources to these parties if the former were to fully comply with the latter's claims. Thus, the worry that motivates luck egalitarianism is that there is something problematic about a theory that allows people to leave others worse off$_{FC}$.

As noted in Section 1.6, the luck egalitarian solution to this problem is to *hold people responsible* for making *sanctionable choices*, where a theory

[22] For similar motivating cases, see Kymlicka (2002, 73) and Stemplowska (2009, 241, 252–3). Note that such cases seem to count against Segall's (2016) thesis that there is nothing morally objectionable about any equal state of affairs. Contra Segall, the luck egalitarian theory posited by this paper will entail that equal distributions generated by sanctionable choice are unjust. Any theory that does not have this implication will problematically allow for moral tyranny.

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holds someone responsible for a choice if and only if it maintains that she forfeits a claim to some quantity of advantage in virtue of that choice. By holding people responsible for their choices, luck egalitarianism is able to avoid granting the spiteful destroyer (or grasshopper) the Hohfeldian power to discretionarily, unilaterally, and foreseeably acquire a claim to others' holdings, thereby leaving them with less_{FC}. According to strict egalitarianism, when the spiteful destroyer diminishes her own advantage, she acquires a claim against others that they make equalizing transfers to her. By contrast, luck egalitarianism treats her act of destruction as a sanctionable choice in virtue of which she forfeits a claim to advantage. Specifically, there is some quantity of advantage A such that the conjunction of the destroyer having a claim to A and her act of destruction entails that others are obliged to give her some of their holdings. Luck egalitarianism holds that the destroyer forfeits her claim to A in virtue of her act of destruction, thereby precluding her from acquiring a claim to others making equalizing transfers. This, in turn, implies that fully compliant people would not make any transfers to the spiteful destroyer and, thus, no one else ends up with less_{FC} as a result of her actions. Luck egalitarianism thereby satisfies the moral tyranny constraint in a way that strict egalitarianism does not – which is to say that the constraint entails that an egalitarian theory must include a responsibility component.[23]

Note that the foregoing discussion does not demonstrate that the moral tyranny constraint entails luck egalitarianism. Rather, it entails that egalitarians must endorse the luck egalitarian incorporation of responsibility, that is, the proposition that inequality is just if the worse-off party has chosen sanctionably (more on this in Chapter 6). What it does not entail is the luck egalitarian presumption that persons are entitled to equal shares of advantage absent such sanctionable choice. In other words, unlike the consent theory of legitimacy and the Lockean proviso – each of which merely constrains the kinds of claims and correlative obligations that persons can establish given any arbitrary initial set of claims/obligations – luck egalitarianism also asserts that persons start out with a claim to an equal share of advantage. Chapter 5 will argue that this thesis also

[23] This conclusion helps to elucidate Cohen's famous assertion that luck egalitarianism incorporates "within it the most powerful idea in the arsenal of the antiegalitarian Right: the idea of choice and responsibility" (2011, 32). Specifically, the moral tyranny constraint is the foundational principle of the "antiegalitarian Right" as it both entails core theses endorsed by right-libertarians and entails the unacceptability of strict egalitarianism. Luck egalitarianism then incorporates the constraint by ensuring that it is satisfied while still articulating a highly demanding form of egalitarianism (i.e., a position that entails that a large portion of existing inequality is unjust).

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ultimately follows from a libertarian *desideratum* for moral theories (albeit not the moral tyranny constraint). For now, though, the argument will pause at the conclusion that the responsibility component of luck egalitarianism follows from the moral tyranny constraint. Such a result is seemingly sufficient for establishing the point that the constraint entails a number of influential and attractive philosophical theses and, thus, ought to be included as part of one's ultimate reflective equilibrium.[24]

2.5 Three Objections to the Constraint

Having discussed some reasons for accepting the moral tyranny constraint, it is worth addressing three objections that might be raised against this meta-principle. The *stringency objection* posits that the moral tyranny constraint is implausible because the constraint entails that persons have a number of excessively demanding duties. For example, suppose that P would have married Q but for the fact that Q fell in love with R and got married to R instead. In this case, Q's choice to marry R seemingly leaves P worse off_{FC} than she would have been otherwise. Thus, according to the moral tyranny constraint, a moral theory is acceptable only if it does not license Q's choice to marry R rather than P, where this might be taken to require assigning Q a duty to marry P. However, given that no acceptable theory will restrict Q's moral freedom in this way, a contradiction is reached. Similarly, T might leave S worse off_{FC} by opening a rival business that drives down S's profits. Here, again, one might worry that the moral tyranny constraint unacceptably entails that T has a duty to refrain from competing with S. If the constraint restricts persons' moral freedom in this way, it must seemingly be rejected despite its virtues (as described in Section 2.3).

Alternatively, one might raise a *laxity objection* against the constraint. According to this objection, the constraint entails that persons do not acquire duties in cases where an adequate moral theory would assign them such duties. Consider, for example, the case where A and B are standing on

[24] An additional advantage of the moral tyranny constraint is that it precludes certain varieties of moral blackmail. For example, Johan E. Gustafsson (2022) notes that a committed act utilitarian (or rule utilitarian) can be successfully extorted if other agents commit to bringing about a non-utility-maximizing outcome if and only if the utilitarian does not give them money. As Gustafsson notes, "A plausible moral theory shouldn't lay one open to that kind of exploitation" (2022, 388) and the moral tyranny constraint formalizes this contention: Utilitarianism is defective because a moral theory should not allow would-be extorters to unilaterally, foreseeably, and discretionarily leave others worse off under conditions of full compliance.

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the shore of a pond where a child is drowning. Assume that *B* (and not *A*) has an obligation to rescue the child, as *B* is better positioned to carry out the rescue and could do so costlessly while *A* would incur a modest cost if she were to rescue the child. Further, suppose that *B* refuses to assist the drowning child. Given *B*'s refusal to assist, it seems that *A* acquires a remedial duty to rescue the child. However, the acquisition of such a duty would violate the moral tyranny constraint, as *B* would have thereby left *A* worse off_{FC} with her choice not to rescue. Thus, the moral tyranny constraint appears to deliver the wrong results in this case.

The reply to the first objection begins with the observation that, for any given action ϕ, the moral tyranny constraint does not imply that a moral theory must declare ϕ-ing to be either permissible or impermissible. Rather, it implies that the moral theory's *entire set of posited claims* must adjust in response to an agent ϕ-ing such that no other person ends up worse off_{FC} than she would have been had the agent not ϕ-ed. Thus, the constraint does not entail that *Q* has a duty to marry *P*; rather, it entails that any loss_{FC} of advantage that *P* incurs in virtue of not marrying *Q* must be offset by some other advantage-conferring$_{\text{FC}}$ rights assigned by the theory (where *P* would not be assigned these rights if she married *Q*). By assigning rights in this way, the posited theory of duties avoids moral tyranny by precluding *Q* from leaving *P* worse off_{FC} via her choice to marry *R* – and, crucially, it achieves this without assigning *Q* a duty to marry *P*. Similarly, the constraint does not entail that *T* has a duty to refrain from competing with *S*'s business; rather, it mandates that the theory of duties in question must preclude *T* from $\text{disadvantaging}_{\text{FC}}$ *S* by assigning *S* other compensatory claims that, if respected, would offset any loss of advantage imposed by *T*'s choice. Thus, the stringency objection does not succeed, as the moral tyranny constraint does not entail the posited unacceptable duties.

The laxity objection poses a greater threat to the moral tyranny constraint, as it begins with the recognition that the constraint sets limits on which duties and permissions persons can have conditional on the choices that agents make. Specifically, it contends that the constraint entails an improper restriction on which remedial duties can obtain when *B* fails to discharge her duty to rescue a drowning child (namely, that *A* cannot acquire a duty to rescue the child, as such a rescue would leave *A* worse off_{FC} relative to the world where *B* chose differently). However, this objection incorrectly assumes that one must hold all other permissions and duties constant when assessing whether *A* acquires a duty to rescue the child. Were this the case, then the constraint would, indeed, imply that *A*

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cannot acquire such a duty. Fortunately for proponents of the constraint, there are many alternative patterns of remedial duties that both satisfy the constraint and assign *A* a duty to rescue the child. For example, a moral theory might maintain that *A* acquires a duty to rescue the child *and* that *B* acquires a duty to compensate *A* such that *A* ends up no worse off_{FC} in virtue of *B*'s choice not to rescue the child.[25] In fact, one might take this conjunction of duties to be a more plausible result than simply holding that *A* has to rescue the child and must shoulder the associated costs without any compensation from *B*. If so, this putative counterexample to the moral tyranny constraint is transformed into additional reason for favoring the constraint, as the constraint can explain why it is that *B* must compensate *A* (despite the fact that her undischarged duty was owed to the *child*). Thus, the stringency and laxity objections fail to undermine the plausibility of the moral tyranny constraint.

Finally, the *paternalism objection* contends that the moral tyranny constraint is incompatible with any claim against paternalistic interference (including so-called hard paternalism that is explicitly unwanted by the beneficiary).[26] While not everyone believes that people have claims against paternalistic interference, such claims are widely endorsed by anarchists, libertarians, and liberals of all stripes – that is, those who would be most naturally attracted to the position advanced by the book. Thus, if the

[25] What if *B* is unable to compensate *A*? If one thinks that a person can still have a duty even if she is unable to discharge that duty, then *B*'s inability does not pose any special problem for the compensation solution proposed in this section. However, given that the constraint is concerned with the world of full compliance, it may well presuppose that persons can have a duty only if they are able to discharge it. If duties imply "can" in this way, then *B*'s inability to compensate *A* makes moral tyranny *inevitable*: either one assigns *A* a duty to rescue the child thereby enabling *B* to leave *A* worse off_{FC} or one does not assign *A* this duty thereby enabling *B* to leave the *child* worse off_{FC}. Given this predicament, the suggestion here is that the moral tyranny constraint should be understood to declare a moral theory unacceptable only if it violates the constraint *and* there is some rival theory that does not violate the constraint. In other words, if all possible theories entail that a person has the ability to foreseeably, discretionarily, and unilaterally leave someone worse off_{FC} by making a particular choice, then no theory should be taken to violate the constraint in virtue of that person's ability. Suppose, for example, that a nuclear-weapon-possessing villain has the ability to destroy the planet. If she makes this choice, everyone will be left worse off and there will be no way for her to compensate them. This, in turn, implies that no moral theory will be able to assign duties in such a way as to preclude her from leaving others worse off_{FC}. And, given that *no* theory can satisfy the constraint vis-à-vis this choice, it seems like the fact that some particular theory does not satisfy the constraint vis-à-vis that choice does not count against the theory. For this reason, the moral tyranny constraint should be understood to be satisfied in both this case and the aforementioned rescue case where no compensation is possible.

[26] In fact, one might even think that it entails that agents are *obliged* to paternalistically interfere with others, as this is the only way for a theory to avoid licensing those agents to leave others worse off_{FC}.

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moral tyranny constraint implies that paternalism is acceptable, that would represent a serious theoretical cost.[27]

The quick reply is that this objection mistakenly presupposes that persons must be assigned the set of duties such that each person ends up with the maximum possible quantity of advantage conditional on full compliance with those duties. However, the constraint merely insists that persons must *lack the ability to diminish others' advantage* conditional on full compliance. While a theory that assigned a person a claim against paternalist interference would fail to maximize her advantage$_{FC}$ relative to an otherwise-identical theory that did not assign that claim, it does not give others any greater ability to *choose* how much advantage she ends up with under conditions of full compliance. Thus, the moral tyranny constraint does not entail that persons lack a claim against paternalistic interference.

This reply is "quick" because it does not adequately address an interesting complication that arises when the moral tyranny constraint is applied to theories that include claims against such interference. Consider an arbitrary moral theory that assigns Q a claim against P ϕ-ing where ϕ-ing is an act of paternalistic interference. Because ϕ-ing is an act of paternalism, P ϕ-ing will leave Q better off than if she discharges her duty and does not ϕ – which is to say that she leaves Q better off in the actual world A than in the world of full compliance F_1. However, her choice to ϕ also changes what the full-compliance world looks like because P will acquire remedial duties in virtue of her failure to discharge her duty to not paternalistically interfere with Q (call this adjusted full compliance world F_2). Specifically, one might think that P will acquire a new duty to *compensate* Q for failing to discharge her duty to Q, where this compensatory remedial duty entails that Q is better off in F_2 than she is in A. Further, given that Q is better off in A than she is in F_1, transitivity implies that Q is better off in F_2 than she is in F_1. Thus, Q is better off$_{FC}$ if P ϕ-s than if P discharges her duty and does not ϕ. This result may seem like a problem for the moral tyranny constraint because it appears that the moral theory – which is to say, any moral theory that includes a claim against paternalistic interference – violates the constraint, as P can unilaterally leave Q worse off$_{FC}$ by doing her duty and refraining from ϕ-ing. One might therefore conclude that the constraint does, in fact, problematically imply that there are no claims against paternalistic interference.

Against this worry, note that the moral tyranny constraint does not merely hold that a theory cannot license a person to leave others worse

[27] For a recent defense of paternalism, see Jason Hanna (2018).

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off_{FC}. Rather, it maintains that the theory must not license her to *unilaterally, foreseeably, and discretionarily* leave others worse off_{FC}. For these purposes, the last qualifier is the crucial one, as *P* discharging her duty to refrain from ϕ-ing would not qualify as discretionary in the sense described in Section 2.2. There it was stipulated that a person acts discretionarily only if she does not *have* to carry out that action, where "have" can be interpreted either in terms of ability – that is, there is no other option physically available to the agent – or normatively, which is to say that the agent lacks a permission to carry out any rival action. Because *P*'s duty to refrain from ϕ-ing entails that she lacks a permission to ϕ, it follows that she does not discretionarily leave *Q* worse off_{FC} by declining to ϕ (although she does, in fact, leave *Q* worse off_{FC}). Thus, the posited theory does not violate the moral tyranny constraint, which, in turn, implies the more general conclusion that the constraint is compatible with duties against paternalistic interference.

2.6 Conclusion

This chapter has taken the first steps toward demonstrating the coherence of social anarchism. Specifically, it has argued that three of the position's theses follow, either in part or in whole, from a more general constraint on which normative theories are acceptable, namely, the moral tyranny constraint. The chapter has thereby demonstrated that these theses are neither incompatible nor an arbitrary set of views conjoined together without reason. Rather, they are logically connected in a way that renders the social anarchist position coherent in the sense defined in Section I.2. Additionally, this chapter has argued that the moral tyranny constraint is independently plausible. Given its plausibility, the fact that the constraint entails consent theory, the Lockean proviso, and luck egalitarianism's incorporation of responsibility is a reason to accept these positions. The task of the next three chapters is to show that the remaining anarchist theses – namely, the self-ownership thesis, the anarchist rejection of private property, and the anarchist conclusion – similarly cohere with the other components of the anarchist position.

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CHAPTER 3

You Own Yourself and Nothing Else

> The granary is full; the national treasury is substantial. But the starving and frozen are everywhere. It is the result of the private ownership of property.
>
> Chu Minyi, "Universal Revolution"

Chapters 1 and 2 have introduced the social anarchist position and the moral tyranny constraint. Chapter 1 proposed that social anarchism should be understood as a set of theses that includes (i) the consent theory of legitimacy (which, in turn, implies philosophical anarchism), (ii) the Lockean proviso, (iii) the anarchist self-ownership thesis, (iv) the denial that there is any existing private property, and (v) an endorsement of luck egalitarianism as the moral principle regulating the permissible use of unowned external objects (what was there called "the anarchist conclusion"). Chapter 2 then introduced the moral tyranny constraint and argued that this theoretical *desideratum* entails the first and second anarchist theses as well as luck egalitarianism's responsibility component. This conclusion represents the first step in the book's broader project of demonstrating the coherence of the social anarchist position – that is, that the position's posited theses are not a set of arbitrarily selected (and potentially conflicting) moral principles, but, rather, stand in relations of logical entailment to one another. However, even if both the consent theory of legitimacy and the Lockean proviso follow from the moral tyranny constraint, that still leaves three additional theses that do not obviously stand in any logical relation to these aforementioned propositions.

This chapter will demonstrate that both the self-ownership thesis (as articulated by ASO in Section 1.3) and the rejection of private property follow from the Lockean proviso (and a few other plausible premises). This argument turns conventional libertarianism on its head in two respects. First, libertarian philosophers generally take the self-ownership thesis to be a foundational commitment while viewing the proviso as an auxiliary thesis that one might adopt to avoid the unsavory implications of unlimited

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appropriation. This prioritization is evidenced by the fact that natural rights libertarians universally endorse the self-ownership thesis but only a proper subset endorses the proviso, with many rejecting it as an ad hoc restriction on the power to acquire property.[1] However, this chapter suggests that the proviso should be treated as the more basic commitment with self-ownership ultimately following from the proviso. Second, it is typically assumed that the Lockean proviso allows for the appropriation of a significant quantity of natural resources.[2] Against this assumption, the chapter will argue that the proviso actually *precludes* almost all appropriation of resources (while still allowing people to appropriate their own bodies). The chapter will thereby take a right-libertarian premise and use it to derive a conclusion favored by social anarchists, namely, that people own themselves and nothing else.

The argument proceeds as follows. Section 3.1 argues that the Lockean proviso entails the social anarchist rejection of private property. Specifically, it argues that the proviso, at least as is has been specified in Section 1.2, is stringent to the point where it will not be satisfied by practically any act of initial appropriation, thereby precluding the conversion of natural resources into property. Section 3.3 then argues that, although the proviso is almost never satisfied when it comes to natural resources, it is *necessarily* satisfied when it comes to each person's own body – at least, if appropriation is taken to only establish the weaker ownership rights posited by ASO. Thus, the section concludes that the proviso entails that persons own themselves, but only in the sense specified by ASO. Given that much of the chapter's argument rests on the specific interpretation of the Lockean proviso provided in Chapter 1, Sections 3.3 and 3.4 will provide an extended defense of this interpretation. Finally, Section 3.5 will discuss what the chapter's conclusion implies vis-à-vis the rights of children.

3.1 The Proviso and Private Property

To see why the proviso entails the rejection of external private property, recall how it was interpreted in Section 1.2:

[1] Recall from Chapter 1, Footnote 6 that these "radical right-libertarians" include Rothbard (1998), Narveson (1998), Feser (2005), and Mack (1995) (though he qualifies his radicalism).

[2] One of the few exceptions is Attas (2003) who argues that any plausible specification of the Lockean proviso will entail that no appropriation has occurred. This chapter will provide slightly different, complementary reasons for accepting the conclusion that no appropriation of external natural resources has occurred.

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> **The Lockean Proviso –** A person appropriates some unowned resource via some suitable action if and only if (a) her established claims would not leave anyone worse off under conditions of full compliance and (b) no subsequent waiving of those claims would leave others worse off under conditions of full compliance (where, in both cases, the baseline for comparison is the closest possible world where the appropriator did not exist).[3]

At first glance, the proviso might seem to preclude practically all appropriation, even without the additional restrictions that Condition (b) places on appropriators. This is because most unowned resources are both useful and scarce; that is, a non-appropriator would benefit from the use of those resources and there is not an available substitute that would allow her to acquire that same benefit at an equal or lower cost.[4] Seemingly, the appropriation of such resources would leave others worse off$_{FC}$, as they would now be unable to obtain the benefit in question without incurring a greater cost under conditions of full compliance. Thus, any appropriation of these resources would violate the Lockean proviso.

However, in response to this suggestion, proponents of the proviso will note that one must consider the *net effects*$_{FC}$ of appropriation, not just the costs$_{FC}$ that it imposes on non-appropriators. To do this, one must attend to the various ways in which appropriation *benefits*$_{FC}$ non-appropriators. For example, by precluding fully compliant non-appropriators from using a resource, a person's appropriation might enable her to improve the resource in a way that is ultimately to their benefit (Schmidtz 1994). Or, alternatively, appropriation can prevent fully compliant people from destroying some resource, thereby allowing future non-appropriators to use and benefit from it (Schmidtz 1990). In such cases, although appropriation imposes certain costs$_{FC}$ on others by forbidding their free use of the resource, it will actually leave them better off$_{FC}$ on net, with this fact undermining the prior quick argument that most appropriation violates the Lockean proviso.

There are two things to be said in response to this defense of appropriation. First, even when one factors in the conservation and improvement of resources that appropriation enables$_{FC}$, there will still be many cases

[3] This chapter will make use of the strong version of the proviso discussed in Footnote 18 of Chapter 2. While the moral tyranny constraint only implies the weaker version (as discussed in that footnote), it is assumed here that it is independently plausible that non-worsening$_{FC}$ is a sufficient condition of the successful appropriation of unowned resources in addition to a necessary condition.

[4] Note that even if two useful resources are qualitatively identical, the fact that one is closer to an agent than the other will render former scarce, as the agent will have to travel further to benefit from the resource and will thereby incur a slightly higher cost to obtain that benefit.

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where appropriation harms$_{FC}$ people on net. For example, the appropriation of beaches and other scenic locations will often violate the proviso, as fully compliant people will suffer due to not being able to access these spaces and will not benefit from any development made possible by compliance with the established rights. More generally, the proviso precludes the appropriation of *any* land if there is a single person who would both benefit from moving across that land and would not benefit from the development of that land. Similar remarks apply to consumable resources: While appropriation might leave many excluded parties better off$_{FC}$ (because appropriation would allow for these resources to be either preserved or improved in the full-compliance world in ways that are ultimately to these non-appropriators' benefit), appropriation will not occur if there is at least one person who would not benefit$_{FC}$ in this way and, instead, incurs a net cost$_{FC}$ in virtue of the owner's claim against her using the resource. For example, suppose that the appropriation of a fishpond prevents full compliers from overfishing and depleting the fish stock (as they otherwise would have). Such appropriation might leave most people better off$_{FC}$, as they are better off purchasing fish from the owner for years than eating for free for a few weeks but running out of fish later. However, if there is even one person who does not benefit$_{FC}$ in this way – for example, because she only wants to consume fish in the short term – then the appropriation of the pond will not satisfy the Lockean proviso.

Additionally, the proviso entails that one could not appropriate any object where a person would provide some benefit to another in exchange for the latter not using the object in question. In such cases, the appropriation of the object would strip$_{FC}$ this second person of her bargaining power, as she would no longer be able to use the object in the world of full compliance. She would, thus, end up worse off in this world because she would not receive the benefit that she would have been paid absent appropriation.[5] In this way, the proviso entails that a significant portion of natural resources cannot be appropriated *even if* one considers only Condition (a)'s contention that the claims established by appropriation must not leave others worse off$_{FC}$.

To arrive at the anarchist's conclusion that *practically all* appropriation fails to satisfy the Lockean proviso, however, one must appeal to Condition (b) of the proviso. This condition asserts that, in addition to the established claims not leaving anyone worse off$_{FC}$, it must also be the

[5] For a relevant discussion of a bargaining situation where people trade away the permission to use natural resources in exchange for benefits, see Alan Gibbard (1976, 78–82).

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case that no subsequent waiving of those claims would leave anyone worse off_{FC}. To see why this condition precludes almost all appropriation, consider the case of an explorer who discovers a waterfall and attempts to appropriate it. A few days later, a hiker arrives who wants to spend every morning swimming at the base of the waterfall. If the explorer's act of appropriation succeeded, then she has a set of claims against the hiker swimming, where it is assumed that each day's swim is a distinct action, and the explorer has a distinct claim against each. As it turns out, full compliance with these claims would actually be to the hiker's benefit: Although not swimming each day imposes a cost upon the hiker, it also keeps her from unknowingly polluting the only available water source with her sunscreen, thereby making the water forever taste of soap. Because the hiker prefers never swimming to drinking soap-flavored water, she would end up better off on net if she were to fully comply with the explorer's full set of (hypothetical) claims. Thus, the explorer's appropriation would satisfy an unamended statement of the Lockean proviso that merely asks whether the explorer's full set of established exclusionary claims leaves others worse off_{FC} (i.e., a proviso that includes Condition (a) but not Condition (b)).

However, Condition (b) of the proviso holds that one must ask whether the hiker would be left worse off given *any possible pattern of waiving* of the explorer's posited claims. Suppose, for example, that the hiker wanted to take a post-arrival swim and the explorer decided to waive her claim against this one action. Such waiving would leave the hiker worse off in the full-compliance world, as she would end up with soapy tasting water (due to her swim) and would not get to swim on any of the other days. Given that a possible pattern of post-appropriation waiving would leave the hiker worse off_{FC}, the explorer's attempted appropriation of the waterfall does not satisfy the restated Lockean proviso and, thus, does not succeed.

This case helps to illustrate why the proposed interpretation of the proviso entails that practically all purported appropriations of external resources violate the proviso. Note that, for any posited appropriation of a resource, there is a possible world where the appropriator waives all her posited claim rights – functionally treating the resource as though it were still unowned – *except* for those claims that would impose the greatest costs on full compliers. For the proposed specification of the proviso to be satisfied, it must be the case that every non-appropriator is no worse off_{FC} in this world than she would be in the world where the appropriator did not exist to appropriate the resource in question. Given that the appropriation of practically any resource would violate this constraint, this specification of the proviso entails the anarchist thesis that practically no one has acquired – or will acquire – private property over external things

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via acts of initial appropriation.[6] Specifically, Condition (b) of the proviso undermines the previous libertarian reply that appropriation often benefits$_{FC}$ non-appropriators by enabling the improvement and preservation of natural resources. For, even if appropriation does establish claims that have this beneficial$_{FC}$ effect, it also gives appropriators the power to waive these claims while leaving in place only those claims that impose costs$_{FC}$ on non-appropriators. Given that an appropriately specified proviso must preclude the possibility of appropriators acting in this way, even much beneficial$_{FC}$ appropriation will violate the proviso. Thus, one arrives at the anarchist contention that there has been (practically) no successful appropriation of external resources.[7]

3.2 The Lockean Proviso and Self-Ownership

Section 3.1 has argued that the Lockean proviso, as specified in Section 1.2, entails the absence of private property rights.[8] This section will argue that, while the proviso may entail that there is no ownership of external

[6] The "practically" qualifier is included because it is at least possible that the appropriation of certain resources will satisfy the proviso. For example, in a world without scarcity even the most disadvantageous pattern of compliance will not leave others worse off, as they would have equally good resources available to them to use as a substitute.

[7] It should be noted that the foregoing argument assumes that initial appropriation of external things establishes *full* private property rights including both claims against others using the owned thing in any way and the power to waive any of these claims. However, one might maintain that appropriation establishes a weaker set of rights, where a suitably weak set might satisfy the proviso. For example, a theory of ownership might narrow the set of established property rights by limiting owners' power to waive those rights. That said, this move is not available to will theorists, who maintain that a person possesses a claim (e.g., a claim against others using an owned thing) only if she has a power to waive that claim. Additionally, those who wish to restrict the power to waive must provide some explanation of why the owner's consent is not a sufficient condition for waiving the claims that are declared unwaivable – a task that will be difficult due to the many reasons for thinking that a rightholder's consent is sufficient for waiving any of her rights (see, e.g., Hurd (1996)). Given these difficulties, one might, instead, posit that appropriation establishes a more limited set of claims against use. Specifically, one might hold that it establishes *whichever* maximal set of rights satisfies the proviso, that is, the strongest set of claims against use such that compliance with any post-waiving pattern of those rights would not leave anyone worse off (where this set might include only a single right). The problem with this proposal is that the set of claims that would not leave anyone worse off$_{FC}$ irrespective of whether or not they are waived might be extremely small to the point where it no longer satisfies any of the theoretical *desiderata* that motivate libertarians to endorse private property-based theories of justice in the first place.

[8] The Lockean proviso does not entail the supplementary anarchist contention that rights vis-à-vis external resources are determined by an egalitarian principle of distributive justice (i.e., what Section 1.6 calls "the anarchist conclusion"). However, the conclusion that there are (practically) no existing property rights makes this contention much more attractive, as it allows for proponents of the proviso to avoid the conclusion that the world is in a state of moral free-for-all where any person can permissibly use any resource at any time, no matter how that use affects others. Rather, she is able to maintain that people still have distributive claims against others using resources in various ways. A full defense of the distributive component of the view will be provided in Chapter 5.

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things, it entails that persons can easily acquire ownership of the self – and, more specifically, self-ownership of the kind articulated by ASO. In this way, it aims to provide a novel ground for the self-ownership thesis while simultaneously demonstrating the coherence of the anarchist position (by showing that its various theses stand in the appropriate relations of logical entailment to one another).

So why does the proviso allow for ownership of the self when it also entails that there is no ownership of external natural resources? To answer this question, recall that the proviso holds that an act of appropriation succeeds if its established claims – and any possible subsequent waiving thereof – would not leave others worse off_{FC} *relative to the world where the appropriator did not exist to appropriate*. Further, note that the truth of the antecedent of this conditional can be determined by applying the following *nonexistence test* to the various costs_{FC} incurred by non-appropriators: such costs_{FC} *pass* the nonexistence test if and only if they obtain in the appropriation world but not the counterfactual world where the appropriator did not exist. For example, if *P*'s appropriation gives her a claim against *Q* eating some fruit that *Q* would have enjoyed in the world where *P* never existed, then *Q* suffers a cost_{FC} that passes the nonexistence test. This, in turn, implies that *P*'s appropriation leaves *Q* worse off_{FC} relative to the nonexistence baseline (assuming that there are no offsetting $\text{benefits}_{\text{FC}}$ that similarly pass the nonexistence test) and, thus, *P*'s appropriation violates the proviso.

By contrast, an imposed cost_{FC} *fails* the nonexistence test if and only if it *would* equally obtain in the nonexistence world. For example, if *P*'s appropriation establishes a claim against *Q* eating some fruit, but *Q* would not have been able to eat that fruit in the nonexistence world due to it being out of her reach, then the costs_{FC} of non-enjoyment fail the nonexistence test. And, crucially, because costs_{FC} that fail the nonexistence test obtain in both the appropriation world and the baseline for comparison, they will not contribute to non-appropriators being worse off_{FC} in a way that would violate the proviso.[9] Thus, an act of appropriation will satisfy the Lockean proviso if all of its imposed costs_{FC} (and all incurred costs_{FC} more generally) fail the nonexistence test. Or, to slightly restate this point, an act of appropriation satisfies the Lockean proviso if its

[9] Note that it does not matter whether the act of appropriation *imposes* costs_{FC} in the sense that those costs_{FC} would not have obtained *absent appropriation*. Because the proviso's baseline for comparison is the nonexistence world rather than the non-appropriation world, any actual-world costs_{FC} that do not obtain in the non-appropriation world but still obtain in the nonexistence world will not contribute to non-appropriators being worse off_{FC} in the relevant sense. More will be said to defend the proviso's specified baseline in Section 3.4.

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established claims – and any possible waiving of these claims – would not impose costs_{FC} that pass the nonexistence test.

This test has little bearing on the appropriation of external natural resources, as there does not appear to be any case where the costs_{FC} imposed by exclusionary claims would equally obtain in the world where the appropriator never existed. In other words, when it comes to external appropriation, the imposed costs_{FC} – that is, all of the various costs_{FC} discussed in the previous section – still pass the nonexistence test, with the associated acts of appropriation thereby violating the Lockean proviso. Thus, the nonexistence test does not undermine the previous section's denial that people have acquired or will acquire external property.

By contrast, when it comes to people appropriating *their own bodies*, the nonexistence test entails that the proviso is *necessarily* satisfied – at least, if self-appropriation is taken to establish the claims posited by ASO (i.e., claims against any actions that initiate bodily contact without generating unique supplemental benefit). To see why this is the case, consider the scenario where *P*'s body is unowned (due to her never having previously appropriated it) and *Q* is in desperate need of a new kidney. Suppose that *P* then self-appropriates, thereby acquiring a claim against *Q* that *Q* not take one of her kidneys. In this case, *P*'s self-appropriation leaves *Q* worse off_{FC} relative to the world where *P* has no such claim: Absent such a claim, a fully compliant *Q* would have taken one of *P*'s kidneys, thereby avoiding the pain and suffering of kidney failure (while a fully compliant *Q* would now suffer these costs given *P*'s claim against this action). However, as far as the Lockean proviso is concerned, the question is not whether *Q* is left worse off_{FC} relative to the world where some alternative moral facts obtain. Rather, the question is whether *Q* is left worse off_{FC} relative to the world where *P* did not exist – that is, whether the costs_{FC} she incurs pass the nonexistence test. And, notably, these costs_{FC} *fail* this test, as in the counterfactual world where *P* never existed, a fully compliant *Q* would be just as disadvantaged as she would be in the self-appropriation world where she complies with *P*'s established claims. Specifically, in both worlds, she does not get the kidney and suffers the associated costs. Thus, these costs_{FC} do not count when assessing whether *P*'s self-appropriation leaves *Q* worse off_{FC} in a way that would violate the Lockean proviso. This, in turn, implies that the establishment of a claim against kidney harvesting via self-appropriation does not entail a violation of the proviso.

One might be tempted to conclude that this result generalizes such that a person establishing *any* right to exclude others from her body does not leave others worse off_{FC} in a way that violates the Lockean proviso. Were this the case, then self-appropriation that generated the classical self-

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ownership right against all bodily contact would satisfy the proviso. However, this is a bit too quick, as there are many cases where establishing a general right against contact *will* impose costs_{FC} that pass the nonexistence test. For example, consider the case where *P*'s unowned body stands blocking the only entrance to *Q*'s office. Further, suppose that if *Q* is late for work, then her wages will be docked. Given that *P*'s body is unowned, *Q* can permissibly shove it to the side, thereby allowing her to enter the building and be on time for work. But what happens if *P* suddenly self-appropriates? Assuming that self-appropriation establishes a classical right against nonconsensual contact, it follows that *P* now has a claim that *Q* not shove her aside. This, in turn, entails that a fully compliant *Q* would be unable to access her office and would incur the associated cost. Thus, *P*'s self-appropriation leaves *Q* worse off_{FC} than she would have been otherwise.

Further, *P*'s appropriation leaves *Q* worse off_{FC} *even after one applies the nonexistence test*. In this case, the test asks whether a fully compliant *Q* would equally suffer the costs of being late for work if *P* did not exist. And, unlike in the kidney case, the answer here is no: While *Q* would be late for work in the full-compliance world, she would not be late in the full-compliance world where *P* does not exist (as there would be no one blocking her path). Thus, the costs imposed by *P*'s self-appropriation pass the nonexistence test, which, in turn, entails that *P*'s self-appropriation leaves *Q* worse off_{FC} relative to the nonexistence baseline; that is, *P*'s self-appropriation violates the Lockean proviso.

Why is it that the costs_{FC} imposed in the kidney case fail the nonexistence test while the costs_{FC} imposed in the doorway case pass this test? The explanatory difference here is that, in the kidney case, the cost of compliance for *Q* is limited to the loss of benefits derived from bodily contact *without any loss of supplemental benefit*. Note that, in this case, the only reason that *Q* is worse off_{FC} in the appropriation world relative to the non-appropriation world is that, absent appropriation, she would benefit_{FC} from the contact that she would make with *P*'s body (specifically *P*'s kidneys). When *P* then makes it such that a fully compliant *Q* cannot touch her body, that leaves *Q* worse off_{FC} than she would have been otherwise. However, the nonexistence of *P* equally makes it such that a fully compliant *Q* cannot touch *P*'s body and derive the associated benefits. Thus, *Q* is no worse off_{FC} in the appropriation world than she is in the world where *P* does not exist, with the costs of *P*'s self-appropriation thereby failing the nonexistence test.

By contrast, in the doorway case, *Q* shoving *P* to the side would *uniquely generate supplemental benefit* not caused by the physical contact

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itself, namely, *Q* getting paid her full wages. *P*'s self-appropriation then denies *Q* this supplemental benefit_{FC} (by giving *P* a classical self-ownership claim against *Q* shoving her), thereby imposing costs_{FC} on *Q*.[10] Further, because the benefit is supplemental – that is, it is not derived from contact made with *P*'s body – the nonexistence of *P* would not equally impose these costs_{FC}, which is to say that these costs_{FC} would *not* have obtained in the world where *P* did not exist. Thus, they pass the nonexistence test, with *P*'s appropriation thereby leaving *Q* worse off_{FC} in a way that violates the Lockean proviso.

In other words, the costs_{FC} imposed by a claim against kidney harvesting fail the nonexistence test because they are correlative of a denial of a benefit_{FC} that is solely derived from bodily contact (i.e., non-supplemental benefit_{FC}). By contrast, the costs_{FC} imposed by *P*'s claim against being shoved in the doorway case pass the nonexistence test because they are correlative of a denial of unique supplemental benefit_{FC}. And, importantly, this result generalizes: The costs_{FC} imposed by an agent's act of self-appropriation will fail the nonexistence test – that is, her self-appropriation will satisfy the Lockean proviso – if and only if her self-appropriation does not establish a claim against any person taking an action that uniquely produces supplemental benefit beyond those benefits that result from contact with the self-appropriator's body.

There are two different conclusions that one might draw from the preceding discussion. First, one might conclude that the proviso largely precludes the possibility of self-appropriation. Those who favor this approach would insist that self-appropriation establishes the classical right against any nonconsensual bodily contact. They would then concede that the Lockean proviso is not satisfied in the countless cases where compliance with (any post-waiving pattern of) the established exclusion rights would preclude the realization of unique supplemental benefit. This, in turn, would imply that very few – if any – persons possess the self-ownership rights established by initial appropriation.

Fortunately for those attracted to the self-ownership thesis, one can reach an alternative conclusion by rejecting the classical assumption that self-appropriation establishes rights against all bodily contact. Instead, one would posit that appropriation only realizes the weaker exclusion rights referenced by ASO, that is, rights against all and only those actions that both result in bodily contact and do not uniquely produce supplemental

[10] Note that if *Q* pushing *P* did not *uniquely* generate supplemental benefit, then *P*'s self-appropriation would not deny *Q* these benefits, as she would still have an alternative way of securing them.

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benefit. Thus, when assessing whether *P*'s self-appropriation satisfies the Lockean proviso, one only needs to consider whether *P* establishing these more limited ASO rights would impose costs_{FC} that pass the nonexistence test. Further, given that *P* imposes such costs_{FC} on *Q* if and only if she establishes claims against people acting in ways that *do* uniquely produce supplemental benefit for *Q*, it follows that *P*'s self-appropriation *necessarily* satisfies the proviso. This, in turn, implies that all persons can freely self-appropriate and establish self-ownership rights of the kind articulated by ASO.[11]

Of course, this result does not entail that one *must* accept ASO. As just noted, one could still choose to endorse the classical interpretation of self-ownership so long as one is willing to accept the conclusion that practically all acts of self-appropriation violate the Lockean proviso and, thus, almost no one owns themselves. However, first, it is unclear why self-appropriation must be taken to establish the classical set of rights against all bodily contact. Second, one might contend that which rights self-appropriation establishes is, at least in part, a function of which rights satisfy the Lockean proviso. On this approach, one does not start with a particular interpretation of self-ownership and then hope that self-appropriation satisfies the proviso; rather, one affirms a particular interpretation of self-ownership in virtue of the fact that such self-ownership could be established in accordance with the Lockean proviso. In other words, the reason for thinking that self-owners possess ASO rights is because these are the only rights that persons could come to possess. Such a supplemental premise would render the anarchist position coherent, as ASO would then follow from the Lockean proviso.

Finally, note that the foregoing argument does not entail the truth of the self-ownership thesis – that is, the proposition that all persons own themselves in the sense articulated by ASO. Rather, assuming that one accepts ASO, it merely demonstrates that a person owns herself if and only if she has carried out an act of self-appropriation (as all acts of self-appropriation succeed in virtue of the fact that they necessarily satisfy the Lockean proviso). However, if one accepts an account of appropriation

[11] This argument from the Lockean proviso provides support for something proximate to what Kasper Lippert-Rasmussen calls the "Asymmetry Thesis: Ownership of external resources is intrinsically different, morally, from ownership of one's mind and body" (2008, 88). Lippert-Rasmussen rejects this thesis and one can see why he might be skeptical that there is something special about the ownership of bodies. However, the foregoing argument has demonstrated why bodies are, in fact, special such that all persons might own their bodies even as they are precluded from owning external resources.

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such as that proposed in Section 1.3 – namely, that persons appropriate unowned resources by asserting that they own the resources in question (following Rose (1985, 81)) – then it follows that practically all persons own themselves, as almost everyone has, at some point, asserted that they own themselves (e.g., by saying "don't touch *my* body!"). Thus, the foregoing proviso-based argument for ASO also provides a novel explanation of why people own themselves: They have successfully appropriated their own bodies in accordance with the proviso. This supplemental justification puts the self-ownership thesis on firmer philosophical footing, albeit at the cost of weakening the rights it assigns to each person.[12]

3.3 Comparing Baselines

The arguments of Sections 3.1 and 3.2 have leaned heavily on the specification of the proviso in Section 1.2. In particular, both arguments rely on its proposed baseline for comparison, that is, its contention that appropriation must not leave others worse off$_{FC}$ relative to the world where the appropriator did not exist. Chapter 1 did not provide a defense of this specification, as it was primarily concerned with explicating other aspects of the anarchist position. However, now that the specified baseline has been shown to have significant implications, it is worth defending it at some length. Specifically, this section will defend the specification from the objection that it is unduly restrictive, where a more appropriately permissive specification might avoid the conclusion of Section 3.1 that practically no appropriation satisfies the Lockean proviso. To do this, it will consider the most promising alternative specification of the proviso – one famously endorsed by Nozick – and argue that this rival view is implausible. Further, this section will argue that the reasons for rejecting Nozick's specification also support the anarchist's proposed nonexistence baseline. It will, thus, conclude that one ought to favor the proposed baseline.

According to Nozick's specification, an act of appropriation satisfies the proviso if and only if no one is left worse off – or, presumably, for the reasons discussed in Section 1.3, worse off$_{FC}$ – than they would have been *in a world without any appropriation at all.*[13] This specification is attractive

[12] This weakening is characterized as a "cost" for the reasons discussed in Section 1.7. However, Section 1.4 has argued that ASO's weakening the classical self-ownership thesis gives it a number of important theoretical advantages relative to the classical interpretation of self-ownership.

[13] Nozick's interpretation of the proviso is actually a bit ambiguous. On the one hand, his explicit statement of the proviso puts things in terms of whether or not the appropriation of a particular

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to those who want a more permissive proviso that allows for appropriation precluded by the anarchist's proposed specification, as it licenses appropriation in the many instances where non-appropriators would be harmed$_{FC}$ by an individual's appropriation but would still benefit$_{FC}$ on net from the system of established private property as a whole. For example, suppose that peanut farmer *P* appropriates some unowned field, where this appropriation enables her to produce a large amount of peanuts. Further, suppose that this appropriation will worsen$_{FC}$ the position of neighbor *Q*, as *Q* both previously enjoyed using the field and is allergic to peanuts (i.e., she has no interest in consuming the produced crops). In this case, *P*'s appropriation leaves *Q* worse off$_{FC}$ than she would have been had *P* never existed to appropriate the field. However, it does not leave her worse off$_{FC}$ than she would have been in the world where no appropriation ever occurs, as she benefits$_{FC}$ extensively from others' appropriation. For example, she benefits$_{FC}$ when *other* farmers appropriate land and thereby become able$_{FC}$ to grow crops without interference. Thus, *P*'s appropriation would satisfy Nozick's specification of the proviso but not the proviso as it has been interpreted here. Given this result, some proponents of the proviso might contend that Nozick's specification is superior to the anarchist one, as the former allows for appropriation in cases such as the one just described.

The problem with this contention is that the purpose of the proviso is to ensure that appropriation is justified; however, it does not appear that Nozick's specification is able to play this justificatory role. This point has been expressed by Daniel Attas, who argues that specifications like Nozick's – that is, specifications that compare how *the entire established set private property rights* affects *Q* to how she fares in a world without

thing (in his words, the "process giving rise to a. . . property right" over that thing) worsens others' position (1974, 178). However, he also asks whether their position is "worsened by a system allowing appropriation" and devotes much more space to explaining the advantages of systems of private property than the benefits of particular acts of appropriation (177). Additionally, while Nozick initially sidesteps the question of how to specify the baseline for comparison (177), he later suggests that the relevant comparison world is the world where *no appropriation takes place* (181). Given that it is more natural to compare a world with property to a world without property than it is to compare a world with a particular act of appropriation to a world without property, Nozick's choice of baseline additionally supports reading him as endorsing the interpretation of the proviso attributed to him here. This interpretation of the proviso has also been explicitly endorsed by David Schmidtz (1994, 49–50), and it is also seemingly presupposed by proviso proponents who justify private property by appealing to the benefits of private property systems. See, for example, Loren Lomasky (1987) and an earlier statement of the proviso posited by van der Vossen (2015). Brennan (2014) similarly appeals to the benefits of a system of property, though he does not explicitly endorse the Lockean proviso.

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appropriation – are "completely off the point. The proviso is a requirement of *particular* appropriations. Particular appropriations have to involve counterbalancing gains in order to be justified . . . . [Thus,] a promise of increased benefits of the *general* system. . . . cannot justify [*P*] owning [an appropriated resource]" (2003, 359). However, while Attas is right to assert that it is the particular act of appropriation that must be justified, Nozick's defenders might counter that systemic benefits$_{FC}$ *do* justify particular appropriations. It is, thus, worth considering why one might think that the entire system plays this justificatory role. It will then be argued that these apparent grounds for affirming Nozick's specification are philosophically untenable.

The suggestion here is that defenders of Nozick might advance the following *baseline argument* to defend the idea that systemic benefits justify individual appropriations:

1. If an action – in tandem with various other actions – brings about a state of affairs that is non-inferior to the relevant baseline for comparison, then that action is justified.
2. If an appropriation satisfies Nozick's proviso, then it (in tandem with various other actions) brings about a state of affairs that is non-inferior to the relevant baseline for comparison.
3. Thus, if an appropriation satisfies Nozick's proviso, then it justified.

Admittedly, Premise 1 does not fit easily with Nozick's signature view that the justice of a state of affairs is a function of the justice of the actions that bring it about, as it reverses the dependency relation between the justifiability of states of affairs and the justifiability of the actions that bring them about. However, without this premise, it is not clear how one could establish that appropriations are just by appealing to the harmless$_{FC}$ effects of the entire established system of private property. Additionally, the premise can be supported by appealing to cases where the comparative non-inferiority of a resultant state seemingly justifies the actions that brought it about. Consider, for example, the case where a surgeon saves a patient's life by a process that includes cutting open her chest. In this case, the incision seems justified because it, in tandem with other actions, brings about a state of affairs – namely, the patient continuing to live – that is non-inferior to the relevant baseline, namely, her death. This result seems to support the general claim asserted by Premise 1. One could then apply this general claim to the analogous case where a proviso-satisfying act of appropriation, in tandem with other appropriations, brings about a

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system of property rights that is non-inferior to the absence of such a system.

The defense of Premise 2 would then point out that Nozick's specification of the proviso ensures that the entire set of private property rights does not harm_{FC} anyone – where the absence of harm_{FC} renders that system non-inferior to the relevant baseline for comparison (namely, the world where no appropriation occurs). Specifically, Nozick's proposal would preclude any appropriation that tipped the balance such that the entire system of property rights worked to some person's detriment_{FC}. Thus, his specification of the proviso ensures that all appropriations preserve the comparative non-inferiority of the system of property rights relative to the absence of any such rights.

The problem with the baseline argument is its assumption that the world without any appropriation is the relevant baseline for comparison to the appropriation world. Notably, the argument glosses over the question of which alternative state of affairs is the relevant comparison point when making judgments of non-inferiority. To answer this question, consider a modification of the surgery case where a nurse embeds a small metal sphere inside the patient's chest during the operation. In this case, the action of inserting the sphere brings about a state of affairs (the patient living with a sphere in her chest) that is non-inferior to the alternative baseline where no surgery occurs and the patient dies. However, given that inserting the sphere into the chest was clearly not justified, Premise 1 will be false if this no-surgery state of affairs is the relevant baseline for comparison. Thus, to preserve the soundness of the baseline argument, one should seemingly hold that the relevant baseline state of affairs is one where the surgery occurs but no sphere is inserted into the chest – perhaps because the surgical nurse never existed carry out this action. Such a proposal delivers the correct result by blocking the implication that the sphere insertion was justified.

Similarly, consider the case where two parents throw their child a birthday party but a rude guest shoves birthday cake in her face. While this action upsets the child, suppose that she is glad that she got to have the party on net, even factoring in the cake incident (though she would have preferred a party where the incident did not occur). In this case, the guest brought about an outcome that is non-inferior to the comparison world where no party ever took place. Thus, if this is the baseline for comparison, then Premise 1 entails that her action is justified. However, given that the action is clearly not justified, some other baseline for comparison must be posited. And, again, it appears that the more plausible baseline for comparison

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is the counterfactual world where the rude guest did not (exist to) smash cake on the child.

These results can be generalized as follows. When considering whether the actions in the prior cases were justified, the initial assessments employed what might be called a *compensation baseline*, where this baseline was defined by taking the actual world and removing from it some conjunction of actions that, together, benefit a person on net (e.g., the complete surgical procedure or the entire birthday party), even though at least one of those actions actually harms the person (e.g., the sphere insertion or the cake smashing). However, in both cases, it was argued that Premise 1 of the baseline argument ("if an action – in tandem with various other actions – brings about a state of affairs that is non-inferior to the relevant baseline for comparison, then that action is justified") is false if its use of the term "relevant baseline" refers to a compensation baseline. However, note that Premise 2 of the argument ("if an appropriation satisfies Nozick's proviso, then it (in tandem with various other actions) brings about a state of affairs that is non-inferior to the relevant baseline for comparison") is true only if "the relevant baseline for comparison" refers to the world that lacks the entire advantage-generating conjunction of appropriations that have been (and will be) carried out by many people across time. The problem here is that this baseline is a paradigmatic compensation baseline. Thus, barring equivocation, Premise 2 is true only if Premise 1 is false – which is to say that the baseline argument is necessarily unsound and cannot support the contention that appropriations that satisfy Nozick's proviso are justified. This, in turn, implies that Nozick's specification of the proviso cannot fulfill its theoretical function and should therefore be rejected.

By contrast, the following revised version of the baseline argument is seemingly sound:

1'. If an action brings about a state of affairs that is non-inferior to its corresponding nonexistence baseline, then that action is justified.
2'. If an appropriation satisfies the anarchist proviso, then it brings about a state of affairs that is non-inferior to its corresponding nonexistence baseline.
3'. Thus, if an appropriation satisfies the anarchist proviso, then it justified.

Specifically, one could defend Premise 1' by appealing to the sphere and birthday cases, where, in each case, non-inferiority relative to a nonexistence baseline – that is, the baseline where the agent did not exist to carry out the action in the first place – *would* seem to justify the agent's

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realization of a particular state of affairs. Strictly speaking, the states of affairs produced by *unjustified* actions in these cases were shown to be *not* non-inferior (i.e., inferior) to a nonexistence baseline. In other words, these cases do not function as counterexamples to Premise 1'. Further, if one adjusts these cases such that the action brought about a state that *was* non-inferior to the nonexistence baseline, then the action seems justified as a result. For example, suppose that the sphere prevented blood clots and thereby ensured the patient's survival. Or, in the birthday case, suppose that hitting the child with cake was the only way to keep them from eating it and having a terrible allergic reaction. Together, these results suggest that Premise 1' is true. Given that Premise 2' is true as a matter of definition, one can then infer the proposition asserted by 3' and thereby conclude that the proposed nonexistence specification ensures that appropriation is justified. In this way, the baseline argument ends up supporting the anarchist specification of the proviso rather than Nozick's.

3.4 Defending and Emending the Nonexistence Baseline

The previous section suggested that Nozick's baseline specification is the most obvious more permissive alternative to the proposed anarchist specification of the proviso. It then argued that the best apparent argument for Nozick's proviso actually supports the anarchist specification, with proponents of the proviso thereby having reason to favor this specification despite the fact that it entails surprising conclusions that they would otherwise reject. However, given the importance of the nonexistence baseline, more needs to be said in its defense. Specifically, this section will argue that there is a supplemental reason for endorsing the proposed specification, namely, that it follows from the moral tyranny constraint. Next, it will argue that the nonexistence baseline is superior to an alternative counterfactual inaction baseline. Finally, it will present a slightly technical emendation of the proposed baseline so as to bring the proviso into full compliance with the moral tyranny constraint.

To begin, note that there are many libertarians who reject the Lockean proviso, as they take it to be an auxiliary theory that can be costlessly excised from the core set of propositions endorsed by libertarian property theorists.[14] Given the existence of such proviso skeptics, proponents of the proviso need to provide an adequate justification for building the proviso

[14] Recall the radical right-libertarians from Footnote 6 of Chapter 1. That said, the claim that no-proviso libertarians think the proviso can be "costlessly excised" slightly overstates things, as there

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into a theory of property. Fortunately, Section 2.4 provided just such a justification, namely, that the proviso follows from the moral tyranny constraint. However, whether this conclusion holds depends on how one specifies the content of the Lockean proviso. Thus, there is reason to interpret the proviso in such a way as to ensure that it does, in fact, follow from the moral tyranny constraint.

While Chapter 2 did not specifically demonstrate that the constraint entails the nonexistence specification, that gap can now be filled in here. Or, more precisely, it will be argued that a slight generalization of constraint entails the specification in question, where those who accept the constraint ought to accept the generalization as well. Recall that the moral tyranny constraint holds that a theory of duties is acceptable only if it precludes persons from unilaterally, discretionarily, and foreseeably leaving others worse off under conditions of full compliance. Additionally, recall that these qualifiers were built into the constraint because there is seemingly nothing problematic about a theory allowing persons to unforeseeably, nondiscretionarily, or non-unilaterally leave others worse off$_{FC}$. For example, suppose that a person makes a choice that, as a matter of pure bad luck (i.e., unforeseeably), leaves her much worse off than others. Further, suppose that she would not have ended up worse off had she made a different choice. In this scenario, a luck egalitarian theory of justice holds that she is entitled to equalizing transfers from others – a conclusion that seems unproblematic even though it entails that the person was able to leave others worse off$_{FC}$ than they otherwise could have been. Similarly, there seems to be nothing problematic about the fact that luck egalitarianism entitles her to transfers if her advantage-destroying action was nondiscretionary, for example, because her action was a mere reflexive movement rather than an exercise of agency. Nor is there anything problematic about a moral theory permitting some person P to leave another person Q worse off$_{FC}$ if the only reason that Q ends up worse off$_{FC}$ is that she made a particular advantage-destroying choice in light of P's action (i.e., Q's loss$_{FC}$ of advantage is a function of both P's choice and Q's subsequent choice such that Q is fully able to avoid that loss$_{FC}$).

While Chapter 2 opted for a more modest statement of the constraint that enumerated the qualifications restricting when a theory cannot allow

are no-proviso libertarians who recognize that allowing genuinely unrestricted appropriation would entail certain highly implausible conclusions – for example, that a person could acquire the entire Earth and oblige all others to starve to death – and, thus, try to adjust their theory to avoid such implications (see Mack (1995) and Feser (2005, 71–6)). For a critique of their proposed solution, see Peter Bornschein (2018).

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persons to leave others worse off$_{FC}$, the posited qualifications suggest a more general statement of the moral tyranny constraint: A moral theory is acceptable only if it precludes a person from taking any action such that (a) this action leaves others worse off$_{FC}$ and (b) the person is *morally responsible* for this action. With respect to Condition (b), note that each of the qualifications listed by the original moral tyranny constraint expresses an apparent necessary condition of moral responsibility. Seemingly, *P* is morally responsible for *Q*'s predicament only if *P* could have reasonably foreseen that *Q* would end up in this predicament. Similarly, *P* is morally responsible for that outcome only if she could have avoided bringing about that outcome (i.e., it was brought about by a discretionary choice). And, if *Q*'s predicament is brought about by *Q*'s own actions carried out in light of *P*'s actions, then that, too, seems to negate the *P*'s responsibility, as *Q* is responsible for her own predicament, with that responsibility exculpating *P*. Thus, it appears that moral tyranny requires moral responsibility – that is, the constraint should condemn a theory that allows *P* to leave *Q* worse off$_{FC}$ in some situation if and only if *P* is also responsible for leaving *Q* worse off$_{FC}$ in that situation.

If one accepts this more general moral tyranny constraint, then one must adjust the proviso if one wishes to sustain the desired entailment relation between the two propositions. Specifically, the proviso must prohibit all and only those appropriations where the appropriator is *responsible* for leaving others worse off$_{FC}$. And this, in turn, requires adopting the posited nonexistence specification of the proviso. To see why the proviso must be specified in this way, consider the case where person *O* both watches person *B* pour a bucket of sand in *H*'s house and declines to do anything to help clean up the sand. In this case, it is *B* who is responsible for leaving *H* worse off rather than *O*. But what explains this fact? The answer cannot appeal strictly to counterfactual choices that *B* and *O* could have made, as *H* would have been better off had either of the two chosen differently (i.e., had *B* not dumped the sand or had *O* not declined to clean it up). Rather, it seems that the best way to determine who is responsible for leaving *H* worse off is to compare the world where *H* incurs this cost to the world where various agents never existed. Given that *H*'s house would still have had sand in it had *O* not existed, *H*'s predicament cannot be attributed to *O* or her choices. By contrast, the proposed comparison would not vindicate *B* in this way. Thus, the nonexistence comparison appears to adequately demarcate when a person is responsible for someone else incurring a cost: *O* is responsible for imposing a cost on *H* only if *H* is better off in the closest possible world where *O* does not exist.

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In short, the moral tyranny constraint insists that theories of duties not enable people to both leave others worse off$_{FC}$ and be responsible for leaving them worse off$_{FC}$ in this way. It, therefore, entails the Lockean proviso if and only if the proviso strictly precludes each agent from being *responsible* for leaving others worse off$_{FC}$ via acts of appropriation. Further, given that an agent is responsible for leaving others worse off$_{FC}$ only if they would be better off$_{FC}$ in the world where she did not exist, the proviso must preclude any and all appropriation that leaves someone worse off$_{FC}$ than she would have been in the closest possible world where the appropriator did not exist. Thus, one arrives at the conclusion that the moral tyranny constraint entails the proviso if and only if the proviso is specified in the way proposed in Section 1.2, namely, with the baseline for comparison being the world where the appropriator did not exist.

There are two objections to this argument that are worth considering. First, one might argue that, when assessing whether an agent is responsible for some cost, the relevant comparison is *not* the world where the agent did not exist but, *rather*, the world where she refrained from carrying out some set of actions that imposed that cost.[15] In other words, *O* is responsible for a cost incurred by *H* only if *H* would have been better off had *O* refrained from exercising her agency in the situations in question – or, to restate this consequent a bit more precisely, there is some set of actions *S* such that *H* would have been better off had *O* refrained from carrying out every member of *S*. This proposal has the apparent advantage of comparative evaluative simplicity, as one need only consider a possible world where some set of actions did not occur rather than the more distant possible world where *O* did not exist at all. Additionally, it seems to equally deliver the correct results in the sand case: *H* would have been better off if *B* had refrained from pouring the bucket of sand in *H*'s house, but there is no action on the part *O* such that *H* would have been better off had *O* not carried out that action. Given that (a) the inaction comparison is able to equally demarcate responsible parties from non-responsible parties in this test case and (b) it is easier to apply than the nonexistence comparison, one might conclude that it should replace the latter comparison in the proposed necessary condition of responsibility.[16] And, this, in turn, would entail that the Lockean proviso, if it is to follow from the generalized

[15] This point was raised by an anonymous referee for *Ethics* who reviewed an adapted version of this chapter.

[16] Cf. Nozick's (1974, 84–6) discussion of productive exchange wherein he uses the two comparisons interchangeably (or, strictly speaking, something quite proximate to these comparisons).

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version of the moral tyranny constraint, must be specified such that the inaction world is the relevant baseline for comparison.

However, there are four reasons for favoring the nonexistence comparison over this proposed inaction comparison. First, it is not clear that the inaction comparison is simpler than the nonexistence comparison. Note that the former comparison is already more syntactically complex than the nonexistence comparison (where syntactic complexity is a standard metric for assessing theoretical simplicity) (Baker 2016). Additionally, contrary to initial appearances, the inaction comparison does not seem to be any easier to apply to specific cases. Note that, in order to exculpate someone, one must consider every possible subset of the actions she has carried out and compare the actual world with the possible world where every member of that subset was not carried out – where this possible world will often be quite distant from the actual one, for example, the world where the agent did nothing at all.[17] Thus, carrying out the rival inaction comparison turns out to be significantly more epistemically demanding than merely comparing the single nonexistence world to the actual world.

Second, the inaction comparison seems to deliver incorrect results in certain cases. For example, suppose that *O* is moved against her will and placed in a doorway. Minutes later, a fire starts inside the building, but *O* declines to move, thereby blocking the doorway with her body. This, in turn, results in *H* sustaining a serious injury due to not being able to escape the fire. According to the inaction comparison, *O* is not responsible for *H*'s injury: *H* would not have been better off had *O* refrained from exercising her agency in this situation, as this counterfactual world is identical to the actual world (due to *O* not exercising her agency in either). By contrast, the nonexistence comparison delivers the intuitively correct result that *O* is responsible for *H*'s injury. Given that *H* can freely pass through the doorway in the world where *O* does not exist, she will avoid injury and thereby end up better off relative to the actual world. Thus, the nonexistence comparison appears to have greater extensional adequacy than the inaction comparison.

The doorway case suggests a third worry about the inaction comparison, namely, that it may prove difficult to draw a defensible metaphysical

[17] One could simplify this procedure my considering only single actions rather than sets of actions. However, this modified procedure would deliver incorrect results in cases where an agent has acted in a way that overdetermines some outcome (e.g., she both poisons and stabs a person). In such cases, there will be no single action such that the victim is better off in the possible world where that action does not occur; however, it seems clear that the agent is responsible for the victim's predicament. Thus, one must consider whether the victim would be better off in worlds where conjunctions of the agent's actions were not carried out.

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distinction between action and inaction or the exercise of agency and the absence of such exercise. If the comparison is to yield any determinate judgment, each action must have a counterpart *nonaction* (as opposed to some rival action, which might generate confounding effects). However, it is not clear what would count as a nonaction given a natural account of what actions are – for example, intentional positionings of the body across space and time – as standing in one place is equally an intentional spatiotemporal positioning of the body. Absent such an account, the inaction comparison will lack determinate content.

Finally, the inaction comparison does not provide adequate theoretical support for exculpatory judgments relative to the nonexistence comparison. Briefly, the nonexistence comparison supports the conclusion that a person is not responsible for some state of affairs because it functions as a premise in the following argument:

1. A person *P* is responsible for some state of affairs *S* only if her choices are part of the explanation of why *S* obtains.
2. If *S* would equally obtain absent *P* making any choices at all, then *P*'s choices are not part of the explanation of why *S* obtains.
3. If *S* equally obtains in the world where *P* does not exist, then *S* would equally obtain absent *P* making any choices at all.

   Thus, if *S* obtains in the world where *P* does not exist, then *P* is not responsible for *S*.

By contrast, the inaction comparison could only be substituted into this argument by changing the argument as follows:

1'. A person *P* is responsible for some state of affairs *S* only if her choices are part of the explanation of why *S* obtains.
2'. If *S would have equally obtained had P not carried out any subset of her actions*, then *P*'s choices are not part of the explanation of why *S* obtains.

   Thus, *if S would have equally obtained had P not carried out any subset of her actions*, then *P* is not responsible for *S*.

While this argument would still be valid, it would be much weaker, as Premise 2' is contestable: *P*'s choices could still explain why *S* obtains even if *S* would equally obtain if any conjunction of *P*'s actions were replaced by their inaction counterparts because *P*'s choice *to not carry out some rival action(s)* might explain why *S* obtains. Indeed, it was just such a choice by *O* in the doorway case that seems to explain *H*'s injuries.

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Premise 2' could be strengthened if one adjusted the argument as follows:

1". A person *P* is responsible for some state of affairs *S* only if her *actions* are part of the explanation of why *S* obtains.
2". If *S* would have equally obtained had *P* not carried out any subset of her actions, then *P*'s *actions* are not part of the explanation of why *S* obtains.

Thus, if *S* would have equally obtained had *P* not carried out any subset of her actions, then *P* is not responsible for *S*.

The problem with this revision is that Premise 1" is open to contestation by those who contend that *P* might be responsible for *S* in virtue of some of her *omissions* explaining *S* (even if her *actions* do not explain *S*). By contrast, it seems much harder to dispute Premise 1 (and the identical Premise 1'), as it makes reference to *P*'s *choices* rather than merely her actions. Thus, the nonexistence comparison should be favored over the proposed inaction comparison.

While this first objection to the nonexistence comparison does not succeed, there is a second objection that can only be addressed by emending the proposed comparison and the associated specification of the Lockean proviso's comparative baseline. Specifically, this objection notes that the nonexistence comparison will wrongly exculpate people (i.e., declare them not responsible) in cases where *B* has provided prior benefit to *H*. For example, consider the case where wind blows sand into *H*'s house, *B* cleans it up, but then, a few days later, pours a bucket of sand into *H*'s house. In this case, *B* seems responsible for *H*'s predicament in virtue of her second action. However, the nonexistence comparison would say that *B* is not responsible, as *H* would not be worse off had *B* never existed. To avoid this bad result, the comparison must be modified such that *B* is held to be responsible for leaving *H* worse off via some action only if *H* would be better off in the world where *B* never existed *and* all of the costs and benefits that *B* had previously provided to *H* – that is, all of the other costs and benefits for which *B* is responsible – were provided in some other way.[18]

[18] Strictly speaking, one would also have to modify the comparison so that it delivers correct judgments in cases of overdetermination – that is, cases where *B* is seemingly responsible for imposing some cost on *H* but there is some other person who would impose an equal cost on *H* if *B* did not (e.g., suppose a third party *T* would have dumped just as much sand in the house if *B* did not do so). In such cases, *H* would similarly be no better off in the world where *B* never existed; however, it seems that *B is* responsible for leaving *H* worse off. Thus, the nonexistence comparison delivers the incorrect result

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In short, when assessing whether *B* is responsible for leaving someone worse off (or worse off_{FC}), one must carry out the more complex comparison presented just prior.[19] Further, given that the proviso must be specified so as to ensure that it only precludes appropriations where the appropriator is *responsible* for leaving others worse off_{FC}, it follows that its baseline for comparison must correspond to this emended comparison. Specifically, the proviso must hold that appropriation succeeds if and only if its established claims – or any subsequent waiving of those claims – would not leave anyone worse off_{FC} relative to the world where the appropriator did not exist but all of her prior imposed costs_{FC} and $\text{benefits}_{\text{FC}}$ still obtained. That said, this emendation does not seem to undermine the arguments presented previously. The establishment of – and most-harmful selective waiving – of claims over external resources will still almost always leave others worse off_{FC} than they would have been in the nonexistence world where they still possessed the prior past $\text{benefits}_{\text{FC}}$ and costs_{FC} imposed by the appropriator. In fact, this adjustment actually makes the proviso slightly *more* restrictive for reasons that will be discussed in the next section. Similarly, self-appropriation still necessarily satisfies the proviso. The fact that the baseline for comparison now includes all of the costs_{FC} and $\text{benefits}_{\text{FC}}$ previously produced by the self-appropriator does

and is in need of further emendation. That said, because the concern here is specifically whether appropriators are responsible for leaving others worse off_{FC} via appropriation, one need not worry about cases of overdetermination. Note that overdetermination cases arise if and only if one person imposes a cost on someone but another person would have equally imposed that cost had the former acted differently. However, in the case of appropriation, such overdetermination is not possible, as one of its necessary conditions is negated by the Lockean proviso. To see this, consider the case where *B* attempts to appropriate some resource *R*, where the appropriation of *R* would leave *H* worse off_{FC} relative to the world where *R* is not appropriated. In this case, *B*'s appropriation would also leave *H* worse off_{FC} relative to the world where *B* never existed and, thus, would violate the Lockean proviso. But what if the costs_{FC} imposed on *H* are overdetermined such that they would obtain even if *B* did not exist? In order for the costs_{FC} to be overdetermined in this way, it must be the case that there is some other person *T* who would impose these costs_{FC} if *B* did not exist – that is, who would appropriate *R* in the nonexistence world. However, the Lockean proviso entails that there could be no such counterfactual appropriation, as this appropriation, too, would violate the proviso. This is because *H* would be better off in the world where *T* never existed relative to the counterfactual appropriation world (as the closest possible world where *T* never existed is also one where *B* never existed and, thus, where no appropriation of *R* occurs). Thus, the costs imposed by appropriation cannot be overdetermined and one need not worry about such overdetermination when specifying the proviso's baseline (even though the aim is to provide a specification that ensures that a person violates the proviso only if she is *responsible* for leaving others worse off, and overdetermination complicates counterfactual analyses of responsibility (as noted by Nozick 1974, 85)).

[19] It was suggested previously that the nonexistence comparison may actually be easier to carry out than the inaction comparison. However, with the emendation it is no longer clear that this is the case.

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nothing to change the fact that all $costs_{FC}$ imposed by her self-appropriation will be equally imposed by her nonexistence in that comparison world. Thus, the emended proviso still supports the anarchist contention that people own themselves and practically nothing else (with only those who have yet to self-appropriate being excluded from the set of self-owners).

3.5 Appropriation and Children

With the foregoing argument in place, it is now possible to discuss what the anarchist position entails vis-à-vis children. The primary thing to note is that it implies that children are not self-owners until they self-appropriate, where such self-appropriation requires the cognitive capacities discussed in Section 1.3. Specifically, it was suggested there that persons self-appropriate by asserting that they own themselves. Thus, persons cannot be self-owners if they lack the capacities to make such an assertion (the linguistic capacity needed to make assertions more generally, the cognitive capacity needed to conceptualize ownership, etc.). Given that infants and young children lack these capacities, it follows that they are not self-owners and that their bodies therefore qualify as unowned natural resources. There are two worries that might be raised about this implication.

First, one might worry that the absence of self-ownership unacceptably permits people to mistreat children in various ways, as children lack important claims against bodily contact of the kind possessed by adult self-owners. However, there are three things that can be said in response to this worry. First, practically no theories of rights, libertarian or otherwise, take infants and young children to be self-owners. Thus, it is not a unique problem for the anarchist position that it, too, denies self-ownership rights to young children. Second, as was discussed in Sections 1.6 and 1.7, the fact that someone does not possesses a (self-)ownership claim against a person taking some action does not imply that she lacks *any* claim against the person taking that action. Rather, she might have a distributive claim against that action (or, perhaps, some other variety of claim, though, for the sake of parsimony, no other kinds of claims have been posited here). One can then apply this observation to the case of children who have not yet self-appropriated: although these children lack self-ownership rights, they will still have a robust set of claims against mistreatment, as they will have a claim against any uses of their body that would leave them worse off than others absent some sanctionable choice on their part (where it is assumed that children lack the requisite capacities to choose

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sanctionably).[20] Granted, they have this same claim vis-à-vis all other natural resources and not just their respective bodies; however, given that they will be particularly affected by how people interact with their bodies, their bodily distributive claims will likely be much more restrictive than their other distributive claims (i.e., their claims against uses of their bodies will far outnumber their claims against uses of any other object). One can, therefore, expect that the anarchist position will entail that children have a claim against practically all actions that intuitively seem like child abuse or mistreatment.

There is a third quick reply that can be made to the worry that the anarchist position entails that children lack self-ownership rights. Specifically, one might argue that this result actually counts in *favor* of social anarchism, as it has the intuitively attractive implication that paternalistic bodily contact – that is, contact that benefits the child – is permissible. Note that ASO entails that self-owners have a claim against paternalistic interference with their bodies (so long as that interference does not uniquely generate supplemental benefits). Thus, if children were self-owners, one could not clothe them, for example, without infringing upon their rights. By contrast, if children merely possess distributive claims vis-à-vis their bodies, then it will typically be permissible to make contact with their bodies when that contact is to their benefit.[21]

The second worry that one might have about the proposition that the bodies of young children qualify as unowned natural resources is that it implies that parents can appropriate their children's bodies before the children develop the requisite capacities to self-appropriate. Indeed, this concern is raised by Susan Moller Okin (1989, 79–85) as part of her critique of Nozick's entitlement theory of justice. A quick reply to this concern is that parental appropriation violates the proviso, as there are

[20] One might defend this parenthetical assumption by appealing to the generalized moral tyranny constraint in Section 3.4. There it was suggested that moral theories are unacceptable if they allow an agent to leave others worse off_{FC} while also being responsible for leaving them worse off_{FC}. Further, Section 2.4 argued that luck egalitarianism holds people responsible for sanctionable choices in order to satisfy the moral tyranny constraint. Thus, it should declare that a person has chosen sanctionably if and only if not doing so would entail that the person is responsible for leaving others worse off_{FC}. If one then assumes that young children are never responsible for leaving others worse off_{FC} (because they lack the requisite cognitive capacities to be morally responsible for their actions), it follows that luck egalitarianism should not declare that they have chosen sanctionably or hold them responsible for their choices.

[21] The "typically" qualifier is included because, strictly speaking, other people would have a claim against someone making paternalistic bodily contact with a child if that contact somehow left them with less than their appropriate share of advantage (according to a luck egalitarian theory of distributive justice).

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many post-waiving patterns of the established claims that would leave the child worse off under conditions of full compliance. For example, parental appropriation would give parents a claim against the child putting food in her own mouth, where compliance with this claim would leave the child much worse off. However, one might worry that this reply is, in fact, too quick, as it neglects the way in which the proviso's nonexistence baseline interacts with parental appropriation. Note that this specification – at least, the unemended version – entails that parental appropriation violates the proviso if and only if some subset of the established claims leaves the child worse off_{FC} *relative to the world where the appropriating parent did not exist*. However, if a child's parent(s) did not exist, then the child would not exist either, with the $cost_{FC}$ of nonexistence seeming to equal or even exceed whatever costs the child would incur by complying with her parents' ownership rights over her body.

One way of responding to this worry is to argue that parental appropriation actually *does* leave the child worse off_{FC} relative to the nonexistence baseline (i.e., the world where the appropriating parent(s) – and, by extension, the child – did not exist). For example, one might maintain that being a moral slave to one's parents is a "fate worse than death." If it is better to not exist than have to comply with any arbitrary parental ownership claims vis-à-vis one's own body, then parental appropriation still violates the proviso. Alternatively, one might simply respecify the baseline of the proviso to avoid this arguably marginal problematic implication. Specifically, one could hold that the relevant baseline is the closest possible world where the appropriator does not exist but where all of the non-appropriators under consideration do. Thus, the nonexistence world would be one where the child's parents did not exist but she was somehow conjured into existence or engineered in a lab. And, given that the child is worse off_{FC} in the world where her parents own her body than she is in this respecified comparison world, it follows that parental appropriation violates the Lockean proviso.

An easier response, however, is to simply appeal to the more precise formulation of the proviso presented in the prior section. There it was argued that the proviso must be emended such that the comparison world is the one where the appropriator did not exist but all of her previously produced $costs_{FC}$ and $benefits_{FC}$ still obtained. Given that these $benefits_{FC}$ include the child getting to experience life, the relevant baseline for comparison would be the world where the parents did not exist but the child still existed. Thus, parental appropriation of a child's body would violate the emended proviso, as the established claims would leave the

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child worse off$_{FC}$ than she would be in the appropriate baseline for comparison. This result, in turn, implies that no one can appropriate a child's body prior to her developing the relevant capacities needed to self-appropriate. In this way, the anarchist position avoids the unacceptable implication that adults or parents can come to own a child's body.

3.6 Conclusion

This chapter has attempted to demonstrate that the Lockean proviso simultaneously entails that most people own themselves in the sense articulated by ASO (as it is trivially easy to self-appropriate) and that there is no external private property. In this way, it has attempted to demonstrate the coherence of the anarchist position while also addressing some of the most obvious objections that might be leveled against the foregoing argument. It has also provided an extended defense – and slight emendation – of the Lockean proviso, thereby bolstering the starting premise on which the chapter's argument rests. Finally, it has completed the explication of what anarchism implies vis-à-vis children that was started in Section 1.3. There it was argued that children lack self-ownership rights because they lack the capacities needed to self-appropriate. This chapter has now explained why this lack of self-ownership does not leave them vulnerable to permitted mistreatment or the appropriation of their bodies. In this way, it has demonstrated that the anarchist position can be employed to provide a well-grounded and extensionally adequate account of the rights of children.

Finally, it is worth noting that this discussion of children's rights is another illustration of how the component parts of the anarchist position complement each other by jointly entailing attractive results. The anarchist premise that people acquire self-ownership via self-appropriation helped to explain why practically all adults – despite varying cognitive capacities – have the same set of rights while young children do not possess these rights. The anarchist rejection of external property in favor of luck egalitarian distributive claims then helped to ensure that these children still have rights against mistreatment and abuse (while permitting paternalistic bodily contact). And the anarchist interpretation of the Lockean proviso protected children from having their bodies appropriated before they had a chance to self-appropriate. In this way, the distinct components of the anarchist position come together to help answer notoriously difficult philosophical questions about the moral equality of persons and the rights of children.

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The fact that the anarchist theses jointly entail attractive conclusions in this way also reveals an additional sense in which the anarchist position is coherent: Its separate theses hang together in the sense that affirming only some of these theses but not others will negate certain attractive implications and often generate unfortunate ones in their place. For example, rejecting the Lockean proviso – as radical right-libertarians are inclined to do – raises difficult questions about why adults are not able to appropriate the bodies of young children prior to their achieving self-ownership.[22] One can perhaps solve this problem by contending that children are self-owners from birth, perhaps in virtue of the fact that they will eventually develop certain capacities later on. However, one must then address the apparent implication that parents are forbidden from making even paternalistic contact with their children's bodies. Additionally, by grounding self-ownership in scalar cognitive capacities, one faces the difficult challenge of explaining human moral equality (as was discussed in Section 1.3). Similarly, if one denies that people possess distributive claims over unowned things while accepting the other anarchist theses, then it is difficult to explain why child abuse and other forms of mistreatment are wrongful, as one can no longer appeal to the anarchist's posited distributive claims as part of this explanation. Thus, there is additional reason to affirm the entire set of anarchist theses as opposed to some proper subset – that is, reason beyond the fact that these theses both stand in entailment relations with one another and are also jointly entailed by the moral tyranny constraint – namely, that these theses jointly deliver favorable results that do not follow from the conjunction of any proper subset of the theses.

[22] This objection is directed explicitly at Feser's radical right-libertarian position in Spafford (2021b, 332).

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CHAPTER 4

Property and Legitimacy

> But nobody has the right to seize a single one of these machines and say: "This is mine; if you want to use it you must pay me a tax on each of your products," any more than the feudal lord of medieval times had the right to say to the peasant: "This hill, this meadow belong to me, and you must pay me a tax on every sheaf of corn you reap, on every rick you build."
>
> All is for all! If the man and the woman bear their fair share of work, they have a right to their fair share of all that is produced by all, and that share is enough to secure them well-being. No more of such vague formulas as "The right to work," or "To each the whole result of his labour." What we proclaim is the Right to Well-Being: Well-Being for All!
>
> Peter Kropotkin, *The Conquest of Bread*

Chapter 3 argued that no one has successfully appropriated external natural resources because (practically) no acts of appropriation satisfy the Lockean proviso. This chapter will provide an alternative route for reaching this conclusion by arguing that those who accept a consent theory of legitimacy must also concede that there have been no successful acts of appropriation. Specifically, it will contend that property ownership is a *form* of legitimacy and, thus, has the same necessary conditions as legitimacy, namely, consent. Given that no one has actually consented to the establishment of property, it follows that there is no existing private property, as social anarchists contend.

To reach this conclusion, Section 4.1 will begin by introducing a slightly modified notion of legitimacy called *territorial legitimacy*. Next, Section 4.2 will argue that anyone who endorses a consent theory of legitimacy should also endorse a consent theory of territorial legitimacy. Section 4.3 will then argue that property ownership in land entails territorial legitimacy (and, thus, has consent as its necessary condition). Further, Section 4.4 will argue that there is no relevant distinction between

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land and objects such that consent becomes a necessary condition of appropriating any natural resource – a result that, in turn, entails that no one has any private property rights over such resources. Sections 4.5–4.7 consider and reject three objections to the proposed argument. However, whereas these objections do not succeed, Section 4.8 will note that a consent theory of property acquisition is in tension with the claim in Chapter 3 that persons can easily appropriate themselves. It will then consider three possible ways to resolve this tension. Finally, Section 4.9 will conclude with a discussion of the relationship between philosophical anarchism and the anarchist conclusion – that is, the conclusion that the permissible use of external resources is governed by distributive claims rather than property claims.

4.1 Territorial Legitimacy

The crucial step in this chapter's argument is to show that anyone who has property rights over some tract of land has the same normative power as a legitimate state, where the term "legitimacy" is used to refer to this power. For, if this is the case, then the consent theory of legitimacy entails that land ownership can only be established with the consent of others – that is, the initial appropriation of land has consent as its necessary condition. To see why property rights entail legitimacy, recall the definition of legitimacy offered in Section 1.1: Person P is a legitimate authority with respect to another person Q when P has the power to determine what obligations Q has via the issuing of edicts. In other words, if a legitimate P at time t issues the edict that Q must ϕ, then Q is obligated to ϕ at t. Additionally, it will be helpful to label the set of duties imposed by a legitimate authority the duty bearer's *political obligations*.

Notably, this account makes legitimacy an interpersonal relation that might obtain between any two agents. Thus, one cannot simply assert that a state is legitimate *tout court*; rather, it must be specified which persons are subject to its legitimate authority. However, this notion of legitimacy is very different from the power that actually existing states claim to possess. As Simmons notes, one of the primary rights claimed by states is the jurisdictional control right to impose and coercively enforce laws upon all people *within its claimed territory* (2016, 4–5). According to Simmons, the legitimacy of states should be understood as *bounded* by the borders of their territory such that "only those persons within a state's claimed territories are claimed as subjects of that state's authority, as bound by its laws" (2016, 31).

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Note that this makes the actual power claimed by states both weaker and stronger than *unbounded legitimacy* as defined just prior. On the one hand, it is weaker because states only claim the right to regulate conduct within their territory. By contrast, an unbounded legitimacy relation obtains irrespective of the location of the person(s) subject to the legitimate authority. On the other hand, the power claimed by states is stronger than unbounded legitimacy in that it is the power to specify the obligations of *anyone* who is within their respective territories. An alien – who, by definition, is not a person with respect to whom a state is legitimate in the unbounded sense – is, nonetheless, taken by the state to be obligated to comply with its edicts upon entering its territory. Further, the state takes her to be obliged to comply with edicts that were issued prior to her entry. If the state passed a law in January prohibiting drug use, an alien who enters the territory in February would, in the eyes of the state, be obliged to refrain from using drugs (despite the fact that she was not in the territory when the edict was issued).

To put this point more precisely, states claim the power to specify the *conditional* obligations of others, where such obligations are those that obtain only on the condition that the obliged party is within a given state's territory.[1] This power will be called *territorial legitimacy*, where some person P is territorially legitimate with respect to person Q if and only if there is some bit of territory T such that, if P issues an edict of the form "if Q is within T, then Q must ϕ," then Q is obligated to ϕ if she is within T. States can then be understood as claiming that they possess *universal* territorial legitimacy; that is, they are territorially legitimate with respect to all people.

Section 4.2 will argue that it is *territorial* legitimacy that should concern consent theorists; that is, if one takes consent to be a necessary condition of unbounded legitimacy, then one should also take consent to be a necessary condition of territorial legitimacy. Section 4.3 will then argue that having property rights is equivalent to possessing territorial legitimacy. Thus, consent theorists should also take consent to be a necessary condition of the initial appropriation of private property. The remaining sections will then address some objections to this argument, discuss how it bears upon the self-ownership thesis, and explicate the relationship between philosophical anarchism and the anarchist conclusion.

[1] Or, alternatively, conditional obligations might be understood as obligations to make certain conditional propositions true. For example, if a legitimate state passes a law that all those within its territory T must ϕ, then any given Q is obliged to act in a way that makes true the proposition that if Q is within T, then Q ϕ-s. This might be done either by making the antecedent false (i.e., not entering T) or the consequent true when the antecedent is true (i.e., ϕ-ing within T).

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4.2 A Consent Theory of Territorial Legitimacy

As noted in Section 4.1, territorial legitimacy is weaker than unbounded legitimacy, as the latter is a power to specify subjects' unconditional obligations while the former is the power to specify conditional obligations (where such obligations obtain conditional on a subject's location). Given this difference, a consent theory of legitimacy does not necessarily entail a consent theory of territorial legitimacy. Indeed, there is no logical inconsistency in simultaneously holding that (a) a person must consent if another is to have the power to specify her unconditional obligations and (b) the weaker power to specify conditional territorial obligations does not require such consent. The question, then, is whether a person who endorses Proposition (a) *should also* endorse a consent theory of territorial legitimacy.

There are a number of reasons to answer this question in the affirmative. First, from a purely dialectical standpoint, proponents of consent theory are typically concerned with the moral standing of actually existing states. Given that such states insist that they have territorial legitimacy rather than unbounded legitimacy, consent theorists will want to make consent a necessary condition of the former as well as the latter. Additionally, consent theorists would not want their thesis to be rendered irrelevant by the conditionalization of an unbounded legitimacy claim. For example, suppose that a monarch denies that she needs consent to oblige others because she is not legitimate in the unbounded sense but, rather, is simply *territorially* legitimate vis-à-vis the entire Milky Way Galaxy. Unless consent theorists are willing to admit that their thesis loses all relevance in this case – that is, when what is asserted is not "Q is obligated to ϕ when P says she must ϕ," but, rather, "Q is obligated to ϕ if she is within the Milky Way and P says she must ϕ while in the Milky Way" – then the consent theorist should also take consent to be a necessary condition of territorial legitimacy.

More importantly, the grounds for adopting a consent theory of legitimacy equally support endorsing a consent theory of territorial legitimacy. Consider, for example, Simmons' prominent argument by elimination for a consent theory of legitimacy (2001).[2] Simmons begins by introducing three possible categories of moral requirement under which political obligations might fall. First, there are *natural duties*, which are

[2] Simmons makes this argument across a number of works, beginning with his *Moral Principles and Political Obligations* (1979). However, the cited 2001 text appears to be his attempt at a definitive and condensed restatement of the argument. Thus, the following synopsis largely reconstructs the argument as it is presented there, turning to the 1979 text only to supplement the argument and fill in some minor gaps.

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"moral requirements which apply to all [persons] irrespective of status or of acts performed" and are "owed by all persons to all others" (1979, 13). Additionally, because the duties are owed to all others, the content of those duties must be general, making no reference to particular persons or institutions (2001, 47).[3] By contrast, *special obligations* are owed by particular people to other particular people and arise from the actions of individuals. For example, the moral requirements generated by acts of promising are special obligations, as (a) only a proper subset of people are obliged to carry out the promised action; (b) only a proper subset of people are owed this action (where the content of the obligation makes specific reference to these people); and (c) the moral requirement to act did not previously exist, but, rather, came into existence via the actions of the involved parties.

Simmons divides special obligations into two subcategories: those that are *voluntary* and arise via intentional acts of consent (e.g., promissory obligations) and those that do not come about via voluntary action (e.g., filial obligations) (2001, 45). Simmons then argues by elimination, arguing, first, that political obligations cannot be natural duties, and, second, that they cannot be nonvoluntary special obligations. He, therefore, concludes that political obligations must be voluntary special obligations, that is, they have consent as their necessary condition.

Simmons makes two arguments to support his claim that political obligations are not natural duties. First, he argues that political obligations are *particular* in a way that natural duties are not: Political obligations are owed to only one state, with the content of one's obligation specifically referencing that state (2001, 47). One might have a natural duty to support states that are just or aid states in desperate need, but one will owe this duty to any state that meets the relevant posited criteria. By contrast, political obligations are owed to only one particular state. Thus, political obligations cannot be natural duties.

Second, Simmons argues that natural duties come in two varieties. *Negative duties* are requirements that agents refrain from acting in certain ways. By contrast, *positive duties* require positive action by the agent. Simmons contends that, while negative natural duties are perfect and, thus, allow for little to no discretion in terms of how they are carried

[3] Technically, Simmons claims that the content of duties must be general in this way because "duties are binding on all persons" (2001, 47). However, this seems like a non sequitur, as it seems possible that all persons might have a requirement that specifies a particular person. Rather, it seems generality follows not from all having the duty, but the fact that the duty is owed to all.

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out, positive natural duties are imperfect and allow people a degree of discretion over how to discharge those duties (2001, 48). For example, an agent is typically permitted to refrain from discharging positive natural duties if discharging those duties would impose a significant cost on her (47). Given that political obligations do not allow for such discretion – including those that demand the agent carry out some positive action – it follows that they cannot be natural duties and must, instead, be special obligations.

Having shown that political obligations are special obligations, Simmons still needs to show that they are of the voluntary variety as opposed to the involuntary variety. Here, again, he employs an argument by elimination, considering the most plausible theories of involuntary special obligation and rejecting each in turn. While Simmons' arguments against these theories are too numerous to reconstruct here, he provides sufficient conceptual resources for constructing an abbreviated version of his argument that eliminates whole classes of theories without having to consider them individually.[4] Specifically, nonvoluntary special obligations can be divided into two kinds: those that are grounded in the provision of benefits – that is, have the provision of benefits as their necessary condition – and those that can obtain even absent any such benefit being provided. Simmons rejects the possibility of the latter, contending that it is implausible to hold that anyone might owe involuntary duties to an agent from whom they receive no benefit (1979, 158).[5] As a supporting example, he considers the case of a fur trapper living in isolation so deep within the interior of a territory that the state is not able to provide her with any benefits such as security or defense (159). Simmons contends that, given her circumstances, the trapper is not obligated to comply with the laws of the state (e.g., its gun control laws) (159). Further, if one accepts that the trapper has no such obligation *because* she does not receive any benefits from the state, then it follows that receipt of benefit is, at least partially, a ground of having a (nonvoluntary) special obligation.

This leaves only one remaining competitor to voluntary special obligations: the class of nonvoluntary special obligations grounded in the

[4] For Simmons' discussion of various specific proposals, see Simmons (1979, ch. 6; 1996; 2001, 50–5).

[5] In the context where he advances this claim, Simmons speaks specifically of political obligations having receipt of benefit as a necessary condition, but, presumably, this claim would generalize to all special obligations, or, at least, special obligations of the kind under consideration here (namely, political obligations and territorial obligations).

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provision of benefits. These obligations purportedly arise when the receipt of benefits leaves the recipient indebted to the provider. However, Simmons argues that the receipt of benefits fails to give rise to such special obligations. First, he notes that the mere receipt of benefits (as opposed to the *acceptance* of benefits) cannot ground obligations, as it is implausible to think that a person who explicitly refuses some benefit but has it forced upon her owes a special obligation to the provider of that benefit (2001, 56). Further, even when benefits have been accepted, Simmons insists that this acceptance still cannot ground special obligations. Specifically, he argues that, even insofar as an indebted person owes some return to her benefactor, she does not owe *whatever the benefactor demands* (56). Rather, she merely owes some "fitting return" that is adequately "responsive to the benefactor's needs" (56). Thus, benefaction cannot generate political obligations, as such obligations are "content-specific," that is, they demand specific performances over which the obligor has little to no discretion (56–7). In this way, Simmons rules out the possibility of any sort of nonvoluntary political obligations; that is, one must be a consent theorist about political obligations/legitimacy.

Does this argument for a consent theory of legitimacy also commit its proponent to a consent theory of *territorial* legitimacy? The answer to this question will depend on whether any of the premises or inferences described previously would be compromised if one were to replace all references to the political obligations of unbounded legitimacy with references to the conditional obligations of territorial legitimacy. To put the question a bit more precisely: Must such conditional obligations also fall under the category of voluntary special obligations? Or could they be natural duties or involuntary special obligations? The answer to these questions appears to vindicate a consent theory of territorial legitimacy. Quick consideration of each step of Simmons' argument suggests that, just as political obligations are voluntary special obligations, so, too, are the conditional obligations established by territorially legitimate authorities. Thus, territorial legitimacy has consent as its necessary condition.

First, note that, like political obligations, territory-specific conditional obligations are special obligations, as they are owed only to some person(s) rather than to all persons. There is a slight disanalogy between political obligations and territorial obligations, as the former are typically thought to be owed to a single political authority (the state) while the latter can be owed to multiple authorities, each corresponding to some distinct bit of territory. However, as with political obligations, territorial obligations are owed to a proper subset of people rather than being owed to all

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people.[6] Additionally, the territorial obligations that states claim to impose are both perfect and often demand positive actions – a conjunction of properties that is incompatible with an obligation being a natural duty. Thus, Simmons' argument that the obligations associated with unbounded legitimacy cannot be natural duties applies equally to the conditional obligations established by territorially legitimate authorities.

Similarly, the fact that the obligations associated with territorial legitimacy are conditional fails to exempt them from the second step of Simmons' argument, which denies that there are nonvoluntary special obligations grounded in something other than the receipt of benefit. Given that territorial obligations are special obligations, Simmons' conclusion implies that they also cannot be both nonvoluntary and grounded in something other than benefit receipt. This implication can be further supported by appealing to a modified version of Simmons' fur trapper case. Simmons' contention is that the state is not legitimate with respect to the trapper because it does not provide her with any benefits. However, suppose, instead, that the state merely asserts that it is *territorially* legitimate such that the trapper must comply with its laws *if* she is within its territory. Such a weakening of the state's asserted power does nothing to make it more plausible that the trapper must comply with its gun control laws. Thus, if territorial obligations are to be nonvoluntary, they must be grounded in the receipt of benefits.

Finally, consider Simmons' rejection of the receipt of benefits as a ground for political obligation. Simmons suggests that benefaction cannot generate moral requirements that have the kind of specific content that characterizes political obligations. Similarly, the specificity of territorial obligations precludes them from being grounded in the receipt of benefits: They are requirements to act in the specific way(s) dictated by the territorially legitimate authority (when one is within the territory) without any of the discretion characteristic of benefaction-grounded obligations. Thus, the conditional obligations imposed by territorially legitimate authorities must

[6] There is some oversimplification here. Strictly speaking, natural duties would be owed to a proper subset of persons if some people were to waive their correlative claims. Inversely, a special obligation would be owed to all persons if a single person made an identical promise to each of them (as noted by Diane Jeske (2014, fn1)). Thus, the distinction between natural duties and obligations is better put in terms of *achievement*: All persons *start out* owing a natural duty to all persons, though a state of affairs might be *achieved* where these duties are only owed by some to some (e.g., due to the waiving or forfeiture of claims). By contrast, no one starts out owing a special obligation to all persons; rather, such a state of affairs can only be achieved through human action. However, the main text opts for the simpler statement of the distinction, both for ease of exposition and because this is how it is articulated by Simmons.

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be special obligations of a voluntary kind. Given this result, any consent theorist who bases her view on Simmons' argument by elimination should also accept a consent theory of territorial legitimacy.[7]

4.3 The Absence of Appropriation

Sections 4.1 and 4.2 introduced the concepts of legitimacy and territorial legitimacy and argued that, if one is a consent theorist about the former, one should also be a consent theorist about the latter. The current section builds upon this conclusion by arguing that the holder of private property rights in land is territorially legitimate with respect to all other persons. Thus, consent theorists are committed to the conclusion that the establishment of property rights in land has consent as its necessary condition.

To begin, note that to have a private property right over some tract of land is to have a bundle of rights including the right to use the land, the power to transfer the land (i.e., all of the listed rights and powers), the right to exclude others from that land, and the power to waive these rights.[8] This last-mentioned power is notable because, when paired with the right to exclude others from the land, it follows that the right-holder has the power to determine the conditions under which others are permitted to use the land. If *P* has property rights over some tract of land, then *P* has a waivable right to exclude *Q* from that land, where she can specify the conditions under which the right is waived. Thus, *P* has the power to make it such that *Q* rightfully occupies and/or uses that land if and only if *Q* complies with some edict issued by *P*. For example, *P* might declare that anyone who wishes to use the land – where such use includes standing/walking upon the land – must wear red. She would then have a conditional right against *Q* that *Q* wear red if *Q* is on the land. Further, because this conditional right has a correlative conditional obligation, it follows that *Q* is obligated to wear red if she is within *P*'s property. Thus, *P* has the power to establish conditional obligations for *Q* via the issuing of edicts, where the antecedent of the obligation is *Q* being within the bounds of some

[7] Indeed, Simmons appears to tacitly accept the arguments of the preceding section, as he takes control rights over territory – which is seemingly implied by territorial legitimacy – to be grounded in the legitimacy of the governing authority (2016). Given that he takes legitimacy to have consent as its necessary condition, he is seemingly committed to the conclusion that territorial legitimacy has consent as its necessary condition.

[8] The following discussion will focus exclusively upon land. However, Section 4.4 will contend that the argument generalizes to *all* property.

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geographic territory. In other words, *P* has the power of territorial legitimacy described in Section 4.1.

Given that the consent theorist is committed to the proposition that territorial legitimacy has the consent of all claimed subjects as its necessary condition, she is consequently committed to the proposition that property rights in land have the consent of all claimed subjects (namely, all other people) as their necessary condition. This, in turn, implies a commitment to the proposition that the acts of initial appropriation that establish such property rights have the consent of all others as their necessary condition. Further, given that no one has, as a matter of empirical fact, consented to appropriation, consent theorists must maintain that such initial appropriation has not occurred, which, in turn, implies that all land remains unowned. Thus, consent theorists must deny that there are any existing property rights in land, with one anarchist thesis thereby entailing another.[9]

4.4 Land, Resources, and Artifacts

Note that the aforementioned conclusion only applies to *land-based* property rights. But what about property rights over objects and resources? Are such entitlements also ruled out by a consent theory of legitimacy? If not, then consent theorists are committed to a much less radical position than the anarchist contends, as there could still be ownership of any resources aside from land (setting aside the proviso-based argument of Section 3.1). However, there is reason for thinking that a lack of property rights in land entails that *all* resources and objects are similarly unowned. Specifically, it appears that all property rights over objects entail the power of territorial legitimacy. To see why, recall that *P* is territorially legitimate with respect to some territory if and only if *P* issuing the edict that *Q* must ϕ if she is within the territory entails that *Q* is obligated to ϕ if she is within the territory. But what counts as a territory? And what counts as being *within*

[9] The foregoing argument also puts dialectical pressure on many of those who reject the consent theory of legitimacy. Typically, those who reject the theory also want to deny the libertarian contention that persons have private property rights. However, if legitimacy is one of the powers conferred by property ownership, then critics of consent theory are actually endorsing the view that persons can unilaterally establish at least partial property ownership. Thus, if they want to avoid this conclusion, they must abandon their position vis-à-vis legitimacy and endorse the anarchist thesis that consent is a necessary condition of establishing this power.

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that territory? The answers to these two questions, it will be argued, reveal that to use an owned object or resource is to be within its owner's territory.

With respect to the former question, territory might be thought of as a portion of physical space. However, this isn't quite right – at least, insofar as this portion of physical space is understood as being a fixed spatial region. Consider, for example, the territory claimed by the United States Federal Government: From a cosmic perspective, this territory is moving extremely rapidly in a corkscrew-like motion as the Earth simultaneously rotates and orbits the Sun, which is, itself, in motion. Thus, to make sense of territorial claims, territory must be understood as space defined in relation to some bit of mass such as a planet. Specifically, a territory is a portion of the surface of some massive object (it may also extend above and/or below the surface, but this is more controversial).

The answer to the question of what counts as being *within* a territory is more straightforward: To be within a territory is to be in contact with that territory. For example, when a person walks onto land claimed by the United States, she makes contact with the relevant surface region of the Earth, thereby qualifying her as being within that territory. One might also contend that those who tunnel under or fly above the surface are within the territory. However, the suggestion here is that to hold such a view is to presuppose the more controversial view (noted just prior) that the region below and above the surface is part of the territory as well. Thus, to remain neutral regarding whether one should hold this more expansive notion of territory, one might say that Q is within some territory T if – but not necessarily only if – she is in contact with the relevant surface region of the relevant massive object.

Given this account of being within a territory, P is territorially legitimate with respect to Q if, when P issues the edict that Q must ϕ if she is in contact with the surface of some massive object, Q is obligated to ϕ if she is making such contact.[10] Once territorial legitimacy has been recast in this way, the apparent distinction between property rights in land and property rights over objects collapses. To have property rights vis-à-vis some object is to be able to declare that Q must ϕ if she is in contact with the object and thereby make it obligatory that Q ϕ-s if she touches the object. Thus, the owner of that object is territorially legitimate with respect to all other persons.

[10] The account of territorial legitimacy drops its original necessary condition here to leave open the possibility that P might also be legitimate with respect to Q if Q is above or below the surface in addition to being in direct contact with the surface.

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Put somewhat differently, the territorial legitimacy of the land owner (or head of state) entails that she is able to issue conditional exclusion orders barring others from making permissible noncompliant contact with some surface region of one of the very large objects that we call planets. Similarly, the object owner is able to issue conditional exclusion orders barring others from making permissible noncompliant contact with the surface region of the smaller objects that rest on what we call planets. Of course, there is a size difference between large objects (planets) and the smaller objects resting on those large objects, but, for these purposes, this difference does not seem morally salient. One might think of objects as microplanets that differ in size – but not in kind – from the macroplanets that we generally associate with territory.

Given the lack of a principled distinction between massive objects of different sizes, all property rights can be understood as belonging to a single kind (as opposed to there being distinct kinds of property rights over land vs. resources and objects). Specifically, a property right over any item includes a right to conditionally exclude others from coming into contact with some bit of mass – and, thus, bestows territorial legitimacy upon the rights-holder. Therefore, consent theorists cannot merely deny that there is any owned land; rather, they must also deny that there are any owned resources or artifacts. This conclusion represents a libertarian reason for rejecting external private property altogether.

4.5 Initial Appropriation and Obligation Imposition

There are a few different objections that libertarian defenders of private property might raise against this argument. First, they might appeal to a set of existing objections to the claim that initial appropriation requires consent. Specifically, a number of libertarian philosophers have raised objections to the popular argument that (a) initial appropriation imposes obligations on others and (b) one can impose obligations on others only if they consent to being so obliged. For example, Gerald Gaus and Loren Lomasky (1990), Simmons (2001), and Hugh Breakey (2009) have all objected to Contention (b) by arguing that there are many examples of nonconsensual obligation imposition; thus, there is nothing problematic about imposing obligations via initial appropriation. Gaus and Lomasky appeal to the case of the outstanding professor whose excellent performance unproblematically imposes an obligation upon the head of her department to sign off on a merit-based pay raise (1990, 492). Simmons cites (among others) the case of people who make use of a tennis court and

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thereby nonconsensually – but unproblematically – oblige others to not use it (2001, 220). And Breakey presents a number of seemingly unproblematic cases of duty imposition, including the case of the person who tells another a secret and thereby obliges her not to tell anyone, as well as the case of the person who occupies some bit of physical space and thereby imposes obligations on others not to invade that space (2009, 622–3).

Alternatively, Bas van der Vossen (2015) has argued against Contention (a) by positing that no one *ever* imposes new obligations upon others, as acts like initial appropriation merely change the *practical requirements* of other people's *already existing* conditional obligations. To illustrate this point, van der Vossen suggests that, for any given agent *Q*, the following conditional statement would be obligatory (i.e., *Q* is obliged to make the conditional statement true): If some person *P* has hair, then *Q* does not touch *P*'s hair without permission. Given the existence of this conditional obligation, it follows that *P* does not impose any new obligations on *Q* when she grows out her hair; rather, she merely changes the practical requirements of *Q*'s preexisting conditional obligation, where these requirements follow from the conjunction of the obligation and empirical facts about the world (69–70). Similarly, van der Vossen contends that each person has a conditional obligation to treat other people as property owners if those people carry out acts of initial appropriation. Thus, when people engage in such acts, they do not problematically impose new obligations but, rather, change the practical requirements of that conditional obligation (74).

However, even if one concedes the objections to both Contentions (a) and (b), the argument of this chapter is still sound. Recall the previous contention that a (territorially) legitimate authority is not merely a person who has the power to impose obligations; rather, she is a person who has the power to *specify the content of people's obligations via the issuing of edicts*. Thus, those who affirm the prior claim that legitimacy – and, consequently, initial appropriation – requires consent need only maintain *that this particular method* of obligation imposition has consent as its necessary condition, without having to defend Contention (b)'s much broader claim that *all* obligation imposition requires consent. Given this limited commitment, one might fully concede that playing tennis or telling people secrets imposes obligations upon others without their consent while simultaneously maintaining that one cannot nonconsensually impose obligations on others via the issuing of edicts.[11] Indeed, while a person's choice

[11] This is not to say that one *must* concede these counterexamples. Consider, for example, Breakey's suggestion that telling someone a secret obliges her to not tell that secret to others. One might argue

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to play tennis may oblige others to stay off of the court, it seems highly implausible that she can oblige them to stay off of the court simply by ordering them to do so – unless, of course, they agree to comply with her orders.

In other words, those who endorse a consent theory of legitimacy need not insist that the generation of obligations always has consent as its necessary condition. Rather, they need only affirm the more modest thesis that a certain sort of power to generate obligations has consent as its necessary condition, namely, the power to oblige others within a certain geographic space via the issuing of edicts. Thus, even if the arguments against Contention (b) succeed in showing that one can impose obligations without consent, that does not negate the claim that the more specific power of legitimacy – and, consequently, the possession of property rights – has consent as its necessary condition.

Further, note that if these arguments *did* succeed in showing that initial appropriation requires consent, this result would, in turn, entail the falsity of consent theories of legitimacy. As was argued in Section 4.3, to possess property rights is simply to be a (territorially) legitimate authority; thus, if one can obtain property rights without consent, then one can also become a legitimate authority without consent, which is to say that the consent theory of legitimacy is false. However, if this is the conclusion of Gaus et al.'s arguments, then they have seemingly proved too much, as those who criticize Contention (b) typically have other commitments that entail the consent theory of legitimacy. For example, practically all of these critics are libertarians who believe that anyone can acquire private property, where such ownership gives them both a permission to use their property as they like and an immunity from the nonconsensual loss of this

that this claim only seems plausible because people tacitly consent to not share others' secrets; absent such consent, it does not seem plausible that merely telling someone a secret obliges her to keep that secret. Suppose that a tax cheat tells another person that she is underreporting her income but then immediately says, "Oh, and, by the way, that's a secret, so you can't tell anyone about it!" Is the other party now obligated to refrain from passing along this information? Seemingly not, as she might reasonably respond, "Sorry, but I never agreed to that," with the naturalness of this response suggesting that persons are obliged to keep a secret only if they voluntarily receive it. By contrast, suppose that the tax cheat had first said "Hey, can I tell you a secret?" and the other party had responded in the affirmative. Only then does it seem plausible that the latter is obliged to keep the secret. Further, the apparent reason that there is an obligation in this case (but not the original version of the case) is that the offer to share a secret seemingly includes the tacit condition that the other party not tell the information to others – hence why the other party has to explicitly accept the offer. Thus, contra Breakey, consent appears to be a necessary condition of becoming obliged to keep a secret. Similar arguments can be made against many of the other posited counterexamples, though they will not be provided here.

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permission. However, if a state is legitimate, it can enact laws that impose regulations on persons' property, thereby obliging them to only use their property in a certain way. Given that a legitimate state can strip people of their permissions in this way, the only way to preserve the claim that persons are immune from the nonconsensual loss of such permissions is to maintain that states are legitimate only if they have received everyone's consent. Thus, while libertarians might think that they are rescuing property rights by attacking Contention (b), they are actually opening the door to states having the power to nonconsensually regulate or even transfer away people's property claims.[12]

A similar reply can be made to van der Vossen's denial that initial appropriation imposes obligations on others. Suppose that one fully accepts his claim that an agent never imposes new obligations on others and, instead, merely realizes the antecedents of their already-existing conditional obligations.[13] Given this assumption, P can be understood to be territorially legitimate with respect to Q if and only if, for any given action ϕ , Q has the conditional obligation to ϕ if P issues the edict that Q must ϕ within her territory and Q is within said territory. Indeed, this is how territorial legitimacy was defined in Section 4.1. In other words, the consent theory of territorial legitimacy can be understood as insisting that Q's consent is a necessary condition of her having this particular set of conditional obligations. Further, the contention has been that the possession of property rights entails that this same set of conditional obligations obtains – and, thus, that initial appropriation has consent as its necessary condition.

This restatement of consent theory helps to clarify why van der Vossen's argument cannot function as an objection to this chapter's conclusion. Even if he is correct in claiming that initial appropriation does not impose any novel obligations, the claim being advanced by the chapter is that the conditional obligations entailed by initial appropriation obtain only if consent has been given. Thus, consent would still be a necessary condition of initial appropriation even if such appropriation imposes no new obligations.

4.6 The Propertarian Objection

There is a second possible objection that right-libertarians in particular might raise against the foregoing argument. According to this objection,

[12] Libertarians might reply that property rights function as a prior constraint on whether states qualify as legitimate. This proposal will be critically assessed in the subsequent section.

[13] For my more-detailed objection to van der Vossen's argument, see Spafford (2020a).

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while property ownership entails territorial legitimacy, libertarians who think that state legitimacy requires consent need not concede that there is no private property. This is because their claim does not entail or presuppose the more general proposition that *anyone* must receive consent to be a territorially legitimate authority. Rather, only *states* must obtain consent because that is the only way for them to acquire the power of territorial legitimacy in a context of already-established property rights. The idea here is that, for any given region, private individuals arrived first, appropriated, and thereby became territorially legitimate with respect to – that is, owners of – certain holdings. Given their title to the land, later-arriving states are unable to establish ownership/legitimacy over individuals' already-claimed territory – unless, of course, the latter agree to transfer their claims to former, thereby ceding to states the power to conditionally exclude people from the relevant territories. Thus, despite the fact that both property owners and legitimate states possess an identical moral power, only states require consent to acquire said power, as they uniquely face the challenge of establishing rights over a territory that encompasses other people's already-claimed property. Call this the *propertarian* position.

There are four problems with this proposal. First, note that it makes the truth of the consent theory of state legitimacy a contingent matter, as the theory will be true only if certain empirical claims about the history of state formation and property formation are also true. Specifically, property claims over some territory must predate the formation of the state that claims that territory. While this temporal relation will certainly obtain in some instances, there are likely many regions that were uninhabited prior to a state claiming them, with people only establishing residence and state-sanctioned property claims (i.e., obtaining legal property rights rather than natural ones) in those regions later on.[14] Thus, the propertarian can, at most, claim that *certain* states are not legitimate with respect to *certain* unconsenting individuals. Indeed, there will be many people for whom the edicts of the state are morally binding even absent any form of consent having been given. Further, one cannot know whether a particular individual is obliged to comply with the edicts of a state without first conducting an elaborate empirical investigation of the history of that state and that individual's claimed property to see which territorial right was established first. Thus, the propertarian position represents a significant retreat from the claim favored by most libertarians, namely, that *any state* must acquire consent if it is to be legitimate.

[14] For a theory of how states might come to acquire property, see Cara Nine (2008a).

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Second, propertarianism imposes an additional theoretical cost on libertarians because it entails that there could be nonvoluntary legitimate states in a world without previously acquired private property. Note that, in order to countenance the formation of private property without consent, the propertarian has to maintain that the *only* situation in which state territorial legitimacy has a person's consent as its necessary condition is when the territory in question overlaps with her already-established private property. Thus, in the absence of such property, the propertarian would have no theoretical resources to deny the legitimacy claims made by states. Perhaps some libertarians will bite the bullet and concede that some people might have the power to impose obligations on others via edict in such a world; however, most libertarians – particularly those attracted to a standard consent theory of legitimacy – will likely reject this conclusion.

A third and related point is that the propertarian position is dialectically weak. Note that the position's core claim is that there is an incompatibility between the existence of private property owners and a state being legitimate with respect to those owners. The propertarian then posits that there are such owners and rejects state legitimacy as part of a modus ponens argument. However, one might equally accept one of the many arguments for state legitimacy and employ the propertarian incompatibility premise as part of a modus tollens argument: Given that there are legitimate states and such states are incompatible with libertarian entitlements, it follows that there are not any such entitlements. Further, because the propertarian claim is that the *only* reason that states are illegitimate is because legitimacy is incompatible with private property, propertarians would have no independent grounds for denying the posited premise that there are legitimate states. Granted, they could appeal to their positive reasons for endorsing the existence of property rights. However, these reasons would then have to be weighed against the reasons for thinking that states are legitimate, with there being a nontrivial chance that the latter prove weightier, thereby negating the propertarian position.

Finally, note that propertarianism is incompatible with any consent theory of legitimacy grounded in considerations other than the conflict between state legitimacy and preexisting private property. As discussed just prior, the propertarian must concede that there is no problem with legitimacy obtaining without consent, as she insists that initial appropriation does not have consent as its necessary condition. On her view, consent is only needed when late-arriving states want to govern a territory, where some portion of that territory is already owned. However, this claim contradicts any position that holds that legitimacy requires

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consent irrespective of facts about property. For example, both Simmons' position as described in Section 4.2 as well as other influential arguments against nonconsensual legitimacy (e.g., those advanced by Huemer (2013) or van der Vossen (2019)) would contradict the propertarian claim that, in the absence of property, there can be legitimacy without consent. Given that such legitimacy allows for the establishment of arbitrary perfect, special obligations, Simmons would still insist that it has consent as its necessary condition. Similarly, van der Vossen (2019) observes that libertarians often reject nonconsensual legitimacy on the grounds that it amounts to an unacceptable form of moral subordination. Given this commitment, such libertarians would still seemingly reject nonconsensual legitimacy as an unacceptable form of subordination even when it does not conflict with preexisting private property rights. Thus, most libertarian consent theorists would not want to adopt propertarianism, as that would require rejecting their grounds for endorsing consent theory. Or, to put this point a different way, all of the arguments that they have developed for consent theory will bear against propertarianism, thereby calling its plausibility into question.

4.7 Commonsense Distinctions

Finally, property-sympathetic libertarians might object to the chapter's thesis by appealing to a family of existing arguments for the nonidentity of property ownership and state legitimacy. What these arguments all have in common is that they rest on various commonsense claims about the relationship between private property and state territory. However, it will be argued that these arguments are either flawed or unacceptable to those who endorse core libertarian theses, that is, the people at whom the foregoing argument is directed.

The first commonsense argument is one that has been put forward by Lea Brilmayer (1989, 15), Allen Buchanan (2003, 234), and Cara Nine (2008a, 149). It begins with the premise that, if person P buys a tract of land L within the borders of state S, P owns that land but S is still legitimate with respect to L, as S retains the right to regulate conduct within L, collect taxes on L, etc. If territorial legitimacy and ownership are identical powers as argued previously, then both P and S are owners of L. However, there cannot be multiple (non-joint) owners of L. Thus, ownership and territorial legitimacy are distinct relations. Specifically, on this view, legitimacy is a *jurisdictional* power to impose and enforce rules in L; by contrast, ownership exists within jurisdictions as a distinct power. Only

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if one accepts this distinction can one make sense of how all of the land within a territory belongs to the state (and, on a democratic view, those it represents) while certain tracts of that land are owned by private individuals (Buchanan 2003, 234).

The first problem with this argument is that it is not clear how the jurisdictional power is supposed to differ from property ownership, particularly given the foregoing argument that *P*'s ownership entails the power to impose rule regulating conduct in *L*. While perhaps the abovementioned philosophers might posit that ownership is in some sense subordinate to – and, thus, distinct from – legitimacy, that would seemingly just assert that which needs to be demonstrated. Second, note that libertarians cannot appeal to this argument because they reject its starting premise. On their view, ownership entails exclusive control of the owned thing by the owner. In other words, if *P* owns *L*, it cannot be the case that *S* retains the right to regulate and tax *L*. Admittedly, this understanding of property entails the counterintuitive result that the citizens of legitimate states cannot own property. However, libertarians would insist that this is the correct conclusion and that, while such citizens perhaps have *legal* property rights afforded to them by the state, such rights are not genuine *moral* ownership rights of the kind that they endorse. Indeed, the incompatibility of ownership and legitimacy is part of the reason that libertarians insist that legitimacy requires consent, as noted in the previous section.

A second quick argument also made by Buchanan holds that "property in land is conceptually and morally distinct from the right to territory . . . because land is not the same as territory" (2003, 232). Specifically, he maintains that land is "a geographical concept" while territory "is a geographical jurisdiction," where a jurisdiction is domain in which an authority gets to make and enforce rules (232–3). However, while it is true that land is strictly a geographic notion, the *ownership* of land gives one the ability to make rules governing those within that region, as discussed previously. Thus, while the concept of territory might have normative implications that the concept of land lacks, it does not follow that the *ownership of land* is conceptually distinct from the possession of territorial legitimacy.

A third argument proposed by Nine (2008b) contends that ownership and legitimacy are distinct because they serve different functions. Nine argues that the rights associated with ownership protect people's ability to "pursue their own conception of the good" (961). By contrast, the rights established by legitimate states protect actions and relations of the kind that "makes possible the establishment of justice," for example, the

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enforcement of laws and the protection of the commons (961). This difference in function entails that ownership is not reducible to legitimacy (and vice versa).

However, libertarians who wish to defend the existence of property would have to reject this proposal for a number of reasons. First, most would deny that the proposed examples of justice-upholding actions are properly carried out by states rather than property owners. For example, anarcho-capitalists like Huemer (2013) contend that law enforcement should be carried out by private companies and purchased on the market. And David Schmidtz (1990) contends that private property rights are a way of protecting the commons from degradation and preserving resources for latecomers. Second, libertarians take the relations between people and their holdings to be relations of justice. Given that property rights protect the upholding of these relations, libertarians would deny that territorial rights are justice-promoting in a way that property rights are not. Finally, many libertarians would reject Nine's background assumption that rights "are social tools that we use to protect and encourage the realization of certain values" (2008b, 961). For most natural rights libertarians, rights express pre-social facts about the justice and permissibility of various actions. They would, thus, deny that property rights have a *function* (in the relevant sense), and, by extension, would deny that property rights have a function distinct from territorial rights.

The final argument to be considered is one independently advanced by both Margaret Moore (2004) and Buchanan (2003). Drawing from democratic theory, this argument contends that a state's territory differs from property in that the former *belongs* to the people of that state, where this belonging constrains state authority. For example, Buchanan argues that this belonging relation entails that exercises of state authority must be for the benefit of its citizens (2003, 234–5). Similarly, Moore argues that this relation precludes the state from transferring parts of its territory to other states, particularly if the inhabitants of those regions do not want such a transfer to occur (2004, 141–2). These restrictions set territorial legitimacy apart from ownership, which lacks any such constraints upon its associated rights of use, exclusion, and transfer.

Insofar as libertarians endorse a consent theory of legitimacy, they cannot employ this argument to fend off the preceding argument against private property. Specifically, such libertarians cannot consistently accept the proposed democratic restrictions on state legitimacy, as they would not see a legitimate state as subject to any restrictions beyond those imposed by the consenting parties. According to consent theory, if all parties agree to

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obey the laws of the state, then those parties would be obligated to obey territorial transfer laws mandating that they now obey the laws of a different state. Similarly, they would be obliged to obey laws that were not to their benefit. Of course, a state's subjects may have insisted on prohibitions on territorial transfer and/or non-beneficial legislation as a condition of their consent, thereby giving their state only partial legitimacy. However, the fact that it is possible for a state to have full legitimacy free of such constraints negates the claim that territorial legitimacy is limited in a way that ownership is not. Thus, libertarians sympathetic to consent theory could not appeal to this argument to reject the conclusion that property rights entail territorial legitimacy.

Even if one concedes that legitimacy is bounded in the sense described previously, the argument against property still goes through. Note that, in order to succeed, the argument does not have to demonstrate that legitimacy and the powers afforded by ownership are *identical*. Nor does it have to prove that property rights endow their possessors with a power identical to some alternative power that states possess (where it is Moore's and Buchanan's contention that this latter power is weaker than – and, thus, nonidentical to – property owners' territorial legitimacy). Rather, the argument merely needs to show that ownership entails territorial legitimacy, as one can then infer from the consent theory of territorial legitimacy that ownership has consent as its necessary condition (given that, if *A* implies *B* and *B* implies *C*, then one can validly infer that *A* implies *C*). In other words, even if Moore and Buchanan are correct that *states* are not territorially legitimate because their powers are constrained in various ways that territorial legitimacy is not, it would still follow that *property owners* are territorially legitimate. Thus, property ownership would still have consent as its necessary condition irrespective of whether or not states are territorially legitimate.

4.8 Consent Theory and Self-Ownership

While the foregoing objections do not succeed, the conclusion that property has consent as its necessary condition creates an apparent problem for the anarchist contention that persons are able to acquire ownership of their own bodies through appropriation. If the appropriation of any bit of matter grants the owners the power of territorial legitimacy, then self-owners possess territorial legitimacy, as the bodies they own are just bits of matter like any other resource. Thus, consent theory seemingly entails that self-appropriation has consent as its necessary condition – a result that

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precludes the kind of easily achievable self-appropriation that was posited in Chapter 3.

The quick response to this objection is to note that the anarchist position affirms ASO as opposed to the classical self-ownership thesis – that is, that self-owners have claims against only certain forms of contact, namely, contact that does not uniquely generate supplemental benefit. Because ASO's posited exclusion rights are much more limited than those posited by the classical self-ownership thesis, anarchist self-owners are correspondingly limited when it comes to their ability to issue edicts that conditionally oblige others. In the case of classical self-ownership, if self-owner P issues the edict that Q must ϕ if she is in contact with P's body, then Q is obligated to ϕ if she is making such contact (as P has the power to waive her right to exclude Q from her body on the condition that Q ϕ-s). By contrast, this is not true if P has only the exclusion rights posited by ASO. Given that P only has a right against Q using P's body in ways that do not uniquely generate supplemental benefit, she would have only the following power of *self-sovereignty*: If P issues the edict that Q must ϕ if she is in contact with P's body, then Q is obligated to ϕ if she is making such contact *and* such contact does not uniquely generate supplemental benefit. Given that this is a much weaker power than territorial legitimacy, it is not clear that the basis for positing a consent theory of territorial legitimacy will also support the claim that self-sovereignty has consent as its necessary condition. Anarchists might thereby avoid any contradiction between consent theory and the self-ownership thesis by denying that self-sovereignty requires consent in the way that territorial legitimacy does.

What if this quick reply does not succeed? Suppose it turns out that self-sovereignty is, in fact, relevantly similar to territorial legitimacy such that it has others' consent as its necessary condition as well. In this case, some anarchists may be tempted to simply abandon the self-ownership thesis and maintain that the permissible use of *all* resources – including bodies – is governed by distributive claims rather than property claims. This would not be an entirely intolerable outcome, as most of the anarchist position would remain intact: One would still end up with a rejection of private property and an endorsement of luck egalitarian distributive rights, both of which have been shown to follow from the moral tyranny constraint and other core libertarian theses such as the consent theory of legitimacy. However, as discussed in Sections 1.4 and 1.9, the self-ownership thesis has many attractive implications; thus, retaining the thesis would enhance the anarchist position's plausibility. Additionally, an anarchist position

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that included the thesis would better reflect the commitments of self-identified anarchists who typically prize bodily autonomy.

Fortunately, there are a number of possible ways to resolve the tension between consent theory and self-ownership, even supposing that one rejects the quick reply. Specifically, this section will critically discuss three additional ways to avoid the posited contradiction, beginning with the least promising proposal and concluding with the most promising. That said, each proposal has its own theoretical advantages and disadvantages, and reasonable people might disagree about which is best when it comes to resolving the contradiction between the two anarchist theses.

The first way to avoid a contradiction between self-ownership and consent theory is to weaken the latter such that consent becomes a necessary condition of a person *establishing* legitimacy rather than a necessary condition of legitimacy *tout court*. One would then need to reject the anarchist contention that self-ownership is acquired rather than native – that is, one would have to hold that people enter existence with self-ownership rights already in their possession (either at birth or when they first attain moral personhood). Together, these adjustments would allow one to maintain that persons possess self-ownership rights even absent others' consent due to the fact that these rights are given rather than established; by contrast, initial appropriation *would* require consent, as it bestows territorial legitimacy vis-à-vis some bit of matter on persons who did not previously possess this power. In this way, the anarchist could preserve the self-ownership thesis while still rejecting private property on consent theory grounds.

However, both of these proposed adjustments come at a cost. First, treating self-ownership as native rather than acquired gives rise to the theoretical problems discussed in Section 1.3 and Section 3.6. And, second, it is not clear why consent would be a necessary condition of establishing legitimacy but not a necessary condition of legitimacy itself. Perhaps one might hold that what is problematic is people having *discretionary control* over what powers they have. Thus, while consent is not needed to justify a person's territorial legitimacy, her *making* herself legitimate requires such justification. The problem with this suggestion is that it seems to be the power itself that requires consent, even when it is not subject to a person's control. Suppose, for example, that a monarch insisted that she has possessed territorial legitimacy over some region since birth. Few consent theorists would think that this makes her claimed power any less problematic than if it were acquired. This suggests that a distinction between established and native territorial legitimacy cannot

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support a more limited consent theory that only applies to the former; rather, such a weakening of the theory would be ad hoc and arbitrary.

A more promising way to resolve the tension between consent theory and acquired self-ownership is to further weaken the self-ownership thesis such that it not only assigns the more limited set of exclusion rights articulated by ASO but also does not assign self-owners the power to waive those rights conditional on certain future acts being performed. Without this power, self-owners cannot conditionally permit others to make contact with their bodies and, thus, cannot impose conditional obligations on others via the issuing of edicts. For example, standard ASO assigns self-owner *P* the power to waive her right against *Q* using *P*'s body in a way that does not uniquely generate supplemental benefit on the condition that *Q* wears red, where such conditional waiving obliges *Q* to wear red if she touches *P* in a way that does not uniquely generate supplemental benefit. By contrast, the even-more-limited version of ASO would deny that *P* has this power. This, in turn, entails that *Q* is obliged to not make the specified use of *P*'s body irrespective of what *P* says, thereby stripping *P* of her power of self-sovereignty. Given that the weakened version of ASO does not entail either self-sovereignty or territorial legitimacy, self-appropriation would be fully compatible with the conjunction of consent theory and the fact that no one has consented to anyone else's self-ownership.

There are three potential objections to this proposal, though replies can be made to each. The first objection is that the theoretical choice to exclude the power to conditionally waive from the bundle of self-ownership rights is both *ad hoc* and unmotivated. Why deny persons this power aside from the fact that it makes self-ownership compatible with consent theory? In response to this challenge, one might appeal to various objections that have been made to the conditional exchange of goods and services. For example, I have elsewhere argued that anarchists' opposition to limiting others' freedom leads them to assert that conditional exchange is morally objectionable (2020b). If this thesis is correct, it would represent a principled, anarchist-friendly reason for denying that persons have the power to waive their self-ownership rights conditional on others acting in some way.[15]

The second objection is that the proposal threatens to undermine this chapter's foregoing argument against the existence of private property, as

[15] See also Spafford (2019, 233–4) for an argument that socialists who care about community should oppose conditional exchange.

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the property proponent could make the same argumentative move and posit that property owners lack the power to conditionally waive their property rights. Given that property owners are territorially legitimate only if they can waive their claims to exclude, the acquisition of non-waivable exclusionary property rights would not require consent, thereby sidestepping the argument presented in Sections 4.1–4.4. Admittedly, this move would succeed in its aim of defusing this chapter's consent theory-based argument against private property. However, it will be unacceptable to the defenders of property who would seek to deny this argument. Additionally, Section 3.1's argument from the Lockean proviso would still be sound even if exclusionary property rights are not waivable. Thus, the anarchist could still maintain that no one owns any external natural resources (though she would have only one argument to support this claim rather than two).[16]

Finally, one might reject this proposal on the grounds that non-waivable exclusion rights are unattractive, as they do not give self-owners enough moral control over their bodies. Consider, for example, the person who wishes to spar in a boxing ring with a friend or be kissed by someone who made her laugh. Absent a power to waive her self-ownership rights, she could not give others moral permission to make such contact with her body. Such activities would thereby wrong her – and this would be true even if she held all of the attitudes and performed all of the actions associated with giving consent. Such a result would be highly implausible, thereby ruling out this strategy for rescuing self-ownership from consent theory.

In response to this objection, note that the proposed weakening of ASO does not deny self-owners the power to waive their rights. Nor does it deny them the power to waive their rights conditional on some already obtaining fact or even most future occurrences. Rather, it merely denies them the power to waive their exclusion rights conditional on the

[16] This reply requires qualification. Section 3.1 *did* appeal to the waivability of property rights as part of its argument for the claim that appropriation almost never satisfies the Lockean proviso. Specifically, it appealed to the interpretation of the proviso put forward in Section 1.2 wherein it was held that appropriation succeeds only if no subsequent waiving of the established claims could leave others worse off_{FC}. It then argued that practically all candidate appropriations would violate this necessary condition, as someone would almost always be left worse off_{FC} if the appropriator's established exclusion rights were waived in the most disadvantageous way possible. However, if property rights do not include the specified power to waive, that limits the extent to which appropriators could realize cost_{FC}-imposing patterns of exclusionary claims via waiving. Thus, there will be more cases of appropriation that satisfy the Lockean proviso, potentially allowing for *some* ownership of external resources (though it would likely be quite limited given the scarcity of resources and the associated costs_{FC} of (non-waivable) exclusion rights).

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otherwise-excluded party performing some future action. Thus, in both the boxing and kissing cases presented just prior, the person would be able to waive her claims against bodily contact. Granted, there would still be some cases where this proposal would not allow for conditional waiving of the kind favored by libertarian-minded people. For example, sex work, hired surrogacy, and the purchase of kidneys or blood plasma would violate the self-ownership rights of the persons whose bodies are being used – and this would be true irrespective of whether they agreed to sell their bodies in this way. However, this is a relatively small theoretical cost to pay for rescuing the self-ownership from the consent theorist's argument against property ownership.[17]

The final proposed way to make ASO compatible with consent theory is to weaken the latter such that P can acquire the power of territorial legitimacy – or, more precisely, self-sovereignty – vis-à-vis Q if and only if (a) P acquires consent from Q *or* (b) she would not be responsible for leaving Q worse off_{FC} regardless of how P exercised her acquired power. This added disjunct (b) would then be satisfied by self-appropriation for reasons similar to why self-appropriation satisfies the Lockean proviso (as discussed in Section 3.2). To see this, consider a case where Q's ϕ-ing would make contact with P's body and thereby generate x units of advantage for Q without uniquely generating any supplemental benefit. Further, suppose that P exercises her power of self-sovereignty and issues the edict that, if Q ϕ-s, she must also ψ, where ψ-ing imposes some cost of y on Q. Given that P's established claim is conditional, Q's choice to either ϕ or not ϕ will determine what her future full compliance involves, and, thus, what costs_{FC} she incurs. In the full-compliance world where Q declines to ϕ, the cost_{FC} she incurs is simply x, as she $\text{foregoes}_{\text{FC}}$ the advantage she would have had if she had made the specified contact with P's body. By contrast, the full-compliance world where Q ϕ-s is one where Q also ψ-s, with Q thereby avoiding the cost of x but incurring the cost of y.

Why, then, is P not responsible for leaving Q worse off_{FC} when she issues her edict? Recall from Section 3.4 that P is responsible for imposing some cost_{FC} on Q only if Q's incurred cost_{FC} survives the nonexistence

[17] Interestingly, this result actually brings the position into greater alignment with the intuitions of many non-libertarians who believe that sex workers/plasma sellers/etc. are wronged despite explicitly agreeing to permit the use of their bodies in exchange for money. Thus, this implication of the proposed modification of ASO may actually be an *advantage* for the theory rather than a cost. That said, the argument of the book is primarily directed at libertarians who do not share these intuitions. For this reason, the fact that the proposal's implications run contrary to libertarian intuitions is presented as a theoretical weakness rather than a strength.

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comparison – that is, Q would not suffer that cost in the closest possible full-compliance world where P does not exist. Further, note that the cost_{FC} that Q would incur if P had never existed is equal to x, as P's nonexistence would preclude Q from obtaining the x units of advantage that she would otherwise acquire by using P's body. Thus, the costs_{FC} of Q not ϕ-ing are equal to the costs_{FC} she incurs in the world where P does not exist – that is, the former costs_{FC} do not survive the nonexistence comparison. This, in turn, implies that P is not responsible for Q incurring a cost_{FC} of x when she does not ϕ.

What if a fully compliant Q does ϕ? Given that her ϕ-ing entails that she will then ψ and incur a cost_{FC} of y, there are two possibilities: either she ends up no worse off_{FC} than if she did not ϕ (because $x \geq y$) or she ends up worse off_{FC} (because $x < y$). If ϕ-ing leaves her no worse off_{FC}, then P is not responsible for leaving her worse off_{FC}, as she is no worse off_{FC} in the world where she ϕ-s than the world where P does not exist. For, as noted in the previous paragraph, Q is no worse off_{FC} in the world where she does not ϕ than she is in the nonexistence world; thus, if she is no worse off_{FC} in the world where she ϕ-s than she is in the world where she does not ϕ, then, transitively, she is no worse off_{FC} in the world where she ϕ-s than she is in the world where P does not exist.

Suppose, instead, that Q *is* worse off_{FC} if she ϕ-s relative to the world where she does not due to x being less than y. In this case, Q may end up worse off_{FC} than she would be in the world where P does not exist. However, recall from Section 3.4 that an additional necessary condition of P being responsible for leaving others worse off_{FC} is P having *unilaterally* left them worse off_{FC}. In other words, any avoidable costs_{FC} that Q incurs due to her subsequent choices do not count when assessing whether P is responsible for leaving her worse off_{FC} (i.e., whether Condition (b) is satisfied). Given that Q could avoid the supplemental costs_{FC} of ϕ-ing by not ϕ-ing, it follows that P is not responsible for these costs_{FC}. Thus, irrespective of which choice Q makes, P is not responsible for her incurred costs_{FC}, that is, P is not responsible for leaving Q worse off_{FC}. Further, given that P's edict was described generically, it follows that a self-sovereign P will *never* be responsible for leaving Q worse off_{FC} by issuing an edict, with self-sovereignty thereby necessarily satisfying Condition (b) of the revised consent theory of self-sovereignty. Thus, self-sovereignty is compatible with the previously proposed revised consent theory.

There are two objections to this proposal that are worth addressing. The first worry is that the move to append Condition (b) to standard consent theory is ad hoc and, more problematically, in tension with the motivations

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for adopting consent theory in the first place. Here, one might reply by appealing to the claim in Chapter 2 about the relationship between consent theory and the moral tyranny constraint. Specifically, Section 2.4 suggested that the reason for endorsing consent theory is that legitimacy satisfies the moral tyranny constraint only if it has consent as its necessary condition. Because legitimate authorities are able to foreseeably and discretionarily leave others worse off$_{FC}$ via the issuing of edicts, they must be denied the ability to *unilaterally* do so; that is, consent must be a necessary condition of this power to oblige. However, Section 3.4 argued that the moral tyranny constraint should be generalized such that it condemns moral theories that allow people to leave others worse off$_{FC}$ *while being responsible* for leaving others worse off$_{FC}$ in this way. And it has now been shown that self-sovereign agents are never responsible for leaving others worse off$_{FC}$ in this way. Thus, there is no moral tyranny-related reason for insisting that consent is always a necessary condition of self-sovereignty and territorial legitimacy more generally. Rather, Condition (b) is an appropriate addition to standard consent theory, as, like Condition (a), it allows for (territorial) legitimacy so long as that power does not violate the moral tyranny constraint.

The second objection is that this amendment effectively reduces consent theory to the Lockean proviso. Once one makes non-worsening$_{FC}$ a disjunctive sufficient condition of legitimacy (and self-sovereignty) alongside consent, the resultant principle starts to closely resemble the proviso with its contention that an act of appropriation establishes (self-)ownership rights if and only if the established claims and the possible subsequent waiving of those claims would not leave others worse off$_{FC}$. After all, both consent theory (in its revised form) and the proviso are satisfied if the established rights of exclusion – when paired with the power to waive those rights – do not leave others worse off$_{FC}$. Thus, one might worry that this third compatibilist proposal renders the argument of this chapter redundant (even if it does allow for self-appropriation).

Two things can be said in response to this objection. First, one might reply that even if the Lockean proviso and the proposed revision of consent theory do not differ importantly in their content, this does not diminish the dialectical significance of the foregoing argument. Even if one ends up accepting a consent theory that is quite similar to the Lockean proviso, one does so because standard consent theory threatens to negate the existence of *all* private property including the modest self-ownership rights posited by ASO. In other words, the proposed revision represents the conclusion of an independent argument against private property that has the standard

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consent theory of legitimacy as its starting premise. This is of particular dialectical significance given that those who favor private property seemingly need to endorse a consent theory of legitimacy for the reasons discussed in Section 4.5: Absent such a theory, people are liable to have various permissions to use their owned property stripped from them by state regulation. Thus, one can understand the foregoing argument as a way of pressuring both consent theorists and property rights proponents into first giving up private property and then accepting a revised version of consent theory that approximates the Lockean proviso.

Second, note that there is an important difference between the compatibilist revision of consent theory and the Lockean proviso, namely, that the latter does not make consent a sufficient condition of appropriation. However, the foregoing discussion also suggests that this is something of an oversight and that the proviso should really take a disjunctive form with both consent and non-worsening$_{FC}$ serving as individually sufficient and disjunctively necessary conditions of appropriation. Thus, one might take the proposed compatibilist position to represent a synthesis of the proviso and standard consent theory. Specifically, each principle can be understood as an attempt to address initial appropriation's moral tyranny problem, with the proviso aiming to preclude culpable worsening$_{FC}$ while consent theory aims to preclude any sort of *unilateral* worsening$_{FC}$. Yet, when considered in sequence, each principle appears to be overly stringent. The proviso is too stringent because it precludes consensual appropriation that leaves the consenter worse off$_{FC}$ – an outcome that is unproblematic vis-à-vis the moral tyranny constraint. And standard consent theory is too stringent because it demands consent even when a successful appropriator would be unable to leave anyone worse off$_{FC}$ irrespective of how she exercised her established powers. By contrast, the posited compatibilist version of consent theory allows for appropriation given *either* consent or non-worsening$_{FC}$, thereby correcting for the respective overreaches of the proviso and standard consent theory. It is, thus, importantly distinct from the Lockean proviso (in addition to the fact that it is derived from standard consent theory).

4.9 Philosophical Anarchism and the Anarchist Conclusion

Before concluding, it is worth drawing attention to how the argument of this chapter – or, more precisely, the thesis that ownership entails territorial legitimacy – helps to contextualize what Section 1.6 called *the anarchist conclusion*. When it comes to discussions of state legitimacy, consent

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theorists are *philosophical anarchists* who insist that there are no existing legitimate states (while allowing that there *could* be a legitimate state under the appropriate conditions).[18] However, this position raises a natural objection, namely, that it seems to problematically imply that there is no obligation to comply with just laws. While much legislation is immoral, states also pass laws mandating that persons act in ways that morality seems to require, for example, laws that forbid murder. Thus, upon first encountering philosophical anarchism, many worry that it negates obligations to comply with these laws – that is, obligations to act in the way that morality requires – or to cooperate with state authorities who are enforcing these laws.

In reply to this worry, philosophical anarchists typically note that there are many independent grounds for obligations aside from the edicts of the legitimate state. For example, Simmons (1999) draws a distinction between justification and legitimacy. On this account, a *legitimate* state is one that has the exclusive right to impose novel obligations upon its subjects as a result of some sort of special relation that they stand in with respect to one another (746, 752).[19] By contrast, a *justified* state is one that a person has reason not to undermine (and perhaps even reason to support) in virtue of its moral quality (753). Additionally, Simmons introduces a notion that might be called *justified action*. The idea here is that the moral character of some *specific action* carried out by a state gives others reason to not interfere (and possibly assist) with that action. Thus, even if a state is neither legitimate nor justified, one might be morally required not to interfere with some moral action such as its deployment of police officers to prevent violence (770).

In other words, the philosophical anarchist reply to the aforementioned worry is that, even if a state is not legitimate, individuals might still have certain obligations with respect to that state and its actors. Similarly, the anarchist who rejects private property can apply this rejoinder to worries about what obligations people have vis-à-vis natural resources in a world without private property. Specifically, even if the anarchist position denies individuals the territorial legitimacy entailed by *property rights*, it can still assign them *distributive rights* that determine which uses of natural resources are permissible. Thus, the anarchist conclusion can be understood as an

[18] For a helpful discussion of philosophical anarchism, see Simmons (2001, 102–21).

[19] This statement of legitimacy is not quite identical to that introduced in Section 1.1, as the latter notion is not defined in terms of the *introduction* of *novel* obligations. However, that account of legitimacy is also based upon an account provided by Simmons, albeit a later one that appears to articulate his revised understanding of legitimacy.

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application of Simmons' philosophical anarchism to the special case of property ownership: Given the absence of legitimate property owners, it appeals to other moral bases to posit a set of distributive obligations vis-à-vis the use of land and resources.

4.10 Conclusion

Thus concludes the anarchist argument against private property. The contention has been that two distinctively libertarian theses – namely, the Lockean proviso and the consent theory of legitimacy – independently entail that persons lack any sort of private property rights over natural resources. Social anarchism can, thus, be understood as an inversion of standard libertarianism: While it starts out with core libertarian premises, it arrives at the opposite conclusion regarding the existence of private property. However, this result does not establish that one ought to instead, accept the egalitarian anarchist conclusion introduced in Section 1.6. Defending this claim will be the task of Chapter 5.

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CHAPTER 5

Entitlement Theory without Entitlements

> Likewise the land is indispensable to our existence, – consequently a common thing, consequently insusceptible of appropriation; but land is much scarcer than the other elements, therefore its use must be regulated, not for the profit of a few, but in the interest and for the security of all. In a word, equality of rights is proved by equality of needs. Now, equality of rights, in the case of a commodity which is limited in amount, can be realized only by equality of possession.
>
> Pierre-Joseph Proudhon, *What Is Property?*

Chapters 3 and 4 have argued that there are no existing property rights. Further, they argued that this conclusion follows independently from two principles that libertarians generally accept, namely, the Lockean proviso and the consent theory of legitimacy. The chapters, thus, articulated the distinctive anarchist thesis that private property ought to be rejected on libertarian grounds. However, this thesis underdetermines which permissions people have vis-à-vis the unowned resources that make up the natural world. One possibility is that, absent property rights, persons remain in the state of nature with respect to natural resources; that is, all persons have a permission to use any unowned resource and no one has a right against any other person using any resource. In this view, the only claims that persons can have vis-à-vis natural resources are the property rights that are generated by acts of initial appropriation. Thus, if practically all attempted appropriations fail because they violate the Lockean proviso or require consent that has not been given, it follows that there are simply no claims against others using any unowned object. Call this the *Hobbesian conclusion*. By contrast, the *anarchist conclusion* proposed in Section 1.6 maintains that people *do* possess certain claims against others using unowned resources. Specifically, these claims correspond to the prescriptions of a luck egalitarian principle of distributive justice such that each person has a set of claims against others interacting with unowned resources in a way that would generate an unjust distribution of holdings (where a

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distribution is just if and only if it is either equal or any inequality corresponds to some sanctionable choice on the part of the worse off).

Given that there are multiple conclusions that are compatible with the rejection of private property, why should one accept the anarchist conclusion rather than the Hobbesian conclusion? After all, there is a strong reason for favoring the latter over the former, namely, that the anarchist conclusion appears to be incompatible with the kind of entitlement theory of justice that is both a signature commitment of libertarian thought and seemingly presupposed by the endorsement of ASO in Chapter 1. Briefly, entitlement theories assert that justice is a function of the historical choices that persons have made. While there are many ways of formulating an entitlement theory, most variants approximate Nozick's paradigm account wherein the justice of some set of holdings depends on whether people are entitled to the holdings they possess (1974).[1] Specifically, Nozick's theory of entitlement posits that a person is entitled to some holding if and only if (a) it was unowned and she acquired it in accordance with the relevant principles of justice in acquisition or (b) it was owned by some person from whom she acquired it in accordance with the relevant principles of justice in transfer (1974, 151).[2] Justice in holdings, then, obtains if everyone is entitled to the holdings they possess (151).

In addition to positing this historical account of justice in holdings, Nozick also argues that entitlement theories are incompatible with any non-entitlement principle of distributive justice, where "non-entitlement theories" is inclusive of both "end-state" principles of justice (i.e., principles that make no reference to historical events) and "patterned" principles of justice (i.e., principles that make justice a matter of how much people have relative to some relevant property they possess, such as merit or their having contributed some quantity of labor to the social product) (1974, 153–60). Given that luck egalitarianism is a non-entitlement theory of justice, it follows that entitlement theories are incompatible with luck egalitarianism – and, thus, so are the set of distributive rights posited by the anarchist conclusion.[3]

[1] Some prominent proponents of entitlement theories of justice include Mack (1976), Rothbard (1978), Lomasky (1987), Steiner (1994), Narveson (1988), Feser (2005), and van der Vossen (2009).

[2] Nozick goes on to revise this account so as to incorporate a principle pertaining to the rectification of injustice. This principle holds that each person is entitled to the holdings they *would have had* absent all historical rights violations (Nozick 1974, 152–3). For a discussion of the shortcomings of both the original account and the revised version, see Lawrence Davis (1976, 838–40).

[3] The reason that "entitlement theories" is plural is because an entitlement theory is a *kind* of moral theory that posits that justice is a function of whether holdings were acquired in accordance with principles of just acquisition and just transfer. Given that there are various principles of just acquisition and just transfer that one might posit, there will be many different entitlement

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If this is correct, this incompatibility would be a serious problem for the anarchist conclusion, as there are two reasons that the anarchist cannot simply reject entitlement theories of justice as false. First, note that one of the theoretical advantages of the anarchist position is that it puts dialectical pressure on libertarians to accept egalitarian conclusions. Because it embraces core libertarian principles as its starting premises, the anarchist argument is much harder for libertarians to dismiss than other egalitarian arguments. If, for example, one defends egalitarianism by arguing from some set of non-libertarian premises, libertarians can avoid the conclusion by, first noting that egalitarianism is incompatible with their preferred principles and, second, using that incompatibility to justify rejecting the most controversial non-libertarian premise. By contrast, the anarchist position is not so easily avoided, as it begins with libertarian premises – that is, premises that libertarians cannot easily reject. However, this dialectical advantage is compromised if the anarchist has to reject entitlement theories on the grounds that they are incompatible with the anarchist conclusion. For, in that case, libertarians might simply insist that the anarchist's *modus tollens* argument against entitlement theories is actually a *modus ponens* argument; that is, the anarchist conclusion must be rejected as its negation follows from the acceptance of an entitlement theory of justice.

Second, and more straightforwardly, the anarchist position presupposes an entitlement theory of justice, as it grants that people can establish property rights over things via proviso-satisfying acts of initial appropriation, thereby endorsing a central tenet of entitlement theories. Granted, the set of established self-ownership rights is weaker than those posited by entitlement theorists; however, given that these rights are acquired via actions that accord with a principle of just acquisition, the anarchist argument for ASO still presupposes an entitlement theory of justice. Thus, if the anarchist conclusion proves to be incompatible with entitlement theories of justice, the anarchist cannot simply reject such theories without potentially negating her thesis that people can appropriate their bodies. This suggests that anarchists might be forced to choose between self-ownership and egalitarianism, with those who favor the former having to give up the anarchist conclusion in favor of the Hobbesian conclusion.

This chapter will argue that this is a false dilemma, as the anarchist conclusion is, in fact, compatible with entitlement theories – at least, when

theories, where these theories are individuated based upon which combination of principles they endorse.

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the latter are properly specified. First, though, it will argue that there *is* a serious cost to endorsing the anarchist's Hobbesian rival. Specifically, Section 5.1 will argue that the Hobbesian conclusion violates the moral tyranny constraint, and, for this reason, is unacceptable. Thus, those who accept the moral tyranny constraint (and the argument of the Chapters 3 and 4) ought to accept the anarchist conclusion rather than the Hobbesian one. Sections 5.2 through 5.6 will then argue that the anarchist conclusion is compatible with both entitlement theories of justice and the arguments for accepting such theories. Finally, Section 5.7 will defend the egalitarian component of the anarchist conclusion. Specifically, it will defend the conclusion's presumption that all persons start out with a claim to an equal share of advantage by arguing that it, too, follows from a core libertarian premise (albeit, not the moral tyranny constraint).

5.1 Hobbesian Moral Tyranny

The argument against the Hobbesian conclusion need not be terribly extensive, as even libertarians averse to the anarchist conclusion will likely find the implications of this alternative comparatively unattractive. For example, few libertarians would want to affirm the Hobbesian implication that a person who labors on some resource and improves its value has no claim against others coming and destroying that resource or taking it for themselves. However, it is worth briefly exploring *why* this result is a theoretical problem for the Hobbesian conclusion, as the answer to this question will help to further bolster the contention in Chapter 2 that the moral tyranny constraint entails a broad array of particular moral judgments and, thus, should be accepted as the conclusion of a process of reflective equilibrium.

A natural temptation is to reject the Hobbesian conclusion on the grounds that a world with neither private property rights (over external resources) nor distributive rights would be miserable and poor. According to this line of thinking, it would almost always be imprudent to improve resources in such a world, as others would be free to come and take whatever it is that one produced without having to bear any of the associated costs of production. Thus, all but the most altruistic persons would refrain from producing goods or carrying out even very basic economic activities like agriculture. This would make the Hobbesian world a world without industry – a world of hunters, gatherers, scavengers, and deep poverty. Given the unattractiveness of such a world, the Hobbesian conclusion must be rejected.

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The problem with this argument is one that will be familiar from the discussion in Section 1.2. There, in the context of discussing the Lockean proviso, it was argued that moral changes are causally inert due to not being physical (or mental) events. When someone stakes a claim and declares herself to be the owner of some resource, people will behave in an identical fashion whether or not that attempted act of initial appropriation succeeds as a matter of moral fact. Thus, an act of initial appropriation will never leave others worse off. For this reason, it was posited that the real concern with initial appropriation was whether or not *counterfactual compliance* with the established rights would leave others worse off. Similarly, when considering what was wrong with strict egalitarian theories, it was noted that someone spitefully destroying her own advantage will not *actually* leave others worse off because their post-destruction holdings are a function of their society's contingent redistributive institutions, not any moral fact about whether their holdings are just. Rather, the problem with strict egalitarianism is that it enables the spiteful destroyer to leave others worse off *assuming* everyone were to fully comply with the prescriptions of that moral theory.

The posited objection to the Hobbesian conclusion seems to make the same kind of mistake. It presupposes that an absence of property claims and distributive claims will result in persons behaving differently than they would in the world where they have such claims. However, this presumption is incorrect for the reasons just discussed: People's behavior is a function of their beliefs and their social contexts, not the moral facts. Thus, any objection to the Hobbesian conclusion that appeals to its supposed undesirable outcomes cannot succeed. Even if the Hobbesian conclusion were true, people would not behave any differently than they would if it were false, which is to say they would have still set up systems of legally enshrined private property with all of the attendant economic and social consequences.

Rather, the unacceptability of the Hobbesian conclusion is better explained by appealing to the moral tyranny constraint. Note that if a person has a property claim or a distributive claim against others using some resource in an advantage-diminishing way, then they will owe her compensation if they infringe upon this claim. Given that this remedial duty would be discharged in the full-compliance world, she will end up no worse off$_{FC}$ as a result of their use of the resource, as the compensation would offset any costs$_{FC}$ she would have otherwise incurred due to their infringing action. By contrast, if the Hobbesian conclusion is correct, then persons lack any claims vis-à-vis natural resources. This, in turn, implies

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that they have no claim to any sort of compensation when others act on any given resource. For example, a scavenger could come and take everything that a farmer produces without owing the farmer anything in virtue of this action.[4] Thus, the scavenger would be able to unilaterally, discretionarily, and foreseeably leave the farmer worse off_{FC}, in violation of the moral tyranny constraint.

Given that the Hobbesian conclusion violates the moral tyranny constraint in this way, one can appeal to the constraint to explain the unacceptability of this conclusion. While the truth of the Hobbesian conclusion would not entail that people end up living up in a chaotic and impoverished state of nature, it *would* license people to foreseeably, discretionarily, and unilaterally leave others with $less_{FC}$. Thus, one can deny the Hobbesian conclusion on moral tyranny grounds. This result further bolsters the moral tyranny constraint's explanatory power, thereby strengthening the reflective equilibrium argument for the constraint presented in Section 2.3.

5.2 The Incompatibilist Argument

Given that the Hobbesian conclusion violates the moral tyranny constraint, one must posit some other thesis that *does* assign persons duties vis-à-vis natural resources. Further, given the arguments of Chapters 3 and 4, these duties cannot be property rights and must, instead, be distributive claims of some variety. Given these constraints, the anarchist conclusion seems like a promising candidate thesis to endorse to avoid the moral tyranny of both private property acquisition and the Hobbesian conclusion.[5] However, as noted earlier, this conclusion's incorporation of luck egalitarianism appears to render it incompatible with any entitlement theory of justice. Thus, one

[4] Granted, there are certain measures that the farmer could take to preclude this outcome. While she will not be able to protect her crops via coercive means when such coercion violates the rights of others, she might employ various noncoercive measures such as building a very secure wall around her farm. That said, barring a state of complete security where no person is able to seize any other person's products, the Hobbesian conclusion will still violate the moral tyranny constraint. Additionally, even if, as a matter of contingent fact, no person was able to seize someone else's holdings, one might think that both moral theories and meta-theories like the moral tyranny constraint are *necessarily* true; thus, the Hobbesian conclusion would still violate the moral tyranny constraint because it would allow people to leave others worse off_{FC} in the possible worlds where people's holdings are not totally secured.

[5] Granted, the moral tyranny constraint would be satisfied by many theories of distributive claims so long as those theories are sensitive to responsibility in the sense discussed in Chapter 6. Thus, the foregoing argument does not show that one must accept the egalitarian aspect of the anarchist conclusion. Much more will be said about this point in Section 5.7.

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might worry that accepting the anarchist conclusion requires rejecting entitlement theories with all of the attendant theoretical costs discussed in this chapter's introduction. The task of the subsequent four sections is to argue against this conclusion by demonstrating that the anarchist conclusion can be reconciled with entitlement theories of justice.

Why think that the anarchist conclusion is incompatible with an entitlement theory of justice? Begin by returning to luck egalitarianism's contention that an inequality is unjust if (and only if) it is due to luck – that is, if the worse-off party has not made some relevant sanctionable choice that justifies that inequality. By contrast, Nozick's articulation of entitlement theories holds that a distribution is just if each person is entitled to her respective holdings. Now consider a case where holdings are distributed contrary to the prescriptions of luck egalitarianism – that is, someone is worse off than another person despite not having chosen sanctionably – but, by hypothesis, all such holdings have been obtained via just appropriation and transfer. In such a case, luck egalitarianism would entail that the distribution is unjust while the entitlement theory would entail that it is just. Thus, one must reject one of the two theories to avoid contradiction.

Does this simple *incompatibilist argument* demonstrate that entitlement theories of justice are incompatible with the anarchist conclusion in addition to standard luck egalitarianism? Entitlement theorists might be tempted to answer this question affirmatively, as the anarchist conclusion assigns distributive claims in accordance with the prescriptions of a luck egalitarian principle of justice. As just noted, luck egalitarianism holds that a distribution is just if and only if any inequality reflects some sanctionable choice on the part of the worse off. The anarchist conclusion then incorporates this judgment by assigning to each person claims against others using unowned resources in a way that would leave her worse off than others (where a person forfeits some of these claims when she chooses sanctionably). Thus, entitlement theorists might reasonably infer that the anarchist conclusion is similarly incompatible with entitlement theories of justice.

Against this inference, one might contend that the anarchist conclusion does not presuppose or otherwise imply the luck egalitarian principle of justice. Rather, it simply employs this principle as a way of determining which claims people have, without affirming luck egalitarianism's assertion that any luck-based inequality is unjust. Thus, the anarchist conclusion sidesteps the incompatibilist argument, as it does not entail that distribution in the posited case is unjust. However, this move is a bit too quick, as

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there is arguably a conceptual relation between people's assigned claims and justice that allows for the incompatibilist argument to be applied to the anarchist conclusion. Specifically, one might think that, at least in most cases, if a person has a claim to some state of affairs obtaining, then it is just if that state of affairs obtains – that is, the state of affairs is just.[6] Or, more modestly, one might merely hold that a state of affairs is *unjust* if a person has a claim against the realization that state of affairs. (Perhaps she must hold this claim against all other persons.)

If this is right, then the anarchist conclusion's assignment of claims *does* entail that certain unequal distributions are unjust. Specifically, it will declare that a state of affairs is unjust if someone generated a luck-based inequality by acting on an unowned resource. Notably, this includes distributions where everyone is also entitled to their holdings – that is, distributions that are just according to an entitlement theory of justice. Thus, one cannot rescue the anarchist conclusion from the incompatibilist argument by denying that it declares distributions unjust.

5.3 The Left-Libertarian Solution

One strategy for avoiding the incompatibilist argument is to constrain entitlement theories in a way that precludes the possibility of the posited case obtaining (i.e., someone suffering luck-based disadvantage when everyone is entitled to their holdings). This approach is popular among left-libertarians, who maintain that the appropriation of resources is constrained by an egalitarian proviso. For example, Otsuka (2003), in defending a luck egalitarian principle of equal opportunity for welfare, argues that there can be no case where this principle is violated but all holdings have been acquired through either just transfer or just appropriation.

[6] The reason for the qualifier is that there are some potential counterexamples to the unqualified version of this claim. For example, David Miller (2017, §1.2) suggests that emergency situations might give rise to duties – and more specifically *enforceable* duties – that exceed what is required by justice. Similarly, Buchanan (1987, 562–3) argues that people might have enforceable duties that are not duties of justice, for example, duties to solve collective action problems. However, as Miller notes, these exceptions are rare. More importantly, when it comes to the foregoing dialectic, the incompatibilist argument will extend to the anarchist conclusion so long as its posited case is one where duties to refrain from realizing some state of affairs imply injustice. In other words, the anarchist conclusion will be incompatible with entitlement theories if there is *at least one case* where (a) a luck-based inequality obtains, (b) everyone has justly acquired their holdings according to the relevant entitlement theory, and (c) duties to refrain from realizing a state of affairs *in this case* imply that the state of affairs is unjust.

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Specifically, he argues that an egalitarian proviso obtains such that one can appropriate some natural resource only if everyone else is left an equally good share of unowned natural resources – where two shares are equally good if and only if the holders of those shares have an equal opportunity to obtain welfare via the use and/or exchange of their holdings. Given that luck-based inequality can obtain between two people only if they did not have equal opportunities to obtain welfare, it follows that any luck-based inequality implies a violation of Otsuka's egalitarian proviso. Thus, the existence of luck-based inequality implies that the better-off did not justly acquire their property. This, in turn, implies that the case posited by the incompatibilist argument is impossible: There cannot be a situation where a luck-based inequality obtains but each person is entitled to her respective holdings.

While this strategy may succeed, it is vulnerable to various objections. For example, Mathias Risse notes that anti-egalitarian libertarians might simply reject Otsuka's egalitarian proviso on the grounds that they reject the fairness considerations that ground it (2004, 354–5). Notably, Otsuka defends his proviso by suggesting that it would be *unfair* if the first person to encounter a natural resource were able to acquire it and thereby preclude later arrivals from reaching the level of welfare that they would have achieved had they arrived first and appropriated that resource (1998, 78). However, in response to this complaint, an anti-egalitarian libertarian might simply deny that fairness is a genuine moral concern, or, more modestly, contend that it does not bear upon whether a holding is just. Thus, she would deny the egalitarian proviso, thereby readmitting the possibility of cases where the anarchist conclusion and entitlement theories entail incompatible claims about justice.

More importantly, note that the posited egalitarian proviso is incompatible with the Lockean proviso introduced in Chapter 1 and defended in Chapters 2 and 3. Because the latter allows for appropriations that deny others an equal opportunity to obtain welfare (so long as no one is left worse off$_{FC}$), there will be cases where the two provisos will yield contradictory judgments. Thus, the anarchist cannot employ the kind of egalitarian proviso favored by left-libertarians while sustaining her commitment to the Lockean proviso. Of course, she could abandon that part of her position, but doing so would undermine the argument of Chapter 3, which, in turn, would leave her endorsement of ASO without its foundational supporting argument. Given the high theoretical costs of abandoning the Lockean proviso, some other strategy is needed for making the anarchist conclusion compatible with entitlement theories of justice.

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5.4 Just Holdings vs. Just Distributions

Fortunately for the anarchist, there is an alternative compatibilist strategy available to her. This approach revises entitlement theories but does so without any appeal to fairness or egalitarian notions that entitlement theorists might be happy to reject. Rather, it contends that there is an internal problem with the foregoing account of entitlement theories that should motivate any entitlement theorist to revise her theory in the way suggested subsequently. Recall that entitlement theories have so far been defined using Nozick's formulation: A distribution is just if all persons are entitled to their respective holdings. However, suppose that someone's holdings include some unowned thing that she has never bothered to appropriate but nonetheless possesses.[7] Given such possession, Nozick's posited sufficient condition of justice would not obtain, as it would not be the case that each person is entitled to her respective holdings. While this does not imply that the distribution is *unjust* (as it might be neither just nor unjust), it does mean that, even if everyone else is entitled to their holdings, this is insufficient for establishing the justice of the overall distribution *and everything that justice entails*. For example, one implication of a distribution being just is that one cannot permissibly redistribute or destroy anyone's holdings without her consent. Indeed, the reason that Nozick seemingly posits an entitlement theory of justice is to explain the purported wrongness of such nonconsensual redistribution/destruction. Thus, if a single person's possession of an unowned object is sufficient for negating the justice of the entire distribution – where this implies that it might be permissible to redistribute or destroy *any* holding – then the posited account of entitlement theories seems inadequate.

To resolve this problem, the entitlement theorist should maintain that what justice predicates is not the distribution as a whole but, rather, any given holding or set of holdings. In other words, Nozick's suggestion that a distribution is just if each person is entitled to her holdings should be rejected in favor of the following *revised entitlement theory*: Some holding is

[7] An anonymous reviewer suggests that proposed case is impossible, as Nozick might take the possession of any unowned thing to entail its appropriation so long as such appropriation satisfies the Lockean proviso. It is not fully clear whether Nozick would endorse this view, but even if one grants that he would, the posited case can simply be adjusted by stipulating that the possessed object cannot be appropriated because such appropriation would violate the Lockean proviso. Or, alternatively, one might even take the object to be stolen. For the argument to succeed, one must merely grant that there is at least *some* case where a person possesses a thing without owning it.

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just if its possessor is entitled to it.[8] This theory would allow the entitlement theorist to maintain that it is impermissible to nonconsensually redistribute or destroy those holdings to which people are entitled (as those holdings are just), even if that person or some other person possesses an unowned thing. At the same time, it would allow that one might permissibly redistribute unowned holdings. Such a result seems to best capture what entitlement theorists like Nozick have in mind when advancing their theories.

However, if one accepts this restatement of the relationship between entitlements and justice, then one must reject the argument that entitlement theories are incompatible with the anarchist conclusion. Recall that this argument posits a case where everyone is entitled to their holdings but someone uses an unowned resource in a way that generates a luck-based inequality between two persons. The anarchist conclusion entails that the worse-off party had a claim against this use of resources, which, in turn, implies that the resulting distribution is unjust. By contrast, the entitlement theory *as originally stated* entails that the resulting distribution is just, as everyone is entitled to their holdings. Thus, a contradiction was reached. However, the revised entitlement theory does not affirm that the distribution is just; rather, it merely maintains that the owned holdings are just – a result that is entirely compatible with the anarchist conclusion's implication that the entire distribution is unjust. One is therefore free to endorse the anarchist conclusion without having to give up the entitlement theory presupposed by the social anarchist position (at least, once this entitlement theory is appropriately specified in the way just described).

5.5 Is Entitlement Necessary for Justice?

Proponents of the incompatibilist argument might object to this conclusion by disputing the way in which entitlement theories of justice have been characterized. Note that the foregoing discussion of the incompatibilist argument follows Nozick in positing that a distribution is just if every person is entitled to her holdings. However, the incompatibilist might argue that entitlement is not merely a *sufficient* condition of justice but also a *necessary* one. In other words, a proper interpretation of Nozick's theory would assert that justice obtains if *and only if* each person is entitled to her

[8] Or, more precisely, if its possessor is entitled to it *and* does not owe anyone compensation for past wrongdoing.

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respective holdings.[9] Similarly, the revised entitlement theory should maintain that a holding is just if *and only if* its possessor is entitled to it (as opposed to how it is stated previously, where entitlement is a sufficient – but not necessary – condition of a holding being just).

If entitlement is a necessary condition of some holding being just, that would allow for a revitalization of the incompatibilist argument. Specifically, consider the case where *P* is not entitled to a particular resource *R* but it is in her possession. Additionally, suppose that *P* would be left worse off than *Q* if *Q* were to interact with *R* in any way. Finally, assume that the comparative disadvantage that *P* would suffer if *Q* were to interact with *R* would not reflect any sanctionable choice on *P*'s part (in the sense proposed in Chapter 6). In this case, the anarchist conclusion would entail that *Q* has a duty to refrain from interacting with *R*. This, in turn, implies that the state of affairs where *Q* refrains from interacting with *R* is just (given the conditional relationship between duties and justice posited earlier). However, if entitlement is a necessary condition of justice, an entitlement theory would hold that *Q*'s exclusion from *R* is not just, as *P* is not entitled to her holding. Thus, entitlement theories of justice still contradict the anarchist conclusion.

But why think that entitlement is a necessary condition of justice? There are two reasons for denying this proposition and, by extension, the revitalized incompatibilist argument. First, if one grants that a holding is just only if its possessor is entitled to that holding, that seemingly entails that borrowed holdings are not just, as a borrowed item is, by definition, an item that one possesses but does not own. Further, given that the return of a borrowed holding would meet the sufficient condition of justice (as the possessor of the item would now be the person who is entitled to that item), it seems that borrowers have a duty of justice to return the item to its owner even though they had full permission to be in possession of the item in question. Given that practically any entitlement theorist would reject this result as unacceptable, one ought to reject the proposal that entitlement is a necessary condition of a holding being just.

There are various replies that could be made to this objection. Mack, for example, suggests that this counterexample might be avoided by positing that a person with a borrowed holding is entitled to said holding (2018, private communication). However, endorsing this suggestion would require making significant modifications to other parts of a Nozick-inspired

[9] Vallentyne endorses such an interpretation, arguing that Nozick's failure to posit such a necessary condition was an oversight on his part (2011, 151).

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entitlement theory. For example, while Nozick says little about his principle of justice in transfer, presumably it holds that a transaction is just if the holding in question is voluntarily given and received. Thus, if a borrower is entitled to the borrowed item – and, she then gives that item to a third party – it would follow that the third party is now entitled to the item per Nozick's account. However, entitlement theorists would reject this conclusion. More generally, it seems that Nozick understands entitlement as something very close to full ownership of the holdings (with the caveat that certain exclusion and transfer rights are limited by his posited version of the Lockean proviso). However, borrowers have fairly limited rights over borrowed items, as they lack a right to destroy, transfer, or exclude others from said items. Thus, borrowers cannot be said to be entitled to borrowed items, at least as Nozick uses the term.

The second objection to making entitlement a necessary condition of justice is that this amendment does not follow from the considerations that motivate libertarians to endorse entitlement theories of justice in the first place. Absent such a logical connection to the premises that ground an entitlement theory of justice, making entitlement a necessary condition of justice seems ad hoc and, thus, an implausible way of demonstrating that entitlement theories are incompatible with the anarchist conclusion. Most notably, the primary motivation for positing an entitlement theory is seemingly to negate the permissibility of redistributing those things that persons have justly appropriated or received via just transfer. However, this result is achieved by simply positing that entitlement is a sufficient condition of justice – at least, if one accepts the plausible supplemental premise that it is impermissible to transform a just holding into one that is not just via redistribution. Given that the original statement (and restatement) of entitlement theory satisfies this core theoretical *desideratum*, the proposed amendment to make entitlement a necessary condition of justice seems unmotivated.

5.6 Wilt Chamberlain and the Anarchist Conclusion

It is worth considering a final reason for thinking that entitlement theories of justice are incompatible with the anarchist conclusion. This third incompatibilist argument would concede that there is no contradiction between the implications of the two positions. However, it would maintain that the arguments for rejecting non-entitlement theories in favor of entitlement theories apply equally to the anarchist conclusion. Thus, even if entitlement theories are not technically incompatible with the anarchist conclusion, any entitlement theorist would still reject the anarchist

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conclusion on the grounds that it is negated by the arguments that led her to accept an entitlement theory in the first place. The anarchist conclusion would thereby lose its dialectical significance for the reasons discussed in the introduction to this chapter.

The problem with this proposal is that the anarchist conclusion sidesteps the primary arguments for favoring entitlement theories of justice over non-entitlement theories. Consider, for example, Nozick's (1974) influential Wilt Chamberlain argument. In this thought experiment, holdings are distributed in accordance with the prescriptions of one's preferred non-entitlement principle. However, each person then voluntarily pays Wilt Chamberlain a small amount of money to watch him play basketball, with the result being the emergence of a new distribution that is (by hypothesis) unjust according to the non-entitlement principle.

While Nozick is not fully explicit regarding the structure of his argument, he is best understood as making two distinct *reductio* arguments against non-entitlement principles of justice.[10] The first begins with the observation that, if the post-transfer distribution of resources is unjust according to the non-entitlement principle, then one would act permissibly if one enforced the original distribution and thereby prevented the unjust distribution from arising. However, Nozick argues that such enforcement must take the form of either (a) unacceptably interfering with freedom by blocking free exchanges between consenting adults, or (b) allowing such acts but then redistributing the fruit of Chamberlain's labor – an act that is unacceptable because it is tantamount to slavery (1974; 163, 169–72). In other words, a non-entitlement theory declares the enforcement of the original distribution permissible when such enforcement is, in fact, impermissible. Thus, any non-entitlement theory must be rejected to avoid contradiction.

The second *reductio* posits that if one has a just share according to a non-entitlement principle of justice, then one has the right to dispose of that share as one wishes, with any resultant state of affairs thereby qualifying as just (1974, 161). Thus, given that the starting state in the Wilt Chamberlain case is just, it follows that the state of affairs after people choose to give some of their holdings to Chamberlain is also just.

[10] Different interpreters of Nozick tend to focus on only one of these *reductios* at the expense of the other (e.g., with Onora O'Neill (1981, 308) primarily addressing the first and Cohen (2011, 127) and Mack (2002, 81–4) focusing on the second). However, for these purposes, it will be granted that Nozick is making both arguments.

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However, the resultant distribution is also unjust according to the posited non-entitlement principle because it does not align with its prescribed pattern/end-state. To avoid this contradiction, one must reject the assumed non-entitlement principle of justice.

When considering these *reductios*, one question to ask is whether Nozick assumes that all persons in the Wilt Chamberlain case are entitled to their holdings. Seemingly, the answer to this question must be "yes" given Nozick's own understanding of the moral status of unowned holdings. Nozick must maintain that there is nothing morally problematic about interfering with unowned holdings, as the person who possesses a resource but does not own it has no claim against others coming and using it without permission. Similarly, the possessor would have no claim against them taking that thing and redistributing it to someone else (assuming the absence of any distributive claims). And she would lack any power to give a person a claim to exclude others from that resource. These Hohfeldian no-claims and disabilities follow from non-ownership as a matter of definition. However, there would then be nothing wrong with blocking transfers made by someone who is not entitled to a thing (e.g., someone attempting to bequeath an unowned thing to someone else). Given that Nozick's first *reductio* rests on the premise that such blocking is wrong, he must be presupposing that the people in the Wilt Chamberlain case are entitled to their holdings. Similar remarks apply to the second *reductio*'s contention that the people have a right to dispose of their share as they see fit – a claim that would be true only if they were entitled to their shares. Thus, by his own lights, Nozick's Wilt Chamberlain *reductios* are sound only if it is assumed that the people in the scenario are entitled to their holdings.

There are two things to note about this conclusion. First, as a more general point, it reveals a dialectical weakness in Nozick's argument, as those who endorse some non-entitlement theory of justice can avoid his posited *reductios* by simply denying the possibility of people being entitled to their holdings. Specifically, a non-entitlement theorist can deny that persons are able to acquire the power to transfer claims to others; this, in turn, would allow her to insist that there is nothing problematic about blocking transfers between consenting adults. To preclude this reply, Nozick would have to maintain that the power to transfer follows directly from a person's holdings conforming to the non-entitlement theory in question. If such conformance entailed the power to transfer, then the non-entitlement theorist would be vulnerable to Nozick's *reductios*. However, it is unclear why the non-entitlement theorist should affirm this conditional and give up her denial that anyone has the power to transfer

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claims to resources. Additionally, the foregoing discussion reveals that Nozick cannot consistently assert this conditional, as it conflicts with his own distinction between entitlement and non-ownership. Nozick's contention is that the power to transfer is a distinctive feature of entitlement – that is, it has entitlement as its necessary condition. Thus, he cannot consistently maintain that a particular distribution of holdings obtaining is a sufficient condition of the power to transfer holdings. This leaves him with no way to object to the non-entitlement theorist who denies both the proposed entailment relation (i.e., that a just distribution entails that each person has the power to transfer her holdings) and the more general premise that persons can possess the power to transfer holdings.

That said, the anarchist cannot avail herself of this argument because she *does* grant that persons can possess the power to transfer. She is thereby precluded from denying the premise that the people in the Wilt Chamberlain case have the power to transfer their holdings. Rather, like Nozick, she must affirm that persons have this power if and only if they are entitled to their holdings. Granted, she denies that persons could, in practice, acquire such entitlements via appropriation for the reasons discussed in Chapters 3 and 4. However, she must concede that, at least in theory, a scenario could arise where a group of people *do* acquire property either via everyone's consent or because a total absence of scarcity entails that the Lockean proviso is satisfied vis-à-vis natural resources. Thus, unlike the pure non-entitlement theorist, she must allow that there is a possible Wilt Chamberlain scenario where persons are entitled to their initial holdings (in addition to those holdings conforming to the prescriptions of her favored non-entitlement theory).

Fortunately for the anarchist, she can reject a different premise of Nozick's *reductios* to avoid having to reject the anarchist conclusion. Specifically, both *reductios* contend that the post-transfer distribution is unjust according to the non-entitlement theory in question. However, while this implication does follow from standard non-entitlement distributive principles, it does not follow from the anarchist conclusion. This is because the anarchist conclusion only assigns persons luck egalitarian distributive claims vis-à-vis *unowned* resources. Given that Nozick must affirm that all of the holdings in his Wilt Chamberlain case are owned, it follows that there would be no distributive claims restricting the permissible use of these holdings. Rather, the permissible use of these holdings would be strictly governed by people's property claims over those holdings. Thus, the anarchist conclusion does not entail that Wilt Chamberlain has any duty to redistribute his post-transfer holdings; rather, it concedes that he has property claims against such redistribution. This, in turn, implies

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that the post-transfer distribution is just according to the anarchist conclusion – a result that does not contradict Nozick's contention that the post-transfer distribution is just. The anarchist conclusion thereby sidesteps both of Nozick's Wilt Chamberlain *reductios*.

The anarchist conclusion similarly avoids a third argument against non-entitlement theories that Mack (2002, 82–3) attributes to Nozick. This argument holds that, if some state is unjust, one must be able to explain how it came to be unjust via appeal to some historical occurrence – that is, one must be able to identify the particular event responsible for the emergence of the injustice. However, given that the post-transfer state in the Wilt Chamberlain case is reached via just steps from a just pre-transfer state, there is no such apparent explanation. Thus, the post-transfer state cannot be unjust, contra what a non-entitlement theory implies – and one must, therefore, reject such a non-entitlement theory. However, again, this argument is only valid because non-entitlement theories declare the post-transfer state unjust. By contrast, the anarchist conclusion affirms the justice of the distribution, as there are no luck-based inequalities *that have resulted from the use of unowned resources*. It thereby sidesteps this interpretation of Nozick's Wilt Chamberlain argument in addition to the ones presented previously.

Unfortunately, it is not possible to consider whether the anarchist conclusion avoids every objection to non-entitlement theories of justice. However, the fact that it is able to sidestep all three interpretations of Nozick's Wilt Chamberlain argument is at least suggestive that it will similarly survive whatever other arguments entitlement theorists might develop in the defense of their theory. The general reason for thinking that the anarchist conclusion will avoid such arguments is the fact that it concedes to the entitlement theorist that a holding is just if its possessor is entitled to it. By granting people ownership rights over whatever resources they justly acquire, the anarchist conclusion effectively incorporates an entitlement theory into its broader account of how to assess the justice of holdings. This incorporation means that it will be difficult for entitlement theorists to object to the position.

5.7 Libertarian Egalitarianism

The previous sections have defended the thesis that the anarchist conclusion is the appropriate philosophical response to the fact that no one has acquired ownership over natural resources outside of their bodies (as argued in Chapters 3 and 4). Specifically, Section 5.1 argued that one cannot simply concede that people have no claims vis-à-vis natural resources, as such a conclusion would violate the moral tyranny constraint.

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Thus, one must posit that people have *some* such claims, for example, those posited by the anarchist conclusion. Sections 5.2–5.6 then argued that there is no tension between the anarchist conclusion's posited distributive claims and the anarchist position's incorporation of an entitlement theory of justice. Thus, one might be an orthodox libertarian – that is, one who endorses an entitlement theory of justice – while still accepting the anarchist conclusion.

However, there is a gap in this argument when it comes to defending the particular distributive claims posited by the anarchist conclusion. Note that one can avoid the moral tyranny of the Hobbesian conclusion by positing *any* set of distributive claims so long as full compliance with those claims would sustain a particular pattern of advantage (and the theory holds people responsible for sanctionable choices). Recall that the Hobbesian conclusion allowed for moral tyranny because it did not posit any distributive claims. Absent such claims, a person can act on unowned resources in a way that leaves others worse off_{FC}, as she will not owe any compensation to others for costs imposed by her usage. Thus, future full compliance would do nothing to offset those costs, with others ending up worse off_{FC} as a result. By contrast, the anarchist conclusion's assignment of luck egalitarian distributive claims precludes persons from leaving others worse off_{FC}. While person P might still impose costs upon another person Q and/or infringe upon Q's claims, Q would still be entitled to the same quantity of advantage according to the anarchist conclusion. Thus, if P were to act in the posited way(s), the anarchist conclusion would reassign distributive claims such that full compliance with those claims would leave Q with just as much advantage as she would have had if everyone had complied with the original set of distributive claims (i.e., the claims assigned prior to P's action). Given this reassignment, full compliance will leave Q with the same amount of advantage irrespective of P's action, with P being thereby precluded from leaving Q worse off_{FC}.

However, one can avoid the moral tyranny of the Hobbesian conclusion without assigning persons *luck egalitarian* distributive claims – that is, the set of distributive claims such that full compliance would eliminate all inequalities except those that reflect sanctionable choice. Rather, one merely needs to posit a set of distributive rights where full compliance would yield *some* fixed pattern of advantage.[11] For example, consider a

[11] As noted in parentheses in the previous paragraph, this pattern must be sensitive to responsibility for the reasons discussed in Section 2.4. There it was suggested that one must reject strict egalitarianism in favor of luck egalitarianism, as the former was inadequately sensitive to

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theory that assigns each person a set of distributive claims such that full compliance would leave one person with 100 units of advantage and everyone else with 5 units. So long as this theory reassigns claims in light of persons' actions such that full compliance would generate these same outcomes, it will equally satisfy the moral tyranny constraint, as people will be unable to leave anyone worse off$_{FC}$ than she would have otherwise been. Thus, one cannot appeal to the constraint to justify the anarchist's assignment of *egalitarian* distributive claims – which is to say that the argument of Chapters 2, 3, and 4 does not quite deliver the anarchist conclusion as promised. Rather, it demonstrates that the moral tyranny constraint entails both (a) the absence of external private property and (b) that there is *some* (responsibility-sensitive) advantage$_{FC}$-preserving set of distributive rights. Further argument is therefore required to demonstrate that one ought to accept the anarchist conclusion over rival theories of distributive rights.

There are two approaches one might take to filling in this argumentative gap. First, one might appeal to existing defenses of luck egalitarian principles of distributive justice to ground the anarchist conclusion's egalitarian distributive claims. While these defenses do not typically put things in terms of distributive claims, they do affirm that justice requires that each person receive an equal share of advantage (absent sanctionable choice). Given that the anarchist conclusion insists that each person has a claim to an equal share of advantage, it seems that any proposed argument for luck egalitarianism will also provide support for the anarchist conclusion's egalitarian presumption.

The disadvantage of this approach is that the overarching argument of the book loses some of its dialectical force. As noted previously at various points, the argument is intended to be a libertarian defense of egalitarian conclusions that puts dialectical pressure on libertarians to give up private property rights and, instead, endorse a variety of luck egalitarianism. For this reason, the foregoing chapters have granted as many libertarian premises as possible when arguing for the anarchist position. Similarly, this chapter has attempted to preserve this dialectical pressure by demonstrating that the anarchist conclusion is compatible with libertarian entitlement

responsibility – and, thus, would allow some people to unilaterally, discretionarily, and foreseeably leave others with less$_{FC}$. However, similar remarks would apply to the comparison between any responsibility-insensitive distributive principle and its responsibility-sensitive counterpart. Thus, any share-assigning theory must be structured in such a way that an agent forfeits some claim to advantage if she makes a sanctionable choice – that is, a choice where full compliance conditional on that choice would leave others worse off than full compliance conditional on a rival choice (much more on this in Chapter 6).

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theories of justice. However, if the anarchist conclusion follows from both libertarian premises *and* non-libertarian egalitarian premises – that is, those posited by the luck egalitarian defenses mentioned in the previous paragraph – then libertarians could, at low theoretical cost, deny the anarchist conclusion by rejecting the egalitarian premises. Granted, it is not clear what alternative pattern of advantage the libertarian would endorse instead (for she must endorse *some* pattern to avoid the moral tyranny of the Hobbesian conclusion). Nonetheless, one can imagine certain anti-egalitarian libertarians insisting that there is no positive reason to favor egalitarian distributive claims, with any arbitrary set of advantage$_{FC}$-preserving distributive claims being an equally acceptable theoretical alternative to the anarchist conclusion.

Fortunately, there is a second approach available to the anarchist that restores the dialectical pressure of the anarchist argument. Specifically, the anarchist might observe that practically all libertarians *already* accept an egalitarian approach to the assignment of claims. This point is made by many libertarians themselves, as they argue that their rejection of distributive egalitarianism is grounded in a more fundamental kind of egalitarianism. Specifically, these libertarians contend that their view uniquely recognizes human moral equality by initially assigning all persons *equal rights* – which is to say either identical or symmetrical rights.[12] For example, if one person starts out with the Hohfeldian power to appropriate some object, then all persons start out with an identical power to appropriate that object. Similarly, if one person initially has the right to exclude others from her body, then all persons initially have the symmetrical right to exclude her from their bodies. Of course, some people might end up with fewer rights than others in virtue of having either waived or forfeited their rights; however, there remains a presumption of initial moral equality that insulates libertarianism from charges of moral arbitrariness.

Given this commitment to assigning persons equal rights, it follows that libertarians should assign persons equal distributive rights as well. Granted, libertarians have not heretofore recognized that people have distributive

[12] Some notable examples include Locke (2005, §§ 4–7), Herbert Spencer (1851, 77–8), Anthony Fressola (1981, 316–7), Lomasky (1987, 122–3), Wendy McElroy (1991, 3), Rothbard (1998, 42–3), Narveson (1988, 98), Long (2005, 18–9), and Flanigan (2019b). Critics of libertarianism have similarly recognized libertarianism as egalitarian in this respect including Amartya Sen (1992, 13, 21–3), Cohen (1995, 213), Carl Knight (2009, 340), and Matthew Braham and Martin van Hees (2014, 427, 431). The claim that treating like people alike entails assigning individuals equal rights is also endorsed by Steiner (1974, 223). However, he contends that people should be understood as having equal rights vis-à-vis natural resources, thereby staking out a left-libertarian view that is much closer to the anarchist conclusion proposed here.

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rights. However, if the foregoing argument is correct and there are such rights, then they should be assigned in the same egalitarian fashion that libertarians assign other rights. There is admittedly some ambiguity here regarding what qualifies as an assignment of equal rights. As just noted, one might take two persons to have equal rights if both have *the same right*, for example, *P* and *Q* each have a claim that *R* not ϕ. More commonly, libertarians propose that persons have symmetrical rights, where *P* and *Q* have a symmetrical right if and only if *P* and *Q* *would have* an *identical* right if every reference to *P* in *P*'s right is replaced by a reference to *Q* and every reference to *Q* is replaced by a reference to *P*. For example, if *P* has a claim that *Q* not touch *P*'s body and *Q* has a claim that *P* not touch *Q*'s body, then the two have symmetrical rights, as changing *P*'s right in the way just discussed yields a right that is identical to *Q*'s. However, there is no apparent reason why equal assignments of rights might not also include cases where *P* and *Q* are assigned distributive claims that entitle each of them to an equal share of advantage. After all, such an assignment seems to equally avoid the accusation of moral arbitrariness that motivates libertarians to assign persons identical or symmetrical rights.

Additionally, seemingly any rights schema that assigns persons strictly identical and/or symmetrical distributive claims would not generate a fixed pattern of advantage under conditions of full compliance. This, in turn, implies that all such schemas violate the moral tyranny constraint. To see this, note that the Hobbesian conclusion represents just such a schema, as it assigns to each person a set of claims that are either identical or symmetrical to those possessed by each other person. Specifically, each person has a symmetrical right against others making ASO-infringing contact with her body and all persons have an identical permission to use any given unowned resource. However, because they lack $\text{advantage}_{\text{FC}}$-preserving distributive claims over unowned objects, the Hobbesian conclusion violates the moral tyranny constraint (as discussed in Section 5.1). Similarly, assigning persons additional identical/symmetrical claims will fail to resolve this problem unless those claims somehow offset imposed costs_{FC} in the way discussed at the start of this section. Thus, there does not appear to be a way to assign persons claims in an $\text{advantage}_{\text{FC}}$-preserving fashion while also assigning each person a claim if and only if each other person is assigned an identical/symmetrical claim. Given this result, libertarians should concede that the proposed schema of luck egalitarian distributive claims instantiates an equal assignment of rights (lest their insistence on moral equality be rendered incompatible with the moral tyranny constraint). They would then be able to affirm human

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moral equality while avoiding moral tyranny by endorsing the anarchist conclusion.

5.8 Conclusion

The bulk of the argument for anarchism is now complete. The foregoing chapters have attempted to show that a single plausible theoretical *desideratum* entails a number of conclusions typically embraced by anarchists. Specifically, these chapters argued that the moral tyranny constraint entails the Lockean proviso and the consent theory of legitimacy, each of which further entails the absence of external private property (despite it still being the case that people can easily acquire ownership over their own bodies). This chapter has argued that the moral tyranny constraint also implies that the non-ownership of external resources cannot entail an absence of all claims vis-à-vis those resources. Rather, each person must be assigned some set of advantage$_{FC}$-preserving distributive claims that preclude other agents from discretionarily leaving her worse off$_{FC}$. Additionally, this chapter argued that such distributive claims are fully compatible with an (appropriately interpreted) entitlement theory of justice – a result that sustains social anarchism's claim to being a thoroughly libertarian position. Finally, the chapter argued that libertarians should endorse the luck egalitarian distributive claims posited by the anarchist conclusion, as such rights best reflect libertarians' egalitarian approach to assigning rights to persons.

In short, libertarians who are sympathetic to the moral tyranny constraint should reject private property in external resources and endorse the anarchist conclusion. However, this conclusion is still in need of a bit of further precisification. Notably, the distributive claims posited by the anarchist conclusion are not simply egalitarian in character but, rather, *luck* egalitarian in character; that is, compliance with those claims would leave everyone equally well off *excluding those who have chosen sanctionably*. This italicized qualifier is included for the reasons described in Section 2.4: An egalitarian theory that does not hold people responsible for sanctionable choices (e.g., the choice to spitefully destroy all of one's holdings) will still run afoul of the moral tyranny constraint. But which choices count as sanctionable? This question has so far been left unanswered. It is the task of Chapter 6 to provide a theory of sanctionable choice that brings luck egalitarianism – and, by extension, the anarchist conclusion – into full compliance with the moral tyranny constraint.

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CHAPTER 6

Luck Egalitarianism without Moral Tyranny

> We want to put everything in common, starting from the principle that everybody should do some work and all should live as well as possible. It's not possible to live in this world without working, so if one person doesn't do anything he has to live at the expense of others, which is unfair and harmful. Obviously when I say that everybody should work I mean all those that are able to, and do the amount suited to them. The [disabled], the weak and the aged should be supported by society, because it is the duty of humanity that no one should suffer.
>
> Errico Malatesta, *Between Peasants*

Chapters 3, 4, and 5 have attempted to provide a libertarian argument for luck egalitarianism.[1] Chapters 3 and 4 each took a prominent libertarian thesis and argued that it entails that there are no existing private property rights. Chapter 5 then argued that, in the absence of property, libertarians ought to embrace the anarchist conclusion, which assigns persons luck egalitarian distributive claims over unowned natural resources. More precisely, this conclusion posits that each person has a claim against others interacting with unowned resources in a way that (a) would leave her worse off than someone else where (b) this comparative disadvantage does not appropriately correspond to previous sanctionable choices on her part. The obvious – and so far unanswered – question is: What choices count as sanctionable and which inequalities can be said to appropriately correspond to those choices? This chapter seeks to answer both parts of this question by appealing to the moral tyranny constraint.

Recall from Section 2.4 that luck egalitarianism avoids the moral tyranny of strict egalitarianism by holding people responsible for making sanctionable

[1] This chapter is an adapted version of a paper originally published in *Philosophical Studies* (Spafford 2022). While the animating idea is the same in both versions, some of the technical details of the paper have been adjusted here to improve the proposed theory (particularly in Sections 3–5).

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choices. The problem with strict egalitarianism is that it allows a spiteful destroyer to preserve her claim to an equal share of advantage even as she destroys any advantage in her possession. Because the destroyer preserves this claim, full compliance would require that others make costly equalizing transfers to her. She is thereby able to discretionarily, foreseeably, and unilaterally leave those others worse off$_{FC}$ when she destroys her holdings. By contrast, luck egalitarianism declares that the destruction of her holdings is a sanctionable choice, which, in turn, implies that she forfeits a claim to some portion of advantage (where this forfeiture negates her claim to any transfer). The theory thereby holds her responsible for her sanctionable choice and, in this way, satisfies the moral tyranny constraint.

However, as was noted in Section 1.6, there are two respects in which this general idea of holding people responsible needs to be specified if the anarchist conclusion is to have determinate content. First: Which choices qualify as sanctionable? Some general theory is needed here that can be applied to cases like the spiteful destroyer or Cohen's parable of the ant and the grasshopper. Second: To what quantity of advantage does a person lose her claim when she makes a sanctionable choice? Most luck egalitarians answer these questions by either explicitly or tacitly assuming what might be called *prudential contextualism*: A person chooses sanctionably if and only if she is responsible for leaving herself worse off than she could have been otherwise.[2] She then forfeits a claim to however much additional advantage she would have had if she had chosen differently. For example, if the norm in a given society is that people who park on a certain street have their car towed, then the person who parks there and has her car towed forfeits her claim to the extra advantage she would have possessed had her car not been towed.

Unfortunately, this interpretation of luck egalitarianism has left the position vulnerable to three serious objections – each of which would equally apply to the anarchist conclusion. Most notably, one of these objections holds that this interpretation puts both luck egalitarianism

[2] The term "prudential contextualism" is a slight modification of Olsaretti's term "contextualism," which she uses to describe this dominant interpretation of luck egalitarianism (2009, 180). The chapter will not take a stand on the exact sense in which an agent must be *responsible* for leaving herself worse off – at least, beyond a few claims about the necessary conditions of such responsibility discussed subsequently. It should be noted that not all luck egalitarians are prudential contextualists with some explicitly rejecting the position (e.g., Olsaretti (2009), Stemplowska (2009), and Thaysen and Albertsen (2017)). These alternative views will also be discussed. It should also be noted that there is some dispute over whether certain influential luck egalitarians were contextualists. For a critical discussion, see Stemplowska (2013).

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and the associated anarchist conclusion in violation of the moral tyranny constraint. The task of this chapter is to present an alternative account of sanctionable choice that avoids these objections. Specifically, it will propose that an agent chooses sanctionably if and only if the choice, under conditions of full compliance, can reasonably be expected to produce less appropriately distributed advantage than some alternative choice that could have been made. The remainder of the chapter will explain what is meant by each of these terms and how the proposed account resolves the three objections. First, though, these objections need to be introduced, with particular attention paid to the moral tyranny objection.

6.1 Three Objections to Prudential Contextualism

The first objection to contextualist luck egalitarianism has been forcefully raised by Richard Arneson, who argues that luck egalitarianism delivers incorrect results in cases of charitable action. For example, a Mother Teresa figure who impoverishes herself assisting the poor would, on the prudential contextualist view, have made a sanctionable choice, as she leaves herself worse off in a way that could have been avoided. Thus, the luck egalitarian (or social anarchist) who endorses prudential contextualism would seemingly be committed to saying that she is not entitled to any sort of compensatory redistribution; however, Arneson contends that this is the wrong result, with luck egalitarianism then being rejected as part of a *modus tollens* argument (Arneson 2011a, 244; 2011b, 33–4).[3]

Second, there is what Susan Hurley has called luck egalitarianism's "boring problem." This objection aims to call into question the core luck egalitarian contention that sanctionable choice can justify inequality. Hurley argues that this contention is plausible only if sanctionable choosers are responsible for the inequality in question. However, on the prudential contextualist view, a person chooses sanctionably if and only if she is responsible for *her particular level of advantage*. Given that someone can be responsible for her level of advantage but not the associated inequality – as the inequality is partly a function of the advantage levels of others for which *they* are responsible – it follows that sanctionable choice cannot justify inequality in the way that luck egalitarians contend (Hurley

[3] For an alternative version of this argument, see Larry Temkin's case of a good Samaritan who rescues a drowning child from a pond but injures herself in the process (2011, 63). Here, again, it is maintained that her failure to act prudently means she is held responsible for this personal cost via the denial of any compensation.

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2003, 160–1).[4] Similarly, insofar as the anarchist is motivated by egalitarian concerns, she will want to posit that, while there is something prima facie unjust about inequality, there is nothing unjust about inequality corresponding to sanctionable choice. Thus, her position will similarly be vulnerable to the objection that sanctionable choice fails to defeat the prima facie injustice of inequality.

Finally – and most importantly for the purposes of this chapter – there is Serena Olsaretti's objection (though she does not use this language) that contextualist luck egalitarianism violates the moral tyranny constraint. Specifically, she begins with the observation that most luck egalitarians tacitly assume a contextualist theory of sanctionable choice where a person forfeits a claim to however much advantage she foregoes due to contingent social circumstances and the choices that others make (2009, 180). However, given such a prudential contextualist view, a person's claim to advantage will often – and problematically – depend on the capricious choices of others (176). To illustrate this point, Olsaretti introduces Marc Fleurbaey's (1995) case of a reckless motorcyclist who crashes and is injured as a result of driving too fast and not wearing a helmet. She notes that, on the contextualist theory, the quantity of advantage to which the motorcyclist forfeits a claim will be a function of whether a passerby provides assistance, leaves her unaided, or confiscates her motorcycle – a result that makes contextualist luck egalitarianism seem unacceptable (2009, 175–6).

While Olsaretti does not provide a general theory of why this is a problem for contextualism, one can provide such an explanation by appealing to the moral tyranny constraint. Specifically, contextualism allows the passerby to unilaterally, foreseeably, and discretionarily reduce the quantity of advantage to which the motorcyclist has a claim which, in turn, would reduce how much advantage she would have in the world of full compliance. If the passerby declines to assist the motorcyclist, the latter will be left with less_{FC} advantage than if she would possess if she were assisted. And she would be left with less_{FC} still if the passerby were to confiscate her motorcycle. Contextualist luck egalitarianism thereby violates the moral tyranny constraint, as it enables the passerby to unilaterally, discretionarily, and foreseeably leave the motorcyclist worse off_{FC}. This result explains why prudential contextualism is an unacceptable theory of

[4] For a recent paper that attempts to extend the boring problem into a more general objection to theories that declare luck-based inequality unjust, see Matthew T. Jeffers (2020). For an alternative reply to the boring problem, see Spafford (2023).

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which choices count as sanctionable (particularly given the fact that satisfying the constraint was the motivating reason for adopting luck egalitarianism in the first place). Thus, the anarchist conclusion must employ some alternative account of sanctionable choice – ideally, one that also resolves the other two objections to luck egalitarianism discussed just prior.

6.2 Moralized Contextualism

What is needed is an alternative account of sanctionable choice that satisfies the moral tyranny constraint. The task of the remainder of the chapter is to provide such an account. First, though, it is worth briefly considering an alternative account that might seem like a simple solution to contextualism's moral tyranny problem. This account posits that a person chooses sanctionably if and only if (a) she leaves herself worse off than she would have been otherwise and (b) *she does not end up worse off as a result of someone infringing upon her rights*. She then forfeits a claim to the surplus advantage that she would have possessed had she chosen differently.[5]

This *moralized contextualism* seems to rule out some of the more intuitively problematic forms of moral tyranny endorsed by standard contextualist accounts. For example, in the motorcycle case, one might think that Condition (b) is not met, as the passerby who confiscates the motorcycle infringes upon the rights of the motorcyclist to continue to use her motorcycle. Thus, the motorcyclist does not choose sanctionably, which, in turn, implies that she does not forfeit a claim to the advantage that would result from her continued use of the motorcycle. Further, given that she still has a claim to this advantage, full compliance with her claims would ensure that she retains possession of this advantage (e.g., because the passerby would immediately return the motorcycle), thereby preventing the passerby from leaving the motorcyclist with less_{FC}. This result suggests that moralized contextualism satisfies the moral tyranny constraint.

[5] This seems to be what Olsaretti is suggesting when she says that "the notion of responsibility a theory of justice employs is necessarily moralized, in that it must presuppose a view of what individuals owe to one another in order to determine the legitimate consequences of choices" (2009, 186). A more formal articulation of moralized contextualism is proposed by Zofia Stemplowska (2009), though she significantly qualifies the view. Unfortunately, working through the interesting details of her view would take things too far afield.

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However, there are two problems with this suggestion. First, even if moralization *limits* the extent to which a person is able to leave others with less_{FC}, it does not *eliminate* her ability to leave them with less_{FC}. For example, while the motorcyclist may have a right to her motorcycle, she does not obviously have a right to assistance after the accident (at least, if assisting would be reasonably costly to the passerby). Given the absence of such a right, moralized contextualism delivers the same result as standard contextualism in the case where the passerby chooses not to assist the motorcyclist: The motorcyclist forfeits a claim to however much advantage she fails to secure as a result of the passerby's choice. Thus, full compliance under moralized contextualism would still allow the passerby to (unilaterally, foreseeably, and discretionarily) leave the motorcyclist with less_{FC}. The fact that moralized contextualism grants the passerby this ability entails that the theory still violates the moral tyranny constraint.

The second problem with the moralized contextualist approach is that it would render the anarchist conclusion circular. Note that the anarchist conclusion is supposed to answer the question of which rights people have over objects and resources. Indeed, this is the very point at issue in debates over taxes and transfers, with anarchists contending that natural resources should be distributed in a responsibility-sensitive egalitarian fashion. However, one cannot then assume that there is a given set of rights over objects for the anarchist to use as an input for her theory. For example, it cannot be maintained that the passerby infringes upon the motorcyclist's right to use her motorcycle, as it is an open question whether the motorcyclist does, in fact, have a right to use that motorcycle (particularly given her choice to ride without a helmet). Thus, an anarchist position that assigns claims in accordance with moralized contextualist luck egalitarianism not only fails to satisfy the moral tyranny constraint, but also appears to be unacceptably circular.

6.3 A Theory of Sanctionable Choice

Given the unacceptability of (moralized) contextualism, anarchists need a theory of sanctionable choice that satisfies the moral tyranny constraint. This section proposes the following account: An agent chooses sanctionably if and only if she fails to maximize *warranted expected distributed advantage assuming full compliance*. The task of this section is to explicate each of these italicized concepts and explain why the theory defines sanctionable choice in this way.

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To begin, recall that a theory satisfies the moral tyranny constraint if and only if it does not enable any person to unilaterally, foreseeably, and discretionarily leave others with less_{FC}. Further, recall that there are two ways that a theory might enable a person in this way. First, it might grant her the power to directly strip others of their claims to advantage (or impose advantage-diminishing obligations on them), thereby changing how much advantage they would possess under conditions of full compliance. Second – and more importantly for these purposes – it might fail to adequately sanction those who diminish the total quantity of advantage that would be available if all persons were to fully comply with the demands of morality. To put this point a bit more precisely, such a failure occurs when a person reduces_{FC} the total quantity of advantage by some quantity x but the theory in question holds that her just share is diminished by a quantity that is less than x. Indeed, this is what a strict egalitarian theory asserts in the case of the spiteful destroyer: Even as the destroyer reduces_{FC} the total amount of available advantage by x, the theory holds that she only forfeits a claim to a quantity of x/n, where n is the number of people in the scenario. As a result, if others were to respect her adjusted claim to advantage, at least some persons would end up with less advantage than they would have had otherwise.

To avoid moral tyranny, then, a theory must hold that those who reduce_{FC} the total quantity of advantage forfeit a claim to a sufficient quantity of advantage such that compliance with their claims would not leave others worse off. In other words, when people reduce_{FC} the total quantity of advantage, the theory must declare that they choose sanctionably and hold them responsible by reducing the quantity of advantage to which they are entitled, thereby making them internalize the costs_{FC} of their actions. This is the core idea of the theory of sanctionable choice presented here. However, some additional groundwork and a few refinements are needed to both make the theory acceptably egalitarian and ensure that the correct people are held responsible.

To further explicate the theory, it will be helpful to stake out a position regarding the *equilisandum* of the anarchist conclusion (i.e., the thing to which persons have equal distributive claims). Specifically, it will be assumed that what is to be equalized is *lifetime* levels of advantage, as opposed to the advantage persons possess at a particular time or over some specified period. Thus, there is no injustice in an arrangement where one person labors for the first half of her life while another relaxes, so long as the two switch roles for the second halves of their respective lives. Early on,

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the two people will have very different quantities of advantage; however, injustice only obtains if things are not adequately evened out in the future.[6] Given this assumption, any future use of terms like "the distribution of advantage" should be understood as referring to how lifetime advantage is distributed.

With this simplifying assumption in place, it becomes possible to determine the quantity of destroyed$_{FC}$ advantage that an agent must internalize. A natural temptation is to simply calculate the total quantity of advantage destroyed$_{FC}$ by her choice by taking the total advantage$_{FC}$ that obtains given her choice and comparing it to the maximum quantity that would have obtained had she chosen differently (assuming full compliance in both cases). However, this approach is unacceptable for two reasons. First, it would still violate the moral tyranny constraint. Note that a consequence of using this method is that later choices by other parties will sometimes determine how much destroyed$_{FC}$ advantage an agent has to internalize. Thus, a theory that calculates lost advantage in this way grants later choosers the power to unilaterally, discretionarily, and foreseeably render an agent's earlier choice sanctionable, thereby leaving her with less$_{FC}$. Second, this approach would make sanctionable choice a function of luck, as a choice might reduce$_{FC}$ the quantity of total advantage more than a rival choice due to an unforeseeable future event. Assuming that sanctionable choice requires that the agent be responsible for the state of affairs that grounds the forfeiture of her claim to advantage – and given the fact that agents are not responsible for the unforeseeable consequences of their actions – it follows that the sanctionability of a choice cannot be a function of whether or not it reduces$_{FC}$ the total quantity of advantage relative to a counterfactual choice.[7]

[6] This assumption helps to simplify things in the following way. Later, there will be much talk of how advantage is distributed. If the *equilisandum* of the luck egalitarian principle is lifetime advantage, then there is only one distribution to be assessed, namely, the lifetime levels of advantage everyone ends up with. By contrast, alternative approaches entail that there are many distributions that obtain across time, each of which would have to be assessed. That said, there are objections to taking entire lives as the basic unit of egalitarianism. See, for example, McKerlie (1989) and Temkin (1993).

[7] This assumption is posited because forfeiture seems unacceptably arbitrary if it is not grounded in some kind of responsible choice. Absent responsibility as a necessary condition, it seems one might equally forfeit claims to advantage in virtue of others' choices. Granted, such a condition does allow persons to act in ways that leave others with less$_{FC}$, as it allows them to sustain their claim to having as much advantage as everyone else despite diminishing the total quantity of available$_{FC}$ advantage. However, it does not allow them to *foreseeably* leave others with less$_{FC}$, thereby avoiding any contradiction with the moral tyranny constraint.

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The observation that responsibility requires foreseeability suggests an alternative approach to quantifying how much destroyed$_{FC}$ advantage an agent must internalize: Instead of determining whether her choice reduces$_{FC}$ the total quantity of available advantage, one must determine whether that choice is *expected* to reduce$_{FC}$ the total quantity of advantage. Note that, at any point in time, there is a set of possible ultimate distributions of advantage that could still arise given all of the preceding events (where distributions extend across lifetimes as described earlier). Further, for any given choice that an agent might make, each of those distributions will have a particular probability of obtaining conditional on that choice being made and future full compliance. These conditional probabilities make it possible to calculate the *expected advantage* of that choice (assuming full compliance) by taking the total quantity of advantage of each distribution, multiplying it by the aforementioned conditional probability, and summing the results. This value can then be compared to the expected advantage value of other rival choices that could have been made. When a person makes a choice that has a lower expected advantage value than a rival choice that she could have made, she can be preliminarily understood as having chosen sanctionably, as her action is expected to diminish$_{FC}$ the total quantity of advantage.[8]

This account of sanctionable choice is merely preliminary because a significant revision must be made vis-à-vis calculations of expected value. To calculate the expected value of a choice, one must assign an *advantage value* to each of the possible distributions and then multiply that value by the probability of that distribution obtaining conditional on the choice being made and future full compliance. So far, this advantage value has been set equal to the total quantity of advantage that obtains in that distribution (as bringing about a distribution with less total advantage leaves others with less$_{FC}$, *ceteris paribus*). However, using total advantage obscures how advantage is *distributed* across persons. This is a problem because the moral tyranny constraint requires that agents must not be able to leave *any person* with less$_{FC}$ than she would have had otherwise, not *people on average*. But agents *will* be able to leave particular persons with less if sanctionable choices are specified to be all and only those choices that do not maximize expected value.

[8] This use of expected value has been embraced by a number of luck egalitarians including Arneson (1989), Knight (2013), and Vallentyne (2002; 2008).

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To see this, consider the case where agent P can either ϕ or ψ. If she ψ-s, she will realize a distribution where she, Q, and R each end up with 10 units of advantage. Alternatively, if she ϕ-s, she will realize a state of affairs where R has 20 units of nontransferrable advantage and she and Q have 16 units to split between the two of them (at P's discretion). In this scenario, there are two possibilities: either P's ϕ-ing is sanctionable or it is not. If P's ϕ-ing does not count as sanctionable, then P would retain her claim to an equal share of the available distributable advantage (8 units).[9] Thus, in the world of full compliance, she keeps 8 units for herself and similarly leaves Q with 8 units of advantage – that is, P is able to leave Q worse off$_{FC}$ by ϕ-ing relative to the world where P had chosen to ψ instead. By contrast, if P's choice to ϕ is sanctionable, then she loses her claim to a full 8 units of advantage, thereby allowing a portion of that advantage to be reassigned to Q such that Q would receive 10 units of advantage under conditions of full compliance. Given this result, it follows that P's choice to ϕ must be declared sanctionable if the proposed theory is to satisfy the moral tyranny constraint. However, note that P ϕ-ing also maximizes the expected total quantity of advantage (by producing 36 units of advantage rather than the 30 produced by ψ-ing). Thus, an acceptable theory cannot hold that a person chooses sanctionably if and only if she fails to maximize$_{FC}$ expected total advantage.[10]

[9] It is assumed here that P and Q have an equal claim to the quantity of *distributable* advantage; i.e., they each have a claim to 8 units of the 16 that can be split between them. Alternatively, one might maintain that P and Q have a claim to an equal share of the *total* advantage, which is to say they each have a claim to 12 units of advantage. However, the former approach is endorsed here because it simplifies some of the subsequent discussion and also avoids any incompossibility of rights (i.e., cases where two rights cannot be simultaneously respected). Either way, the following point remains true about this case: P is able to leave Q with less$_{FC}$ by ϕ-ing relative to ψ-ing if her choice to ϕ is non-sanctionable.

[10] It is worth noting that P ψ-ing will also leave R with less$_{FC}$ than R would have had if P had ϕ-ed. Thus, one might worry that moral tyranny is inevitable in cases where advantage is nontransferrable. However, this concern can be sidestepped by qualifying the moral tyranny constraint such that moral tyranny does not obtain if the person who is left with less$_{FC}$ (a) ends up with a just share of advantage and (b) is only left worse off relative to a counterfactual where full compliance would have delivered her a quantity of advantage that exceeded her just share (due to agents' limited ability to transfer). Indeed, there is seemingly nothing problematic about a theory that enables agents to deny full compliers advantage exceeding that to which they have a claim. For the sake of parsimony, though, the rest of the chapter will gloss over this qualification.

Alternatively, one might hold that while both ϕ-ing and ψ-ing leave someone with less$_{FC}$, P does not *discretionarily* leave R with less when she ψ-s because ψ-ing is the only way to respect Q's claim to receiving an equal share of advantage (in addition to everyone else). Given that ϕ-ing does not respect Q's claim in this way, P is obliged to ψ. Thus, it is only ϕ-ing that is problematic vis-à-vis the

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This observation demands that the theory be refined as follows: A sanctionable choice does not merely fail to maximize the expected total advantage under conditions of full compliance but, rather, fails to maximize the total quantity of *appropriately distributed advantage* under conditions of full compliance. The idea here is as follows. At any given point in time, a luck egalitarian theory of justice – and, by extension, the anarchist assignment of distributive claims – will dictate what quantities of possessed advantage are just: Each person is entitled to as much advantage as everyone else minus however much advantage she has forfeited due to previous sanctionable choices. When each person possesses her just share, advantage can be said to be appropriately distributed, with full compliance entailing that people do everything permissible to realize this state of affairs. The problem is that certain choices preclude the possibility of fully compliant persons bringing about an appropriate distribution of advantage, with some persons thereby ending up with less_{FC} than they could have had otherwise (and less than the amount of advantage to which they have a claim). To avoid this form of moral tyranny, the theory must treat such choices as sanctionable *in addition to* choices that leave others with less_{FC} by failing to $\text{maximize}_{\text{FC}}$ the total quantity of transferrable advantage.

To deliver the result that such choices are sanctionable, one can modify the advantage values used to calculate the expected advantage of a choice. Specifically, any distribution where advantage is appropriately distributed receives an advantage value equal to the total quantity of advantage (i.e., the sum of each person's lifetime advantage). By contrast, for any distribution U where advantage is inappropriately distributed, U's advantage value is calculated via the following procedure. First, of those distributions that have a nonzero probability conditional on all past events obtaining, identify the distribution E that has the greatest total appropriately distributed advantage. Second, identify all those persons in U who have less advantage than they would have had in E. Third, sum the differences between how much advantage each such person has in E and how much she has in U. Fourth, calculate the advantage value of U by subtracting this sum from the total value of E (as this reduction reflects how much less_{FC} advantage people end up with in U relative to the counterfactual E where

moral tyranny constraint, as the $\text{worsening}_{\text{FC}}$ due to ψ-ing is nondiscretionary given that ψ-ing is obligatory. This means that a theory of sanctionable choice should only treat P's ϕ-ing and the associated loss_{FC} of advantage as sanctionable. This is the aim of the theoretical refinement proposed in the next paragraph. Additionally, Section 6.6 will say more about the relationship between obligatory actions and the proposed theory of sanctionable choice.

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their just shares are maximized). Fifth, weight the advantage value of each distribution by multiplying it by the probability that the distribution obtains conditional on the choice in question being made and all persons complying with the demands of justice going forward.[11] Finally, calculate the *expected distributed advantage value* of the choice by summing those weighted advantage values.

Once the expected distributed advantage value of each possible choice has been calculated, it becomes possible to compare the value of the actual choice to those of rival choices that could have been made. When the former is less than one of latter values, the agent is responsible for leaving everyone with less_{FC}, where this difference quantifies the total advantage lost_{FC} due to her choice. More precisely, everyone's combined loss_{FC} of advantage is equal to the absolute value of the difference between the expected distributed advantage value of her choice and the value of the choice with the maximal expected distributed advantage value.

Note that the proposed theory of sanctionable choice does not need to prevent an agent from leaving *everyone* with less_{FC}. Rather, to satisfy the moral tyranny constraint, it must merely preclude her from leaving *others* with less_{FC}. Thus, the relevant question is what portion of the expected total loss_{FC} of distributed advantage would be imposed upon others if the agent were not held responsible for her choice. Fortunately, calculating this value is fairly straightforward. Because the anarchist conclusion is egalitarian in character, it holds that, in the absence of sanctionable choice, any diminution in the total stock of advantage is distributed equally across persons. Thus, if the total quantity of lost_{FC} advantage is equal to x and there are n persons in the world, each person will absorb $1/n$ of that lost_{FC} advantage, that is, $\frac{1}{n} \times x$.[12] Given that the total number of people who are not the agent – that is, all those upon whom the cost_{FC} would be

[11] Note that to avoid circularity, the theory must maintain that, when determining what fully compliant people will do given some choice, it must be assumed that they will treat the choice as non-sanctionable. Otherwise the theory will problematically maintain that the sanctionability of a choice depends on what fully compliant people will do in response to that choice, which, in turn, depends on whether the choice is sanctionable. This stipulation is perhaps a bit ad hoc, but this slight theoretical vice does not seem like a significant problem given the account's many significant theoretical virtues.

[12] This is a slight oversimplification, as it ignores cases where some people receive a quantity of nontransferrable advantage that is either equal to or exceeds their just share. In such cases, they will not absorb any of the cost imposed by the agent (because none of their advantage can be transferred away). Thus, rather than standing for the total number of people, "n" should really stand for the total number of people minus those whose nontransferrable advantage insulates them from the $\text{effects}_{\text{FC}}$ of any choice-responsive adjustment of claims.

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imposed – is equal to $n - 1$, the sum of all of their incurred costs_{FC} would then be equal to $\frac{n-1}{n} \times x$. This value represents the costs_{FC} that the agent would impose upon others absent any forfeiture. The theory of sanctionable choice then holds the agent responsible by asserting that she forfeits a claim to this same quantity of advantage – that is, this forfeited quantity is subtracted from the quantity of advantage to which she would have been entitled absent forfeiture. Additionally, everyone else acquires a claim to a share of the total quantity of forfeited advantage such that they are not left worse off_{FC} by the agent's choice.[13] Together, this forfeiture and accompanying claim acquisition forces the agent to internalize_{FC} any foreseeable losses_{FC} of advantage attributable to her action (by effectively transferring her claim to this advantage to those who would otherwise be left worse off_{FC}). Thus, the proposed theory of sanctionable choice precludes the agent from foreseeably leaving others with less_{FC} and thereby satisfies the moral tyranny constraint.

One final bit of elaboration is needed to complete the formal account of sanctionable choice. So far, sanctionable choice has been defined in terms of expected distributed advantage, where this value is a function of distributions' distributed advantage values and the conditional probabilities of those distributions obtaining. However, note that the term "probability" is ambiguous. On the one hand, it might refer to *objective* probabilities, which, in this case, represent how likely it is in some metaphysical sense that a distribution will arise. Alternatively, it might refer to *subjective* probabilities representing the agent's beliefs about how probable it is that a distribution will arise. To eliminate this ambiguity, one can adopt Carl Knight's suggestion that the proper account of probability to incorporate into luck egalitarian (and, in this context, anarchist) calculations of expected value is *warranted subjective probability adjusted for non-culpable incapacity* (2013, 1067). Briefly, Knight contends that the relevant probability is that which the agent *should* have assigned given the evidence available to her – at least, in those cases where she is capable of assessing that evidence (1067). The advantage of this evidentialist view is that it does not differentially hold people responsible for their unchosen epistemic states. By contrast, on the objective probabilities approach, people might be unaware of relevant objective probabilities "through no

[13] For the sake of concision, the chapter will only talk of the sanctionable party forfeiting a claim going forward. However, this should always be taken as shorthand for the assertion that the sanctionable party forfeits a claim *and* the relevant non-sanctionable parties acquire claims in the way just described.

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fault or choice of their own," and this makes it unfair to hold them responsible for non-maximizing choices (1066). Similarly, using subjective probabilities is unfair because those who are, as a matter of luck, overly confident that their choices are optimal will be found less culpable than those who lack that confidence (1066).

For the purposes of this argument, it is helpful to restate Knight's argument in terms of responsibility. An agent cannot seemingly be responsible for that which she could not have known given the evidence available to her. Further, even if she could know certain things, she may not be responsible for failing to form the proper beliefs given certain extenuating circumstances.[14] Given that responsibility is a necessary condition of sanctionable choice, it follows that an account of sanctionable choice that incorporates calculations of expected value should adopt Knight's notion of probability.[15] Thus, sanctionable choice should be understood as a failure to maximize *warranted* expected distributed advantage (WEDA) under conditions of full compliance.[16]

6.4 Applying the Theory

This abstract description of the theory can be illustrated by applying it to a highly simplified version of Fleurbaey's (1995) reckless motorcyclist case. Specifically, it will help to provide some invented numbers to demonstrate how the relevant calculations are carried out, beginning with the WEDA value of the motorcyclist choosing to wear a helmet:

[14] For more on this point, see Vallentyne (2002, 536).

[15] One might slightly amend Knight's account in the following way. Knight suggests that, in cases where an agent in not culpable for her failure to assess the evidence, she should be treated as having not made a choice at all, and, thus, not acted sanctionably (2013, 1068). However, one might alternatively think that, in cases where an agent is not responsible for her incorrect beliefs about how likely various distributions are to obtain, she might still be responsible for making a suboptimal choice *given* those beliefs. Thus, one might calculate expected distributed value using subjective probabilities in such cases.

[16] One consequence of incorporating Knight's suggestion is that the proposed theory of sanctionable choice does not countenance *option luck*. Briefly, option luck is generally understood to be the outcome that results from a deliberate and avoidable gamble, with many luck egalitarian theories taking persons to have chosen sanctionably if (a) they choose to make such a gamble and (b) they lose out on advantage as a result (see, e.g., Dworkin (1981, 293)). In other words, if a person gambles and loses, this is judged to be bad option luck for which the person is held responsible (i.e., the fact that she ends up worse off than others is held to be just by the theory). By contrast, the proposed theory does not hold people responsible for losing a gamble; rather, it holds them responsible for making any gamble that does not maximize WEDA, irrespective of how that gamble turns out. It is, thus, a variety of what Shlomi Segall has called "all-luck egalitarianism" (2010, 46).

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Table 6.1 *Calculating the WEDA Value of Motorcycling with a Helmet*

	Distribution 1	Distribution 2	Distribution 3	Distribution 4
	Wears a Helmet			
	Does Not Crash	Crashes		
	No Transfer	Assist (No Transfer)	Assist (Transfer)	Failure to Assist
Distributed Advantage	M = 500, P = 500	M = 480, P = 500	M = 490, P = 490	M = 360, P = 500
Advantage Value	1000	980	980	860
P(Distribution | Helmet)	0.7	0	0.1	0.2
Expected Advantage	700	0	98	172
WEDA	970			

Each column of Table 6.1 represents a distribution, where that distribution is defined in terms of the unique set of events compatible with the ultimate quantity of advantage possessed by all persons (in this case, the motorcyclist and the passerby). In Distribution 1, the motorcyclist wears her helmet, does not crash, and no subsequent transfers of advantage (or additional events) occur. In Distribution 2, the motorcyclist wears a helmet, crashes, and is then assisted by a passerby. Distribution 3 is defined by the same series of events as Distribution 2 except the passerby also makes an equalizing transfer to the motorcyclist. And, finally, in Distribution 4, the passerby simply drives past the injured motorcyclist and does not assist her. (For simplicity, assume that the passerby cannot help the motorcyclist.)[17]

The first row of Table 6.1 represents how much advantage each person is stipulated to possess in each distribution. In Distribution 1, where the motorcyclist does not crash, she and the passerby each end up with 500 units of advantage. In Distribution 2, the passerby is able to costlessly treat the motorcyclist's injuries from the crash and, thus, is left with the same quantity of advantage that she would have had if no crash had occurred (500 units). The motorcyclist, however, is a bit bruised and battered, so she ends up with only 480 units of advantage. In Distribution 3, the passerby's supplemental transfer increases the motorcyclist's advantage

[17] Additionally, it will be assumed that the passerby is unable to make any transfer to the motorcyclist in this scenario, perhaps because she continues traveling to a distant location where her spatiotemporal position makes it impossible to relocate the motorcyclist and transfer advantage to her.

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to 490, but that comes at the expense of the passerby, who also ends up with 490 units of advantage. Finally, if no assistance is given, the passerby maintains her original 500 units of advantage while the motorcyclist's untreated injuries reduce her advantage to 360 units.

The second row of Table 6.1 represents the advantage value of each of the four distributions, where this value is a function of the values listed in the first row. As noted earlier, the first step of calculating the advantage value of a distribution is to identify the distribution with the greatest total quantity of advantage that is appropriately distributed and that has a nonzero probability of obtaining conditional on the choice under consideration being made under conditions of full compliance. Assuming no prior sanctionable choice on the part of either party, Distribution 1 satisfies these conditions, and, thus, receives an advantage value equal to the total advantage possessed by all persons (1000 units). The next step is to calculate the advantage value of each additional distribution by identifying every person in that distribution who ends up worse off than she would have been in the comparison distribution. In Distributions 2 and 4, only the motorcyclist ends up worse off, while in Distribution 3, both the motorcyclist and the passerby end up worse off. Each difference in advantage is then subtracted from the advantage value of the comparison distribution. So, for Distribution 3, one would subtract 10 (the difference between how much advantage the motorcyclist has in Distribution 1 and how much she has in Distribution 3) and another 10 (the difference between how much advantage the passerby has in Distribution 1 and how much she has in Distribution 3) from 1000 to get an advantage value of 980.

The third row of Table 6.1 represents the warranted probability of each distribution obtaining conditional upon the motorcyclist not wearing a helmet under conditions of full compliance. For the purposes of this example, it is stipulated that the motorcyclist's evidence suggests there is a probability of 0.7 that Distribution 1 obtains, a probability of 0 that Distribution 2 obtains, a probability of 0.1 that Distribution 3 obtains, and a probability of 0.2 that Distribution 4 obtains. Distribution 2 has a probability of 0 because the theory is only concerned with the probability of a distribution obtaining under conditions of full compliance. Given that fully compliant people would equalize holdings (as neither party has chosen sanctionably prior to the motorcyclist's choice), it is assumed that the passerby transfers 10 units of advantage to the assisted motorcyclist, as this is what the latter is owed as a matter of justice. Thus, Distribution 2 is assigned a probability of 0, and whatever probability it would have been assigned assuming actual compliance (say, 0.1) is added to the probability of Distribution 3 obtaining assuming

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actual compliance (again, 0.1) to yield the probability of Distribution 3 obtaining under conditions of *full* compliance (0.2).

The fourth row lists the probability-adjusted distributed advantage value of each distribution. The values in this row are determined by multiplying the advantage value of each distribution by its conditional probability. For example, Distribution 3 has an advantage value of 980, which is then multiplied by the conditional probability of .1 to get an expected distributed advantage value of 98. The WEDA value for the choice not to wear a helmet is then the sum of the distributed advantage values of all possible distributions, which, in this case, equals 970.

The WEDA value of not wearing a helmet can be similarly represented by the following table:

Table 6.2 *Calculating the WEDA Value of Motorcycling without Wearing a Helmet*

	Distribution 5	Distribution 6	Distribution 7	Distribution 8
	Does Not Wear a Helmet			
	Does Not Crash	Crashes		
	Transfer	Assist (No Transfer)	Assist (Transfer)	Failure to Assist
Distributed Advantage	M = 510, P = 510	M = 460, P = 500	M = 480, P = 480	M = 100, P = 500
Advantage Value	1020	960	960	600
P(Distribution | No Helmet)	0.7	0	0.1	0.2
Expected Advantage	714	0	96	120
WEDA	930			

As with Table 6.1, the distributions represented in Table 6.2 are defined in terms of the sets of events that generate a particular distribution of advantage. However, Table 6.2 describes the possible distributions that might arise from the motorcyclist choosing *not* to wear a helmet. Thus, the numbers in the distributed advantage row have been adjusted to model the distributional consequences of this choice. For example, the motorcyclist is assigned more advantage in Distribution 5 than she is in Distribution 1, as it is assumed that she derives greater enjoyment from riding without a helmet. Additionally, because WEDA calculations are made under the assumption of full compliance, it is assumed that the motorcyclist transfers half of this surplus advantage

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to the passerby, thereby leaving each party with 10 more units of advantage than she possesses in Distribution 1. Similarly, it is assumed that an accident without a helmet is much more severe than an accident with a helmet. Thus, the motorcyclist is assigned less advantage in Distributions 6, 7, and 8 than in counterpart Distributions 2, 3, and 4. Finally, because the fully compliant passerby makes an equalizing transfer in Distribution 7, she ends up with less advantage than she is assigned in counterpart Distribution 3.

Using the procedure described earlier, these inputs yield a WEDA value of 930 for the choice to not wear a helmet. Given that this value is 40 units less than the WEDA value of wearing a helmet, the proposed theory maintains that the motorcyclist chooses sanctionably when she declines to wear a helmet. She then forfeits a claim to a quantity of advantage that is equal to the quantity of advantage that all others would be expected to forego_{FC} absent such forfeiture. Recall that this value is calculated by dividing the total expected loss_{FC} of advantage by the total number of people and then multiplying that by the total number of people minus 1. So, in this simplified two-person world, one would divide 40 by 2 and then multiply by 1 to get 20 units of forfeited advantage. Additionally, the passerby would acquire a supplemental claim to this same quantity of advantage.

Finally, one can use these values to calculate the quantity of advantage to which each person is entitled. Specifically, one would subtract 20 units from the quantity of advantage to which the motorcyclist *would have had a claim* were her choice not sanctionable. For example, suppose that the motorcyclist crashes but is assisted by the passerby. According to Table 6.2, this pair of events leaves everyone with a total of 960 units of available advantage that can be distributed between the two parties. Were the motorcyclist's choice non-sanctionable, then a luck egalitarian principle of justice would assign her a claim to an equal quantity of advantage – that is, 480 units – as no one has made any past sanctionable choice that would justify inequality. However, because her choice *is* sanctionable, one must subtract the forfeited 20 units of advantage to arrive at a just share of 460 units. Additionally, one would add 20 units to the passerby's counterfactual share to yield a just share of 500 units. Thus, a just distribution is realized without any supplemental transfer from the passerby to the motorcyclist. The anarchist conclusion would then assign both the motorcyclist and the passerby a claim against anyone (i.e., the other party) using unowned resources in a way that would diminish – or, in the case of the motorcyclist, further diminish – her respective share. In other words, the passerby sustains all of her prior claims against the motorcyclist using various resources despite the fact that respecting those claims will now leave the motorcyclist comparatively worse off.

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6.5 Anarchism without Moral Tyranny

Sections 6.3 and 6.4 have explained how the proposed theory of sanctionable choice holds people responsible for destroying$_{FC}$ advantage such that they cannot leave others with less$_{FC}$. In other words, these sections have demonstrated that the theory satisfies the moral tyranny constraint in a way that standard prudential contextualism does not. However, note that this demonstration does not show that the theory *fully* satisfies the moral tyranny constraint. To fully satisfy the constraint, a theory must not only preclude sanctionable choosers like the motorcyclist from leaving others with less$_{FC}$ but also preclude those others (e.g., the passerby) from leaving sanctionable choosers with less$_{FC}$. Only then will the proposed account have a theoretical advantage over contextualism.

Fortunately, the demonstration of this point is fairly straightforward. Note that contextualism's moral tyranny problem follows from (a) its claim that the sanctionability of a choice is a function of the actual advantage the chooser foregoes as a result of that choice and (b) the fact that other agents are able to determine the quantity she forgoes *after* her choice has been made. Together, these two propositions entail that other people have the power to unilaterally render a person's choice sanctionable, thereby stripping her of a claim to advantage, which, in turn, leaves her with less$_{FC}$. By contrast, the theory proposed here makes sanctionable choice strictly a function of the agent's choice and the evidence already available to her (namely, the evidence about the consequences of various choices under conditions of full compliance). As a result, the agent is able to avoid choosing sanctionably, meaning that others lack the ability to *unilaterally* leave her with less$_{FC}$. Given that such unilaterality is a necessary condition of moral tyranny, it follows that the proposed theory fully satisfies the moral tyranny constraint in a way that contextualism does not.

Suppose, for example, that, after the motorcyclist crashes without a helmet, the passerby refuses to assist her. According to the proposed theory, this choice would also be sanctionable, as the WEDA value of not assisting (600) is lower than the WEDA value of providing assistance without transfer (960).[18] Thus, according to the proposed theory, the passerby would forfeit a claim to 180 units, as this value is equal to the

[18] It is assumed that the probability of each distribution obtaining is 1 conditional on the choice to not assist and assist, respectively. Thus, the WEDA value of each choice is equal to the distributed advantage value of the distribution it will bring about.

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total lost_{FC} advantage (360) multiplied by $\frac{2-1}{2}$. This value must then be subtracted from what would have been the passerby's just share, were her choice not sanctionable. In this case, this counterfactual just share is equal to 320. Note that there are 600 total units of advantage available to distribute, with an equal distribution assigning 300 units to each party.[19] However, given the motorcyclist's past sanctionable choice to not wear a helmet, her share has to be adjusted downward to 280 units to reflect the 20 units of advantage she forfeited in virtue of that choice. These units are then reassigned to the passerby such that her counterfactual just share is 320 rather than 300 units. One then subtracts the forfeited quantity of 180 units from this amount to yield a just share of 140 units of advantage. Finally, one reassigns these 180 units to the motorcyclist, who ends up having a just share of 460 units (with the anarchist conclusion assigning her the appropriate corresponding set of distributive claims). Crucially, this is the same quantity of advantage to which she would have been entitled had the passerby assisted her; thus, assuming future full compliance, the motorcyclist will end up with just as much advantage without assistance as she would with assistance. In other words, the passerby is unable to leave the motorcyclist with less_{FC} – a result that demonstrates that the WEDA-based anarchist conclusion satisfies the moral tyranny constraint in a way that a contextualist version of the position does not.

6.6 Amending the Theory

Before completing the argument, a quick amendment must be made to the theory to avoid an objection that might otherwise undermine its plausibility. In its present form, the proposed theory makes sanctionable choice a function of the failure to maximize WEDA *assuming full compliance*. However, in many cases, people will not actually comply with others' claims. As a result, there will be cases where the choice that maximizes full-

[19] When calculating the WEDA value of the motorcyclist's choice, it was assumed for simplicity that there was no opportunity for further advantage transfer conditional on the passerby declining to assist the motorcyclist. This assumption has now been relaxed so as to illustrate how advantage is to be distributed in virtue of the passerby's choice. If one were being very precise, all of the possible distributions of advantage conditional on non-assistance should have been included in the two tables and each assigned a probability. However, given that this would have added hundreds of columns to the tables without changing the result of the WEDA calculations, these distributions were excluded from the foregoing discussion.

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compliance WEDA runs contrary to the demands of justice. Consider, for example, David Estlund's Slice and Patch case:

> **Slice and Patch Go Golfing**
> Suppose that unless a patient is cut and stitched he will worsen and die (though not painfully). Surgery and stitching would save his life. If there is surgery without stitching, the death will be agonizing. Ought Slice to do the surgery? This depends, of course, on whether Patch (or someone) will be stitching up the wound. Slice and Patch are each going golfing whether the other attends to the patient or not. Does anyone act wrongly? (2020, 33)

In this case, Slice choosing to operate would maximize WEDA under conditions of full compliance, as a fully compliant Patch would stitch up the wound, thereby leaving everyone with maximal equal advantage. However, given that actual Patch *will not* stitch up the wound, it seems plausible to think that justice demands that Slice refrain from operating. (For these purposes, this can simply be stipulated.) Given these premises, the posited theory entails a seemingly unacceptable result: Slice declining to operate is both a just choice and a sanctionable choice in virtue of which she forfeits a claim to advantage.

To avoid this problem, the theory can be amended as follows. Rather than define sanctionable choice strictly in terms of a failure to maximize WEDA under conditions of full compliance, a second necessary condition of sanctionable choice can be added to the theory: A person chooses sanctionably if and only if she fails to maximize WEDA under conditions of full compliance *and* fails to maximize the chances that advantage is appropriately distributed assuming actual compliance. Thus, when Slice chooses not to operate on the patient, she does not choose sanctionably, as the added necessary condition is not met.

Further, the amended theory still satisfies the moral tyranny constraint. Admittedly, when Slice declines to operate, she leaves the patient with less_{FC} advantage than if she chose to operate. However, recall from Chapter 2 that the moral tyranny constraint is only violated when a theory enables a person to *discretionarily* leave others with less_{FC}, where a discretionary action is one that is not obligatory according to the theory in question. Given that it is obligatory that Slice not operate, the fact that this choice leaves the patient with less_{FC} advantage under the proposed theory does not entail that the theory permits moral tyranny. The amended theory thereby avoids declaring just actions sanctionable while also satisfying the moral tyranny constraint.

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6.7 Additional Advantages of the Theory

In addition to resolving the moral tyranny objection, the proposed theory of sanctionable choice also allows the anarchist conclusion to avoid the other problems with luck egalitarianism presented in Section 6.1. Recall, first, Arneson's objection that luck egalitarianism delivers incorrect results in cases of costly rescue, for example, by declaring Mother Teresa to have chosen sanctionably when she gives her money to the poor (Arneson 2011a, 244; 2011b, 33–4). While this objection seems like a genuine problem for prudential contextualist luck egalitarianism, there are two reasons that the proposed theory would not entail that Mother Teresa chooses sanctionably.

First, there are certain ways of filling in the details of the case such that Mother Teresa maximizes WEDA under conditions of full compliance and, thus, does not choose sanctionably. For example, if the poor are in their position due to bad luck and Mother Teresa has a comparative advantage in transferring advantage, then her actions would be expected to leave others with more_{FC} than if she focused on generating advantage. Second, even if her actions do not maximize WEDA assuming full compliance, the poor would have distributive claims that others only use natural resources in ways that increase their advantage, thereby making her transfers obligatory. Given such a duty to transfer, Mother Teresa's choice to aid the poor does not meet the second necessary condition of sanctionable choice introduced in Section 6.6. Thus, the anarchist conclusion avoids delivering an incorrect result in this case because it does not entail that she forfeits any distributive claims.

Section 6.1 also introduced Hurley's "boring problem." Recall that this problem emerges from (a) luck egalitarianism's claim that inequality is justified if and only if those with less have chosen sanctionably and (b) the standard contextualist view that sanctionable choice is a function of whether or not a person has imprudently failed to maximize her possessed advantage. When taken together, these two claims entail that a comparative relation between levels of advantage can be justified by appealing to a responsibility relation that obtains between a person and her individual holdings. However, Hurley argues that the latter relation does not appear to justify the former: The fact that a person is responsible for having a particular quantity of advantage would not seem to justify others having *more* advantage, as the person is not responsible for this *difference*. Thus, Hurley worries that luck egalitarianism is internally incoherent (2003, 160–1).

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What is now apparent is that this objection is specific to contextualist versions of luck egalitarianism, as only contextualism maintains that a person's imprudent choices – that is, those that leave her with some diminished quantity of advantage – justify a comparative inequality in advantage. By contrast, the proposed theory holds a person responsible for failing to position herself and others in a way that would allow everyone to bring about justice via compliance without anyone needlessly foregoing advantage. This seems like a much more apt *justificans* for comparative inequality than a person being responsible for her own level of advantage.[20] Alternatively, the comparative relation might be justified by the fact that this relation obtaining is a necessary condition of avoiding moral tyranny. Regardless of the exact justification offered, the proposed theory solves Hurley's boring problem by explicating why an individual's sanctionable choice justifies inequality despite that individual not being responsible for the inequality in question. Thus, the anarchist who takes inequality to require justification (for the reasons discussed in Section 5.7) can avoid Hurley's worry that sanctionable choice is not a suitable *justificans*.

[20] Gerald Lang (2015; 2021) has suggested that the boring problem might be solved by modifying the *justificandum* of sanctionable choice: Rather than have such choice justify a comparative inequality between two persons – that is, the gap between their respective levels of advantage – it would, instead, justify a gap between an agent's level of advantage and some egalitarian baseline. On this proposal, each person is assigned some baseline share of advantage. If she then ends up with either more or less advantage than her assigned baseline share, that deviation would be just if and only if the difference between her share and the baseline is attributable to her choices rather than luck (2015, 706). The thought here is that, while a person is not responsible for the fact that she has less advantage *than someone else*, she *is* responsible for the fact that she ends up with less *than her baseline share*. Thus, there is no longer a justificatory gap of the kind identified by the boring problem, as the agent's sanctionable choices make her responsible for the state of affairs that those choices are supposed to justify.

However, there are three problems with this proposal. First, as Lang notes, it is unclear how to determine each person's appropriate baseline share (714). Second, the proposal seems to fail on its own terms. Lang's suggestion is that, while all *interpersonal inequalities* qualify as luck because they depend on the choices of the better-off party in addition the choices of the worse off, deviations from the baseline depend solely on the choices of the agent and, thus, are controlled in a way that renders these deviations non-luck (and therefore justifiable). However, deviations from the baseline would equally qualify as luck (so construed), as such deviations almost always depend on the uncontrolled choices of others. For example, the person who drops below the baseline due to losing at roulette ends up in this state only because of how forcefully the casino employee spun the wheel – a fact over which she had no control. Finally, note that Lang's proposal still assumes a prudential contextualist theory of sanctionable choice where a choice justifies a deviation from the baseline if and only if it leaves the agent worse off than she might otherwise have been. Given this assumption, Lang's baseline account is still vulnerable to the moral tyranny objection, making the proposed WEDA account a superior solution to the boring problem.

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6.8 The Disadvantage Creation Account

The proposed theory of sanctionable choice is similar in certain respects to a revised version of luck egalitarianism proposed by Jens Damgaard Thaysen and Andreas Albertsen (2017). Thus, it is worth explicating their theory in some detail so as to clarify the similarities and differences between the two theories. Specifically, this section will suggest that their theory is best understood as asserting that sanctionable choice is a function of how agents' choices affect the total quantity of advantage. It will then argue that the proposed WEDA-based theory of sanctionable choice has three advantages over this interpretation of Thaysen and Albertsen's account.

Like the proposed account, Thaysen and Albertsen attempt to solve the problem of costly rescues – that is, the problem illustrated by Arneson's Mother Teresa case – by revising which choices count as sanctionable. Specifically, they posit that a choice is sanctionable if and only if it *creates* disadvantage that would not have otherwise been possessed by anyone. For example, if a villain drops a brick off of a building and it strikes someone, she creates disadvantage because she leaves someone worse off while no one would have been worse off had she chosen differently (95). By contrast, the hero who pushes someone out of the way of a falling brick and gets struck herself *distributes* disadvantage, as she merely changes who possesses disadvantage that would have obtained irrespective of her choice (96). In this way, Thaysen and Albertsen's theory avoids the implication that Mother Teresa makes a sanctionable choice when she aids the poor, as she is merely distributing disadvantage to herself rather than creating disadvantage.

To fully explicate Thaysen and Albertsen's proposal, a more precise account of disadvantage creation must be provided. Their formal statement is that an "agent is responsible for creating a (dis)advantage if, and only if, she is responsible for behaving in such a way that *somebody* was (dis) advantaged" (94). If taken literally, this statement is misleading, as it suggests that an action ϕ creates disadvantage if and only if there is a person who is left worse off in the world where ϕ occurs relative to the counterfactual world where it does not.[21] However, this is clearly not how Thaysen and Albertsen intend their analysis to be interpreted, as such an account would entail that the hero creates disadvantage due to the fact that there is a person who is left worse off by her action (namely, herself).

[21] This is also the natural way of precisifying Thaysen and Albertsen's later restatement of duty creation wherein they assert that such creation obtains when "nobody would be worse off if not for [the agent's] exercise of responsibility" (95).

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To clarify Thaysen and Andersen's analysis of disadvantage creation, it will be helpful to consider their analysis of disadvantage *distribution*, as the former is supposed to contrast with the latter. Specifically, they posit that disadvantage distribution occurs if and only if "*X*, rather than *Y*, was (dis)advantaged" by the agent's action. However, there is some potential ambiguity in this statement that calls for additional precisification. One way of interpreting this analysis is as follows: An agent distributes disadvantage by ϕ-ing if and only if *X* is worse off in the world where the agent ϕ-s than in the world where she does not ϕ and *Y* is worse off in the latter world than she is in the former. Notably, this restatement delivers the correct results in the hero case, as the hero is worse off in the world where she pushes the beneficiary than she is in the world where she does not push, while the beneficiary is worse off in the latter than she is in the former. One could then define disadvantage creation as cases where (a) the agent's action leaves someone worse off relative to inaction and (b) the action is not an instance of disadvantage distribution.

The problem with this proposal is that the restated analysis of disadvantage distribution seems to deliver incorrect results. Consider, for example, a modified case where a villain has a small quantity of fun dropping a brick on her victim. In this case, the victim is worse off in the world where the brick is dropped than she is in the world where it is not dropped; at the same time the villain is worse off in the latter world than she is in the former (because she has less fun). Thus, the restated account would entail that the villain distributes disadvantage rather than creates it. Given that this is seemingly a paradigmatic case of disadvantage creation, this result is a *reductio* of the proposed restatement.

So what is a better statement? The apparent solution is to put things in terms of the total quantity of disadvantage resulting from an action: An agent distributes disadvantage by ϕ-ing if and only if (a) some person has either more or less advantage in the world where the agent ϕ-s than the counterfactual world where the agent does not ϕ and (b) there is the same total quantity of disadvantage in the former world as there is in the latter. This account seems to deliver the correct results in the paradigmatic cases. For example, when the hero saves the beneficiary from the falling brick, the resulting world contains the same quantity of disadvantage as the world where no rescue occurred; the only difference is that the beneficiary has more advantage in the rescue world while the hero has less. Thus, the hero merely distributes disadvantage in that case. By contrast, the villain who derives enjoyment from dropping a brick off of a building does not distribute disadvantage, as there is more disadvantage in the world where

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she drops the brick than there is in the world where she does not act in this way.

One final adjustment is needed. The fact that Thaysen and Albertsen use the term "(dis)advantage" when articulating their distribution/creation distinction suggests that they actually take there to be four distinct phenomena: advantage distribution, disadvantage distribution, advantage creation, and disadvantage creation. This fourfold division is incompatible with the just-posited restatement, as this restatement would only allow for disadvantage creation/distribution with there being no apparent acts of advantage creation/distribution. To fix this problem, the analysis can be amended as follows. An agent distributes *disadvantage* by ϕ-ing if and only if (a) there is the same total quantity of disadvantage in the world where she ϕ-s as there is in the counterfactual world where she does not ϕ and (b) there is less total advantage after she ϕ-s than there was just prior to her ϕ-ing. This joint counterfactual and trans-temporal comparison seems to capture the idea that people are worse off – that is, there was *dis*advantage generated – but the agent merely distributes that worsening without contributing to it. The account of *advantage* distribution would then be identical to the just-proposed analysis except that Condition (b) asserts that there is *more* total advantage after the agent ϕ-s.

The restatement of (dis)advantage creation is a bit more straightforward, as one can capture the idea of leaving everyone (worse off) better off without having to make any trans-temporal comparisons. Specifically, an agent creates disadvantage by ϕ-ing if and only if there is less total advantage in the world where she ϕ-s than there is in the counterfactual world where she does not ϕ. And she creates advantage by ϕ-ing if and only if there is more total advantage in the world where she ϕ-s than in the counterfactual world where she does not ϕ.

This explication helps to reveal the similarities and differences between Thaysen and Albertsen's theory of sanctionable choice and the one posited by this chapter. The primary similarity is that both theories reject contextualist theories of sanctionable choice and, instead, make sanctionable choice a function – at least in part – of what effect the agent's choice has on the total quantity of advantage (more on the qualifier later). This allows both theories to sidestep Arneson's objection that luck egalitarianism unacceptably entails that costly rescues are sanctionable. Given that such rescues do not paradigmatically affect the total quantity of advantage, they would not count as sanctionable choices under either theory.

However, there are three important differences that give the posited WEDA-based account a theoretical advantage over Thaysen and Albertsen's

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proposal. First, their theory makes sanctionable choice strictly a function of created disadvantage rather than the *expected advantage value* of choices. As a result, their theory entails that a person chooses sanctionably when she makes a choice that maximizes expected advantage but ultimately creates disadvantage due to bad luck. For example, suppose that a person reasonably believes that there is a probability of .9 that she will create 100 units of advantage if she ϕ-s and a probability of .1 that she will create 10 units of disadvantage (i.e., −10 units of advantage). By contrast, if she does not ϕ, she will create 5 units of disadvantage with a probability of 1. Given that the expected value of ϕ-ing is 89 while the expected value of not ϕ-ing is −5, the agent chooses to ϕ; however, she gets unlucky and generates 10 units of disadvantage. Given that there is more total advantage in the world where the agent ϕ-s than the counterfactual world where she does not, the posited restatement of Thaysen and Albertsen's proposal entails that she has created disadvantage and can thereby be held responsible – a seemingly unacceptable result.[22] By contrast, the WEDA account avoids this implication by making sanctionable choice a function of expected total advantage rather than counterfactual advantage comparisons.

A second important difference is that Thaysen and Albertsen's account seemingly declares inequality to be just both when someone chooses sanctionably – that is, creates disadvantage – and *also* when someone makes a choice that creates advantage. For example, they hold that the miner who happens to strike a vein of gold that no one else would have found creates advantage and is, thus, entitled to keep some of the profits even if that results in inequality (98).[23] However, it seems inappropriate for a luck egalitarian theory to declare such a luck-based inequality just. After all, the fact that the miner was lucky enough to be uniquely positioned to extract the gold does not seem to justify her ending up better off than everyone else. By contrast, the WEDA theory incorporated into the anarchist conclusion does not posit such a category of *rewardable choice*; rather, anything short of maximizing WEDA is sanctionable while only the maximizing choice entitles a person to an equal share of advantage

[22] Thaysen and Albertsen do specify that a choice is sanctionable only if it was *foreseeable* that it would create disadvantage (100). However, they do not consider cases where the disadvantage creation was foreseeable but not the reasonably expected outcome.

[23] Note the caveat that the miner is only entitled to *some* of the profits. This is because, according to Thaysen and Albertsen, she is only responsible for generating part of the created advantage, as some of that advantage is attributable merely to the resources rather than anything the miner did (98). Unfortunately, they do not provide an account explicating how one determines the portion of created advantage for which a person is responsible.

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relative to the shares of other successful maximizers. Thus, the proposed theory would not license the inequality in question.

Finally, while Thaysen and Albertsen make sanctionable choice a function of counterfactual differences in total advantage, the posited account makes sanctionable choice a function of both the quantity *and* distribution of advantage in the relevant counterfactual worlds. This allows the posited WEDA account to avoid seemingly counterintuitive implications of Thaysen and Albertsen's proposal. Consider, for example, a case where *P* has a choice between realizing world *E* where she and *Q* each have 10 units of advantage or world *U* where she has 5 units of advantage and *Q* has 20 (assume, for simplicity, that the warranted probability of each outcome is 1). On Thaysen and Albertsen's account – at least, as it has been interpreted here – *P* would create disadvantage if she realizes *E*, as it has less total advantage than *U*. In other words, if *P* were to realize the egalitarian distribution, she would thereby make a sanctionable choice for which she could be held responsible. However, this result is seemingly a *reductio* of any posited theory of luck egalitarianism. By contrast, the theory proposed in this chapter would assign a higher WEDA value to *E*, thereby making *P*'s choice to realize an egalitarian distribution non-sanctionable.

In sum, Thaysen and Albertsen make the right kind of theoretical move by rejecting contextualism in favor of an account that makes sanctionable choice a function of total advantage. However, their failure to build expected value into their theory, their endorsement of rewardable choice, and their neglect of distributive considerations all compromise the extensional adequacy of their account. Thus, luck egalitarians troubled by Arneson's objection ought to adopt the proposed WEDA-based theory rather than Thaysen and Albertsen's proposal.

6.9 Conclusion

This concludes the argument for the anarchist position. It began with a fairly simple and plausible constraint on which theories of duties are acceptable. It then argued that a number of influential libertarian and egalitarian principles follow from this constraint, namely the consent theory of legitimacy, the Lockean proviso, and luck egalitarianism's incorporation of responsibility. These principles, in turn, were shown to entail other components of the anarchist position: Both the Lockean proviso and the consent theory of legitimacy independently entail the absence of external private property, while the former entails that persons can easily appropriate their bodies, thereby allowing for (near) universal

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self-ownership of the kind articulated by ASO. Finally, it was argued that, in the absence of private property, both egalitarians and libertarians have reason to accept the anarchist conclusion – that is, the contention that each person has a claim against others using unowned resources in a way that (a) would leave her comparatively worse off where (b) that inequality did not correspond to any sanctionable choice on her part. This conclusion, it was argued, is both compatible with libertarian entitlement theories of justice and follows from libertarians' egalitarian approach to assigning persons rights and powers.

The purpose of this chapter was to render the anarchist conclusion fully determinate by specifying which choices qualify as sanctionable – and, more specifically, to do so in a way that brings the position into full compliance with the moral tyranny constraint. This chapter posited that a choice is sanctionable if and only if it fails to maximize warranted expected distributed advantage under conditions of full compliance (and fails to maximize the chances that advantage is appropriately distributed assuming actual compliance). Such an account ensures that no person is able to unilaterally, discretionarily, and foreseeably leave others with less_{FC}, thereby satisfying the moral tyranny constraint. Additionally, this theory of sanctionable choice allows the anarchist conclusion to avoid some of the major objections that plague standard luck egalitarian theories of distributive justice while still delivering equally egalitarian prescriptions vis-à-vis the use of natural resources.

In this way, the foregoing chapters have aimed to defend a heterodox philosophical position that synthesizes both libertarian moral principles and an egalitarian principle typically associated with the socialist left. Of course, the suggestion that these principles might be combined in this way will be intuitive to social anarchists, as their movement is composed of people who endorse (or would, upon reflection, endorse) just such a set of principles. However, they might still have been surprised to discover that this position can be largely derived from a single, simple theoretical *desideratum* and, thus, has the kind of coherence discussed in Section I.2. Similarly, libertarians may have been surprised to find that some of their core principles commit them to rejecting private property in favor of egalitarianism. And, for those who were not already sympathetic to either libertarianism or the anarchist position, the foregoing argument has hopefully demonstrated that there is at least a plausible and coherent variety of anarchism that deserves serious consideration when assessing what duties we have vis-à-vis resources and the state.

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CHAPTER 7

A State-Tolerant Anarchism

Given that this book is about anarchism, it may seem odd that so little has been said about the state. Section 1.1 did introduce the consent theory of legitimacy and the associated conclusion that no one is obligated to comply with the laws of the state (as practically no one has actually consented to the state's governance). However, this *philosophical anarchism* is a much weaker claim than the *political anarchism* typically espoused by self-identified anarchists. For the philosophical anarchist, the state merely lacks a certain kind of moral power, where this does not necessarily entail that one has any obligation to dismantle the state. Indeed, the philosophical anarchist may even allow that persons are obliged to *support* the state and the activities of its agents if doing so aligns with demands of justice. By contrast, the political anarchist contends that states are *unjust*, where this, in turn, implies that persons have a duty to abolish existing states (or, more modestly, that each state has a duty to abolish itself). More strongly, the political anarchist holds that similar duties would obtain vis-à-vis all – or at least most – possible states.[1] Thus, the fact that the proposed social anarchist position does not declare states unjust in this sense may come as a disappointment to those interested in a more radical sort of political anarchism.[2]

[1] As noted in Footnote 17 of Chapter 2, Simmons persuasively argues that there is no reason to deny the legitimacy of a state if everyone has consented to comply with its laws; thus, one should reject Wolff's (1970) contention that there are *necessarily* no legitimate states and, instead, take philosophical anarchism to assert that there are no *existing* legitimate states (1987, 269fn2). Further, there is no obvious reason for thinking that the existence of a state is unjust if it is legitimate or all persons otherwise endorse its existence. Thus, a charitable interpretation of political anarchism would not assert that states are *necessarily* unjust. Rather, it would allow that consensual states are just but no others. Or, perhaps some other possible states would be excepted, so long as it is still the case that the vast majority of possible states are declared unjust.

[2] An anonymous commenter has suggested that the proposed position might be redescribed as "socialist minarchism," as it holds that a state is just if and only if it takes the minimal form required to promote luck egalitarian redistribution while respecting self-ownership rights. Any regulatory action of the state beyond advancing this end would be unjust – and, thus, persons would have reason to strip the state of the power to carry out such activities.

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This chapter will argue that political anarchism is misguided. This is not because there are pragmatic disadvantages to eliminating the state in favor of some non-state political arrangement. Rather, the chapter will argue that there is a conceptual problem with political anarchism that undermines its plausibility. Specifically, it will note that the political anarchist must provide an analysis of statehood such that one can determine what must be changed if existing states are to be abolished. Further, if political anarchism is to be plausible, the posited analysis must satisfy two *desiderata* (introduced in the subsequent section). However, it will be argued that none of the most plausible analyses of statehood satisfy both of these *desiderata*. Thus, political anarchism is implausible and should not be incorporated into the social anarchist position.

7.1 Two *Desiderata* of Political Anarchism

As was just noted, the political anarchist must provide an account of the necessary and sufficient conditions of some group qualifying as a state. Further, if political anarchism is to be plausible, these conditions must satisfy two *desiderata*. First, the analysis must support the political anarchist's contention that the mere existence of a state constitutes an injustice, where that injustice is negated by the elimination of the state. Thus, the political anarchist must endorse the following *grounding desideratum*: Any acceptable analysis of statehood must entail that (a) any given state is unjust and (b) the elimination of that state would eliminate the injustice.[3] One can test whether Proposition (a) is true by considering whether there is any case where some group meets the posited sufficient condition of statehood but no injustice obtains. If, for example, the posited analysis held that some group constitutes a state if and only if it has more than 1,000 card-carrying members, then Proposition (a) would be false, as there are many possible worlds where some group exceeds that size but no injustice obtains. This is a way of testing the adequacy of the sufficient condition(s) of the proposed analysis. Additionally, if injustice obtains when the sufficient condition of statehood is met, one must ensure that

[3] Proposition (a) needs to be qualified in light of the discussion that appears in Footnote 1. If the state has obtained universal consent to carry out the activities that render it a state, then the political anarchist will presumably have to concede that there is nothing unjust about the state. However, this is a special case, and the political anarchist might reasonably maintain that all states that lack this consent are unjust. Thus, the grounding *desideratum* should be understood to be satisfied by an analysis if and only if that analysis entails that Proposition (a) is true for all states *except* those that have obtained universal consent.

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Proposition (b) is true by considering whether, for each posited necessary condition of statehood, that same degree of injustice would still obtain in the closest possible world where that necessary condition of statehood is not met. If the injustice persists, then Proposition (b) is false and the grounding *desideratum* goes unsatisfied. This test assesses the adequacy of the analysis' posited necessary conditions of statehood.

Second, the political anarchist needs an analysis of statehood that delivers the result that there are actually existing states, where these states at least roughly correspond to the groups that are pre-theoretically understood to be states. For example, the proposed analysis should not deliver the result that the United States Federal Government is not actually a state. Such a result would conflict with the intuition that motivates the political anarchist in the first place, namely, that the existing institutions that we call states are unjust. Call this constraint on analyses of statehood the *actuality desideratum*.

The political anarchist is committed to endorsing both of these *desiderata*, as they are presupposed by her claim that arrangements like the United States Federal Government are morally defective and should be abolished. However, the subsequent section will argue that none of the most plausible analyses of statehood satisfy both *desiderata*. Thus, political anarchism does not meet its own presupposed criteria of plausibility and should be rejected in favor of the more modest philosophical anarchism posited by the social anarchist position. Finally, the chapter will conclude by considering a recent argument that philosophical anarchism collapses into either political anarchism or statism.

7.2 Twelve Analyses of Statehood

So what is a state? As just discussed, the political anarchist must provide an answer to this question that satisfies both of the posited *desiderata*. To this end, she might draw upon Max Weber's influential claim that a state is "a human community that (successfully) claims the *monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force* within a given territory" (1991, 78).[4] This proposal suggests a number of potential analyses of statehood, beginning with one that makes use of Weber's appeal to legitimacy. Previously, the term "legitimacy" has been used to refer to the Hohfeldian power to oblige others via the issuing of edicts. However, political anarchists cannot posit that some group is a state if and only if it is legitimate in this sense, as they

[4] Emphasis in the original text.

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are also philosophical anarchists who deny that those entities popularly assumed to be states – and more generally, any existing candidates for statehood – are legitimate.[5] Thus, if legitimacy in the just-specified sense is a necessary condition of statehood, then there will also be no existing states, where this result entails that the proposed analysis does not satisfy the actuality *desideratum*.

Alternatively, one might construe Weber's claim that states monopolize "the legitimate use of physical force" as an assertion that some group is a state if and only if it possesses *political authority*, that is, a special moral permission to use violence/coercion that ordinary people lack (e.g., a permission to coercively regulate behavior or violently enforce rights). However, this second proposed analysis of statehood runs into the same problem as the first, as political anarchists also deny that states possess political authority in this sense. Given this commitment, the second analysis of statehood would imply that there are no existing states, thereby failing to satisfy the actuality *desideratum*.

Given the failure of an analysis that makes reference to the actual moral status of candidates for statehood, one might employ the notion of "legitimacy" as Weber interprets it, that is, to express a claim about what people *believe* about the moral status of these candidates for statehood. According to this third analysis, a group is legitimate if and only if its purported subjects believe that they are obliged to obey the edicts issued by some members of the group (but not edicts issued by nonmembers). Or alternatively, the group is legitimate if and only if its purported subjects believe that the group possesses political authority – that is, that coercion/violence deployed by some members of the group is permissible while identical acts of violence by nonmembers is impermissible. In either case, this proposed analysis makes statehood a function of the beliefs that the purported subjects have about the candidate's Hohfeldian incidents rather than the actual Hohfeldian incidents that it possesses.

This revised analysis aims to satisfy the actuality *desideratum*, as one can concede that all existing candidates for statehood are not legitimate and lack political authority while also observing that most people mistakenly believe that entities like the United States Federal Government, the Government of the United Mexican States, etc., are legitimate and possess political authority. However, note that *not all* of the purported subjects of

[5] Technically, one could be a political anarchist without being a philosophical anarchist. In other words, one might think that states both have the power to oblige their citizens and are unjust and ought to be abolished. However, in practice, no one seems to hold this conjunction of views.

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these entities hold these beliefs. As a contingent matter, every society contains at least a few philosophical anarchists who explicitly deny that the purported state of that society possesses legitimacy or political authority. Thus, strictly speaking, the actuality *desideratum* is not satisfied by this third analysis of statehood.

If one wanted the proposed analysis to satisfy the actuality *desideratum*, one would need to posit a fourth analysis of statehood such that a group is held to be a state if and only if *some suitable portion* of its purported subjects believe that it has special powers to oblige and/or special permissions to enact violence. However, it is not clear how one would specify the required portion without rendering the analysis of statehood arbitrary and *ad hoc*. Additionally, the proposed analysis would fail to satisfy Proposition (b) of the grounding *desideratum*. Suppose that everyone in the United States were to endorse philosophical anarchism. On the posited account, the United States Federal Government would not, in this world, qualify as a state. However, presumably the political anarchist would not judge the United States Federal Government to be just in this world. Thus, the *desideratum* is not satisfied, and the revised legitimacy-based account of statehood must also be rejected.

Perhaps these problems can be avoided by embracing Weber's proposal that a state *claims* the monopoly on legitimate violence. On this line of thinking, what matters is not whether a group has special moral status or is believed to have special moral status but, rather, whether *it contends* that it has a special moral status (i.e., that it possesses either political authority or the power to oblige and that its subjects lack the associated permissions and powers). This fifth analysis of statehood would maintain that a group qualifies as a state if and only if it publicly affirms that, unlike its subjects, it is legitimate and/or possesses political authority. However, as Nozick notes, this analysis proposes an implausible sufficient condition of statehood, as it is implausible that any single person can transform herself into a state by making a public moral claim (1974, 23).[6] Or, to slightly restate this point, the analysis does not satisfy the grounding *desideratum* because it allows that there are many possible just states (since, presumably, there is no injustice when an arbitrary person insists to her friends that she has the power to impose obligations on them via the issuance of edicts). Additionally, suppose that the United States Federal Government formally endorsed the philosophical anarchist position while sustaining all of its

[6] It is not fully clear whether this is Nozick's observation or if he is recapitulating a point made in an unpublished paper by Marshall Cohen.

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current activities. Such a resolution would render it no longer a state on the proposed analysis. However, given that this endorsement does nothing to eliminate the injustice posited by the political anarchist, Proposition (b) of the grounding *desideratum* goes unsatisfied.

Fabian Wendt (2015, 329) revises this proposal by suggesting that the defining feature of a state is that it both denies that persons have a permission to privately enforce their rights – that is, it asserts that it alone has political authority – *and* it legally enshrines that assertion by denying them the legal right to carry out acts of private enforcement. The problem with this sixth suggested analysis is that, from the perspective of the philosophical anarchist, there is no moral difference between a group that refuses to grant persons some legal right and a group that publicly asserts that they lack this right. In her view, laws do not have any normative implications; thus, the issuance of a law can seemingly do more than command people to act in certain ways and inform them that there might be consequences for noncompliance. Granted, laws are typically enacted via a complicated social process, where the exact nature of this procedure will depend upon one's substantive view of the necessary conditions of lawmaking. However, irrespective of how one fills in those details, it is unclear how that process could render the issuance of a law against private enforcement more unjust than a mere public declaration that only the state has political authority. Thus, the proposed legal analysis of statehood would fail to satisfy the grounding *desideratum* for the same reason that the previous analysis failed to satisfy it: There would be no improvement vis-à-vis justice if the United States Federal Government were to eliminate its laws against private enforcement (while still continuing to carry out all of its current coercive operations to preclude such enforcement). And, similarly, a private individual might – without committing any injustice – develop her own legislative process and declare others' rightful actions illegal according to her set of laws (so long as she does not coercively enforce those laws). In this way, the proposed analysis fails to make statehood adequately track injustice in the way that the grounding *desideratum* requires.

The foregoing discussion has demonstrated that, for the political anarchist's purpose, statehood cannot be a function of the special moral properties of some candidate for statehood, the beliefs that people have about its moral properties, or the assertions it makes about its moral properties (where the passing of laws is one such mode of assertion). Rather, there must be some other property of groups, the possession of which is a necessary and sufficient condition of statehood. Here one might

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appeal to the final component of Weber's account of statehood and contend that some group is a state if and only if it has an actual monopoly on violence; that is, it successfully uses its power to preclude its subjects and/or those within its claimed territory from employing unauthorized violence or coercion. However, this seventh analysis also fails to satisfy the actuality *desideratum*. As Marshall Cohen has noted in an unpublished paper, for any given purported state, some of the subjects in its territory continue to use violence and coercion that is not authorized by the state (e.g., various gangs).[7] Given that no group successfully monopolizes violence, this proposed analysis would unacceptably entail that there are no existing states.

This result suggests an alternative analysis of statehood that drops the requirement that states must *successfully* monopolize coercion/violence in the way just described. Specifically, one might, instead, endorse Nozick's proposal that, although states need not actually monopolize the use of violence or coercion, "a necessary condition for the existence of a state is that it. . . announce that, to the best of its ability (taking into account costs of doing so, the feasibility, the more important alternative things it should be doing, and so forth), it will punish everyone whom it discovers to have used force without its express permission" (1974, 24). However, while Nozick puts things simply in terms of what the group announces, it seems better to analyze the notion of statehood in terms of what the state actually attempts. Otherwise, the proposed analysis will fail to satisfy the grounding *desideratum* for the same reason that the fifth proposed analysis of statehood failed to satisfy it: If mere assertion is a sufficient condition of statehood, then a person would become a state simply by making the relevant assertion, despite there not being any attendant injustice. Thus, to avoid this problem, the eighth proposed analysis of statehood posits that some group qualifies as a state if and only if it attempts to preclude its subjects and/or those within its claimed territory from employing unauthorized violence or coercion whenever doing so is both feasible and within the bounds of prudence.[8]

[7] This paper is not available but its details are discussed by Nozick (1974, 23).

[8] This seems to be what Vallentyne proposes when he contends that "to be a state, an organization need neither have, nor claim to have, a de jure (i.e., rightful) monopoly on the use of force. It just has to prohibit the use of force without its permission (i.e., it has to claim a de facto monopoly)" (2007, 189n5). As Wendt notes, it seems odd to think that the defining feature of a state is that it *asserts* that it has a *de facto* monopoly on the use of force, as opposed to actually having such a monopoly (2015, 321). However, one might make sense of this claim if one interprets Vallentyne's assertions that states "prohibit the use of force" and "claim a de facto monopoly" to mean that states *attempt* to regulate all use of force by their respective subjects and/or those within their respective territories.

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Unfortunately for the political anarchist, this analysis has problems of its own. First, consider the case of a large armed group that attempts to preclude all other persons from using unauthorized violence – that is, a group that qualifies as a state according to the proposed analysis. However, that group also authorizes each person to carry out all and only those acts of violence/coercion that the political anarchist deems morally permissible (acts of proportionate self-defense, coercive acts required to preserve the just distribution of resources, etc.). Further, the group's agents act in only those ways that the anarchist judges permissible. Would such a state be just? It is unclear on what basis the political anarchist could deny that it is. From her point of view, the actions of its agents are all morally impeccable. And the only actions it attempts to prevent are those that she believes ought to be prevented. Thus, there is no apparent basis for her maintaining that the state is unjust, with the proposed analysis thereby failing to satisfy the grounding *desideratum*.

Alternatively, consider the single anarchist who attempts to directly realize justice via her actions. Presumably, she will also attempt to preclude unauthorized acts of violence – at least, when doing so seems feasible and reasonably prudent. For example, she will intervene to break up fights or threaten people to deter them from violating the rights of others. Further, there is no obvious limit to her ambitions: If she could prevent all rights-violating coercion and violence, she would. The only reason she does not attempt to intervene is because she knows that she will either not succeed or incur great costs for doing so. However, this makes her efforts of a kind with those of the hypothetical state discussed in the previous paragraph, as it, too, presumably tolerates a certain degree of unauthorized violence simply because it lacks the ability to prevent that violence from occurring. While there is a difference in the degree to which these two entities are able to regulate others' use of violence, they are both still states as far as the eighth analysis of statehood is concerned. And, because their respective efforts are seemingly just, these cases entail that the proposed analysis fails to satisfy the grounding *desideratum*.

Does the mere act of authorization render the state posited two paragraphs prior unjust (despite the fact that it authorizes all and only morally permissible acts)? Wendt argues that it does, as he contends that imposing "an authorization process on others is a violation of their moral immunity protecting their moral power to enforce their rights" (2015, 325). However, there are a few problems with this suggestion. First, it seems to problematically imply that individual anarchists act unjustly when they allow some acts of violence while trying to prevent others.

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The only way to avoid this implication is to contend that a state's authorization process goes beyond that of the individual in a way that is morally significant. But what is the morally salient difference? The political anarchist cannot claim that, unlike individual anarchists, the state changes the moral status of actions when it authorizes or refuses to authorize them, as this would presuppose that states are legitimate – a premise that she rejects. In her view, state authorization can be no more than the declaration of an intention to prevent certain acts of violence. Given that such a declaration might be equally issued by any street gang or individual anarchist, it is unclear on what basis she might maintain that the individual anarchist's authorization process is just while the morally impeccable state's authorization process is not.

Second, even if one sets aside this problem, Wendt's proposal seems to be making a pair of category mistakes. He contends that state authorization – or, really, the state's refusal to authorize – violates a moral immunity protecting the power to enforce one's rights. However, first, people have *permissions* to enforce their rights, not powers. Powers give people the ability to alter what Hohfeldian incidents they or others possess while enforcement is a physical activity that is either permitted or not. Second, while rights might be violated, immunities cannot be. Assuming that one working within the Hohfeldian analytical system, an immunity is the correlative incident of the absence of a power. In other words, to say that a person is immune from the loss of her permission to enforce her rights is just to say that no other person has a power to negate her permission (i.e., oblige her to not enforce her rights). Thus, when the state refuses to authorize some person's act of enforcement, the immunity implies that this refusal does not strip her of her permission to enforce. But no violation occurs that would ground the proposition that the state has acted unjustly.

Of course, if some group like the United States Federal Government goes out and actually prevents people from enforcing their rights, it will violate their claims against interference and thereby act unjustly. One, might, thus, suggest that *this* is the necessary and sufficient condition of statehood, as such an analysis will ensure that the grounding *desideratum* is satisfied. However, this ninth proposed analysis of statehood also runs into problems. First, if statehood is defined in terms of unjust actions such as violating claims against interference, then it follows that a group could cease to be a state simply by refraining from carrying out such actions – a result that will likely run contrary to the intuitions of most political anarchists, who may not want to concede that the United States Federal Government would no longer be a state if it refrained from violating

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persons' claims against interference. More significantly, this result trivializes political anarchism: If the only difference between a state and its counterfactual non-state counterpart is that the former carries out some unjust action(s) that the latter does not, then clearly justice requires that the latter entity be realized rather than the former. If this is all that political anarchism demands, then there would be no disagreement between the position and the one advanced by this book (as well as by other philosophical anarchists who are typically taken to reject political anarchism).

Additionally, this analysis of statehood would counterintuitively imply a proliferation of states, as private individuals will often try to prevent others from enforcing their rights. Further, there is no apparent basis for insisting that an agent is a state if and only if she violates one kind of right – namely, a person's claim against interference when enforcing her own rights – while also holding that she is not a state if she violates other kinds of rights. Thus, a consistent political anarchist would seemingly have to maintain that states are abolished if and only if no one violates others' rights. However, this contention would both further proliferate the number of states and also further trivialize political anarchism.

Perhaps the idea of the state having a monopoly on violence can be salvaged by appealing to another popular account of statehood put forward by exponents of anarchism (e.g., David Miller (1984, 5–8) and Michael Huemer (2013, 232–3)). In this view, the defining feature of a state is its nonvoluntary character and the absence of choice when it comes to state affiliation. For example, an analysis focusing on the absence of choice would posit that some group is a state if and only if (a) there are other people who receive services from the group conditional on deferring to its regulations and (b) there is an insufficient number of alternative groups that those persons could choose to receive services from instead. Such an account would help support the anarcho-capitalist's claim that she is endorsing the abolition of the state when she proposes that the police and military should be replaced with competing private security firms that people hire in an open market. Additionally, it might appeal to social anarchists who envision security and welfare provision being administered by small, decentralized, and voluntarist private societies. However, this tenth proposed analysis would also seemingly violate the actuality *desideratum*, as the fact that there are multiple existing governed regions that allow immigration entails that persons are able to choose to receive security (and welfare) services from a variety of groups.

Granted, the conditions that persons must meet to change security services in the status quo are a bit more onerous than what anarcho-capitalists

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envisage when they propose their security markets. For example, for a Canadian to receive (indefinite) protection from the United States Federal Government, she must move locations, go through a difficult bureaucratic process, and be subjected to a novel regulatory regime. However, it is not clear that these barriers are different in kind from what she might encounter in a private security market. It seems entirely likely that the anarcho-capitalist's private security firms would limit the areas in which they operate such that a person must move to a particular location if she wishes to be protected. Similarly, one might expect that these firms would run background checks on prospective clients and require them to go through an onboarding process that is not substantially dissimilar from that which the United Sates Federal Government imposes on people who apply for American citizenship. And such firms would similarly make regulatory compliance a condition of service provision. (They will protect some person only if she refrains from theft, does not start fights with others, refrains from the use of amphetamines, etc.) Thus, there is not an obvious basis for maintaining that the status quo does not offer people genuine choice of security provider of the kind provided by private security markets. This, in turn, makes it difficult for the political anarchist to contend that the actuality *desideratum* is satisfied by the tenth proposed analysis of statehood.

In response to this worry, Huemer argues that competition between security firms would keep the costs of choosing a different security firm low – much lower than choosing a different state via emigration (2013, 232–3). Thus, he might maintain that a group is a state if and only if it provides persons with security *and* the cost of their receiving services from a rival provider exceeds some threshold. This eleventh analysis would then satisfy the actuality *desideratum* if and only if the posited cost threshold is set to be lower than the current costs of emigration (but higher than the costs of switching security providers in a free security market, as this is needed to prevent Huemer's security firms from qualifying as states). However, the analysis would not seemingly satisfy the grounding *desideratum*, as the difference in cost between emigrating and switching security firms does not appear to ground a difference in justice between the current system of security provision and its replacement with a private security market. The difference in cost might ground a difference in justice if the cost of emigrating were prohibitively high such that persons did not have a genuine exit option. In this case, there would be a difference in kind between the cost of emigrating and the cost of switching firms, where such a difference could explain why the current system of security provision is

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unjust in a way that a security market is not. But if the difference in cost is merely a matter of degree – as appears to be the case – then it does not seem that one can posit a nonarbitrary threshold such that security provision arrangements with exit costs above the threshold are unjust while those with exit costs below the threshold are just. This, in turn, implies that the posited analysis of statehood would not satisfy the grounding *desideratum*, as a state dropping below the threshold would cease to be a state without any concomitant improvement vis-à-vis justice.

In response to this objection, Huemer might reply there is a unique injustice that arises when some group artificially drives up exit costs by preventing competition in a way that violates the rights of competitors. Such a proposal would seemingly articulate the difference between the current state system and the private security market, as the former is characterized by groups like the United States Federal Government violently preventing certain varieties of security provision. However, Huemer would not need to appeal to increased exit costs to establish that the group in question is unjust; rather, he would merely need to cite the fact that it violates the rights of its competitors when it suppresses competition. But this reveals that this posited reply trivializes political anarchism as it has been previously described: If a state is just a group that acts unjustly, then justice trivially demands the abolition of the state, thereby rendering political anarchism an uninteresting thesis.

Given these difficulties, a final posited analysis of statehood might suggest that it is not the absence of choice *between* security providers that renders them states. Rather, it is the absence of a choice about whether to affiliate with a security provider *at all* that makes those security providers states; that is, it is the nonvoluntary character of state regulation and security provision that is the defining feature of statehood. Stated explicitly, this twelfth analysis of statehood holds that some group is a state if and only if it either provides others with benefits or regulates their behavior without their consent. However, this analysis also fails to satisfy the grounding *desideratum*. Consider, again, the individual anarchist who acts in a morally impeccable fashion. Sometimes she will provide people with benefits even when those benefits are not requested (e.g., when those benefits are necessary and sufficient for ensuring that the recipient acquires her just share of advantage). Similarly, the anarchist will sometimes coercively regulate others' behavior without their consent, for example, by preventing them from violating others' rights. Thus, the proposed analysis of statehood entails that such anarchists are states despite the fact

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that they act in a just fashion. This result implies that the grounding *desideratum* is not satisfied by the proposed analysis.

It is not possible to provide an exhaustive list of potential analyses of statehood. However, this section has attempted to present the most plausible analyses that the political anarchist might incorporate into her position. And, in each case, it has argued that the proposed analysis fails to satisfy one of the political anarchist's crucial *desiderata*. Thus, there does not appear to be a plausible, nontrivial version of political anarchism – and, for this reason, the proposed social anarchist position rejects political anarchism in favor of a more modest philosophical anarchism.[9] Granted, there may be some overlooked analysis that satisfies both the grounding and actuality *desiderata*, in which case political anarchism might be shown to be a viable position. However, Section 7.3 will argue that there is a general reason for thinking that no such analysis can be provided.

7.3 A State-Tolerant Anarchism

The similarity of many of the previous objections to proposed analyses of statehood suggests that there is a more general problem with political anarchism. Specifically, it appears that political anarchists face a general dilemma that precludes them from providing a satisfactory analysis of statehood. Note that, when analyzing statehood, one must hold that the defining feature of a state is either (a) some action that the state carries out (e.g., preventing private rights enforcement) or (b) some structural

[9] Wendt (private communication, 2022) wonders whether the difficulties of analyzing statehood also create problems for the philosophical anarchist position defended here. After all, philosophical anarchism is typically characterized as the position that there are no existing legitimate states. But how can one assess this claim if no satisfactory analysis of statehood can be provided? In response to this question, it should be noted, first, that the foregoing argument merely maintains that there is no analysis of statehood *that is compatible with the political anarchist's own prior commitments*. Thus, one cannot infer that there is no analysis of statehood suitable for the philosophical anarchist's purposes. More directly, the philosophical anarchist can contend that her thesis does not have to be stated in terms of there being no existing legitimate states. Rather, she merely contends that the entities that *we pre-theoretically think of as* states are illegitimate. Note that the position defended here grounds the philosophical anarchist thesis in the consent theory of legitimacy: If consent theory is correct, then the United States Federal Government and other such entities are illegitimate because they have not obtained the consent of those whom they claim to govern. However, note that this conclusion does not presuppose that these entities have anything in common, and the premise that the United States Federal Government is a state does not play any role in the proposed argument. Given this proposed argumentative structure, no analysis of statehood needs to be provided to support the proposed philosophical anarchist conclusion. By contrast, political anarchists are committed to the view that the United States Federal Government is unjust *in virtue of the fact that it is a state*. Thus, it seems that they *do* have to provide an account of statehood to support this contention – and, more specifically, an account that satisfies both the grounding and actuality *desiderata* introduced earlier.

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property that does not entail that the state carries out any set of actions. If one opts for the latter variety of analysis, then one is faced with the problem of the possible state that meets the sufficient condition in question while acting in a morally impeccable fashion. The possibility of such a state – and there should always be such a possibility given that the sufficient condition of statehood implies nothing about the candidate for statehood's actions – entails that the grounding *desideratum* goes unsatisfied, as there is seemingly nothing unjust about the state that acts impeccably. That means that the political anarchist must adopt an analysis that declares some group a state if and only if it acts in some unjust way. But such an analysis will trivialize political anarchism for the reasons discussed previously. Thus, political anarchism ends up being either implausible or trivial.

Given this dilemma, the suggestion here is that political anarchists should abandon their view in favor of a position that tolerates groups like the United States Federal Government conditional on their acting justly. When these groups discharge their duties, there is no reason for an anarchist to resist their activities. By contrast, when these groups violate others' rights, then the anarchist does have reason to resist the rights-violating activities in question. In this way, the proposed social anarchist position puts states on a moral par with private individuals: In both cases, one is concerned strictly with the deontic status of the agent's actions rather than some other property possessed by the agent. Further, this approach seems to follow from the denial of state legitimacy (which political anarchists endorse). Once one rejects that states have any special moral status, one should treat them as one would any individual or group agent. Given that anarchists typically respond to bad behavior by individuals and groups by positing that others have permissions and obligations to resist the unjust actions – as opposed to insisting that the rights-violating individuals or groups should be *abolished* – it seems that anarchists should adopt a similar attitude toward states.

That said, there is a contingent, empirical argument for political anarchism that is compatible with the posited social anarchist position and the arguments advanced previously. This argument begins with the plausible starting premises that (1) persons sometimes have obligations to prevent other agents from violating rights and (2) if one is obliged to ϕ and ψ-ing is a necessary condition of ϕ-ing, then one is obliged to ψ.[10] The argument

[10] Some libertarians and anarchists might reject (1) because they might insist that persons have only negative duties to refrain from actions without any positive duties to act in particular ways. The argument of the book has tried to remain neutral on the question of whether persons have positive duties, so it should be noted that the proposed argument for political anarchism does presuppose

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would then propose that (3) there are certain properties of individuals or groups that are both (a) a necessary and sufficient condition of statehood and (b) a necessary and sufficient condition of some rights violation of the kind that all persons are obliged to prevent. Together, these three premises entail that persons have an obligation to prevent states from existing because they are obliged to negate the necessary conditions of statehood (as negating the necessary conditions of statehood is, itself, a necessary condition of preventing rights violations, which is obligatory).[11] For example, suppose that some group is a state if and only if it has a certain amount of power to realize its desired states of affairs. Further, suppose that simply having this degree of power will, as a matter of contingent empirical fact, lead any given group to violate the rights of others. In this case, other agents would be obliged to preclude any group from acquiring or possessing the quantity of power in question – that is, to abolish any existing state.

This argument is valid and may turn out to be sound. However, its soundness will depend upon whether empirical Proposition (3) is true, where the truth of this proposition seems quite difficult to establish. Thus, the political anarchist faces a demanding burden of proof that cannot be obviously met, even if the posited argument cannot be rejected *a priori*. If it were to be met, however, then one might amend the posited social anarchist position to include a political anarchist thesis in addition to its philosophical anarchist component.

7.4 In Defense of Philosophical Anarchism

Before concluding, this section will briefly address Wendt's (2020) recent argument against philosophical anarchism, as it seems to threaten the posited endorsement of the position presented just prior. Specifically, Wendt suggests that the position is unstable and ultimately collapses into either political anarchism or a form of statism. Given that the social anarchist position advanced by the book includes a philosophical anarchist

the existence of such duties. That said, the political anarchist might avoid this commitment by restating the argument strictly in terms of the negative duties possessed by the state and/or the agents who compose it. Specifically, she would posit that these agents have negative obligations to refrain from carrying out actions that are a sufficient condition of the properties that are themselves a sufficient condition of both statehood and future rights violations.

[11] One might, alternatively, construct a probabilistic version of this argument, where this variant would contend that individuals are obliged to eliminate social structures that make rights violations *more likely* (with states being instances of such social structures).

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component – and that this chapter has been a critique of political anarchism – it is worth discussing and replying to Wendt's argument.

Wendt takes philosophical anarchists to be committed to three propositions. First, philosophical anarchists deny that the state has political authority, where Wendt stipulates that political authority entails both the power to impose obligations on others and permissions to coercively enforce laws (2020, 528). Second, because philosophical anarchists deny that states possess political authority, they also deny that the state has *legitimacy*, where Wendt defines this notion as referring to "the moral rights that allow the institution to function as the institution that it is" where "these moral rights are the rights that constitute political authority" (529). This definition is a bit odd because it seems to identify political authority and legitimacy, thereby rendering the second philosophical anarchist thesis trivial. For this reason, it seems better to revise Wendt's definition of "legitimacy" such that the referent of the term is limited to the permission to enact and enforce certain kinds of laws.[12] Additionally, to avoid trivializing the second proposition, it seems better to redefine "political authority" such that it merely refers to the power to oblige, as opposed to the conjunction of the power to oblige and the permission to coercively enforce laws, which is to say, the power to oblige and legitimacy (otherwise, states would, as a matter of mere definition, lack legitimacy in virtue of lacking political authority). Thus, the first thesis would merely assert that states lack the power to oblige while the second would assert that, in virtue of this lack of authority, states also lack a permission to enforce certain kinds of laws – that is, they have a duty to not enforce certain kinds of laws. Finally, philosophical anarchists hold that states can be either justified or act justly, where the former notion entails that persons have content-dependent reasons to comply with laws or otherwise support states (e.g., because noncompliance would bring about a morally bad state of affairs) and the latter notion entails that states act permissibly when they enforce certain laws due to the content of those laws (e.g., laws against murder) (529).

[12] To avoid confusion, it is important to note that Wendt is switching the referents of "legitimacy" and "political authority" relative to how the terms are defined by the book. Prior to this section, "political authority" has been used to refer to the permission to coercively enforce laws while "legitimacy" has been used to refer to the power to oblige via the issuing of edicts. By contrast, Wendt uses the term "legitimacy" to refer to political authority and uses "political authority" to refer to the conjunction of legitimacy and political authority. To avoid misrepresenting Wendt's argument, this section will adopt his definitions for the terms in question, but one should keep in mind that any subsequent appearances of the terms "legitimacy" and "political authority" correspond to different referents than the appearances of these terms in previous sections.

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Wendt's argument against this position proceeds in two stages. First, he argues that the second and third theses are incompatible as a matter of definition: It cannot be the case that a state both lacks a permission to enforce certain kind of laws (i.e., it is not legitimate) while also being justified in enforcing those laws, as "having a [permission] not to do something simply means not having a duty not to do it" (533). In other words, because the illegitimate state *lacks* a permission to enforce the law, it has a correlative duty to *not* enforce the law, where this duty is incompatible with the philosophical anarchist's thesis that states are justified in enforcing the law.[13]

This incompatibility generates a dilemma for the philosophical anarchist. On the one hand, she can give up her contention that the state is justified in enforcing certain kinds of laws; however, to make such a concession is to abandon philosophical anarchism in favor of political anarchism, as one seemingly has reason to abolish the state if it is not justified in carrying out any of its law enforcement operations (535). On the other hand, the philosophical anarchist might insist that law enforcement is justified, but this would then force her to concede that the state is legitimate, which Wendt takes to be a form of statism rather than philosophical anarchism (532). Granted, the philosophical anarchist could avoid this conclusion if she revised her notion of legitimacy such that it did not refer merely to the permission to enforce the law but, rather, some other moral virtue, where this virtue (a) is not entailed by the permission to enforce laws and (b) is negated by the absence of political authority (536). However, this position is plausible only if some reason can be given for thinking that the state's lack of political authority is problematic enough to undermine the state's legitimacy (in this revised sense) but not so problematic as to render its enforcement actions unjustified (536). Given the apparent absence of such a reason, Wendt concludes that philosophical anarchism collapses into either political anarchism or statism.

There are two objections that can be made to this argument. First, one might contest Wendt's claim that a state cannot be both justified in carrying out enforcement actions and lack legitimacy, that is, a permission to enforce its laws. Wendt seemingly takes this to be a self-evident conceptual truth – one that follows from the similarly self-evident proposition that an action being justified implies a permission to carry out that

[13] Note that this sentence is simply negating both sides of the identity claim quoted in the previous sentence, as this transformation helps to clarify the logical relationship between the quoted claim and this section's exposition of Wendt's argument.

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action (534). However, this entailment does not hold if one takes rights and duties to be merely *pro tanto* moral considerations such that a duty to ϕ does not imply that one ought to ϕ, all things considered. For example, one might think that even if P has a property claim against Q breaking into P's cabin, Q may still break in if doing so is the only way for her to avoid freezing to death.[14] In this case, Q's need does not negate her duty to remain outside, as evidenced by the fact that she would owe certain remedial duties to P in virtue of her action (e.g., a duty to compensate P for any damage or to at least apologize for using the cabin without permission). The persistence of this duty, in turn, implies that Q lacks a permission to break into the cabin, as one has a permission to ϕ if and only if one does not have a duty not to ϕ. Yet Q is, nonetheless, justified in breaking into the cabin (where a person is more generally justified in ϕ-ing if and only if it is not the case that she ought not ϕ).

Given this plausible view of the relationship between duties/permissions and justification, Wendt is wrong to assert that a justified action is one that a person has a permission to do (i.e., no duty not to do). This, in turn, implies that a state might lack legitimacy vis-à-vis some act of enforcement but also be justified in carrying out that act of enforcement. Thus, contra Wendt, one might maintain that there is no contradiction between the philosophical anarchist's second and third commitments, that is, the denial that the state is legitimate and the insistence that it might be justified in enforcing certain laws.

Alternatively, the philosophical anarchist might argue that Wendt's objection to philosophical anarchism is primarily verbal rather than substantive. To advance this argument, the philosophical anarchist would simply concede that the state is legitimate in the sense that it has a permission to enforce some of its laws. She would then contend that the core philosophical anarchist claim is that the state lacks political authority but sometimes has Hohfeldian permissions to enforce its laws; that is, it is legitimate but lacks political authority. Given that the denial that states possess political authority is compatible with those states also being legitimate, the posited position sidesteps Wendt's argument, thereby avoiding any collapse into political anarchism.

Wendt anticipates this argument, and his preemptive reply is that the concession that states are legitimate is an abandonment of philosophical

[14] This case is borrowed from Joel Feinberg (1978, 102). Feinberg also endorses the proposed account of the relationship between duties/permissions and what one ought to do, all things considered. For another explication and defense of this account of duties, see Thomson (1990).

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anarchism in favor of statism (542). Here one might object that this reply still makes the dispute sound merely verbal, as nothing of philosophical significance hangs on whether one labels the position in question "philosophical anarchism" or "statism." However, Wendt argues that the disagreement is substantive, not verbal, as those who endorse the proposed position (i.e., that states are legitimate but lack political authority) "do not see themselves as anarchists. And they have good reason not to. A position that deserves the name 'anarchist' should deny that states are legitimate, and the position under consideration does not do this. As Simmons says, 'one central claim unites all form [sic] of anarchist political philosophy: all existing states are illegitimate. I take this thesis to be an essential, if not defining, element of anarchism'" (543).[15]

This reply is unconvincing for a few reasons. First, it seems to be no less of a verbal move than any of those it is supposed to support. So far, this section has granted that a state is appropriately labeled "legitimate" if and only if it has a permission to enforce some subset of its laws, with the term "political authority" being used to refer to a state's power to oblige. However, as noted in Footnote 12, this is an inversion of how these terms have been used by both this book and many other philosophers. Given that different philosophers assign different referents to the term "legitimacy," it is not clear that the denial of state legitimacy-as-Wendt-defines-it is the essential characteristic of an anarchist view as opposed to the denial of legitimacy-as-it-is-defined-earlier-in-this-book (i.e., the power to oblige). Indeed, when Simmons claims that the denial of state legitimacy is the defining feature of anarchism, he is using the latter sense of the term rather than Wendt's (1996, 106) – a point that Wendt, himself, recognizes (2020, 541). Thus, Wendt's appeal to Simmons' authority seemingly *undermines* his contention that the book's posited view would not qualify as a variety of anarchism.

Further, even if Simmons were referring to the permission to enforce rather than the power to oblige, it is not clear that one must accept his view as the correct one. As noted in Section I.1, it is difficult to answer the question of which philosophical positions deserve the "anarchist" label, and neither Simmons nor Wendt provide reasons for accepting their proposal that such positions must include the denial of state legitimacy (irrespective of what "legitimacy" refers to). Absent such reasons, one might assess this proposal by applying Section I.1's posited criterion of

[15] The "sic" indicates a slight mistranscription of Simmons' text by Wendt rather than an error in Simmons' original text being noted by Wendt.

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what counts as an anarchist view: The anarchist position is that which the bulk of self-identified anarchists would accept given adequate philosophical reflection. Of course, as was noted there, it is difficult to determine whether a given position meets this criterion a priori. However, it was suggested that anarchists' post-reflection uptake of some position is a function the extent to which the position is independently plausible and the extent to which it coheres with their prior beliefs. Thus, to convincingly show that the posited philosophical anarchist position is not a genuine form of anarchism, Wendt would need to show that a position that assigns states a permission to enforce certain laws is either (a) less plausible than a rival view that does not assign such a permission or (b) is less coherent with other anarchist commitments.

It does not seem that Wendt would be able to demonstrate (a). Doing so would require showing that states lack a permission to enforce all and only those laws that any private individual would be permitted to enforce (e.g., a law against violent aggression). But this seems implausible. Why would a police officer lack a permission to stop an assault when a person standing next to the police officer possesses such a permission? Perhaps the answer to this question is that the state and its officers uniquely lack this permission due to the fact that the state should not exist at all. This answer would also support Proposition (b), as the political anarchist commitments of self-identified anarchists would then be incompatible with the state having a permission to enforce certain laws. However, first, even if the state should not exist, it is not clear that this negates its permissions to carry out many acts of law enforcement. Consider, as an analogy, the case of a trespasser who witnesses an assault occurring within the bounds of the private property she is invading. Presumably, she would be permitted to stop the assault even though it is also true that she should not even be positioned to stop the assault in the first place. This result suggests that an agent's permission to enforce certain rights can persist despite her failure to discharge other duties. Thus, more argument would be needed to show that the state's duty to dissolve itself negates the permission of its agents to enforce certain laws. Second, the discussion of the previous section has aimed to show that the political anarchist insistence on abolishing the state is misguided. If that conclusion is correct, then any (purported) incompatibility with political anarchism does nothing to diminish the plausibility of the posited position. Further, the incompatibility would not preclude anarchists from endorsing the position after adequate philosophical reflection, as such reflection would lead them to abandon any prior political anarchist commitments.

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For these reasons, one should reject Wendt's claim that the proposed view is not an anarchist one.[16]

In sum, there is nothing inconsistent about the book's allowance that, although states lack the power to oblige, its agents sometimes act permissibly when they enforce their laws. Indeed, Wendt does not dispute this basic point. Rather, his only argument against such a position is that it is a form of statism rather than anarchism. However, he does not provide an account of which positions are anarchist in character, and the account proposed in Section 1.1 does not appear to vindicate his contention. Thus, there is no apparent problem with the social anarchist position's rejection of political anarchism in favor of philosophical anarchism.

7.5 Conclusion

So concludes the book's exposition and defense of social anarchism. The posited position is an unorthodox articulation of social anarchism *qua* political philosophy. However, this unorthodoxy allows it to attain various theoretical virtues such as a high degree of coherence and independent plausibility. The book has not attempted to compare social anarchism's advantages and drawbacks with those of rival views such as utilitarianism, Rawlsian liberalism, or other varieties of liberal egalitarianism. Instead, it has focused on putting dialectical pressure on libertarians, arguing that their position ultimately collapses into social anarchism. That said, its efforts to defend the independent (i.e., non-comparative) plausibility of the position – for example, by showing that it follows from a plausible meta-principle and does not generate unacceptable implications – have hopefully sufficed to show that social anarchism deserves a seat at the table alongside the more reputable political philosophies that have garnered the bulk of philosophers' attention.

[16] Wendt (private communication, 2022) pushes back on this argument by noting that the declaration that a state is *illegitimate* connotes that there is something morally problematic about the state that demands remedy. Thus, he suggests that an adequate account of legitimacy should entail that an illegitimate state is morally defective in a way that extends beyond it merely lacking the power to oblige. However, this point can be accommodated by appealing to the fact that existing states tend to *act* as though they do have the power to oblige, where the conjunction of this behavior and the fact that they lack said power is morally problematic. Given that states act in this way, pointing out that they lack legitimacy is a serious moral accusation, with the proposed account thereby satisfying Wendt's constraint on what counts as an adequate definition of "legitimacy."

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